inter/tidal. vi.

edited by jeff fedoruk, eilidh keegan-henry, and matthew maclellan
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**Introduction**

Jeff Fedoruk

In Canto I, Ezra Pound, Odysseus, steers his ship to the Kingdom of the Dead, performs rites, pours libations, sacrifices sheep, and summons Tiresias, the blind prophet.

Tiresias approaches.

—*A second time? why? man of ill star, facing the sunless dead and this joyless region?*

A third time?

A sixth time?

—*Odysseus shalt return through spiteful Neptune, over dark seas, lose all companions.*

We have heard this story before: Odysseus shalt return, Ezra Pound shalt return, Jeff Fedoruk shalt return.

**SOCRATES —**

But wait: also Andreas Divus, translator of Homer, shalt return, Homer shalt return.

—*Lie quiet Divus. I mean, that is Andreas Divus, in officinal Wecheli, 1538, out of Homer,* says Pound, Odysseus, translator of Divus, translator of Homer, wishing to stifle the voice of the previous translator, to overshadow the previous translator’s presence in the Kingdom of the Dead. For integrity? Still, Pound recognizes that the previous translator’s presence is necessary, in passing the story from one voice to the next. Pound, Odysseus, the translator. Fedoruk, the translator.

So why return, again, to the Kingdom of the Dead? And why return, again, home from the Kingdom of the Dead? Because Tiresias prophesies as much? To continue passing the story along? The story is a little bit different each time.
We return, again, to our homes, to our cities, to other cities, to our pasts, to what we left behind, to pick up what we left behind, to the other, to the Other. To gain insight? To see something we might have missed the first time? The second time? The sixth time?

We return, again, to *inter/tidal*. To “Intertidal.”

We return, again, to the Kingdom of the Dead, for, is not all of art, all of literature, the Kingdom of the Dead? Characters, influences, companions wait for us there.

And we return, again, home, to Ithaca, for, do not more companions wait for us there?

Tiresias, the blind prophet, prophesies as much. Except, we lose no companions. We gain many companions. *So that:*

---

**Works Cited**

from you get a boner i get eternity pressing
Casey Wei

(after yeats)

that sadness in those eyes
is nothing more than a reflection
in cooling bathwater, when you look down and
tell yourself it’s just narcissism.

your hands wrinkled and dented
from making, and washing off the make,
can still feel through their dryness
the flesh and bone underneath, by the hip.

that same flesh and bone
that was yours and will never be yours,
looks at the same crowd of stars at night
with those same sad eyes.
Wei / from you get a boner...

and or not

I thought about leaving home and now I think about coming home. 
I think about coming home after being gone for this long. 
I think about calling home but I write home instead. 
I think about being home only to leave again. 
I think about the bare bones of a home. 
I think about making home alone. 
I think about how long it’s been 
and how long it will be 
until I take my books 
out of their boxes, 
if they will be 
weathered 
warped 
smelly 
damp 
bent 
and 
/or 
not
 .
Wei / from you get a boner...

. o O ;~

the smoke ring through
an o shaped mouth
moves silently,
growing into
disappearance.

it hits the window screen,
stops and holds-
winks goodbye.
“Intertidal” and the History of Squatting in Vancouver’s Fraser Delta
Sean Antrim

If a person were to move along Vancouver’s Burrard Inlet in the mid-nineteenth century, the Coast Salish shoreline would be found strewn with squatters’ shacks, built and lived-in by workers and their families. Shortly after Vancouver's founding in 1886, squatters’ shacks were among the most common forms of housing (McDonald 86). The history and culture of these encampments, tent cities, and squatters’ uprisings are inseparable from working class culture today. Vancouver was founded on the periphery of Europe and continues to negotiate the same contradictions of a settler society that brings private property to its own logical conclusion—colonization—while giving birth to fragments of a new idea of human life and human society: the idea of the commons.

Though the history of the squatters’ movement in the region is suppressed by hegemonic colonial narratives, there is not a decade that has gone by without some documented struggle resulting in or starting with a squat, passing through the legal conflict of private property and the commons. The history of the Fraser Delta is as much the history of squats as it is a history of linear urban development. The action is a form of “taking space” that opts neither for a straightforward “settlement,” nor for a capitalist obsession with profitable “land use.” Squatting can take the form of a political offensive to gain terrain, or it can be used defensively, out of necessity.

Squats punctuate Vancouver’s development. The “hobo jungles” of the 1930s are now famous. In the post-war period, a massive housing shortage led to dozens of occupations in the urban center, now known as some of the most militant occupations in the
city’s history. The most notable squat of that period is the occupation of Hotel Vancouver, where veterans flooded into the hotel under the slogan “A Palace for the Public” and converted the luxury hotel into a hostel for the homeless (Wade).

In the 1960s, a group of Doukhobours, who called themselves the “Sons of Freedom,” were considered squatters (Hazlit). They staged nude protests and planted time bombs. The province proposed issuing identity cards to all people of Russian origin to ensure that they paid property taxes.

In 1990 homeless youth squatted a series of abandoned houses on Vancouver’s East side, documented in the feature length documentary *The Beat on Frances Street*. That action ended with an intervention by the SWAT team. The Vancouver Police Department sent in at least one hundred heavily armed officers after about a dozen unarmed youth. The squat rallied a mass of support and set numerous other anarchist squats in motion through Vancouver, including a famous Main Street squat ending in a blazed building. The next decade saw Woodsquat in 2002 in the abandoned site of Vancouver’s Woodward’s. In the wake of Woodward’s the Downtown Eastside community has occupied important properties at numerous locations throughout downtown, including the front lawn of Science World in 2003, the North Star Hotel in 2006, an empty lot at 950 Main Street in 2007 and—during the 2010 Winter Olympics—the Concord-owned property at 58 West Hastings Street, as well as the privatized Olympic Village in 2011.

In most instances, struggles take place at the margin of the economic expansion of capital. Vancouver is a city whose development has been guided by real estate monopolists, which is the main reason squats and occupations are the dominant form of class struggle instead of strikes and labour actions, although the latter are equally recurrent in a city that is nonetheless a periphery with respect to a shifting industrial core of the global economy. In this respect,
squatting represents an instance of a particular idea in Vancouver’s history, an idea shaped by a subjectivity and re-appropriation specific to workers and tenants. The idea is sometimes realized by a flash of agency over the conditions of production and reproduction in society, fostered by a subjective understanding of relations of exploitation and environment as products of capitalist and colonial powers.

The “Intertidal” Squats

This idea was what drew many of local history’s utopians to the intertidal zones on the North Shore of the Burrard Inlet, between the Second Narrows and the Indian Arm. The story of the occupation of this area is one of the best examples of the political potential of squatting through its capacity to reveal the contradiction of social relations that are based on private property. The larger movement of which it was a part led to serious gains in terrain, including the construction of thousands of units of social housing along False Creek and in South Vancouver, the first ever election of an New Democratic Party government, and the hosting of a United Nations-led forum on housing.

Though the origins are undefined, the squat on the Dollarton Highway mudflats was for decades home to a whole community of activists, scientists, artists, and other resistors. In a turn of events that has now been mythologized, squatter Malcolm Lowry lost one of the later manuscripts of *Under the Volcano* to a fire that took down his shack in 1954. By the late 1960s, a miscoordination of state powers had left the land undefined as private property. Beyond the low tide line is the jurisdiction of the federal government, but a survey done by North Vancouver District City Council only surveyed to the high-tide line, leaving the space in between in a legal grey area, an accidental commons. The squatters’ homes were built out of driftwood and stood on stilts, sitting over water when the tide was at its highest point.
The culmination of the squats are documented by two films: *Livin’ on the Mud* (1975), produced independently by Sean Malone, and another by the National Film Board of Canada called *Mudflats Living* (1972). The latter documents the final days and eventual eviction of the squatters.

In 1970, the state decided that the homes on the mudflats needed to be destroyed. They had become a threat to development and growth. Tentative plans were supposedly being created by the mayor at the time, Ron Andrews, who wanted to turn the area into a “town centre.” The fact that the squatters were inhibiting urban sprawl from bleeding into the Burrard Inlet was true, but it would be revealed later that the development plans were a ruse to put an end to the squatters’ eco-socialist utopia. The limit was not one of geography, but of ideology. No mall was ever built, and the mayor’s rhetoric reinforces the power that the activists really had: “It just can’t continue. They are living in ways that is fine in parts of the province, or parts of Canada, but not in a Metropolitan Centre” (*Mudflats Living*).

The presence of an established, sustainable, and functional commons right in the middle of a dense urban environment reveals the contradictions of private property ownership. It becomes difficult to argue that landlords or real-estate developers are necessary when there are people living happily without them. Though any instance of public property is a threat to capital, land taken back by conscious political struggle is particularly dangerous, because it is evidence of the revolutionary potential of the working class.

The “Intertidal” squats were particularly revolutionary not only as evidence of the possibility of the self-created commons, but in their analysis of the colonial state. In the *Mudflats Living* film, white squatter Willie Wilson acknowledges the land as rightfully belonging to the First Nations, and links this in with the squatters’ “long term plan.” Len George, son of Tsleil-Waututh Chief Dan George,
predicted a loss of First Nations culture as children lose their access to the land and were further assimilated:

The Indian kids are going to lose their culture all together. It’s just going to be taken away from them. They’re only going to know streets, and paved roads and houses, and they’re going to have a section of yard and they’re going to have fences, and there’s going to be changes that are bad. I’d like to see the Indians get it back. (Mudflats Living)

Every piece of dialogue in Mudflats Living posits some kind of “take back” from the owning class, whether on the basis of environmental sustainability (the squatters faced the Shell Refinery on the south shore of the Burrard Inlet), to the acknowledgement that the land had, for thousands of years, been held and lived in as a commons. From the perspective of real estate monopolists, the seminality of this idea demanded some sort of intervention. Private property is the foundational requirement of capitalist accumulation, so alternatives are dangerous.

One spokesperson for the squat was Dr. Paul Spong, a neuroscientist at the Vancouver Aquarium who later became one of the founders of Greenpeace. In his counterpoint to the mayor of North Vancouver, Spong stated that it was the very existence of the squatters that politicians took issue with:

I think they’re just very confused people. I think that the mayor has a concept in his mind of what we are, that he is unable to get beyond. He totally denies our existence in his own mind. He wants to forget us.

(Mudflats Living)

On 7 December 1971, the squatters were denied in their request to plead their case at North Vancouver District Council, and the decision went to the BC Supreme Court (“Hearing Refused for Squatters” 1971). On 18 December 1971, municipal authorities burned down one of the squatters’ homes. This is the closing scene of the Mudflats Living film, but the story continued and the squat managed to survive a while longer. Two years later, they were still there but in 1973 the remaining squatters staged a “wake” after finally submitting to
pressure from the state. At the same time, it was revealed that one older squatter, who had disassociated himself from the political movement, would be allowed to stay (Stockand). One reporter wrote that this was because he “stayed out of politics” (Eng). The town centre which had been used as grounds for eviction in the 1970s was never built. Much of the site is still undeveloped and sits as a bird sanctuary.

The 1970s Squatting Movement

Through the late 1960s to 1970s an awareness of the power and influence of monopoly real estate interests drew people together in resistance both at the periphery and at the heart of the urban centre. In 1966 legislation was created to allow the sale of condominiums, which themselves are a complicated legal device that allows the communal ownership of shared amenities like hallways and elevators that had until then been inhibited (Harris 697). The Strata Title Act essentially allowed the exponential subdivision of geographic space move into three dimensions. At the same time that laws were being written, activists were mobilizing.

Led by Mary Lee Chan, renters and property owners in Strathcona and Chinatown joined together to fight the destruction of their neighbourhoods to make way for a highway that would lead to a third passage across the Burrard Inlet. They called for more affordable housing instead of parks, and are now looked back on historically as being one of the most successful groups to fight against gentrification and state-led economic development schemes.

At the same time, renters in Vancouver’s Kitsilano neighbourhood had formed the Vancouver Tenants’ Association. In 1968 they organized their first rent strike against the Wall & Redekop Corporation. Through these and other actions, they won victories such as three-month notices for rent increases, the right for tenants to vote
in elections, and the responsibility for landlords to make repairs on apartments instead of tenants.

On the other side of the downtown peninsula, the entrance to Stanley Park became home to a squat when activists pre-empted the construction of a massive hotel by creating “All Season’s Park.” Hundreds of squatters asserted a sense of permanence by planting trees and flowers and by building improvised homes for fifty permanent residents (Gutstein 187).

In the summer of 1971 a police riot broke out in Gastown, in response to a “Smoke-In” organized by the Vancouver chapter of the Youth International Party (also known as the Yippies). Youth who had been squatting in industrial buildings in the neighbourhood staged a peaceful protest against police crackdowns, and were intercepted and beaten in a violent backlash from police, who used horses and truncheons to break up the protests.

**Ebbs and Flows**

Since 1971, income inequality has increased dramatically. Vancouver is now the most unaffordable city in North America, and the second most in the world. We can take hope in the fact that in the past decade the frequency and intensity of squatting has increased as well, keeping pace.

As long as the Fraser Delta is controlled by landlords and property developers, there will always be an “Intertidal” zone, a terrain on which people are forced to live or decide to fight back. The idea of the commons is imbedded in the unconscious of the working class, and squatting will continue to be used as a strategy until monopoly capital has been defeated. No matter how distanced struggles are, whether geographically or temporally, time and again they come to arrive at the same tactics brought forward by the same understanding of their class position.
Antrim / “Intertidal”...

Works Cited


from Tiny Movies
Jeffrey Langille and Avery Nabata
Langille and Nabata / from Tiny Movies
Langille and Nabata / from Tiny Movies
Langille and Nabata / *from* Tiny Movies
Langille and Nabata / *from* Tiny Movies
93.7 (Slight Rodeo)
Susanna Browne

It’s late December. I am 13 going on 14, preparing for my birthday party. My father picks me up from school and we take the Volvo out to the suburbs to rent a karaoke machine for the occasion. As we cross over the Arthur Laing bridge the sun is setting, and driving deeper into the reddened evening I see cows sleeping in fields, horse heads through barn doors. Safe, just the two of us, I switch the dial from the CBC to the local country radio station.
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<td>Highway 20 Ride</td>
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<td>Little More Country Than That</td>
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<td>Gimmie That Girl</td>
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<td>I'm In</td>
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<td>DEB</td>
<td>Let Me Introduce Myself</td>
<td>Carolyn Dawn Johnson</td>
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SADDLE BRONC

1. Clint Cannon  Walker, TX
2. Kaycee Field  ElkRidge, UT
3. Kelly Timberman  Mills, WY
4. Heath Ford  Greeley, CO
5. D.V. Fennell  Neosho, MO
6. Tim Shirley  Grant, CO
7. Steven Dent  Mullen, NE
8. Joe Gunderson  Agar, SD
9. Zach Dishman  Beaumont, TX
10. Cody Demers  Kimberly, ID
11. Caleb Bennett  Morgan, UT
12. Matt Lait  Seven Persons, AB
Browne / 93.7 (Slight Rodeo)
It’s a costume party, dress up as your favourite singer. I choose Britney Spears, convenient as I attend private school and already have the uniform. My friends choose similar starlets, Christina Aguilera, the Spice Girls. We tempt sex and roll up our skirts, put on too much make-up, pretend my parents aren’t watching us from the kitchen. I scroll through the machine, pausing on Tim McGraw.
Browne / 93.7 (Slight Rodeo)

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Country Girl
by M. Nakazawa

Hand

Foot

COUNTRY STYLE
But my hesitation is brief. We choose only pop hits, select songs carefully, respond to group taste and giggles. I don’t allow myself to sing the songs I really want to sing, the country ballads, the pedal-steeled stories. I quiet the tiny cowgirl in me, the one who’s origins I still don’t quite understand. After cake, presents, gossip, my guests go home. My parents retreat to their room and I’m left alone with the karaoke machine. I sing late into the night.
from Nostalgia
Tegan Cheremkora

Copp’s Shoes
Cheremkora / from Nostalgia
Cheremkora / from Nostalgia

Galo Shoe Services
Cheremkora / from Nostalgia
Untitled
Erma
from Voyage of a Laughing Man/Girl Laughing
Casey Wei

the linear course of events
as a record of time
Wei / from Voyage...

as it passes in one direction
Wei / from Voyage...

it is an arrow
Wei / from Voyage...

when two different events occur
Wei / from Voyage...

recorded by the same camera
Wei / from Voyage...

they are grouped in the same folder
on the day of the import
Ministry of a Free World
Kavita Reddy

The war machine has taken charge of the aim, worldwide order, and the States are now no more than objects or means adapted to that machine.

- Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

Insite and Enbridge are contemporary examples of emergent lines of flights diverging from the capitalist framework resulting only in reaffirmation of the structure from which the flights initially deviated. Both cases demonstrate reterritorialization of individual moments creating absolute movements further perpetuating the total war state of capitalism. These case histories suggest that capital is more than a pernicious metaphysics; it is integral to social ontology.

The recent decision to continue the operation of Insite resided on the advocates’ ability to creatively redefine the components of the discourse: addict, dignity, health care, and criminal law. The advocates were able to convince the Supreme Court that addiction was not subject to criminal prosecution but was the concern of public medical health. They re-aligned drug use with a different narrative within the same structure, forcing the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the federal stance. The *schiz* was identified, and the court could no longer reasonably criminalize a medical issue. As a result Insite was deemed legal as a single operating facility in Vancouver. However, the Supreme Court also re-stated that the province is accountable and responsible only for the delivery of health care, and the federal government would maintain authority to infringe on provincial jurisdictions by sustaining the authority to determine what is considered a medical issue. Future establishments similar to Insite would have to be assessed and approved on a case-by-case basis by the federal government, pending potential implications and benefits.
On the other hand, Enbridge is currently in a federal review process and has been subject to extensive controversy due to environmental risk and safety implications of the Northern Gateway project. Concurrently, the federal government passed Bill C-38, the Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act, which permits expedited oil sand exports by allowing circumvention of potential barriers from extensive environmental evaluations. Similar to the advocates’ redefinition and realignment of addiction to health care in the Insite decision, the federal government redefined environmental concerns within a budget implementation act. Political and civilian discourse surrounding Insite and construction of the pipeline fails to address the underlying capital metaphysics, which sustains political power. The discourse continues to address only surface problems, which invariably trace back to the origin of the developments: capital. Both Insite and Enbridge established individual moments of flight from the \textit{socius} that deviated from the capitalist structure of the state; however, the totality of capitalism, the war machine, continued to utilize the individual through dependence on the state.

Creative employment and wilful appropriation of words and phrases was pivotal to the recent Insite decision. Insite was granted an exemption on the basis that addiction to a prohibited substance was no longer deemed exclusive to criminal prosecution and could also be considered under the medical health jurisdiction of harm reduction. Armed with scientific evidence based on observational studies, lawyers convinced the Supreme Court that, since establishment of Insite, the fatal overdoes rate within 500 metres of Insite had decreased 35% from 2001 to 2005 (Marshall 1429), and a decline in unhygienic needle practices, which minimizes the risk of contracting HIV or other associated diseases and infections, had been observed. The accessibility to Insite, a rehabilitative center, and Insite counsellors increased the likelihood of individuals with addiction to seek help. Reports from Vancouver Police Department and
surrounding businesses reinforced that the presence of Insite did not enhance drug activity or associated violence.

The Supreme Court’s choice was significant because, prior to the final exemption granted on 30 September 2011 that effectively granted ongoing consent, Insite was threatened with the possibility of closure. The Conservative government was previously unwilling to grant a third exemption because they believed that federal funds would be better directed towards prevention and rehabilitation in line with a more “tough on crime” approach. Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s response to the Supreme Court’s decision was to state bluntly, “I am disappointed” (MacQueen and Partiquin), and Tony Clement, the previous Health Minister, stated that Insite was an “abomination to the policies surrounding the War on Drugs” (Pongracic-Speier). The “tough on crime” narrative supported by the Harper government had not provided substantial evidence of improving the situation of drug addiction. During the implementation of Harper’s Crime Bill, Texas conservatives observed that they had “Been there; done that; didn’t work” (Milewski).

It was evidence proving Insite’s ability to decrease harm that persuaded the Supreme Court to allow continued operation. The empirical evidence provided by the proponents of Insite contrasted the lack of evidence from the Harper government’s counsel, reinforcing that the Crime Bill promoting the War on Drugs had an ideological basis. By challenging the “tough on crime” narrative with substantial evidence, the Insite advocates were able to alter the codification of addiction. However, the organization of the newly constructed concept of addict was still within the reach of the federal government. The lawyers successfully widened the definition for *addict*, which was a definition drawn from a previously established framework. Insite was granted an exemption as a single operating entity but not granted rights to operate another facility without consent from the federal government because the term *addiction*
simply shifted to the realm of health care, which remained in control of the federal government.

On the advocates’ challenge to the concept of addiction, the line of flight attempted to escape the coercive grip of Harper’s retributive criminalization outlined in Bill C-10, the Safe Streets and Communities Act. The courts could no longer justify the archaic approach to the problem that the Harper government adopted: criminalizing a behaviour for which no substantial evidence existed to prove drug use was deterred by imprisonment. The Harper government’s approach to crime focused on prevention and rehabilitation when “82% of the total direct cost associated with illicit drug use in Canada is accounted for by law enforcement, only 16% of the cost goes towards the provisions of health care, a mere 8% is spend on prevention and research” (Kerr 10). However, the criminalization of addicts did not reduce addictions but subjected marginalized individuals to the revolving door of the criminal justice system, never addressing the mitigating factors of addiction. Harper advocated for mandatory sentencing through elimination of conditional sentences, even for youth offenders, in hopes of cleaning up Canadian streets. He promised that the Crime Bill would be passed in the first hundred days of his session, which he successfully achieved, questionably worthy of a confidence not born of due diligence. Claims of the necessity for the drastic approach embodied in the Crime Bill were not evidence-based or, more precisely, based where evidence was not. The paucity of evidence supporting the “tough on crime” approach implied that Harper attempted to deter crime by instilling fear of harsher punishments, causing the individual to internalize the police officer. Leveraging public concern for the potential of violent crime, he relied on compliance tactics rather than facts. Harper justified a retributive approach to criminal activity by citing information from Statistics Canada, revealing that, in spite of a 6% decrease in volume and severity of crime from 2009 to 2010 (1),
31% of people do not report the crimes and, therefore, the government must act on the unreported, unknown crime (“Conservatives to Introduce Massive Omnibus Crime Bill”). The War on Drugs was justified because of the increase in drug-related crimes, which has been showing an upward trend since 1990, and the rise was attributable to an increase in cannabis offences. There was no attempt to provide a correlation between a retributive approach to drug addiction and a lower overall drug crime rate.

Similar to the Deleuzian and Guattarian mechanism of the war machine that “unties the bond just as he betrays the pact” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 352), the concept of addiction was brought into the dominion of health care, which is subject to the same degree of control as criminal activity. The advocates’ arguments were based on principles outlined in section 7 the “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” which outlines the right to “life, liberty, and security of the person.” The Insite decision was contingent on updated research that confirms the facility provides more health benefits than adverse implications to the surrounding community. The proposal for Insite drafted in 2000 to the then Liberal government outlined the scope of the Insite prototype and the considerable benefits the facility would provide in reducing the epidemic of drugs and disease in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. The proposal outlined the present cost of providing medical care to those suffering from HIV or AIDS compared to the projected reduction of costs if individuals addicted to drugs were allowed a safe place to use under medical supervision and were provided access to counselling and medical attention, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of improper needle injection practices. The individuals would have access to a designated “chill-out room,” were they can sit in a protected place surrounded by nurses and rehabilitative pamphlets. The proposal anticipated that, with the availability of medical care and assistance, more would seek help and thus increase the likelihood
that they would re-enter society as a positive, contributing member. Therefore, there would be a decrease in social welfare dependence and hence lower cost. Similar to Foucault’s analytics in The Birth of the Clinic, this proposal attempted to gain appeal by encouraging health of the individual and by reinforcing that “a set of regulations would have to be drawn up that would read at service or mass, every Sunday and holy day and which would explain how one should feed and dress oneself, how to avoid illness and how to prevent or cure disease, these precepts would become like prayers that the most ignorant, even children would learn to recite” (25-26).

Insite’s intention was to resolve the problem of addiction by warding off state control in one area and increasing it in another in the context of federal standards of security of a person, a standard to which laws and individuals within society are measured. The proposal revealed the possibility of converting individuals dependent on state resources to contributing members of society through reinforcement of proper health. Medical intervention of the state was justified because it provided a greater adherence to the “right to life, liberty, and security of the person” story than the alternative Controlled Drug and Substance Act narrative.

The discourse surrounding Insite and the Enbridge pipeline fails to acknowledge that capital is more than a metaphysics and belief, that it is integral to societal being. Capital initiates deviations while simultaneously creating state dependence. This discourse continues to address only visible, surface problems that trace back to the origin: capital. The Insite decision exhibits an implicit call to labour and capital and demonstrates a recapturing of individuals back into the socius. The “tough on crime” approach failed to provide conclusive evidence that imprisonment deters the problem of addiction. In contrast, there was ample evidence available reinforcing that a solution was gravely needed for the growing epidemic in the Downtown Eastside.
The term *addiction* is not permanently within the realm of health and not completely out of the realm of the criminal justice. A safe injection facility was granted as an exemption from the law to exist in areas where ample scientific evidence proved a need and benefits outweighed risks. No new facilities have been granted existence by the federal government to date.

With Enbridge, there is a more explicit preoccupation with capital. Debates between stakeholders and Enbridge executives failed to comply with an established British Columbian social narrative and subsequently created a *schiz* that interrupted the flow of oil out of Alberta and the flow of money into Enbridge and the federal government. The Northern Gateway pipeline project is in the federal review stages, subject to a debatable degree of scrutiny on safety regulations and BC’s fair share. British Columbia Premier Christy Clark, speaking for her constituents, opined that “the balance isn’t there for British Columbia today and I don’t think British Columbians will want this project to go ahead until we can find that balance - unless we find that balance” (Fowlie and Hoekstra). She attempted to gain this balance by requesting that the federal government and Enbridge comply with British Columbia’s five conditions. Clark told the *Globe and Mail*, “the pipeline will only get built if it has the social license to proceed” (Mason). According to Clark, obtaining the “social license” requires that Enbridge passes the review process, provides a world-class safety response, practices adequate prevention, respects First Nations treaties, and apportions a fair share of the economic benefits. Confident that the conditions can be met due to previous success in BC, Clark firmly states, “I’m not taking the position that it can never happen because it is happening now. If we expand the volume dramatically of this very difficult product, we have to have the proper safeguards in place” (Mason).

The Harper government expressed interest in the debate between British Columbia and Alberta on Enbridge’s project,
reinforcing that oil sand exports and greater ties with Asia are key issues for Canadians (Sorensen), insisting that proceeding with the project is acting within the country’s national interest. Harper’s comments serve to rebrand Canadian oil production for Canadian audiences as “ethical oil” on the grounds that Canada is an ethical society (when compared to societies like Nigeria and Saudi Arabia) and provides a safe source of oil (Chase). These remarks exploit the tendency of Canadian listeners to give license to the government to act according to a perceived national self-image. Harper’s government proposed and successfully passed Bill C-38, a budget implementation act pervaded with amendments to environmental legislation. Harper and the Conservatives fast-tracked the bill in hopes of limiting discussion. The opposition party questioned the democratic merit of the bill, declaring “the bill is undemocratic: that by packaging so many different things together, proper scrutiny, study and debate is not possible” (Wherry).

Enbridge projects that the development of the pipeline will boost the Canadian Gross Domestic Product by $270 billion over 30 years (“Enbridge not Impressing B.C. Government on Pipeline Safety”). Bill C-38 amends the Environmental Assessment Act, the Navigable Waters Protection Act and the Fisheries Act. Amendments to the Navigable Waters Act and the Fisheries Act limit or remove governmental enforcement from previously protected areas, lowering environmental barriers for private companies. The Environmental Assessment Act reduces the number of departments and agencies that can do environmental reviews from the forty to three with the aim to speed up approval of projects that would help boost the Canadian economy. There is an enforced timeline of four years put in place to ensure that all projects are reviewed within a timely manner and only those with direct interest in the project have the right to intervene in the review process, but the exact nature of a direct interest is yet to be defined. The acts allow the federal government to intervene within
provincial jurisdiction if the project is considered major; the degree to which a project is considered major or not is determined using criteria that can be defined by the federal government. In response to these amendments the minister of Natural Resources states, “With scarce resources, it is counter-productive to have the federal and provincial government completing separate reviews on the same project. This new plan is critical to creating jobs, economic growth and long-term prosperity. We need to tap into the tremendous appetite for resources in the world’s dynamic emerging economies - resources we have in abundance” (Davidson).

The northern coastline is not only an ideal platform to ship oil to Asia; it contains many of BC’s natural resources. A multiplicity of natural products beyond oil is contained within the concept of natural capital, and those products contribute to fuelling and maintaining the social capitalist machine. Fish and lumber, for example, are not only resources that BC extracts from nature and trades, but also the reason for jobs in production, extraction, and selling that are key to BC’s economy:

The commercial fishery in BC employs approximately 16,000 people, sport fishing, fish processing and commercial fishing generates close to 1.7 billion combined each year. In addition, the north coast crab fishery supports 41 commercial crab vessels that fish Dungeness crab in Hecate Strait; from this fishery alone $20 million worth of crab is produced, and employs 145 people on vessels and 250 shore workers. An oil spill along the BC north central coast could kill thousands of marine animals and destroy habitats as well as drastically affect the fishing and tourist industries. How will it impact the salmon? (“Working to Stop the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline”)

Opposition has been spurred by the major oil spill on July 2010 in Michigan caused by Enbridge, where three million liters of diluted bitumen poured from pipes into wetlands and rivers and flowed for 17 hours after the initial alarm (Emmanuel). These risks would be avoided if the second and third requests, world-leading prevention
and response, outlined in Clark’s social license are met, and levies are imposed by Ottawa on oil shippers that would be allocated towards a recovery and disaster fund. The environmentalists and Christy Clark functioned under the principle that they did not want such a development in their back yard without ensuring that BC would receive some benefit. We are already extracting oil and other resources from BC, and “British Columbians want to have our environment protected and they want to know that we’re going to be looking out for their best interests when it comes to jobs and economic benefits” (Fowlie and Hoekstra).

The fourth condition that needs to be met is that Enbridge and the federal government should respect the First Nations treaty rights and see that they are compensated accordingly. Enbridge has stated that 60% of First Nations communities along the pipeline’s proposed route accepted an equity stake in the project (Sorensen). However, the main concern for the First Nations is the ongoing, unsettled land claims negotiations that BC and the federal government have failed to address. Everyone wants a piece of the land, but who actually has rights to it? The main critic of the pipeline’s business plan observed that “the company never considered the project in a B.C. context, never tried to foresee the problems it would face, did not seek out broad, experienced advice or find possible allies in governments and get them committed to resolving the land claims and environmental issues up front. In other words, the company never perceived the linkages necessary for success” (Enemark). Enbridge’s success hinges on obtaining a “social license.” This social license has been summed in a few lines that all explicitly or implicitly deal with budget, labour, capital, and natural resources. Further, Deleuze and Guattari explain that

\[
\text{Smooth or nomad space lies between two striated spaces: that of the forest, with its gravitational verticals, and that of agriculture, with its grids and generalized parallels, its now independent arborescence, its art of extracting the tree and wood from the forest. But being between}
\]
also means that the smooth space is controlled by the two flanks. (*A Thousand Plateaus* 384)

Society is within the un-territorialized smooth space but is controlled by the two flanks: natural resources and development or agriculture. As one side grows, the other depletes. What society has achieved is assigning value and claim to everything in the name of operating the social machine, and “this form, as a global and relative space, implies a certain number of components: forest – clearing of field; agriculture grid laying; animal raising subordinated to agricultural work and sedentary food productions; commerce based on a constellation of town-country communications” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 384). The discourse on the Northern Gateway pipeline project is interesting not because Enbridge failed to meet BC’s political and economic needs but because, in spite of the fact that the factions think they are fighting over different issues, the terms of the social license reinforce that they desire the same thing: resources and capital.

Few voices care to question what will happen when all components of the natural landscape become depleted through extraction and pollution. Those that advocate against the project miss that the underlying risk is acceleration of the inevitable process of environmental degradation by human hands. The Deleuzian and Guattarian notion of the capitalist machine, the war machine, speaks to the incapacity of escaping such an overarching structure: “it has rendered concrete the abstract as such and has naturalized the artificial, replacing the territorial codes and the despotic overcoding with an axiomatic of decoded flows, and a regulation of these flows” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 261). It slots everything, such as health care, social interactions, and even desires into the pursuit of capital. There are some sincere concerns regarding the depletion of our natural resources, but they are voiced only from within the
capitalist myth because nothing can escape its hold. Because we all consume and work towards production, no individual is off the grid.

Both Insite and Enbridge established individual moments of flight out of the socius that deviated from the capitalist structure of the state; however, the totality of capitalism (the war machine) continued to utilize the individual through state dependence. In both cases the deterritorialization and subsequent reterritorialization of legislation revealed how integral capitalism is to the perpetuation of the state. A secure needle was placed around the drug, ensuring the correct method of flow, and a social license guarantees success in harvesting natural resources and achieving an arbitrary balance. The social contract that was formed by Thomas Hobbes, and life in primitive, unconscious societies was no longer “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (87), but when was there ever just one individual? The socius is formed by intrinsic individual desires that proceed to define culture. Evident in discourses of these two cases is that language (law) and culture formed an external link with capital and the state, and the individuals became objects of the totality of capital, which is perpetuated by the manifestations of the intellect. Paul Virilio speaks to the prosecution of silence in modern art and science, which contributes to blind adherence to the state and capital, when “contemporary art’s prosecution of silence is in the process of lastingly polluting our representations” (Virilio 39).

Capital and labour are inherent to individual desire, and the “devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things” (Marx 22). In both cases society attempted to recapture the flight by establishing grid lines either over the ecosystem or the human body. The increased dependence on the economy via the state is cultural and not compulsory. Society internalized capitalism in the same manner that Plato suggested the individual internalize reason; we deduced capital, culture, and language to reason, making tangible the intangible.
Through culture, society errs in ascribing meaning within false dichotomies—an arbitrary standard of good and evil that disregards the multiple singularities. This predetermines use of the war machine (capital). The equilibrium created by the two opposing processes of de- and re-territorialization creates a steady state. A momentary disparity in intensity of one process impels the whole system briefly in a direction without ever abandoning any colonized inner ground.
Works Cited


Notions of Revolution
Eilidh Keegan-Henry

Something deeper encoded presented deciphered

Right here for you to see

Stitched into skin
Keegan-Henry / Notions of Revolution
She
Dig deeper
and you will be able to speak
with your ancestors

Their gods are my gods
What is a Concept? Before, Alongside, and After the Animal
Matthew MacLellan

The friction between categories of the human and the animal has been a structural logic of Western thought and literature since the time of antiquity. The figure of the “animal,” broadly conceived, can be seen alongside the human in writings as diverse as Homer, Aristotle, Hegel and Nietzsche. However, the line between the animal nature of the human and the beastly nature of the animal has been re-articulated in a myriad of ways over the centuries. I want to consider these conceptualizations by focusing on the dimensions of temporality that enter our language when articulating these discursive notions: mainly, what it means to be before, alongside, or after the animal. Jacques Derrida articulates this problem in *The Animal that Therefore I Am*, in a discussion of the book of Genesis found in Hebrew and Christian scripture. While this problem may find its genesis in Judeo-Christian literature, it runs like a thread throughout other philosophies and literature. I will provide a brief (but not all-encompassing) summation of these conceptualizations in Western philosophy, in order to draw attention to the way the opposition between the self and the animal creates the forces that culminate in the erection of the stable, bounded, human subject. I will employ the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to illustrate the force of conceptual frameworks, followed by a brief discussion of two stories by Franz Kafka. These stories provide another way to penetrate the opposition between the human and the animal, since the figures that Kafka presents in his stories seem to be both or neither, perhaps at the same time. It is my contention that where the animal is conceptualized in relation to ourselves, whether before, alongside, or after—but always in terms of a “linearity”—poses threats to what
forces and effects are capable of being produced, something that has ramifications for life itself (whether constructed as animal or human life).\footnote{i}{kort noter: Jeg har ikke noen ekstern referanse for å støtte dette.}

The figure of the animal is instrumental in establishing a stable human subject. The opposition between the human and the animal has a long pedigree in Western thought and literature; however, these categories are usually erected to service discourses of man. These discourses usually begin with a bounded human subject, presumed to be endowed with reason or *logos*, and proceed to all that is outside this constructed boundary. Aristotle established a very in depth, (though hierarchical) view regarding humans and animals. Though it is an instrumental form of logic, Aristotle presumed that the simpler “animals” (such as plants) displayed the least amount of soul, while he put man at the top of his hierarchy. All of these organisms, from plants to humans (including what we might identify as animals) have souls, but depending on where something falls in the hierarchy, it displays different forms of “potency” or potential. In Descartes, we see a different formulation of the animal; for Descartes, animals are simply machines that act by reflex to external stimuli. German idealist philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel, seem to maintain that the animal is useful only in so far as it can tell man how much better he is than the animal. Kant argues that animals are useful insofar as they tell us how we should act to fellow men, since they are an analogue to humanity. Kant also argues that man alone has self-consciousness, an idea that is picked up by Hegel and Kojève in his lectures on Hegel. In Kojève’s formulation, the animal displays a base form of desire, namely a desire for objects another possesses. According to Kojève, man desires the desire of the Other, something he argues animals cannot do. I do not intend to provide a full exposition on all the philosophers who have made the figure of the animal Other into one of grave importance in order to establish the stability of the bounded human subject endowed with *logos*, but
simply to illustrate that the animal is instrumental in maintaining this subject. There are exceptions to this technique, of course. Several examples might be Michel de Montaigne, Plutarch, and some of the interactions the protagonist of Dante’s *Inferno* shares with hybridic animal figures. I only mean to show that the animal somehow seems secondary or subjugated in relation to man, especially when an *episteme* is deployed that assumes that animals lack *logos*.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari ask what it is to think in their writings. They ask this question in the context of their book, *What is Philosophy?* In the first chapter of this book, “What is a Concept?” Deleuze and Guattari allow us to understand that concepts and theories are strategies with forces and effects that make a difference to our own experience of our quotidian lives. One answer they provide to the question of “What is a Concept?” is that even the foundational concepts upon which is a philosophical system rests must rely upon something:

Even the first concept, the one with which a philosophy ‘begins,’ has several components, because it is not obvious that philosophy must have a beginning, and if it does determine one, it must combine it with a point of view or a ground. Not only does [each philosopher] not begin with the same concept, they do not have the same concept of beginning.

(15)

This statement draws attention to the ways in which every epistemological system has a ground upon which it rests. We need concepts to address the experience of life itself, but the existence of concepts does not necessarily result in the creation of truth. Deleuze and Guattari fear that the production of concepts will lead to discursive formulations of truth, a situation where the concept and the proposition become confused with each other. They state that “Confusing concept and proposition produces a belief in the existence of scientific concepts and a view of the proposition as a genuine “intension” (what the sentence expresses)” (22). Rather than reject the discourses previously mentioned as worthy of aggressive critique and
subsequent dismissal, I want to emphasize that they are worthy of our attention because of the questions they open up for investigation and careful consideration.

One problematic that presented itself to me was a consideration of what it means to come before the animal. In the book of Genesis, the “first” book of the Hebrew Bible, two contrasting accounts of the relationship between human and animals is presented. In the first account (New Oxford Annotated Bible, Gen. 1.20-26), the earth is established with living creatures (20), and “man” is created and given dominion over the creatures (26). In the second account of creation (Gen. 2.5-20), man is created first and the creation of “beasts” and “birds,” which the man is instructed to name. These two accounts of creation contradict each other. This in itself is not a problem, since it is generally understood that the book of Genesis is compiled from a variety of oral and written sources. However, this contradiction does betray a certain conceptualization in terms of progress and creation in relation to the animal.

What does it mean to come before, with, or after the animal, and what are the ramifications of this perspective? In The Animal that Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida poses this question, while addressing the contradictory nature of the Genesis text. He even goes so far as to suggest that “To follow and to be after will be […] the question of what we call the animal” (10). For Derrida, the question of where the animal is situated (before, alongside, after) is intimately tied to the question of what a response means in terms of the animal. In other words, Derrida raises the question of what it would mean for the animal to respond and whether the animal ever responds in an autographical manner—whether it “ever replies in its own name” (10). If the animal is to respond at all, we must let it respond on its own terms. A method of inquiry that suggests, as Descartes has suggested, that animals must respond with speech in order to be seen as communicating is too anthropocentric to open up the issue of the
response in relation to the animal to new forces and effects. In addition, a discourse that instrumentalizes the animal for the establishment of the human betrays a certain Darwinian logic of evolution, a view that is largely accepted. One must acknowledge that these specific concepts structure our discourse in singular and specific ways and lead to certain discursive material effects. I propose that an analysis of Franz Kafka’s short stories will result in bringing to light other forces and effects at play within the structuring opposition between human and animal.

I find several points in Franz Kafka’s short stories, especially “Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk,” where he positions the animal somewhere between common conceptions of humans and animals, thereby challenging any strict line one might maintain between the two. As Jerry Zaslove writes, Kafka displays an ideal of community portrayed by “animalized humans and humanized animals” (“Mimetic Friendship against Mimetic Violence” 90), which allows for a reflection on our own relationship to animality.

Kafka’s stories can be read as exemplifying a number of genres, even oscillating between them; it is not clear whether they are parables, fables, myths, or something else entirely. By drawing out the rhetorical devices of these genres, “The Burrow,” for example, can be read as a parable. One reason for this is its lack of exposition: it positions the reader directly inside the story, not on the outside looking in. Other features of parables include oscillations between distance, especially near and far, and the question of collectivity and community raises questions about what unites a group of people or a social movement. Parables often also raise moral and ethical questions, and exist outside a specific linear conception of time (Zaslove, Lecture). Kafka is able challenge our conceptions of a story, inviting us to consider what a story can do and how text(s) can be read more carefully. A central concern of Kafka, especially in the stories that most explicitly depict animalized humans (“Josephine the
Singer,” “The Metamorphoses,” “Report to an Academy,” “The Burrow”) is that of home and exile. Kafka displays an extreme sensitivity to the effects alterity has on community. His stories deal with issues related to class, power and domination and the ethics of accommodation. In “Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk,” issues relating to community and accommodation become the central feature of the story. The protagonist is Josephine, and as it is described in the opening paragraph of the story, her singing “carries people away” (360). It is not clear what Josephine’s relationship to the people who are entranced by her is: some feel the need to protect her, implying she needs the patriarchal protection of the law (even if it is the ‘invisible’ law of this community, it functions in tangible ways); otherwise, it almost seems that Josephine is the surface upon which the anxieties of the community are projected. In either situation, Josephine serves as a figure that collectivizes the group entranced by her song.

Returning to the original question that framed my investigation into the figure of the animal, it remains unclear whether Josephine is before, alongside, or after the group she is singing her songs to. For example, when she stops singing, the “mouse people” (though it is unclear whether they are actually mice) seem to go about their work in a quotidian manner. What remains unclear in the story is how long they can sustain this work without the sustenance her singing provided, as the story does not allow us to see this. Kafka’s investigation into the problem of before/after the human is complex precisely because the reader is never given full disclosure. Although we are aware that a man wrote the story, humans are curiously absent from the story, having been replaced by these hybridic figures already mentioned. It is obvious that the animals in “Josephine” respond, though they do so in a way that is discursively intelligible to us. Josephine’s singing provides a direct link between her song and the mouse people.
Kafka’s “Metamorphoses” is another story that positions the animal problem in a unique way. One day, Gregor Samsa awakes to find himself transformed into a monstrous beetle. In a very basic and obvious way, we can say that the human in this conceptualization comes before the animal, since Gregor was a human who becomes the animal; however, the presentation by Kafka is not so simple. The way that Kafka frames the figure of Gregor is what makes his approach to the issue of temporality and procession worthy of investigation.

A close reading of the opening paragraph of “The Metamorphosis” reveals a number of rhetorical choices that position the narrative voice in a specific way. From the very first sentence of the story, Gregor has been transformed. In the logic of the story, if we accept the story on its own terms and resist imposing an interpretative framework upon it, there is no “before” transformation into a beetle figure for Gregor; he is presented in his transformed form, from the very beginning of the story. Kafka writes:

[Gregor] was laying on his hard, as it were armor-plated, back and when he lifted his head a little he could see his domelike brown belly divided into stiff arched segments on top of which the bed quilt could hardly keep in position and was about to slide off completely. (89)

The imagery of the opening paragraph establishes a picture of Gregor laying on his back and barely being in control of his own body. In a certain way, Kafka almost presents Gregor as disembodied. It is appropriate, however, to raise the question of what he is disembodied from: the human or the animal? Recalling that Kafka’s stories are filled with figures that might be identified as humanized animals/animalized humans, Kafka presents Gregor as disembodied from the experience of life itself. Gregor finds his own body so monstrous and cumbersome that he can hardly move; his own spindly legs seem to act as automata. This duality between the outside and the inside is replicated in “The Metamorphoses” between the comic grotesque approach Kafka takes to public/private life. It reads as comic when Gregor is more concerned about being late for his work.
than he is about his monstrous bodily form. The story also displays a certain anxiety and self-consciousness of the body (in a way that reads almost as hysterical as Descartes’ own establishment of the mind as distinct from the body), as well as questions regarding the fragility and precariousness of the body as it switches so rapidly between sick and healthy.

The presentation of the monstrous body in “The Metamorphoses” also betrays certain established ideas we maintain about the insect. Generally, instincts are thought of as rather small-scale creatures. In “The Metamorphoses,” the humanized beetle is so large it can barely fit through the door. By constructing Gregor’s body into something so large, boundaries are not as easily transgressed, further problematizing where we place the dividing line between the human and the animal. One might question why Kafka presents us with a humanized beetle; his stomach is described as a “belly,” which is very humanistic language. One possible explanation is to defamiliarize the reader from his/her own preconceptions of human and animal life; it places the reader in a mode of abnormality that is abnormal enough to become naturalized and feel normal.

Overall, Kafka seems to bounce between boundaries to point to our own alienation from our own conceptualizations—or how far a “concept” may be from the real material conditions of life itself. To some extent, Deleuze and Guattari alert us to this in their writing by pointing out that concepts open us out to the chaos and forces of life; they do not point us towards transcendental truth that exists “out there” for us to find. Kafka collapses the binary relationship of human and animal (categories that have been constructed for discursive purposes), public and private, distance and intimacy, among others. By entering Kafka’s stories on their own terms, and by seeing what issues they unravel, the relationship discourses of man serve to the figure of the animal may become clearer.
There is no final answer to be given on the question of whether the human comes before, alongside, or after the animal. However, what does remain clear is that where we conceive of the animal—if we choose to consider it in a linear fashion or not—has ramifications for what forces and effects our discourses will produce. While concepts may seem abstract, they can quickly accumulate force and agency, leading to material effects for the lived.
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East

early toasted nothings
she lengthened handsomely across
yawning, a city pressed neat
under linens
oh, standing
near certain types of weather
the string of it dried in reunion

train car shunts against the
clever, always true, often stateless
slapping stems against the gate
uttering at small boats
wandering round birds in an old village,
in a garden
in a ghostly
The Area Undergoes Total Rejuvenation

rough and rowdy staging
a heritage slowly fills
with refuse. whistles instead of westminister.
from foreshore saloon to chicken shop shooting
crews and captains quickly
driving a chain lift geared toward tradition
a faulty barkeep operates all
but two hands on the home pitch.
Several Teams from the League Regard the Park

during the summer the park can be extremely busy with notable instances of gun crime
financial support has made it possible to harness street people sleeping on the spot cold weather

the south end of the ground is a popular vantage point for unloaded loggers to prosper
adjacent to the viaduct

several teams from league regard the park as a network of modern invention
August

english men really love american kitsch
once I found one with a joke
tattoo of the big apple and I loved
him
A long while back I told my mother I wanted to do something about my hometown, Staten Island: something charismatic about it, something that gave it its charm, just something. Having grown up there all my life, taking the ferry, I am frequently told that my hometown is a “dump.” This reference, rather, a stereotype, is only found in part by the former Fresh Kills Landfill, currently being reconstructed into a park by the New York City government.

“This is where we should start feeling at home,” says Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, speaking in a New York dumping grounds. “Part of our daily perception of reality is that this disappears from our world. When you go to the toilet, shit disappears. You flush it” (Examined Life).

It is true. We tend to disregard the disappearance of garbage, trash, shit, or any refuse, almost equivocally shared with the production and alienation of commodities. Growing up in Staten Island, still living there, much of the remains of the waste, rotting away like a corpse in a desert, still haunts to this day. This is not to say just Staten Island—it is our whole ecological and cosmological situation.

Informed by the popularized slideshow An Inconvenient Truth, by Al Gore, our concerns about global warming are to reduce, reuse, recycle, buy eco-friendly material for compost or biodegradation, take public transportation, and use less gas; buy hybrid vehicles, use less fossil fuels, and so on. These tactics alone, by and large, offer an interesting approach that I find ultimately problematic: the garbage that we continue to produce is still harmful to the environment and is still “there.”
Prior to the 2010s, Staten Island planned on removing all of the garbage from the Fresh Kills Landfill, which was the largest landfill in the world at that time. So large, that in his 1992 book, *Rubbish!* , William Rathje observed that the mass weight of all the garbage was far greater than an Incan temple in Latin America. The stench bothered citizens in Richmond County, and it has been a long running gag between Staten Islanders and New Jerseyians, whether or not the industrial work smells worse than the dump.

In 2001, Fresh Kills Landfill was closed off, moving all of the garbage (900 tons a day) from Staten Island, to a landfill in South Carolina and various barges outward. The landfill left a 56-year footprint, with its tombstone being the smell, to remind us all of yesteryears. It is now the plan to change that environment from landfill to park. The garbage, still invisible from the public’s eye, is being used as an artificial topography for the former wetlands’ transformation into a park. The NYC Parks and Recreation site boasts of the development:

At 2,200 acres, Freshkills Park will be almost three times the size of Central Park and the largest park developed in New York City in over 100 years. The transformation of what was formerly the world’s largest landfill into a productive and beautiful cultural destination will make the park a symbol of renewal and an expression of how our society can restore balance to its landscape. In addition to providing a wide range of recreational opportunities, including many uncommon in the city, the park’s design, ecological restoration and cultural and educational programming will emphasize environmental sustainability and a renewed public concern for our human impact on the earth.

In my project, I undertake a “garbage ethnography” of Staten Island, questioning more generally the infrastructural role of environment in establishing a city or society, and the globalization of garbage. Garbage is nomadic, in the sense of its autonomy, its movement, and the fear it instills in society. I use the work of Mary Douglas (*Purity and Danger*), Rathje, Roland Barthes (*Plastic*), and Gilles Deleuze
and Félix Guattari (*Nomadology: The War Machine*) to discuss the importance of garbage in our society, historically, conceptually, and presently. The report is inconclusive: beyond what we know of the networks of garbage, there is a rhizomatic function behind the origins of waste. We can trace back the archaeology and geology of garbage, but the way the land is transformed to suit its citizens is a matter of territory. We have indeed entered our new home.

**Garbology**

What is garbology? According to Merriam-Webster, *garbology* is “the study of modern culture through the analysis of what is thrown away as garbage.” The first known use was in 1975, when William Rathje, an archaeologist teaching at the University of Arizona, took his students to excavate landfills around the area. In these landfills, one can find samples of what culturally defines a society’s waste; for Žižek, it would be the “pornography” that catches one off guard. Most garbage can say a lot about a culture in general.

Garbology is the fusion of archaeology with waste management to understand why the objects collected are considered garbage. Of course, for a discipline so aptly named after garbage, garbology also problematizes the larger issues surrounding the environment—much of it owed to pollution—while obtaining information on percentages of trash found, mass weight of the landfills, and distribution of materials to be recycled.

In the present day discipline of garbology, the focus has shifted from understanding cultures to understanding ecologies: for instance, the correlation of garbage to marine life. Why this disciplinary shift was introduced may have much to do with the cosmological issue of global warming; but I still do think that changes in land and territory, especially in the situation of a landfill
transformed into a park, leaves a lot of questions unanswered about the refuse.

In his essay on plastic, Roland Barthes states that “it [is] a miraculous substance: a miracle is always a sudden transformation of nature. Plastic remains impregnated throughout with this wonder: it is less a thing than the trace of a movement” (97). The infinite transformative form of plastic, materialized in garbage, has almost an artistry that leads one to wonder about the “singular of the origin and the plural of the effects” (97). Its use, however, is what gives plastic reign as a supreme pleasure item, with the whole world being subject to plasticization. This is certainly true when Barthes cites the creation of plastic aortas for those undergoing heart surgeries.

Barthes is right in suggesting plastic’s role in defining our world. He is wrong to suggest, however, the power in defining these—ideologically speaking—as polluting agents.

**Pollution and Nomadology**

In *Purity and Danger*, Mary Douglas problematizes power in relation to pollution:

* A polluting person is always in the wrong. He has developed some wrong condition or simply crossed some line which should not have been crossed and this displacement unleashes danger for someone. Bringing pollution, unlike sorcery and witchcraft, is a capacity which men share with animals, for pollution is not always set off by humans.
* Pollution can be committed intentionally, but intention is irrelevant to its effect—it is more likely to happen inadvertently. (114; emphasis added)

Here, by emphasizing Douglas’s words, I begin to ascribe the concept of pollution to the physical manifestation of power by the state. Pollution is always deemed the opposite of pure; it is the dirty, the unhygienic—the shared attributes of animal with human, and so on. Further, Douglas symbolically employs pollution in the context of
rituals for the treating of outsiders, when she looks at the “abominations” traditionally found in the Western biblical references of Leviticus.

Douglas words project the “wrongness” and the “intentionality” of pollution. In the cosmological sense, wrongness is defined by a committed injustice infringing upon the rights of an entity; because the Bible tends to be the hegemonic force behind the West in reference to morality, it is apparent to say that the symbolism of pollution and abomination go hand in hand. But the intentionality of pollution remains “irrelevant” to its effect because pollution remains contingent on any number of inadvertent occurrences.

By definition, garbage, as a form of pollution, is deemed the polluting other, which we in turn create on occurrences. We have a shared capacity with garbage for that reason, despite symbolically referring to garbage as “garbage” for the purpose of displacing it ritualistically.

In Nomadology, Deleuze and Guattari write of the nomad, a being constantly in flight, formed by labor, identity, and an unknown origin:

It is not that the ambulant sciences are more saturated with irrational procedures, with mystery and magic. They [the nomads] only get that way when they fall into abeyance. And the royal sciences, for their part, also surround themselves with much priestliness and magic. Rather, what becomes apparent in the rivalry between the two models is that the ambulant or nomad sciences do not destine science to take on an autonomous power, or even to have an autonomous development. They do not have the means for that because they subordinate all their operations to the sensible conditions of intuition and construction—following the flow of matter, drawing and linking up smooth space.

*Everything is situated in an objective zone of fluctuation that is coextensive with reality itself.* (412; emphasis added)

With the nomad, and concerning the act of situating a position in space and time, there comes the notion of territory—a land that is divisive, fractured by boundaries, maintained by trade, and disjoined
by difference (Appadurai). These differences, which come to prominence when identifying with ourselves and others, and with varied categories imagined and prescribed, become a political orientation defined by multiplicities (various paradigms that become shifted around notions of power and desire). The nomad always threatens the State, the sovereign power, from the outside, and always follows a line of flight, “the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 9-10).

Is it possible to connect garbage to the nomad? In a cosmological context (i.e. in terms of global warming, waste management, and fear of the End), garbage is the nomad. It threatens the entire existence of not just humankind, but worldkind. Because of this endangerment to “us,” “we” must find a way to develop a territory for “them.” It is only by the State that we create them, through commodification, through industrialization, through use, and definitely, through value. It is only with “us” that we create the definition, the stereotype, and the culture of the thing called garbage.

Now, we enter areas that have become the haven for garbage: the wasteland, the landfill, the dump. All of these identifiers have at least a connoted dimension that, within history, becomes transformed by paradigms of power, shifting stylistically from discipline to control (Deleuze). These transformations have been identified in discussions on neoliberalism, biopolitics, appropriation, and capitalism. However, this is beyond ideology and practicality—the politics here are fluctuating, rather than static. It is *affect*, the state of mind and body unified in relation to feelings, such as joy or sorrow, or *emotions*, like desire.

Garbage has autonomy in assembling together in “their” territory. If, however, we consider the history behind this territory, we owe much to the nomads for designating a culture behind the land.
Thus, considering the concept of territory, there is a
deterritorialization and a reterritorialization of this space-time
paradigm. For example, with the Fresh Kills territory—it was once a
pure forest with salt marshes, then a province, then a landfill, and now
being developed into a park.

We have reached an impasse: there is no real way of
removing garbage from our planet. When landfills reach capacity, it is
time to move the garbage away. Garbage even persists through
photographs and through the pollution we experience in the city-
space. This is a cosmological issue, which has lead us to consider
alternatives, such as greener products and commodities, or a
biopolitics of trash.

It is only when we acknowledge these issues at a larger
scope, as a symmetrical network based on multiplicities along a line
of flight, that we begin to act in an according manner (Latour).

**On Site and On Sight: Schmul Park, Topography, and
Development**

In 2012, I went to Schmul Park, located towards the
northernmost tip of the former Fresh Kills landfill site. I was amazed
by the design of the park, with its various sports courts, a playground
with swings, two baseball fields in development, and lots
of pathways around. It was clean.

I ventured further, however, beyond the park, dealing with
the fact that if I was caught by any of the park staff, I would have
been charged with trespassing on government property. I found
several pathways outside of the baseball field that lead to the former
landfill area. What was most interesting to find, aside from the
pesticide warnings and the wildlife, was the remnants of refuse in the
area. By the southeast edge, in a little pond, a bicycle, along with
several wooden crates, were exiled into a space non-existence, an invisible silence ambiently coddled by the park.

A week later, I went to Staten Island Borough Hall. It was there that the Topography Department, led by a cartographer named Tom, helped me in my quest in understanding the land’s history. Based on my research, the landfill area was bought by the city government in 1953, but the area was already being used by the borough as a dumping ground six years prior.

At the Borough Hall I found several atlases, the oldest being from 1874, of Richmond County. The Fresh Kills area was once prosperous and lively prior to the 1940s. The atlases also plot the populations in this area, and with each later edition, the plot size becomes smaller. This was the first instance of transforming the land.

Tom also handed me several scans from the grid, ranging from 1911 to 1912, of the Fresh Kills area. These topographical charts provided much information about the geological strata within the area, prior to the landfill’s existence.

This inquiry led me to wonder: now that the landfill has been closed off, what would the geology of the area be shaped like? Tom assured me that by 2013, the next set of scans in the area will be taken care of; thus, my study was, for now, inconclusive.

“If you live next to a landfill for twenty years, you’ll understand why,” says Jonah, the project manager for the Freshkills Park development team. Jonah sat down with me to discuss the transitional image of an area. The Fresh Kills area used to be wetlands that in 1948 was underappreciated and undevelopable, according to Robert Moses, a prominent city development figure. The landfill was to be a temporary project, but as all the other boroughs’ landfills closed off, Fresh Kills became the primary municipal site for dumping in New York City.

In the mid-90s, the North and South mounds, which are artificial, rolling hills built by garbage, reached capacity at about 150
feet tall. Jonah, who is not a native to Staten Island, informed me that it was not until 2001 that Rudy Giuliani, George Pataki, and Guy Molinari (all Republican representatives in government), agreed to close off the landfill. Staten Island has been a predominately conservative and Republican area outside of the city.

In regards to garbage, Jonah considers waste development as part of the urban metabolic process, somehow almost natural in behavior. It is a part of life, but we need to acknowledge what we do with the garbage; Freshkills Park, as a developing project slated to be completed by 2036, is an entity with which to promote and engage alternatives to waste. Further, it will act as a “buffer” agent to the global warming cosmological and ecological issue. The garbage is being used as part of the landfill cap, which has several barriers to protect the waterways and airways from the degrading garbage underneath.

By 2015, the North Park, where the North Mound of garbage was, will open as a full park, including Schmul Park and Owl Hollow, a recreational area. Freshkills has influenced other landfills to convert into parks. Echoing Žižek, Jonah recounts how, for a very long time, residents on Fifth Avenue would take their garbage out with no clue as to where it will end up; yet Staten Islanders knew, for over fifty years, exactly where the garbage went.

Findings and Conclusions

Waste is natural. The politics behind it are aesthetically and heuristically oriented. We deem things as “garbage” or “trash” or “shit,” and then we remove them from our perception. Garbage is a nomadic entity in both the sense of its movement and its threatening stance. Now it is found underground or in other landfills, with no exact origin or end point. All we know is that it is there and is part of the fabric of urban development.
Land can transform, but this case study of the Fresh Kills landfill shows much around the politics of urban development as far as what we deem as “developable” or otherwise “producible.” We shift the focus now to alternative measures in waste production to teach the next generation not to repeat a landfill the size of Fresh Kills.

Most of my findings are inconclusive. I say this because there are a lot of networks involved with the development of the park, the development of the landfill, and the lack of appreciation for wetlands. Historically speaking, we can see that topography leaves a huge trace for what was, and what will be from now on. To speak about garbage: we do not know where it will go from here, but we need to begin acknowledging its movement in relation to its creation, heuristically and politically. *One man’s trash is another man’s treasure*—if only that could be true now.
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Thematic Trends in Contemporary Internet Art
Aureliano Segundo

T-shirts, meat, ladders, stock photos, garbage bags, cardboard boxes, water, triangles, product stills, athletic wear, Greek shit, fake nails, tropical sunsets, gradients, gestural images, potted plants, office decor, spiritual iconography, pizza, things that are blue. This is the stupid shit we post online. And then we call it art.

I like that we call it art. I think it’s utopian and powerful and critical in its own way. But it’s easy to just stop at lol and not go deeper.

Most of the time we smile or we laugh and then we say an artwork is ironic, or that it’s a joke. But irony is a contrast between two things, and jokes are funny. So what exactly is it that we’re contrasting when we post this stupid shit? What exactly is so funny?

Our unconscious mind works hard to process things we are not always consciously aware of. And laughter is often a sign that we understand something unsaid, even if we can’t put our finger on it right away.

I have a feeling that if we look into why our art is funny, it might also help explain why it’s art.

T-shirt Art, Instruments of Possession, and Other Useless Things

There are a lot of people who post pictures of t-shirts they’ve slapped their own graphics on, but I don’t know anyone who does it better than Alex Gibson. Alex bases his work around the real life practice of wearing graphic T’s.

During an interview we had together, the t-shirt genius said self-publishing is an analog to wearing a graphic t-shirt: “in both cases the individual identifies him or herself in certain social niches
and subjects him or herself to criticism and examination by others” (Segundo).

And then he went meta, saying that if he wears a t-shirt in real life that he posted to the internet “[I] refer reflexively to the same act of publication. I am incorporating my digital persona into my physical one. Publishing a publication, and simulating a simulation of the self,” which is an interesting and surprisingly eloquent description of his artistic practices, but I’m not sure that it explains why these t-shirt pictures are art. Or why they make me laugh. So what two things are contrasting in Gibson’s work?

Gibson talks a lot about turning his digital shirts into real shirts, so I’m going to go out on a limb and say that he makes images of shirts he would want to wear. He’s fetishizing a commodity that does not exist yet, for which he lacks the means to make. In this way his artistic practice temporarily inverts his dominated socio-economic position. He appropriates desired goods through publication.

Second, a shirt is a functional item that you buy and then you wear. When a t-shirt is displayed on its own in a photo, we assume it’s for sale in some form or fashion. Gibson’s t-shirts can neither be bought nor worn. This is a contrast between our cultural expectations of t-shirts as a class of items, and the reality of Gibson’s digital t-shirts. They’re useless, able only to be looked at. And it is their uselessness that elevates them from functional item to art object.

Publication as a form of consumption is not a new artistic practice. Jeff Koons has been working with consumption as art for some time and Eugène Atget took pictures of store window displays (Tomkins). More recently, R. Gerald Nelson writes in DDDoomed that image aggregators on sites like tumblr, ffffound, or etc, use images as “tools of possession,” rather than “tools of knowledge.” Nelson is critical of image aggregators. But he is referring to the standard soft-focus-bullshit-black-and-white-photo image
aggregators, rather than the remixers, conceptual curators, or original content blogs like R-U-IN’s, Jogging, or Internet Archeology.

I agree with Nelson’s categorization of most image aggregators and similar as “instruments of possession.” But unlike Nelson who sees this trait as distinctly negative, I am in favor of any and all alternative forms of possession. We (artists, young people, bloggers, the 99 percent) are a dominated people, so why not take what we can get? Why lament the “artlessness” of the possession? If it can be done artfully, better. If it can operate through a pointedly ironic critique, perfect.

Brad Troemel sees the Tumblr generation’s air of constant irony as a mechanism through which meaning is stripped away. He likens net art’s surface level vapidity to Frank Stella’s remark that his paintings are “a flat surface with paint on it – nothing more” (qtd. in Troemel 27). For Brad this semiotic emptiness brings us towards an eventual emptiness in our lives and in our art.

It is not emptiness. It is an exchange of depth for breadth. And breadth can be important too.

By estranging signifiers from their signified concepts we can more easily recognize a thing, or a picture of a thing for what it is. Whether that thing is beautiful, or absurd, or gauche, it’s easier to recognize it when we’ve been overwhelmed by signifiers—that is, when we’ve brought out the emptiness Troemel laments in his essay “Why No Serious?”

An image aggregator rends signs from their meanings and lets us, through iteration, see patterns and truths we otherwise might have missed. It’s the same way saying the word “oval” a thousand times in a row will empty the word of it’s meaning, and if you’re paying attention, help you see the roundness of it’s “o” and the wetness of it’s “l.” It is a case of semantic satiation.

Solomon Chase’s *Khakiism* is an excellent example of how an image aggregator’s iterations on a theme can let properties emerge
from images we might never have noticed. Chase’s project unfolds a twisted rope gradient of neutral colors by way of glossy stock photos and production stills. *Khakiism* lets us zoom out and see not only the shared surface aesthetics of the images, but also consider them as a category within society. Visual similarities emerge. The totalitarian uniformity of disparate merchant’s photographic aesthetics reflects the cultural uniformity demanded by global capitalism. Visual differences emerge. A single product still of “a pair of black bellbottoms” looks like “a pair of black bell bottoms” when presented on its own. But couched between a black headset of a deeper black and a gaudy pair of raven-colored costume wings we see that the pants are not just black, but that their color is just, “so.”

A single interesting and well-contextualized image invites us to consider the majesty of the image and the skill of the artist who created it. But the barrage of banal images aggregated on Chase’s blog invites us to consider an entire social phenomenon tinged with capitalism’s eerie gloss.

Chase’s images are funny because they are goofy and ridiculous and aesthetically uniform. But this is a reflection of our culture. They are useable goods that can never be used. Through aggregation the goods are possessed. Irony and semantic satiation rob the individual images of meaning. This allows us to reconsider the aesthetics of the image. Meaning is reconstructed at the meta-level and assigned to the group of images within their new context.

**Over-Identification, Going Shallow**

BAVO outlines the strategy of *over-identification* in “Always Choose the Worst Option - Artistic Resistance and the Strategy of Over-Identification.” An artist is better received when they mock an idea they are opposed to by submitting to it rather than directly criticizing it. Presenting challenging art invites the viewer to respond
with his or her own challenges, and rather than fostering a dialogue, the artwork incites an argument.

Don’t be whiny, be funny.

Rather than creating art that is directly critical of contemporary society, capitalism, and the rest, an artist only needs to assent wholeheartedly to its forms and ideals in order to reveal it as faulty. By presenting an argument through art that is overly embracing of dominant hegemonic ideas and practices, an artist can develop a pastiche in which criticism emerges through naivety. The artist plays the straight man to culture’s larger absurdities.

When an artist like Arran Ridley creates a blog uncritically waxing his desire for a vacation to Ibiza, he gives himself over to the fetishized mythology pimped out by the destination’s resorts. The viewer is slapped in the face by Ridley’s naivety and is forced to reconcile their own understandings of the gulf between what is advertised and what is offered. In the end their new understanding of the gap comes from their own reasoning. The argument is enthymematic.

Similarly, when a group like PaintFX incorporates over the top gloss, shadow, bevel, and emboss, and default lighting effects from programs like Photoshop, Art Rage, and Zbrush, not only are they creating a distinct painterly aesthetic, they’re allowing a critique to emerge from their work. Not a critique of painting, but a critique of the state of commercial software. By refusing to be subtle in their use of the program’s capabilities they ask, “why hide the software?” Appreciate the paintings for their inherent aesthetic value, but if you have a problem with the glossy commercialism of the paintings you ought to have a problem with the glossy, commercial society that produced the software.

There is something to be said about going shallow. Art crews like PaintFX and bloggers like Arran Ridley don’t take penetrating
looks deep into the cultural ocean. They take snapshots of the surface of the water and in them we can see our own goofy reflections.

It is important to note, though, that while internet artists often deal with the differences between contemporary mythologies and realities in virtual environments, they are not dealing with the differences between the real and the virtual. There are no differences between real and virtual.

All information on the web is physically instantiated somewhere. It is never not real. In fact, much internet art, like Jon Rafman’s *Kool-Aid Man in Second Life* serves to mock antiquated Baudrillardian notions of the virtual “through the looking glass” notion of the hyper-real.

The relationship between the internet and the real world is not analogous to physical body and ethereal soul, but physical data to abstract patterns of information over time, as Australian artist and academic Ry David Bradley points to in *School of Global Art*. The contemporary internet artist does not (or should not) explore the gulf between real and virtual. What should be explored is the (ironic) contrast between what is promised in contemporary society, and what is truly offered.

**Placing Contemporary Internet Artists in the Canon**

Placing art within a canon has always seemed like a kind of pointless exercise to me. Contemporary internet art feels like Dada, acts like Jeff Koons or Eugène Atget, and, at times looks startlingly similar to the Abstract Illusionist movement. But to say that most of the hyper-aware bloggers, bohèmes, and programmers who produce much of the work floating around today consciously, or even unconsciously borrow from those movements would probably be sinful. This is art put out by a generation who steals from everyone and no one at the same time.
It might be fair to say these artists steal as much from MTV as they do from the Dadaists. And probably more than that, they steal from each other.

However similar the aesthetics of any one contemporary internet artist’s work may be to one movement or the other, the work of a contemporary internet artist is fundamentally different from that of any other generation’s because the cultural and political landscape has changed fundamentally.

Where the academic and artistic doctrine of the last umpteen years has been one of criticism, the new doctrine is iterative. In an online context, messages, movements, and opinions all build through iterations. The artist can no longer serve as a cultural critic because the critic doesn’t have a place on the web. It’s only possible to be positive. When something receives enough positive reviews online it bubbles to the surface of public awareness.

There is no “dislike” button on Facebook. Music critics used to tell us what not to listen to. Now music blogs on the internet tell you what we have to listen to. All I check at Pitchfork is “Best New Music.” I can’t remember the last time I gave a shit that a movie got two thumbs down. When I want to see a movie I look online for the most positive review. I look for the “best of” lists. The scale of computer technology has obsolesced the centralized criticizer and replaced it with a decentralized network of positive worker bees.

So how do successful contemporary internet artists put forward art that serves to make the world a better place in a marketplace that censures negativity?

They be funny.
Segundo / Thematic Trends...

Google:

Paint FX. Paint FX. Tumblr, n.d.
Still Lifes
Aureliano Segundo
Segundo / Still Lifes
Segundo / Still Lifes
from Shelf life for bottles and faces
Emily Fedoruk

Dec. 7
Tonight I planned to transcribe back, to stick to the plan, to stick something on my face or stand at a perfume counter. On the contrary, I spent the hour doing the opposite: steel wool to an oven cheese melt. It was still a foundation and I thought a lot about the colour, about pulling and picking--maybe, more accurately, pushing--and now more of an art studio, of standing with you, of charcoal.

The problem is, I complained a lot of a black feeling today. And the problem is yesterday, Maria told us about Duncan and "endarkenment." We were reading from nocturnes. We were doing better than that feeling, better than bent scrubbing and switching arms.

Dec. 8
When I read your words I want them to be mine. I read the lines a few times and your rhythm matches my heart beat. I begin to coordinate my movements in the cosmetics department....but steel wool trips me up, do you have mice too? I need to buy some steel wool to stuff the hole with. Tin foil is not abrasive enough; the cute little bugger pushes the tin scrunchie out and has a party on the crummy floor.

What colour are you feeling today? Write me a nocturne about it. "better than bent scrubbing and switching arms"

you are my favorite poet. lets cull from our email one day during the break and when i start at ecu i'll print it as a book using the photocopy machine. we can design a cover and we can hand print that maybe? with a potato stamp? haha

xo
Dec. 8

I just caught the reality of an internet-based disease. Although infection is more alliterative. Tonight I’m sitting in the difference. What was heartache, supremes, the interruption of itunes on shuffle, it was lovesick, it was a problem with venus.

Every window shows something I worry about. I can make breaks for it, heart beats want to use tune again, but beats shouldn’t be in tune but in time. This time though, this tune repeats and this time makes drum. Where the beat goes in email—into assonance.

Into a hole in the wall. For me, it went back in: the wool rubbed out what could have been a mice treat, the burn turned states, slid into the sink, stained like ink. Rhymes for rhythm. Four segments to email

Foreshadowing in replies not missed for once but mystified. Online honour.

I promise to write, e
Solidarity and Singularity: A Biopolitical Approach
Michael McDonell

In this paper, I re-examine the political concept of solidarity, and what I argue is its form of life—singularity—from a biopolitical perspective, understanding life as shared action and relation. Central to the notion of biopolitics are the goals and conflicts arising from problems of population life, as well as the ways of knowing and legitimately governing more or less valuable human lives. From this perspective, concepts of life and action, and life and politics (properly understood as tactics of solidarity and conflict) are interdependent. According to Giorgio Agamben, life cannot be separated from its form, and is what establishes the potential for community solidarity. What institutes the nation-state as the hegemonic form of solidarity in modernity is its channelling of human action and needs (often experienced demographically as “social problems”) into demands for rights and citizenship, with the “home” par excellence for these identity claims as “civil society” and “the public sphere.” I will argue, however, that the instability of these identities and forms of incorporation requires a new concept of solidarity based on an “internal” relation between different forms-of-life or singularities, which I understand as shared, concrete universalizations. Singular solidarities more easily avoid the problematic relationship between, on the one hand, an abstract, structural or sovereign whole, and on the other hand, an atomized particularism in which actors cannot relate with one another through shared meanings. This open-ended, but non-contingent experience of solidarity and affective action is best realized through gesture, habit, and imagination in what Agamben calls “the coming communities,” rather than the bounded communities of the nation, public sphere, or civil society. I demonstrate the significance of this shift for contemporary political life by looking at the Canadian labour movement’s response to the
shift to a non-standard employment regime, especially in relation to community union tactics and the presence of migrant labour.

**Life and Action**

Biopolitical thought from Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt onwards views the dignity of the human condition not as a fixed value, but according to according to its form of vital action—embodied, experiential, and affective, rather than effective. In her book *The Human Condition*, Arendt shows the immanence of self-disclosing action and language for human life, distinguishing them from their preconditions, labour and work. While, on the one hand, *labour* is the endless condition of (re)producing human existence itself through technique, sense-perception, and behaviour (*zoë*), on the other hand, finite *work* involves specific projects in the creation of particular objects beyond the labour process and nature. *Action* differentiates individual life (*bios*) from species-being, moving people from a definite place of origin toward an infinite horizon (7). Since all action is ongoing, no *system* of action can ever be total or definitive in ordering human life. However, under the imperatives of economic productivity and state-managed “growth,” in the guise of nervous and banal forms of sociality, life has retreated into the private sphere of self-preservation: life as action becomes “inoperative” (Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*), and thus appears as “the ideology of its own absence” (Adorno 180). In modern social relations, life’s concrete potentiality—that is, its power-to-do (*potestas*)—is reduced through fetishization, to a positive actuality over-against the individual actor, and appears as a sovereign power (*potere*) or thing (Agamben, *Means Without End* 142). Rather than an “ecstatic” projection of the social imaginary “beyond what is to an otherness that might be . . . [that] exists already, really, subjunctively” as part of the human condition, the formalization of action (for example, as standard wage-labour) is
measured by its end result or product” (Holloway 24). Consequently the creative, linguistic “nature” of humans is alienated, and the gesture is separated from experience, visible in both spectacular images and “everyday” banalities (Agamben, Means Without End 96). A form-of-life is an experience which cannot be formalized and repeated generically, independent of context; rather, it is a way of life which has the possibility of redefining life itself when properly thought (8-12). This understanding of life as concrete potential, especially as found in Agamben’s work, has strong affinities with autonomist Marxism, and recent autonomist perspectives have imagined action and practice as affective and embodied prior to their “rational” or technical codification (Beasley-Murray, Posthegemony 37). This view recognizes that as “realistic” as technique is, its instrumentalization of the human body through the “subjective” power of the mind or will is ultimately a non-articulated behaviour which disrupts gesture, habit, and the non-technical practices it is itself formed by; thus, the frantic search for technical possibilities is a product of fear and panic. Radical phenomenology also clarifies the nature of this crisis of the life-world: on the one hand, the subject of technique is the unitary human agent, acting teleologically and on principle against constraining structures (in a sense, trying to tame or discipline them for its identity), and on the other hand, in contrast, stands the experiential actor as “the incarnation of action” (Vahabzadeh 181).ii Actors are thus practical assemblages of power, moving forward without a clear conception of a future humanity, following divergent but related pathways outwards toward common destinies (185). In the autonomist critique, a society in which everyday life has been de-eroticized, and in which there has been “a generalized loss of solidarity” through a lack of sympathetic experience, is forced to compulsively repeat the hegemonic symbolic injunction to “just do it” in order to act (Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody 133-4, 80, 175). The question always arises: how? That is,
through which means? However, when aligned with the *general intellect*, autonomous action does not require hierarchical direction and/or coordination, arising instead from shared meanings, experience, and embodiment, rather than cognitive discourses or “communicative rationality.” Thus, an autonomist perspective positions “the soul [as] the *clinamen* of the body. It is how it falls, and what makes it fall in with other bodies. The soul is its gravity. This tendency for certain bodies to fall in with others is what constitutes a world” (Smith, “Preface” 9). Critically adapting Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* to affective practice, Jon Beasley-Murray defines *habitus* as “what generates the habits in which are incarnated an entire *disposition* toward the world” (*Posthegemony* 177, emphasis added).

The *logos* peculiar to *habitus* involves a “temporal slippage” in which habit constantly transcends out of but from its immanent “field” of reproduction, and giving rise to a striving (*conatus*) in which “habit is both a reminder of the past and a kernel of what is to come” (178). As an improper repetition, habit produces difference, and is therefore relatively free from both mechanical compulsion and idealistic mental detachment. Habit is not extra-ordinary, but harbours the potential for “becoming-other” (other possible *forms-of-life* or needs), free of subordination to “other” extant agents: “through habitus, power is invested in the production of life itself, in the everyday affects of ordinary encounters” (188). Action and experience are both affective because they are unconsciously habitual: they are related to “natural,” creative dispositions, rather than determinations, and escape the reduction to mechanisms or techniques for achieving already-conceived ends. Forms-of-life engage in affective actions which cannot be formalized or repeatedly generalized, but which form a world between actors.
Political Life

Politics is constitutive of human action and life, but it can never be constituted in the form of State power without also negating its object, human actors, by limiting them first to “mass” populations, and then into re-humanized citizen-subjects. Relating the concept of habitus to biopolitical analysis, we can see that action based in habit and disposition guides what Beasley-Murray calls a “micro-politics of affect”: “the politics of habit is not the clash of ideologies within a theater of representation. It is a politics that is immanent and corporeal, that works directly through the body; it is not an effect of political processes that take place elsewhere” (Posthegemony 180). Politics, defined phenomenologically, is the way in which words (language) and things come together through action, and thus the way in which similar or different “economies of presence” are articulated and revealed to actors (Vahabzadeh 114). “The political” is therefore enacted through conflict and solidarity rather than through mechanisms of social problem-solving and state-citizenship: a “politics of the event” and action emerges beyond organization and representation (Holloway 214). On the other hand, when subjects’ experience and action, through awareness of rights, are appropriated by institutions as objective norms—in a context of limited policy options—they may no longer be able to attach conscious meaning to them, and thus experience cynical feelings of apathy (Vahabzadeh 114; Adorno 180). Adorno thus argues that under the development of late capitalism, politics has become a self-regulating system of administering life to “the masses,” who stand apart as a separate population integrated by a unitary state (103-114). In such a context of “processed demands,” and homogenous identities, fixed representations of personhood and authenticity become self-negating when generalized. According to Adorno, “Fidelity to one’s own state of consciousness and experience is forever in temptation of lapsing
into infidelity, by denying the insight that transcends the individual and calls his substance by its name” (16). Arendt’s perspective is similar, in that she argues that modernity involves the progressive elimination of the difference underlying political life, replacing it with the paradigm of identity subsuming action as behaviour (cf. Gandesha 265-72). This argument has been especially influential for the work of Agamben, who subsequently argues that what he calls the state of exception—the State’s suspension or denial of rights—has revealed itself as the rule for modern politics: the political life (bios) proper to social individuation has been reduced to the naked life (zoë) of formal citizenship and identity politics. Agamben’s biopolitics allows political life to be understood not just as the State’s (generic formal) mediation of life, but rather as the mediality of human life itself (Means Without End 117). Within the current political context, however, the dominant issues are systemic: productivity, standard of living, and “growth” can be theorized in relation to the formal imagination of the social body, for example, through labour market regulation, citizenship controls, and other boundary-drawing mechanisms. All political power over life—taking the form of population governance—must at a basic level refer to life as potential for action and movement, but after the introduction of the Rights of Man after the French Revolution, and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights after World War II, political life has been bifurcated between life and citizenship (Agamben, Means Without End 15-26). The capitalist state can only succeed in this tactic of division when actors have already been converted into masses, and then into citizen-subjects belonging to a bounded community, or People defining their humanity as born into “the nation.”
Civil Society and the Public Sphere

Seemingly in opposition to the universal “rule” of the State, civil society offers the promise of public discourse and constituent power unconstrained by sovereign authority, but in fact it constitutes its parts by recognizing them within a larger sphere—that of citizenship-claims. Civil society consists of the “interest groups,” foundations, institutes, social movements, and public sphere mediating relations between the “economic” (market) and “political” (State) spheres, or between People and State; it thus aims to include citizens within participatory and deliberative democracy (Angus, Emergent Publics 35-7). For civil society theorists, democracy becomes “the core of a style of life” in which the people determine the collective life of the nation through their capacities as relatively equal citizens in public discourse (20). But the arguments valorizing civil society ultimately reduce to the demand that the excluded be included within the polity and governed by an ever-expanding public sphere producing consensus: the experience of “marginalization” is thus re-articulated in nation-state terms as “social exclusion” (44). According to a biopolitical perspective, however, the potential for “anyone to belong” strips actors of their forms-of-life, and in the words of Beasley-Murray, “transparency is promoted through the technocratic conversion of disparate affects (the way things make us feel) into statistical opinions (what we think about them) that can justify a single set of policies, a single outcome for the government client” (Posthegemony 108). Hence, in civil society, “affects are replaced by reasons (by Reason) as answers are solicited to the questions of management and state direction” (116-7). Under a strong nation-state, civil society is aggregated as a set of parts operating to integrate actors as agents in the larger whole—“society,” constituted by the State—in which mutual recognition “mediates” life through a mirroring process of making-conscious. As such, its actions usually
take the form of campaigns for rights, consultations, “dialogues,” lobbying, partnerships, and a “diagnostic” or messenger role regarding the social problems of “the general public” (Angus, *Emergent Publics* 58-9). The “leaders” of civil society are “organic intellectuals,” personified as a class of public scholars (Gramsci 12-3). But, as Adorno has argued, the enormous growth of the public sphere corresponds to the marginalization of individuated political action: “In face of the totalitarian unison with which the eradication of difference is proclaimed as a purpose in itself, even part of the social force of liberation may have temporarily withdrawn to the individual sphere. If critical theory lingers there, it is not only with a bad conscience” (Adorno 118). The nation-state is not a product of sovereign Reason; rather, it emerges out of discourses of the public sphere as an *imagined* community, which organize feelings of “home,” but yet are unable to account for difference beyond certain “civil” parameters (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Sharma 3-27).\(^v\) The democratic discourse of rights and civic identity, despite its conscious recognition of individual agents’ rights, tends to conceal rather than alleviate systemic oppression (Vahabzadeh 109-16).\(^vi\) While consciousness can play a helpful role in reorienting experience and practice, it is also often a symptom of a crisis in the life-world: thus, under the influence of fear and panic (negative affect), assertions and codifications of identity provide an objective form (name, subject-position) for subordinated selves, but problematically separate their possible self-practices from experience, thus, from gestures, habits, and affects (action). The subject of civil society believes and thus wills objective causes, but remains largely impotent to act on them. Civil society and the public sphere are thus deeply implicated in the transformation of “mass” populations—formerly actors—into members of People, whose “active domestic participation” is fundamental to achieving social cohesion.
Community and Solidarity

Ultimately, resistance to the capitalist state’s biopolitical power comes from communities acting in solidarity regardless of affiliations to broader state institutions and civil society networks. Jean-Luc Nancy provides a helpful characterization of how this might look: the content (as well as, implicitly, the form) of politics, when understood as the nexus of words, things, and acts, is revealed through the active inscription of community life (Being Singular Plural 40). Nancy argues that the “world” of communities consists of a non-reductive being-together (Mitsein), which Hannah Arendt understood through the exemplar of the conscious pariah (outcast or exile), differentiated from the figure of the parvenu, “underdog” (119). While this can take the form of identity, identity is unnecessary to community life. Thus, a further feature of community is its future temporality: its “being” is always anticipatory, “to-come,” that is inessential; it cannot be an identity “present-at-hand” (Agamben, The Coming Community). However, instead of seeking to replace “merely formal” roles with substantial identities, the coming communities are inoperative in their actions: their solidarity cannot be reified as “mere means” to an end, no matter how urgent this end may seem (Nancy, The Inoperative Community). Their politics can rather be understood as one of prefigurative solidarity (Featherstone 186-93). As a result, the “goal” of community life is not happiness: rather, its negative dialectic involves a subjunctive mood of non-fulfillment characterized by uncertainty, anxiety, longing, and possibilities of “dignity” (Holloway 61). Thus, while solidarity is immanent, it lacks definitive “ground” or justification, emerging from affinity-based practices, and tied to shared ethical commitments rather than moral duties or hegemonic imperatives (Day 177, 188-90). According to this conception by Richard Day, “these commitments are necessarily always shifting, but also always present, as no community can be
sustained without them” (177). Solidarity is thus not first an object of cognition prior to action; rather, it is an affective activity involved in both “ecstatic” and everyday political mobilizations (Beasley-Murray, “Thinking Solidarity” 128). Reflective solidarity, as distinct from Arendt’s notion of “reflective judgement,” is too often based on universal essences, and hence insufficiently relational (Featherstone 37). Furthermore, if it can be agreed that movements for social change begin with affect rather than discourse—”the beginning is not the word, but the scream”—then the thoughts arising from solidarity should remain inceptive, charting different possibilities for action, rather than models of consensus or principles of association (Holloway 1). This mode of thinking is responsive and recollective because thought ultimately depends on experiencing phenomena in their own terms and situated in their own world (Vahabzadeh 147-150). Thus many of the possibilities for the coming communities, and prefigurative solidarity arguably have already been revealed by social movement actors themselves. For example, in Italy, autonomist solidarity between workers, students, and youth after 1968 realized “the desire to allow differences to deepen at the base without trying to synthesize them from above, to stress similar attitudes without imposing a ‘general line,’ to allow parts to co-exist side by side, in their singularity” (Lotringer and Marazzi 8). The turn toward new forms of solidarity realizes that politics can neither be constituted—from above in the state-form or moral community (Hegelian sittlichkeit)—nor constituent—from below in “civil society.” The opposite of abstract association is the coming communities, rather than “homely” notions of citizens’ democracy or “civic discourse.”

**Singularity**

The single, unified whole—whether as State or as Person—is actually a mosaic of pre-existing elements woven together in
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singularized form. Ian Angus’s work, when immanently criticized, again yields helpful arguments. Angus agrees with the thinkers of the coming communities that politics—as relation between parts—is inscribed or patterned, rather than subject to rule: “what is inside is separated from what is outside, not by a unique content, but by a distinctive relation between contents. . . . While some parts may be different on either side of the division, it is not these elements that define the difference between inside and outside. It is defined through pattern rather than content” (A Border Within 107). However, this notion of particularity is still adapted to a context of identity and mutual recognition, and hence, insufficient for emerging forms of affective action and solidarity, which require singularity. Post-structuralist thinkers have conceived the singular life as generic (indistinguishable), yet, like in Angus’ approach, distinctly patterned. Thus, for Gilles Deleuze, “we can not accept the alternative . . . [between] either singularities already comprised in individuals and persons, or the undifferentiated abyss” (103). According to Agamben, and Day, singularity exists beyond the particular-universal and individual-society problematics of much social and political theory, and its examples always reveal themselves as—but not “through”—singular objects. This form of difference can only be defined by its way of differing from others, from whom it both intrinsically and extrinsically relates in changing ways (Hardt and Negri 338-9). Singularity is able to challenge State-power because of its whatever being, understood as “an aspect or moment of being that is relatively free from dependence upon identification and subjectification, from the poles of the mass, the many, the well-disciplined, the people” (Day 180). For post-anarchists, the possibility for subjects to resist systemic imperatives over their lives stimulates their actions toward creating autonomous spaces, and they argue that recent examples suggest a strategy of creating sustainable alternatives which show concretely—rather than telling, debating, or determining
beforehand—that another world is possible (181-203). The social subject of such projects has been labelled “the smith,” that is, an actor who exists as “a kind of communitarian nomad . . . an intensity that burns only, or at least burns best and longest, when alongside others” (Day 176). In similar fashion, autonomist and post-Marxist approaches have argued that identities give way to processes of singularization when the finite human mind cannot conceive the whole—as criss-crossing network, or as cosmos—of its world; hence, the formation of singularities is conjunctural, rather than separately connected by association (Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody 181). Such a dynamic, which was present in the Italian factory-councils of 1918-20, allows for a dialectic of immanence and subjectivity, which Andrea Righi calls immanent finitization, a relation which “actualizes specific interventions into life without congealing them into rigid and concrete forms” (26). However, singularities are able to self-organize and cooperate without a central authority, such as a council, because they simultaneously refer to an infinite (yet specific) set of relations and meanings in action, which can only be enjoyed as “the finite inscription of its infinity” (Nancy, Being Singular Plural 39). The logos drawing singularities together consists of the biopolitical nexus of gesture, habit, and affective action. Thus, for example, a “single” mood, body movement, meaning, or gesture can unconsciously disclose a multiplicity of other relations and form an inceptive event, though it cannot be conceived in terms of discrete information or objective knowledge, and it clearly does not constitute the sum total of those relations it experiences momentarily: “Ereignis designates a synchronic event of local singular presencing, and not a universal economy of presence” (Vahabzadeh 147-8). In this understanding of political action, the founding of a regime (Urstiftung, primal institution) is unified, but its “end” (Endstiftung, destitution) is multiple: the common destiny and world between actors ensures that the singular combination of differences does not lead to isolation or
fragmentation in the absence of abstract universals or rules and procedures (117). Transitional political actors can thus be said to possess unique forms of shared, but distinct meanings, that is, mobile, pre-conceptual experiences: “A genuine experience destines its articulators toward topoi, toward places of singular experiences” (150). Nancy further adds that such “worldy” and non-totalizable forms of being-with-others involve unevaluable or immeasurable forms of “dignity,” as opposed to the desire-happiness model of particularity and recognition (Being Singular Plural 40). Singularity is a newly emerging logic of community and political solidarity, providing a lifeworld for biopolitical struggles: singularity is how social experience and common action happen across actors’ differences in the absence of totality.

**Canadian Labour and Precarious Workers**

As an example, the Canadian labour movement has not responded effectively to these shifts in biopolitics and community action, and has therefore suffered from inadequate solidarity toward precarious people in recent decades. The labour movement, as represented by trade union leaders, is still “adversely incorporated” into civil society and the public sphere, continuing to be internally divided and “crisis”-prone (Fletcher and Gapasin). In response to “neoliberal” attacks by capital and the State, unions have sought to protect standard employment norms of permanent, single-employer, guaranteed benefit and union protected wage-labour (as a guarantee of standards of living) and protect the advantages already possessed by its members in the labour market. Fearing the effects of neoliberal policies on union membership rates and union bargaining power, they have continued to rely on a particular kind of affect—formal grievance procedures—that gives agency to its professional officials, but confines action to contractual “collective agreements” for its
particular members (Camfield 11-20, 40-44). Despite gesturing toward wholeness, through union centrals and the Canadian Labour Congress, organized labour still largely conceives solidarity in terms of resource-sharing and institutional recognition or affiliation for individual “bargaining units.” As a result, it has had little success in achieving solidarity with non-standard or precarious employees, who now make up more than a third of the Canadian labour force, a figure which excludes growing numbers of workers in very small workplaces (Swartz and Warskett). Migrant workers are especially neglected given the expansion of the Temporary Foreign Workers Program (TFWP) from 125,000 workers per year to over 300,000 between 2004 and 2012 (Clark). Yet, the “differences” between citizens, immigrants, and migrant workers are not necessarily immaterial: as Nandita Sharma argues, they are based on the singular relationships (“discourses”) between nation, race, gender, and class. One example of a union initiative to help migrant workers was the United Food and Commercial Workers’ (UFCW) partnership to fund migrant workers centres and do legal case-work with the Agriculture Workers Alliance (AWA) representing mainly Latin American migrants, primarily in the provinces of British Columbia and Ontario (Choudry and Thomas). But these social unionism efforts have been limited because of the effects of citizenship-mediated labour market status, and while they have involved some union locals, they have not been based in rank-and-file member initiatives. Organized labour efforts to reclaim standard employment norms and protect the mass of workers comprising union membership may lead to successful results in limited cases, such as in Toronto and York Region Labour Council (TYRLC) and late-1990s Canadian Auto Workers activity, but they still remain hierarchical and centred on negotiating consensus with employers. In contrast, forms of social movement and community unionism aim to directly establish workers’ centres and other “infrastructures of dissent” for expansive class-formation (action),
rather than moving from an already-conceived class-identity deduced from a central class structure of wage-labour (Camfield 51). By making cohesion secondary, they promote wider, but also less encompassing, forms of solidarity (O’Brien 193-5). These re-emerging forms of unionism pursue the logic of singularity and biopolitical action through non-contractual interchanges (that is, open-ended reciprocity and permeable contact) between workers and other allied movements to provide solidarity and challenge the separation of work from life and other areas of experience (Black 154-7). They also recognize workers’ need to invent forms of creative self-activity, “to be able to realize spontaneously new aspects, new realms of being, something apart from the deadness and alienation” (Charlesworth 292). New forms of solidarity in the Canadian labour movement are insubstantial from the point of view of national trade union identity, as well as of labour as abstract wage-labour (labour-power), and therefore continue to be marginalized despite their long history within the labour movement and the needs of present-day workers.

In adopting singularity and community solidarity, metaphysical separations of potentiality and actuality have to be questioned, and action reoriented toward concrete use-value and creative possibilities. The political consequences of the concept of singularity, as it emerges in biopolitical events, and in relation to forms of life realized through action, are widespread and visible. It may be that only with this theoretical focus can new bases of common experience and action be found that cross lines of nation, race, ethnicity, and gender, such as in the actions of social movement, and community unions. Thus, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri critically observe that “the revolutionary process results in a proliferation of differences, since the nature of singularities is to become different . . . what identity is to property, singularity is to the common” (339). While this may be threatening to the agent, who chooses on the basis
of principles, it is suited to the actor, assembled through habit, gesture, and affect with others. Thus “identities can be emancipated, but only singularities can liberate themselves” (339). However, this “self” is always already multiple, and can therefore have shared life-world experiences through meanings, rather than the conscious transmission of information, opinion, or consensus and consent. As a finite moment of infinite processes, singularity can affect a broader range of actions and solidarities than what can be represented in organizational and sovereign state forms, as well as in the form of value. In this sense, with a strong understanding of the dis-identification processes charted by Adorno, Arendt, and others, the so-called “apathy” and cynicism of newer generations of citizens regarding politics and organizations can possibly be reinterpreted as a flight from the conversion of actor into mass, and mass into People, indicating instead the crisis of citizenship as a concept. Thus, a lack of involvement in formal politics may not represent a loss or fragmentation of political experience, but if properly articulated, could be a reservoir of unbounded potential.
Jean-Luc Nancy, in his book *The Creation of the World or Globalization*, calls this (following Hegel and Levinas’s thinking) “the badinfinite,” which as “pure potentiality,” or as presupposition of action, is almost entirely beyond human control, yet requires endless desire and effort to actualize (40).

Vahabzadeh thus adds: “the actor can never precede action” (181).

There is a large conceptual gap between disposition as potential or affinity for possible action, and any *pre*-disposition or *pre*-determination which would limit action to separate individuals simply manipulating or acting upon the world.

Here I make a crucial distinction between social individuation and the more liberal individualism or individualization.

A distinction can be made between two forms of “otherness” or non-identity: one the one hand, external otherness is beyond the reach of a self or subject, and on the other hand, exteriority as a mode of being of a self or subject, similar to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s notion of “constitutive outside.” However, beyond this is the institutionalization of opposition within the democratic polity, in which the possibility of transformation of modes of sovereign power is imagined and projected within the sovereign state—which is essentially what this method of conflict resolution achieves.

Vahabzadeh thus states that since every “relation of subordination”—in which one actor subjects another to their decisions—has a specific relation of oppression (antagonism), all inequality is potentially open to contestation, and hence, “inequality cannot precede conflict” (107; emphasis added). Nor, according to this approach, can oppression and conflict be understood (subsumed) by a democratic awareness or discourse of rights. The democratic discourse, as “third” subject to conflict (105), often informs humanitarian efforts, charity, welfare, and civil society campaigns opposed to crime, violence, civil war, domination, and other dehumanizing and delegitimizing problems. On the contrary, for Vahabzadeh, there is no guarantee that democracy will prevent violence or systemic oppression (104-13).
Works Cited


Breaking the Gaze: *Ressentiment, Bad Faith, and the Struggle for Individual Freedom*

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With demonstrations like the Arab Spring, Occupy movements, and Spanish protests erupting around the globe in recent years, it is evident that the problems of repression and freedom are not dead topics of discussion. Though debates surround the reasons for and desired outcomes of these radical displays of dissatisfaction, it is generally agreed upon that what these civil uprisings aim to do is initiate social and political reform. Not only do these protestors share a spirited rejection of human rights violations, political corruption, and social and economic inequality, they participate in what can be seen as a worldwide campaign against the established organizations that disregard their individual rights in favour of what is beneficial to the elites. The concerns of these heterogeneous groups are nothing new; however, they should not be dismissed, especially considering how the entire historical movement of modernity—from premodernity, where the individual is dominated by tradition and religion, to modernity, where the emphasis on reason and natural science has reduced the individual to a mere object, and finally to postmodernity, where the sovereign, autonomous individual is rejected and the subject and object, the self and the other, is merged together—is but a portrait of the repressed individual whose freedom is constantly sacrificed. While modernity is moving from one stage to another, the individual is continuously left behind and abandoned in the name of progress and the greater good. This is precisely why Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean-Paul Sartre, and their philosophies, are still relevant today. What better way to look into this problem and question of individual autonomy, sovereignty, and freedom than to
revisit Nietzsche and Sartre’s firm belief in the liberation of the individual?

Without a doubt, Friedrich Nietzsche is viewed as one of the most prolific and multi-dimensional philosophers of his time. The sheer magnitude and diversity of Nietzsche’s writings are, arguably, unmatched by any other philosopher. With such pluralistic and nonsystematic thoughts and perspectives, it is not surprising that his influence can be seen throughout a number of different scholarly disciplines, such as, but not limited to: philosophy, political theory, psychology, sociology, and philology. As what David Allison calls “one of the underlying figures of our own intellectual epoch” and “a model for the tasks and decisions of the present generation,” Nietzsche’s profound influence can be seen in conservative philosophers such as Leo Strauss and Stanley Rosen, postmodernist and poststructuralist philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, and existentialist philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre (ix). Although he inspired many, Nietzsche’s particular influence on the existentialist movement is an obvious yet overlooked discourse. Ironically, Nietzsche’s connection to the existentialist movement is overshadowed and surpassed by misinterpretations of his philosophy: the Nazis made selective use of Nietzsche’s ideas,¹ and a more recent and equally outrageous misinterpretation suggested that he is the original rockstar.² Other than the obvious misreading of Nietzsche’s philosophy, what both of these interpretations have in common is the fact that they disregarded one of Nietzsche’s key ideas: the liberation of the individual who embraces their existence and is responsible and “honest” enough to “endure” Nietzsche’s “seriousness” and “passion” (“The Anti-Christ” F).³ It was not until decades after his death that individuals such as Walter Kaufmann sought to correct the Nazi’s misapprehensions of Nietzsche’s work.
Nietzsche is often labelled as an “immoralist,” someone who eschews morality; however, to reduce his entire philosophical career to this epithet is to ignore the “quality and breadth of ethical thinking to be found in his work” (Thompson 11). As with Nietzsche, Sartre’s philosophical career also suffered similar treatments. Like Nietzsche, Sartre was constantly being attacked by his contemporaries and critics, and his philosophy was ridiculed from all sides. Alas, both philosophers’ works suffered periods of being extremely unpopular, and their contributions to philosophy were very nearly forgotten. This is exactly why it is important to reread both philosophers’ works in order to do justice to their passionate stance against the oppressors of individual freedom. Rather than defining the individual in terms of a universal human essence or nature, as many other schools of thought have done, both Nietzsche and Sartre celebrate the uniqueness of what makes an individual their own person. Considering the current social and political displays of discontent around the world, it is clear that Nietzsche’s connection to existentialism warrants a second look.

Like Nietzsche’s own campaign for individual liberation, existentialism is perhaps one of the few philosophical movements that places the individual at the forefront; yet, ironically, it is also one of the most overlooked. It is this precise connection between Nietzsche and existentialist philosophy that will drive the argument of this paper. What this paper aims to do, then, is to show how Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment and Sartre’s notion of bad faith diagnose this problem of individual freedom. By looking into this idea of “the gaze of the other” in Nietzsche’s doctrine of ressentiment and Sartre’s concept of bad faith, this paper will provide a discussion of individual autonomy, sovereignty, and freedom. In identifying the existential emphasis on the individual, this paper will also discuss both philosophers’ concepts of self-deception, self-repression, and individual responsibility and authenticity. The paper thus aims to
show how both Nietzsche and Sartre are advocates of human freedom and challengers of oppression.

According to Nietzsche, *ressentiment*, which stems from reactivity, is a particular form of resentment or hostility towards what one identifies as the cause of one’s frustration. In other words, a mode of revenge directed against the source of one’s suffering and a reassignment of the pain that accompanies a sense of inferiority onto an external scapegoat. It is a “poisonous and inimical” feeling that is “fester ing” within the ones who are “oppressed” (“On the Genealogy of Morals” 1.10). Unlike the English word “resentment,” which is a bitter indignation at having been treated unfairly, *ressentiment* is a psychological state that arises from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred and a sense of weakness or inferiority in the face of a superior and dominant morality. As Bernard Reginster points out, *ressentiment* is a state of “repressed vengefulness” (286), a negation of the dominant code of values (295), and a feeling of impotence (297). Nietzsche himself defines *ressentiment* as “the popular uprising” and “the revolt of the underprivileged” (*The Will to Power* 179), calling it “a kind of immuring out of fear” and a way for the “mediocre” to “defend themselves . . . against the stronger . . . and to destroy them” (296). The “revolt” to which Nietzsche refers is the “slave revolt,” which arises from a *ressentiment* revaluation that negates the morals and values of the privileged part of society in favour of the “slave” or the “common man” (Reginster 289). It is not enough to simply reject and nullify the master’s morality; the slave must create his own set of values, ones that highlight the same qualities that the master-morality identifies as being “bad,” thereby putting the slave, who possesses these qualities, in a more advantageous position.

In Nietzsche’s opinion, *ressentiment* is “the instincts of decline” and “cowardice;” it is a sense of “discontent” that precedes “the drive to destroy” (*Will to Power* 864) and “the regression of mankind” (“Genealogy of Morals” 1.11). As a despicable and
poisonous state of mind, *ressentiment* not only injures the weak but it also incapacitates the strong (Solomon, “Nietzsche, Postmodernism, and Resentment” 277–8). The strong being referred to are the “nobles” of the “master-morality” while the weak are the “men of *ressentiment*” who belong to the “slave-morality,” which functions as a social-control mechanism and device used by the weak to defend, avenge, and assert themselves against the stronger (Schacht 615). The qualities that are regarded as “strong” are interpreted by the “weak” as evil traits that can cause harm to them (*Will to Power* 315). It is important to note, however, that the nobles of Nietzsche’s master-morality did not attain their nobility through birth; rather, they are noble by spirit, or more specifically by a sense of “free-spiritedness” (Thompson 13). These free, noble spirits are the ones who can bear the thought of the “eternal recurrence” and the heavy burden of freedom. Although Nietzsche used the terms “master” and “slave” to describe the different moralities, “it is important not to oversimplify his position” by assuming that his ideas stem from a preference for the upper class who are noble by birth (14). It is the noble free spirits that Nietzsche wants to cultivate. Since members of the ruling class are not necessarily noble by spirit, it is inaccurate to deduce that a class analysis is needed in order to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy.

With the concept of *ressentiment*, a clear line is drawn between the strong nobles of the master-morality and the weak, oppressed individuals of the slave-morality. These individuals are “the men of *ressentiment*” who are “corrupted” and lack the “integrity of self,” a trait that Nietzsche identifies as an essential element to the “nobility” of the master (Reginster 283). While the slave-morality—a fundamentally negative set of values—is based on “suspicion and mistrust,” the master-morality is both “positive” and “self-affirming” (Thompson 14):
The “well-born” felt themselves to be the “happy”; they did not have to establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they were happy (as all men of ressentiment are in the habit of doing). . . . While the noble man lives in trust and openness with himself . . . the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him . . . he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble. (“Genealogy of Morals” 1.10)

These “good” and “strong” qualities that Nietzsche identifies and associates with the noble masters, however, are destroyed by the “venomous eye of ressentiment,” in other words, the “man of ressentiment” (“Genealogy of Morals” 1.11). In the slave’s campaign to “shift the responsibility for their existence . . . on to some sort of scapegoat” (Will to Power 765), the master’s nobility, or sense of self, and strength of character, is smothered and replaced with a “center of gravity” that belongs to the “mediocre” (864). Nietzsche further specifies that ressentiment—though it can also occur in the strong, for they too find themselves in a world that is sometimes beyond their control and not always to their liking—is only a destructive and negative force when it claims the minds of the weak (Solomon, “Nietzsche” 280). Should it “appear in the noble man,” ressentiment would simply “[consummate] and exhaust itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison” (“Genealogy of Morals” 1.10). In the weak, however, ressentiment would simmer and seethe until it completely consumes (Solomon, “Nietzsche” 279) the “man of ressentiment” and causes him to “drag” the strong nobles “down with the weight of [his] folly” (“Twilight of the Idols” 52).

Why are the slaves capable of such destruction when the nobles are considered stronger and in possession of self-affirmation? To answer this question, one has to realize that Nietzsche’s “man of ressentiment,” though weak, is not weak willed. The “man of
"ressentiment" is only weak “because he does not have what it takes to realize his values, not because he lacks the will to pursue them” (Reginster 294). As Reginster points out: “his will is, on the contrary, prodigiously strong, so strong indeed that it is not even altered by his conviction that he is too weak to fulfill its demands” (294). With his strong will, the “man of ressentiment” sets out to invent new values, ones that negate the already existing morals and ideals. As a response to this new and opposing form of morality, the master becomes so decadent and unsure of his existence that he allows himself to be taken in by this “revaluation of values;” thus abandoning his set of morals for those of the slaves’ (Solomon, “Nietzsche” 280). Although the “man of ressentiment” is clever enough to invent new values, the motives behind his revaluation and the resulting new values are both things that Nietzsche regards with disgust.

Unlike the slave, the “reactive man” who has “the invention of the ‘bad conscience’ on his conscience,” the “active” and “arrogant” master “has no need to take a false prejudiced view of the object before him,” and as a result has a “freer eye, a better conscience on his side.” According to Nietzsche, the master, the “stronger, nobler, more courageous” man of action, is “still a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive man” (“Genealogy of Morals” 2.11). What matters most to the “man of ressentiment” is not the new values and ideals that he brings into the world, but the negation of the pre-existing and dominant ones; that is to say, what drives the weak man’s valuation is not the affirmation of new values but rather the desire to deny the old ones (Reginster 295). Rather than affirming their own existence, the “man of ressentiment” has simply destroyed the strong man’s life-affirming qualities, the same ones that should be celebrated. The slave-morality, then, like any other traditional modes of valuation, is “contrary to the enhancement of life” (Schacht 615).

Unlike the nobles who are self-affirming, the “man of ressentiment” lives in accordance to “the gaze of the other,” the
stronger, more dominant members of society. Rather than recognizing and asserting that his values and freedom are independent of the master’s gaze, the slave measures his worth based on the master’s assessment. Even though he ultimately rejects the master’s valuation of his being, the slave does so not because he recognizes that he is not bound by the master’s gaze and is essentially free to make himself, but because he wants to create a new set of values that would put him at an advantage. The “slave-morality,” Nietzsche states, “says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself.’” Rather than directing his views back to himself, the “man of ressentiment” directs them “outward” (“Genealogy of Morals” 1.10). Since the slave sees himself as “irremediably weak” and his condition as “incurable,” his “will to power” becomes “sickly” and “more dangerous” (1.6). With his hatred for the master growing “to monstrous and uncanny proportions,” the slave aspires to make the superior noble just as weak as him (I.7). This is precisely why the “slave-morality” does not provide a valuation that would “enhance” life and, instead, represents “ressentiment against life” itself (Reginster 297).

The new values created by the “man of ressentiment” are nothing more than “imaginings,” “lies prompted by the bad instincts of sick natures” that are “harmful in the most profound sense.” “All the problems of politics, of social organization, and of education,” Nietzsche claims, “have been falsified through and through” by the lies of the weak (“Ecce Homo” 256). In an attempt to diminish the master’s will and eradicate his power, the “man of ressentiment” has achieved “human equality” by preaching universal and neighbourly love (Reginster 303). To Nietzsche, however, “human equality” is nothing more than a ploy “to make men more and more alike” (Will to Power 315): “to mingle . . . the blood of all classes” so that the different “race[s]” of people are “no longer recognizable.” As a result of these lies, individuals—those who stand apart from the herd as rulers of their own lot in life—no longer exist; instead, everything and
everyone have become an indistinguishable part of the mob (Will to Power 864). This “levelling” (Will to Power 315) effect of the “slave-morality” declares that society must be “classless even while maintaining powerful class structures and differences” (Solomon, “Nietzsche” 278). This hypocritical aspect of the “slave-morality” is precisely why “ressentiment revaluation” is identified throughout Nietzsche’s work as “falsification,” “lie,” “mendaciousness,” and “counterfeit” (“Genealogy of Morals” 1.10, 14, 15; 2.11; 3.19; “Ecce Homo” P, 2-3).

How exactly does this “levelling” effect take form? The key aspect of this form of revaluation is convincing the master that, in order to be “virtuous,” they must “change their character, shed their skin and blot out their past.” The master “should cease to be distinct” and “begin to resemble one another in their needs and demands.” In other words, they “should perish” (Will to Power 315). This “collective instinct against selection . . . [and] privilege of all kind” soon becomes “so powerful and self-assured” that “the privileged themselves” will “soon succumb to it” (864). With the “slave-morality” comes the “mendacious slogan of reSENTIMEnT:” “supreme rights of the majority” (“Genealogy of Morals” 1.16). The “terrible and rapturous counterslogan” of the master-morality, “supreme rights for the few” (1.16), is no longer relevant and viewed as an offence against human equality and “humility” (1.14). As a result of this “levelling” effect, the behaviours of the majority become regulated by a “prescriptive morality” of “the herd” and individual freedom is measured by and limited to the “good of all” (Thompson 14). Humanity has become a herd where no one individual stands out among the indistinguishable mass and modernity has become a passionless age that hinders and stifles all actions that stem from an individual’s actual freedom of thought, as opposed to the freedom that is prescribed in order to maintain equality. Rather than promote action and transcendence, this new morality has taught the master to be
ashamed of what makes him distinct and strong, prompting him to deny his potential for greatness. As a result, mediocrity has now become the face of all humanity. Though Sartre’s *bad faith* is not situated in the formation of opposing moralities, it is still deeply rooted in this idea of “the gaze of the other.” Its underlying threat to individual freedom is also just as grave.

Writing in two different centuries, the parallels between Nietzsche’s and Sartre’s concerns for the problem of meaning and emphasis on the liberation of the individual signify that—even with the enlightenment, or maybe because of it—individual freedom is an ongoing predicament. Like Nietzsche, Sartre is also an advocate of human freedom, responsibility, and authenticity. As with Nietzsche, Sartre’s philosophy puts the spotlight back on the autonomous individual who will not crumble under “the gaze of the other” and stresses the recognition of individual freedom. Rather than adhering to social convention, Sartre’s individual takes a stance against it by assuming full responsibility for their existence and nurturing their authenticity. In order to do either of these two things, the individual would have to accept their condition in life and realize the radical freedom that comes along with it. That is to say, they must free themselves of *bad faith* and, in turn, transcend the other’s gaze.

Although Nietzsche is only mentioned twice in Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness*, hints of his influence on Sartre’s concept of *bad faith* are indicated in these two brief references: Sartre alludes to Nietzsche’s “illusions of worlds-behind-the-scene” in order to point our attention to “the being-behind the appearance,” one of the driving forces behind his question of “being” and campaign for the individual’s radical freedom (4). In order to understand “the being-behind the appearance,” one must first look at Sartre’s concept of “being-for-itself:” a being that is conscious of its own consciousness (120). Unlike “being-in-itself,” which lacks the ability to change and is unaware of its existence (26), “being-for-itself”—man—lacks a
predetermined essence and is, therefore, forced to create itself from nothingness (568). Instead of simply “being . . . what it is,” as the “being-in-itself” does, man, as a “being-for-itself,” must “choose” and “make” his own being (28). In his constant attempt to “make” himself, man has “created” for himself different “roles” and “appearances” in order to interact with the external world. This is where “the being-behind-the-appearance” comes in. The “being-behind-the-appearance,” then, is the internal self: an existence that is separate from one’s social roles, which are formal projections, “representations,” and “images” of a self that one wants to “play” “for others” (102–3). These “representations” of the self, then, are responses to the presence and, therefore, “the gaze of the other.” Since man is not a “being-in-itself,” he can only become aware of himself when he is confronted with the “gaze” of another: “I recognize that I am as the Other sees me . . . the Other has not only revealed to me what I was; he has established me in a new type of being which can support new qualifications . . . but at the same time I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being” (302–3). Even if man tries to resist or negate the other’s definition of his being, he is still basing his negation of the other’s gaze and, therefore, on the other’s initial definition of his existence—no matter what he does, man cannot escape “the gaze of the other” (Solomon, “Sartre, Jean-Paul” 813).

Since he cannot be free of the other’s gaze, man must remember that the other’s definition of his being is neither concrete nor final. Though one is never free of one’s “situation,” one is always free to deny or negate that situation and try to change it (Solomon, “Sartre” 812). That is to say, the self is not a “fixed personality;” rather, it is a constant “process of becoming” (Thompson 17) and is able to perpetually recreate itself (Sartre 100). With this freedom comes the ability to “envision new possibilities, to reform ourselves and to reinterpret our facticity in light of new projects and ambitions”
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(Solomon, “Sartre” 813). Man, Sartre says, is “never any one of [his] attitudes, any one of [his] actions” (Sartre 103). Inasmuch as man cannot hold onto any one attitude or action, no one attitude or action can be equated with the whole of his existence. This is easier said than done, however, since the “mere appearance of the Other” puts the self “in the position of passing judgment on [it]self as on an object, for it is as an object that [the self] appear[s] to the Other” (302). If man attempts to “recover” his being “by assimilating or absorbing the other” (Bell 294), and “forgets” that he is a “self-determining” being, then he is in bad faith (Solomon, “Sartre” 813). Man is, therefore, in bad faith when he identifies himself wholly with the way the other defines him and refuses to admit to his full freedom (Martin 70).

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre declares that “if man is what he is, bad faith is forever impossible and candour ceases to be his ideal and becomes instead his being. “But is man what he is,” Sartre asks, if he “exists as consciousness of being” (101)? Since “consciousness can be produced only in and through the existence of the Other,” man can only become aware of himself when he is confronted with the “gaze” of another (363). If man is only aware of himself through “the gaze of the other,” “how can he be what he is” (101)? Unless “the gaze of the other” always produces an accurate interpretation of the one being looked at, man can only exist as a “representation for others and for [him]self” (102). In order to fully understand why man—as a representation—is never what he is, one must look at Sartre’s discussion of the waiter in the café:

Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton. . . . All his behaviour seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his
movements as if they were mechanisms. . . . his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms. (101)

It is clear from this passage that the waiter is merely “playing at being a waiter in a café,” “amusing himself” in order to “realize” “his condition” (102). None of his attitudes and actions come naturally; rather, they seem forced and exaggerated. If he “is” a waiter in a café, there will be no need to “play” at being what he is. Since “playing at being a waiter” is just a representation, it is “in vain” that the waiter tries to “fulfill the functions of a café waiter” (102–3). Furthermore, Sartre describes the waiter as an “automaton” and his movements as “mechanisms” in order to stress his “object-ness” and inability to be who he is. In being viewed as an object, the waiter—a “being-for-itself”—has now become a “being-in-itself.” If he has become a “being-in-itself,” it is obvious that he is not what he is: a “being-for-itself.” Contrary to what D. Z. Philips suggests, the waiter is not “in danger of becoming a caricature of a waiter” (Philips 23); rather, his “too precise” and “too rapid” movements seem to emphasize the waiter’s over-identification with his role of a waiter. Since his being is always a representation in the eyes of the other, man is never what he is; this can only mean that the danger of bad faith is very possible.

Interestingly, Sartre’s image of the café waiter seems to echo Nietzsche’s thirty-eighth aphorism in “Maxims and Arrows.” Here he asks, “Are you genuine? Or an actor? A representation? Or that itself which is represented? – Finally you are no more than an imitation of an actor . . . Second question of conscience” (37). It is unclear whether or not Sartre borrowed this idea directly from Nietzsche; however, the similarities between the waiter and the actor are too telling to dismiss the possibility.

What exactly is bad faith and why does it oppose individual freedom? Bad faith can be simply defined as a “lie to oneself” (Sartre 88). It is also the denial that we are responsible for our actions and, therefore, responsible for ourselves (Thompson 16). In Being and
Nothingness, Sartre distinguishes between two different types of lies: the ones told by someone who “is in complete possession of the truth which he’s hiding” and the ones told “to oneself, not to the other” (89). Unlike the liar who lies in general, the liar of bad faith believes in his own lies and does not lie knowingly. Bad faith, then, is “a lie without a liar” (92). What is this “lie” that one tells oneself? It is a lie that involves the denial of our own radical freedom: “the idea that, although we are surrounded by social . . . constraints, each of us . . . remains a free agent in the sense that we not only can choose, we have to choose” (Thompson 16). Since the majority of us do not live up to the challenge of radical freedom, we choose to deny this freedom and instead choose to “erroneously” believe that we are “something fixed and settled” (Solomon, “Sartre” 813). No matter what we do, however, we cannot escape this condition of our existence: in choosing to deny our freedom we are, in effect, positing the very same thing that we are trying to negate. To deny that one is radically free, then, is to lie to oneself in bad faith. As Solomon points out, “to be human, to be conscious, is to be free to imagine, free to choose, and responsible for one’s lot in life” (“Sartre” 812). By denying one’s freedom, and the responsibility attached to it, one is essentially denying one’s own humanity. As long as one exists, one is sentenced to a life of radical freedom.

Since freedom “is the foundation of all essences,” it is not something that we can eradicate from our existence by simply negating it (Sartre 566). Sartre goes on to say that “we are [both] perpetually threatened by the nihilation of our actual choice and perpetually threatened with choosing ourselves—and consequently with becoming—other than we are” (598). We do not want to take up the responsibility of being our own person but, at the same time, we do not want to have our freedom of choice taken away from us. This is why we live in bad faith—by convincing ourselves that we do not have a choice, we eliminate the need to choose ourselves. If we are
not able to “make” ourselves, we are not pressured into being responsible for who we are. As Sartre says, “the goal of bad faith . . . is to put oneself out of reach; it is an escape” from the condition of one’s being (110).

There seems to exist a sense of urgency in Sartre’s discussion of bad faith and the individual’s need to be responsible. Near the end of Being and Nothingness, it is clear that this sense of urgency stems from the inevitability of death. Insofar as our freedom is limited to our mortal existence, death will unavoidably eliminate our freedom of choice. Therefore, we must take up our responsibility now and live authentically when the power of choice is still with us. iv Since “the very existence of death alienates us wholly in our own life to the advantage of the Other,” we must embrace our freedom and exert it now (695). “The fact of death,” Sartre says, gives “the final victory to the point of view of the Other” and since “to die is to exist only through the Other,” we must realize and embrace our radical freedom while we still can (696).

Coming to terms with the condition of our existence, in turn, requires us to live both responsibly and authentically. In order to behave authentically, we must act without relying on the self-deceptions of bad faith; in order to behave responsibly, we must not use our supposed “fixed personality or nature” to explain or justify our actions (Thompson 16–7). For Sartre, “absolute responsibility . . . is simply the logical requirement of the consequences of our freedom” (Sartre 708); since radical freedom is the condition of our existence, we are wholly responsible “without being able . . . to tear [ourselves] away from this responsibility for an instant” (710):

What happens to me happens through me . . . everything which happens to me is mine . . . I shall carry the entire responsibility for it . . . because it is the image of my free choice of myself, and everything which it presents to me is mine in that this represents me and symbolizes me . . . . Thus there are no accidents in a life . . . I did not have any excuse . . . the peculiar character of human-reality is that it is without excuse . . . I
am responsible for my very desire of fleeing responsibilities. To make myself passive in the world, to refuse to act upon things and upon Others is still to choose myself. (708–10)

Since we are responsible for every one of our actions, we are also responsible for all the consequences that arise out of our decision to act a certain way. For example, not only is it not possible for wars to start spontaneously on their own but they cannot continue for no apparent reason; instead, wars are products of our own choices and we therefore must take full responsibility for them: “the war is mine . . . by the sole fact that it arises in a situation which I cause to be and that I can discover it there only by engaging myself for or against it. . . . If it is going to be four empty years, then it is I who wear the responsibility for this” (709). Though he deviated from this voluntarist position in his later writings, in an interview a few years before his death, Sartre still believed that “in the end one is always responsible for what is made of one” (Solomon, “Sartre” 812).

Like Sartre, Nietzsche is also an adamant believer of freedom—the will to affirm life—and individual responsibility, that is, “responsibility for oneself” (“Twilight” 103). It is important to note, however, that while Sartre believes in a radical freedom that exists behind every human choice, Nietzsche rejects the “superlative metaphysical” concept of freedom (Ridley 206–7). Though he is in agreement with Sartre that human freedom is “seriously diminished, if not entirely eliminated” by such things as “one’s history” and the “conventions of one’s society,” Nietzsche does not go as far as Sartre to suggest the existence of an “absolute” freedom (Ridley 206); rather, he offers an account of freedom that is “in contradistinction to the ‘ascetic’ or ‘slavish’ ways of the past” (Guay 302). While Nietzsche does speak positively of freedom and the freedom of the will, he does not do so in order to advance a “metaphysical thesis” of freedom; instead, his thoughts on freedom is meant to draw attention to a kind of “self-relation” (Ridley 208) that enables us to venture
beyond “fixed notions of what is good and what is bad” (Thompson 13). What both of their thoughts on freedom have in common, however, is the concept of transcendence: while Sartre’s “man of bad faith” has to embrace his freedom of choice in order to transcend the social roles that he plays, Nietzsche’s “man of ressentiment” has to move beyond the morality of the herd in order to become an “emancipated individual” (Mandalios 205), one who has learned how to speak the “language of non-repressed subjectivity” (Bergoffen 68). This is why freedom, for Nietzsche, is characterized as being “purely subjective determination” (Guay 302)—”a self-correcting enterprise of self-invention that is coincident with self-discovery” (313).

In Nietzsche’s terms, responsibility, like freedom, is a “noble” (Will to Power 944) trait that only belongs to the “highest men” (975). The weak, “the man of ressentiment,” would only “collapse under” (975) the “heavy responsibilities” that the strong “instinctively seeks” (944). Not only is “the man of ressentiment” unable to “bear” (975) the weight of this noble characteristic, his morality based on “equality” also “diminishes” the strong man’s “will to self-responsibility,” which in turn, causes a “decline [in] autonomy” (936). Unlike the “higher men,” “the man of ressentiment’ does not want to be responsible for his condition and instead places blame on an external factor—namely, the other—in order to make his own existence bearable:

The cry of the slaves, the underprivileged, places blame on the other rather than the self for their condition: “It is a crime to be born in to be born in favourable circumstances; for thus one has dispossessed the others, pushed them aside, condemned them to vice, even to work—
How can I help it that I am wretched! But somebody must be responsible, otherwise it would be unbearable!” (Will to Power 765)

Since “the man of ressentiment” refuses to be responsible for his existence, he can never truly be free. In order to account for this “lack” in his character, the weak man then chooses to think of himself as being “unfree” (Ridley 206–7). In the same way, Sartre’s man of
bad faith also over-identifies with the social categorization of his formal identity and convinces himself that his lack of freedom prevents him from transcending the formal projection of his person.

Responsibility and authenticity, however, are not easy things to come by. In fact, both Nietzsche and Sartre—after having identified the source of the individual’s repression and charting the necessary path out of it—are in agreement that freedom is a heavy burden to carry: while Nietzsche called for individuals who are strong enough to endure the task of overcoming, Sartre proclaimed more than once that humans are “condemned to be free.” It is this ability to bear one’s freedom that both philosophers highlight as the requirement for achieving transcendence. In order to test this ability, Nietzsche offered his concept of the “eternal recurrence:”

_The greatest weight._—What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you in your loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence. . . . Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: “You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.” If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing . . . would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (The Gay Science 341)

Since life repeats itself infinitely, the individual is stuck in a situation that requires them to continually exert their freedom to make sense of the world and their existential role within it. As it turns out, freedom is not something one simply accepts, for with acceptance comes the constant process of becoming—the perpetual need to have many
perspectives and reinterpret one’s facticity. Since both philosophers reject the notion of absolutes, to settle within a fixed identity is to adhere to the same thing one believes to be false. This is why they both stress the individual’s need to endlessly make and remake their identity autonomously. Nietzsche’s “eternal recurrence,” then, is a mental exercise that measures the individual’s strength of will. If one can rejoice in the concept of the “eternal recurrence” and learn to love one’s fate, one can withstand the full burden of freedom.

As should now be clear, Nietzsche’s influence on and connection to Sartre’s philosophy offers a great deal. By looking at their respective concepts, not only can one deduce that Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment was a model for Sartre’s own idea of bad faith, one can also confidently conclude that both Nietzsche and Sartre have provided the groundwork for challenging oppression. What distinguishes Nietzsche’s ressentiment and Sartre’s bad faith is their emphasis on a self that is able to choose to be free of “the gaze of the other.” In their campaign for human freedom, both philosophers set out to liberate the individual from the social constraints that weigh down their will to act. For both Nietzsche and Sartre, freedom amounts to the ability to choose what one does and how one thinks. Though external influences are unavoidable, both philosophers are in agreement that one should never let these “foreign factors” guide one’s existence and entirely define who one is as an individual. It is the individual that both philosophers place at the forefront. Both philosophers are also adamant in their declaration that, in order to live an honest and authentic life, the individual must have an active and responsible role in their own existence. Rather than modeling their life after “the gaze of the other,” Nietzsche’s and Sartre’s individual must be wholly independent in both thought and action in order to achieve true freedom. For individual freedom to be within reach, this individual must be both free of external control and have the strength for self-governing. This individual not only has to define who they
are in accordance to their own standards and nobody else’s, they must also realize this freedom by having full control of their lot in life. In other words, for individual freedom to exist, one must possess both individual autonomy and sovereignty.
On 8 June 1981, *Der Spiegel* (The Mirror), Europe’s largest and most influential weekly magazine, published its 24th issue of the year with the illustration of Nietzsche and Hitler on the cover. The image shows Hitler emerging from Nietzsche’s head holding a gun with the caption “The Return of a Philosopher: Nietzsche the Thinker, Hitler the Perpetrator” running across the page, making the connection between Nietzsche and Hitler quite clear: Nietzsche is portrayed as the mastermind behind Hitler’s violent plan to unify Germany under a pure master race. It did not help matters that Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth, who was a Nazi supporter and friend of Hitler’s, organized, edited, and published his collection of random notes. This collection of notes, known today as *The Will to Power*, was later adapted by the Nazis in their campaign against the Jews.

Craig Schuftan provides a misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s ideas in his attempt to uncover “the hidden roots of rock & roll in the Romantic movement of the 1800s.” He claims, in an interview with Zan Rowe, “as soon as I started reading [Nietzsche], I felt like I was in the presence of a rockstar.” Schuftan then proceeds to make a connection between Nietzsche and Depeche Mode’s lead singer’s self-destructive, irresponsible, and hedonistic lifestyle. He claims that Nietzsche, with his rejection of a “social conscience” and “the good,” would have invented rock & roll in the nineteenth century.

Walter Kaufmann clearly lays out how the Nazis presented their misconceptions as true interpretations of Nietzsche’s writing. Not only did they claim that Elisabeth’s edition of *The Will to Power* was Nietzsche’s *magnum opus* (40-41), but they also made selective use of its passages and perverted its meaning. By not marking the omitted words with the customary dots (291), or mentioning that Nietzsche put certain words within quotation marks (301), the Nazis were able to successfully depict him as their philosopher and his words as their anthem. It did not matter that Nietzsche did not consider the Germans a master race (284), as the Nazis’ abuse of Nietzsche’s work only reinforced the misapprehensions that already existed (9), having arisen from the aphoristic nature of his writing.

Martin Heidegger proposes a similar position in his discussion of “being-toward-death,” a state of being that creates authentic individuality. According to Heidegger, to be a “being-toward-death” is to understand that one’s “insuperable” death is “nonrelational” and one’s “ownmost” (241). That is to say, one’s death is both inevitable and entirely one’s own. By taking ownership of one’s own death and recognizing it as a possibility, one is separating oneself from
the “they.” Therefore, this awareness of the possibility of one’s own death reveals one’s authentic self, a self that “is related to itself” (242). However, an inauthentic form of “being-toward-death” exists if, in “idle talk,” one tries to “flee” from the meaning of one’s own death and its “definiteness” (248) by reintroducing the “they” back into the discussion: “Dying, which is essentially and irreplaceably mine, is distorted into a publicly occurring event which the they encounters.” In “idle talk,” “death is understood as an indeterminate something” that only “strikes the they” as it “is not yet present for oneself, and is thus no threat.” Though dying “does concern Dasein,” everyday Dasein engaging in “idle talk” believes that death “belongs to no one in particular.” For Heidegger, “such ambiguity” is the precise reason why Dasein runs the risk “of losing itself in the they with regard to an eminent potentiality-of-being that belongs to its own self” (243). It is the everyday “evasion of death” that makes Dasein “an inauthentic being toward it” (249). In this sense, both Heidegger’s Dasein and Sartre’s individual, as beings-toward-death, need to eliminate the “they” and the “Other,” respectively, from the self in order to achieve authenticity—to do otherwise is to exist inauthentically.

V Nietzsche’s term for this form of love is “amor fati”: “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary—but love it” (“Ecce Homo” 10).
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from Gestalt
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a mobile system of contingency and the gravitational spectrum of dependence and servitude pointing towards its own deference, self-deceit and chimera
a device with which to measure the unthinkability of an encounter with the Other
a specific linear gauge of barbarism (and subjects thereof) upon which lies the immolation of symbol on platelets of gold and zinc
designed to permeate elements of consciousness and suspend feats of silence and gesture in a porous, free floating mental resin
“Identity” is intrinsically uncertain, because what by definition can never be “tracked” is the origin of paternity. The great family plots turn on the implicit knowledge that pater semper incertus est.
- Christopher Prendergast

Lifting the valleys of the sea
My father moved through griefs of joy;
- e.e. cummings

what is a name? i paid my way. i paid my way. i gave: a blue robe, a number of notebooks, something miraculous, a perennial figure in photos, a hand holding cakes and children. as i tracked this a piston exploded and a figure fell out of the frame. you become remote as radio wave. a recording. a bit of words waving. a few towers received you and replicate you back. MER is a measure. your back, a splinter. not so much beautiful as busted. An error vector for all imperfections including amplitude imbalance and distortion. all pages begin with mer.

what is a name?

As a young boy, Debussy's parents had plans for him to become a sailor. as an adult composing "La mer" he rarely visited the sea. my childhood bends beside me. giving your birthday cards back into the Fraser, my brother populates the Pacific with this absence.
and we ourselves walked along by the stream of the Ocean in the southwest region the river Acheron flows into the Ionian. and you Mer.: used in historical astronomy to indicate the southern direction mimic this movement. I dig a pit to put my name in. what is in a name? i take the southbound exit. you're how the viaduct cuts and what it cuts into. There are several languages or dialects called Mer: one for new guinea, one for murray, one for forgetting. a figure falls behind the foliage. a piston exploded. A repeat unit (or mer), is not to be confused with the term monomer a substance for synthetics. one they grant and one they gather. you're in neither. finally fodder. without a tongue or tool to recall you, you become statue of who? statue of libertine. statue of listening.

drove sleeping selves to swarm their fates
woke dreamers to their ghostly roots

scaling the metal plates of your face i sunder. i solder. i sign the waiver. publicly owned and traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol MER i give you over. i paid my way. i paid my way. a black tooth comb, some aftershave, an undershirt. "Mer" originates from the Greek word "meros," which means part(s). installation payments, no profit.
Richard / MER

and to Tiresias / alone, apart i would offer...

- Monomer
- Dimer
- Trimer
- Tetramer
- Pentamer
- Hexamer
- Heptamer
- Octamer
- Nonamer
- Decamer
- Polymer
- Heteromer
- Isomer

in the absence of an axis: i look over the railing. a rover. (MER) is an ongoing space mission. an impression on a mattress a collector of the composition of minerals gold coins in a safety deposit a geological process that shaped the local terrain and influenced the cratering clothes hung in the closet. at last he came / a shade. what's in a name?

-mer and mer- are affixes. fixing the covers of your illness you move through news of silence.
the revival of the Mer project was announced. my childhood bends beside me. a mutiny. user interfaces and hardware adaptation will be able to build their products on top of the Mer core. before i could restore it, a piston exploded. in the MER [mechanic equipment room] where water heaters, plumbing and electrical or electronic equipment are stored a video projector burned out its centre. a figure fell from the frame. flung under few cheap flowers. i paid my way. i paid my way.

what's in a name?