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Apollos Kim, Ph.D. Thesis Defence, MBB
11:00 AM - 3:00 PM
June 19, 2013
Thesis Title: Structural and kinetic analysis of Escherichia coli signal peptide peptidase A
Dr. Mark Paetzel (Sr. Supervisor)
Dr. Nicholas Harden
Dr. Edgar Young
Dr. Dipankar Sen (Public Examiner)
Dr. Ross MacGillivray - UBC (External Examiner)
Dr. Frederic Pio (Chair)
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Hagen Schwerin, PhD Thesis Defence, Economics
11:00 AM - 1:00 PM
June 20, 2013
Senior Supervisor: Steeve Mongrain
Abstract:
This thesis considers implications of the commitment of resources to specific dirty and
clean production technologies. Chapter one examines underutilizing capital to preserve
the environment. I consider an economy in which building new capital units may create
additions to pollution of the same kind that production of a general factor creates. The
second chapter analyzes the distribution of investment in dirty versus clean technologies
when building new capital units creates such emissions. The third aspect, in Chapter
three, is the planning and dispatch of dirty and clean production capacity given the
fluctuation of clean technology inputs, in particular of renewable energy for electricity
production.
Chapter 1: If the utilization of dirty technology capital can be chosen then emissions
can be saved. If underutilization postpones capital use, replacing investment, then emissions
from investment can be prevented. This is of particular interest in regard to climate
change, because currently existing fossil-fuel using machines have been built without
regard to the climate, and investment in clean energy technology creates emissions. I
examine the Pareto optimal utilization of dirty and clean technology capital and their
irreversible investment in controlling an environmental stock. Dirty technology production
is below capacity if government policy internalizes the externality after such policy is
sufficiently long delayed. Capital can be optimally underutilized if the pollution is below
its long-term level. Optimal early utilization diminishes the capital stock until investment
becomes worthwhile followed by full utilization. The emissions tax that implements an
optimum is smaller in those early periods than the tax that induces a welfare maximum
under the premise that producers fully utilize capital. Clean technology capital may be
underutilized to save emissions from investment or because creating new units is more
costly than forwarding existing units.
Chapter 2: The paper studies the role of emissions from investment for the distribution
of investment among dirty and clean technologies. Dirty technology may not be used at a
stationary point that is a Quasi-Clean Age because the cost of pollution reduction relative
to consumption increase is smaller for the dirty technology, though clean technology may
be relatively more expensive on all scales, and the societal effect of the first pollution unit
may be small. In plausible cases there is a unique stationary point. If technologies imply
a continuum of stationary points then the point with greatest clean capacity is optimal. If
the discount factor is not too small then disregarding emissions from investment in dirty
technology biases the stationary cost of polluting downward, because society is willing to
pay more to preserve the environment if it has less polluting technology and accounting
a greater portion of emissions in investment lowers the complete emission intensity. The
paper establishes relationships between the investment in clean technology, the cost of
polluting, and the shadow return or marginal rate of return.
Chapter 3: This paper examines production using a dirty and reliable technology versus
production using a clean and unreliable technology in a dynamic economy. Consumption
can be efficiently equal across states because investment absorbs the fluctuation in clean
technology productivity in days in which consumption is maximized. In the celebrated
case dirty technology backs up production in states when productivity of clean technology
is low, yet the underutilization of dirty technology capital when the clean technology’s
productivity is high does not smooth consumption across all states in a long period in
which capital is built. Clean output subsidies such as feed-in premiums, when rebating
a general energy tax or a general tax on investment goods that produce energy, or that
differentiate the surcharge in a fully-funded system between households, can implement
a Pareto optimum.
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Hagen Schwerin, PhD Thesis Defence, Economics
11:00 AM - 1:00 PM
June 20, 2013
Senior Supervisor: Steeve Mongrain
Abstract:
This thesis considers implications of the commitment of resources to specific dirty and
clean production technologies. Chapter one examines underutilizing capital to preserve
the environment. I consider an economy in which building new capital units may create
additions to pollution of the same kind that production of a general factor creates. The
second chapter analyzes the distribution of investment in dirty versus clean technologies
when building new capital units creates such emissions. The third aspect, in Chapter
three, is the planning and dispatch of dirty and clean production capacity given the
fluctuation of clean technology inputs, in particular of renewable energy for electricity
production.
Chapter 1: If the utilization of dirty technology capital can be chosen then emissions
can be saved. If underutilization postpones capital use, replacing investment, then emissions
from investment can be prevented. This is of particular interest in regard to climate
change, because currently existing fossil-fuel using machines have been built without
regard to the climate, and investment in clean energy technology creates emissions. I
examine the Pareto optimal utilization of dirty and clean technology capital and their
irreversible investment in controlling an environmental stock. Dirty technology production
is below capacity if government policy internalizes the externality after such policy is
sufficiently long delayed. Capital can be optimally underutilized if the pollution is below
its long-term level. Optimal early utilization diminishes the capital stock until investment
becomes worthwhile followed by full utilization. The emissions tax that implements an
optimum is smaller in those early periods than the tax that induces a welfare maximum
under the premise that producers fully utilize capital. Clean technology capital may be
underutilized to save emissions from investment or because creating new units is more
costly than forwarding existing units.
Chapter 2: The paper studies the role of emissions from investment for the distribution
of investment among dirty and clean technologies. Dirty technology may not be used at a
stationary point that is a Quasi-Clean Age because the cost of pollution reduction relative
to consumption increase is smaller for the dirty technology, though clean technology may
be relatively more expensive on all scales, and the societal effect of the first pollution unit
may be small. In plausible cases there is a unique stationary point. If technologies imply
a continuum of stationary points then the point with greatest clean capacity is optimal. If
the discount factor is not too small then disregarding emissions from investment in dirty
technology biases the stationary cost of polluting downward, because society is willing to
pay more to preserve the environment if it has less polluting technology and accounting
a greater portion of emissions in investment lowers the complete emission intensity. The
paper establishes relationships between the investment in clean technology, the cost of
polluting, and the shadow return or marginal rate of return.
Chapter 3: This paper examines production using a dirty and reliable technology versus
production using a clean and unreliable technology in a dynamic economy. Consumption
can be efficiently equal across states because investment absorbs the fluctuation in clean
technology productivity in days in which consumption is maximized. In the celebrated
case dirty technology backs up production in states when productivity of clean technology
is low, yet the underutilization of dirty technology capital when the clean technology’s
productivity is high does not smooth consumption across all states in a long period in
which capital is built. Clean output subsidies such as feed-in premiums, when rebating
a general energy tax or a general tax on investment goods that produce energy, or that
differentiate the surcharge in a fully-funded system between households, can implement
a Pareto optimum.
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