




Cosmopolitan Islamists in Turkey: Rethinking the Local in a Global Era

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Introduction

The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a spectacular rise in the political importance of Islam throughout the world, and there is now a sizeable body of scholarly work devoted to studying Islamic politics. These studies can be grouped into two theoretical perspectives. The first is that of modernization. Research in this area tends to focus on local cultural and political dynamics. The modernization perspective interprets the rise of Islamic politics as the resurgence of a traditional culture, which rejects market competition and capital accumulation.¹ Modernization itself is viewed as a uniquely Western process rooted in technologically and morally superior ways of accumulating wealth.

The second perspective is informed by globalization studies. Research in this area focuses on the world historical dynamics of political economy² and global culture.³ The globalization perspective does not have a unified theoretical position. Some try to understand culture in broader terms as constitutive of globalization wherein the global-local dynamics interact and interconnect.⁴ According to this view, any attempt to explain religion in terms of the distinctive characteristics of a local culture misrepresents the complexity of globalization. However, others persist in viewing culture in terms of a dichotomy between the global and the authentically local.⁵ This is similar to modernization theory and expects religion, seen as an element of a local culture, to either form a reactionary counter movement against the global economy, or to disappear with the expansion of market forces, telecommunication systems and computerized information networks. The latter view in globalization studies points to the intense cultural interactions, marked by a tension between homogenization of the world and local cultural differences.

This is a recurrent theme in social theory. A good many theorists from Karl Marx and Max Weber to Daniel Bell had predicted a decline in the importance of religion, resulting from the expansion of a capitalist market economy around the globe. Current perspectives of social theory also envision the homogenization of the world under the influence of American economic, political and cultural dominance.⁶

Far from disappearing from the political scene, however, Islam has emerged as a major player in international politics. Even if these studies, which privilege the division between local and global politico-economic and cultural factors, are synthesized, most of the arguments relating to modernization and globalization have limited utility in

1. Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Balantine Books, 1995).

2. Phillip McMichael, *Development and Social Change* (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 2000).

3. John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).

4. Roland Robertson, "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity" in Mike Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson, (eds.), *Global Modernities* (London: Sage, 1995).

5. Malcolm Water, *Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1995).

6. George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society* (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 2000).

explaining the continuing importance of Islam. This is because many studies often associate Islamist politics with an oppressive tradition and violent anti-modern, anti-Western social movements.⁷ As they rarely address actually existing domestic and world-historical conditions,⁸ these analyses often lack context and therefore cannot account for the dynamic interplay between local and global factors in mediating the advances and variations of Islamist politics across the globe.

Turkey is an excellent case for analyzing the complexities involved in the interplay between the local elaboration of Islam and the dynamics of global power relations. I am convinced that the complex interplay between domestic and external power relations elevates Turkey to the status of a paradigmatic example in studies of contemporary cultural movements. Turkey also occupies a very important geographical location as a country on the border between the West and the Islamic world. In addition, it has been an important player in NATO and in regional alliances of the Middle East. Further, it is an associate member of the European Union and stands at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the U.S. and the EU on the Eurasian continent. An interesting consequence of these complex political and military relations is that Turkey is the only Muslim country that has been integrated into Western political, economic and cultural structures. On the other hand, Turkey also differs from other Muslim countries in its domestic politics. Unlike Iran, Algeria, and Egypt, Turkey has achieved a political compromise between secular and Islamic political elites, and Islam has been incorporated into the secular structure of the state. Violent Islamist groups are marginal. Turkey, being both a Western and a Muslim country, refutes theories of modernization and political economy, which are silent on the cultural character of the capitalist economy.

I argue that it is difficult to articulate the political importance of Islam within the conceptual categories provided by both modernization and globalization perspectives. Rather than setting up the traditional/local and modern/global as cultural opposites, I seek to examine how some Islamist groups in Turkey utilize religious beliefs to advance their participation in the global economy. I present this discussion in order to develop hypotheses on the question of whether Islamists view culture as a repository of tradition, essentially outside of the global economy. A sociologically significant observation here is that Islamists appear to be diverting economic development away from its Western moorings. This is an important issue to examine if one considers that the sociological literature on cultural movements conceptualizes Islam as representing an anti-modern traditional opposition to Western ways.

I first address theoretical arguments concerning the interplay between national political strategies and shifting patterns in the global economy of capitalism. An analysis of the rise of Islamist politics needs to go beyond the dichotomous conception of modern versus tradition. It is not enough to say that Islam is framing a confrontation of indigenous religious and traditional cultures against the modernizing pressures of the

7. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

8. Fred Halliday, *Islam & The Myth of Confrontation* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996).

global economy of capitalism. Nor is it enough to insist on holding to the prediction that capitalist development will produce a universal history based on the modern doctrine of the self-regulating market, as described by Karl Polanyi (1944) in *The Great Transformation*.⁹

One way of responding to this dichotomous conceptualization is to look at the ways in which the links between participation in the global economy and moral/cultural claims are conceived. This paper seeks to shed light on the Islamists' response to the theoretical divide between universal modernity and Islam.

Islam and Participation in the Global Economy

According to Hobsbawm, the 1980s and 1990s produced a spectacular uncertainty both in the world economy and politics.¹⁰ The end of the Cold War destroyed the post war geopolitical ordering of the world economy that had stabilized international relations for some forty years. McMichael argues that the end of the Cold War also exposed the internal tensions of nation-states contained within that stability. Hobsbawm sees culturally framed movements as arising out of the internal tensions of nation-states within the political context of this uncertainty. According to him, nation-states found themselves pulled apart by the universalizing forces of a transnational economy, and by the localizing infranational social movements.

Wallerstein expressed similar views.¹¹ He sees present uncertainties in world politics as being caused by the erosion of the nation-state system under the universalizing forces of the transnational economy. Although there is no agreement among scholars on the extent to which global economic forces actually disempower states,¹² Stephen Gill directs our attention to a contradiction arising from the lack of correspondence between the increasingly globalizing economic forces and the territorially-bounded internal politics of nation-states.¹³ He locates what he calls harsher forms of emergent social order, such as religious fundamentalism, within this contradiction. This is a compelling view, which sees cultural politics as constituting the ideological battleground in the capitalist world economy.

The effectiveness of post war modernization projects in burying rival strategies has been discussed extensively in the sociological literature on social change. In Wallerstein's view, the Cold War had contained international inequalities stemming from

9. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).

10. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

11. Immanuel Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: The New Press, 1995).

12. Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

13. Stephen Gill, "Economic Globalization and Internationalization of Authority: Limits and Contradictions," *Geoforum* 23 (1992), pp. 269-283.

experiences of underdevelopment within the modernization project. But modernization projects failed to replicate Western ways in non-Western societies. The end of the Cold War has thus created the conditions for the rise of ideological tensions between the universal pretensions of capitalism on the one hand and particularistic ideologies on the other. The rise of Islamist politics is thus seen as an example of particularistic ideologies. Huntington has offered a similar view. According to him, the main purpose of the West's universal pretensions was to win the loyalty of the non-Western world toward the capitalist camp of the NATO alliance. In Huntington's analysis Islam constitutes an antithesis to Western dominance. The West's universalist pretensions would be counteracted by the cultural foundations of the Eastern world, and Islam epitomizes those Eastern civilizations which most seriously threaten Western cultural dominance. Huntington thus anticipates a revolt against the West. Although Wallerstein expects a revolt to be generated by the failure of modernization, Huntington's formulation suggests that the revival of non-Western cultures will be based on the growing power of non-Western societies produced by the very success of modernization.

Scholars working on the rise of Islamic politics in Turkey also offer explanations in line with the dichotomy approach presented by the modernization and globalization perspectives. Gulalp, for example, views the rise of Islamist politics in Turkey since 1980 as a response to the frustration of the promises of modernization under the impact of economic globalization.¹⁴ According to Keyder, however, the rise of political Islam owes its broadening appeal to the actual practice of limited modernization - one which did not expand political liberalism and citizenship rights in society.¹⁵ Here the emphasis is on the failure of the Turkish modernization project known as Kemalism - the project central to the ideology of the Turkish Republic, named after founder Mustafa Kemal. As Kemalism fails to achieve its goal of modernization, Islam tends to rise. In both explanations, the rise of Islam is understood as forming a resistance culture resulting from the failures of economic or cultural modernization.

Gulalp views the oppositional character of Islam in terms of cultural globalization. Cultural globalization, which implies a move toward greater cultural integration based on individualism, rationality and progress,¹⁶ also invokes ideas about a tendency toward cultural relativism leading to the rise of identity politics,¹⁷ the recognition of the diversity of local cultures,¹⁸ and the right to multiple paths of modernity.¹⁹ Gulalp sees the rise of Islamist politics as part of this tendency of resistance to the homogenizing tendencies of globalization.

14. Haldun Gulalp, "Globalizing Postmodernism: Islamist and Western Social Theory," *Economy and Society* 26/3 (1997), pp. 419-433.

15. Caglar Keyder, "Whither the Project of Modernity" in Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, (eds.), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 37-51.

16. Ritzer, *The McDonaldization*.

17. Ernesto Laclau (ed.), *The Making of Political Identities* (London: Verso, 1994).

18. Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

19. Theodor Shanin, "The Idea of Progress" in M. Rahnema and V. Bawtree, (eds.), *The Post Development*

I argue that an effective analysis of the rise of Islamic politics needs to go beyond the above explanations. Although the ideas of a small group of Islamist intellectuals are informed by a literature on identity politics, there is a range of Islamic groups who express diverse interests, goals, and priorities. Their ideas cannot be understood by reference to that literature. Moreover, Islamic politics did not suddenly emerge in the 1980s as a new social movement under conditions of globalization. It has its roots in the 19th century pan-Islamist movement of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Islam has been incorporated into the state structure in ways far more complex than is often assumed. The Ottoman Empire (which lasted from 1299 to the end of WWI) and the Turkish state (founded in 1923) were actively involved in shaping the political role of Islam in politics.

I argue that it is not enough to expect a zero-sum relationship between Islam, which is assumed to represent traditional values, and globalization, which supposedly has a modernizing impact on “traditional” societies. Much more is involved. As Robertson and Chirico argue, the rise of religious politics is not a uni-directional process, stemming from what has been happening within societies.²⁰ They insist that the rise of religious politics can also be seen as part of the relations between the local and the global which exist as mutually constitutive elements. Robertson captures the complex relations between the local and the global through the idea of glocalization.²¹ In relation to the rise of religious politics, he argues that people assert local values but they also want to share in global values and lifestyles. This is an approach adopted by Tomlinson in his conceptualization of cosmopolitan - a concept used to understand how people think of themselves as belonging to a global neighbourhood.²² In line with these suggestions, I seek to examine Islamists’ participation in the global economy as part of these cultural complexities.

There are a growing number of engineers, business groups and industrialists who are part of the present Islamic political movement in Turkey. They are among the country’s fastest growing capital groups. I argue that these Islamists have emerged in the specific political context of the 1980s and 1990s as a new group of capitalists who are struggling to reposition themselves in the highly competitive relations of the global economy. This is not to say that Huntington is correct in his predictions. Rather than assuming that cultures will be the dominating sites of conflict and competition among the world’s populations, my account of the rise of Islamist politics in Turkey helps to construct a different understanding of the politics of Islamist groups. I address Islamist politics in Turkey as part of a culturally polycentric world. This stands in direct

Reader (London: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 65-72.

20. Roland Robertson and JoAnn Chirico, “Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence” in F. J. Lechner and J. Boli, (eds.), *The Globalization Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), pp. 93-98.

21. Robertson, “Glocalization”.

22. Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*.

opposition to the general sociological prediction that culturally defined differences will disappear as a function of globalization.

I suggest that Islamists figure in the ideological politics of Turkey in complex ways. My goal in this paper is to examine this complexity by exploring the connection between participation in the global economy and Islamist beliefs. Concerned with the effects of Protestant ethics on the advent of capitalism in Europe, Weber had shown the importance of studying cultural practices in mediating economic activity.²³ However, this observation is only half the story. Studying Islamist politics in functional terms does not provide evidence for a much stronger link between changes in power configurations of the state, political regimes, and religion. Therefore, I suggest that we focus on the ways in which Islamists interact with the deployment of state power over the shape of that power and economic strategy.

I agree with Onis²⁴ and Keyder²⁵ who argue that Islam is in part a political protest movement expressing the grievances of the poorest, marginal segments of the population who are excluded from the benefits of globalization. While Islamist politics may be seen as a protest movement of the poor and marginalized, I develop the argument a step further and suggest that this approach can be highly misleading unless the contingent connection between protest and religious beliefs is established. Mardin states that Islam establishes bridges between various social groups because it provides a common cultural outlook shared by upper and lower classes.²⁶ Yet, I argue that the state ruling elite, including civil and military bureaucrats, and political parties, must build these bridges politically. For example, as I show in the subsequent sections of this paper, the political decision made to develop a religious educational system allowing the urban lower class and rural small producers to educate their children played a significant role in building such bridges, while also incorporating them and their cultural beliefs into the state structure.

I frame my work on the basis that there is nothing natural in the connection between Islamic beliefs and a protest movement. Islamist ideology is fundamentally shaped by political choices made by state managers and political elites in response to domestic and international political and economic pressures. After all, following the 1980 military coup, it was the decision of civilian and military bureaucrats to restructure state organs and institutionalize neoliberal policies in Turkey while promoting Islam as a panacea to contain the Left.

23. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (T. Parsons, trans.) (New York: Scribner's, 1958).

24. Ziya Onis, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective," *Third World Quarterly* 18/4 (1997), pp. 743-766.

25. Keyder, "Whither the Project of Modernity", pp. 37-51.

26. Serif Mardin, "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Science" in Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, (eds.), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 64-80.

There is no doubt that Islam is part of the daily life activities and cultural values experienced at the local level by citizens, as it is also a part of the long lived historical legacies embedded in Ottoman social arrangements. I suggest that Islamists, like many other devout Muslims in Turkey, refer to religious beliefs and values as the main tenet of their individual and collective social life. Furthermore, Islam functions as a social bond. Various Islamist groups who are among the large, medium and small size fractions of capital also refer to an Islamic faith and cultural outlook. For example, Islamists of large capital want to increase their competitiveness in the global economy. These individuals are highly educated professionals who locate themselves in the global circuits of the economy, utilizing new technology and various other means to be financially successful. However, they are not fully incorporated into the political structure of the state. Their reference to the Islamic moral principles of justice and equality equips them with a sense of entitlement. Similarly, Islamists of small and medium size fractions of capital want to enhance their share of economic opportunities and increase their ability to have access to state resources and incentives. These groups also refer to Islamic values as a source of greater social justice.

It seems that Islam helps to construct a cross-class alliance, bringing together small and medium size Islamist capital fractions with globally competitive Islamist professionals and business groups under the socially unifying rubric of social justice and equality. There exists a link between religion, which constitutes a frame of knowledge in the minds of believing and practising Muslims, and the political alliances of these social groups toward their empowerment in the competitive relations of market capitalism. These alliances are forged within a political context of hyper populism. In subsequent sections of the paper, it will become clear that the education of the children of Muslim urban lower class and rural small producers in the state-run religious or secular schools facilitates the strengthening of these groups in society while contributing to the building of bridges between Islamic values and participation in the global economy.

The Data

I use data drawn from content analyses of daily newspapers, Islamist monthly journals and the published works of prominent Islamist scholars. The data mainly covers a period from the early 1920s to the present, and includes news coverage, public statements, literary writings, and other Islamist elaborations of culture. I have utilized this data to analyze the links between a variety of Islamist organizations, political parties, business organizations, and financial institutions.

I have also used official statistics collected by the Directorate of Religious Affairs to obtain information on religious education, graduates of religious schools and the employment structure of these graduates. This kind of data displays the ratio of religious school graduates by year from the 1970s to the 1990s as a percentage of all high school graduates. While there is no data to establish the link between religious school graduates

and Islamists, my data does provide insight into the future university education, civilian government and private sector employment of these graduates.

An examination of the economic activities of Islamist groups poses significant difficulties resulting from the problem of access to information. There are also wide ideological differences among various Islamist groups that make it difficult to advance generalizations. An analysis of the politics of these groups nevertheless shows how Islam is used as a strategic resource in the class politics of the Turkish economy. I have examined the ideological manifestations of Islam in business life through an analysis of MUSIAD publications (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), which represent Muslim businessmen. I have also gathered data on the economic approach of the Sufi orders from various newspapers as well as their own publications.

I have defined organizations and business groups as Islamist to the extent that they are affiliated with various religious communities, have some ties with the Islamic political party, or take Islam as a significant reference point in their activities. Although some Muslims in Turkey may show sensitivity to religious issues and qualify as devout Muslims, most of them are not Islamists. This is evidenced by the fact that the pro-Islamic political party represented by the National Salvation Party during the 1970s, the Welfare Party during the 1980s and early 1990s, and the most recent Virtue Party have not received more than 10 per cent of the vote in national elections (the 1995 election results are the only exception when the Welfare Party received 21 per cent of the vote. The percentage fell again in the 1999 elections). I have analyzed the Islamist cultural strategy with data drawn from in-depth interviews of Islamist engineers conducted by Gole.²⁷ These personal interviews offer a rich form of evidence for analyzing the self-presentation of Islamists.

It is my contention that political projects cannot be an object of analysis independent of their articulations at the larger level of politics and history. The following section therefore discusses the history of Islamist politics in twentieth century Turkey. The task here is to identify the conditions and trajectories of change in the Turkish state. This will assist in the interpretation of empirical data.

Islamist Politics in 20th Century Turkey

The Turkish nation-state has experienced several periods of restructuring since its founding in 1923. The cultural production of nationhood has long been problematic. One of the major politico-cultural and institutional restructuring processes in Turkey took place after the military coup of September 1980. The principal goal of the military regime (1980-1983) was to depoliticize urban marginal groups and youth who had come to play an important role in the growth of political tensions during the 1970s. This required the

27. Nilufer Gole, "Engineers: Technocratic Democracy" in M. Heper et al., (eds.) *Turkey and the West* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993).

suppression of every manifestation of ideological politics, especially the Left. The military saw the Islamic concept of ummah (community of Muslims) as a panacea for containing the Left. More radical manifestations of an underground Islam emanating from the religious orders were also subject to close scrutiny. The promotion of ummah was also to be under strict state control. In this manner, the military regime sought to combine Turkish nationalism with Islam. The official ideology of the 1980s was referred to as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.²⁸ Civilian governments later adopted this approach. After coming to power in 1983, the Motherland Party (MP) gave the Turkish-Islamic synthesis ideology its particular form.

Although it was not an Islamist party, the MP's ideology, under the unique leadership of Turgut Ozal, represented a mixture of economic liberalism, nationalism and some Islamic platforms. According to Onis, it was Ozal's personality and his ability to combine a liberal Western orientation with a strong attachment to Islam that held together the liberal and Islamic factions of the party around the cause of economic liberalization.²⁹ After Ozal's withdrawal from active party politics, the ideological outlook of the party shifted to the centre-right. An in-depth analysis of the MP's ideological outlook and its power base is beyond the scope of my analysis, but the basic conclusion remains; under Ozal's leadership the MP managed to establish a broad-based coalition and promote the view that Turkey's economic development projects should rest on the moral/cultural strength and legitimacy of Islam.³⁰

The presence of a strong pro-Islamic faction within the party was a crucial dimension of the strategy that established a link between Muslim cultural values and an economic development project. A Holy Alliance (Kutsal Ittifak) was formed between liberal and pro-Islamic groups within the Motherland Party, pressing for the institutionalization of a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the state structure.³¹ A particular emphasis was placed on the role of religion in the state educational system to cement different, and often conflictual, societal demands. A more tolerant approach to Sufi orders was also part of this national consensus project.

This new formulation of official state ideology settled one persistent question in the political debate over the role of Islam in defining the nation. This debate dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century when Ottoman reformers initiated a wholesale westernization program to restructure the Ottoman state along secular principles. Pan-Islamist reformers opposed the secularization project. Islamists advocated the adoption of western technology, but not its culture. Islamists argued that a nation, which turned its back on its own culture, could only produce a rootless imitation. For them, this was a call for disaster. The controversy was temporarily settled during the formative years of the

28. Bozkurt Guvenc, G. Seylan, et al., *Turk-Islam Sentezi Dosyasi (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis File)* (Istanbul: Sermal, 1991).

29. Onis, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence", p. 757.

30. Rusen Cakir, "Devlet Islami Istiyor (The State Wants Islam)," *Birikim* 55.

31. *Turkish Daily* (20-25 June 1988).

Turkish nation-state in the 1930s when the founding leaders of the Turkish state eliminated any possibility of opposition against the ruling party. For them, technology and culture were seen as elements of a unified whole. Industrialization, therefore, required a wholesale adoption of western cultural values. Nonetheless, with the establishment of the multi-party regime in 1945 and the rise to power of the Democrat Party in 1950, the intellectual debate on Islam re-emerged. By incorporating rural producers into the national economy the DP also integrated small producing peasants along with their Muslim beliefs and practices. During the 1970s, the debate over culture versus technology was revived within the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party. The NSP popularized the theme of Western imperialism and questioned the presumed universality of a Western model. Under Ozal's leadership, during the 1980s, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis ideology of the MP integrated Islam as a cultural-moral value within the strategy of a competitive export-oriented economic model, while, according to Onis, also connecting it with a liberal Western orientation.³² The combined effect of these ideological shifts was that the West was no longer perceived as a coherent cultural unit of modernity. It was regarded as an economic power within the larger space of global competition.

It is indisputable that Islam has been a permanent partner in the ideological configuration of cultural politics since 1945. State strategy has been to contain real or potential Leftist and radical Islamist opposition with a modernist assertion of Islam into the state structure. This, however, has not prevented the rise of an Islamist movement in national politics. Older Islamic Sufi orders and other religious communities are the main players in this movement. What is interesting is their engagement with the process of globalization and their search for a way to participate in new markets and new technologies without becoming Western.

I would now like to examine the changing dynamics of Islamist education. An emphasis on Islamic education was instrumental in the creation of a new genre of Muslim professionals, employed mainly as engineers in the state bureaucracy and private sector. These professionals were the children of religiously minded rural small producers and urban lower classes. The intended goal behind the policy choice was never to subvert the existing hierarchies but to articulate more effectively a cultural link between the state and Muslims from rural and urban lower classes.

Islamist Education

The Report on National Culture prepared by the State Planning Organization in 1983 stated that the crisis of the 1970s was an outcome of the destruction of Turkish youth's moral and cultural values by divisive foreign ideologies with a leftist orientation.³³ These foreign ideologies, according to the report, prompted Turkish youth

32. Onis, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence", p. 757.

33. State Planning Organization, *Milli Kultur: Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu (Report on National*

as well as intellectuals to imitate western cultural values - a process destructive to the national culture. The preservation of national culture was considered a duty of the state. National culture was viewed in this report as the sum of tradition and belief, culminating in religion. Religious courses were made a mandatory part of the school curriculum in primary schools, middle level high schools, and lycees by the 1982 Constitution. This was a reflection of the military's commitment to the creation of a new national culture by an injection of Islamic cultural elements to combat Leftist politics. However, Islam was also subject to political regulation by the state. Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980 military coup, explained the importance of state control over religion:

[r]eligious education cannot be given to children by every family. In fact, even if the family tried to do so, this would be improper since it may be taught wrongly, incompletely or through the family's own point of view ... I ask you ... not to send your children to illegal (private) Koran schools ... religion will be taught to our children by the state in state schools. Are we now ... against the cause of secularism or serving it? Of course we are serving it.³⁴

It is the increasing importance of Imam-Hatip Schools (schools for Prayer Leaders and Preachers) and Koranic schools that underlines Islamist education in Turkey. There were only 7 middle level and lycee level Imam-Hatip schools in 1951-52. Their number has multiplied since the 1950s, reaching 588 in 1980. From 1980 to 1986 the number of Imam-Hatip schools increased by 22 per cent, from 588 to 717. The number of students enrolled in these schools also increased by 34 per cent, from 178,000 to approximately 240,000. In the 1985-1986 academic year there were 5600 official general high schools (including middle level high schools and lycees) with 2.4 million enrolled students. The ratio of Imam-Hatip school students to official general high school students increased from a ratio of one to 37 in the 1965-1966 academic year to one to ten in the 1985-1986 academic year.³⁵ There are now 446,429 students attending middle level and lycee level Imam-Hatip schools.

The original purpose for founding these schools was to meet the shortage of educated religious personnel. This seems to be of secondary importance now. Although they were founded as vocational-religious schools, the Imam-Hatip schools have been transformed into an alternative educational system. Most of their graduates continue their education in various university departments for careers in engineering, law, and medicine. They enter the job market as professionals and civil servants. For example, nearly 40 per cent of the students in the Public Administration Department of Ankara University's prestigious Faculty of Political Science are graduates of the Imam-Hatip Lycees.³⁶ The only institution that has not been affected by this trend is the military. Military schools reject Imam-Hatip graduates. Nevertheless, the Sufi orders, especially the Isik (Light) order organized by Fethullah Gulen, try to recruit young students who

Culture) (Ankara: Office of the Prime Minister, 1983).

34. Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anilari (Kenan Evren's memoirs) 4*. (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1991), p. 301.

35. Republic of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics. *Statistical Yearbooks of Turkey* (Ankara).

36. *Cumhuriyet Newspaper*, various issues (1987).

enter the military Lycees by providing them with Islamic instruction during their weekends at home. Most students of Imam-Hatip schools are from urban lower class families and rural small producers. For them, these schools provide alternative channels of upward mobility.³⁷

The government strictly regulates the content of religious education in Imam-Hatip schools. The curriculum offers a blend of religious and secular courses such that students are also able to gain employment in areas outside the religious profession. The schools are similar to the private Catholic schools in North America. A study conducted by Aksit found that Imam-Hatip students greatly preferred courses in mathematics, physics, literature, English and Arabic as well as studies in the Koran.³⁸ Most of these students expressed a desire to continue their university education in order to establish careers in engineering, medicine, law and public administration. Only a few students planned to become prayer leaders and preachers after graduating from the Imam-Hatip Lycees. They are employed exclusively by the state.

Only 10 percent of the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools are employed as prayer leaders and preachers upon graduation (Directorate of Religious Affairs Statistics). One-sixth of students are female. Since female clergy are not yet an accepted practice in Islam, these women will not be employed as imams or hatips. Most of these students are unemployable in their professions. Table 1 presents data on the number of graduates from Imam-Hatip Lycees who took jobs in religious professions from 1980 to 1989.

Table 1:
The number of Imam-Hatip Lycee graduates who take jobs in the clerical professions

Years employed by the	number of graduates	number of graduates who are Directorate of Religious Affairs
1980-1981	4393	None
1981-1982	9865	None
1982-1983	11222	2238
1983-1984	14347	3876
1984-1985	18467	3444
1985-1986	15257	4039
1986-1987	15971	7432
1987-1988	17758	7281
1988-1989	16640	5917

37. Birsen Gokce, et al., *Orta Ogretim Gencliginin Beklenti ve Sorunlari (Expectations and Problems of Youth in High Schools)* (Ankara: M.E.G.S. Bakanligi Yayinlari, 1984).

38. Bahattin Aksit, "Imam-Hatip and Other Secondary Schools in the Context of Political and Cultural Modernization of Turkey," *Journal of Human Sciences* 5/1.

Despite the shortage of job vacancies, the growth in the number of graduates from Imam-Hatip Lycees indicates that Imam-Hatip schools have been transformed into an alternative educational system. Students who do not find employment in their intended professions try to get into university. This has resulted in an increased number of religiously educated students studying engineering, medicine, law and public administration who are then employed in the state bureaucracy or in the private sector as professionals.

There is no data to suggest a link between Islamists and the graduates of these schools. We do not know how many of these Muslim professionals have Imam-Hatip school diplomas. What is well known is that these schools create an affinity between these young upwardly mobile and religiously educated Muslims and the secular values and ideology of the state.

Koran schools are also part of the Islamist educational system. There are 4,925 Koran schools with 176,892 regular and 52,028 evening-school students. In 1996, 1,326,443 children attended summer courses.³⁹ These schools also operate under state control. There is also an increasing number of unofficial private Koran schools and youth hostels. They have been established outside the official sphere of state control by the Sufi orders, although some of them are subject to state regulation. Their goal is to privately educate youngsters in Islam who have come from small urban and rural areas to be educated in the state schools. The Isik Evleri (Light Houses) run by Fethullah Gulen group are among the best-known examples.⁴⁰ There is no publicly available data regarding the exact number, student enrolment, and the management of these private schools. Their influence on the Islamic education of students in state-run schools would be an interesting project for further research. What is missing in the literature is an answer to the question of whether there is a mutually constitutive interaction between the two types of Islamic education in shaping an Islamist mode of thinking in Turkey. And if there is, what is the nature and extent of this interaction?

What is interesting about these privately-run schools is the sources of their financial support. There is no publicly available data to clearly establish external financial connections. There is evidence, however, to suggest that Saudi capital has funded an ever-growing number of private Koran schools organized by the religious orders. Through Faisal Finance of Turkey and the Al-Baraka Turk, Saudi capital was involved in the founding of several wakfs (religious charity and educational foundations) and autonomous Koran schools. The Naqshbandi-affiliated members of the new and

39. Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and the State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey" *Middle East Report* 50/1. p. 47.

40. Ugur Komecoglu, U. "Kutsal ile Kamusal: Fethullah Gulen Cemaat Hareketi (Sacred and Public: The Fethullah Gulen Movement)" in Nilufer Gole (ed.), *Islamin Yeni Kamusal Yuzleri (The New Public Faces of Islam)* (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 2000), pp. 148-194.

growing Muslim business sector provided the liaison.⁴¹ Among these wakfs are the Bereket Vakfi (the Al-Baraka Wakf) and the Ozbag Vakfi.

The Bereket Vakfi (Al-Baraka Wakf) provides students with scholarships for religious education, organizes conferences, and offers financial support for religious publications. For example, Al-Baraka Finance supplied the pro-Islamist newspaper *Turkiye* with 833 tons of paper between 1984 and 1985 (Mumcu, 1994: 194). The aim of the Ozbag Wakf was to build new mosques, open Koran schools, provide financial assistance to students in religious education, and support research into various religious issues.

Saudi support for private religious education is intimately and conceptually tied to an increase in the number of publicly funded Imam-Hatip schools. There is no firmly established link between the Imam-Hatip schools and transnational Islamic institutions. However, it has been documented that from 1982 to 1984 the Saudi-based financial institution Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami paid monthly salaries of \$1100 to Turkish Imams working in Western Europe as state employees appointed by the Directorate of Religious Affairs.⁴² Between 1984 and 1987, Saudi finance was also used to pay the salaries of many Turkish university instructors teaching Arabic in Turkey. The Imam Mohammed Ibn-Saud Islamic University of Saudi Arabia provided the funding. In addition, the Saudis have contributed to the construction of many new mosques and mescids (small mosques) on university campuses.

To conclude this section, I would like to point out that these schools constitute half of the antinomy in the emergence of Islamist alternative schooling. They have also been used as an effective means for the state to gain moral control over the rural and urban lower classes through a formal curriculum, which articulates Islamic and secular education. This is a compelling finding which shows that Islamic education in Imam-Hatip schools allows students to combine a secular line thinking, as advocated by the state, and Islam - thus supporting my earlier contention that Islam and global/modern cultural values cannot be seen in opposition to one another. The conceptualization of the role of Islamic education in creating congruence between Islam and the modern/global would be incomplete if it failed to take into account the position of newly emerging Muslim professionals in the post 1980 neoliberal globalization era.

Islamist Engineers and Western Modernity

In this section of the paper, I focus on a specific group of professionals in Turkey, Islamist engineers, in order to illustrate how their education bridges the presumed divide between Islamic and modern ways. This group is actively involved in the assertion of

41. Yildiz Atasoy, "Beyond Tradition and Resistance: Islamic Politics and Global Relations of Power: The Case of Turkey, 1839-1999. (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis. University of Toronto, 1998).

42. Ugur Mumcu, *Rabita* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinlari, 1994). p. 171-173.

cultural meanings in an effort to reposition themselves in the global circuits of the world economy.

Significantly, most of the new engineering managers come from modest lower-middle class family origins in small Anatolian cities and rural areas.⁴³ They came to hold highly strategic positions of power within the bureaucracy during the 1980s. Much of their upward social mobility was due to significant achievement in their technical education. We do not know how many engineers have Imam-Hatip diplomas. Some do have such a background. What is well known, however, is that their Islamist orientation is largely related to their family background and education in autonomous Koran schools.

The biographies of these engineers clearly illustrate the presence of a very strict Muslim morality in their work ethic - an important factor in the struggle of these Islamists to reposition themselves as a distinct capital fraction competing both in national and global circuits of capital. I will offer two illustrative quotations from Gole's biographical study of these engineers. The first pertains to a manager from an Islamic banking institution.

I am 42 years old. I was born in Eskisehir, and completed my secondary education there ... I was brought up in a Muslim family, in a Muslim environment. At the university, I studied mechanical engineering. Then I attended a one-year postgraduate programme in business administration. I spent a year and half in England and, for three years, I taught at a university in Saudi Arabia. Then, for four years, I worked as an expert at the SPO. Now I am working in a private company.⁴⁴

The second quotation relates to an engineer who has also combined a religious background with a secular education.

I was born in Maras. I am the first engineer in my family. Since the time of my grandfather, every member of my family has been educated. But they all studied religion (through private lessons). It was only I who studied "profane sciences". I graduated from the Engineering Faculty of Istanbul Technical University, and ran an engineering project company. Then I taught at a university. I resigned from my post at the university on 17 September 1983, and became a founding member of the MP."⁴⁵

These engineers played a prominent role in formulating Turkey's new export-oriented industrialization model. They claim that their logical-scientific approach, mathematical reasoning and access to technical language enable them to provide better solutions to the problems of Turkey.

The image of the West held by Muslim engineers is not one of rejection. It assumes a give and take relationship within a strategy of economic competition. The

43. Gole, "Engineers: Technocratic Democracy", p. 207-208.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

West, accordingly, does not pose a threat to the moral-cultural integrity of Muslims. Islam thus ceases to be an ideological force in opposition to the West. These engineers see no conflict between Islamic values and competitively participating in the market economy. One of the Muslim engineers clarifies this point:

There are several dynamics which shaped the West. First of all, there is the idea of Dostoevsky in his book *The Brothers Karamazov* namely 'If God does not exist everything is permissible.' Since the period of the Enlightenment, there is an approach which accepts only the reality of the five senses of human beings. Another dynamic is the one which deifies the will of the individual, which comes from liberalism and identified with the formula, *laissez-faire, laissez-passer*. And finally, the aspiration for consumption is the ultimate goal of these societies: to consume means being happy. One of the alternatives to this material civilization is Islam.⁴⁶

For Muslim engineers, Islam does not require a wholesale rejection of the West. Instead, Islam appears to be a cultural component of the economic activity that these engineers promote in strengthening their entrance into the competitive relations of the economy within this particular period of time. One Muslim engineer clarifies this point:

We have to be an open society. We have to leave behind the dogmas of the Left and Right, and keep an atmosphere of debate. Turkey is, in fact, beginning to display vitality. There is a new generation, between 30 to 35 years old, in blossom. They are the ambitious young professionals who speak two foreign languages and who are impatient to expand towards the world market.⁴⁷

Muslim engineers articulate an Islamist position, which combines Muslim cultural values and the competitive logic of the globalized economy, as well as a pragmatic engineering approach. In concert with other Islamist groups, they also argue that the Turkish economy could be among the most dynamic within the world economy, if the younger generations were provided with a knowledge of national culture based on their Muslim heritage. This position explicitly incorporates Islamic references to the integration of the Turkish economy with the Muslim countries of the former Soviet Union, Balkans, and the Middle East.

Having highlighted the sociological importance of rejecting the notion that Islamic and modern/global are polar opposites on the ideological continuum, I will now focus attention on how this fusion of Islam and modern relates to the growing importance of Islamist capitalists in the Turkish economy. The following analysis shows that the blending of Islam and the modern is not only a general consequence of a particular state-regulated Islamist education but depends on a politico-economic context which stimulates such a fusion as a strategy in the competitive class politics of various capital groups.

46. Ibid. p. 214.

47. Ibid. p. 216.

Islamist Political Economy

The blending of Islam with secular thinking implies increased opportunities for Islamists to advance new demands within the state structure. This may suggest that they utilize this opportunity to produce often well-articulated economic strategies and to search for a way to participate in new markets without becoming subordinate to the West or Western life styles. Islamists refashion demands by cultivating an ethical sensibility appropriate to competitive relations in the global economy. I examine Islamist demands by looking at the ways in which different segments of Turkish society were incorporated into or excluded from the state as a result of the opportunities provided by the world economy. I will offer a brief look at the internal contradictions of the Turkish economy, and then analyze how various fractions of Islamist business engage with globalization itself in the search for a way to participate in new markets. I am interested in analyzing the emergence of a new group of Islamist capitalists within the shifting relations of the Turkish economy. I will also examine the relative position of these Islamists vis-à-vis each other, other capital groups, and the pro-Islamic political party.

A particular state-led industrialization strategy based on import substitution was followed throughout the world between 1945 and 1975. McMichael refers to this as the development project.⁴⁸ As I have discussed elsewhere, this development project, which was followed in Turkey since the 1930s, came into crisis in the 1970s.⁴⁹ The main thrust of the Turkish industrialization model was one that would subordinate small town-based capital groups to the large industrial interests of big cities, while eliminating the small producing Turkish peasantry in favour of an urban wage earning class. The protection or subordination of small and medium size fractions of capital as well as the rural populations was often the source of political conflict. Turkish governments were able to contain these conflicts until the mid 1970s within a development project based on import substituting industrialization. This was sustained by the foreign economic aid negotiated with the U.S. within the favourable conditions of the Cold War.

During detente, under the impact of a debt crisis and the economic recession that followed, the inflow of foreign currency was extremely limited, and thus the political conflicts within the nationally-focussed development project acquired constancy throughout the late 1970s. Competition among various capital groups seeking to influence government allocation of scarce resources was the source of sustained political conflict. Large industrialists engaged in foreign trade were in favour of a more open trade regime, while small-medium size industrialists engaged in the domestic market preferred protection and opposed government allocation of resources to large industrialists. Private sector interest diversification was suppressed temporarily when the government was toppled by a military coup in 1980. Under military tutelage, subsequent civilian governments subordinated small and medium size industrial fractions of capital, rural

48. McMichael, *Development and Social Change*.

49. Atasoy, "Beyond Tradition and Resistance."

populations, and labour within a market-oriented economic policy. The political suppression of small capital interests and labour resurfaced during the late 1980s and 1990s as the pro-Islamic political party articulated a political agenda of justice based on Islamic morality.

The pro-Islamic National Salvation Party of the 1970s, which became the Welfare Party in the 1980s, and then the Virtue Party in the late 1990s, have articulated an Islamist strategy which elevated the protection of small and medium size capital interests to a position of central importance in Turkish politics. The Islamist political movement privileged the protection of smaller size capital interests and labour against the globalization project based on a free trade economy. This is evidenced in the public statements delivered by Erbakan, the leader of the party.⁵⁰ There is no hard evidence to suggest that the pro-Islamic party supports reinstatement of a theologically-centred politics, but there is plenty of evidence to propose that the pro-Islamic party cultivates an ideology based on moral responsiveness to smaller capital interests.

It is important to underscore the fact that there is no unified community of Islamists, nor is there one coherent Islamist ideology. Political Islam in Turkey can easily be characterized by internal cleavages between the pro-Islamic political party, Sufi orders, professionals, and intellectuals. The following analysis of Islamist business covers the economic activities and ideological positions of the Sufi orders, Muslim business associations, and Islamic financial institutions. I pay particular attention to the relative positions and differences among these Islamists as compared to a particular Islamist ideology advocated by the pro-Islamic party based on the protection of small capital interests.

Before proceeding further, I would like to point out that it is very difficult to differentiate Islamist capital groups from secularists. Islamists are an integral part of the larger Turkish economy, and follow the rules set by the secular state. There are no specifically Islamic rules of conduct that distinguish Islamist activities from other secular business groups. Even the Islamic prohibition on paying or receiving interest is not strictly observed by all Islamists.⁵¹ Therefore, I have restricted my analysis to those business groups that have ties to Sufi orders and business associations where Islam is used as an organizational strategy.

Sufi Orders and Islamist Business

Sufi orders strategically manage Islamic ethics toward establishing entitled groups, ones that recognize Muslims as members of previously marginalized cultural

50. Necmettin Erbakan, "Welfare Party 3rd. General Congress: The Opening Speech of the Leader Professor N. Erbakan." (Ankara: Pamphlet Published by the Welfare Party, 1990).

51. Ayse Bugra, "Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, pp. 521-539.

category. This is in line with the ideological position of the pro-Islamic party vis-à-vis small size capital groups. As distinct from the pro-Islamic party, which focuses on the accumulation of wealth by small capital groups within protected national markets, Sufi orders would prepare these entitled groups to participate in the global economy.

The Sufi orders encourage Muslims to form small, personal, community-based discussion groups under a Sufi leader. These discussion groups focus on the strengthening of faith and self-reformation of individuals.⁵² Gurdogan (an engineer and director of Faisal Finance of Turkey, affiliated with the Naqshbandi order) has called these groups invisible universities as they aim to distance participants from the influences of secular institutions within the informal structure of discussion groups. The Sufi emphasis on the moral self-renewal of individuals does not direct Islamists to rethink the global economy and find ways of reversing it. Interest in re-establishing a sense of connection with local community-based living is high in the scholarship critical of globalization.⁵³ Such a critical approach to globalization is absent within Islamist thinking on economic activity. Instead, the Sufi orders play an active role in preparing Islamists to venture into transnationally involved business power relations. The invisible universities of the Sufi orders operate to increase the power of Islamists' responses to highly competitive relations within the global economy.⁵⁴ Individual self-renewal is directed toward developing an Islamic work ethic and enhancing a cultural capacity to think over an economic space above and beyond community-based economic activity. This vision does not develop alternative principles and practices to the present market economy, industry, science and technology. Rather, it promotes Islamists' involvement within the global economy. As a result, the number of large companies with direct connections to Sufi orders has increased.

Since the second half of the 1980s Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandi and Nur movement began to constitute the core of the Islamist-led fraction of large capital groups. Holding companies and financial institutions that have direct links to these orders are now expanding into global markets. They invest in Germany, the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Bosnia, the Middle East, the new Muslim Republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as in the United States. The Naqshbandi order, for example, has played a significant part in the wealth accumulation strategies of the Islamist Ozal and Topbas families in their trade and investment ventures in the Middle East.⁵⁵ The Server Holding, which comprises 38 firms operating in various sectors of the economy, is directly affiliated with the Naqshbandi order.⁵⁶

52. M. Z. Kotku, *Cihad (Jihad)* (Ankara: Seha, 1984). M. Z. Kotku, *Mu'minin Vasiflari (The Qualities of the Believer)* (Ankara: Seha, 1984).

53. Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.), *The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward the Local* (San Francisco, California: Sierra Club Books, 1996).

54. Ersin Gurdogan, *Gorunmeyen Universite (Invisible University)* (Istanbul: Iz Yayinlari, 1991).

55. Mumcu, *Rabita*, pp. 171-173.

56. Faruk Bulut, *Yesil Sermaye Nereye? (The Green Capital)* (Istanbul: Su Yayinlari, 1999), pp. 75-76.

Another religious community, affiliated with the Nur movement, operates under the leadership of Fethullah Gulen. Gulen is a retired Imam who worked as a state employee for the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Gulen, who received both a secular and religious education in his training as an Imam, shows a remarkable ability to fuse Islam with Western modernity. Reminiscent of Weber's Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism, Gulen's ideas could be appropriately referred to under the heading of the Islamist ethic and spirit of global capitalism, where Islam assumes a moral value involving economic activity.⁵⁷ In contrast to Weber's expectation of Islam leading to mystical contemplation or otherworldly asceticism,⁵⁸ Gulen's Islamism is not built on a Weberian tension between mysticism and asceticism. Rather, Gulen sees no contradiction between Islam and a market economy. He takes the example set out by the Prophet Mohammed who himself was a merchant engaged in the competitive relations of a market economy in Madina. Gulen envisions an economic model based on continued capital accumulation through the help of science and technology. According to him, the worldly affairs of the economy should not be conflated with the spiritual rules of religion; they are separate although economic activity cannot go against the spirit of religion. Gulen suggests that ways must be found to mobilize the hidden wealth of devout Muslims and establish large-scale firms capable of entering foreign markets. Well-educated technocrats must undertake the management of these firms. In his *Golden Generation (Altin Nesil)* published in 1978, he stresses the importance of younger generations learning modern science and technology and blending them with an Islamic morality to contribute to the financial power of the state.⁵⁹

The Gulen group appears to be among the richest of Islamist groups and the fastest growing of all capital fractions in Turkey. There are about 500 firms affiliated with this group. It has also founded Asya (Asia) Finance and Isik (Nur/light) Insurance in 1996. It is also particularly interested in founding schools both in Turkey and abroad. The Gulen group has established more than 250 middle and lycee level schools in different areas of the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. The number of schools it has founded in Turkey exceeds 20,000. It also has 7 universities, 5 of which are abroad and 2 of which are in Turkey.⁶⁰ Another business group affiliated with a particular branch of the Nur movement is the Ihlas (True) Holding of the Isikcilar community of Enver Oren. Its economic involvements range from media, marketing and finance/insurance to automotive, electrical appliances, machinery, food, construction and foreign trade.⁶¹

Both the Fethullah Gulen group and Ihlas Holding, and their affiliated agencies combine an Islamist sensibility with a strong nationalist ideology directed toward the protection of newly emerging capital groups and expansion into the markets of the former

57. Fethullah Gulen, *Prizma: 2 (Prism: 2)* (Izmir: Nil, 1997).

58. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (T. Parsons, ed.) (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 79-80.

59. Fethullah Gulen, *Altin Nesil (The Golden Generation)*. (Erzurum, 1978).

60. Bulut, *Yesil Sermaye*, pp. 57, 83-86, 300.

61. *Ihlas Holding Annual Report* (1997).

Soviet Union and the Balkans. This strategy clearly regards Islam as an ethical instrument for mobilizing Islamist economic activity in the competitive relations of the market economy.

The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MUSIAD)

MUSIAD is an umbrella organization, founded in 1990 by a group of young businessmen with an average age of 33. In 1996, the number of MUSIAD member firms reached close to 4,000. MUSIAD presents an alternative class strategy to that formulated by TUSIAD. With a membership of around 400, TUSIAD (founded in 1971) represents the largest industrialists, advocating an open trade regime and integration with the EC markets.⁶² MUSIAD, on the other hand, has a different membership base with a wider regional representation from smaller Anatolian cities. It promotes closer economic ties among Muslim countries. Most MUSIAD member firms have greater variation in size. They were established recently during the late 1980s. The following table summarizes the size of MUSIAD's membership.

Table 2: Firm Size of MUSIAD Member: 1995

Size	Number
<10	658
10-24	475
25-49	285
50-99	159
>100	149
na	169
Total	1895

Source: MUSIAD Catalogue, 1995

As seen from the table, MUSIAD generally represents smaller firms employing less than 50 workers. In terms of geographical distribution, although Istanbul houses the highest number of MUSIAD members (523 in total), a majority of the firms are located in smaller cities. It seems that construction and construction materials, textile and leather, and food and beverages constitute the largest sector of concentration for the companies.⁶³ There are no significant variations among sectors in terms of company size.

62. Selim Ilkin, "Businessmen: Democratic Stability" in Metin Heper, A. Oncu and H. Kramer, (eds.), *Turkey and the West* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1993).

63. Bulut, *Yesil Sermaye*, p. 102.

The geographic location of MUSIAD economic activities and the size of firms leads me to believe that MUSIAD articulates a class strategy involving the small business interests of less advantaged cities. Thus, MUSIAD's position in relation to an open trade economy is not clearly established compared to that of secularist TUSIAD. Looking at the relative position of large Islamist companies within MUSIAD, however, the degree to which small capital interests are incorporated into the MUSIAD strategy seems less clear. The number of large companies employing over 100 workers within MUSIAD is significant. Among the largest companies within MUSIAD are Kombassan Holding, Yimpas Holding, the Ulker Group, Saray Biscuits, and Al-Baraka Turk.⁶⁴

Kombassan, for example, was established 10 years ago by a school teacher in Konya, a small Anatolian city. It began by making paper products and then expanded into tourism, transportation, finance, a retail sales chain, and manufacturing interests. With 40 factories and 100 firms, it employs almost 30,000 people in Turkey, and invests in the Balkans, the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, Germany and the U.S.⁶⁵ Kombassan has more than 40,000 shareholders, none of whom is allowed to hold more than a 1 per cent stake in the company.⁶⁶ The source of the investment funds is the hidden wealth that pious Muslims keep under their pillows. For these Muslims depositing in conventional banks is sacrilegious, since they believe earning interest on money is against the teachings of the Koran. According to unofficial estimates several billion dollars have been invested in Muslim companies in this manner. The other source of capital is the remittances from Turkish workers in Germany. There is no hard data on the circulation of workers remittances from Europe to Islamist corporations in Turkey. This kind of capital movement is largely funnelled through the informal channels of religious communities. It is widely reported that enormous investment funds have been mobilized from abroad in this way.

It would be wrong to assume that all the small and medium size companies represented under the umbrella of MUSIAD have an Islamist orientation. Large firms affiliated with MUSIAD have an Islamist outlook. Onis argues that a fraction of highly successful small and medium sized firms have an Islamic orientation in Turkey and are also affiliated with MUSIAD.⁶⁷ The representation of small-medium sized firms with an Islamist orientation is not unique to MUSIAD. There are other organizations in Turkey with such firms within their membership. According to Bugra, what is unique to MUSIAD is its use of Islam as a basis for cooperation and solidarity between business groups, a device to create secure market niches and sources of investment finance, and a means of containing potential social unrest and labour militancy.⁶⁸ MUSIAD forms special commissions and professional committees; it organizes conferences around political and economic issues; it arranges international fairs in Turkey and foreign trips to

64. Ibid, pp. 102-103.

65. Ibid, pp. 302-304.

66. Chris Morris, "New Firms Tap Hidden Wealth of Pious Turks," *Guardian Weekly* (May 23, 1999).

67. Onis, "The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence", p. 759.

68. Bugra, "Class, Culture, and State", pp. 528-530.

fairs abroad. In all these efforts MUSIAD aims to enable its members to have access to information about technological innovations, marketing, global production and trade patterns besides enhancing solidarity among its members.

In general, Islam is used as a strategic resource in MUSIAD's class strategy to create a basis for solidarity among smaller capital groups in order to establish larger companies capable of competing in external markets. MUSIAD constructs a notion of Muslimness as a cultural-political category to describe those who were culturally and economically marginalized in the Turkish economy. These companies represent newly emerging Anatolian small town capital in competition with the traditional business establishment in Istanbul. Although Istanbul-based large capital had grown under the protectionist policies of the state during the development era, the Anatolian-based small capital groups desire to receive protection through MUSIAD.

MUSIAD does not demand that their members be active practitioners of Islam, but they must be believers. One common theme discussed in MUSIAD's publication, *Homo-Islamicus* (1993-1997), is how to re-assert Islam as a source of morality within the competitive relations of the economy, and associate it with modern technology. MUSIAD advocates Islamist businessmen to do everything needed to be successful in the markets without sacrificing Islamic morality. This is actually a form of worship as it is required to be done in the service of God. Writing against a certain association of Islam with the mystical principle, Erol Yerar, the first President of MUSIAD, argues that: "One mouthful of food, one short coat' was misconceived and opened the way to sluggishness. As a result, motivation toward the world was lost completely."⁶⁹

MUSIAD advocates wealth accumulation by focussing on the ideological necessity of removing any misconceptions about the incompatibility of Islam and capitalism. The Islamist encouragement of wealth accumulation, as I have indicated through the example of MUSIAD, Sufi orders and other religious communities, leads me to ask to what extent the Islamist desirability of wealth accumulation is framed with reference to the relevance of the distinction between the West and the non-West in the competitive relations of the global economy. Islamist projects in Turkey promote the idea that Islam is compatible with the competitive logic of the global economy and the major features of global culture. This is also seen in the cosmopolitan approach Islamist engineers have adopted to underline their ideological orientation. Here the relevance of the non-West is played out with respect to the promotion of Islamic solidarity among Muslim nations both to secure markets and strengthen Turkey's ties with Muslim countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia (MUSIAD, 1996).⁷⁰

69. Erol Yerar, *A New Perspective of the World at the Threshold of the 21st Century* (Istanbul: MUSIAD, n.d), p. 3.

70. MUSIAD, *Basbakan Necmettin Erbakan'in Dogu Asya Gezisi ve MUSIAD'in Bosna- Hersek Gezisi Raporu* (Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's Trip to South Asia and MUSIAD's Bosnia Trip Report) (Istanbul, 1996).

Conclusion

My leading concern in this paper has been whether the rise of Islamist politics corresponds to the classic dichotomy model of global versus traditional/local, as is supposed in theories of modernization and political economy, and, if it does, what this means for a study of cultural movements in an era of globalization. Does it mean that, as is often expected within the scholarship of globalization, locally-embedded politics of Islam form anti-modern, and sometimes violent, resistance movements against the global market economy? My analysis of the rise of Islamist politics in Turkey has demonstrated that various fractions within the newly emerging Islamist capital groups use Islam as a strategic resource for capital accumulation. My answer to the main question of this paper then is negative. This is certainly true with regard to modernization theory, which sees Islam as representing authentically homogeneous local cultural values and practices. When viewed from a globalization perspective, cultural values and practices also appear to intervene in the transformation of an economic activity within a certain locality. Yet, such intervention does not exemplify a form of locally-based politics mobilized against the universalizing tendencies of the global economy. Rather, it anticipates a greater economic expansion and integration of the region through economically mobile and morally motivated Islamist capital groups.

To be sure, some Islamists, especially those organized within the pro-Islamic political party, focus on the protection of small capital groups and labour from the negative effects of market competition. But the strategies of the newly rich Islamist groups are directed at participation in the global economy. These Islamists formulate a cultural disposition of openness to the world on the basis of an Islamic morality through which Islamic culture serves the goals of international economic competitiveness.

The Islamist emphasis on being competitively engaged with the global economy breaks the ideological connection between the cultural arrangements of the West, as described by Weber, and the economy. Islamists view Muslim values as an element in the competitive strategy. This reflects a political desire on their part to emerge as a competitive force as they try to reposition themselves in both the national and global circuits of the economy. The West now represents a competitive partner, and not a model for emulation in the cultural realm. This dimension of the Islamist project expresses an ultramodern instrumentality that is caught between westernizing social practices and global economic competition. Herein lies the ambivalence involved in Islamist politics: Buying into Western ways while challenging its claims to a more general cultural superiority.

However, this issue might prove to be more complex and contentious than merely identifying the relevance of Islam to the global economy. This is related to the subordination of cultural values and practices to the requirements of the market economy. Polanyi described the emergence of political movements for self-protection as being embedded in the cycles between the market economy and the local space of territorial

states. Drawing from Polanyi, it is possible to argue that Islamist politics shape a strategy for protecting and strengthening those who are adversely affected by global market forces. This reflects an Islamist desire to gain better access to resources while making a competitive principle in class politics spiritually acceptable. Such a Polanyian interpretation of Islamist politics in Turkey adds a political culture twist to an understanding of the state and economy. However, the potential conflicts between locally and globally oriented Islamist groups might involve more than a process of reshaping the relations between the national state and a market economy. Whether or not Islamists will solidify into a unified position is not certain, but for the time being they are engaged in promoting Islam as a strategic resource in the class politics of Turkey. This may very well signal the beginning of a new kind of political economic formation emerging out of regional cultural-political attachments. There is no clear indication as to what exact form it will take in the near future. But it is quite clear that Islamists are re-positioning themselves in the economy. This requires rethinking the political economy of Islamist politics in its relations between the market and the state. And it certainly compels us to reconceptualize Islam beyond a binary opposition between the global and culturally local.

Note

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