DISPASSIONATE PASSIONS

I want to trace the Hellenistic origins and mediæval career of the idea that there can be emotions that do not have the disagreeable baggage with which ordinary emotions travel – emotions that are neither turbulent nor disruptive, emotions that lack any somatic component, emotions that are the product of reason rather than opposed to it: in a word, *dispassionate* passions of the soul, the ancestor of Spinoza's *amor intellectualis Dei.* The mediæval motivation for this idea of dispassionate passions is not far to seek. Immaterial beings such as God and His angels, as well as postmortem human souls, enjoy bodiless bliss in Heaven as the highest state of which they are capable; the transports of delight experienced there must be independent of the body; they are the final fulfillment of rational nature, not its annulment, and contribute to a stable and settled state of eternal blessedness. Yet while its motivation is clear, the doctrine itself is not. How could passions be dispassionate, emotions unemotional, feelings unfelt?

The fragmentary nature of our sources for early and middle Stoicism permits us to be clear about the main outlines of the doctrine of dispassionate passions, though not about the reasons behind it, despite being one of the aspects of Stoicism heavily criticized in Antiquity (§1). Mediæval philosophers tried to transplant the doctrine of dispassionate passions from its Stoic origins to different philosophical environments: Augustine into Platonism (§2), Aquinas into Aristotelianism (§3).

1. THE STOICS

The Stoic doctrine of dispassionate passions has three constituent parts: (*a*) the account of the passions, πάθη; (*b*) the view that the Sage is passionless, ἀπαθής; (*c*) the further view that the Sage experiences εὐπάθειαι, literally 'goodpassions'. Even before delving into details the paradox is apparent, since (*b*) should entail that (*c*) is impossible, or, if not impossible, then to the extent that the εὐπάθειαι of (*c*) fall under (*a*) they must be drained of their affective content by (*b*), rendering them no more than the passionless passions of the Sage. Yet the Stoics were not averse to couching their theories

* All translations are mine.

in paradoxes. A closer look at (*a*)–(*c*) should tell us whether the 'paradox' of dispassionate passions is real or merely apparent.

Unfortunately, a closer look at (*a*) is not straightforward, for our sources are fragmentary and they do not always clearly agree. Diogenes Lærtius introduces his discussion of the Stoic theory of the passions as follows:[1]

> Turmoil, extending to the rational faculty, arises from falsehoods; from it come many passions and causes of instability. According to Zeno, a passion is an irrational and unnatural motion of the soul, or an excessive impulse… They hold the passions to be judgments, as Chrysippus says.

The broad brushstrokes in this passage link the acceptance or endorsement of falsehoods to mental upheaval, disruptive to the point of affecting rational thought; passions are an effect of such an upheaval, if not the upheaval itself, and in their turn bring about instability – most likely unsteady or unreliable reasoning in the case of human beings, though that is not explicit. The causal connections described here, though their nature is not spelled out, are clear: human passions are produced by accepting falsehoods, and they contribute to psychological disequilibrium.[2] What passions themselves are, however, is unclear, since there is apparent disagreement between Zeno and Chrysippus. In particular, Zeno seems to identify the passions with psychological 'motion' or turmoil, perhaps arising from or supervening upon falsehoods in some way, whereas Chrysippus explicitly declares passions to be judgments. Yet even whether there is disagreement is itself unclear. In his lost treatise Περὶ πάθῶν, Chrysippus is said to have offered an interpretation and analysis of Zeno's remarks[3] as merely "giving a sketch" (ὑπογράφει) of the passions – a sketch presumably capable of being further elaborated by providing a more thorough account, which is what Chrysippus did. For the next several

[1] Diogenes Lærtius, *uit.* 7.110: ἐκ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὴν διαστροφὴν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀφ' ἧς πολλὰ πάθη βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀκαταστασίας αἴτια. ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα… δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίνεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος. Compare the parallel introductory remarks in Cicero, *tusc.* 4.6.11: Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, auersa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. Quidam breuius perturbationem esse appetitum uehementiorem…, slightly amplified at 4.21.47. See also Stobaeus, *ecl.* 2 (88.8–11), and Chrysippus *ap.* Galen, *plac.* 4.2.8.

[2] See Inwood/Donini [1999] 699: "What distinguishes the Stoic theory most clearly is the conviction that passions are causally dependent on intellectual mistakes about values, that in principle one eliminates passions and the underlying psychological instability by correcting one's beliefs."

[3] Galen, *plac.* 4.2.8, 4.2.13, 4.2.19, and 4.7.2; Sorabji [2000] 57–58, Tieleman [2007] 94–102.

centuries, the first and second founders of Stoicism were understood to offer complementary rather than competing views: passions involve on the one hand psychological 'motion' as emphasized by Zeno, and on the other hand a cognitive component as emphasized by Chrysippus. On the Zenonian psychological side, when experiencing passions the soul is said to undergo 'contraction' (συστολή = *contractio*) and 'expansion' (ἔπαρσις = *elatio*), as well as 'swelling', 'stretching', 'shrinking', and a variety of other related states.[4] On the Chrysippean cognitive side, the agent holds that something good or evil is present or anticipated, and further that it is appropriate to react to the circumstances in a particular way – the former usually construed as a belief (δόξα = *opinio*) about something that appears good or evil,[5] the latter a judgement (κρίσις = *iudicium*), either implicit or explicit. Their two approaches are reported together by Pseudo-Andronicus:[6]

> Distress is an irrational contraction, namely the fresh[7] opinion of the presence of something evil about which people think they should undergo a contraction. Fear is an irrational shrinking away, namely avoidance of an anticipated danger. Desire is an irrational stretching forth, namely pursuit of an anticipated good. Delight is an irrational expansion, namely

[4] The Stoics held that the mind (really the ἡγεμονικόν) is material, so this Zenonian terminology may be more than metaphor: changes in mental states should be reflected in changes in material states, however the two may be correlated. Note that these changes are not the somatic changes usually associated with passions: the type of physiological responses characteristic of anger – faster respiration, increase in heartbeat, and so on – are not the 'expansion' or 'swelling' mentioned here, though presumably there is a causal link from the psychological state to the somatic effects. See Chrysippus *ap.* Galen, *plac.* 3.1.25 and 3.5.43–44.

[5] There are complexities here that require delicate handling. The belief might be about a state of affairs or be an an evaluation of a state of affairs; in either case it may involve or bring about assent, which is required for a judgment, though the assent need not take the form of a judgment: for various intricacies see Inwood [1985] 143–155, Frede [1986], Sorabji [2000] Part 1, Brennan [2003], Graver [2007].

[6] Pseudo-Andronicus, Περὶ πάθῶν (SVF 3.391): λύπη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἄλογος συστολή· ἡ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οἴονται δεῖν συστέλλεσθαι. φόβος δὲ ἄλογος ἔκκλισις· ἡ φυγὴ ἀπὸ προσδοκωμένου δεινοῦ. ἐπιθυμία δὲ ἄλογος ὄρεξις· ἡ δίωξις προσδοκωμένου ἀγαθοῦ. ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄλογος ἔπαρσις· ἡ δόξα πρόσφατος ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οἴονται δεῖν ἐπαίρεσθαι. I take the alternatives in this passage, introduced by ἤ, as epexegetical. See also Stobaeus, *ecl.* 2.90.7–18 (perhaps derived from Arius Didymus); Diogenes Lærtius, *uit.* 7.111–114; and especially Cicero, *tusc.* 4.7.14–15 (cfr. 3.11.24–25 and 4.6.11–12), the main source for Augustine, discussed in §2.

[7] 'Fresh' (πρόσφατος = *recens*): "not determined by the clock or the calendar" (Inwood [1985] 148), but a sign of its liveliness to the agent – see Cicero, *tusc.* 3.31.75.

the fresh opinion of the presence of something good about which people think they should undergo an expansion.

Pseudo-Andronicus does not choose these passions at random. For the Stoics these four passions – distress (λύπη = *aegritudo*, fear (φόβος = *metus*), desire (ἐπιθυμία = *libido* or alternatively *appetitus* or *cupiditas*), delight (ἡδονή = *laetitia*) – are the most generic kinds of passions, the categories under which all others may be ranged. They are traditionally presented in a table, based on the cross-cutting distinctions good/evil and present/future, as follows:

	present	future
good	*delight*	*desire*
evil	*distress*	*fear*

Traditional it may be, but the table does not include the psychological state (associated with Zeno) or the judgment of appropriateness (the second cognitive component associated with Chrysippus). A pity, for the most striking feature of the presentation of Pseudo-Andronicus is that these two approaches occur side-by-side without any apparent consciousness of tension: the psychological expansion of delight – think of feeling elated, or buoyant, or even 'expansive' – simply *is* the lively awareness of an apparent good to whose possession such a reaction is thought proper.[8] Mistakenly, of course; the passions are not rational responses to their circumstances,[9] or at any rate their motivating powers are 'excessive' (ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα). These formulae arguably amount to the same thing: passionate impulses exceed the control of reason, and so prompt behaviour that is not reasonable.

The delicate balance among the parts of the Stoic theory of passions was upset by Posidonius, who, it seems, wanted to adopt a platonic division of the soul into rational and irrational parts, ascribing passions to the latter; his

[8] Stoic passions are therefore response-dependent evaluative concepts, much as some contemporary philosophers have argued about the emotions generally; see for example Gibbard [1990] and D'Arms/Jacobson [1993].

[9] The sense in which a passion is 'not rational' (ἄλογος) is disputed, as indeed is whether there is a dispute here. Zeno is said to have held that passion does not conform (ἀπειθης = *non obtemperans*) to reason, presumably keeping the agent from fulfilling the injunction to live in accordance with nature, τῇ φύσει ζῆν (Stobaeus *ecl.* 2.88.9 and Cicero *off.* 1.136). Chrysippus, perhaps by contrast, catalogues the kind of errors that could be made – reasoning badly, making a mistake, overlooking something, and the like (Galen *plac.* 4.2.12, 4.2.24, 4.4.21–23, 5.4.14). Sorabji [2000] 55–61 holds there to be genuine and deep disagreement here. By contrast, Inwood [1985] 158–162 argues that an agent fails to conform to (right) reason precisely by the kinds of epistemic failures listed by Chrysippus.

criticism of the traditional Stoic account is rehashed with relish and at length by Galen, and to a lesser extent by Plutarch, who make use of it to reject Stoicism altogether. Yet while their purposes are clearly polemical, often opposing Zeno to Chrysippus, and their reports untrustworthy, the philosophical points they raise are worth pressing. Is passion a psychological state? Is it cognitive? If so, is it a belief, or a judgment, or something compounded of these? What is the connection between psychological states and cognitive factors? Between either of these and somatic manifestations? How are these elements excessive, at variance with reason, constitutive of turmoil, the product of falsehood? Good questions all, to which the earlier Stoic confidence that the various parts of their theory all fit together might seem philosophically naïve. The later Stoics address these questions, usually in the form of what Zeno and Chrysippus 'really' said, or meant, in their writings, a dialectical strategy that need not countenance any real disagreement or philosophical problem. To the extent there was consensus, later Stoics maintained that Chrysippus explained and elaborated Zeno's doctrines, which, after all, were often formulated orally rather than written down in detailed fashion.[10]

Given the ancient controversy, it might seem presumptuous to try to settle now what wasn't settled then. Yet certain features of the Stoic theory are clear. First, the psychological states described by Zeno and elaborated by others, namely the expansions and contractions of the soul, are the (purely mental) 'feelings' associated with the passions. This fits with ordinary usage: we have sinking feelings, we may be expansive, we feel the bite of conscience. These states are to be sharply distinguished from the somatic manifestations associated with the passions: the queasy stomach and flop sweat associated with stage fright are distinct from the internal feeling of shrinking away from the spotlight. Second, for the Stoics the passions are, or at least essentially involve, cognitive components; they are more than mere feelings. Whether the cause of the passions or part of their definition, beliefs and judgments are central to the Stoic analysis. Hence it is wrong to identify the passions with visceral reactions, be they somatic or purely psychological.[11] Third, all

[10] Galen, *plac.* 4.7.2: τῶν παθῶν ὑπό τε Ζήνωνος εἰρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦ Χρυσίππου γεγραμμένοι.

[11] Such visceral reactions are taken into account by the (perhaps middle) Stoic theory of 'pre-passions' (προπαθειαι) clearly attested by Epictetus *ap.* Aulus Gellius, *noct.* 19.1.14–20 (there attributed to Zeno and Chrysippus as the founders, *conditores*), and by Seneca, *ep.* 113.18 and *de ira* 2.2.1–2.4.2; Cicero identifies them with Zenonian psychological states in the absence of the relevant Chrysippean judgment, *tusc.* 3.34.83: Hoc detracto [*sc.* iudicio], quod totum est uoluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiunculae quaedam

Stoics agree in thinking that passions fail to conform to reason, whatever the explanation for the failure may be. (There may be different causes in different cases.) This is more than the claim that there are norms of propriety for the passions, criteria with which to assess the reasonableness of an emotional response to a given set of circumstances. To put it bluntly, for the Stoics there are *no* circumstances in which passions are rational. The passions are, instead, failures of reason.

This last point leads to another on which all Stoics seem to be united, namely that the only way to avoid the failings of the passions is to extirpate them altogether – the goal of passionlessness, ἀπάθεια.[12] This deliberately constrasts with the strategy of moderating the passions, μετριοπάθεια, endorsed by Platonists and Peripatetics. Seneca, at the start of one of his letters to Lucullus, puts the Stoic case sharply:[13]

> The question is often raised whether it is best to have moderate passions or no passions. We get rid of them; the Peripatetics regulate them. For my part, I do not see how any moderateness of a disease could be wholesome or useful.

A passion is literally a disease (νόσος).[14] This is more than a rhetorical metaphor. The passions are excessive impulses contrary to nature, disorders of the whole human personality (ἡγεμονικόν); the condition they induce is – note the etymology – pathological. If so, Seneca is surely correct to see no 'moderate' amount of a disease to be healthy; health at a minimum demands the absence of disease. Likewise mental health.

The Stoics offer a variety of therapeutic techniques to assist in the quest to attain ἀπάθεια, ranging from slogans and sayings to repeat to oneself (in the

animi relinquentur. The same analysis can be brought into play for non-human animals, who cannot, strictly speaking, have passions – a claim Posidonius strongly objected to: see Galen, *plac.* 5.1.10 and 5.6.37–38. At best, non-human animals are 'pre-emotional', capable of states that are merely analogous to human emotions, much the same way they have only rudimentary language or reasoning abilities.

[12] Diogenes Lærtius, *uit.* 7.117: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον εἶναι.

[13] Seneca, *ep.* 116.1: Utrum satius sit modicos habere affectus an nullos saepe quaesitum est. Nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant. Ego non uideo quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi.

[14] Cicero even proposes *morbus* as a literal translation of πάθος, though in the end he adopts 'disturbance' (*perturbatio*), in which he is later followed by Augustine; *fin.* 3.10.35: Nec uero perturbationes animorum, quae uitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci πάθη appellant? poteram ego uerbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conueniret ad omnia... See also *tusc.* 3.4.7 and 4.5.10.

vein of Epicurus), to behavioural modification, to moral training, to subtle argumentation.[15] Some of the exercises are directed towards strengthening the mind, others to counteracting the passions directly, but the goal of all of the exercises is to become 'passionless'.

Even in Antiquity there was confusion over the meaning of ἀπάθεια and whether it should be counted as a legitimate ideal.[16] It was often (and not merely polemically) understood as a deliberate repression of emotions, or a wooden insensitivity, or an inhuman denial.[17] Yet it is none of these. It is neither repression nor denial, since in each case the agent still has the passions but tries to avoid the fact. Nor is it insensitivity. An agent who becomes insensitive or 'numb' does not experience passions, it is true, but in a way that misses the mark. Passions are *irrational* responses to circumstances; the goal is not to get rid of all responses, which would throw out the baby with the bathwater, but to rid oneself of irrational responses and have instead only *rational* responses to circumstances – which by definition are not passions. Yet the Stoic goal is feasible only if rational responses are possible, so that the agent replaces the passions with the correct responses.

Are there such rational responses?

The Stoic doctrine of εὐπάθειαι (*constantia*) describes how the wise person ought to respond to circumstances that would, among the non-wise, elicit an emotional reaction.[18] The responses of the wise person take three forms, we are told, each of which is εὔλογον rather than ἄλογον, rational rather than

[15] See Nussbaum [1994] Chapters 8–12 (especially Chapter 10), Sorabji [2000] Part 2, and Tieleman [2003] Chapter 4 for a survey of Stoic therapies. Most notorious is Epictetus's advice to say to yourself as you kiss your loved ones that one day they will die, in order to become sufficiently accustomed to the idea that you can bear its coming to pass: *ench.* 3.

[16] Even among Stoics! Panaetius is reported to have rejected "insensibility and passionlessness" (Aulus Gellius, *noct.* 12.5.10: ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπάθεια). The point is directly addressed in Diogenes Lærtius, *uit.* 7.117.

[17] See Irwin [1998]. Misreadings aside, ἀπάθεια was criticized for being unattainable by mere mortals, a claim given support by the Stoic insistence that in this regard the Sage is "godlike" (Θείους, Diogenes Lærtius, *uit.* 7.119) – a theme taken up by Plotinus, *enn.* 6.7.35, and thereafter by Augustine, as described in §2.

[18] I take the εὐπάθειαι to be central to Stoic thought from its origins. For its likely origins with Chrysippus, and scholarly disagreement with that claim, see the admirably succinct survey in Inwood [1985] 305 n. 207. Its centrality is downplayed in Sorabji [2000] 47–51, who calls them "largely an ideal" – true enough, but so is the Stoic Sage, whose centrality and importance are undeniable. For their connection with passionlessness, Inwood [1985] 173 offers the memorable slogan 'απάθεια is εὐπάθεια'.

irrational, being the offspring of virtue:[19]

> [The Stoics] say that there are three εὐπάθειαι: elation, caution, wishing. They declare that the opposite of delight is elation, being a rational expansion; the opposite of fear is caution, being a rational shrinking away. For the wise man will not be afraid in any way, but he will be cautious. They declare that the opposite of desire is wishing, being a rational stretching forth

Each of the three εὐπάθειαι is the counterpart to one of the basic passions, described in terms of its psychological states: elation (χαρά = *gaudium*) is the rational version of delight; caution (εὐλάβεια = *cautio*) the rational version of fear; wishing (βούλησις = *uoluntas*) the rational version of desire. Like the basic passions, they are the most generic forms under which subtypes are ranged, and they too may be presented in a table:

	present	future
good	*elation*	*wishing*
evil	•	*caution*

There is no counterpart to distress because the soul has no rational response to the presence of a genuine evil; the Stoic Sage accepts it as part of Fate and is not depressed by it – there is no rational 'contraction', much less 'expansion' or 'shrinking' or the like, of the soul.[20] The Sage is neither pleased nor displeased at something evil, though of course preferring that it not be so.

The most striking fact about the Stoic εὐπάθειαι is not the absence of a counterpart to distress. It is rather that there is no discussion of an associated cognitive component, in this case inerrant judgment(s), unlike the case of the passions. The reason is not far to seek. To get things right, as the Stoic Sage does, is not a matter of any single judgment or cognitive attitude, but to have a life in which beliefs, judgments, dispositions, actions, *etc.* are all in

[19] Diogenes Lærtius, *uit.* 7.116: εἶναι δὲ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαράν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν. καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δ'εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν. φοβηθήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθήσεσθαι δέ. τῇ δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν, οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν. The same trio are given in Pseudo-Andronicus, Περὶ πάθῶν §6 (SVF 3.432), and Cicero, *tusc.* 4.6.12–14. See the references in Inwood cited in the preceding note for other candidates for εὐπάθειαι. For the link to virtue, see Diogenes Lærtius, *uit.* 7.94.

[20] Rist [1969] 49–50: "It would have been unnecessarily paradoxical, not to say foolish, of the Stoics to argue that any [distress] is *per se* even a preferred state… Nor, obviously, can [distress] be any kind of natural accompaniment of virtuous activity."

accordance with nature: τῇ φύσει ζῆν.[21] An automobile may have a single point of failure, so that it won't run because of a faulty alternator. But to run smoothly, *all* its parts have to be in good working condition and mesh well with the rest. So too with the good life, the life of the Sage, in which the εὐπάθειαι have their proper place as concomitants of virtuous – which is to say rational – action.

We are now in a position to return to the question with which we began this section. Is the Stoic position on dispassionate passions paradoxical? More exactly: Are the Stoic εὐπάθειαι instances of dispassionate passions?

The Stoics deny that they are: εὐπάθειαι differ from passions precisely in not being irrational, which is why their goal can be described as ἀπάθεια. We might be tempted to treat this as merely a verbal point. Surely the elation felt by the Sage is as much an emotion as the delight felt by the Fool; the Fool may make a mistake about whether something is good, but surely his (mistaken) emotion of delight is no different in kind from the Sage's (correct) emotion of elation. The psychological state involved in each is described in the same terms as an 'expansion' of the soul. From the point of view of 'feelings' delight and elation may be indistinguishable. For all the Stoic insistence that passions are irrational, their account of εὐπάθειαι shows that the difference is extrinsic to the emotion. False beliefs do not systematically differ from true beliefs; the same should hold for 'false' emotions (passions) and 'true' emotions (εὐπάθειαι).

This line of argument treats emotions as being largely a matter of the psychological states (the 'feelings') that the agent experiences. There is something to it, but it overstates the case. Emotions, as the Stoics insist, are more than mere feelings; they are bound up with cognition, sensitive to attitudes and beliefs, permeable by reasons and arguments. Likewise, Stoic passions are not merely engendered by or targeted at falsehoods: they are 'excessive', the sort of psychological state that results from rushing to judgment, leaping to conclusions, not taking the time to weigh and balance evidence, and so on. Above all they are hasty, rather than measured, responses to their circumstances. Indeed, delight and elation may differ by no more than this. But that is no small difference. The Fool who does not pause to consider alternatives

[21] A point made well by Seneca, *ep.* 95.57: Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit uoluntas; ab hac enim est actio. Rursus uoluntas non erit recta nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit; ab hoc enim est uoluntas. Habitus porro animi non erit in optimo nisi totius uitae leges perceperit et quid de quoque iudicandum sit exegerit, nisi res ad uerum redegerit. Non contingit tranquillitas nisi immutabile certumque iudicium adeptis: caeteri decidunt subinde et reponuntur et inter missa appetitaque alternis fluctuantur.

may yet leap to the correct conclusion, which he hastily believes to be true; the Sage, who does consider the alternatives, arrives at the same result, and yet has knowledge rather than mere belief once he arrives. Passions are immoderate; εὐπάθειαι are not. The latter are 'dispassionate' precisely in not being passionately held or felt.

For all that, there is something of false advertisement about the Stoic claim that the Sage is passionless. For the Sage does have affective responses to situations, as does the Fool; to mark the difference between them as a matter of being passionate or passionless doesn't quite hit the target. It is a substantive thesis that in order to live rightly the Sage will have to keep ordinary emotional responses at arm's length, and to insist on the 'excessive' character of ordinary emotional responses only goes half the distance: we need an argument that Stoic rationality entails a form of emotional detachment,[22] which seems to fly in the face of the doctrine of 'goodpassions' (εὐπάθειαι). In most situations the Sage will not react as the Fool does. But that is not to say the Sage does not have emotions in a perfectly straightforward sense, only that his values have become systematically different from those of others.

The Stoic position, then, is philosophically suspect. Working through the detailed analyses of the passions, it is not clear that passionlessness is at all incompatible with what we would call emotion. (Above and beyond any disagreement with the Stoic cognitivist approach, that is.) Yet even if the Stoics did not in the end put forward a philosophically adequate account of dispassionate passions, they certainly were taken to have done so, and so bequeathed to philosophical posterity the not entirely compatible ideals of ἀπάθεια and εὐπάθειαι.

2. AUGUSTINE

Augustine discusses the Stoic theory of passions in his *De ciuitate Dei* twice, in Book 9.4–5 and throughout Book 14. He has a clear working knowledge of late Roman Stoicism, derived primarily from Cicero but also from Seneca, Aulus Gellius, and other Latin sources:[23] he sketches the general Stoic account of the passions (*ciu.* 9.4), the four basic passions (14.6), the goal of ἀπάθεια (14.9), and the εὐπάθειαι (14.8). Augustine's knowledge of Stoicism is neither scholarly nor technical, but it is enough to convince him to reject their account of the passions – and as Augustine went, so went the Middle Ages.

[22] See Rist [1978].

[23] See Testard [1958] and Hagendahl [1967] for Augustine's knowledge and use of classical literature.

Augustine begins by endorsing Cicero's claim that the Stoic account of the good differs from the Platonist and Peripatetic accounts merely in their terminology of 'goods' and 'indifferents' and 'preferred' (*ciu.* 9.4).[24] He cites an anecdote about a Stoic reacting badly to dangers at sea to prove that even the Sage experiences passions.[25]

More to the point, Augustine holds that the Stoics are wrong about the passions. Some of their views are objectionable: counting mercy as a passion to be extirpated (9.5), for instance, and the potential encouragement of insensitivity through the ideal of ἀπάθεια (14.9). But his disagreement runs deeper. For one thing, Scripture bids us to feel passions:[26] to love our enemies, to fear God, to be angry at sinners, to be distressed when faced with temptation. Even Jesus wept: *et lacrimatus est Iesus* (*jn.* 11:35). His emotion was not feigned, but a function of his assumption of human nature; as such, Jesus clearly felt emotion (particularly at the Passion), and as simultaneously divine it follows that His experience of the several emotions He felt was altogether fitting and appropriate.[27] These Biblical references clinch the point for Augustine. We might hope for argument.

We get it when Augustine carries his battle into the Stoic camp in *ciu.* 14. First, Augustine radically reduces the four basic Stoic passions to forms of willing (*uoluntas*):[28]

[24] Cicero, *fin.* 3.2.5 *et passim*; see also *tusc.* 4.5.10–11.

[25] Augustine takes the anecdote from Aulus Gellius, *noct.* 19.1, paraphrasing Epictetus; Augustine cites it again in *hept.* 1.30 to prove the same point. But Augustine is mistaken. The original anecdote seems to have concerned not the passions but the 'prepassions' and to have been garbled by Gellius in transmission: the details are untangled in Sorabji [2000] 375–384; see also Byers [2003].

[26] A claim initially made at *ciu.* 9.5 and reiterated with citations at 14.9.

[27] Augustine, *ciu.* 14.9: Quam ob rem etiam ipse Dominus in forma serui agere uitam dignatus humanam, sed nullum habens omnino peccatum adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicauit. Neque enim, in quo uerum erat hominis corpus et uerus hominis animus, falsus erat humanus affectus. – See also Augustine's discussion of Christ's fear of death in *in Ioh. eu.* 60.4–5, and the analysis in O'Daly/Zumkellar [1986] 174A–175A.

[28] Augustine, *ciu.* 14.6: Interest autem qualis sit uoluntas hominis; quia si peruersa est, peruersos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, uerum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam uoluntates sunt. Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi uoluntas in eorum consensione quae uolumus? Et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi uoluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus? Sed cum consentimus appetendo ea quae uolumus, cupiditas; cum autem consentimus fruendo his quae uolumus, laetitia uocatur. Itemque cum dissentimus ab eo quod accidere nolumus, talis uoluntas metus est; cum autem dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus accidit, talis uoluntas

> What matters is what a man's willing is like. For if it is perverse, he is going to have perverse emotions; if on the other hand it is upright, they are going to be not only blameless but even praiseworthy. Willing is in them all – or rather, they are all nothing other than kinds of willing. What is desire and delight but willing with consent the things we will for? What is fear and distress but willing in dissent from the things we will against? Rather, when we consent in pursuing the things we will for, it is called desire; when we consent in enjoying the things we will, it is called delight. And again, when we dissent from what we will against happening, such willing is called fear; when we dissent from what happens to us who will against it, such willing is distress. In every instance, on the part of the things are pursued or avoided, just as a man's willing is attracted or repelled, so too it changes and turns into different affections.

The Stoics – especially Late Roman Stoics – made much of the mind's ability to assent, or to refrain from assenting, to impressions. Augustine wants to turn this thesis against them by arguing that it makes all emotions into forms of (free) assent, or the withholding of it.[29] From this he concludes that "what a man's willing is like" is what matters. To the Stoic condemnation of all passions, Augustine replies that it all depends: "an upright will is thus a good love, and a perverse will an evil love" (14.7: *recta itaque uoluntas est bonus amor et uoluntas peruersa malus amor*).[30] The will's choice of object determines the moral value of an emotion; there is nothing objectionable in emotion *per se*.

Second, what holds for Stoic passions also holds for Stoic 'goodpassions', the εὐπαθειαι. In *ciu.* 14.8 Augustine from Scriptural and classical authority that ordinary people (not Sages) experience elation, caution, and wishing [=willing]. He concludes:[31]

> tristitia est. Et omnino pro uarietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur uel offenditur uoluntas hominis, ita in hos uel illos affectus mutatur et uertitur.

[29] Augustine's thesis here is even more radical than it appears at first glance. He is not merely reducing the four basic passions to distinct types of volition, which would be radical enough; his claim is that each is a form of willing, that is, of *uoluntas* = βούλησις (rendered 'wishing' above), one of the εὐπάθειαι. This is part and parcel of his claim in 14.8 that the latter are not restricted to the wise but common to all, to be taken up shortly.

[30] Augustine further reduces the four basic Stoic passions to forms of love (14.7): Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque fruens laetitia; fugiens quod ei aduersatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia est. Proinde mala sunt ista, si malus amor est; bona, si bonus.

[31] Augustine, *ciu.* 14.8: Proinde uolunt cauent gaudent et boni et mali; atque ut eadem aliis uerbis enuntiemus, cupiunt timent laetantur et boni et mali; sed illi bene,

> Hence good men and evil men will, are cautious, are elated. To put the point another way, good men and evil men desire and fear and delight. But the former do so rightly and the latter wrongly, corresponding to each as the will is upright or perverse.

Even distress may occur in a good way, as when someone becomes distressed over his sins and repents of them.[32] The moral is clear: there is nothing special about the Stoic εὐπάθειαι. Augustine then poses a rhetorical question to put the nail in the Stoic coffin:[33]

> Yet since, when these affections are exhibited where they are appropriate, they are in accordance with right reason, who would then dare to declare that the passions are diseases, or full of vice?

The passions are "appropriate" and "in accordance with right reason" and therefore are not "diseases" – Stoic terminology used against the Stoics. Augustine then rehearses a long list of "appropriate" emotions: fear of God, distress at one's sins, and so on.

Yet despite Augustine's complete rejection of Stoicism, he tries to retain their notion of dispassionate passions. After rehearsing his list of proper emotional responses, he then offers an unexpected observation:[34]

> Well, it has to be admitted that the affections we have, even when upright and in accordance with God, belong to *this* life, not to the one we hope for in the future, and that we often give in to them unwillingly.

This admission is meant to call to mind Augustine's earlier discussion of the issue:[35]

isti male, sicut hominibus seu recta seu peruersa uoluntas est.

[32] In *ciu.* 14.8 Augustine cites the story of Alcibiades from Cicero, *tusc.* 3.32.77. See Wetzel [1992] 109–111 for a sense of just how radical Augustine's claim is.

[33] Augustine, *ciu.* 14.9: Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones, quando ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc morbos seu uitiosas passiones audeat dicere?

[34] Augustine, *ciu.* 14.9: Proinde, quod fatendum est, etiam cum rectas et secundum Deum habemus has affectiones, huius uitae sunt, non illius, quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inuiti cedimus.

[35] Augustine, *ciu.* 9.5: Sed adhuc merito quaeri potest, utrum ad uitae praesentis pertineat infirmitatem etiam in quibusque bonis officiis huiusce modi perpeti affectus, sancti uero angeli et sine ira puniant, quos accipiunt aeterna Dei lege puniendos, et miseris sine miseriae compassione subueniant, et periclitantibus eis, quos diligunt, sine timore opitulentur; et tamen istarum nomina passionum consuetudine locutionis humanae etiam in eos usurpentur propter quandam operum similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem, sicut ipse Deus secundum scripturas irascitur, nec tamen ulla passione turbatur. Hoc enim uerbum uindictae usurpauit effectus, non illius turbulentus affectus. – Augustine makes much the same point in *en. Ps.* 2.4 and *ciu.* 15.25.

> We can still properly raise the question whether affections of this sort, felt even while doing good works, belong to the weakness characteristic of our present life. Well, the holy angels should punish without anger those whom they receive to be punished by God's eternal law; they should minister to the sorrowful without any shared feeling of sorrow; they should aid without fear those whom they love when the latter are in danger. Yet the names of those passions are taken over from ordinary human usage for them as well, not due to the weakness of the passions, but due to a certain analogy in the deeds. Likewise, God Himself is angered, according to Scripture, yet He is not disturbed by any passion; this word is taken over from the effects of His vengeance, not His turbulent affections.

So much for the evidence from ordinary usage Augustine appealed to earlier, we might say, but his point could hardly be more clear: God and His angels act dispassionately, unmoved by any emotions; even morally appropriate emotions have no place in Heaven.[36] This is the Stoic ideal of passionlessness reborn with a vengeance.[37]

Augustine recognizes this explicitly: "Accordingly, if ἀπάθεια is understood... as a life without the affections that arise contrary to reason and upset the mind, it is clearly good and highly desireable, but it does not belong to this life."[38] It seems that heavenly bliss is Stoic passionlessness, in which we are free from all emotions – even from morally praiseworthy emotions. This gets half the equation, the blessed life being dispassionate, but it seems to recommend mere insensitivity (to which we attribute emotional states on analogy with our own).

However, Augustine leaves himself a loophole. Notice that he declares ἀπάθεια worthwhile if it frees the mind not from all emotions, but from those that are "contrary to reason and upset the mind." Similarly, the emotions he rules out of Heaven are the sorts of emotions we experience in this life. But there are other 'passions' that are unlike those we experience in this life,

[36] The Afterlife is not symmetric: sinners and devils feel passions deeply in Hell (*ciu.* 14.9).

[37] In his early writings, Augustine talks about ἀπάθεια using the Latin term *tranquilitas*, as for instance *ord.* 2.6.8 and 3.8.25, as well as *acad.* 1.4.11. Colish [1985] 221–225 maintains that Augustine abandoned the ideal of passionlessness after this early period. I disagree, as will be evident shortly.

[38] Augustine, *ciu.* 14.9: Quocirca illa, quae ἀπάθεια Graece dicitur (quae si Latine posset *impassibilitas* diceretur), si ita intellegenda est (in animo quippe, non in corpore accipitur), ut sine his affectionibus uiuatur, quae contra rationem accidunt mentemque perturbant, bona plane et maxime optanda est, sed nec ipsa huius est uitae. – In *serm.* 348.3 Augustine declares that only saints can reach ἀπάθεια, and not in this life.

reserved for the blessed; they are Augustine's own εὐπάθειαι. He describes it thus:[39]

> Therefore, it can be said, not absurdly, that complete blessedness will be without any pang of fear and without any grief; but who would claim that there will not be love and elation there, except someone wholly shut away from truth?

The difference between blessed love and elation on the one hand, and ordinary love and elation (which Augustine has said is open to ordinary mortals), seems to be in part a difference in their objects:[40]

> For where there is the unchangeable love of the good that has been obtained, surely the fear of an evil to be avoided is carefree (if it can be so called). By 'clean fear'[41] is signified the will by which it shall be necessary that we will against sinning: not by anxiety over weakness, lest perhaps we sin, but to avoid sin by the tranquillity of love... Furthermore, a blessed and eternal [life] will have love and elation that are not only upright but also assured, and no fear or distress.

The good that has been reached in Heaven is, of course, God; love for God, Who is eternal and unchangeable, is itself thereby eternal and unchangeable – a constant theme in Augustine's writings. In Heaven there is no fear, strictly speaking; it would have to be 'carefree' and 'clean', involving no anxiousness. In short, it would not be fear at all. Instead, it would be an attitude based on 'tranquillity', Augustine's earlier preferred rendering of ἀπάθεια. The ordinary passions of love and elation are transformed by their eternal certainty, and take the well-deserved place of temporal cares and worries, including beneficial emotions such as the fear of the Lord.

For Augustine, a final question remains. Are the ordinary passions natural to human beings? Or as he puts it, did Adam and Eve, in their prelapsarian condition, experience delight, distress, fear, and desire? Augustine explores this question at tedious length in *ciu.* 14.10–26, but his results can be summarized briefly. Fear and distress are *not* part of sinless human nature, which

[39] Augustine, *ciu.* 14.9: Potest ergo non absurde dici perfectam beatitudinem sine stimulo timoris et sine ulla tristitia futuram; non ibi autem futurum amorem gaudiumque quis dixerit, nisi omni modo a ueritate seclusus?

[40] *Ibidem.*: Ubi enim boni adepti amor inmutabilis est, profecto, si dici potest, mali cauendi timor securus est. Timoris quippe casti nomine ea uoluntas significata est, qua nos necesse erit nolle peccare, et non sollicitudine infirmitatis, ne forte peccemus, sed tranquillitate caritatis cauere peccatum... Beata uero eademque aeterna amorem habebit et gaudium non solum rectum, uerum etiam certum; timorem autem ac dolorem nullum.

[41] A reference to *ps.* 18:10, where Augustine has *castus* for the Vulgate's *sanctus.*

is presumably how they can be absent from us in Heaven (14.10); it is with Original Sin that humans became "disturbed by conflicting and fluctuating affections" (14.12), and in particular by the two uncontrollable emotions of anger and lust (14.19),[42] which operate largely independent of our will. In our prelapsarian state even these were under conscious control, so that sexual arousal, for instance, did not involve strong feelings, any more than farmers seeding their crops would (14.23). Blessedness will consist in a restoration of our sinless state and thus freedom from the unruly emotions to which we are now subject.

Take stock. Augustine rejects the Stoic account of the passions, but he retains their ideal of a state in which there are only dispassionate passions. But are there? Augustine maintains that (*a*) in Heaven there are no disorderly passions; (*b*) in Heaven there are emotional states unattainable in this life; (*c*) elation and love as found in Heaven are qualitatively different from elation and love in this life, due to the assured eternality of their object. From (*a*) we may infer that heavenly elation and heavenly love are not tumultuous, and from (*c*) that the assured eternality of their object makes them settled and tranquil rather than tumultuous, as they are in this life. This, too, is authentically Augustinian: throughout his works he aligns emotional turmoil with the lack of a constant and reliable object. When in his youth an unnamed close friend died unexpectedly, Augustine describes how upset he was and concludes that the problem was in loving mortal, and hence transitory, things (*conf.* 4.4.7–4.12.19). The shock of loss, the anxiety over keeping possession of a good that can be lost against one's will, the successive attachments to different objects – all these make up the tumultuousness of ordinary emotional life. Augustine insists that the presence of an assured eternal loving relationship would in fact transform the emotions into something that is calm and settled, or, in a word, dispassionate; he is arguably correct.

We might of course reject Augustine's thesis that the only cure for desire is something eternal. If we do reject it, the possibility of mundane blessedness, or of emotional turmoil even in Heaven, become live possibilities. Yet even if we accept his thesis, it is unclear how 'dispassionate' heavenly love and elation are. For Augustine wants them to do the job of explicating the reward of the Beatific Vision, to justify suffering in this life, and to make Heaven a plausible ethical ideal. He can't easily do that if the saints are never more than quietly pleased about their lot in the afterlife.

[42] Augustine takes these two passions, anger (*ira*) and lust (*libido* or *concupiscentia*) to be paradigmatic of two parts of the soul distinct from and often opposed to reason, in good Platonic fashion (*ciu.* 14.9).

Assessing the degree to which Augustine is successful in forging a theory of dispassionate passions isn't easy, since he does not usually give precise accounts or technical details. Whether we find it philosophically adequate or not – I for one would like a lot more detail first – Augustine was taken to be authoritative on these points in the Middle Ages. No need to engage the Stoic arguments; Augustine has disposed of them. And it became a part of Christian dogma that human nature, prior to Original Sin, is free of desire and fear; that in Heaven there are dispassionate passions, which, even more paradoxically than anything the Stoics came up with, are passionately felt there; that human emotions have to be situated between love and will. Such was Augustine's legacy.

3. THOMAS AQUINAS

The Augustinian view of dispassionate passions is part of the philosophical/theological inheritance of the Middle Ages. As such, it is assumed more often than argued for, and generally treated as one of the many background truths that helped define the mediæval intellectual landscape. But that landscape underwent a seismic shift with the recovery and gradual assimilation of Aristotle; old wine had to be poured into new bottles, including the Augustinian heritage. Thomas Aquinas is one of the few who directly address dispassionate passions, trying to fit them into his adopted Aristotelian framework.

Begin with Aquinas's general account of the passions. Having argued that there are passions in the soul, Aquinas turns in *sum. theol.* $1^a2^{æ}$ 22.2 to the question whether they are appetitive or cognitive. Citing Augustine (*ciu.* 9.4) as precedent, Aquinas argues that the passions can only motivate action – as they unquestionably do – if representations of their objects occur in a context in which they move the agent (as in the appetite) rather than one in which such representations are merely assessed for their informational content (as in cognition). Hence the passions belong to the appetitive part of the soul.

Given the division between parts of the soul, Aquinas's conclusion is foregone. But in the course of replying to one of the initial objections raised at the beginning of his discussion, he offers a radical departure from Augustine and the Stoics. There are two ways in which bodily organs used by the soul may undergo change (*sum. theol.* 1^a 78.3): immaterially, when it receives the representation (*intentio*) of the object in the organ, and materially, when the organ itself undergoes a physical change. In visual perception the immaterial reception of the representation is essential, but any change in the eye is merely incidental (the eye does not itself become coloured). But things are

different with the passions:[43]

> But the actualization of the sensitive appetite is essentially an instance of the second sort of change. Accordingly, in the definition of the movements of the appetitive part, some natural change in an organ is materially given. Anger, for example is said to be the boiling of blood around the heart.

For Aquinas, the somatic manifestations of a passion are an essential part of the passion. Or, to put the point another way, only an embodied person can have emotions. This contrasts sharply with Augustine, who was careful to insist in his discussion of the passions that he was concerned with them primarily as mental events.[44] The Stoics were committed to thinking that all psychological events have material explanations in the end, but they are clear that the Zenonian psychological states of expansion, contraction, and so on, are not essentially somatic but rather mental. Aquinas breaks with tradition in holding that both immaterial and material changes must be essential to the passions.

Aquinas begs the question, though. His claims are directed to the sensitive appetite, but he has at this point only argued that the passions belong to the appetitive part of the soul; whether they belong to intellective or sensitive appetite has not yet been settled, and it is in fact the next question he takes up (*sum. theol.* $1^a2^{æ}$ 22.3). Passions have a somatic component, but this could be merely a causal effect of an intellective appetite; Aquinas owes us an argument. We do not get one. If anything, he makes matters worse by relying on his question-begging reply to argue that the passions belong to the sensitive appetite:[45]

> As we have remarked, a passion is strictly found where there is a physi-

[43] Aquinas, *sum. theol.* $1^a2^{æ}$ 22.2 *ad* 3: Sed ad actum appetitus sensitiui per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio: unde in definitione motuum appetitiuae partis materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutation organi: sicut dicitur, quod ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor [*De an.* 1.1 403^b1].

[44] The burden of *ciu.* 14.5 is to establish that the Platonists are mistaken in thinking that emotions are due solely to the soul's entanglement with the body; part of Augustine's argument is that the four basic types of passion are not intrinsically connected to the body, and can be experienced as purely mental phenomena.

[45] Aquinas, *sum. theol.* $1^a2^{æ}$ 22.3: Dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie inuenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem inuenitur in actibus appetitus sensitiui; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiua, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem appetitus intellectiui non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est uirtus alicuius organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie inuenitur in actu appetitus sensitiui quam intellectiui.

> ological change. This is found in actualizations of the sensitive appetite: it is not only immaterial, as it is in the case of sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Yet in actualizations of the intellective appetite a physiological change is not required, since this kind of appetite is not the faculty associated with an organ. Accordingly, it is clear that the passions are more strictly found in the actualization of the sensitive, rather than the intellective, appetite.

Why are the passions not phenomena of intellective appetite, that is, of the will? Aquinas's reply boils down to claim that the passions necessarily involve somatic changes. That is to travel in a small circle indeed; no wonder his reasoning was challenged in short order.[46]

Question-begging or not, Aquinas does not hesitate to draw the consequences. If the passions are restricted to the sensitive appetite, then they cannot occur in anything lacking a sensitive appetite, including God, angels, and discorporate human souls. Citing Augustine's views about the 'analogous' attribution of emotions to such incorporeal beings (*ciu.* 9.5), Aquinas declares that "when love or joy or the like are attributed to God or angels, or even to human with respect to the intellective appetite, they signify a simple act of the will with similar effects but free of passion."[47] It seems clear that Aquinas cannot follow Augustine's strategy of finding a pure delight that is qualitatively transformed in Heaven by dint of being directed to an eternal object. There are no grounds in Aquinas for any kind of delight, or other passion, in a bodiless state no matter the circumstances. Yet he is as committed as Augustine – in no small measure *because* of Augustine – to heavenly happiness and God's love for all of creation. These must be dispassionate; the question is how they can be 'passionate' at all. The only clue he offers is a cryptic reference to a "simple act of the will." Fortunately, he returns to the issue in his *Summa contra gentiles*.

[46] For example, when Duns Scotus takes up in his *ord.* 3 d. 33 q. 1 the question whether moral virtues have their seat in the will, he recites Aquinas's argument that they do not, because they regulate the passsions which are restricted to the sensitive appetite (n. 13), and replies that there are passions in the will strictly speaking (nn. 33–36) – citing Augustine's reduction of the four basic passions to the will in *ciu.* 14.5 as support. There is a parallel discussion in Scotus's *Reportatio*, in which Scotus declares that the will is prone to "enjoy along" (*condelectandum*) with the sensitive appetite.

[47] Aquinas, *sum. theol.* $1^a2^{æ}$ 22.3 *ad* 3: Amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo uel angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectiuum, significant simplicem actum uoluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione. – The same hint is dropped in *sum. theol.* $1^a2^{æ}$ 31.4, where Aquinas describes pleasure in the intellective appetite as "a simple act of will."

In *c. gent.* 89, Aquinas asks whether there are affective passions (*passiones affectuum*) in God. He argues that there cannot be: passions only exist in the sensitive appetite, which God lacks; passions are necessarily accompanied by physiological changes, whereas God has no body; passions are an index of potency, but God is pure actuality. But now Aquinas adds a wrinkle. Some passions must be absent from God not only because of the kind of thing they are, namely physiological, but because their objects are unsuitable: distress, for example, by its very nature cannot be present in God, since it is directed at an evil that one possesses – but there is no evil in God.[48] Likewise hope (*spes*: the eventual transformation of Stoic βούλησις) is inappropriate for God, since there is no good that He lacks. Similarly for desire, fear, and anger. But the Augustinian εὐπάθειαι, elation and love, are not ruled out by their objects or the relation in which one stands to their objects.

Small consolation, one might think, since elation and love are nevertheless ruled out because of the kind of thing they are, namely passions. Yet Aquinas argues that God nevertheless does have elation (*c. gent.* 90) and love (*c. gent.* 91), at least in some sense, expanding on his earlier cryptic reference to a "simple act of the will":[49]

> Now the operations of the appetite are classified into kinds according to their objects. Hence in the intellective appetite, the will, we find operations that are similar in respect of their kind to the operations of the sensitive appetite; but they differ in that they are passions in the sensitive appetite, due to its connection with a bodily organ, whereas in the intellective appetite they are simple operations. For just as someone avoids a future evil through the passion of fear, which is in the sensitive appetite, so too the intellective appetite does the same thing but without passion.

These "simple operations" of the will are, I submit, Aquinas's dispassionate passions. They cannot be genuine passions, as Aquinas is careful to note. They are analogous to passions, though, where the analogy is a matter of

[48] Aquinas, *c. gent.* 89: Quaedam autem passiones remouentura Deo non solum ratione sui generis, sed etiam ratione speciei. Omnis enim passio ex obiecto speciem recipit. Cuius igitur obiectum omnino est Deo incompetens, talis passio a Deo remouetur etiam secumdum rationem propriae speciei.

[49] Aquinas, *c. gent.* 90: Sed operationes appetitus speciem ex obiectis sortiuntur. Inueniuntur igitur in appetitu intellectiuo, qui est uoluntas, similes operationes secundum rationem speciei operationibus appetitus sensitiui, in hoc differentes quod in appetitu sensitiuo sunt passiones, propter coniuncionem eius ad organum corporale, in intellectiuo autem sunt operationes simplices: sicut enim per passionem timoris, quae est in appetitu sensitiuo, refugit quis malum futurum, ita sine passione intellectiuus appetitus idem operatur. – Kretzmann [1997] 235–236 has an insightful discussion of this passage, and of 'dispassionate passions' generally.

having the same object as the corresponding passion, and responding in the same fashion, though at the level of volition; they are "simple" since they do not involve any physiological changes. Take Aquinas's example: we can feel fear (passion) at the sight of a lion, say, and run in the opposite direction as fast as possible; we could also intellectually recognize the danger that a lion poses and choose to avoid the danger by removing oneself from physical proximity to the lion, also as fast as possible, without necessarily having any feelings at all. The latter is a dispassionate reaction, one a well-programmed android might have. We can call it a 'pseudopassion' that occurs at the level of the will. Furthermore, what holds for God holds for the bodiless generally, and presumably is open to us even in our embodied state: there can be parallel acts of the appetite at the sensitive and intellective levels, resulting in a passion and a pseudopassion respectively. They will have motivational force, as do the passions, and so is capable of moving the subject to act, whether there is any emotional 'feeling' associated with it or not.

Philosophical doubts raised about the accounts of dispassionate passions offered by the Stoics and Augustine had to do with whether the approved emotions, the Stoic or Augustinian εὐπάθειαι, were properly dispassionate. For Aquinas the difficulty is rather in seeing how the pseudopassions are at all passions, rather than volitional directives to the same ends to which the passions move us. Aquinas tries to make good on this, I think, in his particular accounts of God's elation and love. Consider the former. Elation, Aquinas declares, is a matter of "the will's resting in its object" (*c. gent.* 90: *quaedam quietatio uoluntatis in suo uolito*). There is an appropriate intellective attitude to have toward a good in one's possession; it is not necessarily an occurrent feeling, but more like the satisfaction one might take in a job well done. It is harder to map out a volitional equivalent to love. We might see it as an extension of the intellective attitude of benevolence, that is, of wishing another well for his or her own sake; more difficult is to understand the unifying and binding aspects of love on a pure volitional level (*c. gent.* 91).[50] In any case, Aquinas recognizes the difficulties, and offers a sense in which the will's pseudopassions also provide their subject with motivational force, though of a different character and order from that provided by the passions – namely to motivate dispassionately. Such is Aquinas's attempt to transplant the doctrine of dispassionate passions into the soil of scholastic aristotelian philosophy.

[50] See Kretzmann [1997] 238–250 for a detailed analysis of Aquinas's account of God's love.

CONCLUSION

We have now seen what two mediæval philosophers have done with the paradoxical notion of 'dispassionate passions' inherited from the Stoics. In each case the results are mixed, as indeed they are in the case of the Stoics themselves; none of the three accounts examined here is philosophically satisfying. That may be no more than the best a paradoxical doctrine can hope for. Once the doctrine passed into the framework of Christian thought, of course, it was part of the intellectual furniture of all the learned, even without a fully adequate philosophical justification – and so it became a part of the culture. How it passed from its unlicensed ubiquity in the Middle Ages into early modern philosophy, if indeed that is the route the idea traveled on its way to Spinoza and others, is history yet to be explored on another occasion.

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