“Unobserved Preference heterogeneity in Demand Using Generalized Random Coefficients”

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Abstract

We prove a new identification theorem showing nonparametric identification of the joint distribution of random coefficients in general nonlinear and additive models. This differs from existing random coefficients models by not imposing a linear index structure for the regressors. We then model unobserved preference heterogeneity in consumer demand as utility functions with random Barten scales. These Barten scales appear as random coefficients in nonlinear demand equations. Using Canadian data, we compare estimated energy demand functions with and without random Barten scales. We find that unobserved preference heterogeneity substantially affects the estimated consumer surplus costs of an energy tax.

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1 Introduction

For discretely demanded goods, unobserved preference heterogeneity is typically modeled using random coefficients, as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP 1995). In this paper we propose an analogous way to introduce unobserved preference heterogeneity in nonlinear continuous demand systems. This includes a new identification theorem showing how the joint distribution of random coefficients in general nonlinear and additive models can be nonparametrically identified. This is in sharp contrast to almost all existing random coefficients theorems, which, like BLP, assume a linear index structure for the regressors.
The application we consider is energy demand by consumers. Energy is consumed in continuous quantities and displays substantial nonlinearities in income and price effects. Therefore, energy cannot be appropriately modeled using discrete demand methods like BLP, and instead requires the methodology of continuous demand systems.

We demonstrate the importance of accounting for random coefficient type unobserved preference heterogeneity in energy demand. In particular, we show that failure to do so results in a dramatic underestimate of the variance of impacts of energy price changes across consumers. Moreover, we find that this variation in energy price elasticities is particularly large among poorer households. Accounting for this variation is crucial for correctly assessing the true costs to society of energy policies such as a carbon tax. We show that measures of social welfare that ignore this unobserved preference heterogeneity yield substantially biased estimates of the full costs to society of an energy tax on consumers, by failing to fully account for the tax’s distributional impacts.

One of the most commonly used methods for incorporating observable sources of preference heterogeneity (such as the impacts of age or family size) in continuous demand systems is via Barten (1964) scales. Barten scales deflate the prices faced by consumers, and so have a structure that is equivalent to random coefficients on prices, in that they multiply each price in the demand system. This suggests that a natural way to introduce unobserved preference heterogeneity into continuous demand systems is to allow random variation in the Barten scales via random coefficients on prices. We call these, "random Barten scales."

Allowing for random Barten scales introduces a substantial econometric difficulty because, unlike discrete demand models such as multinomial logit, realistic continuous demand models are highly nonlinear in prices, due to constraints like Slutsky symmetry. We therefore require a general type of random coefficients that can be identified and estimated in nonlinear, or even nonparametrically specified, demand functions. We define "generalized random coefficients" to be random coefficients applied to variables in a general nonlinear or nonparametric model, in contrast to ordinary random coefficients that are applied in linear index models. In our demand application, generalized random coefficients on prices are the random Barten scales.

In this paper we first provide some identification theorems, showing that the joint distribution of random coefficients can be nonparametrically identified in nonlinear, and in additive nonparametric, regression models. We then apply these results to identification of random Barten scales in demand systems. This application includes proving a new theorem that nonparametrically characterizes the preferences associated with demand functions having a certain additive structure.

Based on these identification theorems, we estimate energy demand functions for a set of Canadian consumers. To illustrate the importance of allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in Barten scales, we evaluate the (partial equilibrium) impacts of a hypothetical tax on energy goods, like a carbon tax. Among other results, we find that allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity has a large impact on the estimated distribution of the relative costs (consumer surplus impacts) of the tax. For example, we find that this distribution across consumers has a standard deviation that is more than twice as large in our model compared to an analogous model that does not allow for such unobserved preference heterogeneity.

Consider first our proposed generalization of random coefficients models. Suppose an observed variable $Y$ depends on a vector of observed regressors $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_K)$, and on a set
of unobserved errors $U_0, U_1, ..., U_K$ that are (possibly after conditioning on other covariates $Z$) independent of $X$. We propose a generalized random coefficients model given by

$$Y = G(X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) \quad \text{or} \quad Y = G(X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) + U_0$$

for some function $G$. We focus mainly on results for the special case of equation (1) where $G$ takes the additive model form

$$Y = \sum_{k=1}^K G_k(X_k U_k) + U_0$$

and the functions $G_1, ..., G_K$ are unknown.

In these models the vector $U = (U_1, ..., U_K)$ represents unobserved heterogeneity in the dependence of $Y$ on $X$, while $U_0$, if present, represents measurement error or other independent variation in $Y$. We provide conditions under which the joint distribution of the vector $U$ is nonparametrically identified. If present, $U_0$ is assumed independent of these other errors and has a marginal distribution that is also nonparametrically identified.

In our empirical application, $Y$ will be a measure of energy demanded by a consumer, $G$ will be a Marshallian demand function, each $X_k$ will be the price of a good $k$ divided by a consumer’s total expenditures, and each $U_k$ (other than $U_0$) will be a random Barten scale. All previous empirical implementations of Barten scales have exactly these forms, but with every $U_k$ other than $U_0$ specified as deterministic functions of observable characteristics that affect preferences, such as age or family size. In contrast, we allow the Barten scales to be random, depending on both observable and unobservable characteristics. We show that the joint distribution of these random Barten scales can be nonparametrically identified, under low level regularity conditions.

One of our identification theorems shows that if $G$ is known, then under some conditions the joint distribution of the elements of $U$ is nonparametrically identified. We also provide a theorem giving conditions under which, in equation (2), each function $G_k$ can be nonparametrically identified. Combining both theorems then allows us to simultaneously nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of $U$ and nonparametrically identify each $G_k$ function. Combining both theorems also provides additional restrictions that we argue might be exploited to further generalize the model (specifically, by possibly relaxing the additivity assumption with some interaction terms).

Imposing the additivity of equation (2) directly on Marshallian demand functions yields some implausible restrictions on preferences. However, we show that, when $K = 2$, these restrictions can be relaxed by suitably transforming $Y$. In particular, we prove a theorem showing that when $K = 2$, if $Y$ is defined as a logit transformed budget share, then demands will take the additive form implied by equation (2) if and only if indirect utility has a correspondingly additive form. This theorem also provides closed form expressions for the indirect utility function corresponding to nonparametrically specified demand functions that are additive in this way. These closed form expressions greatly simplify our later consumer surplus and welfare calculations.

We first provide a literature review on the econometric identification of models containing random coefficients and on the modeling of preference heterogeneity in continuous demand
systems. We then present our main identification theorems, followed by our theorem characterizing the nonparametric connection between preferences and logit transformed demands. We next provide our empirical implementation of the random Barten scales model, including consumer surplus calculations on the hypothetical impacts of a large increase in the price of, or taxes on, energy goods. We then list some conclusions. One important finding is that an energy tax may impact inequality and welfare through a previously unrecognized channel, which is the variation in consumer surplus effects for households that have the same observed budgets and characteristics. We find that this variation is particularly large for poor households.

Following the conclusions is an appendix that contains proofs of Theorems. We also have an online supplemental appendix. The online supplemental appendix contains an extensive set of additional empirical analyses verifying the robustness of our estimated results to a wide variety of alternative model specifications, including adding complexity to the utility function specification, relaxing the parametric structure on preference and error distributions, and dealing with potential endogeneity of regressors. The online supplemental appendix also includes a Monte Carlo analysis of our estimated model, and contains some additional technical results of lesser importance.

2 Literature Review

We use generalized random coefficients to represent price scales in consumer demand models. There is a long history of using such scales to empirically model observed sources of preference heterogeneity. See, e.g., Rothbarth (1943), Prais and Houthakker (1955), Barten (1964), Pollak and Wales (1981) and Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982), and see Lewbel (1997) for a survey. Barten (1964) type price scales (hereafter: Barten scales) take the form of multiplying each price in a demand function by a preference heterogeneity parameter, as in equation (1). It is therefore a natural extension of this literature to include unobserved preference heterogeneity in Barten scales.

We apply estimated demand functions and estimated Barten scale distributions to do welfare analyses. In particular, we use a Barten scaled energy demand function to perform consumer surplus calculations for an energy price change (as in Hausman 1981). Our consumer surplus calculations can be interpreted as a variant of Hoderlein and Vanhems (2011), who introduce unobserved preference heterogeneity into the Hausman model. The first of these two papers introduced scalar preference heterogeneity into the model nonparametrically, while the latter incorporated heterogeneity in the form of ordinary linear random coefficients. As an alternative to modeling unobserved heterogeneity, Hausman and Newey (2014) provide bounds on average consumer surplus.

In contrast, our model follows the prior consumer demand literature by including preference heterogeneity in the form of Barten scales, differing from the prior demand literature in that our Barten scales include unobserved heterogeneity (a smaller additional difference is the way we also include an additive measurement error). We also apply our empirical results to estimate Atkinson (1970) type social welfare functions, and thereby analyze the extent to which allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity affects estimated tradeoffs between mean impacts and inequality of impacts of a tax or price change in energy.
Other papers that introduce nonseparable unobserved preference heterogeneity in continuous demand systems include Brown and Walker (1989), McFadden and Richter (1991), Lewbel (2001), McFadden (2005), Beckert (2006), Matzkin (2007b), Beckert and Blundell (2008), Hoderlein and Stoye, (2014), and Kitamura and Stoye (2014). Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) propose a continuous demand system model in which the standard separable errors equal utility parameters summarizing preference heterogeneity, and do welfare calculations showing that accounting for this unobserved heterogeneity has a substantial impact on the results. Lewbel and De Nadai (2011) show how preference heterogeneity can be separately identified from measurement errors. A related empirical model to ours is Comon and Calvet (2003), who use repeated cross sections and deconvolution to identify a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in income effects.


Ordinary random coefficients are the special case of the additive model in equation (2) in which each $G_k$ is the identity function. Additive models are a common generalization of linear models; see, Hastie and Tibshirani (1990), Linton (2000), and Wood (2006), and in the particular applications of additivity to consumer demand systems include Gorman (1976) and Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978).

This paper also contributes to the literature on estimation of models with nonseparable errors, in particular where those errors arise from structural heterogeneity parameters such as random utility parameters. Older examples of such models include Heckman and Singer (1984) and Lewbel (2001). More recent work focusing on general identification and estimation results include Chesher (2003), Altonji and Matzkin (2005), Hoderlein, and Mammen (2007), Matzkin (2007a, 2008), and Imbens and Newey (2009).

Fox and Gandhi (2013) provide general conditions for identification of random utility parameters in multinomial choice problems, including linear index models with random coefficients, and models analogous to Berry and Haile (2009) that exploit Lewbel (2000) type special regressors. They note that the only general sufficient condition known for one of their identifying assumptions is utility functions that are real analytic functions.

A related result to ours is Hoderlein, Nesheim, and Simoni (2011), who provide a high level condition they call $T$-completeness that suffices for nonparametric identification of a vector of random parameters within a known function. They provide some examples where $T$-completeness can be shown to hold, such as when error distributions are in the exponential family, or are parameterizable by a single scalar. Our model when $G$ is known is a special case of their general setup, and so our theorem proving identification for this model provides a new framework where $T$-completeness could be satisfied. More generally, one goal of our analysis is to provide relatively low level conditions that serve to identify our model, instead of high level, difficult to verify conditions as in Fox and Gandhi (2013), or like $T$-completeness.

Perhaps the result that comes closest to our identification theorem is Matzkin (2003), which
in an appendix describes sufficient conditions for identification of a general class of additive models with unobserved heterogeneity. The biggest difference between our results and Matzkin (2003) is that we identify the joint distribution of $U$, while Matzkin assumes the elements of $U$ are mutually independent. However, even our model when $K = 1$ (the case where there is no joint distribution to be identified) does not satisfy her identification assumptions and so even in that case our Theorem is new and cannot be derived from her results. Our online supplemental appendix contains details regarding these differences.

3 Generalized Random Coefficient Model Identification

In this section we first provide, in Theorem 1, assumptions under which the joint distribution of random coefficients can be identified in the general model of equation (1) when $G$ is known. We then provide, in Theorem 2, separate assumptions under which each function $G_k$ (and the marginal distributions of each random coefficient $U_k$) can be identified in additive models given by equation (2). We then combine both theorems to nonparametrically identify both the joint distribution of random coefficients and the functions $G_k$.

Later sections provide the connections between these theorems and our Barten scales model of demand. However, we note upfront that in our empirical application $X$ is positive (though not bounded away from zero), so it is relevant that our identification theorems allow for zero being on the boundary of the closure of the support of $X$.

3.1 Identification of the Distribution of Generalized Random Coefficients

Let $\tilde{Y}$ be a dependent variable, $X$ is a vector of covariates $(X_1, ..., X_K)$ which will have random coefficients $(U_1, ..., U_K)$. Let $Z$ be a vector of additional covariates that may affect the distribution of these random coefficients. For now think of $\tilde{Y}$ as being observable along with $X$ and $Z$, although later we will generalize to having the dependent variable be $Y = \tilde{Y} + U_0$. For any random vectors $A$ and $B$ let $F_{A|B} (a | b)$ and $f_{A|B} (a | b)$ denote the conditional cumulative distribution function and conditional probability density function, respectively, of $A$ given $B$.

ASSUMPTION A1: The conditional distribution $F_{\tilde{Y}|X,Z} (\tilde{y} | x, z)$ and the marginal distribution $F_Z (z)$ are identified. $\tilde{Y} = G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K)$ for some continuous function $G$ and some unobserved random coefficients $U = (U_1, ..., U_K)$, where $U \perp X | Z$.

Assumption A1 first assumes identification of the distributions of observables, which would in general follow from a sample of observations of $\tilde{Y}, X, Z$ with sample size going to infinity. We will first consider identification of $F_{U|Z} (U | Z)$, the joint distribution of the random coefficients (conditional on $Z$), assuming the function $G$ is known. Later we will provide nonparametric identification for a class of $G$ functions. Standard random coefficients is the special case in which the known function $G$ is just the sum of the $X_k U_k$ terms.

In our empirical application, the random coefficients $U_k$ will represent unobserved taste heterogeneity, and $Z$ could then be a vector of observable characteristics that also affect tastes. Another possible role for $Z$ is to serve as control function residuals, which then allows the
random coefficients $U_k$ to be unconditionally correlated with $X$, so elements of $X$ can be endogenous. See, e.g., the correlated random coefficients model of Heckman and Vytlacil (1998). This allows for Heckman and Robb (1986) control function type endogeneity, with $Z$ being control function residuals as in Blundell and Powell (2003, 2004). In particular, if $X_k = h_k (X_{(k)}, Q) + Z_k$ for some observed instrument vector $Q$ and some identified function $h_k$ (typically $h_k$ would be $E (X_k \mid X_{(k)}, Q)$), then the conditional independence assumptions in A1 correspond to standard control function assumptions.

The vector $Z$ can be empty, so all the results we provide will hold if there is no $Z$, in which case $U$ is independent of $X$ and so the regressors $X$ are exogenous. The assumptions also permit $Z$ to be discrete, and place no restriction on the dimension of $Z$, although control function residuals would generally be continuous and have dimension equal to the number of endogenous elements of $X$.

ASSUMPTION A2: The distribution of $\left( U_1^{-1}, \ldots, U_K^{-1} \mid Z \right)$ is identified from its integer moments. $supp (X)$ is rectangular, $supp (X \mid Z) = supp (X)$, and the closure of $supp (X \mid Z)$ equals the closure of $supp (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_K X_K \mid Z, U)$.

We will identify $F_{U\mid Z}$ by identifying moments of the distribution of $\left( U_1^{-1}, \ldots, U_K^{-1} \mid Z \right)$. Necessary and sufficient conditions for integer moments to identify a distribution are known, and are weaker than the conditions needed for existence of a moment generating function. See, e.g., Assumption 7 of Fox, Kim, Ryan, and Bajari (2012). In our empirical application it will be reasonable to assume that each $U_k$ is bounded and bounded away from zero, which is sufficient and stronger than necessary.

Given $U \perp X \mid Z$, the support condition in Assumption A2 could be satisfied in a few different ways. In particular, the support condition holds if the closure of $supp (X \mid Z) = \mathbb{R}_+^K$ and $supp (U \mid Z) \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+^K$, or if $supp (X \mid Z) = \mathbb{R}_+^K$ and $U$ has any support that excludes the origin. In our application we satisfy the first of these conditions by assuming $X$ (prices scaled by total expenditures) can take on any positive value and by noting that Barten scales $U$ must be positive.

Let $t = (t_1, \ldots, t_K)$ denote a $K$ vector of positive integers. For a given function $h$ and vector $t$, define $\kappa_t$ by

$$\kappa_t = \int_{supp(X)} h \left( G (s_1, \ldots, s_K) , t \right) s_1^{t_1-1} s_2^{t_2-1} \ldots s_K^{t_K-1} ds_1 ds_2 \ldots ds_K \quad (3)$$

ASSUMPTION A3: Given $G$, for any $K$ vector of positive integers $t$ we can find a continuous function $h$ such that $\int_{supp(X)} \left| h \left( G (s_1, \ldots, s_K) , t \right) s_1^{t_1-1} s_2^{t_2-1} \ldots s_K^{t_K-1} \right| ds_1 ds_2 \ldots ds_K$ exists, the integral defining $\kappa_t$ is convergent, and $\kappa_t \neq 0$.

Assumption A3 assumes integrability of the function being integrated in equation (3), and requires that the integral is finite and nonzero. This assumption imposes restrictions on $G$, but these restrictions are mitigated by the fact that the function $h$ is freely chosen, based on knowing both $G$ and $t$. The classes of general $G$ functions that satisfy Assumption A3 are difficult to characterize, so Lemma 1 below provides a sufficient condition that is relevant for our application.
LEMMA 1: Assume $\text{supp}(X) = \mathbb{R}_+^K$, $G(X_1, \ldots X_K) = \sum_{k=1}^K G_k(X_k)$, and there exist positive constants $c_1, \ldots, c_K$ such that $G_k(X_k) \geq c_k X_k$ for $k = 1, \ldots, K$. Then Assumption A3 holds.

Proofs are in the appendix. Assumption A3 is most readily satisfied by taking $h$ to be a positive function that is thin tailed in its first argument, as in the proof of Lemma 1 where $h$ as a function of $G$ is the exponential density function. As is also illustrated by Lemma 1, the function $h$ is not required to depend on $t$, but it is allowed to do so.

There are examples of $G$ functions for which identification of the joint distribution of $U_1$ and $U_2$ is clearly not possible. An example is $G(X_1, X_2) = \ln(X_1) + \ln(X_2)$, since in this case $U_1$ and $U_2$ appear only in the form $\ln(U_1) + \ln(U_2)$ with no way to separately identify each. Lemma 2 in the appendix proves that this function violates Assumption A3, so the assumed existence of a function $h$ does limit the class of allowable $G$ functions.

THEOREM 1: Let Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 hold. If the function $G$ is known or identified, then the joint distribution function $F_{U|Z}(U_1, \ldots U_K \mid Z)$ is identified.

The proof is in the appendix. To provide an idea of how Theorem 1 works, consider the case of $K = 1$ and observe that, by a change of variables argument, $E \left( \int h(G(UX)) X^{t-1} dX \right) = E \left( \int h(G(s)) s^{t-1} U^{-t} ds \right)$. The left side of this equation can be estimated, while the right equals a known function times $E \left( U^{-1} \right)$. We can in this way identify any moment of $U^{-1}$ and thereby identify the distribution of $U$.

Providing some more detail, define $\lambda_t(Z)$ by

$$
\lambda_t(Z) = \int_{X \in \text{supp}(X)} E \left[ h \left( \tilde{Y}, t \mid X_1, X_2, \ldots X_K, Z \right) X_1^{t_1-1} X_2^{t_2-1} \ldots X_K^{t_K-1} dX_1 dX_2 \ldots dX_K \right] \quad (4)
$$

$\lambda_t(Z)$ is an integral of a known conditional expectation, and so is identified. The proof of Theorem 1 works by showing that the moment $E \left( U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \ldots U_K^{-t_K} \mid Z \right)$ is identified by equaling the ratio of identified objects $\lambda_t(Z)/\kappa_t$. Identification of these moments for any $K$ vector of integers $t$ then implies identification of the distribution of $U_1^{-1} U_2^{-1} \ldots U_K^{-1} \mid Z$ by Assumption A2, and hence identification of $F_{U|Z}(U_1, \ldots U_K \mid Z)$. We could have instead tried to directly identify $F_{U|Z}$ by working with negative values of $t$, but Assumption A3 would then be more difficult to satisfy than with positive integers $t$. More speculatively, we might instead try to identify the characteristic function of $F_{U|Z}$ by replacing $t$ with the square root of minus one times $t$ for real vectors $t$, but in that case dealing with boundary issues associated with the change of variables step in the proof becomes more complicated.

A special case of Theorem 1 is when $G(s_1, \ldots s_K) = s_1 + \ldots + s_K$, corresponding to the standard linear random coefficients model. Nonparametric identification of the linear model under varying conditions is established by Beran and Hall (1992), Beran and Millar (1994), Beran, Feuerverger, and Hall (1996), and Hoderlein, Klemelae, and Mammen (2010), using assumptions and methods that differ substantially from Theorem 1. The latter authors give key sufficient identifying assumptions in the linear model as being $U$ independent of $X$ as we assumed, and that the distribution of $U$ have square integrable derivatives of sufficiently high order. Generally, identification of the distribution linear random coefficients has been based on
either assuming large support for \(X\) or assuming thin tails for \(U\), (see, e.g., Masten 2013 for a summary), while Theorem 1 for a general \(G\) function requires both support and tail restrictions as in Assumption A2. The linear \(G\) model automatically satisfies our Assumption A3 by being a special case of Lemma 1.

Although Theorem 1 imposes large support restrictions on the regressors, it does not depend on identification at infinity or other types of "thin set" identification arguments (see Khan and Tamer 2011). The support restrictions in Theorem 1 are only used to ensure that boundary terms equal zero in the change of variables step in the proof of the Theorem.

### 3.2 Additive Model Identification

Theorem 1 identified the joint distribution \(F_{U|Z}(U_1,...,U_K | Z)\), assuming the function \(G\) is identified. We now provide a theorem that shows nonparametric identification for a class of \(G\) functions. We will then combine both Theorems. Some assumptions of Theorem 2 duplicate those of Theorem 1; we write the assumptions this way so that each Theorem can stand alone. Let \(e_k\) be the \(K\) vector containing a one in position \(k\) and zeros everywhere else. Let \(X_{(k)}\) denote the \(K - 1\) vector that contains all the elements of \(X\) except for \(X_k\).

**ASSUMPTION A4:** The conditional distribution \(F_{Y|X,Z}(y | x, z)\) and the marginal distribution \(F_Z(z)\) are identified. \(Y = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(X_k U_k) + U_0\) for some unknown functions \(G_k\) and some unobserved random coefficients \(U_0\) and \(U = (U_1, ..., U_K)\), where \((U_0, U_1, ..., U_K) \perp X | Z\) and \(U \perp U_0 | Z\). Either \(U_0\) has a nonvanishing characteristic function (conditional on \(Z\)) \(^1\) or \(U_0\) is identically zero. \(supp(U_0) \subseteq supp(Y)\).

**ASSUMPTION A5:** For \(k \in \{1, ..., K\}\), \((U_k, X_k) | Z\) is continuously distributed, and for every \(r \in supp(X_k U_k)\) there exists an \(x_k \in supp(X_k)\) such that \(f_{U_k}(x_k r) \neq 0\). \(X\) has rectangular support and \([0, e_1, ..., e_K]\) is a subset of the closure of \(supp(X)\).

**ASSUMPTION A6:** For \(k \in \{1, ..., K\}\), \(G_k\) is a strictly monotonically increasing, differentiable function. The location and scale normalizations \(G_k(0) = 0\) and \(G_k(1) = y_0\) for some known \(y_0 \in supp(Y)\) are imposed.

As before, Assumption A4 first assumes identification of \(F_{Y|X,Z}(y | x, z)\) and \(F_Z(z)\), which would in general follow from a sample of observations of \(Y, X, Z\) with sample size going to infinity. Identification of \(F_{Y|X,Z}(y | x, z)\) is actually stronger than necessary for Theorem 1, since only certain features of this distribution are used in the proof. For example, it would suffice to only identify \(F_{Y|X,Z}(y | x_k e_k, z)\) for \(k = 1, ..., K\). Assumption A4 also imposes conditional independence and support requirements on \(U, X\) and \(Z\). These are standard assumptions for random coefficients models, except for the assumption that the additive error \(U_0\) is conditionally independent of the other random coefficients. Beran and Hall (1992) assumed independence of \(U_0\), but later linear \(G\) models do not impose this restriction. Although independence of \(U_0\) is a strong assumption, we show it’s plausible in our empirical application.

\(^1\) Formally, the condition on \(U_0\) regarding a nonvanishing characteristic function required for the deconvolution step of the proof is only that the set of \(t \in \mathbb{R}\) for which \(E(e^{it U_0}) \neq 0\) is dense in \(\mathbb{R}\). See, e.g., Meister (2005).
Assumption A5 assumes that the regressors and random coefficients are continuously distributed. Assumption A5 also calls for some support restrictions, but these are all much milder than the support restrictions that were required by Theorem 1. A key feature of this assumption is that the closure of the support of each element of \( X \) includes zero.

Assumption A6 requires each \( G_k \) function to be smooth and monotonic. This facilitates identifying the distribution of unobservables \( U_k \) that lie inside each \( G_k \). In our application, economic theory will imply this monotonicity. The normalizations in Assumption A6 are all free normalizations, that is, they are made without loss of generality. This is because, first, if \( G_k(0) \neq 0 \) then we can redefine \( G_k(r) \) as \( G_k(r) - G_k(0) \) and redefine \( U_0 \) as \( U_0 + G_k(0) \), thereby making \( G_k(0) = 0 \). Next, given a nonzero \( y_0 \in \text{supp} (Y) \), there must exist a nonzero \( r_0 \) such that \( G_k(r_0) = y_0 \). We can then redefine \( U_k \) as \( r_0U_k \) and redefine \( G_k(r) \) as \( G_k(r/r_0) \), thereby making \( G_k(1) = y_0 \). These particular normalizations are most convenient for proving Theorem 2 below, though in empirical applications alternative normalizations may be more natural, e.g., choosing location to make \( E(U_0) = 0 \).

**THEOREM 2:** Let Assumptions A4, A5, and A6 hold. Then the functions \( G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_K \) and the distributions \( F_{U_0|Z}, F_{U_1|Z}, \ldots, F_{U_K|Z} \) are all nonparametrically identified.\(^2\)

The proof is in the appendix. As noted in the literature review, Theorem 2 is similar to, but is not a direct corollary of, results in Matzkin (2003). In an online supplemenal appendix, we summarize the ways in which Theorem 2 differs from Matzkin (2003). One obvious (though not the only) difference is that Matzkin assumes the elements of \( U \) are mutually independent, either conditionally or unconditionally, and we do not.

The proof of Theorem 2 depends on an identification at zero argument, i.e., thin set identification (see Khan and Tamer 2011). This is undesirable because it means that most of the observable population distribution is not used for identification, and as a result often implies slow rates of convergence for corresponding nonparametric estimators. However, two arguments help mitigate these concerns. First, additional pieces of information can be constructed and used for estimation or testing. For example, given a \( G_k \) and \( F_{U_k|Z} \) function identified by Theorem 1, an additional equality that these functions satisfy for all values of \( x \) (not just in the neighborhood of zero) is

\[
\frac{\partial E(Y \mid X = x, Z = z)}{\partial x_k} = \int_{u \in \text{supp}(U_k|Z=z)} \left[ \frac{\partial G_k(x_ku)}{\partial x_k} \right] dF_{U_k|Z}(u \mid z) \quad (5)
\]

Equation (5) provides additional restrictions on the \( G_k \) and \( F_{U_k|Z} \) that might be exploited for estimation, testing, or alternative identification arguments. The restrictions provided by equation (5) apply over the whole support of the data, not just on a thin set.

A small extension to Theorem 2 is the following.

\(^2\)The proof of Theorem 2 involves evaluating the distribution of \( Y \) given \( X \) where either \( X = 0 \) or all but one element of \( X \) equals zero. This means conditioning on a set of measure zero. Note, however, that issues of nonuniqueness of the limiting argument (the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox) do not arise here, since the identification proof depends only on transformations of smooth conditional density and expectation functions. It would be possible to recast the proofs in terms of conditioning on sets \( \| X \| \leq c \) and taking limits as \( c \to 0 \).
COROLLARY 1: Let $Y = G(X_1U_1, ..., X_KU_K) + U_0$ for any function $G$ that includes $X_kU_k e_k$ in its domain, for $k = 1, ..., K$. Then

i) There exists functions $G_1, ..., G_K$, and $\tilde{G}$ such that

$$Y = \tilde{G}(X_1U_1, ..., X_KU_K) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(X_kU_k) + U_0$$

(6)

where the function $\tilde{G}(X_1U_1, ..., X_KU_K)$ equals zero when all but one of its elements equal zero, and

ii). Theorem 2 holds replacing $Y = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(X_kU_k) + U_0$ in Assumption A4 with equation (6).

In Corollary 1, the function $\tilde{G}$ is not identified, so the main points of this corollary are first that any function $G$ can be decomposed into an additive part $\sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k$ and an interactions part $\tilde{G}$, and second that the presence of the interaction function $\tilde{G}$ does not interfere with identification of the $G_k$ and $F_{U_k | Z}$ functions using Theorem 2. Corollary 1 would then be useful in contexts where $\tilde{G}$ is known or can be identified by other means.

3.3 Full Model Identification

Here we combine Theorems 1 and 2 to identify all the unknown functions in equation (2).

COROLLARY 2: Let $Y = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(X_kU_k) + U_0$ and let $G(X_1U_1, ..., X_KU_K) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(X_kU_k)$. Let Assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, and A6 hold. Then the functions $G_1, G_2, ..., G_K$ and the joint distribution function $F_{U | Z}(U_1, ..., U_K | Z)$ are identified.

Corollary 2 shows identification of the model, but also may provide additional restrictions implied by the model that might usable either for alternative identification strategies, or to obtain identification under more general conditions. In particular, both Theorems 1 and 2 identify the functions $F_{U_k | Z}$ for $k = 1, ..., K$, and so restrictions on the functions $G_1, G_2, ..., G_K$ and $F_{U_1 | Z}, ..., F_{U_K | Z}$ are obtained by equating the construction of the functions $F_{U_k | Z}$ from each of the two theorems for each $k$. Equation (5) provides more such restrictions. Still more restrictions might be obtained by applying Theorem 2 using different $h$ functions, and it may be possible to use that variation to identify the $G_k$ functions without the use of Theorem 2 at all. Similarly, the additional equations that are obtainable using multiple $h$ functions might also be used to identify richer models, such as those containing interaction terms like the function $\tilde{G}$ in Corollary 1. We defer discussion of these conjectures to the online supplemental appendix.

Theorems 1 and 2, and hence our model identification result of Corollary 2, is constructive. However, designing an estimator based on mimicking the steps of these identification arguments would likely be both inefficient and difficult to implement. Inefficiency is likely because Theorem 2 uses thin set identification, and Theorem 1 provides equations based on specific choices of the function $h$, and it is hard to see how one might choose the function $h$ to maximize efficiency. Indeed, different $h$ functions might be optimal for each moment and each function to be estimated. Also, Theorem 1 identifies moments of $U_1^{-1}, ..., U_K^{-1}$, so an inversion would be needed to directly obtain the distribution function of $U$. Finally, sequentially applying Theorem 2 to
estimate $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_K$ and Theorem 1 to estimate $F_U$ would ignore the additional identifying information discussed in the previous paragraph. In our empirical application we parameterize these unknown functions and use maximum likelihood estimation, though one could consider extending our estimator to allow for nonparametric specification of these functions using sieve maximum likelihood. To facilitate such an extension, we provide series expansions that could serve as basis functions for a possible sieve estimator.

4 Barten Scales in Utility Functions

Let a "consumer" refer to an individual or household that maximizes a single well behaved utility function. Let $Q_k$ denote the quantity purchased of a good $k$, and let $S(Q, U)$ denote the direct utility function over the bundle of goods $Q = (Q_1, \ldots, Q_K)$ of a consumer having a vector of preference heterogeneity parameters $U = (U_1, \ldots, U_K)$. Assume $S$ is continuous, non-decreasing, twice differentiable in $Q$ and quasi-concave in $Q$. Define the reference consumer to be a consumer that has heterogeneity parameters $U$ normalized to equal one, and let $\bar{S}(Q_1, \ldots, Q_K)$ denote the direct utility function of a reference consumer. Each consumer chooses quantities to maximize utility subject to the standard linear budget constraint $\sum_{k=1}^{K} P_k Q_k = M$ where $P_k$ is the price of good $k$ and $M$ is the total amount of money the consumer spends on this bundle of goods. Let $W_k^* = Q_k P_k / M$ be the share of the money budget $M$ that is spent on good $k$ (called the budget share of good $k$). Write the Marshallian budget share functions that result from maximizing the reference utility function $\bar{S}$ subject to the budget constraint as $W_k^* = \omega_k (P_1 / M, \ldots, P_K / M)$. Let $V(P_1 / M, \ldots, P_K / M)$ denote the indirect utility function corresponding to $\bar{S}$, obtained by substituting $Q_k = \omega_k (P_1 / M, \ldots, P_K / M) M / P_k$ into $\bar{S}(Q_1, \ldots, Q_K)$ for $k = 1, \ldots, K$.

Our empirical application is based on Barten (1964) scales. Barten scales are a longstanding method used to bring preference heterogeneity on the basis of observed variables into continuous demand models. Barten scales are consequently a natural starting point for the incorporation of random utility parameters representing unobserved preference heterogeneity. See, e.g., Lewbel (1997) for a survey of various types of equivalence scales in the consumer demand literature, including Barten scales, and see Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982) for a prominent empirical application of traditional Barten scales. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) includes an extensive discussion of parametric identification of Barten Scales.

Barten (1964) proposed the model in which consumers have utility functions of the form $S(Q_1, \ldots, Q_K; a_{z1}, \ldots, a_{zK}) = \bar{S}(Q_1 / a_{z1}, \ldots, Q_K / a_{zK})$, where the Barten scales $a_{z1}, \ldots, a_{zK}$ are positive functions of observable household attributes $z$, such as age or family size, that embody variation in preferences across consumers. For households with multiple members, Barten scales can be interpreted as representing the degree to which each good is shared or jointly consumed. The smaller the Barten scale $a_{zk}$ is, the greater the economies of scale to consumption of good $k$ within the household. This is then reflected in the demand functions, where smaller Barten scales have the same effect on demands as lower prices. For example, if a couple with one car rides together some of the time, then in terms of total distance each travels by car, sharing has the same effect as making gasoline cheaper. The more they drive together instead of alone, the lower is the effective cost of gasoline, and the smaller is the couple’s Barten
scale for gasoline.

More generally, Barten scales provide a measure of the degree to which different households get utility from different goods. This is how we will employ them. Although Barten scales have long been a popular method of modeling preference heterogeneity in empirical work, up until now Barten scales have always been modeled as deterministic functions of observable characteristics of consumers. Here we consider using Barten scales to embody unobserved heterogeneity of preferences across consumers.

We propose random Barten scales, assuming that consumers have utility functions of the form $S(Q_1, \ldots, Q_K; U_1, \ldots, U_K) = \overline{S} (Q_1/U_1, \ldots, Q_K/U_K)$, where $U_1, \ldots, U_K$ are positive random utility parameters embodying preference heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved) across consumers. More formally, we could write each random Barten scale as $U_{zk}$, since for each good $k$, the distribution function that $U_{zk}$ is drawn from could depend on observable household attributes $z$. Barten’s original model is then the special case where the distribution of each $U_{zk}$ is degenerate with a single mass point at $a_{zk}$.

Define normalised prices $X_k = P_k/M$ for each good $k$ and rewrite the budget constraint as $\sum_{k=1}^{K} X_k Q_k = 1$. Now $\overline{S} (Q_1, \ldots, Q_K)$ and $V (X_1, \ldots, X_K)$ are the direct and indirect utility functions of the reference consumer, and $\omega_k (X_1, \ldots, X_K)$ is the Marshallian budget share demand function of the reference consumer. It can be immediately verified from the first order conditions for utility maximization that a consumer will have Marshallian demand functions of the form $W^*_k = \omega_k (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_K X_K)$ for each good $k$ if and only if the consumer’s direct and indirect utility function equal, up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation, $\overline{S} (Q_1/U_1, \ldots, Q_K/U_K)$ and $V (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_K X_K)$, respectively. Also, given a specification of reference indirect utility $V (X_1, \ldots, X_K)$, the corresponding Barten scaled demand functions can be obtained by the logarithmic form of Roy’s identity:

$$W^*_k = \omega_k (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_K X_K) = \frac{\partial V (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_K X_K)}{\partial \ln X_k} / \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^{K} \frac{\partial V (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_K X_K)}{\partial \ln X_\ell} \right)$$

(7)

Notice that the functional form of each $\omega_k$ only depends on the functional form of $\overline{S}$ or equivalently of $V$, so $U_1, \ldots, U_K$ can vary independently of $X_1, \ldots, X_K$ across consumers. These derivations are exactly those given by Barten (1964) and by later authors who applied Barten scales, e.g., Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982), except that we put unobserved random variables $U_k$ in place of deterministic functions $\alpha_{hk}$ of observed household characteristics. Random Barten scaled Marshallian demand functions then have precisely the form of our generalized random coefficients given in equation (1).

### 4.1 Indirectly Additively Separable Utility

In our empirical application, we let $\omega_1$ be the budget share of a single good of interest, energy, and we let $\omega_2$ denote the budget share of all other goods, corresponding to the general Barten scaled model with $K = 2$. This case only requires estimating a single equation for $\omega_1$, since the equation for $\omega_2$ is automatically determined by construction as $\omega_2 = 1 - \omega_1$. If we had $K > 2$, then we would have $K - 1$ separate equations to estimate, and we would have further restrictions to impose because the same Barten scales, with the same joint distribution $F_{U|Z} (U_1, \ldots, U_K \mid Z)$,
would appear in each equation.

Matzkin (2007a), (2007b), (2008) discusses identification of systems of equations where the number of equations equals the number of random parameters, assuming it is possible to invert the reduced form of the system to express the random parameters as functions of observables. Although our model has \( K \) Barten scales \((U_1, \ldots, U_K)\) and \( K \) demand equations, Matzkin’s identification method for systems of equations cannot be applied here because there are actually only \( K - 1 \) distinct demand functions \( \omega_1, \ldots, \omega_{K-1} \), with the remaining demand function \( \omega_K \) determined by the adding up constraint that \( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \omega_k = 1 \). We therefore have more random parameters than distinct equations in the system.

The decomposition of total consumption into \( K = 2 \) goods is often done in empirical work when one wishes to focus on the welfare effects of a price change on a particular good, as we will do empirically. See, e.g., Hausman (1981), Hausman and Newey (1995), Blundell, Horowitz, and Parey (2010), and Hoderlein and Vanhems (2011). This construction is formally rationalizable by assuming utility is separable into good 1 and a subutility function of all other goods. See, e.g., Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978). Alternatively, Lewbel (1996) provides conditions on the distribution of prices (stochastic hicksian aggregation) under which Marshallian demand functions have the same properties with nonseparable utility as with separable utility.

With \( K = 2 \) goods, our model is \( W_1^* = \omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) \) and \( W_2^* = 1 - W_1^* \), and with \( K = 2 \) we can rewrite equation (7) as

\[
\lambda (W_1^*) = \ln \left( \frac{\partial V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right)
\]

(8)

where \( \lambda (W_1^*) \) is the logit transformation function \( \lambda (W_1^*) = \ln \left[ W_1^*/(1 - W_1^*) \right] \).

Due to the constraints of Slutsky symmetry, imposing additivity directly on the Marshallian budget share function \( \omega_1 (X_1, X_2) \) would result in extreme restrictions on behavior. See, e.g., Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978). So we instead impose additivity on the logit transformation of \( \omega_1 (X_1, X_2) \) (later this will be relaxed to allow for interaction terms), thereby assuming demands have the additive form

\[
\lambda (W_1) = \lambda [ \omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) ] + U_0 = g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2) + U_0
\]

(9)

Here the functions \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are nonparametric and \( U_0 \) is interpreted as measurement error in the observed budget share \( W_1 \) relative to the true budget share \( W_1^* \). This implies that the underlying demand function for good 1 is given by

\[
W_1^* = \omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) = \left( 1 + e^{-g_1 (U_1 X_1) - g_2 (U_2 X_2)} \right)^{-1}
\]

(10)

Use of the logit transformation here, and assumed additivity in logit transformed budget shares, has as far as we know not been considered before in the estimation of continuous demand functions. However, this logit transformed model has a number of advantages. First, \( \lambda (W_1) \) has support on the whole real line, so the measurement error \( U_0 \) has unrestricted support, instead of a support that necessarily depends on covariates. Second, with this transform no constraints need to be placed on the range of values the nonparametric functions \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) take on. Third, unlike all other semiparametric or nonparametric applications of the Hausman (1981) consumer
surplus type methodology (such as those cited above), a closed form expression for the indirect utility function that gives rise Marshallian demands (10) and hence (9) exists, and is given by Theorem 3.

THEOREM 3: The demand function $\omega_1$ satisfies $\lambda [\omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)] = g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2)$ for some functions $g_1$ and $g_2$ if and only if $\omega_1$ is derived from an indirect utility function of the form

$$V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) = H [h_1 (U_1 X_1) + h_2 (U_2 X_2), U_1, U_2].$$

for some monotonic in its first element function $H$ and some differentiable functions $h_1$ and $h_2$. The functions $g_1, g_2, h_1,$ and $h_2$ are related by

$$h_1 (U_1 X_1) + h_2 (U_2 X_2) = \int e^{g_1 (U_1 X_1)} d \ln x_1 + \int e^{-g_2 (U_2 X_2)} d \ln x_2$$

and

$$g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2) = \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_1 (U_1 X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_2 (U_2 X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right)$$

Also, the functions $h_1 (U_1 P_1 / M)$ and $h_2 (U_2 P_2 / M)$ are each nonincreasing, and their sum is strictly increasing in $M$ and quasiconvex in $P_1, P_2,$ and $M$.

The proof is in the Appendix. The function $H$ in Theorem 3 has no observable implications for individual consumer’s demand functions, and is present only because utility functions are ordinal and therefore unchanged by monotonic transformations.\(^3\) We can therefore just write the indirect utility function in Theorem 3 as

$$V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)^{-1} = h_1 (U_1 X_1) + h_2 (U_2 X_2).$$

which takes $H$ to be the reciprocal function (this is a convenient normalization since we later take $h_1$ and $h_2$ to be increasing functions, and utility must be nondecreasing in total expenditures).

Preferences $V (X_1, X_2)$ are defined to be indirectly additively separable (see, e.g., Blackorby, Primont, and Russell 1978) if, up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation $H$, $V (X_1, X_2) = H [h_1 (X_1) + h_2 (X_2)]$ for some functions $h_1, h_2$. So an equivalent way to state the first part of Theorem 3 is that $\omega_1$ satisfies equation (10) if and only if preferences are given by a Barten scaled indirectly additively separable utility function. The second part of Theorem 3 then provides closed form expressions for the indirect utility function given the nonparametric (additive in the logit transformation) demand function and vice versa.

### 4.2 Random Barten Scales: Identification

From equation (9) we have the demand model

$$\lambda (W_1) = g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2) + U_0$$

\(^3\)Later we will reintroduce the function $H$ to construct a money metric representation of utility for use in social welfare calculations.
Identification of this model can be obtained by Corollary 2, letting $Y = \lambda(W_1)$ and $G_k = g_k$. A condition that suffices to make the monotonicity of Assumption A6 hold is that the goods not be Giffen goods.\footnote{While possible in theory, very little empirical evidence has been found for the existence of Giffen goods, and particularly not for the types of goods we consider in our application. A rare example is Jensen and Miller (2008), who show that some grains may have been Giffen goods for extremely poor households in rural China.} Having good 1 not be Giffen guarantees monotonicity of $g_1$, and similarly the restriction that good 2 is not Giffen means that $\omega_2$ is monotonic in $X_2$, which by the adding up constraint $\omega_1 + \omega_2 = 1$ implies monotonicity of $g_2$. As discussed earlier, Assumption A3 is satisfied for a wide range of possible $g_k$ functions, e.g., those satisfying Lemma 1.

Next consider Assumptions A1, A2, and A4. $U_0$ is assumed to be measurement error in $Y$, not a taste parameter, and hence independent of the other variables. As discussed earlier, Barten scales are traditionally modeled as deterministic functions of demographic characteristics and other factors that affect demand, so in our extension to random Barten scales we take $Z$ to be demographic characteristics, and other taste shifters for energy such as weather. Continuity of each $X_k$ and $U_k$ is straightforward. $U_1$ and $U_2$ are preference parameters, and it is common to assume that tastes are determined independently of regressors in partial equilibrium analyses. In our application $W_1$ will be energy demand by Canadian households and the regressors $X_k$ are prices divided by budgets. One might therefore be concerned about correlations between $U_k$ and $X_k$ caused by endogeneity of prices, however, Canadian households comprise a very small fraction of world energy demand, and so the likely effect of $U_k$ on energy prices should be very small. In our online supplemental appendix, we verify that endogeneity, if any is present due to this or other sources (such as potential measurement error in total expenditures), appears too small empirically to significantly change our results. Economic theory also bounds the support of $U_1$ and $U_2$ in the positive orthant, assuming maximizing utility does not imply zero consumption of either energy or other goods.

Each $X_k$ is by construction nonnegative so to satisfy Assumptions A2 and A5 we assume the support of each $X_k$ is $(0, \infty)$, the closure of which includes zero. We are therefore assuming that in theory prices can be very low and/or total expenditures can be arbitrarily large. In our empirical application we observe a very wide range of total expenditure levels (from poor to wealthy individuals), and substantial relative price variation. Further, in our empirical specification we also exploit variation in other regressors $Z$ to aid identification (see the next subsection for details). An additional mitigating factor is that our identification results do not depend solely on thin sets, given the additional restrictions that were discussed in section 3.3. We also provide a Monte Carlo study (in the online supplemental appendix) with design given by our actual estimated model and using our actual $X_1$, $X_2$ and $Z$ data. This Monte Carlo shows good performance of our estimator for sample sizes in the range of our empirical application.

### 4.3 Random Barten Scales: Specification and Estimation

In our main results, we present estimates of a parametric model wherein the demand function (9) given by the difference in the logs of squared cubic functions of $X_1$ and $X_2$, the unobserved preference heterogeneity parameters follow a truncated bivariate log-normal distribution, and the normalized prices $X_k$ are taken to be exogenous. We then consider consumer surplus and
social welfare analysis with this parametric specification. In our online supplemental appendix, we provide a variety of robustness checks and tests of model adequacy. In particular, we: (1) allow for the demand function to depend on higher-order squared polynomials of $X_k$; (2) allow for interaction terms in $X_k$ in the demand function; (3) allow for more general distributions of unobserved preference heterogeneity and of measurement error; (4) allow for heteroskedasticity of the measurement error term $U_0$; (5) implement a Monte Carlo analysis with design based on our actual estimated model and data; and (6) allow for possible endogeneity in prices (which are the numerators of $X_k$) via estimation with control functions and exogenous supply shifters. The results are that our major findings regarding demand, inference, consumer surplus, and social welfare analysis survive these robustness checks.

Marshallian budget shares are commonly modeled as equal to, or proportional to, polynomials, almost always of third or lower order in terms of flexibility. See, e.g., Lewbel (2008) and references therein. We therefore specify the functions $g_1$ and $g_2$ in (9) as squared third-order polynomials

\[ g_1(X_1) = \ln \left( \left( \beta_{10} + \beta_{11}X_1 + \beta_{12}X_1^2 + \beta_{13}X_1^3 \right)^2 \right) \]

\[ g_2(X_2) = -\ln \left( \left( \beta_{20} + \beta_{21}X_2 + \beta_{22}X_2^2 + \beta_{23}X_2^3 \right)^2 \right) \]

with constants $\beta_{ks}$ for $k = 1, 2$ and $s = 0, \ldots, 3$. We square these polynomials, analogous to Gallant and Nychka (1987), to ensure that the resulting demand functions will not entail taking logs of a negative number. This specification also has the advantage that we can analytically evaluate the integrals that define the corresponding indirect utility function in Theorem 3. Specifically, by equation (11) we get $V^{-1} = h_1(U_1X_1) + h_2(U_2X_2)$ where

\[ h_k(X_k) = \int_{\ln X_k} \left( \beta_{k0} + \beta_{k1}e^r + \beta_{k2}e^{2r} + \beta_{k3}e^{3r} \right)^2 dr \]

As noted earlier, it is both unusual and convenient to have closed form expressions for utility functions corresponding to arbitrary demand function components like these.

We impose the normalizations $\beta_{20} = 1$ and $E(U_0) = 0$, which are free normalizations that take the place of the normalizations of the $g$ functions described in Theorem 2. These observationally equivalent normalizations are used in place of the ones used to prove Theorem 2, because they’re more natural and easier to impose in our particular application.

Applying Theorem 3 and substituting (15) and (16) into (9) gives:

\[ \lambda (W_1) = \ln \left( \left( \beta_{10} + \beta_{11}X_1 + \beta_{12}X_1^2 + \beta_{13}X_1^3 \right)^2 \right) - \ln \left( \left( \beta_{20} + \beta_{21}X_2 + \beta_{22}X_2^2 + \beta_{23}X_2^3 \right)^2 \right) + U_0. \]

We next need to specify the distributions of $U_0$, $U_1$ and $U_2$. The distribution of $F_{U|Z}(U_1, U_2 | Z)$ for a vector of observed demographic characteristics $Z$ is in theory nonparametrically identified. But to reduce the dimensionality of the model, instead of letting the dependence of $U$ on $Z$ be entirely unrestricted, we assume each Barten scale takes the form

\[ U_k = a_k (Z) \tilde{U}_k, \]
for \( k = 1, 2 \) and where each function \( \alpha_k (Z) \) is a traditional deterministic Barten scale, and the remaining random variation given by \( \tilde{U}_k \) in each Barten scale is assumed to be independent of the covariates \( X_k, Z \). We model \( \ln [\alpha_k (Z)] \) as linear in a vector of demographic characteristics \( Z \). This index does not include a constant term, because the scaling of \( \alpha_k (Z) \) is freely absorbed into the \( \beta_{k*} \) parameters. An additional advantage of this specification is that we now have the support of each \( \alpha_k (Z) X_k \) instead of just the support of \( X_k \) to help identify the distribution of \( \tilde{U}_k \). Thus, we exploit variation in \( Z \) to aid in the identification of the distribution of \( \tilde{U}_k \).

We specify \( f_0 \), the density of \( U_0 \), as a mean zero normal with variance \( \sigma_0^2 \). We specify the joint distribution of the random component of the Barten scales, \( \tilde{U} = (\tilde{U}_1, \tilde{U}_2) \), to be a truncated (trimmed) bivariate log-normal. Specifically, before truncation, the density of \( \ln \tilde{U} \) is

\[
f_{\ln \tilde{U}} (\tilde{U}_1, \tilde{U}_2, \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \rho) = \frac{1}{2\pi \sigma_1 \sigma_2 (1 - \rho^2)^{1/2}} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2 \sigma_1^2} \left( \frac{\ln \tilde{U}_1}{\sigma_1} \right)^2 - 2\rho \frac{\ln \tilde{U}_1}{\sigma_1} \frac{\ln \tilde{U}_2}{\sigma_2} + \frac{\ln \tilde{U}_2}{\sigma_2} \right)
\]

We truncate the distribution to make the support of \( \ln \tilde{U} \) equal the box defined by \( \pm 3\sigma_1, \pm 3\sigma_2 \). Bounding the support of \( \tilde{U} \) in this way satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1 that \( \tilde{U} \) and hence \( U \) be bounded away from zero and ensures that a moment generating function exists. Our estimation method uses numerical integration, and in our the empirical application we implement this distribution by integrating \( \ln \tilde{U} \) over its bounded support with a stepsize of 0.06\( \sigma_k \), yielding a 10,000 point grid for the numerical integration.

For a given consumer with observed values \( x_1, x_2 \) and \( z \), the conditional density function of \( W_1 \) is then given by

\[
f_{W_1|x_1, x_2, z} (w_1 \mid x_1, x_2, z; \alpha, \beta, \sigma, \rho) = \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty f_0 (\lambda (W_1) = \lambda [w_1 (\alpha_1 (z) \tilde{u}_1 x_1, \alpha_2 (z) \tilde{u}_2 x_2, \beta)]), \sigma_0) f_{\tilde{U}} (\tilde{u}_1, \tilde{u}_2, \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \rho) \partial \tilde{u}_1 \partial \tilde{u}_2.
\]

Substituting in the logit transformation \( \lambda \), the demand function (18), the barten scale functions (19), the joint log-normal distribution (20) (for \( U_1, U_2 \)) and the normal distribution (for \( U_0 \)) into the conditional density function (21) gives

\[
f_{W_1|x_1, x_2, z} (w_1 \mid x_1, x_2, z; \alpha, \beta, \sigma, \rho) = \int_{-\infty}^\infty \int_{-\infty}^\infty \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2 \sigma_0^2} \left( \ln \frac{W_1}{1 - W_1} - \ln \left( \frac{\sum_{s=0}^3 \beta_1 s (\tilde{u}_1 \alpha_1 (z) x_1)^s}{\sum_{s=0}^3 \beta_2 s (\tilde{u}_2 \alpha_2 (z) x_2)^s} \right)^2 \right) \right) \frac{f_{\ln \tilde{U}} (\tilde{u}_1, \tilde{u}_2, \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \rho)}{(2\pi)^{1/2} \sigma_0} \partial \ln \tilde{u}_1
\]

Assuming \( N \) independently, identically distributed observations \( w_{1i}, x_{1i}, x_{2i}, z_i \) of consumers \( i \), estimation proceeds by searching over parameters \( \alpha, \beta, \sigma, \) and \( \rho \) to maximize the log likelihood function

\[
\sum_{i=1}^N \ln f_{W_1|x_1, x_2, z} (w_{1i} \mid x_{1i}, x_{2i}, z_i; \alpha, \beta, \sigma, \rho).
\]
5 Empirical Results

5.1 Data

We estimate a baseline parametric specification as above, and with it undertake Engel curve, cost-of-living and social welfare analyses. We estimate the model using Canadian household expenditure microdata from the 1997 to 2008 Surveys of Household Spending. We consider households comprised of one adult (as of 31 Dec) aged 25-64 residing in cities of 30,000 or more residents in provinces other than Prince Edward Island (due to data masking). We drop observations whose expenditures on energy goods are zero, and eliminate a few extreme outliers by removing those whose total nondurable expenditures are in the top or bottom percentile of the total nondurable expenditure distribution. This leaves 9971 observations for estimation.

We consider the budget share of energy goods, $W_1$, defined as the share of total nondurable expenditures devoted to energy goods. Total nondurable expenditures are constructed as the sum of household spending on food, clothing, health care, alcohol and tobacco, public transportation, private transportation operation, and personal care, plus the energy goods defined as fuel oil, electricity, natural gas and gasoline (reported in thousands of dollars). We include eight demographic characteristics, comprising the vector $Z$, as observed preference shifters: a dummy for female individuals; age of the individual (on an 8 unit integer scale for 5 year age groups with age 40 to 44 coded as 0); calendar year minus 2002; a dummy for residence in the francophone province of Quebec; Environment Canada ex poste records of the number of days requiring heating and cooling in each province in each year (normalized as z-scores from the full sample of all households in all provinces in all city sizes); an indicator that the household is a renter (spending more than $100 on rent in the year); and an indicator that the household received more than 10% of its gross income from government transfers. These demographic characteristics equal zero for the reference consumer (whose utility function is $\tilde{S}$ and indirect utility function is $V$): a single male aged 40-44 with less than 10% transfer income living in owned accommodation outside Quebec in 2002 with average heating and cooling days.
Table 1: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>std dev</th>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logit energy share, $Y$</td>
<td>-1.949</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>-7.140</td>
<td>1.005</td>
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<td>energy share, $W_1$</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>nondurable expenditure, $M$</td>
<td>15.661</td>
<td>7.104</td>
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<td>energy price, $P_1$</td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>0.230</td>
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<td>non-energy price, $P_2$</td>
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<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.755</td>
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<td>energy normalized price, $X_1$</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<td>heat days, normalized</td>
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<td>cooling days, normalized</td>
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<td>1.007</td>
<td>-1.729</td>
<td>4.013</td>
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<tr>
<td>renter indicator</td>
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<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>transfer income indicator</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prices vary by province (9 included) and year (12 years) yielding 108 distinct price vectors for the underlying commodities comprising nondurable consumption. These underlying commodity prices are normalised to equal one (a free normalisation) in Ontario in 2002. To account for the impact on prices of individual variation in compositional differences of these aggregate commodities, we follow the methodology of Lewbel (1989) and Hoderlein and Mihaileva (2008) in constructing $P_1$ as the Stone price index using within group household specific budget shares of energy goods, and $P_2$ is constructed similarly for non-energy goods. This construction has the feature of further increasing relative price variation across households. The budget, $M$, is equal to the total nondurable expenditures of the household. The normalized prices $X_k$ are then given by $X_k = P_k / M$. Finally, the regressand, $Y$, is the logit transformation of the energy budget share, so $Y = \lambda (W_1)$. Table 1 gives summary statistics for these budget shares, expenditures, prices, normalised prices and demographic preference (Barten scale) shifters.

5.2 Parameter Estimates

Our main analyses are based on two models. The first, Model 1, imposes the restriction that $\tilde{U}_1 = \tilde{U}_2 = 1$ (so $\tilde{U}$ is degenerate), and simplifies equation (21) to

$$f_{W_1|X_1, x_2, z} (w_1 \mid x_1, x_2, z; \alpha, \beta, \sigma_0) = \frac{\exp \left( -\frac{1}{2\sigma_0^2} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{W_1}{1-W_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{3} \beta_1 (a_1(z)x_1)^i}{\sum_{i=0}^{3} \beta_2 (a_2(z)x_2)^i} \right)^2 \right) \right]}{(2\pi)^{1/2} \sigma_0}.$$ 

(24)

This is just a traditional deterministic Barten scale model, having $U_k = a_k (z)$, estimated using our general functional form for energy demand. Model 1 is then compared to our real specification, Model 2, which is equation (22) with the distribution of $\tilde{U}$ given by equation (20), and...
therefore contains our random Barten scales $U_k = a_k(z) \tilde{U}_k$. Both models are estimated using maximum likelihood in Stata, with likelihood functions given by substituting equation (24) or (22) into equation (23). Estimated coefficients are given in Table 2 below.

As noted earlier, in our online supplemental appendix we provide an extensive set of analyses to verify the robustness of our baseline empirical results (given in Table 2). A brief summary of these results is that, while some departures from our baseline Model 2 are statistically significant, none result in big changes in our economic analyses or conclusions, indicating that our results are robust to many different possible sources of misspecification and estimation imprecision.

Our model imposes the equality constraints of Slutsky symmetry and homogeneity. However, we do not impose the inequality constraints that the $g$ functions be monotonic or that the Slutsky matrix be negative semidefinite (concavity).\footnote{In a parametric setting like ours, failing to impose inequality constraints on estimation that are satisfied by the true model does not affect standard limiting distribution theory, assuming that the true parameter values do not lie on the boundary of the parameter space.} Despite not imposing these conditions, we find that our Model 1 estimates satisfy monotonicity throughout our observed data, and that our Model 2 estimates satisfy monotonicity at 97.7% of the data points in our sample. Similarly, our Model 1 estimates satisfy negative semidefiniteness at 99.6% of the data points in our sample, and our Model 2 estimates satisfy it at 99.9% of the data points in our sample.

Model 2 has three more parameters than Model 1. They are $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \rho$, the standard deviations and correlation coefficient of the bivariate normal distribution of $\ln U_1, \ln U_2$. The likelihood ratio test statistic for the restriction that these parameters are all zero is 672, so the parameters that allow for random Barten scales parameters are highly jointly significant. One can see in Table 2 that they are also individually highly significant.

Figures 1 and 2 show the estimated joint distribution of $\ln U_1 = a_1(z)$ and $\ln U_2 = a_2(z)$ (logged deterministic portion of the Barten scales) in Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. Summary statistics for these distributions are provided in the bottom panel of Table 2. In both Models the estimated distributions of $\ln a_1(z), \ln a_2(z)$ are bimodal. The two modes are driven almost entirely by the renter variable; conditioning on just renters or just owners produces unimodal distributions. In Canada, most renters do not pay for their own home heating or electricity (this is included in rents and doesn’t depend on usage), causing a ceteris paribus reduction in their energy shares relative to home owners.

Looking at the bottom of Table 2, we see in both models that the standard deviation of $\ln a_2(z)$ is much larger than that of $\ln a_1(z)$. This indicates that heterogeneity in preferences due to observables is larger for non-energy than for energy goods. This is not surprising; it just says that people vary more (based on observable characteristics) in their taste for non-energy goods than in their taste for energy goods. Unconditionally, $\ln a_1(z), \ln a_2(z)$ are slightly negatively correlated in both models. However, conditional on rental tenure, the deterministic components of Barten scales are strongly positively correlated.
Table 2: Estimated Parameters

<table>
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<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<td><strong>Std Err</strong></td>
<td><strong>Estimate</strong></td>
<td><strong>Std Err</strong></td>
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<td>$\sigma_1$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.036</td>
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<td>$\sigma_2$</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.011</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.883</td>
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</table>

In Model 1 the log Barten scales equal $\ln a_k(z)$, but in Model 2 the log Barten scales are given by $\ln U_k = \ln a_k(z) + \ln \tilde{U}_k$. The components $\ln a_k(z)$ and $\ln \tilde{U}_k$ are, respectively, the observed deterministic and unobserved random components of these Barten scales. Thus the variance and correlations of the $\ln \tilde{U}_k$ terms in Model 2 are directly comparable to the corre-
sponding statistics of the $\ln \alpha_k(z)$ terms. The estimated parameters of the distribution of $\ln \widetilde{U}_k$ show some similar features to that of $\ln \alpha_k$. The standard deviation $\ln \widetilde{U}_2$ (equal to $\sigma_2$) is much larger than that of $\ln \widetilde{U}_1$ (equal to $\sigma_1$), so both observed and unobserved components of Barten scales vary more across consumers for nonenergy goods than for energy goods. Likewise, $\ln \widetilde{U}_1$ and $\ln \widetilde{U}_2$ are positively correlated (like $\ln \alpha_1$ and $\ln \alpha_2$ after conditioning on the rental dummy). That the estimated effects of the unobserved random components of Barten scales have similar patterns to the estimated effects of observed preference shifters of Barten scales is a reassuring indicator of the sensibility and reasonableness of our model.

Overall, we find that unobserved preference heterogeneity is about as important as observed preference heterogeneity in driving variation in Barten scales. The estimated joint distribution of $\ln U_1$, $\ln U_2$, summing the effects of $\ln \alpha_k(z)$ and $\ln \widetilde{U}_k$, is shown in Figure 3. Comparing Figures 1 and 3 shows that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity substantially increases the estimated total heterogeneity in tastes across individuals.

The unobserved preference heterogeneity terms $\widetilde{U}_k$ partly pick up unobserved variation that would otherwise be subsumed by the non behavioral error term $U_0$, making the estimated standard deviation of $U_0$ fall from 0.666 in Model 1 to 0.469 in Model 2. But more significantly, $U_1$ and $U_2$ also pick up a substantial portion of what would otherwise be unexplained heteroskedasticity in demand. In the online supplemental appendix, when we consider heteroskedastic $U_0$, we find that allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity via our random Barten scales accounts for a great deal of variation that would otherwise have been falsely attributed to heteroskedastic measurement error.

Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity appears to yield precision benefits as well. Appropriately modeling the heteroskedasticity driven by unobserved preference heterogeneity should increase precision in parameter estimates, just as correctly specified generalized least squares estimation usually reduces standard errors relative to ordinary least squares estimation in heteroskedastic regression models. Empirically, we do see an improvement in estimation precision, comparing across the columns in Table 2. The parameter estimates in Model 2 generally have standard errors about 20 per cent to 50 per cent smaller than those of Model 1.

Table 3 gives summary statistics on predicted values of the logit transformed budget share $Y$ and of the budget share itself, $W_1$. We give estimates for Model 1 evaluated at the observed data in the left panel, and for Model 2 evaluated at the observed data with unobserved preference heterogeneity parameters "turned off" ($\widetilde{U}_1 = \widetilde{U}_2 = 1$) in the middle panel. In the rightmost panel, we present estimates simulated at the observed data with the estimated distribution of unobserved preference heterogeneity parameters $\widetilde{U}_1$, $\widetilde{U}_2$.

Since Model 1 has just a single additively separable error term, the average prediction from Model 1 including variation from all regressors exactly equals the mean of the observed $Y$ ($-1.949$). The predicted average mean of $Y$ in Model 2 is somewhat larger for the cases where we don’t account for unobserved preference heterogeneity $\widetilde{U}_k$, with $Y$ averaging about $-1.78$. But, when we account for unobserved preference heterogeneity (in the rightmost panel), the average prediction of Model 2 predicts is $-1.997$ which is very close to the mean of the observed $Y$. The standard deviation of Model 1 predictions of $W_1$ is 0.044, while that of Model 2 is 0.065. Comparing these predictions to Table 1 shows that, for both $Y$ and $W_1$, Model 2 gives closer predictions to the actual empirical standard deviation of these variables than does Model 1.
Table 3: Estimated Energy Budget Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2 ($U_k = 1$)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logit Budget Shares Y</td>
<td>-1.949</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>-1.775</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>-1.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Shares $W_1$</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.137</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 shows estimated Engel curves from the models, showing $W_1$ as a function of $\ln M$. These are estimated demand functions evaluated at the Ontario 2002 prices $P_1 = P_2 = 1$ and at average demographics $\bar{\alpha}_k$. Model 2 implies a different Engel curve for every value that $\bar{U}_1$ and $\bar{U}_2$ can take on. The single Engel curve for Model 1 is shown as a thick gray line, while that for Model 2 evaluated at $U_k = 1$ is shown as a thick black line. To illustrate the range of Engel curves implied by our model, we also evaluate Model 2 at each quartile of the distribution of $U_1$ paired with each quartile of the distribution of $U_2$, for a total of nine pairs of values. This yields eight additional Engel curves, which are depicted by thin gray lines in Figure 4. Finally, we show the estimated marginal density of $\ln M$ (divided by 10 to fit in the graph) as a thick light gray line at the bottom of Figure 4.

On average, richer consumers tend to spend a smaller fraction of their budget on energy goods than poorer consumers. This can be seen in the mostly downward slope of the Engel curves in Figure 4. Comparing these curves to the depicted density function of $\ln M$ shows that only a small fraction of all consumers, the poorest ones, are on the upward sloping parts of these curves.

A striking feature of Figure 4 is that for each given value of $M$, there is substantial variation in the level and slope of Engel curves, due entirely to variation in $U_k$. To reduce clutter we did not include standard error bars on this graph, but the differences between these estimated Engel curves are statistically significant. For example, at the mean value of $\ln M$ ($\ln M = 2.64$), the top Engel curve displayed is that of the top quartile of both $\bar{U}_1$ and $\bar{U}_2$, and the bottom Engel curve is that of the bottom quartile of both $\bar{U}_1$ and $\bar{U}_2$. The estimated levels of these Engel curves at $\ln M = 2.64$ are 0.166 and 0.104, respectively, with standard errors of 0.002 and 0.008, respectively. We find that variation in the random components $U_k$ of Barten scales, corresponding to unobserved variation in tastes across consumers, yields significant differences in both the levels and slopes of the estimated Engel curves.

Figure 4 showed the effects on $W_1$ of just the random component of the Barten scales at different budget levels $M$. In contrast, Figure 5 illustrates the total effect of Barten scales on $W_1$. Specifically, Figure 5 shows a contour plot of the joint distribution of $W_1$ and $M$ predicted by Model 2, evaluated at Ontario 2002 prices $P_1 = P_2 = 1$ and observed demographics $z$. The vertical variation in this graph therefore shows the estimated variation in $W_1$ due to Barten scales (both observed and unobserved components) at different $M$ levels. This wide variation in tastes will have important implications for welfare analyses below.

Taken together, all of the above results show that Model 2’s inclusion of random Barten scales accounts for more and richer variation in observed behaviour than does Model 1. This is due to the fact that budget shares are highly variable and heteroskedastic, and Model 1 treats this variance and heteroskedasticity entirely as meaningless variation in a nonbehavioral error term, while Model 2 captures much of this variation in a behaviorally sensible, structural way, via random Barten scales.
5.3 Consumer Surplus Effects of a Carbon Tax

We now apply our model to evaluate the partial equilibrium effects of a large change in the price of energy, as might result from a carbon tax.\footnote{Our model is not a general equilibrium model, so we are only estimating the consumer’s responses to a change in energy prices. Moreover, these should only be interpreted as short run responses, since in the longer run consumers could change their energy elasticities and demand by, e.g., buying more energy efficient cars and appliances. Also, we just consider a change in the overall price of energy, and so do not consider impacts of possible changes in the composition of energy goods.} Using equation (17), we have a closed form expression for indirect utility.\footnote{The integral in equation (17) is readily evaluated, e.g., for our squared cubic functions we have
\[
\int (\beta_{k0} + \beta_{k1} e^{r} + \beta_{k2} e^{2r} + \beta_{k3} e^{3r})^2 dr = \\
\frac{1}{4} \beta_{k3}^2 e^{6r} + \frac{1}{2} \beta_{k2} \beta_{k3} e^{5r} + \frac{1}{4} (2 \beta_{k1} \beta_{k3} + \beta_{k2}^2) e^{4r} + \frac{2}{3} (\beta_{k0} \beta_{k3} + \beta_{k1} \beta_{k2}) e^{3r} + \frac{1}{6} (2 \beta_{k0} \beta_{k2} + \beta_{k1}^2) e^{2r} + 2 \beta_{k0} \beta_{k1} e^{r} + r \beta_{k0}^2.
\] Each \( h_k(U_k X_k^2) \) function is given by substituting \( r = \ln(U_k X_k) \) into this expression.} We can therefore numerically invert the indirect utility function (17) to obtain the exact cost of living impact (consumer surplus) of a price change. Without Theorem 3, we could instead use numerical approximation (instead of an exact solution) such as in Vartia (1984), or we could numerically solve a differential equation as in Hausman and Newey (1995), but such a solution would need to be calculated for every value on the continuum of points that \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) can take on.

Recall the indirect utility function defined over normalized prices \( X_k \) and Barten scales \( U_k \) is \( V(U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) = V(U_1 P_1 / M, U_2 P_2 / M) \). For an individual facing initial prices \( \bar{P}_1, \bar{P}_2 \), having total expenditures \( M \), and having preferences indexed by Barten scales \( U_1, U_2 \), the cost-of-living impact of moving to new prices \( P_1, P_2 \) is \( \pi \left( U_1, U_2, M, P_1, P_2, \bar{P}_1, \bar{P}_2 \right) \), defined as the solution to

\[
V \left( \frac{U_1 \bar{P}_1}{M}, \frac{U_2 \bar{P}_2}{M} \right) = V \left( \frac{U_1 P_1}{\pi M}, \frac{U_2 P_2}{\pi M} \right).
\]

Here \( \pi \) is the cost-of-living index giving the proportionate change in costs \( M \) needed to compensate for the price change from \( \bar{P}_1, \bar{P}_2 \) to \( P_1, P_2 \).

To show price effects clearly, we consider a large price change: a 50% increase in the price of energy. This price increase is chosen to approximate the effect of a $300 per ton CO2 tax (see, e.g., Rhodes and Jaccard 2014)\footnote{The Canadian province of British Columbia has a CO2 tax. It charges 6.7 cent/liter of gasoline for 30$/ton. A 67 cent/liter CO2 tax is about half as large as the pump price of gasoline in 2002 (the base year for this analysis).}. We solve for the \( \pi \) function given the initial price vector \( \bar{P}_1 = \bar{P}_2 = 1 \) and the new price vector \( P_1 = 1.5, P_2 = 1 \). Figure 6 shows the resulting estimated joint distribution (contour plot) of \( \ln \pi \) and \( \ln M \) from Model 2 evaluated at the observed demographics \( Z \) and budgets \( M \). This plot is constructed by calculating \( \pi \) for each observation in the data, with draws from the estimated distribution of \( \bar{U}_1, \bar{U}_2 \), and using observed values of the preference shifters \( z \).

Table 4 gives summary statistics (means and standard deviations) of these distributions for Model 1 and Model 2. Analogous to Table 3, to assess the contribution of variation in \( \pi \) due to observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity, we also calculate the \( \pi \) distribution imposing \( \bar{U}_k = 1 \) for Model 2. For ease of presentation this Table reports percent changes in cost of living, that is, 100 \( (\pi - 1) \). Standard errors for these statistics that account for the sampling variability of the parameter estimates (estimated via simulation) are provided in italics.
## Table 4: Cost of Living Impacts: 50% Energy Price Increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent Increase $\pi - 1, \text{ per cent}$</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2 ($\tilde{U}_k = 1$)</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$a_k, U_k = 1$ Mean</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It has long been known that first order approximations to the cost of living effects of marginal price changes can be evaluated without estimating demand functions, essentially by ignoring substitution effects (see, e.g., Stern 1987). These theoretical results have been used to argue that demand function estimation is not required for marginal policy analyses. In our data, the average value of the budget share for energy is 0.146, so if there were no substitution effects in response to a price change, doubling the price of energy would increase the cost of living by 7.3 per cent. This would be the first order approximation based estimate of $\pi$.

The estimated cost-of-living impacts given in Table 4, averaging about 5.4 per cent, are much smaller than 7.3 per cent, showing substantial responses to relative prices. This difference of nearly 2 percentage points is very large relative to the standard error of estimated means in Models 1 and 2 of about 0.20 percentage points, so the hypothesis that the model estimates have a mean of 7.3 is strongly rejected at conventional levels. These results supports findings in, e.g., Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) that, contrary to the first order approximation theory, it is empirically necessary to estimate demand functions and associated price elasticities to properly evaluate the consumer surplus and welfare effects of large price changes. Moreover, one goal of an energy tax would be to reduce energy consumption (a substitution effect), so it’s important to account for the impact on welfare of this reduction.

Models 1 and 2, with or without variation in $a_k$ or $\tilde{U}_k$, deliver similar estimates of the mean effects of the energy tax on cost of living. However, the inclusion of the random Barten scale components $\tilde{U}_k$ in Model 2 more than doubles the estimated standard deviation of $\pi$ across consumers. This difference is statistically significant as well as being economically large; the z-test statistic for the hypothesis that these standard deviations are the same has value of 6.1. Though less substantial economically, the difference in mean effects between the Model 2 estimates without and with unobserved preference heterogeneity (5.64% and 5.37%, respectively) is also statistically significant with a z-test statistic of 3.9.

The large estimated standard deviation of $\pi$ in Model 2 (which is mostly due to unobserved variation in tastes $\tilde{U}_k$) has substantial welfare implications. The larger is the variation in $\pi$, the larger is the variation in impacts of an energy tax. Although the average consumer would need to have their budget $M$ increased by 5.37% to compensate for the tax, some consumers (those near the bottom of Figure 6) would only need a slight increase in their budget to be made whole, while others (those near the top of Figure 6) would be greatly harmed by the tax, needing more than a 10% increase in the budget $M$ to compensate.

What makes this substantial variation in cost of living impacts particularly relevant economically is that it mostly impacts poorer consumers. As can be seen in Figure 6, both the mean and the variation in cost of living impacts is larger at low values of $M$ than at high values, so those consumers who are hurt the most by the tax in percentage terms are also predominantly the poorer consumers, who can least afford the increase in costs. Not only do richer consumers spend a smaller fraction of their budget on energy goods (as seen in Figure 4), but they also
appear to have a greater ability to substitute away from energy when the relative price of energy increases.

5.4 Social Welfare Implications of a Carbon Tax

The above analysis showed the distribution across consumers of the cost of living effects of an energy tax. We now evaluate the implications of these results for aggregate welfare, based on a range of social welfare functions. To evaluate social welfare functions, we require interpersonally comparable, cardinalized measures of individual utility. We follow the standard procedure in this literature of constructing money metric cardinalizations of utility. A money metric utility cardinalization \( V \) of a given indirect utility function \( V \) is the monotonic transformation of \( V \) having the property that, evaluated at base prices \( P_1, P_2 \), the function \( V = M \). We therefore define cardinalized utility \( \tilde{V} \) by

\[
\tilde{V} (U_1 P_1 / M, U_2 P_2 / M) = H \left[ V (U_1 P_1 / M, U_2 P_2 / M), U_1, U_2, \overline{P}_1, \overline{P}_2 \right]
\]

where, by definition, the monotonic transformation function \( H \) is chosen so that

\[
\tilde{V} (U_1 \overline{P}_1 / M, U_2 \overline{P}_2 / M) = M
\]

for all values of \( M, U_1, U_2 \). We let base prices be \( \overline{P}_1 = \overline{P}_2 = 1 \).

The money-metric function \( \tilde{V} \) gives a utility level that may be interpreted as the number of dollars that, at base prices, delivers the same level of utility that the consumer can achieve with a budget of \( M \) dollars when facing prices \( P_1, P_2 \). Attained utility depends on \( U_1, U_2 \), so the function \( H \) that yields \( \tilde{V} \) will likewise depend on these Barten scales.

The range of social welfare functions that we consider are in the Atkinson (1970) Mean-of-Order-\( r \) class, defined by

\[
S_r (\tilde{V}_1 ... \tilde{V}_N) = \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum (\tilde{V}_i)^r \right)^{1/r} \text{ for } r \neq 0, \text{ and } S_r (\tilde{V}_1 ... \tilde{V}_N) = \exp \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum \ln \tilde{V}_i \right) \text{ for } r = 0.
\]

We use \( r = -1, 0, 1 \) corresponding to the harmonic, geometric and arithmetic mean of individual money metric utility. The social welfare function \( S_1 \) is inequality neutral, while \( S_0 \) and \( S_{-1} \) are inequality averse. Since \( \tilde{V}_i \) is measured in dollars, so too are the welfare functions \( S_r \).

We compute proportionate welfare losses \( \triangle S_r \) equal to welfare at base prices minus welfare at new prices divided by welfare at base prices. The money metric at base prices \( (\overline{P}_1 = \overline{P}_2 = 1) \) equals the budget \( M_i \) of each consumer. Letting \( \tilde{V}_i \) be the money metric at \( M_i \) and new prices \( P_1 = 1.5, P_2 = 1 \), we have

\[
\triangle S_r = \left( S_r (M_1 ... M_N) - S_r (\tilde{V}_1 ... \tilde{V}_N) \right) / S_r (M_1 ... M_N)
\]

A first cut at welfare analysis is to employ a first-order approximation of the money metric. A standard approximation of the individual money-metric utility associated with a given price vector, which in our case is \((1.5, 1)\), is given by \( \tilde{V}_i = M_i / (W_{1i} \ast 1.5 + (1 - W_{1i}) \ast 1) \). This is the Laspeyres index approximation to the money metric for consumer \( i \). The welfare loss associated with this approximate money metric accounts for some heterogeneity across individuals.
(because $W_{1i}$ differs across individuals) but does not account for substitution responses. The arithmetic mean welfare index computed using this approximate money-metric utility shows a welfare loss of 6.30 per cent. The inequality-averse geometric and harmonic mean welfare indices show higher welfare losses of 6.74 and 7.18 per cent, respectively. This is because energy budget shares $W_{1i}$ are negatively correlated with budgets $M_i$, so the welfare indices that up-weight poorer households show a greater welfare loss associated with lower budgets and hence with higher energy budget shares.

These approximate social welfare loss numbers can be compared with the estimates from Models 1 and 2, provided in Table 5. Standard errors accounting for the sampling variability of the estimated parameters were generated via simulation and are shown in *italics*. In Table 5 we account for both substitution effects and heterogeneity using our models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Loss, Per Cent</th>
<th>Model 1 Estimate</th>
<th>Model 2 Estimate</th>
<th>Model 2 (Uk = 1) Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std Err</td>
<td>Std Err</td>
<td>Std Err</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetic Mean</td>
<td>4.81 0.19</td>
<td>5.14 0.14</td>
<td>4.91 0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Mean</td>
<td>5.27 0.26</td>
<td>5.43 0.16</td>
<td>5.37 0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonic Mean</td>
<td>6.14 0.54</td>
<td>5.48 0.17</td>
<td>5.85 0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Every estimate in Table 5 is lower than its corresponding first-order approximation. For example, the welfare loss given the geometric mean welfare index is about 1.5 percentage points lower (about one-fourth lower) than the first-order approximation. This shows that accounting for substitution effects has a substantial effect on welfare. All the estimates also show welfare losses increasing with the inequality aversion of the welfare index. As discussed above, this is primarily due to the downward sloping Engel curves as seen in Figure 4.

Another feature seen in Table 5 is that the estimates based on Model 2, which account for unobserved preference heterogeneity, have smaller standard errors. For the more inequality-averse welfare measures, this improvement in precision is substantial, e.g., the estimated harmonic mean welfare loss for Model 2 has about half the standard error of that for Model 1. This is due to the fact that the Model 2 treatment of unobserved heterogeneity increases precision of estimated parameters over model 1, as discussed earlier.

Further, we find that dealing with unobserved preference heterogeneity affects both the level and pattern of estimated welfare losses. There are two ways in which the misspecification of Model 1 compared to Model 2 matters for welfare analysis. First, Model 2 Engel Curves are on average less downward sloping than those of Model 1. This means that, even without accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity, when we consider welfare functions that are very inequality-averse, Model 1 will tend to overstate welfare losses. For example, in the upper panel of Table 5, the harmonic mean index shows a welfare loss of 6.14 per cent for Model 1 but only 5.48 per cent for Model 2.

A second difference is that Model 2 has greater variance in individual utility losses than does Model 1, and inequality-averse welfare functions will tend to penalize such variance. This effect can be seen by comparing the middle and right panels of Table 5. In the right panel we account for unobserved preference heterogeneity, which modestly increases the welfare loss for inequality-averse welfare functions (from 5.48 to 5.85 per cent).

The welfare loss in Model 2 not accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity (middle
panel) is 0.34 percentage points higher with the harmonic versus the arithmetic mean welfare index. Because these welfare loss measures are highly positively correlated, this difference is statistically significant, with a standard error of 0.05. In the right panel of Table 5, where we add variation due to unobserved preference heterogeneity, the difference in estimated welfare loss is 0.94 percentage points, with a standard error of the difference of 0.15. Thus, appropriately accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity dramatically increases the sensitivity of estimated welfare loss to the inequality-aversion of the welfare index.

Overall, our energy tax experiment yields two major conclusions. First, accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity has a big impact on how much variation we find in the impacts of price changes. In our example, the standard deviation of cost-of-living impacts due to a 50% energy tax is more than doubled by accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity by random Barten scales. Second, we find that accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity changes welfare analyses in a variety of ways, and in particular decreases estimated welfare loss when the welfare index is inequality-averse.

6 Conclusions

We show nonparametric identification of a generalized random coefficients model. We also provide an empirical application in which the generalized random coefficient structure arises naturally from extending an existing commonly used economic model of observed heterogeneity to a model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. In this Barten scales application, we allow for general forms of unobserved preference heterogeneity that are shown to be important for empirically evaluating the welfare effects of potential policy interventions such as a carbon tax. For example, we find that accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity more than doubles the estimated variation in impacts of an energy tax (as measured by the standard deviation across consumers of the cost of living impact of the tax).

Accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity via Barten scales is economically important because, by including them, we discovered that the variance in the impacts of energy prices is particularly large among poorer consumers. As a result, an energy tax may impact inequality and welfare through a previously unrecognized channel, which is the variation in energy price elasticities across households. We find that this variation in price responses is particularly large for poorer households. This can be seen in Figure 6, where the variation in cost of living impacts of an energy price increase is largest at low values of total expenditures. This figure also confirms the previously known result that mean cost of living impacts of energy price increases are also higher for the poor. Roughly, these results say that not only are energy taxes regressive on average (the previously known result), but also the degree of regressivity varies more among poorer consumers than among the rich.

This result has important implications for social welfare. Empirically, the unobserved preference heterogeneity revealed by our model strongly interacts with inequality aversion in social welfare calculations, reversing conclusions that would have been made using almost all previous demand models, which fail to account for such preference heterogeneity.

Useful areas for further work on the theory of generalized random coefficients would be finding conditions under which Theorem 1 alone could be used to identify the model with-
out the identification at zero assumptions used in Theorem 2, formalizing the extent to which additional implications of the model like those discussed in section 3.3 might be used to identify more general structures. It would also be useful to investigate how the assumptions used for identification might interact with assumptions needed for inference based on nonparametric estimators such as sieve maximum likelihood.

Our application focuses on consumers with single utility functions, that is, unitary households. A possible extension would be to consider collective household models. For example, Barten scales are used in the collective household models of Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013). It would also be useful to extend our carbon tax analyses into a general equilibrium setting, which would affect the conditional independence assumptions we used for identification of the random Barten scales.

7 Appendix A: Proofs

PROOF of Lemma 1: We have $G_k (X_k) \geq c_k X_k$. Let $h (G, t) = e^{-\rho G}$ for any $\rho > 0$. Then

$$
\kappa_t = \prod_{k=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho G_k (s_k)} s_k^{t_k - 1} ds_k \leq \prod_{k=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho c_k s_k} s_k^{t_k - 1} ds_k = \prod_{k=1}^{K} (\rho c_k)^{-t_k} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-r k} r_k^{t_k - 1} dr_k
$$

which is finite, because the gamma function $\Gamma (t_k) = \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-r k} r_k^{t_k - 1} dr_k$ is finite. Also, $\kappa_t > 0$ because the function being integrated is strictly positive everywhere in the interior of $supp (X)$.

PROOF of Lemma 2: Let $G (X_1, X_2) = \ln (X_1) + \ln (X_2)$. Do the change of variables replacing $s_1$ and $s_2$ with $s_1$ and $r = s_1 s_2$ to get

$$
\kappa_t = \int_{0}^{\infty} h [\ln (s_1) + \ln (s_2), t] s_1^{t_1 - 1} s_2^{t_2 - 1} ds_1 ds_2
$$

and the second integral is not convergent for $t_1 > t_2 - 1$.

PROOF of Theorem 1:

Let $\Omega_X = supp (X)$, $\Omega_{X|Z} = supp (X | Z)$, etc. By the definition of $\lambda_t (Z)$ we have

$$
\lambda_t (Z) = \int_{X \in \Omega_X} \int_{U \in \Omega_{U|Z}} h (G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K), t) dF_{U|Z} (U | Z) X_1^{t_1 - 1} X_2^{t_2 - 1} ... X_K^{t_K - 1} dX_1 dX_2 ... dX_K
$$

$$
= \int_{U \in \Omega_{U|Z}} \int_{X \in \Omega_{X|Z}} h (G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K), t) X_1^{t_1 - 1} X_2^{t_2 - 1} ... X_K^{t_K - 1} dX_1 dX_2 ... dX_K dF_{U|Z} (U | Z)
$$

30
where the second equality follows from Fubini’s theorem and \( \text{supp} \ (X) = \text{supp} \ (X \mid Z) \). Do a change of variables on the inner integral, letting \( s_k = X_k U_k \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, K \) to get \( \lambda_t (Z) = \)

\[
\int_{U \in \Omega_{U \mid Z}} \int_{s \in \text{supp}(X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K \mid Z, U)} h(G(s_1, \ldots, s, t), s_1^{t_1} s_2^{t_2} \cdots s_K^{t_K} U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K})
\]

\[
d s_1 d s_2 \cdots d s_K d F_{U \mid Z}(U \mid Z)
\]

\[
= \int_{U \in \Omega_{U \mid Z}} \int_{s \in \Omega_X} h(G(s_1, \ldots, s, t), s_1^{t_1} s_2^{t_2} \cdots s_K^{t_K} U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K})
\]

\[
d s_1 d s_2 \cdots d s_K d F_{U \mid Z}(U \mid Z)
\]

\[
= \int_{U \in \Omega_{U \mid Z}} \kappa_t U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K} d F_{U \mid Z}(U \mid Z)
\]

\[
= \kappa_t \int_{U \in \Omega_{U \mid Z}} U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K} d F_{U \mid Z}(U \mid Z) = \kappa_t \mathbb{E}
\]

\[
\left( U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K} \mid Z \right)
\]

where the second equality above uses \( \text{supp} \ (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_K X_K \mid Z, U) = \text{supp} \ (X) \). It therefore follows that moments \( \mathbb{E}
\]

\[
\left( U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K} \mid Z \right)
\]

are identified for all positive integers \( t_1, \ldots, t_k \) by equalling the ratio of identified objects \( \lambda_t (Z) / \kappa_t \). To identify moments where \( t_k = 0 \) for one or more values of \( k \), redefine \( \lambda_t (Z) \) and \( \kappa_t \) setting the corresponding \( X_k \) terms equal to zero. For example, to identify moments having \( t_1 = 0 \), replacing equation (4) with

\[
\lambda_t (Z) = \int_{(X_2, \ldots, X_K) \in \text{supp}(X_2, \ldots, X_K)} \mathbb{E}
\]

\[
\left[ h(\tilde{Y}, 0, t_2, \ldots, t_k) \mid X_1 = 0, X_2 \ldots X_K, Z \right] X_2^{t_2-1} \cdots X_K^{t_K-1} d X_2 \cdots d X_K
\]

and correspondingly redefining \( \kappa_t \) as

\[
\kappa_t = \int_{(s_2, \ldots, s_K) \in \text{supp}(X_2, \ldots, X_K)} h(G(0, s_2, \ldots s_K), 0, \ldots, t_K) s_2^{t_2-1} \cdots s_K^{t_K-1} d s_2 \cdots d s_K
\]

gives \( \lambda_t (Z) / \kappa_t \) equal to \( \mathbb{E}
\]

\[
\left( U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K} \mid Z \right).
\]

We have now shown that \( \mathbb{E}
\]

\[
\left( U_1^{-t_1} U_2^{-t_2} \cdots U_K^{-t_K} \mid Z \right)
\]

is identified for any nonnegative integers \( t_1, \ldots, t_k \). It then follows from Assumption A2 that the joint distribution of \( U_1^{-1} U_2^{-1} \cdots U_K^{-1} \mid Z \) is identified from these moments, and therefore that the joint distribution \( F_{U \mid Z}(U_1, \ldots, U_K \mid Z) \) is identified.

Before proving Theorem 2, we prove a couple of lemmas.

**Lemma 3:** Let \( \tilde{Y}_k = G_k (X_k U_k) \) where \( G_k \) is a strictly monotonically increasing function. Assume \( U_k \perp X \mid Z \). The marginal distributions of \( U_k \) and \( X_k \) are continuous. The support of \( X_k \) includes zero, the support of \( U_k \) is a subset of the support of \( \tilde{Y}_k \), and for every \( r \) such that \( G_k (r) \) is on the support of \( \tilde{Y}_k \) there exist an \( x_k \neq 0 \) on the support of \( X_k \) such that \( f_{U_k}(x_k^{-1} r) \neq 0 \). Assume the location and scale normalizations \( G_k (0) = 0 \) and \( G_k (1) = y_0 \) for some known
$y_0$ in the support of $\bar{y}_k$ are imposed. Let $r = H_k (\bar{y}_k)$ be inverse of the function $G_k$ where $\bar{y}_k = G_k (r)$. Assume $H_k$ is differentiable. Define $X_{(k)}$ to be the vector of all the elements of $X$ except for $X_k$. Define the function $S_k (\bar{y}_k, \bar{x})$ by

$$S_k (\bar{y}_k, \bar{x}) = E \left[ F_{\bar{y}_k | X_k, X_{(k)}, \bar{x}} (\bar{y}_k | \bar{x}^{-1}, 0, Z) \right] = \int_{\text{supp}(Z)} F_{\bar{y}_k | X_k, X_{(k)}, \bar{x}} (\bar{y}_k | \bar{x}^{-1}, 0, z) f_z (z) \, dz.$$ 

Then, for all $x_k$ and $\bar{y}_k$ such that $x_k \neq 0$ and $f_{U_k} (x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}_k)) \neq 0$,

$$H_k (\bar{y}_k) = \text{sign} \left( \text{sign} (x_k) \frac{\partial S_k (\bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial x_k^{-1}} \right) \exp \left( \int_{y_0}^{\bar{y}} x_k \frac{\partial S_k (\bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial \bar{y}_k} \, d\bar{y}_k \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)

Note that if $Z$ is discretely distributed, then the integral defining $S_k$ becomes a sum. If $Z$ is empty (so $U_k$ and $X$ are unconditionally independent) then $S_k (\bar{y}_k, \bar{x}) = F_{\bar{y}_k | X_k, X_{(k)}} (\bar{y}_k | \bar{x}^{-1}, 0)$. The main implication of Lemma 3 is that if the distribution $F_{\bar{y}_k, \bar{x}}$ is identified, then the function $H_k$ is identified by construction.

**PROOF of Lemma 3:** For any $\bar{y}_k = G_k (x_k U_k)$ and any $x_k > 0$ we have

$$F_{\bar{y}_k | X_k, X_{(k)}, \bar{x}} (\bar{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) = \Pr \left( G_k (x_k U_k) \leq \bar{y} \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right) = \Pr \left( U_k \leq x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}) \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right) = F_{U_k | X_k, X_{(k)}, \bar{x}} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}) \mid x_k, 0, z \right] = F_{U_k | Z} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}) \mid z \right]$$

where the last equality uses $U_k \perp X \mid Z$. Similarly for any $x_k < 0$ we have

$$F_{\bar{y}_k | X_k, X_{(k)}, \bar{x}} (\bar{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) = \Pr \left( G_k (x_k U_k) \leq \bar{y} \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right) = \Pr \left( U_k \geq x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}) \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right) = 1 - F_{U_k | Z} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}) \mid z \right]$$

Together these equations say

$$F_{U_k | Z} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}_k) \mid z \right] = I (x_k < 0) + \text{sign} (x_k) F_{\bar{y}_k | X_k, X_{(k)}, \bar{x}} (\bar{y}_k | x_k, 0, z).$$

So

$$F_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\bar{y}_k) \right] = \int_{\text{supp}(Z)} \left[ I (x_k < 0) + \text{sign} (x_k) F_{\bar{y}_k | X_k, X_{(k)}, \bar{x}} (\bar{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) \right] f_z (z) \, dz = I (x_k < 0) + \text{sign} (x_k) S \left( \bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1} \right)$$
It follows that for any $x_k \neq 0$,

$$\frac{\partial S(\bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial x_k^{-1}} = \text{sign} (x_k) f_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k(\bar{y}_k) \right] H_k(\bar{y}_k)$$

and

$$\frac{\partial S(\bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial y_k} = \text{sign} (x_k) f_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k(\bar{y}_k) \right] x_k^{-1} \frac{\partial H_k(\bar{y}_k)}{\partial y_k}$$

So for $f_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k(\bar{y}_k) \right] \neq 0$ it follows that

$$\frac{x_k \partial S(\bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1}) / \partial \bar{y}_k}{\partial S(\bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1}) / \partial x_k^{-1}} = \frac{\partial H_k(\bar{y}_k) / \partial \bar{y}_k}{H_k(\bar{y}_k)} = \frac{\partial \ln |H_k(\bar{y}_k)|}{\partial \bar{y}_k}$$

so

$$\exp \left( \int_{\bar{y}_0}^{\bar{y}} x_k \frac{\partial S(\bar{y}, x_k^{-1}) / \partial \bar{y}}{\partial S(\bar{y}, x_k^{-1}) / \partial x_k^{-1}} d\bar{y} \right) = \exp \left( \int_{\bar{y}_0}^{\bar{y}} \frac{\partial \ln |H_k(\bar{y})|}{\partial \bar{y}} d\bar{y} \right) = \exp (\ln |H_k(\bar{y}_0)| - \ln |H_k(\bar{y})|) = |H_k(\bar{y}_0)|$$

where $H_k(\bar{y}_0) = 1$ follows from $G_k(1) = \bar{y}_0$. Finally

$$\text{sign} \left( \text{sign} (x_k) \frac{\partial S(\bar{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial x_k^{-1}} \right) = \text{sign} \left( \text{sign} (x_k) \text{sign} (x_k) f_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k(\bar{y}_k) \right] H_k(\bar{y}_k) \right)$$

$$= \text{sign} (f_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k(\bar{y}_k) \right] H_k(\bar{y}_k)) = \text{sign} (H_k(\bar{y}_k))$$

So the right side of equation (25) equals $\text{sign} (H_k(\bar{y}_k)) \times H_k(\bar{y}_k) = H_k(\bar{y}_k)$ as claimed.

**LEMMA 4:** If Assumptions A4 and A5 hold, and the normalization $G_k(0) = 0$ for all $k$ holds, then $F_{U_0 | Z}$ and the distribution function $F_{\tilde{Y} | X, Z} (\tilde{Y} | x, z)$ are identified, where $\tilde{Y} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k)$.

**PROOF of Lemma 4:**

$F_{Y | X, Z} (y | 0, z) = \Pr (G(0) + U_0 \leq y | X = 0, Z = z) = F_{U_0 | X, Z} (y | 0, z) = F_{U_0 | Z} (y | z)$ identifies the distribution function $F_{U_0 | Z}$ on the support of $Y$, which contains the support of $U_0$. Next define $\tilde{Y} = Y - U_0$. Then since $Y = \tilde{Y} + U_0$ and the distributions of $Y | X, Z$ and $U_0 | X, Z$ are identified, for each value of $X = x, Z = z$ apply a deconvolution (using the nonvanishing characteristic function of $U_0$) to identify the distribution of $\tilde{Y} | X, Z$, where $\tilde{Y} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k)$. 

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PROOF of Theorem 2: When \( X(\vec{k}) = 0 \) (equivalently, when \( X = e_k x_k \) for some \( x_k \)) we get \( \tilde{Y} = G_k (X_k U_k) + \sum_{j \neq k} G_j (0) = G_k (X_k U_k) \). Define \( \hat{Y}_k = G_k (X_k U_k) \). It follows that \( F_{\tilde{y}_k | X_k, X(\vec{i}), Z} (\hat{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) = F_{\tilde{y} | X, Z} (\hat{y}_k | x_k e_k, z) \), so the distribution function on the left of this identity is identified, given by Lemma 4 that \( F_{\tilde{y} | X, Z} \) is identified. Let \( r = H_k (\hat{y}_k) \) denote the inverse of the function \( G_k \) where \( \hat{y}_k = G_k (r) \). It follows by construction from Lemma 3 that \( H_k (\hat{y}_k) \) is identified for every value of \( \hat{y}_k \) on the support of \( \tilde{y}_k \) satisfying the property that, for some \( x_k \) on the support of \( X_k \), \( f_{U_k} \left( x_k^{-1} H (\tilde{y}_k) \right) \neq 0 \). This identification of \( H_k \) on its support. Finally, given identification of \( F_{\tilde{y} | X, Z} \) and of \( H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \), the distribution function \( F_{U_k | Z} \) is identified by \( F_{U_k | Z} \left[ H (\tilde{y}) / x_k | z \right] = F_{\tilde{y}} | X_k, X(\vec{i}), Z (\tilde{y} | x_k, 0, z) \) for \( x_k > 0 \) and \( F_{U_k | Z} \left[ H (\tilde{y}) / x_k | z \right] = 1 - F_{\tilde{y}} | X_k, X(\vec{i}), Z (\tilde{y} | x_k, 0, z) \) for \( x_k < 0 \).

PROOF of Corollary 1: For part i), Given any function \( G \), for \( k = 1, ..., K \), define \( G_k (X_k U_k) = G (X_k U_k) \) \( = G (0, ..., 0, X_k U_k, 0, ..., 0) \) and define \( G \) by \( G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) = G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) - \sum_{k=1}^K G_k (X_k U_k) \). Then, by construction, part i) holds. For part ii), we have that the function \( G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) \) is zero when evaluated at \( X = 0 \) or at \( X = X_k e_k \) for any \( k \), so evaluated at any such value of \( X \), equation (6) is equivalent to equation (2). For equation (2), the proof of Theorem 1 shows that for \( k = 1, ..., K \) identification of \( F_{U_k | Z} \) and of \( G_k \) only using \( X = 0 \) and \( X = X_k e_k \), so these functions are also identified for equation (6).

PROOF of Corollary 2: Theorem 2 identifies the functions \( G_1, G_2, ..., G_K \), and shows that the distribution of \( \tilde{Y} \) defined by \( \tilde{Y} = G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) \) is identified. Given that the distribution of \( \tilde{Y} \) is identified, Theorem 1 can be applied to identify the joint distribution function \( F_{U | Z} (U_1, ..., U_K | Z) \).

PROOF of Theorem 3: As discussed in the text, a property of Barten scales (which can be readily verified using Roys identity) is that, if \( V (X_1, X_2) \) is the indirect utility function corresponding to the demand function \( \omega_1 (X_1, X_2) \), then up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation \( H (V, U_1, U_2) \) of \( V \), the indirect utility function corresponding to \( \omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) \) is \( V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) \), and vice versa. It therefore suffices to prove that the theorem holds with \( U_1 = U_2 = 1 \).

By equation (7), given any indirect utility function \( V \), the corresponding demand function \( \omega_1 \) is given by

\[
\omega_1 (X_1, X_2) = \left\{ \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_1} / \partial \ln X_1 \right\} \left[ \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_1} + \left( \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right) \right] \tag{26}
\]

This is just one way to write Roys identity in a demand system of two goods. Then by the definition of \( \lambda \), we have that for any demand function \( \omega_1 \), the corresponding indirect utility function \( V \) satisfies

\[
\lambda [\omega_1 (X_1, X_2)] = \ln \left( \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right) \tag{27}
\]
and similarly, given any \( V \) the corresponding \( \omega \) satisfies equation (27).

It follows immediately that, given any differentiable functions \( h_1(X_1) \) and \( h_2(X_2) \), if \( V(X_1, X_2) = h_1(X_1) + h_2(X_2) \) then equation (27) equals

\[
\lambda [\omega_1(X_1, X_2)] = \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_1(X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_2(X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right)
\]

which is in the form of equation

\[
\lambda [\omega_1(X_1, X_2)] = g_1(X_1) + g_2(X_2),
\]

showing that any additive indirect utility function generates a demand equation in the form of (29). Also, by equation (28) given the functions \( h_1 \) and \( h_2 \) we can define \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) by

\[
g_1(X_1) + g_2(X_2) = \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_1(X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_2(X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right).
\]

To go the other direction, start by supposing that equation (29) holds for some functions \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \). We will apply the following two component special case of Lemma 4.1 in Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978, p. 160): Assume a function \( F(r_1, r_2) \) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in its elements. Then \( F(r_1, r_2) = F_0(F_1(r_1) + F_2(r_2)) \) for some functions \( F_0, F_1, \) and \( F_2 \) if and only if

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial r_1} \ln \left( \frac{\partial F(r_1, r_2)}{\partial r_2} \right) = \psi(r_1)
\]

for some function \( \psi \). Taking the derivative of equation (27) with respect to \( \ln X_1 \) and using equation (29) gives

\[
\frac{\partial \lambda [\omega_1(X_1, X_2)]}{\partial \ln X_1} = \frac{\partial g_1(X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1} = \ln \left( \frac{\partial V(X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right).
\]

Apply the Lemma with \( r_k = \ln X_k, F(r_1, r_2) = V(X_1, X_2), \psi(r_1) = \frac{\partial g_1(X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1}, \) and \( F_k(r_k) = h_k(X_k) \) to prove that \( V(X_1, X_2) \) must equal \( F_0(h_1(X_1) + h_2(X_2)) \) for some function \( F_0 \), which by the properties of indirect utility functions must be monotonically increasing (recall also that twice differentiability was one of the assumed properties of our indirect utility functions). Finally, applying equation (26) to this indirect utility function shows that equation (30) holds, which we can integrate to obtain

\[
\int e^{g_1(x_1)} \, dx_1 + \int e^{-g_2(x_2)} \, dx_2 = h_1(X_1) + h_2(X_2).
\]

Together these results prove the first part Theorem 3. Adding back the Barten scales \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) to the functions \( g_1, g_2, h_1, \) and \( h_2 \) proves equations (12) and (11). The properties of the functions \( h_1 \) and \( h_2 \) given at the end of Theorem 2 follow from the fact that the indirect utility function \( h_1(U_1 P_1/M) + h_2(U_2 P_2/M) \) must possess the standard properties of all indirect utility functions, i.e., homogeneity and quaisconvexity in \( P_1, P_2, \) and \( M \), nondecreasing in each price, and increasing in \( M \).
8 References


Estimated Distribution of $\ln(\alpha_1), \ln(\alpha_2)$: Model 1
Estimated Distribution of $\ln(\alpha_1), \ln(\alpha_2)$: Model 2
Estimated Distribution of $\ln(U_1),\ln(U_2)$: Model 2
Estimated Budget Shares, Models 1 and 2

Model 2 at quartiles of $U_1, U_2$; evaluated at base prices and mean $\alpha_j$
Distribution of Predicted Budget Shares, Model 2
at base prices and estimated $\alpha_j$ and $U_j$ distribution
Distribution of Log Cost of Living Impacts, Model 2

Given base prices, 50% increase in Energy Price, and estimated $\alpha_j$ and $U_j$
1 Online Supplemental Appendix

This Appendix contains additional theoretical and empirical results that are not included in the main text.

1.1 Additional Theoretical Results

1.1.1 Differences between Theorem 2 and Matzkin (2003)

In our notation, Matzkin (2003) considers, in an appendix, models of the form:

\[ Y = \sum_{k=0}^{K} M_k (S, X_k, U_k) \]

where \( M_k \) are unknown functions and \( S \) are additional observed covariates. Our Theorem 2 fits this general framework with:

\[ M_k (S, X_k, U_k) = G_k (X_k U_k) \]

and \( G_0 (X_0 U_0) = U_0 \) with \( X_0 = 1 \). As we do, Matzkin assumes that \( M_k \) is monotonic in \( U_k \) and that \( U \) and \( X \) are continuous and conditionally independent.

It should first be noted that Matzkin assumes the random coefficients are conditionally or unconditionally mutually independent, and we do not. See Assumption AA.5 and AA.5’ in Matzkin (2003), or see the first paragraph of her Appendix where she writes, "Assume, further, that the joint distribution of \((\varepsilon_1, \ldots, \varepsilon_K)\), conditional on \( X_0 \), is the multiplication of the marginal distributions of the \( \varepsilon_k \)'s, conditional on \( X_0 \)." This already suffices to show that our Theorem 2 is not just a corollary of Matzkin (2003), because Theorem 2 does not impose this constraint. This also shows that nothing like our Theorem 1 is possible in her framework, since our Theorem 1 identifies the joint distribution of the random coefficients. The only remaining issues are additional differences between her results and our Theorem 2.

Matzkin proposes a few different restrictions or normalizations that suffice to identify each function \( M_k \) and each distribution \( F_{U_k} \), but none of her proposed restrictions exactly fit our generalized random coefficients framework. As a result, even if we ignore her independence assumption (or impose it unnecessarily as an additional constraint on our model), our Theorem 2 would still not be a corollary of her results. Matzkin’s closest result to our model is the assumption that \( M_k (S, X_k, U_k) = N_k (S, X_k - U_k) \) for some function \( N_k \). By redefining \( X_k \) and \( U_k \) as \( \ln X_k \) and \( \ln U_k \), we can replace our \( G_k (X_k U_k) \) with \( g_k (X_k - U_k) \) for a suitably redefined function \( g_k \). However, we still could not apply Matzkin’s results by equating \( N_k (S, X_k - U_k) = g_k (X_k - U_k) \), because for this specification Matzkin requires the presence of at least one additional regressor \( S \) that has certain properties, and our model has no such additional regressors inside the \( G_k \) functions.

\(^9\)Each \( \varepsilon_k \) in her notation corresponds to each \( U_k \) in our notation.
An alternative identifying restriction Matzkin proposes has $S$ empty, which fits our framework, but she then additionally requires that $M_k (\bar{x}_k, U_k) = U_k$ for some known value $\bar{x}_k$. However, in our model this would impose $G_k (\bar{\bar{x}}_k U_k) = U_k$, which can only hold when $G_k$ is proportional to the identity function. So this alternative identifying assumption can also not be used for our model. Yet another alternative restriction Matzkin proposes for identification is assuming that $M_k$ is linearly homogeneous in $X_k$ and $U_k$. Again this constraint cannot hold for our general $G_k$.

In summary, Matzkin imposes an independence assumption among the random coefficients that we do not impose, and even if one ignores this difference, Matzkin’s other identifying assumptions do not apply to our model. Matzkin (2003) also contains nothing comparable to our Theorem 1. Nevertheless, it is the case that both the statement of our Theorem 2 and our method of proof of Theorem 2 are similar to Matzkin (2003).

1.1.2 Additional Overidentifying Information

It may be possible to obtain additional overidentifying information by applying Theorem 2 using different $h$ functions. Assume there exists a set of functions $\{h_\rho : \rho \in P\}$ where $P$ denotes a set such that, for any $\rho \in P$, Assumption A3 holds for the function $h = h_\rho$. Similarly, define $\lambda_{\rho,t} (z)$ and $\kappa_{\rho,t}$ as $\lambda_t (z)$ and $\kappa_t$ when $h = h_\rho$. It then follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 2 that

$$\frac{\lambda_{\rho,t} (z)}{\kappa_{\rho,t}} = \frac{\lambda_{\bar{\rho},t} (z)}{\kappa_{\bar{\rho},t}}$$

for all $t \in \mathbb{R}^K_+$, all $\rho \in P$, $\bar{\rho} \in P$, and all $z$ on its support. (31)

Theorem 2 only needed and used positive integers $t$, but the same equations hold for reals $t$. For a given choice of $t$, $h_\rho$, and $h_{\bar{\rho}}$, equation (31) depends only on conditional expectations of data that can be readily estimated, and on the functions $G_1, \ldots, G_K$. Equation (31) therefore provides a continuum of identified equations in the unknown functions $G_1, \ldots, G_K$ for each pair $\rho$ and $\bar{\rho}$ in $P$. For example, based on Lemma 1 we might let $h_\rho (G, t) = e^{-\rho G}$ and $P$ could equal $\mathbb{R}_+$ providing an infinite number of such equations for an infinite number of choices of $t$.

If there exists only one set of functions $G_1, \ldots, G_K$ that jointly satisfies equation (31) for all real vectors $t$ and all $\rho, \bar{\rho} \in P$, (which is essentially a completeness assumption), then they would suffice to identify $G_1, \ldots, G_K$. In this case Theorem 2 would not be needed at all, since this result combined with Theorem 1 would then identify the entire model. Currently the potential usefulness of this construction is speculative, since we do not know of sufficient conditions to ensure that the collection of equations (31) has a unique solution.

1.1.3 Models With Interaction Terms

The overidentifying information discussed in the previous subsection and in the main text suggests that Theorems 1 and 2 might also be combined to potentially identify richer models than $Y = \sum_{k=1}^K G_k (X_k U_k) + U_0$. Suppose that

$$Y = \tilde{G} (X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K, \xi) + \sum_{k=1}^K G_k (X_k U_k) + U_0$$

(32)
where the function \( G \) is known, but the vector of parameters \( \xi \) is unknown, and \( G \) equals zero whenever all but one of its first \( K \) elements equals zero. Then the functions \( G_1, G_2, ..., G_K \) are still identified by Corollary 1. We can then identify and construct the function \( \kappa_{\rho,t} (\xi) \) defined by

\[
\kappa_{\rho,t} (\xi) = \int_{\text{supp}(X)} h_\rho \left[ \tilde{G} (s_1, ..., s_K, \xi) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (s_k), t \right] s_1^{t_1-1}s_2^{t_2-1}...s_K^{t_K-1}ds_1ds_2...ds_K
\]

and it follows from equation (31) that

\[
\frac{\lambda_{\rho,t} (z)}{\kappa_{\rho,t} (\xi)} = \frac{\lambda_{\bar{\rho},t} (z)}{\kappa_{\bar{\rho},t} (\bar{\xi})} \quad \text{for all } t \in \mathbb{R}_+^K \text{ and all } \rho, \bar{\rho} \in P.
\]

This then provides infinitely many equations that might be potentially used to identify the finite parameter vector \( \xi \). If \( \xi \) can be identified from these equations, then we can then apply Theorem 1 to identify \( F_{U|Z} (U_1,...,U_K | Z) \), and so the entire model will be identified.

To illustrate, consider the model

\[
Y = G_1 (X_1 U_1) + G_2 (X_2 U_2) + \xi X_1 U_1 X_2 U_2 + U_0
\]

for some unknown scalar constant \( \xi \), so in this example \( \tilde{G} (s_1, s_2, \xi) = \xi s_1 s_2 \). Apply Theorem 1 to identify \( G_1, G_2, \) and \( F_{U_0|Z} (U_0 | Z) \). Assume there exists a value of \( \rho, \bar{\rho}, \) and \( t \) such that \( \kappa_{\rho,t} (\xi) /\kappa_{\bar{\rho},t} (\bar{\xi}) \) is strictly monotonic in the scalar \( \xi \). This then would suffice to ensure that equation (33) has a unique solution and hence that \( \xi \) is identified. Finally, apply Theorem 2 with \( G (s_1, s_2) = \xi s_1 s_2 + G_1 (s_1) + G_2 (s_2) \) to identify \( F_{U|Z} (U_1, U_2 | Z) \), and so the entire model given by equation (34) would then identified.

### 1.2 Additional Empirical Results

In this appendix we provide an extensive set of analyses to verify the robustness of our empirical results to a wide variety of alternative model specifications and data environments, including a Monte Carlo to assess finite-sample performance, adding complexity to the utility function specification, relaxing the parametric structure on preferences and on error distributions, allowing for additional heteroskedasticity of errors, and dealing with potential endogeneity of prices via control functions.

A brief summary of these results is that, while some departures from our baseline Model 2 are statistically significant, none substantially change our main economic findings or conclusions, indicating that our results are robust to many different possible sources of misspecification.

#### 1.2.1 Monte Carlo Analysis

A number of possible concerns arise in bringing our identification results to data. Although our estimates are parametric, recovering the distribution of the unobserved random components from the empirical distribution of data may entail to an ill-posed inverse problem, especially given identification at zero from Theorem 2 (concerns of this type date back at least to Heckman
and Singer 1984). There is also the potential issue that the range of observed values of $X_1, X_2$ in the data may be too limited, given that identification assumes the distribution they are drawn from has support equal to the entire positive orthant. Finally, our model has a moderately large number of coefficients relative to the sample size, and is nonlinear. All of these features may degrade the performance of our estimator in practice.

In this section, we conduct a small Monte Carlo to affirm that our estimator performs moderately well with our data, and in particular can recover good estimates of the true distribution of the random coefficients. We simulate data from our Model 2. Our actual data set is 9971 observations, so we perform the Monte Carlo with roughly the same sample size, $N = 10,000$ observations, and with a much smaller sample size of $N = 2,500$ observations.

The larger is $\sigma_0$ (the standard deviation of $U_0$), the greater is the noise in the dependent variable, and hence the more difficult the signal extraction problem becomes. We therefore vary $\sigma_0$ between 0.1 and 0.5 (roughly our estimated value) in our Monte Carlo experiments. Another factor that may greatly affect the difficulty of estimation is the correlation $\rho$ between the random coefficients $U_1$ and $U_2$, since the larger $\rho$ is, the more difficult it becomes to separate the effects of these two Barten scales. We therefore vary $\rho$ across the experiments, considering values $\rho = 0, \rho = 0.5, \text{ and } \rho = 0.9$.

We implement the Monte Carlo by first taking independent draws from our actual observed $X_{ki}$ and $Z_i$ data. We then draw observations from the $(U_0, U_1, U_2)$ distributions corresponding to the experiment, and construct each associated $Y$, and estimate the model using these drawn observations. We repeat this procedure $B = 100$ times for each experimental design. Summary statistics across these $B$ replications are reported in table A1, focusing on the estimates of $\sigma_0, \sigma_1$ and $\rho$. We have six experiments corresponding to six combinations of values for $N, \sigma_0$ and $\rho$. For each Monte Carlo experiment, we report the mean of the estimates and their root mean squared error (rmse) with respect to the true values in the experiment.

Our baseline estimates reported in Table 2 of the main text use a 10,000 point grid for the numerical integration of the Model 2 likelihood function. The resulting estimation of Model 2 with our real data set took about two days to converge. So, to reduce the computation time required for the Monte Carlo experiments, we used a courser grid of 400 points. This introduces a small additional source of error in our reported Monte Carlo results, which may increase the reported root mean squared errors relative to our baseline model. Note also that in both the baseline estimator and the Monte Carlo estimates $\sigma_1$ and $\sigma_2$ are constrained to be positive (via exponentiating underlying parameters) and that $\rho$ is similarly constrained to lie in $(-1, 1)$. So, e.g., for $\rho = 0.9$, the root mean squared error is limited by the fact that $\rho$ cannot exceed 1.
Table A1: Monte Carlo Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parameter</th>
<th>baseline estimates</th>
<th>Monte Carlo Experiments</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coeff</td>
<td>std err</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_0$</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_1$</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results are reported in Table A1. The top panel of Table A1 shows the performance of our estimator in the larger sample size, which is similar to the sample size of our actual data. This panel is estimated with $\sigma_0 = \sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 0.5$ and letting $\rho$ vary across 0, 0.5 and 0.9. The last column of this panel, where $\rho = 0.9$, is the closest simulation to our actual baseline model empirical estimates. What is notable in this entire top panel, but particularly in the last column, is that there is little mean bias in the estimates, and that the root mean squared errors are all of the same order of magnitude as the estimated standard errors in our real data set. Moreover, the largest difference between true data standard errors and monte carlo root mean squared errors is for the noise parameter $\sigma_0$, while the match for the structural random coefficient parameters of primary interest, $\rho$ and $\sigma_1$, is better still. This suggests that the standard parametric asymptotic theory we use to calculate standard errors is generating a reasonable approximation to the actual estimator distribution.

In the bottom panel of Table A1 we analyze three other variations from the baseline. In the first column of the lower panel, we consider a smaller sample size of 2500. One concern regarding ill-posedness and identification at zero is that convergence might be much slower than root $N$, despite our use of a parametric maximum likelihood estimator. The first column of the lower panel addresses this concern, showing that root mean squared errors are roughly double those of the upper panel, as would be expected by the standard parametric convergence rate.

In the middle columns of the lower panel, we consider a smaller value of $\sigma_0$. This results in substantially reducing the root mean squared errors for $\sigma_1$ and $\rho$, as expected by this increase in the signal to noise ratio. Increasing $\sigma_1$ and $\sigma_2$ in the last column of the lower panel has a similar effect, as expected.

Overall, these results strongly suggest that potential issues associated with an ill-posed inverse, limited data support, and ordinary nonlinearity or multicollinearity, are not causing serious problems with the parametric estimation of our model.

### 1.2.2 Interactions in Utility

The indirect additive utility function $V^{-1} = h_1(X_1) + h_2(X_2)$ from Theorem 3 restricts price interaction effects. To relax the restrictiveness (in terms of cross effects) of the resulting additive
demand functions we here consider adding interaction terms to the model of Theorem 3, giving 
an indirect utility function of the form

\[ V^{-1} = h_1(X_1) + h_2(X_2) + S(X_1, X_2, \xi) \]  

(35)

where the interaction function \( S \) has a simple parametric form (with parameter vector \( \xi \)), as in equation (34).

By applying Roy’s identity to (35), then as before logit transforming the result, adding Barten scales, and adding the error term \( U_0 \) we obtain the demand model:

\[
\lambda(W_1) = \ln \left[ e^{g_1(U_1X_1)} + M_1(U_1X_1, U_2X_2, \xi) \right] - \ln \left[ e^{-g_2(U_2X_2)} + M_2(U_1X_1, U_2X_2, \xi) \right] + U_0
\]

(36)

where

\[
M_k(U_1X_1, U_2X_2, \xi) = \frac{\partial S(U_1X_1, U_2X_2, \xi)}{\partial \ln (U_kX_k)}
\]

(37)

and, as in Theorem 3,

\[
\frac{\partial h_1(X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1} = e^{g_1(X_1)} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial h_2(X_1)}{\partial \ln X_2} = e^{-g_2(X_2)}
\]

Keeping the same polynomial expansions for \( g_k \) as before, namely, equations (15) and (16), yields the same \( h_k \) as before, equation (17), and when substituted into the above gives the demand function

\[
\lambda(W_1) = \omega_{s1}(U_1X_1, U_2X_2, \beta, \xi) + U_0
\]

(38)

\[
= \ln \left[ \beta_{10} + \beta_{11} \ln (U_1X_1) + \beta_{12} (\ln (U_1X_1))^2 + \ldots + \beta_{1S} (\ln (U_1X_1))^S \right]^{2} + M_1(U_1X_1, U_2X_2, \xi)
\]

\[- \ln \left[ \beta_{20} + \beta_{21} \ln (U_2X_2) + \beta_{22} (\ln (U_2X_2))^2 + \ldots + \beta_{2S} (\ln (U_2X_2))^S \right]^{2} + M_2(U_1X_1, U_2X_2, \xi) + U_0
\]

The demand function given by equation (38) is the same as (18), except for the addition of the \( M_k \) functions given by equation (37), which embody the desired price interaction terms.

We consider two models for \( S \). One is the simple multiplicative interaction term

\[ S = U_1X_1U_2X_2\xi_{11}, \]

which has

\[ M_1 = M_2 = U_1X_1U_2X_2\xi_{11}. \]

This is the most obvious model for interactions, but it forces \( M_1 = M_2 \), pushing the \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) terms by the same amount. We therefore also consider

\[ S = U_1X_1U_2X_2\xi_{11} + (U_1X_1)^2 U_2X_2\xi_{21} + U_1X_1(U_2X_2)^2 \xi_{12} \]

which allows \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) to differ:

\[ M_1 = U_1X_1U_2X_2(\xi_{11} + 2U_1X_1\xi_{21} + U_2X_2\xi_{12}), \]

\[ M_2 = U_1X_1U_2X_2(\xi_{11} + U_1X_1\xi_{21} + 2U_2X_2\xi_{12}). \]
For both models, we restrict the parameters $\zeta$ to be weakly positive because negative values of the parameters $\zeta$ induce violations of regularity (that is, budget shares outside 0, 1, or equivalently, taking logs of negative numbers) for large values of $U_k$.\textsuperscript{10}

Table A2 gives results for the model with the simple interaction $S = U_1 X_1 U_2 X_2 \zeta_{11}$ on the right hand side, and for our baseline model on the left. We do not present estimates for the more complicated interaction model because the estimated values of $\zeta_{21}$ and $\zeta_{12}$ in that case were zero (that is, the positivity restrictions on those parameters were binding), reducing that specification to the simple interaction model. Table A2 gives a subset of estimated coefficients, summary statistics on budget shares and cost of living impacts, and social welfare analysis analogous to those results in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the main text.

Looking at the top panel of Table A2, which shows the estimated parameters governing the distributions of $U_0$, $U_1$ and $U_2$, we see that the inclusion of the interaction term $\zeta_{11}$ does not much affect the estimated variance of $U_0$ or $U_1$, or the correlation of $U_1$ and $U_2$, but it does seem to increase the estimated variance of $U_2$. Further, the inclusion of the interaction term $\zeta_{11}$ reduces the precision of these parameter estimates. In particular, it doubles the estimated standard error of $\rho$.

The magnitude of the estimated interaction term appears relatively large and significant.\textsuperscript{11} However, since we have no estimated difference between $M_1$ and $M_2$, the model becomes $\lambda(W_1) = \ln(e^{81} + M_1) - \ln(e^{-82} + M_1) + U_0$, which approximately equals $\ln(e^{81}) - \ln(e^{-82}) + U_0$ using $\ln(e^{81} + M_1) \approx \ln(e^{81}) + \ln(M_1)$. As a result, the overall impact of the interaction terms on behavior is rather small for most consumers. This can be seen by comparing the left and right sides of the lower portions of Table A2. For the same reason, inclusion of interactions generally reduces the precision with which objects like welfare losses are measured, while having almost no impact on their estimated magnitude. For example, the bottom lines of Table A2 show that including the interaction term changes estimated welfare impacts by less than 3%, and increases standard errors of the welfare effects by more than that amount.

\textsuperscript{10}To allow for possible negative interactions, we also tried the model $S = a / (1 + U_1 X_1 U_2 X_2)$, the magnitude of which is bounded by $a \geq 0$. This specification has $M_1 = M_2 = -U_1 X_1 U_2 X_2 a / (1 + U_1 X_1 U_2 X_2)$. We then estimate equation (38) imposing the same normalizations and using the same sieve maximum likelihood method as before. Empirically, this did not yield any different results.

\textsuperscript{11}The product $\tilde{U}_1 \tilde{U}_2$ has a median of 1 and a right-skewed distribution, which makes the distribution of $M_1 = M_2$ also right-skewed, with a mean of 0.047 but a median of 0.021 and an inter-decile range of (0.005, 0.098).
Our overall conclusion is that possible interaction effects (and hence potential violations of the additivity assumed by Theorem 3) may be present, but if so, they do not materially affect our conclusions.

### 1.2.3 Higher Order Polynomials in Demand

Given nonparametric identification, we originally attempted to estimate the model using Sieve Maximum Likelihood as in Chen (2007). However, we found that, given our sample size, complexity of the model, and the dimensionality of our data, attempts to estimate more than second or third order expansions for the unknown functions in the model yielded results that were numerically unstable. We have therefore opted to follow a parametric Maximum Likelihood modeling strategy for our baseline results presented in the body of the paper, though using functional forms based on series expansions. In this section, we consider higher-order polynomials for the demand functions.

Our baseline model specifies demand functions using squared third-order polynomials for functions $g_1$ and $g_2$. This is consistent with a large theoretical and empirical literature on
demand estimation finding that three terms in total expenditures per demand equation are sufficient to capture the shapes of various demand functions. See, e.g., Lewbel (2008) and references therein. This specification yields a total of seven parameters (the beta’s) governing the shape of the demand function for energy over $X_1, X_2$.

To check for adequacy of this specification we also estimated models with fourth and fifth order polynomials. We find that the fourth and fifth order terms for energy goods ($\beta_{14}, \beta_{15}$) are small, and are both individually and jointly insignificant. The estimated fourth and fifth-order terms for nonenergy goods ($\beta_{24}, \beta_{25}$) are very large in magnitude but also have very large standard errors, indicating numerical parameter instability, which is a common problem that indicates overfitting when estimating high order polynomials with small data sets. To save space we do not reproduce a full summary of alternative estimates as in Table A2, but simply note that these high-magnitude high-variance parameters associated with higher order polynomials introduce a large amount of noise into the fitted model. For example, this alternative specification nearly triples the standard errors of estimated welfare losses. We therefore confine our empirical analysis to the more stable squared third-order polynomials in our baseline specification.

1.2.4 Specification of the Distributions of Unobservables

Our estimated models assume that the measurement error term $U_0$ is distributed normally, and our baseline Model 2 assumes $\tilde{U} = (\tilde{U}_1, \tilde{U}_2)$ has a bivariate log-normal distribution. Here we consider more general specifications for these distributions, based on hermite polynomial expansions of the type commonly used for sieve estimation. Denote the joint density of $\tilde{U}$ by $f_{\tilde{U} J}$ and the density for $U_0$ by $f_{0, J}$, where $J$ indexes the order of our polynomial expansions. Specifically, we let $J = 0$ index our baseline parameterizations where $\ln \tilde{U}$ is a mean zero bivariate normal and $U_0$ is a mean zero normal. Higher values of $J$ then correspond to richer distribution specifications based on polynomial expansions that multiply the base normal distributions.

We employ the seminonparametric density models used by Gallant and Nychka (1987). Ignoring trimming for now, the joint density of $\tilde{U}$ is specified as

$$f_{\tilde{U} J} (\tilde{U}_1, \tilde{U}_2, \gamma, \sigma, \rho) = \frac{\left( \sum_{j_1=0}^J \sum_{j_2=0}^J \gamma_{j_1 j_2} (\ln \tilde{U}_1)^{j_1} (\ln \tilde{U}_2)^{j_2} \right)^2}{U_1 U_2 \bar{C}_J (\gamma, \sigma, \rho) \exp \left( \frac{(\ln \tilde{U}_1)^2}{\sigma_1^2} - 2\rho \frac{(\ln \tilde{U}_1)}{\sigma_1} \frac{(\ln \tilde{U}_2)}{\sigma_2} + \frac{(\ln \tilde{U}_2)^2}{\sigma_2^2} - 2(1 - \rho^2) \right)}.$$

(39)

where $\gamma$ is the vector of polynomial coefficients $\gamma_{j_1 j_2}$, $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$, and $\bar{C}_J (\gamma, \sigma, \rho)$ is the constant necessary to make $f_{\tilde{U} J}$ integrate to one. Because we scale by $\bar{C}_J$, we can without loss of generality let $\gamma_{00} = 1$. In the simplest model when $J = 0$ this reduces to our baseline specification of a bivariate log normal $\tilde{U}$ with $\bar{C}_J (\gamma, \sigma, \rho) = 2\pi \sigma_1 \sigma_2 (1 - \rho^2)$, each $\ln \tilde{U}_k$ having mean zero and variance $\sigma_k^2$, and correlation coefficient $\rho_k$. Note that we don’t need to explicitly model the mean of $\ln \tilde{U}$ and hence the scaling of each $\tilde{U}_k$, because the scaling of $\tilde{U}_k$, like that of $\alpha_k (Z)$, is freely absorbed into the $\beta_{ks}$ parameters. As in our baseline specification, we trim this distribution of $\ln \tilde{U}_k$ at $\pm 3$ standard deviations. We trim to bound the support of
\( \tilde{U}_k \) away from zero and to ensure existence of a moment generating function, both as assumed by Theorem 2. This trimming was found to have minimal numerical effects on our empirical estimates.

We analogously model the density of \( U_0 \) as

\[
 f_{0J} (U_0, \delta, \sigma_0) = \frac{\left( \sum_{j=0}^{J} \delta_j U_0^j \right)^2}{C_J (\delta, \sigma_0)} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{U_0}{\sigma_0} \right)^2 \right)
\]

where \( \delta_0 = 1 \), and \( \delta_1 \) is set to ensure that the error term \( U_0 \) has mean zero\(^{12}\).

Estimation then proceeds by replacing \( f_0 \) and \( f_{\tilde{U}} \) with \( f_{0J} \) and \( f_{\tilde{U}J} \) in equations (21) and (23), including \( \gamma \) and \( \delta \) as additional parameters to estimate. Table A3 summarizes results with \( J = 3 \) for \( U_0 \) and with \( J = 2 \) for \( \ln \tilde{U}_1, \ln \tilde{U}_2 \). Just like Table A2, Table A3 gives selected estimates from this model on the right, along with the corresponding estimates from our baseline model \( (J = 0) \) on the left for comparison, including summary statistics on estimated budget shares, cost-of-living indices, and social welfare losses. \( J = 2 \) was the most flexible model we could estimate for the joint distribution of \( \ln \tilde{U}_1, \ln \tilde{U}_2 \), in that attempts at estimating models with \( J > 2 \) produced very large standard errors and numerical instability of the sort discussed in the previous subsection.

Figures 7 and 8 show the estimated distributions of \( U_0 \) and \( \ln U \) based on these polynomial expansions. Figure 7 shows only a very small departure from our baseline normal model for the density of \( U_0 \). The estimated joint distribution of \( \ln U \) differs from our baseline lognormal estimate mainly in having a larger variance (particularly for \( \ln \tilde{U}_1 \)), and has a small second mode. The resulting estimate of the joint density of \( \ln U \) is shown in Figure 8. Comparing Figures 3 and 8, the larger variance of \( \ln \tilde{U} \) results in the two modes of Figure 3 largely merging into one, while the second mode in \( \ln \tilde{U} \) puts some extra mass at smaller values of \( U \).

The estimates in these figures and in Table A3 show departures from the baseline model that are statistically significant, but turn out to have numerically modest and insignificant affects on our economic analyses. The estimates of every summary measure and welfare implication of the more richly specified model equal the values estimated from our baseline model.

\(^{12}\)It is straightforward to verify that the function \( C_J \) needed for estimation is given by

\[
 C_J (\delta, \sigma_0) = (2\pi)^{1/2} \sum_{j=0}^{J} \sum_{k=0}^{J} \delta_j \delta_k \sigma_0^{j+k+1} \mu_{j+k} \text{ where } \mu_{j+k} = E(e^{i+j-k}) \text{ for a standard normal } e. \]

Similarly, \( E(U_0) = 0 \) if and only if \( \zeta_J (\delta, \sigma_0) = \sum_{j=0}^{J} \sum_{k=0}^{J} \delta_j \delta_k \sigma_0^{j+k+1} \mu_{j+k+1} = 0 \), which we imposed on estimation by appropriately specifying \( \delta_1 \). For example, when \( J = 3 \) we get \( C_3 (\delta, \sigma_0) = (2\pi)^{1/2} (15\delta_2^2 \sigma_0^3 + (6\delta_1 \delta_3 + 3\delta_2^2) \sigma_0^5 + (2\delta_2 + \delta_3^2) \sigma_0^7 + \sigma_0) \) and \( \zeta_3 (\delta, \sigma_0) = 2 (\delta_1 \sigma_0 + 3 (\delta_1 \delta_2 + \delta_3) \sigma_0^3 + 15 \delta_2 \delta_3 \sigma_0^5) \). So \( E(U_0) = 0 \) is imposed by setting \( \delta_1 = -(3\delta_3 \sigma_0 + 15\delta_2 \delta_3 \sigma_0^3) / (\sigma_0 + 3\delta_2) \).
Table A3: Non-Normal Unobserved Preference Heterogeneity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2 w squared poly</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>llf=-9706.88</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Std Err</td>
<td>llf=-9561.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_0$</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.017</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\delta_1$</td>
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<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_2$</td>
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<td>1.401</td>
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<td>$\gamma_{10}$</td>
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<td>0.036</td>
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<td>0.017</td>
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<td>$\gamma_{01}$</td>
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<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.563</td>
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<td>1.401</td>
<td>0.062</td>
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<td>-0.225</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>$\gamma_{22}$</td>
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<td>0.097</td>
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<td>0.097</td>
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<td>0.691</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
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<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.034</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Std Err</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Std Err</th>
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<td>std dev</td>
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<td>0.627</td>
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<td>0.380</td>
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<tr>
<td>std dev</td>
<td>ln $\alpha_1$</td>
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<td>0.627</td>
<td>1.336</td>
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<td>0.710</td>
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<tr>
<td>correlation</td>
<td>ln $\alpha_1$, ln $\alpha_2$</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(renter=1)</td>
<td>ln $U_1$, ln $U_1$</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>budget shares</td>
<td>$M, a_k = \alpha_k, P = 1, \tilde{U}_k = 1$</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean, sd)</td>
<td>$M, a_k, P = 1, \tilde{U}_k = 1$</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M, a_k, P, \tilde{U}_k = 1$</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M, a_k, P, \tilde{U}_k$</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-of-Living</td>
<td>$M, a_k = \alpha_k, \tilde{U}_k = 1$</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean, sd)</td>
<td>$M, a_k, \tilde{U}_k = 1$</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M, a_k, \tilde{U}_k$</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>6.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare Loss</td>
<td>Arithmetic Mean</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(est, std err)</td>
<td>Geometric Mean</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>5.84</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmonic Mean</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>6.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, to the extent that the results from these more general specifications differ from
baseline, they all strengthen rather than weaken our economic conclusions. For example, the estimated variation in cost-of-living impacts due to a 50% increase in the price of energy is larger in this model than in the baseline model, and the extent to which increasing inequality aversion increases welfare losses is also somewhat larger.

1.2.5 Heteroskedasticity of $U_0$

While the previous subsection considered possible non normality of $U_0$, this subsection considers potential heteroskedasticity in $U_0$. Heteroskedasticity of the Barten scales $U_1$ and $U_2$ is already modeled by the deterministic components $a_1(z)$ and $a_2(z)$. As noted in the main text, if our Barten scale model of taste variation is valid, then $U_1$ and $U_2$ should pick up a substantial portion of what would otherwise be unexplained variation, including heteroskedasticity, in demand. As a result, if our model is appropriate, then the nonbehavioral error term $U_0$ should be much smaller and more homoskedastic in Model 2 than in Model 1.

Table 2 in the main text showed that $U_0$ is indeed much smaller in Model 2, with an estimated standard deviation $\sigma_0$ falling from 0.666 in Model 1 to 0.469 in Model 2. To measure how much of the heteroskedasticity that would end up in $U_0$ is captured by the random coefficients $\widehat{U}_k$, we consider a maximum likelihood analog to the Breusch-Pagan test. Specifically, we reestimate the models allowing the standard deviation of $U_0$, $\sigma_0$, to depend on normalized prices and demographics, and then examine the significance of these covariates in $\sigma_0$. For this test we replace $\sigma_0$ with a function $\sigma_0(X_1, X_2, Z)$ that is linear in the ten variables comprising, $X_1$, $X_2$, and $Z$. We then examine the estimated size and significance of the function $\sigma_0(X_1, X_2, Z)$ in Models 1 and 2.

In Model 1, the sample value of the Wald test of the joint significance of the coefficients comprising $\sigma_0(X_1, X_2, Z)$ is 327, while in Model 2 the Wald test statistic drops by over 50% to 145. So by this measure more than half of the heteroskedasticity in the residual $U_0$ in Model 1 is captured (and hence explained by) the preference heterogeneity embodied by our random Barten scale components $\widehat{U}_k$. These Wald statistics remain above the critical values of the $\chi^2_{10}$ distribution at conventional levels, so although our model is big improvement over traditional Barten scales in this dimension, there remains some residual systematic heterogeneity that our model does not explain.\footnote{An assumption of the model from Theorem 1 is that $U_0$ is independent of $X$ after conditioning on $Z$. In Model 1, the coefficients of $X_1$, $X_2$ in $\sigma_0(X_1, X_2, Z)$ are small in magnitude but highly statistically significant with \( t \) statistics over 5. In contrast, the coefficients of $X_1$, $X_2$ in $\sigma_0(X_1, X_2, Z)$ are even smaller and much less significant in Model 2, with \( t \) statistics of 1.04 and 2.52, respectively.}

Another way to measure how much heteroskedasticity is explained by random Barten scales is to compare the estimated values of $\sigma_0(X_1, X_2, Z)$ under the two models. In Model 1, the mean and standard deviation of $\widehat{\sigma}_{0i} = \widehat{\sigma}_0(X_{1i}, X_{2i}, Z_i)$ are 0.656 and 0.087, respectively. In Model 2, the mean and standard deviation of $\widehat{\sigma}_{0i}$ are 0.472 and 0.068, respectively. This again shows that random Barten scales explain a substantial portion of both the size and systematic components of otherwise unexplained variability in demand, by making $U_0$ both smaller and more homoskedastic. As in Tables A2 and A3, attempting to generalize our baseline model by modeling remaining heteroskedasticity in $U_0$ results in almost no change in the resulting economic analyses.
1.2.6 Endogeneity of $X_k$

All of our estimates treat normalized prices $X_k$ as exogeneous regressors. Our model has no constant term, and $X_k$ does not enter $Y$ linearly, so endogeneity with respect to the measurement error $U_0$ is difficult to motivate. In contrast, endogeneity of $X_k$ with respect to the unobserved preference heterogeneity parameters $\tilde{U}_1$ and $\tilde{U}_2$ is certainly possible. For example the distribution of $\tilde{U}$ is assumed to be independent of regressors, so the presence of unobserved characteristics that correlate with both $\tilde{U}_k$ and other regressors could induce bias, specifically bias in the estimates of the $a_k$ functions (since the $\tilde{U}_k$ terms are specifically the unobserved components of Barten scales and hence of preference heterogeneity, while the $a_k$ functions are the observed components of Barten scales).

As discussed in the text, Canadian households are a small fraction of the world energy market, and so are unlikely to have much effect on energy prices. However, $\tilde{U}_k$ could be correlated with $X_k$ to the extent that the distribution of Canadian household preferences affects total Canadian household demand, and such demand contributes to differences between local (within Canada) energy prices and world energy prices. Similar arguments may apply to non-energy prices, and measurement error in $M$ could similarly cause correlations between the errors and regressors.

To test for the possibility that budgets $M$ or prices $P_1$ and $P_2$ are endogenous, we try instrumenting these variables with gross annual income by source (for budgets), world oil price (for energy prices) and the US residential Case-Shiller index (for nonenergy prices), all interacted with observed demographics $Z$ and a constant. The first stage for these regressions is very strong, with F statistics in excess of 100 in all 3 cases, so the instruments are not weak. We cannot test for exogeneity of these instruments, since we do not have observed residuals analogous to $\tilde{U}_1$ and $\tilde{U}_2$ with which to construct an overidentification test. However, we note that the use of income to instrument total expenditures $M$ is standard in the consumer demand literature. The world oil price ought to be a valid instrument for energy prices in Canada because Canadian residential demand is such a small component of the world energy market. It is also a relatively strong instrument, especially since we interact it with $Z$ which includes the calendar year, thereby obtaining sufficient variation in the prediction ($R^2$ is about 0.75 in this first stage regression). The US residential price index is likewise to be a good instrument for Canadian non-energy prices because Canadian residential prices are correlated with USA residential prices, but are not a big driver of them, and because local goods and service prices are highly correlated with residential prices (see, e.g., Moretti 2012).

Given the nonlinearities and nonseparable errors in our model, we use control function methods to test for endogeneity. As observed in, e.g., Wooldridge (2011), testing the significance of the coefficients of control function residuals provides a valid test of endogeneity, even when the resulting control function estimator does not satisfy all of the assumptions necessary to completely cure the potential endogeneity problem. This is relevant because endogeneity due to simultaneity of supply and demand does not in general lead to the triangular structures necessary for validity of control function based estimation.
We obtain control function residuals by regressing $\ln M$, $\ln P_1$ and $\ln P_2$ on our instrument vector and on demographic characteristics $Z$. We then include the residuals from these three regressions as control function regressors inside the functions $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$. The sample value of the Wald test statistic for the hypothesis that all six control functions are zero is 713, and the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis is 124, which are both above conventional chi squared statistic critical values. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that no endogeneity is present, however, as with our other robustness checks, we can examine whether including these control function residuals materially affects our estimates, and hence verify whether attempting

<table>
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<th>Parameter</th>
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<th>Model 2 w ctrl fns</th>
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<td>llf=-9644.41</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>$M, \alpha_k, \bar{U}_k$</td>
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<td>(mean, sd)</td>
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</table>

We obtain control function residuals by regressing $\ln M$, $\ln P_1$ and $\ln P_2$ on our instrument vector and on demographic characteristics $Z$. We then include the residuals from these three regressions as control function regressors inside the functions $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$. The sample value of the Wald test statistic for the hypothesis that all six control functions are zero is 713, and the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis is 124, which are both above conventional chi squared statistic critical values. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that no endogeneity is present, however, as with our other robustness checks, we can examine whether including these control function residuals materially affects our estimates, and hence verify whether attempting
to correct for potential endogeneity would be economically relevant. Note, however, that these estimates, which are provided in Table A4 in the same form as Tables A2 and A3, are only consistent if endogeneity takes the specific control function form.

Most of the impact of the control function residuals is due to the log budget residual $v_{\ln M}$. This is consistent with our a priori belief that unobserved preference heterogeneity is unlikely to have much correlation with prices, but might well be correlated with the budgets of households, possibly due to measurement error in $M$. As in our previous robustness checks, the correction for potential endogeneity does not change our economic analyses much. One difference is that the estimated correlation between $\ln \alpha_1$ and $\ln \alpha_2$ is increased, but this is offset by an estimated decrease in the correlation between $\ln \tilde{U}_1$ and $\ln \tilde{U}_2$, leaving the estimated correlation between the Barten scales $\ln U_1$ and $\ln U_2$ little changed.

As with our experiments estimating more complicated error distributions, to the extent that controlling for potential endogeneity differs from baseline, all of the results in this alternative specification strengthen rather than weaken our economic conclusions. For example, the estimated variation in cost-of-living impacts due to a 50% increase in the price of energy is larger when including control function residual than in the baseline model, and the extent to which increasing inequality aversion increases welfare losses is also increased a small amount.
Estimated Distribution of U0: Model 2

Third Order Squared Polynomial times Normal Density
Estimated Distribution of $\ln(U_1), \ln(U_2)$: Model 2
Second Order Squared Polynomial times Bivariate Normal Density
Estimated Distribution of $\ln(U_1), \ln(U_2)$: Model 2
Second Order Squared Polynomial times Bivariate Normal Density