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Interpreting imperatives. By MAGDALENA KAUFMANN. (Studies in linguistics and philosophy.) Dordrecht: Springer, 2012. Pp. 280. ISBN 9789400722682. $139 (Hb).

Reviewed by CHUNG-HYE HAN, *Simon Fraser University*

Magdalena Kaufmann starts this book by identifying three problems regarding the meaning of imperatives. First, clause types are pairs of form types and function types, and for imperative-sentence form types, ORDER is the prototypical function. Second, the imperatives of a given language are generally associated with a range of speech act types, including COMMAND, WARNING, PROHIBITION, WISH, REQUEST, ADVICE, and PERMISSION. And in many languages, they can also function on a sub-speech-act level, having a similar function to the antecedent of conditionals. Third, imperatives in many languages are associated with functions that are tied to universal quantification (COMMAND, ORDER, REQUEST, WISH) as well as functions that are tied to existential quantification (PERMISSION, CONCESSION). The goal of the book is to present a proposal for the semantics of the imperative clause type that can account for these three problems.

In Chs. 2 and 3, K argues that imperatives express propositions and therefore have truth values, 'but come with an additional presuppositional meaning component that makes them unfit for assertive use and shield the truth value from being conversationally accessible' (57). K makes a plausible connection between imperatives such as *Close the door!* and performative modal declaratives such as *You must/should close the door!*, and proposes that semantically, the two are equivalent. As supporting evidence that imperatives are not that different from declaratives, K notes that imperatives answer questions (Q: *Should I go to the reception?* A: *Don't go!*), just as declaratives do (Q: *Is it raining?* A: *Yes, it is raining.*); just as one can lie with a declarative, one can make the addressee believe something that is known to the speaker to be incorrect with an imperative (saying *To go to Harlem, take the B train!* when the speaker knows that going to Harlem requires taking the A train); and just as a declarative can be turned into a question, an imperative can be turned into a question in some languages (in German, a rhetorical WH-question such as *Where is it that you should put the flower pot?* can be formed with an imperative verb). As far as I can tell, these are novel observations about the connection between imperatives and declaratives and provide strong support for the position that the semantic type of imperatives is propositional rather than property-like (cf. Portner 2007). Adopting Kratzer's (1981) approach to the semantics of modality, K proposes that imperatives contain a necessity modal operator with two conversational background arguments—a modal base f and an ordering source g—and a temporal argument that defines the interval at which the event/state expressed by the imperative is required to hold. An imperative $\phi!$ is thus interpreted as a function that maps a world w to the truth value 1 if ϕ is true in all worlds returned by f and g in the defined interval.

What f and g of the imperative modal operator look like is discussed in Ch. 4. For typical imperatives that express orders, commands, and requests, K proposes that f is what the speaker and hearer jointly take to be possible future courses of events, the common ground, and g is what the speaker orders. An imperative such as *Get up!* means 'According to what I order you to do, it is necessary that you get up now'. For imperatives expressing wishes such as *Enjoy the film*, g is

proposed to be what the speaker wants with *f* as the common ground. The presuppositional meaning component of imperatives is also discussed in this chapter. K proposes that this component consists of three presuppositions, which are termed as epistemic authority, ordering source restriction, and epistemic uncertainty. According to the epistemic authority constraint, imperatives must combine with conversational backgrounds on which the speaker has epistemic authority. By definition, a speaker has epistemic authority on the common ground, *f*, and also on what she orders or what she wants. The epistemic uncertainty constraint requires that the speaker believe that the content of the imperative is possible but not necessary. If the speaker is sure that ϕ will happen or will not happen, then issuing an imperative ϕ! is infelicitous (#*I know you won't go to confession. So go to confession!*). The ordering source restriction requires that if there is a salient decision problem in the context to which the imperative provides an answer, *g* is a prioritizing ordering source, and if there is not a salient decision problem, then *g* is a bouletic ordering source. So with a prioritizing ordering source, imperatives express orders, commands, or requests, and with a bouletic ordering source, imperatives express wishes. With these presuppositions, K derives the intuition that ORDER is a prototypical function of imperatives, because in any unmarked context, all presuppositions are met for the ordering source *what the speaker orders*. Furthermore, as these presuppositions can be met by many other conversational backgrounds, imperatives can be associated with other speech act types related to ORDER, REQUEST, and WISH, for example. It also follows from the epistemic authority requirement that uttering an imperative is self-verifying, and as such, it is always a performative.

In Ch. 5, K discusses imperatives that seem to have possibility meaning: those that express permission such as *Take an apple!*, and those that give advice such as *For example, don't buy cigarettes!* as an answer to *How could I save money?*. K argues that *g* of permission imperatives is what the addressee wants, and the permission reading comes about pragmatically because updating the context with a necessity proposition conveys the information that the prejacent of the imperative is compatible with what is required by the speaker. In order to account for the *for example*-advice imperatives, however, K considers decomposing the necessity modality operator of the imperative into a possibility operator and a covert exhaustifier. Exhaustified possibility is equivalent to a necessity operator, but if there is an anti-exhaustifier, such as *for example*, the exhaustification of the possibility operator is blocked, and the possibility meaning for the imperative survives. Though this accounts for the data, questions arise as to whether all necessity modals should be decomposed this way or just the ones in imperatives, and whether there is a lexical correlate for the postulated covert exhaustifier.

Ch. 6 discusses imperatives in embedded contexts. Applying tests such as referential properties of deictic elements and extractability of WH-phrases, K concludes that there is a range in the degree to which imperatives are embeddable across languages. Malagasy does not allow embedded imperatives; Ancient Greek and Middle High German allow them only in limited contexts as idiomatic or fossilized expressions; many Old Germanic languages such as Old Icelandic, Old Swedish, Old Saxon, and Old High German and Modern High German allow them as indirect speech with a requirement that the reference to the speaker and the addressee match between the matrix and the reported utterance context; and Japanese allows them as indirect speech with no such restrictions. In deriving this conclusion, K is careful to tease apart quoted speech and indirect speech, and establishes that there is no universal restriction against the embedding of imperatives. In the same chapter, K also discusses imperative-and-declarative (IaD) and imperative-or-declarative (IoD) constructions that appear to have conditional meaning. As for IaDs, K makes a distinction between Type I IaDs (*Mow the lawn, please, and I'll give you 59 euros.*) and Type II IaDs (*Be late and you'll lose your job!*), and argues that while Type I IaDs should be treated as speech act conjunction with modal subordination, Type II IaDs are truly conditional. Adopting Kratzer's (1991) treatment of conditionals as modal sentences, K proposes that in interpreting Type II IaDs, the necessary modal operator comes from the imperative, with a modal base that is restricted by the prejacent of the imperative and a stereotypical ordering source. Applying the meaning of the imperative conjunct to the meaning of the declarative conjunct results in the desired conditional meaning. Though questions remain as to what happens to the presuppositional

component of the imperative meaning and why the ordering source here is stereotypical, and not the usual prioritizing one, the proposed analysis is a well-thought-out application of the semantics of imperatives spelled out in Ch. 4. The book concludes with a brief discussion of IoD constructions such as *Don't be late or you'll miss the first slot*. Using Geurts's (2005) nonclassical treatment of disjunction, K proposes a semantic analysis of IoDs that achieves the effect that the first disjunct is used as a plain imperative and the second disjunct specifies what happens in case the imperative is not complied with.

This book has a commendable empirical coverage, comprising data from many languages ranging from Germanic to East Asian and discussions pertaining to issues ranging from the syntax to the semantics/pragmatics of imperatives. K's review and critique of previous work on the semantics of imperatives is extensive and thorough, and her exposition throughout on both formal definitions and intuitions behind them is clear and accessible. This book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of how we should approach the meaning of imperatives as well as how clause types in general should be handled in the semantics-pragmatics interface. I would recommend it to anyone who is interested in the topic.

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Grammatical categories: Variation in Romance languages. By M. RITA MANZINI and LEONARDO M. SAVOIA. (Cambridge studies in linguistics 128.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. 364. ISBN 9780521765190. $105 (Hb).

<div align="right">Reviewed by KNUT TARALD TARALDSEN, *University of Tromsø*</div>

This new book by M. Rita Manzini and Leonardo M. Savoia presents a coherent picture of the authors' views on foundational questions concerning the morphosyntax of natural language. M&S's theoretical approach is best described by quoting one of the last few sentences of the book: 'Indeed, a key property in terms of which our approach differs from the others reviewed is its uncompromisingly lexicalist stance, whereby structures are projected from actual lexical terminals' (311). By this, they mean to contrast their theory with various approaches in which structures are built up from abstract functional heads with universally fixed content and possibly occurring in an invariant order across languages, as in the cartographic tradition emanating from Cinque 1999. Their book offers a large-scale reinterpretation of the conventional functional categories like complementizers, negation, auxiliaries, and case, based on a comparative study of Romance (largely Italo-Romance) and Albanian varieties. The general drift of the argumentation is that each of these functional heads is better understood as belonging to one or another of the lexical categories N, V, Q, and D. Variation is determined by the intrinsic lexical content of the items that lexicalize these categories. That is, crosslinguistic variation is reduced to differences in the lexicon. Another interesting aspect of their analysis is that the syntactic categories they postulate also occur inside units that are traditionally regarded as morphological words. The empirical ma-