Conversational Implicature: Extensions

Source: Levinson 1983
Felicity Conditions

• Maxim of Quality can be extended to incorporate all felicity conditions
  – John has two PhDs
    • \( +> \) I believe he has, and have adequate evidence that he has.
  – Does your farm contain 400 acres?
    • \( +> \) I don’t know that it does, and I want to know if it does.
Manner 4: Be orderly

• Alfred went to the store and bought some whisky
  – -> He first went to the store and then bought some whisky.
  – Following Manner 4.
• ?? The lone ranger rode into the sunset and jumped on his horse.
• “These generalized implicatures often arise wherever features of the context do not actually block them with the result that they can be easily confused with the permanent aspects of the semantics of the expressions involved.” (Levinson, p. 108)
Other Properties of Conversational Implicature

• Reinforcibility (Sadock)
  – Some of the boys went to the soccer match, but not all.
  – ?Some of the boys went to the soccer match but not none.

• Universality
  – That man has two children.
    • +> That man has no more than three children
  – The cloth is white
    • +> The cloth is entirely white.
• Suspendsability
  – “It should be possible to find cases where a generalized conversational implicature is implicitly cancelled simply by virtue of a non-cooperative conversation.”
  • C: On many occasions?
    W: Not many.
    C: Some?
    W: Yes, a few.
Conventional Implicatures

• Discourse-deictic items.
  – However, moreover, besides, anyway, well, still, furthermore, although, oh, so

• Socially-deictic items
  – Sir, madam, mate, your honour, sonny, hey, oi
    • Tu es le professeur.
    Vous êtes le professeur.

• Properties:
  • ??The Duke of Norfolk has three mansions, but only one car, and there is in fact no contrast between these two facts.
    – Non-cancelable
    – Detachable
    – Non-calculable
GCI: Scalar Implicatures

• Horn 1972
• \(<e_1, e_2, e_3, \ldots e_n>\>
• A linguistic scale consists of a set of linguistic alternates, or contrastive expressions of the same grammatical category, which can be arranged in a linear order by degree of informativeness or semantic strength, where if we substitute \(e_1\), or \(e_2\) etc. in a sentential frame \(A\) we obtain the well-formed sentences \(A(e_1)\), \(A(e_2)\), etc.; and where \(A(e_1)\) entails \(A(e_2)\), \(A(e_2)\) entails \(A(e_3)\), etc., but not vice versa.
If a speaker asserts that a lower or weaker point (rightwards) on a scale obtains, then he implicates that a higher order or stronger point (leftwards) does not obtain.

- Some of the boys went to the party.
  - => Not all of the boys went to the party
- Some of the boys went to the party, in fact all.

- The speaker S has said A(e₂); if S was in a position to state that a stronger item on the scale holds--i.e. to assert A(e₁)--then he would be in breach of the first maxim of Quantity if he asserted A(e₂). Since I the addressee assume that S is cooperating, and therefore will not violate the maxim of Quantity without warning, I take it that S wishes to convey that he is not in a position to state that the stronger item e₁ on the scale holds, and indeed knows that it does not hold.
• <all, most, many, some, few>
  <and, or>
  <n, ..., 5, 4, 3, 2, 1>
  <excellent, good>
  <hot, warm>
  <always, often, sometimes>
  <succeed in Ving, try to V, want to V>
  <necessarily p, p, possibly p>
  <certain that p, probable that p, possible that p>
  <must, should, may>
  <cold, cool>
  <love, like>
  <none, not all>
GCI: Clausal Implicatures

- Gazdar (1979)

- If S asserts some complex expression p which (i) contains an embedded sentence q, and (ii) p neither entails nor presupposes q and (iii) there's an alternative expression r of roughly equal brevity which contains q such that r does entail or presuppose q; then, by asserting p rather than r, S implicates that he doesn't know whether q is true or false, i.e. he implicates $Pq \& P\neg q$.

  - I believe John is away. (c.f. I know John is away)
    - $\Rightarrow$ It is possible, for all I know, that John is in fact not away.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Stronger form</th>
<th>(b) Weaker form</th>
<th>(c) implicatures of (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘p and q’</td>
<td>‘p or q’</td>
<td>{Pp, P¬p, Pq, P¬q}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘since p, q’</td>
<td>‘if p then q’</td>
<td>{Pp, P¬p, Pq, P¬q}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘a knows p’</td>
<td>‘a believes p’</td>
<td>{Pp, P¬p}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘a realized p’</td>
<td>‘a thought p’</td>
<td>{Pp, P¬p}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘a revealed p’</td>
<td>‘a said p’</td>
<td>{Pp, P¬p}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘necessarily p’</td>
<td>‘possibly p’</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Simplying Semantics

• ‘or’ is uniformly inclusive in English.
  – Implicatures of ‘p or q’
    • Scalar: K¬(p & q)
    • Clausal: \{Pp, P¬p, Pq, P¬q\}

– Mirabelle’s in the kitchen or the bedroom.
– The book is red or crimson
Projection Problem

- Gazdar 1979:
  - On the utterance of U, first the entailments of U are added to the context. Next all the clausal implicatures are added to the context that are consistent with the content of C, inconsistent clausal implicatures simply being rejected and not added to the set of propositions in context C. Only now can scalar implicatures be added, just in case they are consistent with the entailments and clausal implicatures of U.

- Some, if not all, of the workers went on strike.
  - Clausal: $P(\text{all the workers went on strike})$
  - Scalar: $K\neg(\text{all the workers went on strike})$

- Some of the boys went to the party, in fact all did.
  - Entailment: all of the boys went to the party.
    - Scalar: $K\neg(\text{not all of the boys went to the party})$. 