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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF THE HUMANITIES

humanitas

About the Institute

The Institute for the Humanities at Simon Fraser University, now almost twenty years in existence, initiates, supports and promotes programs devoted to the exploration and dissemination of knowledge about the traditional and modern approaches to the study of the humanities.

The Institute sponsors a wide variety of community-based activities, along with its university-based academic programs.

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Once again I am grateful for the opportunity to reach out to you, the readers of this *Bulletin*—in the University, the city and beyond. In the *Bulletin* you will once again find evidence of our continued efforts to study and act on the fourfold mandate of the Institute: to offer programs and projects under the headings of Violence and its Alternatives, Human Rights and Democratic Development, the Humanities and Culture, and Community Education. Together they comprise a stretching combination of concerns held together by a "public-sphere and public-service critical model," which is how I described our self-understanding in last year's *Bulletin.*

Two gleanings from the newspapers (remember them?) give pointed urgency to what the Institute attempts to do.

First gleaning. In a recent *Globe and Mail* article ("Curious George and the postliterate" by Ray Conlogue: 21 November 2002, R3) the author describes a recent conference at York University in Toronto at which "Curious" George Steiner, Susan Sontag, Camille Paglia and Jean Baudrillard were all speakers (think of it—you don't have to want to have been there, or even to like any or all of the speakers named, to recognize the voltage of such a conference). Their common position, according to Conlogue, was one that "believes that the catastrophic forgetfulness that has overtaken the West since the Second World War is a sign that the print culture that sustained us for six centuries is actually dying," that although many can read computer manuals, very few will "have either the wish or the will to read *The Iliad*"—which Steiner, at the age of eight, read with his father in the original Greek.

This position was supported by an interview with Steiner in which, among other predictions, he posits the death of the value of the transcendent as a result of the longterm effects of modernity, particularly technology (and see, in relation to this point, the article by Richard Lee from our 2002 Joanne Brown Symposium on Violence on the theme of technology and violence). And, of course, behind the six centuries of print culture to which the article refers, stand centuries of writing on stone, metals, papyrus, parchments and vellum, which stand under even more serious threat than print.

Second gleaning. A surprisingly supportive editorial in *The Vancouver Sun* (27 November 2002, A22) on the subject of SFU's new approach to the undergraduate curriculum which emphasizes writing, mathematics and the importance of studies outside the students' areas of specialty. In what the editorial calls a "sage" decision, it describes how the new program "will focus on written communications and on critical thinking and problem solving—crucial skills for students in any field"—yes, and skills long and regularly emphasized by the Humanities Department to which we belong. The editorial goes on to affirm the connection between these skills, the development of intellect and imagination, and the participation of free and informed citizens in the public sphere.

Two recent comments, then, among hundreds or thousands which might be cited: the first, a virtual death knell for the humanities in so far as they are communicated through print media; the second, an affirmation of support for a new curriculum incarnating the values which the Humanities Department and the Institute attempt to study and act upon, particularly our concern for citizenship. "On such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures."[1]

To gear ourselves anew for effective commitment to these ventures, we have worked this year at renewing both the infrastructure of the Institute and our common vision for its future. The steering committee has been enlarged; separate meetings have been held with our community associates and our faculty associates; and, on December 2, a meeting was held with Kathleen Woodward, PhD, Director of the Simpson Centre for the Humanities at the University of Washington in Seattle and former international co-ordinator of the Consortium of Humanities Centres and Institutes (CHCI) as our resource person.

Kathleen's contribution was visionary and catalytic for the 20 of us who spent the day with her. Both from her international experience as well as from her own experience as a centre director she gave us many stretching perspectives. Out of the day have come ideas for new beginnings in the areas of funding, intra-university profile, citizenship concerns, and approaches to community education. We came away from the day with a renewed sense of what our possibilities are as a small, modestly-funded institute with a great track record (it's our 20th anniversary next year) and a future limited only by our imaginations. I record here our warm thanks to Kathleen Woodward for facilitating an occasion of real stimulation and forward thinking.

Are these small efforts worthwhile? I believe they are, and I am trusting that the readership of this *Bulletin* would agree. This being so, we welcome your support in any form it may take: correspondence and conversation, enquiries about our programs, participation in our events and financial support of the Institute itself. In this last regard, we encourage you to contact Gail McKechnie, Director of Advancement Services, Simon Fraser University, at telephone 604-291-5315 or email gail_mckechnie@sfu.ca to signal your support.

Once again I conclude with greetings to the many of you with whom we have worked over this past year and with whom we hope to work again. We welcome as always your sharing in the ongoing offerings of an Institute with a distinguished past and a future, as I said last year, both engaging and engaged.

Donald Grayston, PhD
Director, Institute for the Humanities

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[1] Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar,* IV.iii.222–24

Violence and its Alternatives

The 2003 Joanne Brown Seminar on Violence and its Alternatives

—Stephen Duguid

Last October the Institute hosted the third in its series of seminars on Violence and its Alternatives, the theme this year being 'Technologies of Violence'. Funded by a generous grant from Joanne Brown, these seminars are held on Bowen Island at the Lodge at the Old Dorm, a comfortable Bed and Breakfast managed by Dan Parkin. Attendance is limited to sixteen participants and the seminar takes place over two days. This year's seminar featured addresses by Richard Lee from the University of Toronto Department of Anthropology, Robert Menzies from SFU's School of Criminology, and Joy Parr from the Department of Humanities at SFU. The other seminar participants were a mixed group of SFU faculty and people from the wider community, including a number of Institute associates.

This year's theme had its origins in my own ongoing preoccupation with the increasing popularity of actuarial risk-prediction instruments in various social policy areas. In my introduction to the seminar I referred to the easy toleration of 'false positives' by the practitioners of risk assessment, the acceptance of pre-emptive intervention in social policy and even international relations, and the uncritical acceptance of technologies of surveillance. Sensitive to the need not to diminish the impact of the word 'violence', it was proposed to the seminar that these bureaucratic, political and academic 'technologies' were in many ways as violent in their impact as physical assaults.

Our discussion of this theme over the two days was organized around the three papers being presented. Richard Lee started us off with his reflections on a lifetime spent studying hunter-gatherer cultures. His paper, "Hobbes, Rousseau and the Ju|'hoansi: Reflections on Violence in the Longue Durée" (reprinted below) provided the perspective we needed in order to explore these modern responses to violence. Lee ended up on the Rousseauean path, arguing for an innate sense of justice in humans and, at the same time, acknowledging that human cultures must include room for and create appropriate responses to the spontaneous violence that is also part of human nature. Larry Green, one of the seminar participants, observed that we may have come full circle here, with our earlier desire to make justice abstract and impersonal as a means of breaking the cycle of revenge now being challenged by the demand to add a 'personal' dimension to justice not unlike the practices cited by Richard Lee.

Robert Menzies's paper "Unfit Citizens and the B.C. Royal Commission on Mental Hygiene, 1925–28"

described the practice of trying to build "prophylactic walls around a degenerate gene pool… the screening of incomplete rationalities and… the sterilization of the feeble-minded." In discussing these modern methods of coercion (what Michael Kenny in his response called "actuarial genomics"), Menzies reminded us of the "extraordinary capacity of people to locate a praxis of resistance" to such coercion, a resistance that he said came through clearly in the files of the patients he was researching. Here, technologies of control were clearly seen as technologies of violence and the paper pointed out in singular fashion the dangers involved if the state becomes an administrator of a new kind of actuarial law.

Joy Parr's work-in-progress "Knowing by Taste and by Test, Distributing Doubts about Water in Walkerton, 2000", examined the violence that occurs with the breakdown of a technology—in this case the means by which we ensure the delivery of safe water. Here, the focus of our discussions was on the tensions between scientific knowledge and local knowledge, the importance of the 'social realm' that surrounds any technology and the social organizations through which that technology is deployed. It was noted that local knowledge is multi-functioned, existing not only to insure clean and safe water but also to preserve the community. It thus possesses many functions, only one of which is to insure clean water. It is not specialized. Science, on the other hand, separates and specializes.

Throughout the weekend, the discussion kept returning to the ideas set forth in Richard Lee's opening talk, the substance of which we are presenting here.

Stephen Duguid is the Chair of the Humanities Department at SFU and a member of the Institute's steering committee.

Photo by Joy Parr

Participants at the 2002 Joanne Brown Seminar on Violence and its Alternatives on Bowen Island, British Columbia.

Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Ju|'hoansi: Reflections on Violence in the Longue Durée

—Richard B. Lee,
   University of Toronto

Is violence the primordial condition of humankind? Or has 'civilization' raised levels of violence to unprecedented heights? At the 2002 Joanne Brown Seminar on Violence and its Alternatives, the group explored violence from multiple perspectives. I considered the role of the impact of the state on levels of violence by comparing the forms of violence in state and stateless societies. These reflections built out from my long-term fieldwork with the Ju|'hoansi, former hunter-gatherers of Botswana and Namibia. Evidence from the Ju|'hoansi (formerly known as the !Kung San or Bushmen) and from other hunting and gathering peoples is significant because, collectively, they represent the longest-lived, sustainable human adaptation, a way of life in which human culture, society, and consciousness—and hence, human nature—evolved.

Evolutionary arguments are fraught with pitfalls, and one must proceed with extreme caution. Yet with the appropriate caveats, arguments from hunter-gatherers can offer an immensely valuable glimpse into a way of life as human as any other, but without the complications brought about by hierarchical organization, class inequalities, ecological crisis, and advanced technologies of social and thought control.

Arguably the greatest philosophical battle of the 17th and 18th centuries was the 'state of nature' debate; among its many skirmishes, it pitted the hard-headed materialism of Thomas Hobbes against the soul-searching humanism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For Hobbes, the nightmare vision of life in the state of nature as the "war of all against all" could only be avoided by the surrender of individual sovereignty to the

Photo by Stephen Duguid

Richard B. Lee, University of Toronto

> On the key question of violence, the Ju|'hoansi have presesented contradictory images. Considered primitive pacifists by some—one book about them was entitled *The Harmless People*—to others, particularly German colonial writers, they appeared as warlike as depictions of the Lakota of Sitting Bull. They fought amongst themselves when they weren't turning their formidable military skills to keeping at bay invaders both black and white.

Leviathan, a state in which an absolute monarch enjoyed a monopoly of power. Evil lay in the faulty human material, which left to its own devices, could only come to ruin.

For Rousseau, it was the Leviathan itself that was the source of evil. The state was the problem, not the solution. Left to their own devices humans could live lives of dignity and fulfillment. That "man was born free but everywhere lives

in chains" was his profound reflection on the corruption and bankruptcy of France's *ancien régime,* a regime whose demise was hastened by Rousseau's writings.

Three centuries on, the debate shows few signs of being resolved. Reflections on the possibility of good government and the perfectibility of humanity (or lack thereof) continue to animate social and political philosophy. What has changed are the terms of engagement. Formerly, arguments pro and con were based on philosophical starting points originating in the great black box of human nature. Almost any position— innate greed, innate aggression, innate altruism—could be defended by reference to some putative characteristic projected on the behavior, biology, or psyche of Homo Sapiens.

Modern social and cultural anthropology provides at least a partial corrective to untrammeled speculation. Learned disputation has been enriched by the entry of empirical evidence, not from the lab or the dissecting table but from the field, documenting the ways that human beings actually lived. Now classic ethnographies of hunters and gatherers from a variety of settings in the Arctic, Africa, Australia, Amazonia, and elsewhere have provided an important check against what used to be called brick-making without straw.

Of the hundreds of ethnographic case-studies, the African Ju|'hoansi are among the best documented. Over thirty researchers conducted in-depth studies of a range of topics—ecology, social organization, politics, religion, and child-rearing—during a period (prior to 1980) when foraging subsistence remained dominant, and the people retained a degree of political autonomy from the colonial order which allowed them to continue to live their lives without hereditary or formal leadership.

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During my fieldwork (1963–69) I examined the levels and forms of violence in detail. Although the absence of centralized authority worked for the Ju|'hoansi it was a mixed blessing. When fights did break out there was no one within Ju|'hoansi society with the force of law behind him (or her) to separate the parties and reach a settlement. Far from being harmless, the Ju|'hoansi could be scrappy and violent, and the violence sometimes led to fatal results. During 1960s fieldwork, 81 disputes were recorded in all, including 10 major arguments without blows, 34 involving fights without weapons, and 37 with weapons. My retrospective inquiries on the period 1920–1955 turned up cases of homicide, and although homicide ceased between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, it flared up alarmingly in the late 1970s.

Given the lack of property and the widespread practice of sharing, what was there for the Ju|'hoansi to fight about? And given the lack of governmental

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structures, when fights do break out, what prevented them from escalating out of control? I was initially attracted by the characterization of the Ju|'hoansi as the 'harmless people'. But my early fieldwork interviews turned up pesky and oblique references to bloody fights in the past.

After first ignoring these signals, I decided to make a systematic study of conflict and violence. I systematically began inquiring about homicides and gradually, reluctantly, people began mentioning cases. In all, 22 cases of homicide came to light, and 15 other cases of nonfatal fights, most of which had happened 20 to 40 years before, but some as recently as eight years before my arrival. But I also found that the Ju|'hoansi had many mechanisms for controlling aggression and preventing serious fights from breaking out.

The Ju|'hoansi distinguish three levels of conflict: talking, fighting, and deadly fighting. A talk is an argument that may involve threats and verbal abuse but no blows. A fight is an exchange of blows without the use of weapons. And a deadly fight is one in which the deadly weapons—poisoned arrows, spears, and clubs—come out. At each stage attempts are made to dampen the conflict and prevent it from escalating to the next level. It will be useful to look at each level in turn.

Master conversationalists, the Ju|'hoansi bring a rough joking and bantering quality to their speech, much of which verges on argument. But when real anger replaces joking, a 'talk' ensues—an outpouring of angry words delivered in a stylized staccato form. If tempers flare, the 'talk' may escalate further to become a very grave form of argument, involving sexual abuse or 'za'. Male examples include the insult, "may death pull back your foreskin," and female forms include "may death kill your vagina," and "long black labia." Hurling a 'za' insult arouses intense feelings of anger or shame and may lead directly to a fight.

Ju|'hoansi fights involve men and women in hand-to-hand combat while third parties attempt to break them up

(or in some cases, egg them on). In 34 fights recorded, 11 involved men only, 8 were between women, and 15 were between men and women. Fights are of short duration, usually two to five minutes long, and in wrestling and hitting at close quarters rather than fisticuffs. Fighters are separated and forcibly held apart; this is followed by an eruption of excited talking and sometimes more blows. Serious as they appear at the time, anger quickly turns to laughter in Ju|'hoansi fights. We have seen partisans joking with each other when only a few minutes before they were grappling. The joking bursts the bubble of tension and allows tempers to cool off and the healing process to begin. Frequently the parties to a dispute will separate and go away for a few days or weeks to sort out their feelings. Fission is an excellent form of conflict resolution, and people like the Ju|'hoansi, with little investment in fixed property, find it easier to split up temporarily than stay locked together in a difficult argument.

Despite the resort to laughter and fission as a means of defusing conflict, not all fights are easily resolved. In all fights efforts are made to keep men between the ages of 20 and 50 apart. These are the people who possess the deadly poisoned arrows and other weapons, and are likely to use them. The pronouncement "we are all men here and we can fight. Get me my arrows," crops up in several accounts of fights. If this level is reached, the situation is out of control and the point of real danger to life and limb has been reached.

The period of my main fieldwork, 1963–1969, was a time of relative peace. However, before 1955, poisoned arrow fights occurred somewhere in the Dobe or Nyae Nyae regions on the average of once every two years. In deadly fights during the period 1920–1955, the protagonists tended to be members of closely-related living groups. The most common *casus belli* was a fight between men over a woman and, once started, might degenerate into a general brawl. Rapid escalation would draw in more participants making the outcome more and more unpredictable. Bystanders, not parties to the original dispute, could

caught in the cross-fire. In one case none of the four wounded were even principals in the original argument.

Deadly fighting was almost exclusively a male occupation. All 25 of the killers in the 22 cases were male, as well as 19 of the 22 victims. Of the three female victims, only one was a principal in a conflict; the other two were unfortunate bystanders. This contrasts sharply with the high level (25 to 50 percent) of female homicide victims in most Western societies. It may reflect women's high status in Ju|'hoan society.

The main weapons used are poisoned arrows, employing the same lethal poison used to kill game. Since a 200 kilogram antelope will die within 24 hours, one can imagine the effects on the body of a human weighing 50 kilograms. Even with prompt treatment, a person shot with a poisoned arrow has only a 50 per cent chance of survival. Because of the very nature of homicide, when one killing takes place it is hard not to follow it with another in retaliation. Feuds, in fact, accounted for 15 of the 22 killings. In only seven cases was a homicide not followed by another and another. In one dramatic series 9 people were killed in Nyae Nyae in a series of related feuds over a twenty year period (Lee, 1979:390-391), and other feuds involved another six victims.

The prevalence of feuds brings us back to our original question: Once the Pandora's Box of violence is opened, how is it possible for people to close it down again in the absence of the state or an overriding outside political authority? The Ju|'hoansi do have one method of last resort for bringing a string of homicides to an end. On four occasions, killings of wrongdoers were carried out, by a form of tacit agreement that can only be described as executions. A chosen person attacks and dispatches the killer in a previous conflict and the latter's allies will make no move to protect him or to retaliate.

In the most dramatic case on record, a deranged man named |Twi had killed three other people, when the community, in a rare move of unanimity, ambushed and fatally wounded him in full daylight. As he lay dying, all the men fired at him with poisoned arrows until, in the words of one informant, "he looked like a porcupine." Then, after he was dead, all the women approached his body and stabbed him with spears, symbolically sharing the responsibility for his death. I find this image striking. It is as if for one brief moment, this egalitarian society constituted itself a 'state' and took upon itself the powers of life and death. It is this collective will in embryo that later grew to become the form of society that we know today as the state.

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At present, the Ju|'hoansi have state structures imposed upon them; depending where they live they are under Botswanan or Namibian jurisdiction. On the local level the recent presence of outsiders—Tswana and Herero—has had important modifying effects on the way the Ju|'hoansi handle conflict. Since the appointment of a Tswana headman in 1948, Ju have preferred to bring serious conflicts to him for adjudication rather than allow them to cross the threshold of violence. The kgotla 'court' has proved extremely popular with the Ju|'hoansi, and Tswana and Herero at other waterholes frequently act as informal mediators in Ju|'hoan disputes. The reason for the court's

popularity is not hard to find: it offers the Ju a legal umbrella and relieves them of the heavy responsibility of resolving serious internal conflicts under the threat of retaliation. On the other hand, the impact of outside law should not be overestimated. Two homicides occurred in the Dobe area after the headman's appointment, and in Nyae Nyae one offender was killed after he had been jailed by the South African authorities and released.

Paradoxically, the presence of outsiders has also had adverse consequences. With the increasing availability of cash and alcohol since the 1970s, the Ju|'hoan homicide rate has flared up. Men and women have become homicide victims as Saturday-night drinking parties turn violent and deadly. At the South African run settlement in Namibia six killings were recorded in the two year period (1978–80). Overall there has been a four-fold increase in violent deaths compared to the earlier study period (1920–1970).

Summing up for the pre-state period we can ask: were the Ju|'hoansi pacifists? Not at all. But neither was warfare endemic. And although homicide occurred and occasionally led to blood feuds, the Ju|'hoansi had effective means of keeping violence in check. Spacing kept combatants apart, and in the longer run opposing groups made peace by arranging marriages between them. And remember, all this was accomplished in the total absence of centralized authority, without police force, courts, or jails. It is ironic that among the contemporary Ju|'hoansi, all of the above are in place and in spite of the controls (or because of them?)—fueled by alcohol—the incidence of homicide has quadrupled.

Lessons drawn?
Looking at the larger question of violence from a Ju|'hoansi vantage point, what lessons can we draw, both for violence in history and for the human condition in the present day? First, the fact that Ju|'hoansi are not nonviolent should caution us against any overly Rousseauean view that life without the State is paradise on earth. Second,

and equally, the opposite is true; the evidence shows that neither is the Ju|'hoan world a Hobbesian nightmare. Violence does occur, but powerful mechanisms exist for defusing situations and bringing passions under control. I am particularly taken by the healing power over past hurts symbolized by the incidence of marriages arranged between members of groups that had engaged in deadly fighting. The word 'passion' is used here with intent. Most of the transgressions that Ju commit are crimes of passion. Things get out of hand and arrows fly. The exceptions are the revenge killings in blood feuds. These obviously involve a degree of planning and premeditation. In formal law codes, the degree of spontaneity or deliberation becomes a key factor in determining the severity of the crime. Third, as noted, the level of non-violence is achieved without the presence of superordinate authority. No police, no judges, no prisons. Only consensus. This remarkable achievement is perhaps the greatest refutation of the Hobbesian world-view.

It is important to ask how typical the Ju|'hoansi are of hunting and gathering and other 'egalitarian' societies. I would put them in the middle of the range. They are not nearly as peaceful as the Semai/Semang of Malaysia made famous by Robert Dentan, but there are other societies that are far more bellicose. New Guinea examples include the Jalée (Christopher Koch) and the work of Bruce Knauft describing endemic warfare; but note that here the economic base and population density are quite different. The Yanomano of Venezuela studied by Chagnon, subject of recent debate, are a complicated case (read Brian Ferguson).

Underlying the details of variations in conflict and violence in band and many tribal societies, is a deeper commonality. These are societies built on a foundation of common ownership of resources. In a long conversation within anthropology going back to the 19th century and Lewis Henry Morgan's *Houses and House Life of American Aborigines* (1881) the strength of communal land tenure, the relative scarcity of private property, and

the supreme value placed on the law of hospitality attests to the proposition that the human baseline is some form of primitive communism. This was the world that was lost when states appeared and conquered the globe.

One of the most striking generalizations made about contemporary hunter-gatherers is the sense of respect for the autonomy of the person, combined with the strong value attached to sharing. I would agree with C.B. Macpherson's view that today's norm of possessive individualism does not express the primordial state of humankind. That members of bands and tribes fought and killed is not in doubt; but with levels of violence so variable, the

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explanation needs to be sought not in some biological constant like the selfish gene or Lorenzian aggression, but rather in social, ecological, and historical conditions.

If hunters and gatherers represent in some sense the original condition of humankind, what are the pathways human societies have traveled since? One key feature differentiating these band and tribal societies from the rest of the human world, is the point made by Marshall Sahlins when he compared state and stateless societies in his book *Tribesmen* (1968). Lacking states, tribal people lack standing armies and state-organized warfare. Lacking police, they also lack police brutality. The rise of states brings with it a trade-off: internal peace bought at the cost of a severe decline

in individual liberties. The sense of entitlement, of personal autonomy, of band and tribal societies, is severely curtailed (except for the few). Serfhood or slavery are the norm in early states but exceedingly rare in non-state societies (though not unknown). The origin of the state therefore was not some triumphant march into the future as most histories portray it. Rather it was for many if not most, as Engels argued, a bitter pill, to be swallowed with generous draughts of religion backed by force. For Engels, the "Sturm and Drang" of state formation is the death struggle of the old communal order as the new elite imposes its will on a fractious underclass-in-the-making. At the end of this long process which is still going on, the state became for Engels, an historical entity in which the deepest contradictions of class became cast in stone.

For Sahlins, states bring another trade-off. They enforce peace within in order to wage war without. One of the trends in history is for the scale of warfare to expand in size, duration, and deadliness of weaponry, a process culminating in the modern era, where the number of war dead of the 20th century has far exceeded that of any previous century.

Why is war-making such an integral part of state formation and state reproduction? Surely one important dynamic is the psychological process of displacement—with the build-up of tensions and contradictions within the now-deeply-divided social formation redirected towards external conquest. Why resolve contradictions when you can export them? War becomes an escape valve for unresolvable internal tensions (a process very much in evidence today).

Peace within, violence without. Is that the trade-off in the rise of states?

So far we have only been discussing violence in the narrow sense: acts of physical aggression. But with the rise of the state we get entirely new forms of violence: 'the hidden injuries of class'. Thanks largely to insights of the late Pierre Bourdieu's updating of the ideas of Marx and Engels, these new forms of

violence are lumped under the heading of structural violence, and arise when inequalities are deeply entrenched. Structural violence has a long history; today it is expressed in myriad ways from minimum wage rates, to lack of housing, cutbacks to education, racial profiling, differential access to health care and essential services and the grip of advertising on consciousness.

The routinization of structural violence as part of the permanent fabric of society brings about profound changes in human consciousness. Take the example of the institution of slavery itself. In egalitarian societies, all of 'us' are human; only enemies are beyond the pale. In states the human core subdivides in at least two directions; while commoners may retain their human status, those who fall through the cracks to slavery or serfdom become less than human, while at the opposite end lords become kings and kings become akin to gods. The fancy word for the latter is apotheosis, but we lack a correspondingly elegant term for the former (immiseration? dehumanization?). Whatever the semantics, in ancient Rome Augustus became a god, while the Roman slave was a 'thing' and not a man.

Commoners did not escape the dehumanizing process. Rack-renting, conscription, *le droit de seigneur,* are examples of the exercise of arbitrary power. The many dimensions of poverty, the lack of civil rights, the vastly different life-chances of the rich and the poor are examples of structural violence.

In our deliberations at Bowen Island, the phrase 'technologies of violence' was extended to include, metaphorically, social and other-not-strictly-material forms of technology. Social technologies of violence would include, perhaps most famously, Michel Foucault's insights into the history of punishment, in which 19th century incarceration superseded 18th century public torture and execution as a means of disciplining criminals. In Foucault's terms, this seemingly benign reform movement had more sinister

undertones. The prison, the asylum, even the clinic, were means by which the powerful could discipline bodies, leading to the exercise of "capillary power," internalizing social control and therefore making it all the more insidious. In Foucault's hands, Jeremy Bentham's mid-19th century notion of the "panopticon," the all-seeing central watchtower vantage-point in prison architecture, becomes the trope of a nightmare vision of modernity, the surveillance society (cf. *NY Times* Sunday Sept 29, 2002, p.1).

The loss of privacy and the erosion of civil rights in recent decades and especially in the post 9/11 era certainly bears out Foucault's vision. But I would argue that like all other hazards and risks, the burden of surveillance falls unequally on citizens, depending on their position in the class structure or in the international division of labour. Marginalized minorities are punished for possession of drugs, while white-collar criminals in boardrooms steal millions with relative impunity (at least until the Enron, World-Com, and Arthur Andersen debacles).

Social inequality and the means by which it is reproduced remain the 'technology' of violence which causes the most harm in the world today. A large cohort of critical epidemiologists (Stephen Bezruchka, Richard Wilkinson, Clyde Hertzman, I. Kawachi, B.P.

Kennedy, M. G. Marmot and others) present convincing documentation on the links between indices of well-being —life expectancy, infant mortality, and burden of disease and income distribution.

In middle- and high-income countries, neither overall national wealth nor per capita GNP nor average income are good predictors of overall population health. By contrast, the distribution of income—the difference between high and low income, known as the Gini coefficient—provides an excellent index. The higher the Gini coefficient, that is, the greater the disparity between high and low income, the poorer is overall health. Sweden and Norway, with low Gini, have a two-year greater life expectancy compared to the much wealthier, but high Gini, United States. The latter, with five per cent of the world's population spends 40 per cent of the world's health care budget, yet ranks 25th in the Health Care Olympics (a measure of overall national health developed by Bezruchka). Interestingly, the correlation between income disparity and health works equally well in comparing US states, with Louisiana and Mississippi (highest Gini) at the low end in health status and the low Gini states New Hampshire and North Dakota at the high end. Canadian provinces, on these scales, are tightly clustered at the high end or beyond.

Peace within, violence without. Is that the trade-off in the rise of states?

discussion took us a long way indeed from the savannahs of Africa. The Ju|'hoansi welcomed the arrival of the Tswana headman as a force for adjudicating their disputes. Little did they realize that his arrival heralded the passing of political decision-making from the local to sites far beyond their control. Decisions made in Gaborone and Johannesburg, now determine much of their lives. In a sense the Ju|'hoansi's world now mirrors the world of the citizens of Walkerton, Ontario, reported on by Professor Parr, where the values attached to local decision-making and personal autonomy may be at odds with the agendas of distant and unresponsive powerholders.

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Lest we drift too far from our original terms of reference, we should ask the question of how this perspective might be applied to the question of violence. One harbours a strong suspicion that the Gini coefficient would be an even stronger predictor of the prevalence of violent acts, than it would in predicting overall health status. After all, the causal chain between wealth disparity and violence is surely much shorter than that between wealth and health. And one could predict that, conversely, lessening of wealth disparity should lead to a reduction in violent crime. But confirmation of that will have to await further research.

For our present purposes, I have attempted to trace in evidence and theory a line of argument that takes us from the philosophical debates of the early modern period to empirical grounding in the Ju|'hoansi of the African savannah, and from there through history of the origin of the state, to the present; tracing the interwoven history of physical and structural violence. The papers presented at the symposium by Bob Menzies and Joy Parr added important dimensions to the problem by showing the ideological roots of violence in contemporary society and the manifold ways that institutions designed to protect the public welfare, by sins of omission and commission can have the opposite effect. The

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Reverend James Lawson, the 'Architect' of the American Civil Rights Movement, Receives the Thakore Visiting Scholar Award
—Trish Graham

The 2002 recipient of the Thakore Visiting Scholar Award was The Reverend James Lawson, Jr., a Methodist clergyman recognized as an important leader and teacher in the US civil rights movement. He is currently teaching non-violence, working with the Martin Luther King Centre for Nonviolence in Los Angeles, and with the 'living wage' movement. Lawson's work, captured in the television series *A Force More Powerful* has been recently aired on the Knowledge Network.

The Thakore Visiting Scholar Award is presented annually at SFU on October 2nd—the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi—to an outstanding public figure who in some way carries forward the legacy of Gandhi. The award is co-sponsored by the Institute for the Humanities, the Thakore Charitable Foundation, and the India Club.

Reverend James Lawson, Jr., has been called the 'architect' of the African-American civil rights struggle. Prior to graduate school in Ohio, he traveled to India as a coach. While in Nagpur, Lawson studied Gandhi's techniques of non-violent struggle. He brought home to America a few years later not only a belief in Gandhi's principles, but a commitment to put Gandhi's understanding of non-violence and non-violent opposition into practice at home in the struggle against racism. This began first in the Midwest, and then, at the suggestion of Martin Luther King, Jr., in Tennessee. King saw Lawson's subsequent workshops on non-violent strategic opposition to racism and segregation as models for the civil rights movement. It was James Lawson who engineered, organized, and supervised the February 27, 1960 sit-ins in Nashville, Tennessee. Prior to the sit-ins, he conducted workshops on techniques of peaceful resistance. It was a strategic plan—a plan he claims to have learned from Mahatma Gandhi, that brought

three waves of students, who had been well-coached, into a Woolworth Store, calmly taking their seats at the cafeteria counter. Following the demonstration, Lawson says "all over the country people saw and read about it in the news: students—calm, posed, dignified—refusing to spit back on the one side, and then on the other side, these ruffians [the police]—hitting, harassing, landing blows—simply because we were sitting at the lunch counter." Such media revelations pointed the way toward real change.

In an interview with Fanny Kiefer, Cable 4 Vancouver, on October 2, 2002, just prior to his acceptance of the Thakore Visiting Scholar Award at an evening program at SFU, Lawson discussed both his past and present work.

Lawson reflected on the early beginnings of his commitment to a non-violent approach to segregation and bigotry. He identified a childhood experience, when he was no more than ten years old or so, as an experience that was pivotal in his memory. While on an errand for his mother, he was confronted by a white child who called out "nigger" as he passed by. Lawson says that in response he "walked over and smacked the child," and then went on to complete his errand, and return home, where he reported to his mother what had happened. "What good did that do?" his mother asked him quietly. "There must have been a better way." It was from this moment on that Lawson says he "felt the world came to a screeching halt." The search for "a better way" has directed him ever since. "I learned much of my sense of opposing prejudice, and fear, and bigotry and racism and segregation at the feet of my mother and father," said Lawson. The non-violent approach forces your opponent to change; it is the greatest challenge.

Asked how he dealt with the fear of getting hurt, perhaps jailed or killed

Reverend James Lawson (back row centre), the recipient of SFU's Thakore Visiting Scholar Award, and his wife Dorothy, were joined by Jack Duvall and representatives from the India Club, the Thakore Charitable Foundation, Knowledge Network, and SFU after the ceremony on October 2, 2002.

during the struggles of the American civil rights movement, Lawson referred to his Christian principles: "There is that key across the Hebrew-Christian scriptures which insists 'fear not,' 'be of good courage.' I asked that I discern the kind of courage to go forward even when afraid… to do the right thing; to do it with awareness. The issue is not if you are afraid or not; the issue is if you are on your life's path and you are trying to lead it with some degree of integrity and concern for others. Then, in spite of moments of fear, step forward."

When asked how he confronts a situation where many people in America feel that the only chance for peace is the readiness for war, Lawson responded with the following comments: "I happen to think that the paranoia, the fears of the United States, in large part is hysteria and not rooted in the reality of our times… Very obviously we have as much hunger and poverty and injustice in the world because there are a lot of policies and structures that continue to perpetuate the old world of colonialism, domination, militarism and violence… Leaders of the world, especially the powerful and the rich, tend to be always centred in their own egos, and in their own need to have domination and control and to manage human beings. We have to work with people then to

see that 'no, the centre of the universe is not in the oil or the domination. The centre of the universe is in the quality of life of the ordinary person.'… The earth, as Gandhi pointed out, has more than sufficient resources, so that you need not hunger—what he called poverty—the worst form of murder in the world."

In response to the question of how he feels we should deal with the threat of terrorism, Lawson replied, "I'm always prepared to see if we can, through good, overcome evil. I want to see us use law… to deal with terrorism." And in reference to America's official position on Iraq, Lawson said, "the Bush administration wants to violate international law."

Finally Lawson was asked, "what are we teaching our young men?" His reply was, "I maintain that domestic violence and war are of a similar kind. They are male-dominated decisions that brutalize women and children. I sometimes say that domestic violence is the parent of our war-makers. I abhor the fact that in the United States our war makers, our power-brokers, beat up on poor countries or small countries; there is no equality in that at all. And I abhor the fact that they think it's manly to go to war when women and children are the fundamental victims of war making."

The Reverend James Lawson continues to work with the working poor and union organizing of the poor. He also continues to lecture and teach on the practical applications of non-violent struggle. In December 2002 he was involved in a major protest in New York City against the US administration's attitude towards Iraq. It was a privilege to welcome James Lawson to SFU in October 2002.

Violence and its Alternatives Lecture Series

Fall 2002

Attention to Violence and its Alternatives forms a major element in the mandate of the Institute for the Humanities. Many SFU faculty are also researching specific aspects of violence and our response to it in our culture. This fall we presented the work of three faculty members with longtime interests in socio-cultural violence.

Is the World Wired for Violence? Reflections on Media and Democracy in the Wake of September 11
—Robert Hackett

Violence and Media

Is the world wired for violence? Do the dominant practices and institutions of public communication, nationally or internationally, share any complicity in the bloody start to the third millennium—in the spectacular terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent "war on terrorism"?

The orthodox problematic, rooted in a functionalist perspective of the media as an independent power centre within a consensually-based social structure, directs attention to questions about media-promoted violations of social norms. For example, do media representations of violence in 'action films' de-sensitize consumers to violence, or even generate copy-cat crimes? Can insurgent terrorists manipulate the media to generate spectacles (the 'theatre of terror') which can demoralize a population, destabilize a society, or induce authorities to over-react in ways which attract political sympathy for the terrorists' cause?

These concerns are not without validity. Contemporary terrorism, propaganda of the deed, historically arose with the emergence of mass media, initially the daily press, which could multiply its impact. The 9/11 terrorists clearly knew that their atrocities would be amplified, globally and immediately, on television.

But the limitations of the orthodox view are highlighted when we

consider how media may facilitate or legitimize not only insurgent violence, but also repression and counter-violence. Most obviously, we have seen how media were spectacularly abused in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to fan the flames of ethnic nationalism and ultimately genocide. But there are less obvious ways in which media are implicated in violence. The overabundance of violent representations in globally distributed media products (notably, Hollywood action films) are related more to economic imperatives than audience demand, but they have implications for how audiences see and act in the world. American communications scholar George Gerbner writes of a "mean world syndrome," in which heavy television viewers become more fearful and distrustful, more accepting of authoritarian policies and simplistic Manichean views of conflict (good versus evil).

Even in liberal democracies, media may facilitate violence insofar as they endorse or legitimize aggressive foreign policy on the part of the State. It is not just a question of media content, but of structure. Commercial media are increasingly operating in global markets, undergoing conglomeration, privatization, hyper-commercialism. Corporate media are integral to the ideology and process of global corporatization, which has both costs and benefits. Media help create global public opinion, which can inhibit (albeit selectively) the violation of human rights by particular regimes; but they also promote a culture of consumerism, which arguably breeds inequality, declining sense of community, and ecological devastation. Notwithstanding the Internet, and significant regional media production centres (India, Brazil, Egypt), global information flows are still dominated by media corporations based in the developed West. The North to South media flow makes more visible to the South the arguably growing gaps between rich and poor, creating a 'fishbowl' effect of rising expectations and resentment. At the same time, the dominant US media largely insulate the

population of the world's most powerful country from foreign perspectives, perspectives which might enable more informed judgements about their own government's policies.

According to Georg Becker, media are themselves integral to hierarchies of

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power and their associated patterns of structural violence.

> If mass-media reception as well as production are at once expression and motor of structural violence; if communications technology can be understood, historically, only as an integral part of the emerging military industrial complex; if the access to and the power over the mass media are unequal and unbalanced… then the mass media can fulfill their original hoped for function as 'peace-bringers' [only] under rare and exceptional circumstances. The representation of violence in the mass media, then, is part and parcel of the universal violence of the media themselves.

US Media and 9/11

Such structural imbalances exact an especially bitter toll at moments of crisis, which are moments of truth for political and media systems, highlighting tendencies which are latent in normal times.

The 9/11 terror attacks were a case in point. As official and media rhetoric escalated rapidly, from "there has been a terrorist attack" to "an act of war" to "we are at war," the American media's dominant narratives, the shared mindset underlying the selection and presentation of news, quickly jelled into a kind of 'master frame'—this is a war (not a campaign or police action) between absolute good and absolute evil. Like a lightning bolt from Satan, September 11 was an unprovoked attack on 'Freedom and Democracy'. You are either for us, or against us. The American people will unite behind its leaders, use whatever means and make whatever sacrifices are necessary, to crush evil and ensure the triumph of good. This is a crusade for 'Infinite Justice'—the original brand name of the retaliatory operation.

Frames are unavoidable in journalism, as in any form of effective story-telling. Comprising mostly implicit assumptions about values and reality, they help to construct coherent narratives out of a potential infinity of occurrences and information. The problem is that when they are accepted uncritically, frames can lead journalism to exclude relevant but dissonant information.

In America's alternative press, but rarely in the dominant media, other frames were in play—that violence begets violence, or that the double standards and hegemonism of the US government's foreign policy were part of a broader pattern from which the evil acts of September 11 emerged. But America's dominant corporate media highlighted stories which fit the master frame—such as heroism and tragedy in Manhattan, and (at last, six years after it had seized power) the Taliban's appalling human rights record.

Not that these topics were inappropriate. The real problem was the omission of news that did not fit the master frame. In *Media* magazine (Fall 2001), I listed relevant questions largely ignored in the crucial weeks after September 11. What geopolitical fires fuelled terrorism? Was 9/11 a case of 'blowback', facilitated by previous US support for Islamic fundamentalists fighting the Soviet

the Soviet Union? What were the policy options besides massive military retaliation? If this is a war on terrorism, what is terrorism, who is the enemy, how far do the intended targets extend, and what counts as victory? What is the state of public opinion elsewhere in the world? What political agendas are piggy-backing on to 9/11? How are civil liberties being affected? What's the extent of 'collateral damage' in Afghanistan?

Such blind spots had several sources. Since the 1980s, US media have cut back drastically on international news coverage. Accelerating media concentration and commercialization have yielded a corporate culture increasingly hostile to radical dissent, or even to the liberal public service ethos associated with the Walter Cronkite generation. The political elite, on which the media depend for orientation, closed ranks. Years of flak from conservatives, convinced despite all the contrary evidence that the media contributed to defeat in Vietnam, have left the press anxious to prove its patriotism. The September 11 events themselves made for an emotionally compelling and gut-wrenching (but in the long run, dangerously simplistic) story line built around the stuff of legend—heroes, villains and victims. The sense of threat contributed to a powerful 'rally round the flag' effect. And as a trump card, there was *de facto* censorship within the media. Several columnists who offered even mild criticism of Bush were fired. In a country with fewer and fewer media employers, it doesn't take too many such examples for journalists everywhere to feel the chill.

Small wonder that in the four months after 9/11, according to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, the press heavily favored pro-administration and official US viewpoints—62% of stories, with

30% mixed, and only 8% reporting all or mostly dissenting viewpoints. (And 'dissent' does not mean the Taliban, just any policy perspective different from the Bush administration's.)

On the fundamental question of war and peace after 9/11, American media have largely failed to play the role prescribed for it in liberal theory—a 'watchdog' keeping powerholders accountable, a public forum helping to formulate a democratic consensus between alternatives, a comprehensive

> In describing the 'theology' of American nationalism, Galtung writes of the Judaic/Christian myths of a chosen people in exile with a special relationship with God, a Manichean construction of world space with the US at the centre as the epitome of good, the world's beacon of freedom with a right and duty to take on the godlike characteristics of omniscience, omnipotence, and beneficence.

news provider nurturing an informed citizenry. Those failures and blind spots have undoubtedly facilitated the escalating militarization of US foreign policy. And yet in September 2001, American public faith in the media reached the highest levels pollsters have recorded since 1968.

What does this dismal combination—democratic failure and public approval—tell us? Peace researcher Johann Galtung reminds us that media criticism can only take us so far. Media institutions are influenced by, as well as influence, the surrounding political culture. Just as audiences are part of the media system, journalists are part of that culture. The media's framing of 9/11 meshed well with

the dominant frame of America's experience of war, which in turn is related to the foundational myths of American nationhood. In describing the 'theology' of American nationalism, Galtung writes of the Judaic/Christian myths of a chosen people in exile with a special relationship with God, a Manichean construction of world space with the US at the centre as the epitome of good, the world's beacon of freedom with a right and duty to take on the godlike characteristics of omniscience, omnipotence, and beneficence. In this worldview, the terror attacks were not only an atrocity and a tragedy, but an act of sacrilege, one motivated by incomprehensible evil, outside the realm of politics and history. To the extent that audiences and media shared the assumptions of this frame, the US media's construction of the events would appear not as a one-sided version, or even as a narrative at all, but as (to invoke Cronkite's famous sign-off phrase) "the way it is."

Global Media Democratization?
From the viewpoint of humane governance and democratic communication, the implications of the media's role in 9/11 are multiple and unfolding. Here, I can only sketch a few points.

First, if media are indeed part of systematic structural violence that fosters resentment, fundamentalism and ultimately insurgent terrorism; if media's processes of exclusion and marginalization preclude equitable participation by different social groups in the construction of public cultural truth (as Robert A. White puts it); if the structures and flows of global communication contribute more to conflict than understanding; then a process of media democratization is one prerequisite for humane global governance.

Building a democratic public sphere independent of state and corporate control would require widespread structural reform of the ownership, financing, control, production and distribution, of technology, programs and networks. The idea, as Karol

Jakubowicz has put it, is to enable each significant social and cultural group to circulate ideas, perspectives and information in such a way as to reach all other segments of society. While public broadcasting at its best has sometimes approximated such a public sphere within individual nations, the challenge is to begin that project at a global level. While UNESCO's *MacBride Report* was buried by a campaign of vilification in the 1980s, the serious North-South (and other) imbalances of communicative power which it highlighted have yet to be addressed.

Yet we should not assume that more and better dialogue, or more accessible and pluralistic media structures, will automatically resolve global conflicts. Quite apart from the many other levels of institutional change needed to assure a humane future, democratization of the media implies more than structural reform; it entails cultural shifts. As Charles Husband argues, the right to communicate, even if embedded in widespread access to the means of communication, needs to be supplemented by the right to be understood—which requires an ethos of willingness to listen to the 'other', and indeed to insist that the 'other' be heard. That ethos poses a challenge not only to allegedly closed and pre-modernist cultures in the Islamic world, with their tendencies towards fundamentalism and authoritarianism, but also to the consumerism, arrogance, indifference, and the persistent temptations of racism and fascism in the West. A globally democratized media system could encourage Americans, as citizens of the world's hegemon, to come to terms with their own history and role in the world, as seen through the eyes of others. Such a breakthrough could be pivotal to progress on issues of global economic justice, environmental sustainability, and political democracy.

Robert Hackett, School of Communications, Simon Fraser University, lectured in the Institute for the Humanities series on Violence and its Alternatives, September 12, 2002.

Race, Gender and Aggression: The Perceptions of Girls About the Violence in Their Lives[1]
—Margaret Jackson

In the street or in school, it's the same. I don't feel I belong. But I learned that if somebody beats on me, I'd better beat back or I'll keep getting hurt. Actually, now I get respect because of it.

—Lena, immigrant girl, aged 14

Lena's words capture the dilemma experienced by many young marginalized girls in Canada today, but which seem especially true for young immigrant and refugee girls. To fit in, to survive, they may turn to aggression; otherwise they may find themselves the target for aggression. Numerous authors focus upon individual risk factors to explain and/or predict why some girls are more prone to aggressive and violent behavior than others. In the present paper, the examination shifts to consider the social context within which the particular factors of race and gender can prove to be 'risky' for girls.

Evidence that the social location of immigrant and refugee girls constitutes a form of risk in and of itself comes from a 1993 UN Working Group Report in which the members indicate that such girls "experience higher rates of violence due to the impact of racism and sexism in their communities and the host society and due to dislocation as the result of immigration" (Barron, 2001:1). As Jiwani (1998) comments, the girls are "caught between two cultures where their own is devalued and inferiorized, and where cultural scripts in both worlds encode patriarchal values" (p.3). As well it appears that refugee girls are actually in a more vulnerable position than refugee boys are in this regard.

In some cultural contexts, girls are less valued than boys and, consequently, are at higher risk for neglect and abuse. Their participation in educational endeavors, for example, is frequently prematurely curtailed and they are subject to sexual abuse, assault, and exploitation in greater number than are boys (*UNHCR Policy on Refugee Children,* 1993, as quoted in part by Cameron, 2001:2).

It will be the intent of this paper to make a closer consideration of the sociocultural factors which may contribute to and have an impact on the immigrant and refugee girl's vulnerability relative to aggression. Framing the analysis throughout, the voices of the young women themselves serve as the data. In the attempt to make meaning of their experiences, the theoretical lens employed is anti-racist, feminist and rights-based. The rights-based perspective is appropriate, as it is evident that these factors of race and gender "place the immigrant and refugee girl-child at greater risk for all forms of discrimination and human rights violations" (Cameron, 2001:3). In essence, examining how these sociocultural factors uniquely intersect (Jiwani, Janovicek & Cameron, 2002:49) for the girls will provide an understanding which should then be contrasted with a similar focus

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[1] This paper is an earlier and shortened version of a chapter to appear in *Girls and Aggression: Contributing Factors and Intervention Principles,* edited by M. Moretti, C. Odgers, and M. Jackson. New York: Kluver Academic/Plenum Publishers (2003).

placed on how individual factors, such as mental health status, have an impact on their vulnerability.

The concept of interlocking systems of domination forms the theoretical basis for the former analysis (Razack, 1998). It is critical, as Razack argues, to consider in a historical manner the meaning of race, economic status, class, disability, sexuality, and gender as they converge to construct immigrant and refugee girls within hierarchical social structures (Barron, 2001:10). In this paper, the focus is limited primarily to the examination of the impact of race and gender, or more accurately, the processes of racialization and gendering (Chan and Mirchandani, 2002:12) upon the aggressive outcomes for the girls. The study of processes rather than static factors allows for a deeper appreciation of how these categorizations are constructed through continuous interactions in society, continuous constructions of 'other' and 'self' in hierarchical ways (Ibid.:12-13).

Study I: The Voices of Immigrant and Refugee Girls

Three interrelated FREDA studies are discussed.[2] The first study involved 59 immigrant and refugee girls of colour in 14 individual interviews and six focus groups. Their countries of origin, or their parents' cultures of origin, included 18 countries, including, China, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Zaire.[3] The age requirement for the girls and young women was that they be between 14 and 19 years of age. The questionnaire was developed with input and feedback from a group of young immigrant and refugee girls. As well, young women of colour led the interviews and focus groups.

The girls were asked to talk about their experiences in school and with family and friends. It is a 'lived realities' approach which can then be used

for comparison with the intended outcomes of relevant policies and programs developed to assist the girls. One question, for example, asked how the girls felt about their treatment in the school environment—safe, respected? Their responses could then be compared with what is attempted to secure that safety and respect by way of such initiatives as anti-bullying and multicultural programs.

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Turning to the findings, the most prominent theme of note to emerge from the interviews and focus groups was what the girls described as a struggle for power among young people from different cultural groups (Jiwani et al.: 67). Those struggles were often violent. Many, though not all of the girls pointed to racism as a key reason underlying violence in the schools and they recognized intercultural tensions as a feature of school life (Ibid.: 67).

A quote from an interview with a Persian girl sets out the intercultural divisions that seem to underlie the tension:

You know in high school people are like that. They talk behind each other's backs. I don't know why. They hate them because of their culture, where they're from. Because people in this school hang out with each other… They just like hanging out with their own country people (Ibid.: 67).

Many of the girls talked about the difficulty of fitting into the dominant culture. It is true that girls who are located differently because of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability and/or class generally are at greater risk of being taunted and targets for violent acts because our society tends not to value those who are different (Jiwani et al.: 68). Among the most vulnerable appear to be those girls who have just arrived in Canada. In schools, recent immigrants are called FOBs, an acronym for "fresh off the boat" (Ibid.: 68). One interviewed girl from Persia defined it this way: "FOB is like fresh off the boat. It means that you're really geeky and you don't know how to speak and stuff. You dress stupidly or whatever, right?" (Ibid.:68).

Assimilation is one answer for the girls but can entail a loss of identity with their own culture or negotiating a balance between the two, often competing, traditions (Ibid.: 68). One interviewed girl described it this way, "(s)ometimes I feel like I have to lose my 'true' identity to fit in" (Ibid.: 68). The process of identity formation then can clearly be problematic for these girls. Their sense of belonging is influenced by their particular location in a culture, on the one hand, and the disjuncture of that location from the dominant culture's norms, on the other.

From the interviews, it became evident as well that schools are often seen as sites of external control rather than serving as places of support or safety. Schools are places where the tensions become crystallized, and where many

girls expressed frustrations with what they experienced as discrimination against immigrant and refugee girls. A South Asian girl commented that, "(f)rom what I've seen, the kids fear it (racist acts in school) so they won't go and tell people about it. They'll just keep it inside. And I think that sooner or later, it's just going to make them explode. So if I could give advice, I'd tell them, number one, go to a person who you know you can trust. I wouldn't say first to go to somebody at school" (Jiwani et al.: 71).

In addition to general challenges at school, the girls also identified problems with language as an obvious reason they felt marginalized in schools. Often these young women are streamed into alternative classes because they have not yet developed efficient language skills (Janovicek, 2001: 11). A Thai girl, who lives in a small British Columbia Interior town, explained that for the first two weeks of school she did not understand a word that was said in class. When one of her parents explained this to the teacher, she was subsequently placed in remedial classes because English as a Second Language (ESL) classes were not available (Ibid.: 11).

As well, the girls can be taunted for their accents and for the clothes that they wear. Their own parents, who encourage them to fit in, often do not have the economic resources to purchase designer clothes that are almost mandatory in many popular school groups (Ibid.: 11).

Having examined how the processes of racialization and gendering can impact on the girls' vulnerability to marginalization and aggression, we now take a look at the 'flip side', that is, how those same processes can come together to increase the vulnerability to commit acts of aggression themselves.

Study II: Immigrant and Refugee Girls on Probation
The second supplemental FREDA study interviewed eight girls who were either on probation or had been on probation.[4] The same basic questionnaire employed in the first study was also used for the second (with some modifications

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because these girls were not as likely to be in school at the time of the interview and because the focus was more upon their criminal justice experiences). In the questioning, the girls were asked about specific areas dealing with "the kinds of violence the girls were knowledgeable about, including questions about racism, health issues, and survival strategies" (Barron, 2001: 13). In fact, half of these respondents had been charged with assault (Ibid.: 15).

Barron notes that "(f)irst the girls only appeared to recognize racism as a factor in violence when asked if they would define racism as being violent." One girl said yes, explaining that, "even though the

person isn't physically [hurt], it hurts them emotionally inside, you know, and I think that hurts more 'cause when someone hits you, it could be over, but when someone says something about your race, you could be thinking about that for the rest of your life, and you'll have doubts about that kind of race" (Ibid.: 24).

It is interesting that, unlike in the first study, few girls made connections to race as a factor in triggering aggressive encounters. One example can be seen in the response made by a girl against another visible minority girl:

> When you fight, it's nothing about race, it's all about popularity... You don't just hate someone because of what they are, but how they treat you (Ibid.: 23).

The same girl indicated she had been called racist names when she was in grade seven, and it offended her at the time, but now she says she is proud to be referred to as "China-woman" (Ibid.: 23). This kind of racist naming gets explained away by another girl who offers the rationale that the person does not intend to be racist, they are just 'mean-spirited' individuals. There was also the belief expressed that there was more conflict between different visible minority communities than between people of colour and white people (Ibid.: 23). Thus the process of 'conventional' racialization by the dominant culture becomes obscured.

Another girl's case—Amy's—is interesting and of relevance to the discussion on the role a girl's experience of violence against herself can lead to their own involvement with violence as perpetrators. Amy was charged with assault and admitted to the charge saying, "(m)y mom hit me, so that's when they took me away. When I went into care, I didn't know anything right, so I assaulted my foster mom and that's how it all started" (Ibid.: 17). And again,

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quoting Barron, "(s)he further explains that her mother, who cannot speak English, was not given any support after she and her father immigrated to Canada from Hong Kong and then her father left the family without financial resources. It is ironic and disturbing that Amy's charges of assault and uttering threats stemmed from a process of her being placed into care for her own 'safety' from her own mother" (p. 25).

Amy's experiences exemplify how a particular social location can impact negatively on how an individual is perceived and processed as a risk. Here the concept of risk can work to the disadvantage of these girls. It is worthy and relevant to note the emphasis on the determination of risk for decision-making about girls on probation, e.g., that is evidenced in the British Columbia Youth Community Risk/Assessment instrument. One risk factor of concern in that instrument, for example, is the fact that "(t)he youth is facing difficulties or conflicts relating to cultural, ethnic, or religious adjustment, including conflicts or adjustments with peers or family" (Barron, 2001: 18). But the question has to be asked: whose risk has priority in decision-making here, the risk of the girl

to the community or the risk to the girl in the community? These are policy and rights questions.

There appears to be the assumption that the problems the immigrant and refugee youth who has come to the attention of the justice system experiences arise from difficulties in her or her family's adjustment to the dominant white society (Ibid.: 18). The difficulties of adjustment are articulated as difficulties of not integrating sufficiently, or not releasing cultural traditions sufficiently to fit in (Ibid.: 18).

Yet another systemic factor which impacts strongly in the riskiness of the immigrant and refugee girl is poverty. It is already evident that there are links between poverty and discrimination against women and children (*Working Group on Girls,* 1995: 2, as quoted by Barron, 2001: 19). These connections are proven here in Canada for immigrant and refugee women and their offspring. With their lesser economic status and restricted labor force involvement, they are vulnerable to being assessed as not ideal citizens (Cameron, 2001: 19). One example to illustrate this situation is the one whereby the professional credentials of many immigrant and refugee women are not recognized in Canada. Or, at another extreme, the disadvantaged situation of domestic workers at risk is not resolved (National Association of Women and the Law, 1999; 8-12; Fitzpatrick and Kelly, 1998, as quoted in Cameron, 2001: 20).

In summary, Barron concludes that it is the risk assessment process in the justice system that contributes to the immigrant and refugee girls' vulnerability to getting caught up in that system (p. 26). In essence, the emphasis on the individual girl's problems of adaptation to the dominant society denies the systemic prevalence of violence in their lives (Ibid.: 26). As we have seen, it is the system—in this case

the justice system—that can set these young women of colour up for failure, through the system's own technologies of assessment. And it is the intersection of processes such as racialization, gendering and povertization, not individual factors, such as the mental status of the immigrant and refugee girl, that figure most prominently in the equation.

Study III: The Voices of Service-Providers Working with the Girls
The third FREDA study examined the perceptions of service providers who work closely with girls and provides confirming information for the other two projects' findings.[5] Five roundtables were conducted with 38 service providers, 10 of whom work with street-involved girls, 10 with lesbians, bisexual, and transgendered girls, 8 with Aboriginal girls, and 6 with girls with disabilities. In addition, individual interviews were conducted with four service providers with immigrant and refugee girls (Janovicek, 2001: 2). The goals of the roundtables were to gain an understanding of the girls' lives and to brainstorm around ways to support girls. The participants were asked to comment on the factors influencing girls' identity formation, their vulnerability to violence, the barriers the girls face, and how they understand and respond to systemic disadvantage. Finally, the service providers also spoke to the question of how policies impact on girls' lives and made recommendations for reform (Ibid.: 2).

Those interviewed point out that a lack of services for these marginalized girls makes them more vulnerable to violence. Girls who do not meet the dominant society's expectations will not be seen as fitting in. The participants argued that existing services are more often likely to be based upon models of social control and punishment than assistance and support (Ibid.: 4). These

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[5] The final report of that project is entitled "Reducing Crime and Victimization: A Service Providers' Report" and was authored by Nancy Janovicek. The study was funded by the National Crime Prevention Centre, Community Mobilization Program, Ministry of Justice, Canada.

responses appear to be derived from more general societal perceptions that the youth are out of control and need to be reformed. Improving services therefore would require a shift in how both service providers and the community think about young people from the margins (Ibid.: 4).

One quote from a service provider working with immigrant and refugee girls nicely encapsulates the general sense of the respondents with regard to the role the system plays in creating the disadvantaged state for these marginalized girls:

> I think it's set up though to alienate some children in the interest of others, the whole system… institutions, penal institutions… They're creating it for those people who they've set up to put there. And most of them don't expect their golden children to be there and they end up there. This is where we have the therapists and all the psychologists and the psychiatrists justifying why this person's behavior would be like this. You never hear such justification for the poor kid or the racialized kids who get institutionalized (Ibid.:5).

The service providers also felt that conflicting cultural values between the family and the dominant society are a major problem for the youth. First there may be disciplinary measures taken in the immigrant or refugee home that conflict with Canadian norms. Spanking is only one example of that kind of unacceptable measure legally sanctioned in Canada, but not an uncommon practice in other countries. Sexual mores represent another common area of conflict (Ibid.: 11). Though sexuality can be a hidden issue in many immigrant and refugee communities, in the Canadian culture, women of colour are often sexualized (Ibid.: 11) in the media and other means of communication in the dominant culture. Therefore mixed messages get delivered to the girls, but silence on the topic in their home does not allow them to understand the messages. Other issues such as HIV/AIDS, homosexuality and acceptable sexual practice can be

similarly hidden (Ibid.: 11). As a result, although most of the girls interviewed in the first two studies indicated they were proud of their heritage and family, the family itself does not evolve as the site for support or clarification on the sensitive issues which make the girls even more vulnerable to negative external influence.

The service providers interviewed also identified schools as a primary site of violence for the girls. Unfortunately, "intercultural tensions among young people are seldom understood to be an manifestation of racist and patriarchal relations" (Ibid.: 10). In the report it is argued that, instead, the media and teachers tend to emphasize bullying as the problem. Again, individual children are blamed with little attention paid to the sociocultural dimension (Ibid.:10). One reality is, though, that the process of racialization in the school system is demonstrated in the negative experiences identified and the high drop out rate of young women of colour (Fernadez et al., 1989; Kelly, 1998; Mogg, 1991, as quoted in Barron, 2001: 27). This can trigger a downward spiral in which the girl drops out of school, becomes alienated from her family, hits the street and becomes targeted for prostitution and aggression.

It is true that power plays can be involved in the tensions resulting in bullying. Defending the pecking order protects a particular group's social location, and, power relations are also played out within cultural groups on the street as well as in school. As one service provider analyzed:

> I think there is an expectation that if you don't exert your power over somebody, then you are on the bottom of the pecking order… It's no different on the street but the level of competition then becomes physical because the only thing that you have left are your fists or your words… I think that we've created a population of young women who just believe that they need to victimize someone else to get their own power back because what they've been taught is you're either a victim or a victimizer

(Janovicek, 2001: 4).

Thus aggression which occurs within a peer group sorts out who possesses the control in the group—and this can happen within gender groups as well (Ibid.: 16). The girls are the most vulnerable to the controlling behaviors from male peers. The service providers agreed that boys maintain control over groups of youth on the street. Through the employment of violence and sexual domination, they maintain power and control of the girls (Ibid.: 16).

One service provider explained this in the following way:

> In the squats, it's just a given. I've heard young women say, "just choose now who you're going to have sex with because you're going to have sex with somebody to stay here because that's the way it's run. The guys are making that really clear. That's just the trade-off and that's the power in the squats" (Ibid.: 16).

But teachers and the media tend not to acknowledge that fights and conflicts also often have a racialized edge (Ibid.: 10). When young people of colour do defend themselves against racist slurs and/or bullying, teachers tend to blame them for provoking fights and being the bullies (Ibid.: 10).

The interviewees also commented that students, as we have seen to be true in the interviews with the girls themselves, often do not seem to find racism a problem. They indicated that they find students who are born here, whether Chinese, South Asian, or Black, seem to find an affinity with the mainstream dominant culture and see immigrant and refugee kids as 'other' (Ibid.: 10-11). The latter perception is consistent with what Barron found in her study, when interviewing immigrant and refugee girls on probation, in the referencing of recent immigrants as FOBs.

The most challenging issue for the girls, according to Janovicek, remains the one of different sets of cultural values that frequently conflict with each other (Janovicek, p. 11). Girls in abusive dating relationships, for example,

continue in the relationship just to defy their parents' cultural values (Ibid.: 11). Because of this, they are particularly vulnerable since, as stated previously, they often do not feel they can turn to their parents for help and understanding. Intersecting with the other difficulties with language, gender, and poverty, it appears then that the tensions between cultural values which impact on how one is expected to behave in society create serious dilemmas for the girls.

Discussion and Conclusions

In reviewing the findings from the three studies, through the theoretical lens initially set out, several common themes emerge:

First, the same systemic processes of discrimination can disadvantage the girls and make them more vulnerable both to becoming targets of aggression and for becoming aggressive themselves.

Second, it is clear that the racialization process for the immigrant and refugee girls can work both within the dominant culture and within the racialized culture itself. That is, the girls may come to internalize the dominant culture's racialized view of themselves as being inferior. Also, the girls provide evidence of feeling discriminated against, especially in the school setting, but they may not connect that same process with their own peer experiences in conflict situations. They recognize hierarchies amongst different 'minority' cultural groups, but construct them as power hierarchies, not necessarily explicitly racial ones.

Third, tensions from conflicting cultural expectations make the girls more vulnerable, especially since many of the girls interviewed expressed mistrust of school authorities to assist in support and counseling as well as the fact that their families were not necessarily seen as locations for clarification on troubling issues about sexuality and bullying.

Fourth, the girls' vulnerabilities arising from their social location can result in the girls being considered as 'risky' from the dominant society's perspective, as was seen to be true for the girls on probation.

Finally, when trying to come up with solutions, all of the above can be further analyzed through a rights based lens, whether it is through application of the Section 15 equality provisions of the

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Charter or such instruments as the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is evident that because of discrimination, their rights to well-being and safety are jeopardized, and should be available to legal remedies, although it is also clear that this route requires advocates for the girls who would carry their case forward.

Margaret A. Jackson, School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University, lectured in the Institute for the Humanities series on Violence and Its Alternatives, October 10, 2002.

Aggressive and Violent Girls: Prevalence, Profiles and Contributing Factors

—Marlene M. Moretti[1] and Candice Odgers[2]

The following is an excerpt (not including reference bibliography) from a chapter which has been published in R. Corrado, R. Roesch & S. Hart (eds.) Multi-Problem and Violent Youth: A Foundation for Comparative Research. *Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2002.*

One of the most consistent findings throughout youth violence research and literature is that males are more heavily involved in serious forms of violence than females. According to official charge statistics, males are far more likely to be involved in both serious (homicide, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault) and minor (Level 1 assaults, intimidation) forms of violence during adolescence (Dell & Boe, 1998; Duffy, 1996; Totten, 2000; US Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). This relationship has held true across time (Corrado, Cohen & Odgers, 2000; Rowe, Vazsonyi, & Flannery, 1995) and across cultures (Budnick & Shields-Fletcher, 1998; Department of Justice Canada, 1998; Tanner, 1996). In addition, self-report data has consistently shown higher rates of violence among adolescent males when traditional measures of physical aggression and violence are employed (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). Support for unequal rates of antisocial behavior between young males and females is also evident within psychiatric literature where an approximate 4:1 male to female prevalence rate of pre-adolescence conduct disorder diagnosis has been reported (Butts et al., 1995; Cohen et al., 1993; Shaffer et al., 1995).

Despite this widely acknowledged sex difference in serious forms of violence, the involvement of females in aggressive and violent behavior has recently captured the attention of a number of individuals working in mental health, youth justice, and educational settings (Artz, 1998a; Budnick & Shields-Fletcher, 1998; Reitsma-Street, 1999). The growing recognition that there are a significant number of young women who engage in behaviors that are highly aggressive, both overtly and relationally (Moretti, Holland, & McKay, 2001), has brought forth a myriad of important research and policy questions. However, despite the immediate demand for answers to these questions and the creation of gender specific programming (Budnick & Shields-Fletcher, 1998) we still know relatively little about prevalence rates, psychosocial profiles, risk factors, and developmental trajectories of violent girls.

The inclusion of young women as a footnote, subset, or minor variation of behavior among males (Artz, 1998a; Bergsmann, 1989; Calhoun, Jurgens, & Chen, 1993; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 1998; Figueria-McDonough, 1992) limits our capacity to develop comprehensive theories of female violence (Horowitz & Pottieger, 1991; Kruttschnitt, 1994; Levine & Rosich, 1996). A substantial degree of confusion surrounding how we should best understand and respond to violence among girls continues to exist. In this chapter we summarize the existing research on

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research on prevalence, profiles, and developmental trajectories. Limitations of research and challenges to the field are discussed.

Rates of Aggression and Violence in Girls: Characteristics and Trends

Many argue that violence among girls is rising. This is not a new observation; in fact, Freda Alder voiced this concern over 25 years ago in her seminal publication *Sisters in Crime* (1975). At that time, Alder stated that "the phenomenon of female criminality is but one wave in the rising tide of female assertiveness—a wave which has not yet crested and may even be seeking its level uncomfortably close to the high-water mark set by male violence" (p.14). Although Alder was speaking more generally about criminality, the underlying concern was that the behavior of young women was becoming more serious in nature and warranted immediate attention. Since that time, violence among young women has continued to rise, and although it has not reached the 'high-water mark' set by males, recent media portrayals of girl gangs, swarmings, and brawls throughout the Western world (Burman, Tisdall & Brown, 1998; Chisholm, 1997; Hennington, Hughes, Cavell & Thompson, 1998) have contributed to the impression that female violence is increasing exponentially and may be transforming into a more vicious phenomenon (Schissel, 1997).

The question, then, is whether the impression that female violence is on the rise can be supported by what we currently know. This issue can be addressed by first examining what the long term trends in female violence are, and then examining how the rates of female and male violence compare over time. In North America, female violence has risen substantially over the last decade. Statistics Canada has reported a 127% increase in charges

for violent crimes among females over this period (Savioe, 2000). Similarly, the Violent Crime Index[3] arrest rate in the United States more than doubled for females between 1987 and 1994; although it has decreased consistently since that time (between 1995 and 1999), the rate still remains 74% above the 1980 rate, while the rate for males has dropped to 7% below its 1980 rate (*OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book,* 2000). The female arrest rate for simple assault in the United States, however, has not

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followed a similar pattern of rapid escalation and moderate decrease. Instead, it has risen over 250% since 1981 and is continuing to rise sharply (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999).

Comparing male and female charges for violence over time reveals that violent crime has increased at a greater rate among girls. In Canada, violent crime has been increasing at twice the rate for female as compared to male youth over the last decade (Statistics Canada, 1999). Similarly, between 1987 and 1994, the Violent Crime Index arrest rate in the United States more than doubled for females while increasing 64% for males (*OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book,* 2000). Measures of simple assault in the US are even more telling where arrest rates have risen 260% for females versus 148% for males between 1981 and 1987.

Admittedly, official statistics only capture a portion of the profile of violence and aggression among girls. While they are an essential source of standardized data in the analysis of prevalence and long term trends, self-report data aids in the approximation of the actual prevalence of aggression and violence. Overall, self-report measures of aggression are also supporting the notion that female youth may be 'closing the gap'. According to the [US] Surgeon General's recent report on youth violence, the ratios of self-report male to female violence have decreased from 7.5:1 to 3.5:1 between 1983 and 1999 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001).

Although there are consistent indications that female violence is on the rise, and that the ratio of male to female violence has decreased over time, a couple of cautionary notes should be considered. First, the percentage increase of female violence is somewhat misleading due to low initial base rates. For instance, although there was a 125% increase in Violent Index Offence arrest rates between 1985 and 1994 in the United States (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999), the arrest rate for males remained 5.8 times the rate for females. Second, males still tend to be more heavily involved in the most serious types of violent crimes, such as robbery and major assault, whereas females are far more likely to be charged with common assaults. For example, Statistics Canada arrest data indicates that in 1999, two-thirds of female youths [arrested] were charged with common assault compared to just under half (46%) of male youths (Savioe, 2000).

Another important methodological issue concerns the forms of aggression and violence that are measured. For example, when overt aggression is measured, which includes acts of physical aggression, significantly more boys than girls report engaging in violence (Bjorkqvist, Osterman & Kaukiainen, 1992; Cotton et al., 1994; Ryan, Matthews

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[3] Violent Crime Index includes the offences of murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

& Banner, 1993; Saner & Ellickson, 1996; US Department of Health and Human Services, 2001), although a handful of studies have reported comparable rates (Finkelstein, Von Eye & Preece, 1994; Snyder & Sickmund, 1999). However, when the traditional definition of violence is expanded, to include indirect or relational forms of aggression, the disparity between males and females decreases (Crick, 1995; Crick & Grotepeter, 1995; Everett & Price, 1995).

Overall, then, official and self-report data indicate that girls' aggression has consistently risen across the past two decades. It is important to keep in mind, however, that female violence is not skyrocketing and girls continue to be under-represented as perpetrators of serious forms of overt aggression.

Do Girls Express Aggression Differently than Boys?
A recent body of literature suggests that girls may be as aggressive as boys if gender-specific forms of aggression are considered. There is little question that in early childhood boys are more physically or overtly aggressive then are girls (Fabes & Eisenberg, 1992; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1980; Parke & Slaby, 1983). Crick and Grotpeter (1995) argue, however, that girls are just as aggressive as are boys if gender differences in the expression of aggressive behavior are recognized. Gender differences in aggression arise because of fundamental differences between males and females in social goals: males' social goals emphasize instrumentality and physical dominance while females' goals are more focused on interpersonal issues. The bilateral model of aggression captures gender differences in aggressive behavior, according to the specific focus or goal to which aggressive acts are directed. Two forms of aggressive behavior are differentiated. Overt aggression includes physical acts and verbal threats toward others, such as hitting or threatening to hit others. In contrast, relational aggression which is intended to harm others through damage to personal and social relationships, such as spreading rumors

and excluding others from social groups. In studies of pre-school children (Crick, Casas & Ku, 1999; Crick, Casas & Mosher, 1997); middle-age children (Crick, 1996; Crick & Bigbee, 1998; Cunningham, et al., 1998; Rys & Bear, 1997) and young adults (Werner & Crick, 1999), relational aggression has been associated with greater loneliness and less social

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satisfaction, independently of level of overt aggression. While both relational and overt aggression are viewed as equally hostile, relationally aggressive acts have been shown to be particularly distressing for girls (Crick & Bigbee, 1998; Paquette & Underwood, 1999).

How consistently are gender differences in the expression of aggression found?
The results of pre-school studies with children as young as three to five years of age indicate that teachers and peers readily distinguish relational from overt aggression. Even at this young age, girls display a significantly higher level of relationally aggressive behavior than do boys (Crick et al., 1997), and girls are more likely to experience relational victimization than are boys (Crick & Bigbee, 1998; Crick

et al., 1999). By middle childhood, the distinction between the gender-specific forms of aggressive behavior appears relatively well-established; although the percentage of aggressive girls and boys is comparable (27% of boys vs. 21.7% of girls; Crick and Grotpeter, 1995), girls tend to display this aggressive behavior through covert, relational acts and boys through overt, physical acts.

Yet not all research supports the view that girls and boys express aggression differently. Some studies have found, for example, that girls and boys engage in relational aggression to the same extent (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995; Rys & Bear, 1997). Indeed in some studies (Craig, 1998; Henington, Huges, Cavell, & Thompson, 1998; Roecker, Caprini, Dickerson, Parks & Barton, 1999; Wolke, Woods, Bloomfield, and Karstadt, 2000) boys are found to engage in even higher levels of relational aggression than are girls. There are several factors that play a role in these diverse findings including diverse assessment procedures (self-report, teacher report, behavior observation) and the age of children across various studies. Nonetheless, it is simply not the case that relational aggression is exclusively a female form of aggressive behavior at any developmental level. Girls and boys both engage in relational aggression across development. Girls, however, generally engage in higher levels of relational than overt aggression and boys generally engage in higher levels of overt than relational aggression.

How Important is Relational Aggression?
An important question to ask, then, is whether relational aggression is of any particular significance in understanding severe aggression and violence in girls. There are two types of information that are relevant in this regard. First, clinically elevated or severe levels of relational aggression may be a 'marker' of other forms of aggressive behavior that are present at the current time. The evidence pertaining to the role of relational aggression as a 'marker' of other forms of aggressive behavior is limited but some trends can be

data. A close look at published studies shows that the correlation between relational and overt aggression is typically very high. For example, in a study of 245 third to sixth grade children, Crick (1996) found a correlation of .77 between relational and overt aggression. Although studies show that relational aggression has unique consequences on social-emotional functioning in girls and boys, independent of overt aggression (Crick & Bigbee, 1998; Paquette & Underwood, 1999), the high correlation indicates that these two forms of aggression often co-occur. Similar results were found in our study of conduct disordered adolescents (Moretti, Holland & McKay, 2001). Girls engaged in significantly higher rates of relational aggression than did boys; however, they did not engage in lower levels of overt aggression and assaultive behavior. Furthermore, the correlation between these two forms of aggression was high for both girls and boys, r=.62 and r=.54 respectively. More importantly, a robust correlation emerged between relational aggression and engagement in assaultive behavior for girls, r=.47, p=.001, but not for boys, r= -.12, ns. These results suggest that very high levels of relational aggression in girls may be a marker for serious overt aggressive behavior. These girls are often highly controlling and manipulating of their social networks (i.e., relationally aggressive), and at the same time, physically aggressive toward others. This is consistent with observations of other researchers (Artz, 1998b; Campbell, 1984; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 1998) who have used diverse methods to understand the lives of aggressive and violent girls. For example, Artz (1998b) describes the social relationships of violent girls as focused on issues of power and dominance designed to secure their position within a tenuous social milieu.

Relational aggression may also be important as a predictor of future violent behavior even if such behavior is not present at the current time.

Unfortunately, longitudinal evidence of such a relationship is limited. In one study, however, Crick (1996) found that level of relational aggression is related

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to peer rejection in girls and that peer rejection increases over time (6 month follow-up) for relationally aggressive girls. Clearly, further research is required to assess the predictive significance of relational aggression to later violent behavior.

In sum, although research shows that relational aggression is generally more pronounced in girls than is overt aggression, relational aggression is not restricted to girls. It is clear that relational aggression is linked with increased levels of psychological problems and social relations difficulty at least concurrently and in the short term. However, research findings are insufficient to conclude that relational aggression, independent of physical aggression, is predictive of the development of severe aggressive behavior or violence in girls or boys. Nonetheless, preliminary findings show that very high relational aggression typically co-occurs with overt aggression and assaultive behavior in high-risk girls but not high-risk boys. Thus, relational aggression may define the social context in which serious acts of overt aggression occur for girls.

Risk Factors, Mental Health Profiles and Developmental Trajectories
Based on our previous discussion it is clear that various forms of aggression are associated with a myriad of social-emotional difficulties in both girls and boys. However, there are very few studies that have made the distinction between minor and serious forms of aggression among girls. Instead, the majority of research has treated girls that engage in antisocial behavior or delinquency as a homogeneous group. For example, a meta-analysis of 60 studies conducted by Simourd and Andrews (1994) concluded that the risk factors that are important

for male delinquency are also important for female delinquency. The majority of outcome measures employed in these studies, however, failed to distinguish between minor forms of antisocial behavior (ie. skipping school, drinking, lying, shoplifting) and more serious measures of aggression (physical fights, use of weapons, robbery, etc.).

The second limitation throughout this body of research relates to the tendency to rely heavily on normative or low-risk populations. For instance, in arriving at the conclusion that there are no significant differences in the correlates of delinquency for males and females, Rowe, Vazonyi & Flannery (1995), relied on a sample (n=836) of predominately middle class, Caucasian youth, from intact families (89%), who reported relatively minor involvement in delinquency. Similarly, the most recent review of the research on female adolescent aggression (Leschied, Cummings, Van Brunschot, Cunningham & Saunders, 2000) was based on studies where the majority— over 70%—of samples were drawn from normative or high school populations.

Arguably, there are two problems with relying on these types of summaries for the purposes of profiling girls who engage in serious forms of violence. First, we know from previous research that highly aggressive youth are not likely to be found in school populations due to high rates of expulsion and dropping out (Figueria-McDonough, 1986; Corrado, Odgers & Cohen, 2000). Second, although the preceding meta-analyses and literature reviews concluded that the factors associated with aggression for males and females were remarkably similar, it is not clear whether this relationship holds true at more extreme ends of the continuum of violence.

Although it is important that researchers understand the significance of even moderately elevated levels of aggression for psychological adjustment in girls, there are limitations in generalizing from research based largely on normative populations and relatively non-serious definitions of violence to highly aggressive and violent girls.

In other words, there is a need to examine separately the factors that contribute to very severe aggressive and violent behavior. Not surprisingly, the information on these very high-risk girls is extremely scant. There are, however, two sources of relevant information on severely aggressive and violent girls, namely, juvenile delinquency and conduct disorder (CD) research. Although not all female offenders

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and conduct disordered youth are violent, most are either overtly or covertly aggressive and thus findings from these studies are of relevance here.

With respect to risk factors, there is a reasonably large body of juvenile delinquency research profiling female offenders. Overall, these studies (Bergsmann, 1989; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 1998; Corrado, Odgers & Cohen, 2000; Crawford, 1988; Lewis, Yeager, Cobham-Portorreal & Klein, 1991; Rosenbaum, 1989; Warren

& Rosenbaum, 1986) report similar findings pointing to high levels of physical and sexual victimization, family dysfunction, substance use, and psychological distress. A review of these studies indicated that 45% to 75% of incarcerated girls have been sexually abused, as compared to approximately 2% to 11% of incarcerated males (Bergsmann, 1989; Corrado, Odgers & Cohen, 2000; U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1997; Viale-Val & Sylvester, 1993). Reported levels of physical abuse are also extremely high among girls in jail. For example, Corrado, Cohen & Odgers (2000), in a Canadian study of 460 incarcerated youth, reported that 70% of females (n=110) versus 38% of males (n= 360) reported exposure to physical abuse. Similarly, other studies (Bergsman, 1989; Calhoun et al., 1993; Viale-Val & Sylvester, 1993) show rates of physical abuse among girls as ranging between 40% and 62%.

Familial dysfunction (Calhoun, et al., 1993; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 1998; Corrado, Odgers & Cohen, 2000), psychopathology (Bergsmann, 1989; Rosenbaum, 1989), and family violence (Heimer & deCoster, 1999) are also extremely common among girls in jail. For instance, Rosenbaum (1989) reported that 97% of girls committed to the California Youth Authority came from non-intact families, and that 76% had family members with previous

previous records of arrest. Likewise, Corrado, Odgers & Cohen (2000) found significantly higher levels of familial dysfunction among girls in custody; 70% had a family member with a criminal record, 76% had a family member with a significant substance abuse problem, and 78% reported that a family member had been physically abused. Levels of family conflict among the females were also significantly higher, with 88% of girls leaving home, and 57% reporting that they had been kicked out of their homes. Moreover, in accordance with previous research (see Bergsmann, 1989; Shaw & Dubois, 1995; Smith & Thomas, 2000), the levels of family dysfunction and level of conflict experienced within the home was significantly higher among the female, as compared to the male offenders.

CD research has produced mixed findings with respect to the effects of exposure to maltreatment. In a study of early-onset CD, Webster-Stratton (1996) found no difference between girls and boys in a host of family variables including parental drug and alcohol abuse and depression, disconfirming the hypothesis that it takes a worse environment to produce conduct problems in girls than boys. In other studies, however, conduct disordered girls are found to be more likely to be placed outside the home in foster care or other such facilities, to be removed from the home earlier than boys, and to be exposed to sexual abuse (Moretti, Holland & McKay, 2001; Moretti, Wiebe, Brown & Kovacs, 2000).

With respect to mental health profiles, studies of youth in detention centres has confirmed the view that girls are more likely than boys to have a broad array of problems. In particular, high rates of suicide ideation and attempts (Bergsmann, 1989; Lewis et al., 1991) have been reported in these samples. In a self-report study conducted by the American Correctional Association Task Force on the Female Offender, over half of the girls reported attempting suicide (Crawford, 1988), while a seven-year follow up study of female

offenders, conducted by Lewis et al. (1991), found that close to 90% of these girls had attempted suicide. Numerous studies have also highlighted the presence of depression and low levels of self-esteem among female young offenders (Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 1998; Crawford, 1988). In addition, higher rates of substance use disorders (SUDs) (Ellickson, Saner & McGuigan, 1997; Jasper, Smith, & Bailey, 1998;

> The typical delinquent and conduct disordered girl has generally experienced more severe maltreatment and trauma than boys with comparable behavior problems… There is consistent evidence that girls have a far greater scope of mental health problems, beyond their aggressive behavior, than do boys.

Kingery, Mirzaee, Pruitt, Hurley & Heuberger (1991) and hard drug use have consistently been found among incarcerated girls (Corrado, Odgers & Cohen, 2000; Crawford, 1988; Horowitz & Pottieger, 1991).

Studies examining the mental health profiles of conduct disordered girls is limited, but findings typically confirm a pattern of pervasive psychopathology which exceeds that found for conduct disordered boys. In one of the first papers to address this issue, Loeber and Keenan (1994) selectively reviewed studies on co-morbidity with CD and specifically examined the effects of age and gender. Where possible, general population studies were selected but studies using high-risk and clinical samples were noted as well. Odds ratios showed

that girls with CD were more likely to suffer from co-morbid conditions of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorder, depression and substance use disorder (SUD) than were their male counterparts. Similar results were found in our recent study of gender differences in rates of co-morbidity among 70 adolescents diagnosed with conduct disorder (Moretti, Lessard, Weibe & Reebye, 2001). Girls and boys in this sample were found to show highly similar patterns of conduct disordered behavior; for example, girls were as likely as boys to be involved in violent or aggressive behaviors such as mugging, cruelty to others, and use of weapons. Despite the comparability in CD symptoms, co-morbid psychiatric disorders were much more prevalent among girls than boys. For boys, 16.1% met criteria for CD alone and approximately 80% were diagnosed with between one to three additional disorders. In contrast, all girls in our sample were diagnosed with a co-morbid condition; in fact, 37% of conduct disordered girls met criteria for between one and three additional disorders and a further 63% were diagnosed with four or more additional disorders. Most commonly, girls met criteria for at least one internalizing, one externalizing, and a substance use disorder. Similar findings were found regardless of whether analyses focused on results from diagnostic interviews or from independent caregiver reports.

A few studies have specifically examined co-morbidity between conduct disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a test of the hypothesis that exposure to trauma is associated with both delinquent behavior and PTSD. Cauffman, Feldman, Waterman and Steiner (1998) found that approximately 60% of incarcerated female juvenile offenders met partial (12%) or full (49%) criteria for PTSD. These rates were significantly higher than those noted for male juvenile delinquents. Furthermore, compared to males, females were more likely to report being victims of violent acts (15% vs. 51% for males and females respectively) rather than witnesses to

Compared to males, females were more likely to report being victims of violent acts… rather than witnesses to such acts.

Although these findings are provocative in suggesting that aggressive and violent behavior in girls is linked to distinct risk profiles, there are several notable limitations. First, existing research is almost exclusively descriptive in nature. Most has focused on assessing the relative level of risk factors in girls and boys rather than the relationship between the risk factors and aggressive behavior. All or some of these risk factors may be more or less strongly related to aggressive behavior in girls than boys. Second, existing research is typically

such acts (48% vs. 17% for males and females respectively). Similar findings were reported by Reebye and colleagues (Reebye, Moretti, Wiebe & Lessard, 2001). Girls diagnosed with conduct disorder met criteria for PTSD more frequently than did boys. Girls more frequently reported exposure to sexual assault while boys were more likely to report exposure to physical assaults, being involved in accidents and witnessing the death of a loved one.

In summary, the typical delinquent and conduct disordered girl has generally experienced more severe maltreatment and trauma than boys with comparable behavior problems. There is some evidence that the type of maltreatment and trauma experienced by delinquent and conduct disordered girls is different than that experienced by boys; girls are more likely to be victims of sexual abuse than are boys. Finally, there is consistent evidence that girls have a far greater scope of mental health problems, beyond their aggressive behavior, than do boys.

> There is some evidence that the type of maltreatment and trauma experienced by delinquent and conduct disordered girls is different than that experienced by boys; girls are more likely to be victims of sexual abuse than are boys.

retrospective. The findings provide a good picture of the types of events that have transpired in the lives of these girls, and the scope of the mental health problems with which they contend. However, they do not provide a test of the causal relationships between risk factors and the development of later aggressive behavior. These are just some of the challenges for future research in this area.

Marlene Moretti, Department of Psychology at Simon Fraser University, lectured in the Institute for the Humanities series on Violence and Its Alternatives, November 14, 2002.

John Rumbiak, West Papuan activist, speaks at Simon Fraser University at Harbour Centre
—Bob Russell

On October 22, 2002, the Institute for the Humanities sponsored a public lecture at Harbour Centre by John Rumbiak, the leading human rights activist in West Papua, who was on a lecture tour across Canada. I was fortunate to have attended his first SFU talk (also sponsored by the Institute) just over a year and a half ago, where I had been most impressed by the strength and courage of the man. That talk, entitled "West Papua: The Next East Timor?" had been very timely, as the university was nearing the end of its 10-year CIDA-funded project in Indonesia and taking stock of the successes and failures of SFU's dealing with the Suharto regime.

John Rumbiak was born in Biak in 1962, studied English at Cenderawasih University and human rights advocacy at Columbia University. He was also a participant in the Canada World Youth program. After a period as coordinator for studies and advocacy at the Rural Community Development Foundation (YPMD) in Papua, he became supervisor of ELS-HAM Papua, the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy. ELS-HAM is committed to non-violence and working towards the demilitarization of West Papua, and empowering the people through advocacy. Rumbiak has travelled extensively to testify on human rights issues, including frequent visits to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the US Congress. He is also a member of the board of directors of the Papua Resource Centre (based in New York City).

This lecture, entitled "Human Rights, Militarism and Terror in the Asia Pacific: The Case of West Papua" was equally timely. With the United States moving to restore aid to the Indonesian armed forces which had been suspended over the issue of human rights in East Timor, Indonesia now hopes to be a US ally against terrorism in Southeast Asia. Rumbiak explained how this strategy, apart from sacrificing human rights, may be counter-productive, since elements of the Indonesian army, like others in the region, are often themselves the authors of terrorist activities. Army officers have been implicated in killings and human rights abuses against 'dissidents' seeking self-determination for provinces like Papua and Aceh, and in sponsorship of Islamist militia groups like Laskar Jihad in predominantly Christian West Papua.

The talk was well attended, largely by individuals who have long been interested in human rights issues in Indonesia and East Timor. In addition to introducing the relatively uninformed to the current situation in West Papua, it provided the opportunity for committed individuals to strengthen their support for a worthy cause—see, for example, the webpage at www.westpapua.ca which is maintained by a West Papua support group. In both of these respects, the Institute for the Humanities sponsorship of talks such as this one provides an invaluable service to the University and the larger community.

Bob Russell is a faculty member in the Department of Mathematics and Statisics, Simon Fraser University.

# Canadian Citizenship and the New Barbarism
—Ed Broadbent

It is often said that the 1960s were the years of great change. The truth is that the real transformation had come earlier.

When I graduated from university in 1959, as a working class kid from Oshawa, I was full of optimism. I thought the world was my oyster—and I was right. Within a year my student debts were paid off and I never looked back. My friend, a fellow philosophy student from Brooklyn, had the same expectations. This was because 1959 was also the year that for the first time in their history, a majority of Americans identified themselves as being middle class.[1]

By the end of the fifties Canadians and Americans had transformed themselves. During the previous two decades as democratic peoples they had changed significantly in their views about the role of government and the nature of citizenship. Citizens in both countries no longer accepted high levels of inequality and insecurity as being inevitable. Following the depression of the 1930s and World War II, they and a crucially important group of political leaders had reached the conclusion that more equality and security were desirable and achievable.

Although I want to concentrate on Canadian citizenship for most of my talk it is worth emphasizing that for a brief period Americans and Canadians seemed to be taking the same direction. In fact, during the march towards greater equality in the middle third of the twentieth century, the Americans did much of the leading.

Photo by Greg Ehlers, SFU

For those who admire contemporary American fiction and have read either John Updike's *In the Beauty of the Lilies* (the early passages) or Annie Proulx's remarkable *Accordian Crimes,* they will have seen how difficult life was in the United States for the large majority, whether native born or immigrant, before the Roosevelt era. In the years leading up to 1959, something happened that had never occurred before in such a period of time. The real income for the average worker doubled.[2]

There are those in the United States and Canada who would have us believe this was simply due to the vigour of individual enterprise. I think they are mistaken. I believe the principal reason for the change in the human condition for the majority was the presence for the first time of a government committed to the equality of its citizens. For it was precisely this period that saw the emergence in the United States of programs and policies designed to achieve this goal.

Beginning in 1935 with his social security program (the model for our

Canada Pension which came 30 years later) Franklin Roosevelt launched a series of initiatives that transformed the life of the average American. In addition to universal pensions there were housing programs, unemployment insurance, municipal works, money for the arts, loan guarantees, tax-subsidized mortgages, and tuition-free state university education.

Laissez-faire was replaced with ongoing governmental activism on both sides of the border. In 1937, as a percentage of GDP, government spending in Canada had been a mere 18.6%. By the end of the fifties this had risen to 28.6%. In the United States, the transformation was even more significant. Starting at a lower 8.6%, governmental expenditure grew by over 300%, ending up over the same period at virtually the same level as Canada.[3] By the time of my graduation, Canadian citizens were beginning to think of themselves as sharing and caring. And most Americans no longer felt class-divided. In each case economic growth played a role. But the major reason is to be found in the many government programs specifically designed to achieve higher levels of equality within that growth.

By 1961 a young John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address could confidently say to his fellow citizens, "ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." I believe that he was able to make this idealistic appeal with credibility because millions of his fellow citizens had grown up with a government that had already demonstrated that it cared for them. In January 2002, President George W. Bush, reflecting four decades of steady decline in government participation in citizens' lives could successfully invoke patriotism only in going to war.

[1] J. Madrick, "Social Security and Its discontents," *New York Review of Books,* December 19, 1996.

[2] R.N. Bellah, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swindler, and S. Tioton point out in *The Good Society* (New York: A. Knopf, 1991) that between 1940 and 1959 the real income of the majority of Americans doubled.

[3] These figures come from *The Economist,* September 20, 1997.

Significantly, George Bush would not want to invoke government expansion for almost any other aspect of life. By the time he was elected, Americans had long since abandoned their commitment to greater economic equality. Canada had moved well ahead of the United States in social spending. In the pre-Bush decades American politicians increasingly talked about tax- payers and consumers and less about citizens. I don't believe this to be accidental.

Democratic Citizenship

Citizenship means to hold the rights and have the obligations of membership in a political community. In the Western tradition this has taken place within either a city or a nation state. The Athenians and the Romans were flourishing examples of the former. Today virtually all the world's citizens are members of nation states—although many see us evolving towards something quite new, namely global citizenship—or citizenship without borders. I want, however, to focus on the nation state, and to talk not just about citizenship but about democratic citizenship.

Democratic citizenship is really quite recent in history. Because women and slaves were excluded from political life, the ancient Greek cities were never real democracies. However, they did give us the core idea of democratic citizenship that has remained with us to this day. For the Greeks a democracy meant that all adults must be included on an equal basis in governing and that governing itself would consist of a continuing political effort to achieve greater equality in the substance of life for all of the citizens and their families.

However, in the actual development of real, modern democratic societies, what we today call representative democracy did not begin in a state of equality. Quite the contrary. Our democracies evolved from within pre-existing authoritarian nation states. The right to vote evolved from the top down, not from the bottom

up. And it did so very much on a class basis. Although democratic reformers often invoked the language of equality, in actual practice those with power made concessions (normally after great conflict) on the basis of income or property. The more of each you had, the more you could be relied upon to support the status quo. In most of today's democracies men who worked as labourers on farms or in factories didn't get the vote until near the end of

> In the years leading up to 1959, something happened that had never occurred before in such a period of time. The real income for the average worker doubled.

the nineteenth century. Voting rights for women came after World War I. In France they were excluded until after World War II. The same is true for Canada's Aboriginal peoples.

It is only very recently that we talk about the full and equal rights of all citizens. Indeed, in Britain, it was just a few years ago that Tony Blair finally suggested the British should stop talking about themselves as 'subjects' and start using the equality language of citizenship. In retrospect it is not hard to understand why equal political citizenship was so slow in coming about. Those with power understood the original idea of democracy very well. In plain terms it meant if you give ordinary people the right to vote they would probably use that right as the Greeks and nineteenth century democratic reformers said they would: to equalize conditions in society. If

you were a British landowner, a French merchant or a German industrialist, this was not an enticing prospect. Here in Canada, Sir John A. Macdonald, our first prime minister, favoured an unelected Senate which he saw as protecting minorities. Rich Canadians, he pointed out, would always be a minority. In the United States, James Madison (a Founding Father) had defended a new federal constitution in part because he saw it as an effective check on majority rule which, if unchecked, could result in pressure to re-distribute property, a 'fault' he associated with democracies.[4]

By and large most liberals and conservatives in the nineteenth century had opposed democratic citizenship until the very last moment. Outstanding figures like John Stuart Mill were the exception. Although he had some concerns, he saw democracy not only as inevitable and equalizing, but as desirable. Mill saw democratic equality as a foundation for a great future on this planet. He believed equal political rights for all men and women would lead to the liberation and education of millions of ordinary people. He wanted them to participate actively in their societies, to develop their skills and talents, to create new science and write great novels. Equality and human liberty were to go hand in hand. As Mill pointed out, no one at birth should be deemed to have a greater claim on the world's resources than anyone else. In making our way in the world, equality, he reasonably asserted, should be the norm. In a democracy it was inequality that required justification. He took it for granted that a democratic government would work to achieve greater levels of equality in society.

What, you may well ask, does all this have to do with Canadian citizenship a century and a half later? By offering this crude sketch about the root meaning of democracy, about how democratic citizenship and equality were originally thought to go hand in hand, I want to

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[4] James Madison, *The Federalist,* No. 10.

emphasize a brief, glorious moment in the middle of the twentieth century, when real live politics in virtually all of the world's representative democracies actually measured up to the original ideal. In Western Europe and in North America the bright candle of human equality seemed to inspire all but a reactionary few. My friend from Brooklyn and I were fortunate to come of age at the right moment. The candle has since almost gone out in America and is flickering today in Canada. So what happened? And what can be done about it?

In retrospect the broad outlines are clear. The Great Depression and World War II shook up the thinking of a whole generation and their politicians. They responded with humanity and creativity. They realized that left on its own a market economy leads to deepening insecurity and inequality. And that precisely because of this, democracy itself was threatened—as it was in the 1930s. The governments of Churchill and Roosevelt planned for the long run and attempted to expand the institutional foundation of the democratic state. Churchill's coalition government with Labour decided that a new set of social and economic rights should be established in Britain after the war and should become part of a new global order. Roosevelt was in strong agreement. In his last presidential address to the American people (January 11, 1944) he became the one and only president to argue that political and civil rights were "inadequate to assure [Americans] equality in the pursuit of happiness." He appealed unsuccessfully to Congress for an Economic Bill of Rights, believing a high degree of real equality was essential if there was to be equal opportunity in the pursuit of happiness. His remarkable wife Eleanor went on to be the leading public exponent of the need for the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

In Canada, prodded on by provincial electoral success and a national public opinion poll favouring the CCF in 1945, Mackenzie King committed the federal

government to building higher levels of equality. In continental Western Europe, social democratic and Christian Democratic parties combined their energies in laying the world's strongest institutional foundations linking equality with democratic citizenship.

In general terms, the prime ministers in Canada I grew up with in my university years, John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson, broadened the foundation of our political heritage by adding in the democratically crucial social dimension. This was extended again during most of the years when Pierre Trudeau and Robert Stanfield led the Liberal and Conservative parties. During the four decades after World War II our notion of democratic citizenship moved well beyond political and civil rights to include social and economic rights. Although not always expressed in the abstract language of rights, politicians and voters alike came to understand that true freedom for ordinary citizens had to involve more equality and less insecurity in society. It involved both private and public goods. Formal political and civil rights can mean little in the daily life of citizens if social and economic circumstances effectively reduce or even deny their use by the majority. The equal right to pursue your own happiness can mean very little to poor kids unless there are strong public systems of education and health care.

Thus, the goals of Canadian citizenship came to include adequate pensions for seniors, universal health care, improved unemployment insurance, unions in the public and private sectors, redistributive income tax policies, high spending on education including the expectation that children from lower income families would be able to gain access to university. Without exception such goals mean governments must intervene to alter what would otherwise be the unequal effects of a market-based economy.

During the Trudeau years, both in the Constitution Act of 1982 and in legislative measures, other equality concerns led to affirmative action programs for women and visible

minorities, the protection of our two official languages, support for multi-cultural programs, and the entrenchment of Aboriginal rights in the constitution. I emphasize again that not only was there an abstract or formal commitment to obtain greater equality in citizenship, it was also seen that a democratic government and the courts had an obligation to intervene both in the economy and in traditional patterns of behaviour, to make it happen.

Although we did have serious disagreements on some issues, on most matters during this period, the differences between myself as a social democrat and Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Stanfield were mostly about speed and detail—not principle. All three of us believed a just Canada meant a more equal Canada. When it comes to democratic citizenship, I think the three of us would have achieved consensus on the following claims and values. First, a market economy is desirable as an expression of free choice and for the innovative production of most goods and services. Second, in a democracy, reliance on the market for many activities—education, health, culture and the environment—is not good, either because the market mechanism is inherently unequal in its effects or because certain non-commercial values are worth protecting for their own sake. Finally, we would have agreed that by the mid-1980s Canada had become a vastly improved democracy compared to 1945: there was more real freedom in more people's lives because politicians had taken care to ensure that the benefits of economic growth were shared. Canadians had indeed become a nation of citizens who shared and cared. While desiring a market economy, we were, unlike our American neighours, rejecting a market society.

Pressure To Change
For a variety of interconnected reasons most developed democracies, including Canada by the mid 1970s, had accumulated unacceptable levels of debt. These reasons included the impact of much higher world prices for oil, demographic changes and the simultaneous experience of high

inflation and high unemployment which had led to lower growth rates in the economy. In Western continental Europe, appropriate adjustments were made, but the on-going commitment to the goal of equal citizenship based on strong social programs and high levels of taxation remained. However, in Britain and Canada a new generation of ideologically-driven political leaders emerged who used the occasion to turn back history. They began an assault on our equality-based social programs in particular and government in general—and did so in a vocabulary that combined simplistic economic slogans with attacks on the very idea of social citizenship. They proposed nostrums not solutions. Consider their list of claims and promises. I think you will find them familiar.

- In order to have higher national productivity we must have lower taxes and less government.

- Reducing the level of government activity will lead to an increase in voluntary citizen participation.

- If we want less inequality and poverty, we must simply let the market grow on its own, unhampered by government involvement.

- Universal social programs are too costly, are inefficient and reduce our competitiveness in an increasingly globalized market place.

Recently, an additional fifth claim has been made by this new generation of politicians. They began to tell us universal health care—by far our most successful, equalizing and popularly supported social program—is no longer sustainable.

An interesting fact about all of these claims is that not a single one is true. They are simply assertions. None of them can be supported by credible evidence. When you look at the evidence, plainly available here in Canada and abroad, a quite different picture emerges, in comparison to

what they have told us.

Let us take the five assertions one at a time.

- During the 1990s, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands (among others) kept the high level of taxes needed to maintain strong social programs. Did their productivity go down? Quite the contrary. During this period their productivity increases actually equaled or exceeded those of the United States and Canada.

> …the recent decision by Daimler-Chrysler to put a multi-million dollar new production facility in Windsor instead of Detroit was strongly influenced by the fact that by doing so they will save millions of dollars each year. Why? In part because of the lower value of the Canadian dollar but also because in the United States, companies in this and many other sectors have to pay for the health insurance of every employee, a cost which does not exist for them in Canada. In short, medicare gives us a competitive advantage in attracting industry.

- Instead of going up when governments slashed billions of dollars from social programs during the l990s, volunteerism in Canada underwent a serious decline by the end of the decade. In fact citizen participation in society and politics is much stronger in Scandinavian states than in any other country. Not coincidentally, the Scandinavians have the world's strongest social programs.

- In spite of claims by the federal government and those of Alberta and Ontario that poverty and inequality

would be looked after by leaving the economy to grow on its own, during the 1990s the opposite occurred. High levels of economic growth in Canada were actually accompanied by a widening of the gap between average and rich families and significant increases in the numbers of poor. During this ten-year period, while the number and percentage of poor children in Canada went up almost every year, five Western European countries virtually eliminated child poverty.

- Instead of universal social programs invariably reducing a nation's economic competitiveness, in many cases they actually improve it. Not only has this been shown theoretically by Anthony Atkinson at Oxford University and the Swede Bo Rothstein, in practice the so-called Asian tigers consciously applied this understanding in building their dynamic economies. Here in Canada our own spending on universal health care not only costs less per capita in comparison with spending on health insurance in the United States, their higher level of spending also leaves 40 million Americans with no health insurance whatever. Furthermore, the recent decision by Daimler-Chrysler to put a multi-million dollar new production facility in Windsor instead of Detroit was strongly influenced by the fact that by doing so they will save millions of dollars each year. Why? In part because of the lower value of the Canadian dollar but also because in the United States, companies in this and many other sectors have to pay for the health insurance of every employee, a cost which does not exist for them in Canada. In short, medicare gives us a competitive advantage in attracting industry.

Finally, the cost of health care. It is not the case that we must give up as 'unsustainable' our current public health care system. That so many Canadians apparently believe the opposite, is a triumph of propaganda over truth. Contrary to what so many of the new politicians and editorial writers want

us to believe, government spending on health as a percentage of GDP is lower today than it was a decade ago. If we want to improve the system, more money is part of the answer. And clearly we can afford it. If medicare is threatened it is primarily the fault of Jean Chrétien, Mike Harris, Ralph Klein and now Gordon Campbell. During the past decade, they treated us as consumers, not citizens. They preferred to give us billions in tax-breaks and starve what many experts continue to regard as the world's best health care system. They created the so-called financial crisis and now have the nerve to tell us something is wrong.

In every way on every day, there is increased pressure to take us back to a concept of Canadian citizenship shorn of equality. We live in a Canada in which social and economic rights are struggling for survival, a Canada in which the law of the jungle is being promoted as the way of the world. Canadian citizenship as envisaged by Pierre Trudeau, Bob Stanfield and Tommy Douglas has been replaced with a new barbarism. I choose my word with care. One of the meanings of 'barbarism' is the absence of civilized standards. We are abandoning such standards. We are now reverting to an old concept of citizenship, one based on the assumption that we humans are primarily competitive with one another, that we are not merely self-interested but also selfish. We are being told that we must re-build our social and political institutions on these divisive assumptions.

Any novelist or sociologist knows such a simplistic view of human nature is false. In fact, when you think about it, we all know it's false. We know that we care for ourselves and our families. But we also care for our neighbours. We want economic rewards based on performance. But we also work for nothing within our communities— coaching teams, fund-raising for the arts and supporting the victims of AIDS. We

want our companies to be economically successful but we also insist that they respect human rights and protect the environment. We have many entirely personal desires and appetites. But we have also created over 175,000 voluntary organizations and by government action we have established equality-based social programs in health care and pensions and education. Yes, we want personal cash to go to the movies, to buy a computer and to have holidays with our kids. But we have also demonstrated in poll after poll that we will willingly

> We are at a crossroads. The civilized option is to join hands with the Swedes and Germans and Austrians and Danes and Dutch and Norwegians who never abandoned their post-war dual commitment to equality of citizenship and economic success. Today they are doing well in the globalized economy. We can too.

pay more taxes to rebuild medicare and to adequately fund our universities, so that students don't have to acquire debt burdens averaging $25,000.

In all of these illustrations, we Canadians demonstrate that our individualism is not necessarily in competition with the social good. This is because our kind of individualism recognizes we are also social beings. It does not reject, but embraces co-operation. Human identities are complex and multidimensional. As I have said, we want a market-based economy, but not a market-driven society.

Many of the new politicians now say bluntly that we must choose between economic growth and social justice. They increasingly point to the United States as a model. Yes, that is one option. It is true that we can have high levels of growth with cut-backs in programs for average Canadians, much suffering for the poor and an over-all increase in inequality.

The other road is to reassert our humanity, to remind ourselves that we Canadians truly flourished in the middle of the twentieth century when we strove for national economic success but did so by embracing at the same time the democratic citizen's goal of equality. We are at a crossroads. The civilized option is to join hands with the Swedes and Germans and Austrians and Danes and Dutch and Norwegians who never abandoned their post-war dual commitment to equality of citizenship and economic success. Today they are doing well in the globalized economy. We can too.

There is no determinism. We can decide. We Canadians who are prosperous and have benefited from what others did in the past can remain silent or we can join in the struggle for justice. It is easy to point to the difficulties and suggest that in the end attempting to change what is wrong can be quite futile. Passivity and cynicism have always come easily to the educated and prosperous.

In Anton Chekhov's short story, "Ward No. 6," there is an exchange between a so-called madman and a self-satisfied doctor. The doctor's philosophy of life contains no need to go beyond a life of personal satisfaction. He remains indifferent to the problems of his community. At one point the madman becomes furious. He says to the doctor:

> You tried to shape your life so that nothing would trouble you or make you stir from your place… You sat around warm and peaceful, saving up money, reading books, delighting yourself with all sorts of nonsense… A convenient philosophy: no need to do anything, and

your conscience is clear, and you feel yourself a wise man… No, sir, that's not philosophy, not thinking, not breadth of vision, it's laziness, fakirism, a dreamy stupor.[5]

We Canadians need to put fakirism to one side and as citizens once again engage in the ongoing struggle for equality.

Edward Broadbent, J.S. Woodsworth Chair in the Humanities from 1997 to 1999, delivered this public lecture sponsored by the Canadian Association of University Teachers at Capilano College in Vancouver, British Columbia on March 17, 2002. He was invested with a Companion of the Order of Canada at UBC in February 2002. He is currently Visiting Fellow at the Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.

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[5] Anton Chekhov, "Ward No.6" in *Stories.* New York: Bantam Books, 2000, pp.199-200.

A Revolutionary Coincidence
—Marc H. Ellis

In January 2002 Marc Ellis, Professor of American and Jewish Studies at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, spoke at SFU's Halpern Centre. His lecture, entitled "Practicing Exile: a Reflection on the Prophetic Call in the 21st Century", was sponsored by the Institute for the Humanities.

Marc Ellis is a Jewish theologian and religious-studies scholar who spent 14 years teaching at Maryknoll School of Theology, a liberationist Roman Catholic seminary. His PhD is from Marquette, where he was inducted into the Jesuit Honour Society. He was with us as part of a western Canada lecture tour. His books include works on Catholic radicalism, the Holocaust, the Israeli-Palestinian question, Jewish-Christian dialogue and Jewish renewal. Of his book, Ending Auschwitz, *Richard L. Rubenstein, one of his mentors, has written, "Ellis skillfully combines excellent writing, fascinating narrative and thoughtful reflections on Judaism, Christianity, Auschwitz, Israel and the Palestinians. Ellis is representative of neither the Jewish nor the Christian mainstream. Nevertheless, he is one of the most influential Jewish thinkers of his generation." He has taught at Morehouse College in Atlanta, Florida State, Harvard, and is now at Baylor University where he is Director of the Center for American and Jewish Studies.*

This year [2002], by mere coincidence, the remembrance of the Holocaust and the commemoration of Deir Yassin share the same calendar date, April 9th. The Jewish calendar is a lunar one, so its corresponding date on the English calendar changes every year. April 9th is the date of the massacre at Deir Yassin, as it was on that day in 1948 that Jewish irregular forces committed their atrocities on the Arab villagers.

Coincidence is both chance and possibility and while the fact of this shared date should not be exaggerated, it cannot be ignored. For the renewed violence in the Holy Land reminds us of a history of struggle and blood and poses the even more important question about the future of Jews and Palestinians. Will the past cycle of violence and atrocity that continues today persist and define the future of the Holy Land? Are Jews and Palestinians prisoners of a historic conflict and will that conflict come to be identified as the essence of the Jewish and Palestinian people?

There is no need to compare the tragedies that have befallen both peoples. The uniqueness of the Holocaust is well established, as is the catastrophe that has caused so much suffering for the Palestinian people. Comparison of historical events, in terms of magnitude and consequences, trivializes the events themselves. Victimization is a fact in history impossible to ignore and all peoples, at one time or another, have felt the blow of terror and dislocation. Devastation comes in all sizes and shapes; atrocity knows no boundaries and too often no limits.

Instead of uniqueness and comparison, connection and solidarity should be emphasized. If we dwell on the negative, life

and history can overwhelm us. We do not have to dwell in a fantasy world to try to glimpse light where there seems only darkness.

At this point in time in the history of Israel/Palestine it does seem almost fanciful to accentuate the positive, but to do so is witness to a possibility beyond the present impasse. It is to place before Jews and Palestinians, indeed the global community, a message of hope. The intractable is not intractable, the catastrophe is not irredeemable, the Holocaust does not have the final word.

Yet a message of hope is only heartening if the issues before us are honestly approached. On this day of remembrance, can we be bearers of a message that is honest, that is rigorous and confessional and hopeful, that is providing a glimpse of a future beyond our own limitations of voice and vision?

I believe this possible. It is also necessary.

If this year's commemoration dates are coincidentally on the same day, the fact that Yad VaShem, the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, and Deir Yassin are in eyesight of one another is not. The situation of Jews in Europe at the dawn of the 20th century was difficult, if not yet impossible. By the 1930s and after it was intolerable. The impetus for the creation of the state of Israel lies in this European situation, but the solution to this problem, as so often has been the case, was found outside of Europe.

Deir Yassin is but a symbol of this 'solution'—one that, through conflict, war and expansion led to the emptying of the part of Palestine that is now Israel.

Jewish and non-Jewish visitors to Yad VaShem understand the Jewish anguish and tragedy. Those who come to Deir Yassin or remember it know the Palestinian anguish and tragedy. Yet the question today is how many people remember each tragedy alone and how many connect these two? The isolation of these tragedies compounds the calamity itself. For after all is said and done, once violence and atrocity occur, it is what we do with terrible events that defines us. This is true for us as individuals. It is also true for peoples and nations.

The purpose of remembrance is found among the living after the calamity. Analysis is crucial here in laying bare the reasons for the disaster, but, especially when so much human suffering is involved, history cannot become a mere curiosity or a place from which power is asserted. Both trivialize those who suffered and those who live after the suffering. Remembrance is for the living to mourn the dead as well as to foster a commitment to personal and communal life beyond such events. Is there anything worse after catastrophe than a memory that encourages further dislocation and death?

What can our remembrance be, and the commitment that comes from remembrance, so that we will not foster a future so calamitous that even the victims of the Holocaust and the Palestinian expulsion will cry out from the earth to end the cycle of violence and atrocity they experienced?

With the Oslo process in shambles and the Al Aksa intifada continuing, it seems we are starkly confronted with two possibilities: either a complete withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank and Gaza with a fully shared Jerusalem or the declaration of a bi-national state in all of Israel/Palestine. There are good reasons to pursue either or

perhaps even both together. For the healing of Jews and Palestinians can only come through independence and interdependence, joining particularity with universality, so that a future without abuse and armaments can be enjoyed by both peoples.

On this day of commemoration, this coincidence that may become, through our efforts, a turning toward each other, let us embrace a forgiveness oriented around justice, a revolutionary forgiveness that gives birth to a future worth bequeathing to our children. In synagogues, churches and mosques, in public halls of debate and government, lets us commit ourselves to a new beginning for the sake of Israel and Palestine, in the name of Jews and Palestinians, and for a future worthy of our people's history.

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For after all is said and done, once violence and atrocity occur, it is what we do with terrible events that defines us.

David Orchard at Harbour Centre: Churchill or Cassandra?
—Donald Grayston

In July, in response to an article in *The Globe and Mail* about the possible departure of Joe Clark as leader of the Progressive Conservatives, I wrote an only half-kidding letter to the editor suggesting that since the NDP was looking for a new leader, that under Alexa McDonough it had become an increasingly 'blue' party, and that the departure of many to the Alliance had turned the Conservatives into even more of a 'red Tory' party than they had earlier been, that now would be the time for the NDP and the Tories to unite and choose David Orchard as leader.

The appearance of this letter generated a phone call from the Orchard organization (Citizens Concerned about Free Trade-Campaign for Canada), and this in turn to an appearance of David Orchard at Harbour Centre on July 23, 2002 co-sponsored by the Institute under the 'human rights and democratic development' rubric in our mandate.

For those unfamiliar with him, let me say that David Orchard is a fourth-generation Saskatchewan farmer (an organic farmer since 1975) who in 1985 began to organize against the free trade agreements entered into by the Mulroney government. In 1998 he was the runner-up in the Tory leadership race, and in 2000 ran, unsuccessfully but respectably, in John Diefenbaker's old riding in Prince Albert. Since then he has continued as a nationalist gadfly in the Conservative Party, and his articles warning of economic and political threats to Canadian sovereignty have appeared in many papers.

Orchard is a modest, sincere, well-informed and well-spoken man of strong conviction. A reference he made to Winston Churchill suggested to me that he sees himself in the tradition of Churchill in the thirties, one who warns the people about unending disaster

Photo by Don Grayston

whether they will listen or not. On the strength of about ten days of publicity, about 200 people, half of them in their teens and twenties, came to Harbour Centre to hear him—an instructive testimony to his appeal.

His theses are those that he repeats wherever he goes across the country: that Canadians are losing—perhaps have lost—ownership of the greater part of the economy to Americans; that the Liberal government is gradually surrendering Canadian sovereignty to the Americans; that no national party other than the Tories has the capacity to form a national government; and that if those who share his concerns will join the Tory party, as he has, there is still a chance to maintain the sovereignty of Canada as the northern neighbour of an increasingly angry and anxious United States. Here I should emphasize that there was no note of gratuitous anti-Americanism. Rather, he believes that under past Conservative administrations—the Mulroney period excepted—Canada has managed both to retain sovereignty and be a good neighbour to the United States, and that this should be our objective for the future.

He shares the feeling of Karin Litzcke in a recent article that Canada, having dealt with its budgetary deficit, is experiencing a 'democratic deficit'—a phrase much used this year by Paul Martin ("Paul Martin on the campaign trail—or not," *The Republic of East Vancouver,* Issue 42, 11 July 2002, p. 4). Litzcke's point is that Martin did not as finance minister, and thereby "part of the small group of people who make the

decisions in Canada," appear to be at all concerned about the "democratic deficit" about which he is now speaking. But the phrase is a good one, because it describes the perception of many about our present federal political situation, one in which the Liberal government appears set to govern forever because of the weakness and dividedness of the opposition parties.

The deficit, in Orchard's view, can, in the classical view, be made up if enough people will involve themselves in the political process and work in that process to defend our sovereignty. The immediate goal would be the defeat of the Liberals by a Tory government; the next step would be the abrogation of NAFTA, something which the agreement itself permits on the basis of six months' notice.

As an individual, he is an unusual person—transparently sincere and classically patriotic—to find in national politics in a time of widespread public cynicism. I believe that it will be interesting and instructive to follow his 'Campaign for Canada' and to see whether his identification with Churchill turns out to have substance, or whether the figure of Cassandra, from an earlier time and struggle, would be a more appropriate parallel.

For further information about David Orchard, his views and campaigns, send an email to ccaftvan@telus.net

Opinion Peace
—Terry Gibbs

After some dramatic posturing and a negotiation process of extremely dubious intent, the Bush administration prepares for war with Iraq. As Rumsfeld, Cheney and gang raced around the globe securing consent for their plans this past fall, the whole process appeared rather circus-like from the home front. Here are some hoops of fire, if you jump through we'll give you a very tasty biscuit, if you don't, we'll beat you with a stick. It reminds one of the 'negotiations' that take place around community participation in structural adjustment policies in poor countries of the South. The not very transparent agenda is—we know we're going to get a lot of flack if we don't at least appear to be having an inclusive discussion but at the end of the day you guys have to agree to this, there's no alternative. Even if you elect that other guy, we're not going away. As the recent elections in Brazil made clear, an invisible but very real factor in the democratic process, 'market confidence', shrinks whenever the basic paradigm is questioned. In the war on terror, anyone who questions the process is at best a naive liberal and at worst a tacit supporter of Osama bin Laden.

We exist at a period in history where democracy as a form of government exists in more countries than ever before. We have an historical opportunity to revisit the values behind our system of government and to reaffirm the substantive agency and accountability that democratic government is supposed to entail. Have we become so cynical and fearful that we accept the 'it's Us vs. Them' thesis, which allows us to stumble alongside the US vision of the war on terror conveniently forgetting what 'We' are supposed to stand for? The choice is not between George Bush and Osama bin Laden's views of the world. There are many other options, options that should take as their starting point a critique of the abuse of power.

If one were to design a plan to build

resentment around the globe, to increase the suspicion and sometimes hatred that many in the Arab world and countries of the South feel for the privileged North, the program would be very simple. Never admit when you've made a mistake, make sure there are no grays (everything is black and white), be clear that there is an objective truth out there and you have it, don't attempt to explore the roots of terrorism and violence, don't try to confront poverty head on, make the world safe for corporations and worry about people later, and complain that your enemies do not respect human

> The choice is not between George Bush and Osama bin Laden's views of the world. There are many other options, options that should take as their starting point a critique of the abuse of power.

rights and the UN, but conveniently ignore it when your allies do the same. One does not have to be a left-liberal to realize that this is a very dangerous game, and since 9/11 the consequences are literally right at our doorstep. This is not to deny the great work that many North Americans have done overseas or to say that 9/11 is our fault. It is simply to flag the implications of the US vision of globalization and its approach to the war on terrorism.

After 9/11 many in the academic world decided they needed to know a little more about the Arab world and Islam. Speaker series, conferences and debates on these themes were seen not only as academically interesting but also, for some, necessary to contribute to a more peaceful future. At the time I was teaching in the Political Science Department at Carleton University in Ottawa. We hosted a number of discussions which

revealed an underlying tension about the role of universities in the politics of the day, and of how professors should deal with the issues raised by the violence in New York and Washington. With these issues in mind, I signed up to volunteer in a Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut for the summer of 2002.

My sponsor, the Canadian-Palestinian Educational Exchange (CEPAL), provides volunteer opportunities for Canadians to teach English, French and computers in the camps of Lebanon. CEPAL's goal is to assist Palestinian refugees in the pursuit of their basic human rights by increasing their access to education and by raising awareness in Canada of their situation.

Fifty-four years after the first exodus from Palestine, the 350,000 refugees of Lebanon are perhaps the most insecure of the Palestinian refugee communities. Lebanon rejects their permanent settlement and Israel will not allow them to return to their homes. They are prohibited by law from employment in most professions, which effectively leaves a majority unemployed and the rest with manual labour and odd jobs. They are bound by the laws of Lebanon but have no political rights. Refugees in Lebanon have been effectively ignored in the Peace Process, which focuses on the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile their communities face economic destitution.

I was based in Bourj al Barajneh refugee camp in the south of Beirut, where almost 20,000 refugees are cramped into one square kilometer of cement apartments stacked vertically and separated by dark narrow passageways. Electricity is often off for a few hours during the day making it unbearably hot indoors without the ceiling fans. We were told not to drink the water even if it had been boiled. Although people can freely spend time outside the camps, most cannot afford to do this. It is extremely difficult for Palestinian families to get their children into universities, and even if they could there would be no jobs for those graduates.

was working mainly with youth and could witness their increasing frustration, and for some, resignation, as they reach the age at which the reality of their situation and their future dawns on them. Many adults in the camps face chronic depression.

I also facilitated activities such as mock elections, conflict resolution workshops and drama skits in the Children and Youth Center (CYC) of Shatila camp. On one occasion, the group reflected on the war on terrorism through a TV talk show skit called "Voices from the Camps." Sipping a Syrian version of Pepsi, the youth explained their boycott of American products and argued as to whether the American people should be thought of separately from their government. Many said that the American people are not to blame for their government's uncritical support of the state of Israel and its demonization of the Arab world. Some said that since America is a democracy, the people are at least partly to blame. One of the younger students asked me if all North Americans hate Muslims. Only a few hundred feet from the Children and Youth Center there is a

Universities have a role to play in providing one of the few contexts where serious reflection on these issues can take place.

mass grave guarded by someone who remembers the Israeli-sponsored massacre of 1982. Within the cement walls of Lebanon's cramped Palestinian camps, one is confronted by the 'made in America' trademark of much of the people's suffering. These youth struggle to visualize their future in a world where they will not be seen as 'terrorists'.

A group of youth visiting from the US dropped into my class one day and a highly charged discussion took place in which they stated clearly that they have a different vision of American values than their government. Although the atmosphere in the room was one of friendship, the Palestinian youth did not appear to expect much from their American friends. One noted, "those who realize what is going on are in the minority, they have no power, the rest have been brainwashed by the media. We will have to fight this battle on our own." Looking at me he added, "the Canadians are much less fanatical of course, but no one really listens to you, look at Cuba." The discussion was enlightening for all involved.

The Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are only a small part of a much larger and more complex problem but one that is at the heart of the West's relationship to the Middle East. Amnon Rubinstein recently commented in the *Ha'aretz Daily* that it was about time that Human Rights Watch condemned Palestinian violence and suicide bombings as crimes against humanity. He goes on to say that there has been a focus on Israeli violence by human rights groups. Unfortunately this debate is at best unhelpful and at worst polemical and unconstructive. One can criticize violence on both sides and still acknowledge the reality in which most Palestinian people live. They are either living as refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon or in occupied territory in the West Bank and Gaza. Since 1948 they have lived in a state of permanent impermanence. Unlike the people of Israel, they do not have a 'country' and a hugely powerful military to protect them. We can criticize Yassir Arafat and his Fatah movement and still have the

ability to bring fresh eyes to the youth growing up in refugee camps and the realities of their day to day existence. It is very dangerous to leave people without hope for too long. Similarly we can criticize Ariel Sharon for his involvement in the crimes against humanity in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps while at the same time acknowledging a younger generation of Israelis who suffer because of the dogmatism of their leaders. While criticizing Saddam Hussein for failing to respect UN resolutions, we cannot ignore Israel's years of defiant disrespect in this regard.

It is time to move beyond the rhetoric generated on all sides by our political leaders and reinforced by media bias. Universities have a role to play in providing one of the few contexts where serious reflection on these issues can take place. But we must go beyond reflection and contribute to constructive solutions. As Canadians we are one step removed from US policy. This has always been a small space of opportunity for Canadians to contribute to an alternative agenda. Now is the time to talk of building understanding and peace. Ralph Nader has called Canada the conscience of the US. Can we live up to that?

Human Rights: Changes and Challenges— 1990–2010

—Derek Evans

We are gathering on International Human Rights Day, at a time when the very concept of the promotion and protection of human rights is under serious challenge and strain. Nations are debating what level of torture should be deemed permissible, and under what circumstances one country may attack another to protect its interests from potential terrorist threats. UN officials search for evidence of 'weapons of mass destruction' in the palaces and factories of a country where other UN officials estimate that more than 500,000 children have died as a direct result of international economic sanctions.

Human Rights Day celebrates the proclamation in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when, in the rubble and aftermath of war and genocide, the international community dedicated itself to the simple, sacred phrase: "Never again."

I continue to say that as a prayer, and to believe in the vision that it reflects. I believe in it because in my life I have seen intimately the consequences of the betrayal of the dream, and because I have also seen, now and then, a glimmer of its real promise.

My time at Amnesty International coincided with a period of massive change in the field of human rights. It has become commonplace for our society to point to September 11 as a moment when the world changed. For most of humanity, the world really did change in significant ways recently, in the months and years immediately following the collapse of another symbolic structure of Western architecture in 1989—the Berlin wall.

The end of the Cold War created a new political environment and, finally, a vital opportunity to remove the ideological barrier that had served as the great excuse for not moving forward in the practical implementation of justice and peace, for respecting human rights and realizing a safer and healthier world for all humanity.

In some ways, the 'peace dividend' did make a meaningful contribution to creating a framework for fulfilling these hopes. In the field of human rights, for example, a range of positive measures was initiated: the reform of the UN and other international agencies on the basis of 'human rights mainstreaming' and the strengthening of civil society, a formal renewal of and practical plan for implementing the Universal Declaration (Vienna Declaration); an international commitment to the promotion of a protection of the rights of women (Beijing Action Plan); movement towards addressing impunity through the establishment of an International Criminal Court *(Statute of Rome)*; and

> Over the course of the 1990s, human rights violations escalated in severity and scale, and changed from being focussed on the repression of beliefs to an assault on identities…

the creation of an infrastructure to support the role of human rights defenders *(General Assembly Declaration)*.

The international community began to open up important new fields for public policy debate and decision-making, such as the question of the responsibility and accountability of business, trans-national corporations, armed opposition groups and other non-state actors in relation to the promotion of human rights and the protection of the environment.

The end of the Cold War also meant, however, that whole regions of the world—such as Africa and Central Asia—ceased overnight to hold any strategic interest in the eyes of those with political and economic power, and were summarily marginalized and then abandoned. Just as suddenly, warlords and dictators who had served as superpower surrogates—created, sponsored and to some extent controlled by either the Soviet Union or the West— were let loose upon their countries to pursue their own interests or private grievances without restraint, sometimes acting as agents of convenience for the big corporations and other forces of globalization in an increasingly unregulated and competitive world. Although the 'cold' international struggle was over, the number of 'hot' domestic conflicts proliferated from about 30 to more than 80 within the first five years of the decade.

From a human rights perspective, these developments brought with them a significant change to the nature of the violations experienced by ordinary people around the world. The pattern no longer tended to be primarily one in which individuals were targeted by repressive governments because of their ideological beliefs or political involvements and punished with arbitrary imprisonment and torture. Over the course of the 1990s, human rights violations escalated in severity and scale, and changed from being focussed on the repression of beliefs to an assault on identities—whether gender, language, religion or ethnicity. Violations occurred less as a political or institutional control strategy, and more as a characteristic of situations of social and structural breakdown. In the war that increasingly defined the lives of more and more people, the key question changed from being "what side are you on?" to simply "who are you?" Instead of attempting to control one's enemies, the perpetrators of human rights violations increasingly sought to eliminate them. The forms of mass terrorism that the whole body of international human rights law was created to ensure would "never again" be part of the human experience erupted again throughout the world: genocide in Central Africa, ethnic cleansing in Eastern Europe, the slavery of women and children in large parts of Africa and Asia.

For most people in most of the world, despite great efforts and many achievements, the 'new reality' was that the world was a much harsher and more dangerous place at the beginning of the new millennium than it had been at the beginning of the 1990s.

This period of massive change continues, and we are faced with some major challenges if human rights are to become a meaningful reality in this decade. The good news is that most of these things are within our grasp, if we have the will and the determination.

Although absolutely vital in the immediate term, I am concerned that much of our efforts at peace-keeping, conflict resolution and mediation may tend in the longer term to reinforce and even perpetuate problems in that our efforts are oriented to obtaining and enforcing agreement on the terms of separation of those who have been in conflict, rather than establishing the bases of their future relationship.

In an increasingly globalized world,

separation is a luxury we cannot afford. Whether in the former Yugoslavia, in Central Africa, in the Middle East, in the relations between the West and Islam, or in our own communities, we need to learn the skills and engage the task of reconciliation—of recognizing that, whether we like it or not, we are in each other's future, and of determining to relate to each other on the basis of our authentic identity rather than simply on the basis of our perceived roles as victim and perpetrator. Learning the way of reconciliation is an urgent task and will require the risk of experimentation, but if there is to be a long term we have no choice. Learning the way of reconciliation is that practice of being present to the future, rather than being bound to the past.

Once we embrace our full humanity and claim our inherent dignity, there is no going back. Grave violations of human rights—torture, indiscriminate killings, and the acts of mass terrorism—will certainly continue to occur, in many situations with increasing severity.

But there is almost no corner of the world where even the poorest and most marginalized people do not know and believe that it is not deserved, that it is not their due, that it is wrong. I believe this global awareness is one of the achievements of the last decade or two. Though largely unrecognized, I believe it represents both a revolutionary change and a real basis for hope, for it expresses an embracing of the bond that unites us and creates the ground upon which we might commit ourselves to ensuring that it is realized for each other—to create the values we know to be right.

Derek Evans offered these thoughts at an Institute for the Humanities reception on Human Rights Day, December 10, 2002. Derek Evans is the Executive Director of Naramata Centre in Naramata, BC. Prior to coming to BC, he served as the Deputy Secretary General of Amnesty International, based in London.

Learning the way of reconciliation is that practice of being present to the future, rather than being bound to the past.

Thomas Merton Society of Canada Partners with the Institute

—Donald Grayston

The Institute was pleased in March of 2002 to co-sponsor a weekend conference at the Canadian Memorial Centre for Peace, 16th and Burrard, entitled "Thomas Merton and Interfaith Dialogue: Transcending Religious Barriers." Conceived as a response to the events of September 11, the conference brought together Jewish, Christian, Muslim and Buddhist resource people. Total attendance was around 85, of which, gratifyingly, 24 were young people present on youth scholarships, in part supported by the Institute. The weekend concluded with a Festival of the Arts, in which sacred art, music, dance, poetry and storytelling provided a right-brain celebration of the possibilities of interfaith dialogue.

More recently, the Institute has made a grant to the recently-renamed Thomas Merton Society of Canada (formerly a chapter of the US Society, it is now autonomous), in support of the biennial international Merton conference, to be held at UBC June 5–7, 2003. More than forty scholars and artists will make presentations, and once again the interfaith dimension will be highlighted.

Just before the conference, "Thomas Merton's New York"—an offering of the Pilgrimage Program and the Society (May 15–22, 2003)—will give participants an opportunity to explore Merton's time there (1934–40). Highlights of this study tour (through which academic credit is available to SFU students via the directed-studies option) will include visits to The Cloisters, Columbia University, Greenwich Village, Corpus Christi RC Church and Merton's grandparents' Episcopal parish on Long Island, as well as a possible book launch at the Jewish Theological Seminary, and a public address by Daniel Berrigan, SJ, longtime peace activist and friend of Merton's.

If you are unfamiliar with Merton and his writings, good introductions may

Photo by Ralph Eugene Meatyard

be found in Lawrence Cunningham's *Thomas Merton: Spiritual Master,* and William Shannon's *Silent Lamp.* Merton (1915–68) was an American Trappist monk and writer, a poet and social critic, who engaged with the concerns of all four of the rubrics in the Institute's mandate. I am happy to say that very recently, he, Hannah Arendt, Mohandas Gandhi (well known as the "Mahatma") and Aurelius Augustinus (better known as St. Augustine), have all agreed to be associates of the Institute, a celestial sub-group.

Full details of these and other Merton events may be found on the Society's website at www.merton.ca or by contacting the co-ordinator of the Society, Judith Hardcastle, at 604-669-2546.

Humanities and Community Education

Venerable Lhakdor Visits SFU

—Trish Graham

Venerable Lhakdor was born in Yakra, Western Tibet, in 1956. He left Tibet in 1962 following the communist Chinese invasion of 1959. He received his monastic ordination in 1964, and in 1976 he joined the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics, where he spent seven years in specialized study. In 1989 he received his Master of Madhyamika Buddhist Philosophy from the same institute, and his Master of Philosophy from the University of Delhi.

In August 1989 he joined the office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and is now his official translator and religious assistant, as well as Joint Secretary of the Private Office of the Dalai Lama. In these capacities, he has accompanied the Dalai Lama on many of his extensive visits throughout Europe, North America, Australia, Africa and Asia.

While Venerable Lhakdor ordinarily remains with the Dalai Lama, he was able to make a speaking tour in April of 2002 because of the Dalai Lama's being on extended retreat on doctors' orders. This marks the first time that a Secretary of the Private Office has agreed, with the blessing of the Dalai Lama, to travel to North America and to give a series of

lectures to the general public, sponsored locally by the Institute of Asian Research at UBC. On April 10, 2002, during his first visit to Canada, he spoke to SFU faculty, students and staff at the Halpern Centre.

Venerable Lhakdor told his audience at SFU that when the Dalai Lama travels and speaks to people, his focus is on three central issues: 1) he teaches that we need to break down the destructive barriers erected between peoples; we need to strive to see universal humanness in each other, rather than dwelling on the apparent differences in race, religion and gender; 2) we need to teach religious harmony. Religion must not be used as a weapon which creates suffering: no religion is the right religion for all peoples; 3) and lastly, the Dalai Lama focuses on Tibet and the need to preserve its culture, which is in great danger of extinction. In summary, his focus is on promoting positive ethical values and religious harmony, as well as preserving Tibetan culture.

Venerable Lhakdor went on to elaborate on what is meant by "positive ethical values." When one recognizes the interconnectedness of all life, he said, one takes more care. When one develops

Photo by Donald Grayston

Trish Graham and Venerable Lhakdor

ethical values that lead to positive and life-enhancing actions, one's behaviour has positive effects. Similarly, destructive actions have equally negative effects or reactions. We must take responsibility for everything that we do—or do not do—quite simply because we are not living as isolated or independent units, but rather live in a world where every action has a reaction. "Karma is not an external agent or force," said Venerable Lhakdor. "It is something you do."

We offer our thanks to Victor Chan, of the Institute of Asian Research, for arranging for the visit of Venerable Lhakdor to SFU. Victor Chan is currently in residence in Dharamsala, India, where the Dalai Lama lives, and is working with him on a forthcoming book.

Critical U

The Institute for the Humanities was pleased again to support the Fall 2002 12-week Critical U program. This program, subtitled 'Making a Space for Critical Dialogue in our Community', was held at Grandview Woodlands Britannia Community Centre.

The program's sponsors were the Vancouver Eastside Educational Enrichment Society (VEEES), Britannia Community Education Services, SFU Institute for the Humanities, Simon Fraser University Student Society (SFSS) and the Vancouver Institute for Social Research and Education (VISRE).

The philosophy of Critical U is that popular education brings together the university and the wider community. Critical concepts are used to frame community issues and to create a setting where participants discuss issues such as pedagogy and co-operative learning; the environment; control: top-down? bottom up?; citizenship and democracy; citizenship, civil liberties and the law; capitalism and the market; globalization; co-operative alternatives; urban environment; language and everyday life; media and culture; and empowering individual communities.

Throughout the weeks, participants were involved in selecting and formulating

specific topics for the following weeks in this experiment in community education.

Participation was free and open to all. Instructors were faculty and students from Simon Fraser University as well as local community educators.

Grace MacInnis Lecture
—Myrna Kostash

The Edmonton based author Myrna Kostash was the Grace MacInnis Visiting Scholar in the Spring of 2002. The following is a transcript of the lecture she delivered to faculty, students and the public at Simon Fraser University, Burnaby Campus on March 14, 2002.

Americans made me a writer. First it was the Chicago Seven. In the winter of 1970 I was sitting in a living room in a country house in England, chugging beer with some ex-pat Canadians, and watching the BBC television dramatization of the (infamous) Trial of the Chicago Seven. The Seven were NQW Left radicals apprehended in the wake of the riots of 1968, police riots, against the demonstrators gathered in Chicago for the Democratic party convention in the hot, very hot, summer of Vietnam.

I had been living in England, writing no-account short stories that were rejected, one by one, by British magazines. Impasse.

But at the conclusion of the BBC drama I heaved myself out of my chair, tore up the stairs to my room and wrote in a feverish ejaculation what was to be my first published piece of prose—an example of the 'gonzo journalism' that I had been assimilating from the pages of *Rolling Stone* magazine for years.

It was published in *Saturday Night* magazine, then under the editorship of Robert Fulford, when it was remarkably sympathetic to the New Journalism pouring forth from the pens of my generation. The article's lacklustre title—"Canada's No Place To Be A Guerrilla"—belied the burden of its message, which was brash (and I quote myself): "Watching Chicago and paying attention to my reactions proved something to me. Young Americans have been called up and we [Canadians] haven't. It's their show, baby, and we are the peanut gallery. Which is what makes Hoffman, Rubin, Hayden et al. [members of the Chicago Seven] as our culture heroes a bit disquieting. For both of us. For them, because they don't need any well-meaning innocents mucking about with issues of real blood and guts. For us, because flashing the peace sign and yelling hooray from the safe side of the forty-ninth parallel is only a prop for our chagrin that we don't have a revolution of our own to die for." I never wrote fiction again. I was on to something else. In that Buckinghamshire cottage I had had an insightful flash not only of the urgency of the events of my own time but also of the rhetoric with which to engage them as a writer.

In the spring of 1972, back in Canada, I boarded a

Roy Miki, Professor Emeritus, Department of English, SFU, Myrna Kostash and Jerry Zaslove, Director Emeritus, Institute for the Humanities, SFU.

Greyhound bus in Toronto and nervously made my way across the border, headed for the annual convention of SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] in Boston. I had been a member of SDS for one bucolic year in Seattle in 1965–66 and so the decision to attend the conference was based both on nostalgia for the Golden Age of student activism in North America and on my journalist's instincts that herein lay a story. (I even got the go-ahead from *Rolling Stone* magazine to cover it but the thirty-one page report I produced was never published.)

I roamed through the conference as if I were saying beads: at the end of a thousand Marxist-Leninist *aves* I would know what I had to do. The borderlessness between Canadian and American desire of the 1960s political generation was only intensified by the extravagance of American events, especially of war, and the privileged positioning of their television and print images throughout the world. 1972: the *Drug Abuse* posters and the *Peace is Hell, Hire a Veteran* posters and *Vandalism is Dangerous* posters staring down at me anytime I rode the subway—folkways of grief. And the newspaper items about the messed-up schools, the riot at Walpole prison, the Puerto Rican packing it in and going back home for a modicum of freedom from terror, the warnings from my friends to keep my doors locked, rumours of corruption and blackmail, forced sterilization and mutilation, not to mention the end of the world.

When I first read SDS's founding document, *The Port Huron Statement,* in 1964, I had felt no disjuncture as subject: the SDS 'we' was inclusive if only because America had supplied all the content. "If we appear to seek the unattainable," they wrote of their social movement, "then let it be known that we do so to avoid the unimaginable." I knew exactly what SDS were talking about: the "unattainable" was justice in Mississippi and Harlem, and an end to the war in Vietnam; the "unimaginable" was nuclear incineration

in New York and Moscow. I read myself into these scenarios and felt included.

When I reread *The Port Huron Statement* in 1972, I was still inside that 'we' but rather nostalgically, as though I had already begun to separate. I wrote of the almost 'unbearable' moral sweetness, political chastity and intellectual sobriety of that early 1960s vision of SDS and of my own now aggrieved longing for that tribal past when the visions of the City of Man, all justice and peace, safety and enlightenment, could still move us to tears, when we could still insist that the future of people already lay full-formed within our imaginations… Look at the nouns: community, participatory democracy, love, self-determination; the verbs: to organize, to labor, to analyze, to confront… If we had known then what was going to happen to us—assassination and war, Black Panthers and Hell's Angels, overdoses and freak-outs, Jim Morrison and Kate Millett—we would have turned to salt.

But all these years later I see that something else was also about to happen. I was on the cusp of becoming a Canadian nationalist, as though I sensed already that people who would name themselves as 'Canadians' would have to locate themselves elsewhere. I wrote:

> All that time that we had been gazing in wonder at the American spectacle, mouthing platitudes about our innocence, the war had been creeping up on us. The FLQ covering its tracks street to street, fishermen starving a little more each generation in Nova Scotia and women beating off strike-breakers, Indians dying under car wheels on the highway… A nation of disparate communities scattering in every direction with one or two lonely groups of national liberationists yelling after them: Hang in! Our struggle is collective. Our enemy is the same. The United States is eating us up for dessert. Death to General Motors!

In Boston, at the SDS convention, I stepped right into a crisis of authenticity.

The agenda of the first day was, in fact, set aside so 500 conventioneers could join a mass march through Cambridge, across the Charles River and onto the

campus of Boston University. We were showing our solidarity with students there who had been protesting all week against a university administration snarled in an escalating series of miscalculations that had begun with the arrival of Marine Corps recruiters on campus. Initially, I felt right at home and marched along, and felt that old excitement at seeing just how many of us were stretched out along the street. But in my notes I recorded that I was sufficiently unmoved by the collective cheers—"Students! Workers! Black and White! Men! Women! Unite! Fight!" and "Hitler Rose, Hitler Fell, Racist Teachers Go To Hell!"—that I felt "rather too old for this sort of thing" (which is how I explained my discomfort at the time).

> I was on the cusp of becoming a Canadian nationalist, as though I sensed already that people who would name themselves as 'Canadians' would have to locate themselves elsewhere.

"When I was 18 they told me this would happen."

I felt an accumulating certainty that, alienated from the passions agitating the people around me, I was a *poseur,* a fake. I interpreted this at the time as class guilt—a kind of moral dyspepsia in considering my life in neo-Leninist terms as petit bourgeois revisionist, class enemy of the proletariat. How long would it take the janissaries of SDS to sniff me out?

I was running the risk of being unmasked in front of the Yankee revolutionaries, but unmasked as what? There was also by 1972 a pointed ambivalence in my feelings about the meaning of American revolution wherein envy and resentment were masked as derision. I wandered around in a jaundiced mood, pretending insouciance when

in fact struggling with a newly emerging point of view—that of the outsider who, having imaginatively stepped outside the American patriotic myth, discovers the 'we' no longer includes her.

Here was an emerging struggle with a rhetoric and gestures that were not exactly foreign to me but which had come to me as a kind of second language. What then was my mother tongue? As I sat down to describe these American 'others' in 1972, a gently derisive tone took over, what I think of now as the "nudge nudge, wink wink" of the incipient Canadian patriot who finally finds her opportunity in the botches of the international New Left.

The newspapers and arguments. *The Bulletin, Challenge, Worker's World, Young Socialist, Canadian Worker.* Are unions tools of capitalism? Is deferential hiring prejudicial to the white worker? Is Mao a running dog of the imperialists? Is it the Progressive Labor or the Young Socialist Alliance that is revisionist? Or somebody else? Are national liberation and women's liberation movements petit bourgeois? If they are, does it matter? Who exactly is the working class? Are you? What do you want to know?

Feeling less and less like a participant and more and more like a foreign correspondent, I ran around with my notebook recording the various lunacies of the American scene—for instance, this communication from Youth Supporters of Hammer and Steel and the Republic of New Africa:

> Plans for the genocide of the Afro-American people on a massive scale are now being made. In the meantime, white workers and imperialists are collaborating in world domination, SDS is collaborating with Nixon and anti-racists are collaborating with anti-national liberationists.

Finally, in recording a series of resolutions that had come spewing out of convention workshops, on welfare, racism in the army, IQ tests, abortion, class struggle in Québec, political strategy, black nationalism, I simply just let the whole thing go.

So many of us had already tried and lost, tried and faded away, in earlier experiments, from the failure to plug our private zombie's wires into the supershow of International Capitalist Imperialism as it moved glacially over all our puny gestures of scornful rebellion. "Hey," we said, "you can't do that," as it rolled right on over us.

And so I snuck out of America before I could be thrown out, fleeing the disapproval of internationalist 'heavies' (read: Americans) who had tried to sell me pamphlets on American imperialism in Borneo and recruit me to the apocalypse raging in the belly of the Beast. I was hard on my generation about this. After all, I had already written that we Canadians had been committed to the idea of the revolution in America only after the event, flashing the peace sign and yelling "hooray!" from the "safe side of the forty-ninth parallel," propping up our chagrin that we didn't have a "revolution of our own to sign up for."

Fortunately, there was a revolution—several, actually—all emerging from the fragmentation of the international New Left project. But in 1972 the future was still to be constructed. In fact, it felt like a gamble, this choosing of a Canadian contingency over the 'actually existing' American. But there was also the chance that the collective experience of the thin stream of people flung across the country, their encounters with the Sasquatch and the Redcoats, their hockey teams and guitar players, their Québecois charladies making bombs in the basement, would count for something the day we made our getaway from General Motors.

American Sixties culture, its politics and values, had been part of our revealed lives for so long that, had I not had the alternative of that other great adventure, the uncovering of the secret life of my generation in Canada, I might have collapsed then and there, on the bus back to Toronto, from atomization. Instead, I became a Canadian writer.

In 1980 I wrote *Long Way From Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada.* It was my second book. I wrote in my concluding chapter, citing a SUPA newsletter of 1966, that "the base of a Canadian oppositional movement is not in a civil rights campaign, or in arguments with liberalism, or in an anti-war movement [all of which describe early SDS] but in the popular nationalism of Canada and Québec and in a participatory democratic movement in the schools and universities. In such a supposition, still so tentative and suggestive, one can hear the creakings of the Americanized stage flats as they shoved aside to reveal the scenario of Canada. After all, the struggle to be in Canada is ongoing, is proceeding every day… To say that the movement was 'imported' is to demean the consciousness Canadians have had all along, however muted or mystified at times, that they live in a place of their own making."

In 1980 the 'sixties generation' was already feeling embattled by the political successes of Margaret Thatcher and by the rhetorical onslaught of the New Right, and I personally felt the painful loneliness of the Canadian writer abused by politically hostile book reviewers and ignored by the Left upon the publication of my book. But this was as nothing compared to the loneliness of the night of the 1988 federal election. By 8:00 pm in Edmonton, our feminist socialist Ukrainian-Canadian NDP candidate was already losing to the Progressive Conservative candidate in Edmonton Strathcona; not that it mattered, Mulroney's Tories having been returned to power even before all the votes were in from the west. Every voting Canadian knew what that meant: the imminent signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the US. I felt that my country—that "place of our own making"—had been kidnapped by forces hostile to my desires as a Canadian citizen.

By these forces it did not mean Americans, at least not in that instance; no, my despair reflected the unspeakable loneliness of the citizen betrayed by her own people: Tories and their supporters, on the farms and at the universities as well as in corporate boardrooms who preferred to hook up with a greedy and violent empire, reformulating the old continentalist wet dream of 'merging' with Americans, rather than struggle for Canadian sovereignty, however perplexed a project that may be. Now I had to adjust my sense of country, home and citizenship to the very narrow place that still felt like 'mine', not 'theirs'. The place was no longer nation-wide, for I had been evicted from there, but as wide as my everyday work, my neighbourhood, my good and trustworthy friends. That seemed a very constricted space after the exuberance of the New Left and counterculture but I hoped that, in retrospect, one day this period of our defeat would represent the beginning of a new politics of the left or at least a culture of resistance rather than the end of them, at a time when the centre did not hold.

Of course, the very notion of a 'centre' was also under aggressive scrutiny. When I moved to Toronto in 1993 to take up the chairmanship of The Writers Union of Canada, I had an agenda for my term. It included the desire to intervene as a white ethnic in the on-going discussion among artists about race and racialization. But friends, looking on me pityingly as a *naif* from Alberta, dissuaded me from such a rash act. "If you stand up in a forum in Toronto to speak as a white person, you will be told to sit down. People of colour will accuse you of 'colonising' their space." I felt

"THE SWORD IS DRAWN
THE NAVY UPHOLDS IT!"

chastened, and sat down.

This was uncharacteristic behaviour for me. Ever since publication of my first book, *All of Baba's Children,* in 1978, I had acted as a kind of spokesperson in western Canada for the idea of ethnicity as a generative identity—well past the immigrant experience—that forms part of a broad "culture of resistance" in Canada to Coca-Colonization. This was very exciting stuff for me—it felt like the leading edge of the cultural debate—and I imagined broader and broader Common Fronts of cultural subversives (feminists, immigrants, eco-guerrilas, Métis, artists, gays and lesbians) challenging the globalization of culture. Then suddenly (so it seemed to me) I felt chastened. What had happened? What had happened, of course, was the articulation of a whole view in our discussions around culture and identity: the articulation of race and colour. It wasn't that we 'ethnics' had never heard or discussed race and colour in the speech around multiculturalism; it's that we had subsumed them within the familiar categories of 'otherness', 'assimilation', 'community', and of course 'ethnicity'.

In 1983, the year of the first Women and Words conference in Vancouver, Lillian Allen, Kristjan Gunnars and I could still be on the same panel discussing the relationship among ethnicity, feminism and our writing, as though the one thing we had in common—that none of us was 'Anglo'—was the most meaningful. The 'politics of difference' soon enough overtook that moment of togetherness, and I realized that, just as feminism's ideal of gender solidarity (Sisterhood is Powerful!) had had to yield to the analysis of historical and cultural and class cleavages among women ("Is Lady Astor oppressed by her chauffeur?"), so too did multiculturalism's ideal of unity among minorities have to yield to specifics of race and colour. In a word, I had discovered that, in the new terms of the discourse, I was white. I was a member of a privileged majority. I was part of the problem, not the solution. It was a shock.

As speech on multiculturalism shifted away from ethnicity and toward race it also shifted in large part from the story of the third generation to the story of immigrants once again. At a conference in Ottawa in 1994 about writers and multiculturalism, Robert Kroetsch and I both felt a pang of nostalgia for the conversations in the 1970s in Edmonton and Saskatoon and Winnipeg which had assumed a collective 'prairie' project of "telling our own stories for the very first time." We could talk with such assurance only because we felt secure and rooted in our place. We were no longer immigrants; we had a Canadian memory. But now we shared artistic space with immigrants who speak English, and with First Nations artists who, in the words of an audience member at the Ottawa conference, "do not belong to the literature of the Settler State [that's Kroetsch and me!] but to the North American landscape."

We were offered a choice: either this was a problem—a dismemberment of a mythic past of wholeness and togetherness—or this was an opportunity for new cultural forms to emerge from new multicultural practice. After all, the emerging generation of writers among the racial minorities and First Nations were standing on the accumulated experience of Canadian society as a whole, of bilingualism, official multiculturalism, feminism, regionalism, sovereignty-association, Native self-government, gay and lesbian activism, and all the other ideas that have played their part in the negotiations among Canadians about the values and principles of civil society. Which is a way of saying that I got over my shock of no longer being the subject of multiculturalism but only one of its subjects and not necessarily even the most interesting one.

II.

In the spring of 1997, as part of my job as writer-in-residence at the Regina Public Library, I found myself standing in front of an early morning English class of high school students, telling stories about Margaret Laurence, the War Measures Act, and the National Hockey League. In the middle of my anecdote, I could see from the baffled expressions on the students' faces that I had finally arrived at that middle-aged moment when I could no longer assume that I and my audiences drew from the same 'memory bank'. A whole new generation had arrived whose memories went as far back as, perhaps, 1970. In the case of the grade ten class, no further back than about 1987.

It was a classic generational gap, I thought. On one side there I stood, talking about Paul Henderson's 'legendary' goal in a twenty-five year old hockey game, on the other side stood the ranks of the next Canadians—according to the 1996 national census, there were 4,557,233 Canadians between the ages of 25 and 35—for whom the world of free trade agreements, electronic communication, educational cutbacks and corporate logos in washroom stalls was utterly normal. I could choose to react to this psychocultural gap in one of two ways. I could join the chorus of my peers who were widely deploring the social and cultural 'deCanadianization' of the post-FTA era, and with it the apparent loss of historical memory and social cohesiveness that had still characterized the last truly 'Canadian' generation, namely my own. Or I could make an expedition out into the terrain of the next Canada to see if our pessimism and defeatism were justified.

How would their Canadian imagination have been formed, the 'next Canadians', for whom everyday politics had been articulated by Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, and Bill Clinton; Canadian culture by Céline Dion singing at the Oscars and guys in suits playing a game of shinney in a beer ad? As I surveyed this terrain, I thought I saw what Douglas Coupland, in *Polaroids from the Dead,* called the "denarration" of his generation, the personal "storylessness" of a generation whose narratives of experience had been dissolved in borderless, denationalized media, and whose continuity with familial, class and cultural memory had been broken, along with the communities that had transmitted them.

But were these the only salient observations to make about the next Canadians? What of that reminder from George Grant—gloomy conservative nationalist that he was in the 1960s, in his little, explosive book, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*—that a nation is not a nation just because of roots in the past. "There must also be a thrust of intention into the future."

Are we Canadians only because of roots in a shared past? What happens when the past is unknown or forgotten or blurry or locked up somewhere or simply declared not the point somehow? Take, for example, the man who wrote a letter to the editor of *The Globe and Mail* last year in which he took exception to the annual lamentation of the Dominion Institute and its revelation, once again, that Canadians don't know their own history. He wrote: "May Canadians stay history- and ideology-free for many years. In this crazy world, it seems to me, those who learn their history are doomed to fight over it."

Although George Grant did not debunk historical memory, he did understand its limitations: "Memory," he wrote, "is never enough to guarantee that a nation can articulate itself in the present. There must be a thrust of intention into the future."

Understanding the "thrust of intention into the future" of the next generation of Canadians became my project: to see and hear for myself what sort of Canada was taking shape in their lives and minds and whether I wanted to live in it, to be thrust forwards into their future.

Was there a common desire, I wanted to know, in the disparate expressions of young Canadians as workers, artists, business people, social activists, and politicians? Did they want to extend some meaning of their personal experience forwards into a collective purpose? Was there something they wanted, as Canadians in their own time and place?

My book, *The Next Canada: In Search of our Future Nation,* is the account of that investigation. Did I find that "thrust of intention"? In a word, yes, and the word is community. It is their word; they kept using it, whether as activists in "communities of the poor" and the "street people's community," or as politicians committed to a "community of tolerance," or as Reclaim the Streets protesters evoking as if out of the wild blue yonder "the commonality, the desire for a community itself." They used it when least expected, as workers for whom the workplace is a "communal space," as neighbourhood loyalists who, with Wal-Mart and Taco Bell in their face, deplored the collapse of the "circles of

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commitment" they identified with their parents' generation, as high-tech wizards who nevertheless admitted to a "cultural hunger" for "rootedness," as though there were something unbearably shallow and lonely-making about their new world of borderless communication. An 'alternative capitalist' spoke of the responsibility he bore to the 'community' of young consumers he was profiting from.

There was the CEO of a small investment company who had been reading Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto*. "There are lessons to be learned," he explained gravely. "Some fundamental truths in Marx. Left to capitalism's own devices, you're dead. I think there is a responsibility to look after people, and I don't mean that in a patronizing sense." What he

meant, in fact, was the 'redistribution of wealth', even some of his own millions. It infuriated him, he said, when governments try to seduce him with tax cuts. "I get an extra hundred bucks for the year and they've shut down a half dozen hospitals, then I go, 'It doesn't make sense. Like, take my hundred bucks.'"

Even at the screens and keyboards of the newest technologies, among a wired generation completely at ease with their procedures, "everybody's looking for community," according to a couple of electronic publishers. I wasn't convinced, pointing out that community used to mean having a sense of responsibility for the people just outside your door— where daily life impinges directly on you and you can't duck your obligations so easily. They conceded that one person in front of a single screen is a solitary being, not even as sociable as a roomful of people watching television together who are at least laughing at the same joke at the same time; but once you put a bunch of computers together, linked electronically, then you do have the possibility to reproduce daily contact with people, 'talking' through the Internet about their fears and hopes, disclosing themselves. "They may not be able to act one-on-one," they argued, "but the act of communication is still there and the act of caring and worrying can still be expressed between people."

I was astonished. For here were young men and women who had grown up in a shrinking 'commons', in which billions of dollars of cuts to social spending and to arts and education, together with the privatization of public goods, and the arrival of massive transnational enterprises into their neighbourhoods where the corner grocery once stood, were not only inevitable developments but apparently desirable. If it's cheaper, buy it! And in their diverse ways, they told me, they were resisting these assaults on their sense of community with one another.

I remember the Starbuck's barista in Vancouver, who said that being a Canadian means more than just the "almighty dollar," as he put it. "We have

to work together to get things done." In his case, that meant joining the Canadian AutoWorkers union. "I love the CAW," he said.

Contrary to many people's fears, the remarkable diversity of micro- and sub-cultures does not act centrifugally, spinning us all away from a core Canadian community, but does act to make that core more complex, more nuanced, even perpetually unfinished, as though our real social history is always in the future where we can still shape it.

Boundaries of identity overlap as new cultures are perpetually arriving and forcing the rethinking of what is fixed and traditional and core. "Recent arrivals to a democratic society want to be part of a process whose real history is in the future, not the past," [Charles Taylor].

Immigrant culture, then, is not a negation of what has been laid down by earlier, 'original' Canadians, but a kind of declaration of intention of how the country could evolve, if it widened its sense of togetherness, or community, to include even those who, with different memories and myths and languages, may argue with or contradict our sense of who 'we' are. The point was being made that the cultivation of cultural distinctiveness strengthened— broadened and deepened—what is meant by the communities we Canadians call 'us'.

I was reminded of what Murray Dobbin referred to in a speech in Edmonton, as the "necessary revolution of the things we do together." But I also made a note to myself to be cautious about this desire for community—Dobbin's, mine and the next Canadians'; if the last decade and more of the post-modern corrective has taught us anything it is that "[t]here is no such thing" as a general public, "all publics… are specialized,"[1] each with its own set of cultural texts. A public is not a given but is interpretive and imagined. Community is not pre-determined but

emerges from what one artist calls "lines of desire," unplanned for, undisciplined and peculiar. In what sense is such a community 'public'?

More notes to self: Those of us who believed or hoped that there was some kind of ideal public into which all diversity and difference would dissolve are challenged by those for whom the 'public' never did include them: workers, minorities, women, the disabled, children, sexual minorities. In reaction they have formed their own counter-

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publics or alternative publics. There is no single overarching public sphere, get used to it.

Nevertheless, my 'Next Canadians' were insistent. No matter where I turned with my question, "Are you a Canadian?"—to an actor at the Edmonton Fringe Festival or an autoworker in Windsor, to a sex researcher in Montreal or a lobster fisher in Nova Scotia, to a Reform Party MP in Edmonton or a food bank director in Toronto, a CBC radio producer in Winnipeg or a women's shelter volunteer in Vancouver—I

was answered much the same way. We take care of each other. Money isn't our bottom line. We are a compassionate society. You can take away the Crown corporations and lift all the regulations at the border and lie down like doormats in front of the WTO, but we have faith it is good to live a Canadian life. And over and over again people cited publicly funded health care as evidence. This was unexpected. After all, the future of health care is everywhere debated and I did not think such a contested policy could serve as a foundation for collective identity. But there it was, one version or another of the statement, "I know I'm Canadian because I believe in the social commitment of public health care." This is a value that is deeply politicized, referring to the ideal of social justice. (And this in spite of Ontario Hospital Association president David MacKinnon's snide aside that "if Canadians see that the major thing that defines them as Canadians is health care… they should get a life.")[2] I began to understand that by 'publicly funded health care' my interviewees didn't so much mean the thing itself—the creature of policy and bureaucracy—but the idea, even ideal, of mutual responsibility and connectedness, what social philosopher Ian Angus, in conversation with me, called the construction of a "fictive history." People want a language not just of economics but of what American social scientist Jeremy Rifkin calls "empathy" and culture as well. And what I call a language of Canadian desire.

I concluded my book on an optimistic note, convinced that somehow or other my generation indeed had managed to reproduce the next generation of conscious Canadians for whom Canada is still a homeplace, a specific social and cultural destination worth preserving into the new century.

But even so I was left with a troubling thought, which has only intensified over the last several months.

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[1] Claude Denis, *We are Not You; First Nations and Canadian Modernity* (Broadview, 1997).

[2] Quoted in *The Globe and Mail,* February 28, 2002.

Stephen Cassady's parents have always had two cars, he has always had colour TV, he's always had access to public transportation, he's always had medicare. Stephen Cassady, electronic magazine publisher in Calgary, is younger than medicare. "Do you think all that just dropped out of the sky?" I asked. "Yeah, it's very natural," he said.

By 'natural' he seemed to mean that that was how things just are, in Canada. Assaults on social programs were part of a cycle, he figured, the political swings back and forth, the shifts, the modifications and changes, over the long haul of history, "but you can't permanently damage things. I think that in Canada there are some inalienable trends that have existed historically. Canada will always be a social system-supporting country with health care and advances in education and in telecommunications. Without it we're toast."

This was heart-warming to hear but it left me uneasy. Where, in Cassady's optimism, was a reflection of the cuts to the Canada Health and Social Transfer plan in the 1990s under a Liberal government, the unsustainable levels of student debt, the one in five Canadian children who live in poverty, the homeless, the jobless in booming economies? Was it possible, I wondered, that a generation of satisfied Canadians had arrived for whom Canada was a kind of virtual, feel-good country, while the actual country was under severe stress?

The techno-realists, for example, seeing that the communal life of the last century has been broken up by the impacts of post-industrialization, claim community in cyberspace with e-conferencing, discussion forums, interactive artworks, and speak hopefully of the reconstruction, in 'virtual community,' of people's deteriorating actual community, urban and exurban. Video art, reproducible in endless multiples, and leaflets distributed anonymously by the hundreds, excite them as means of communication

offered by the copy shops. So do images ripped off underground films and circulated on computers. And Polaroids. They even use Polaroids to find each other.

A post-FTA generation that has been weaned on the language of market values, deficits, downsizing, privatizing, of brand names celebrated as culture, governments pronounced oppressive, borders declared irrelevant, declares that 'here' is not a geohistorical place—as it was for my generation who took borders seriously as the fence between us and the American 'there'—but a landscape of communications. The ultimate postmodern nation is based on a system of networks and is the sum of its telecommunications links, not its railways. These citizens cohabit in overlapping micro- and sub-cultures of culture, gender, and ethnicity, and for them the perennial Canadian identity crisis is an opportunity to develop a whole series of morphed electronic identities. Are Canadians a techno-culture, an art, a wired community, or a political space? We are invited to relish all the possibilities at once.

Last June, *The Globe and Mail* invited several young writers, thirty years after Margaret Atwood's *Survival,* to conjure up the next 'paradigm' of Canadian culture. It was an exercise in metaphoric abandon. Canadian culture is "a Big Tent… where everything is in flux and nothing is nailed down;" it is an "arena, a crossroads circus of jugglers and blind-folded tightrope-walkers that defies both gravity and common sense," it is a "market filled with caravan tents and jumbled stalls, chaotic, messy and alive," (and we're still with the first writer!). It is about "aesthetic not authorial diversity," "surviving alienation" (psychic not physical), that is, post-pioneer; it is a "community beyond nations," and a "literature that is never completely at home," yet is also claimed to be somehow "unassailable." To judge from the tone of the contributions, these young writers are all very cheerful about

Photo by Donald Grayston

Ian Angus, Professor, Department of Humanities, SFU and Myrna Kostash

this kind of Canada, which from my point of view is disturbingly ahistorical. History? "What did I love in *The English Patient?*" asks Madeleine Thien, rhetorically, referring to the Michael Ondaatje novel. "The individual lives and choices of four people against the backdrop of history. The sense of a kind of *homelessness,* identity and country *submerged.*"[3] [Italics mine]

We are invited by their theorists to think of Canada as an imagined community, a proposition, all fluidity and flexibility, an "electric city," as writer B.W. Powe expressed it.[4] What makes many of my generation anxious about post-modernity—that Canada may be only a process of negotiations toward perpetually redefined goals, unhitched from politics and institutions—they offer as virtues for a new age. In this virtual Canada, we Canadians are the sum of our values, cultures, desires, disconnected from an actual, market-driven, globalizing and digitizing corporation with its regional office in the House of Commons.

The younger generation has the capacity to feel at home in a symbolically Canadian media universe while actual Canada—its shrunken public spaces, its undefended institutions, its traumatized environment—disappears. This is deeply radical.

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[3] "Post-Survival Canada" *The Globe and Mail,* June 30, 2001.

III.

In the summer of 2001 on Canada Day the neighbourhood I lived in was the scene of the notorious "Whyte Avenue riot," and the community is still coping with the aftermath. Briefly, the "riot" consisted in an out-of-control horde of drunken young people taking over the main street of a trendy part of southside Edmonton for several hours. They had begun their drinking at the Molson's beer tent near the provincial legislature, continued it while watching the fire works, and then had moved over to Whyte Avenue to continue their drinking until the bars closed. They then moved out onto the street, beer cans in hand, refused to disperse, and created general mayhem and vandalism until finally subdued by police. "One young man holds up a can of Molson Canadian," the *Edmonton Journal* reported. "'That's the shit, man, for Canada Day.'"

I watched some of it myself: carloads of kids doing smoking wheelies in the middle of the street, brandishing huge Canadian flags nailed to hockey sticks, kids puking curbside, their heaving chests painted with big red maple leaves. Weeks of hand wringing and anguished self-examination followed in the letters to the editor of local newspapers and in conversation among Edmontonians: How could this have happened? It was so unCanadian. Yet it had happened on Canada Day and the miscreants themselves had joyfully exhibited their patriotism. I am Joe Canadian! in the words of the famous Molson Canadian beer ad, known as the 'rant.' "Research shows Canadian beer drinkers are proud to be Canadian and they want to show their pride," explained a Molson Canada spokesman, defensively. Nor did Bart Testa, professor of media and culture at the University of Toronto, telephoned for his opinion, see any problem: "The 'I Am Canadian' campaign writes the scenario of, 'I drink a lot of beer and I get up and shake my fist and shout I am Canadian; I get pumped up, I get excited. Everybody thinks that's a good way to get patriotic.'" And, according to a spokesman at the ad agency that created the Joe Canadian campaign in the first place, the rant was "the first act in a new Canadian passion play."[5]

This was finally too much for some Edmontonians. From a letter to the editor in the *Edmonton Journal:* "I am

> The younger generation has the capacity to feel at home in a symbolically Canadian media universe while actual Canada—its shrunken public spaces, its undefended institutions, its traumatized environment—disappears. This is deeply radical.

the first to admit that I am an extremely patriotic Canadian… But it seems that some have confused 'Canada' with the beer 'Canadian'. [She quotes Molson's ad agency] 'Canadians are proud of their beer, proud above all that it is better than American beer.' Excuse me? Am I the only one who is disturbed by the idea that we apparently are not proud of our diverse cultures, two official languages, native peoples, relatively peaceful history, artists, freedom etc? Am I the only one too naive to realize that the only things that unite us all as Canadians are our strong beers, clever ads and hockey games?"

It is a question we ask ourselves all over again in the aftermath of the Gold performance of Canada's Olympic hockey team: the lucky loonie was scooped out of centre ice, the kids with flags flying from hockey sticks were out on the streets again, and in the pages of newspapers we read of the 'meaning' of this Canadian achievement: Wayne Gretzky tells us "it shows our depth," sports columnist Stephen Brunt tells us it's "all about celebrating hearth and home," the very idea of it concentrating our "national longing" as "little guys living next to the big guys," a 25-year-old in Toronto, throwing an American flag onto King Street under the wheels of passing cars, exulted that "we're not going to be pushed over by Americans anymore." Rick Salutin, getting a dig in from the Left, in his *Globe and Mail* column, contrasted the "grace and beauty" of the hockey players with the "vapid heroes of globalization."

Edward Greenspon, columnist in the same paper, also saw magnificence in the athletes, male and female, but drew another lesson: these young people, come of age after the FTA, personify Canada's "new mood of excellence," meaning, thankfully, that Canadians are so "secure" in their identity that society can now move from "policies based on equity" to "policies based on excellence." (Let me note two interesting points about Greenspon's assertion. One is that, as I have shown from my own research, young Canadians are still passionately attached to the idea of "policies based on equity" for their identity; and that, according to the research of British medical historian Richard Wilkinson on the social determinants of health, the Canadian provinces, compared with the American states, distribute more socio-economic resources among the bottom 50% of our population, who are healthier than their American counterparts. As for "excellence," inner angst about negotiating social space may be the central story of stress and health.[6]

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[4] Bruce W. Powe, *A Canada of Light* (Toronto 1997).

[5] Quoted in David Staples, *Edmonton Journal,* July 6, 2001.

Canada kicks butt! In the meantime, that other Canada, the government of the day and its servants, are quietly negotiating the terms of our compliance with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the World Trade Organization, an agreement that would well open up our public health care system to for-profit multinational health corporations.

It is this gap that is so worrying: between a semiotic Canada to which citizens profess their passionate allegiance and the grubby Canada of teachers' strikes in Alberta, massive lay-offs of public sector workers in BC, the recriminalization of dissent and the isolating and stigmatizing of 'bad' protesters by Bills C-35 and C-36 (and the absence of a public uproar against this legislation), the alleged "overwhelming solidarity" with the US in the wake of September 11, the casual official dismissal of concerns about our complicity with Washington's flouting of the Geneva Conventions in its treatment of Afghan war prisoners, the discreet negotiations to establish a "North American security perimeter." As Independent Senator Doug Roche said, "The Canadian public and the political system seem mesmerized in

following US leadership, even though that leadership is violating the rule of law, is selfish, short-sighted, and pushing the world toward economic, social and environmental disruption."[7] Ah, yes, the Canada of excellence.

Which is the real 'next Canada'? The Canada of Light? The veteran CBC broadcaster Peter Gzowski dies, and a large part of Canada goes into mourning for the man who 'connected' them through the miracle of radio. CBC producer Mark Starowicz tells us to "shake off technological despair… and embark on the great project of linking a nation in the technological grammar of today." He also has the last laugh on the marketing executives, who said, "no one would watch" his television series, *Canada: A People's History.* Housing developers tout the new 'wired' neighbourhood in which all homes are connected through a community (there's that word again) intranet that allows the householders to 'connect' and 'talk' with each other without leaving the privacy of their homes.

"What a stupid idea," the other Canada replies.[8] "Isn't there an underlying creepiness in bonding with people that live across the street, without actually going across the street?" The question had of course occurred to me; now it's asked by a university student who wants a 'social' not a 'textual' experience with his neighbours, and who suspects the Internet servers of trying to create the same dependency on their services that we all have on telephone and electricity utilities. In the fallout from the terrorism visited on New York and Washington in fall 2001, young philosophers and ethicists seek to resituate the Canadian citizen in a web of moral responsibility, the responsibility that powerful societies have in relationship to the deprived and desperate. At a Parkland Institute conference on democracy at the University of Alberta last November, University of Toronto philosopher Mark

Kingwell appealed to the audience's "moral indignation" about poverty and violence instead of instinctively retreating to zones of security and self-interest and becoming "fundamentalists with our own way of life."

This is stirring stuff and one wants to rise to the challenge. But immediately the question arises: how in fact do we engage 'responsibly' and 'creatively' with distant, disadvantaged and disaffected 'others' that will make any difference to them, if we are not prepared to engage politically as well as morally? It is our dominance of social, economic and cultural power that makes those 'others' for whom we are so responsible, so miserable. Our moral and emotional transformation is necessary but not sufficient. Can moral philosophy address precisely that peril that Régis Debray signals in his *Digital Intellectuals,* that the "electronic village" limits shared experience to consumers and sects, and politics to politicians?

The thousands who have gathered in protest at the various sites of globalism's board meetings have answered that question by direct action. Even before the events of September 2001 and the war in Afghanistan there was, on the side of the free traders, a grudging acknowledgement that free markets unregulated by governments have not delivered the goods: democracy and economic equity; indeed, that free markets hardly require them. On the side of the protesters, there is a growing confidence that what they are building is not just 'theatre' or a 'war of symbols'. They are constructing a politics of civil society in which a plurality and diversity of what Jeremy Rifkin calls "cultural activists"[9] as well as those activists with real political experience in Mexico and India and South Africa act together to challenge the polarity of McWorld vs Jihad and "expose all the invisible worlds" between them.[10]

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[6] Dr. Richard Wilkinson, "The Price of Inequality," Public Lecture, Edmonton, March 4, 2002.

[7] Quoted in the *Edmonton Journal,* January 26, 2002.

[8] Brendan Procé, *Gateway,* February 5, 2002.

What then of Canadian nationalism and the next Canada? I return to George Grant and *Lament for a Nation* and his Introduction to the Carleton Library edition, 1970, the one I read. What I don't remember reading is his explanation of what he meant by "lament." He meant, he writes, "a lament for the romanticism of the original dream" of Canadian nationalism. He's stepped back from his dream, he continues, because of the "ignoble delusions" of our public men. To "ridicule" those delusions has now become a greater responsibility for the writer than is the "secondary" one of "protecting romantic hopes of Canadian nationalism."[11]

But we live in new times, when the "romantic hope" of Canadian nationalism has become a necessary tool (albeit modified post-colonially) in the ridicule of ignoble delusions. In my own files, just to cite two instances, I have papers by Ian Angus of SFU and Gord Laxer of the University of Alberta and the SSHRC-funded collaborative research project, Neo-Liberal Globalism and its Challengers: Reclaiming the Commons in the Semi-periphery. Angus suggests that the "pretty good society" we all want could be provided within the "umbrella state"—one that shelters universal social and economic programs and allows space for innovation in civil society "where new social identities might prosper." Likewise, Laxer makes reference to "anticolonial, socialist, feminist, ecological and antiracist movements" that work at the level of the nation,

the state. As Canadians, we mean the Canadian state. Laxer is interested in the recuperation of "left nationalism" as an attachment to and support for the "sovereignty of the political community to which one belongs."[12] That would be Canada. Angus explicitly evokes the Canadian political tradition "that examines a plurality of inter-woven relations between particularity and universality," and which could provide

> Even before the events of September 2001 and the war in Afghanistan there was, on the side of the free traders, a grudging acknowledgement that free markets unregulated by governments have not delivered the goods: democracy and economic equity; indeed, that free markets hardly require them.

us the resources to defend our society against the ravages of globalism.[13]

As for me, all I did was get on a bus and go to Boston back in 1972.

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[9] Jeremy Rifkin, *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* July 12–18, 2001.

[10] Naomi Klein, *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* November 1–7, 2001.

[11] George Grant, *Lament for a Nation,* Carlton University Press, 1970.

[12] Gordon Laxer, "The Movement That Dare Not Speak Its Name: The Return of Left Nationalism/Internationalism," *Alternatives* 26, 2001.

[13] Ian Angus, "Post-Colonial Federalism: Social Citizenship and New Identities," *Federalism, Identities and Nationalism,* ed. Claude Couture, 2002.

Louisa Bashmakova at SFU
—Mary Ann Stouck

Dr. Louisa Bashmakova from Kuban State University in southern Russia visited Simon Fraser in March 2002 under the sponsorship of the Humanities Institute, in association with the Departments of English and Humanities. Dr. Bashmakova has a PhD in literature from Moscow State University, and heads Kuban State University's Department of the History of Culture. She is also the founder and director of a very successful visiting student program with the Association of Midwestern Colleges. While at Simon Fraser, Dr. Bashmakova gave a lecture on the Russian poet Anna Akhmatova in Dr. Myler Wilkinson's Humanities 340 course on St. Petersburg. She also spoke to Dr. David Stouck's American literature course on "A Russian Reading American Literature" (she is a specialist in the field of American literature, and wrote her dissertation on Richard Wright). Students found her perspectives on both Russian and North American writers fascinating, and enjoyed a lively dialogue with her. She also accompanied a group of seniors to Victoria on a field trip, as part of a course studying British Columbia writing under Dr. Wilkinson. Visits to the Provincial Museum and the Emily Carr House enabled her to become acquainted for the first time with the art and culture of the West Coast. This was a productive cultural exchange, appreciated by both students and faculty at SFU and by our Russian guest.

Mary Ann Stouck, Department of English and Department of Humanities, SFU

Herbert L. Kessler at SFU
—Paul Dutton

The Institute for the Humanities and Broadview Press (with additional assistance from the Koerner Foundation and UBC's Medieval and Renaissance Studies series at Green College) sponsored a visit and three lectures by the noted medieval art historian Herbert L. Kessler of Johns Hopkins University in the third week of March 2002. Professor Kessler is preparing a book entitled *Seeing Medieval Art* which examines how we regard medieval art and how the medievals themselves approached the art they made. The three lectures, "Object and Ornament," "Picturing a Perpetual Past" and "Looking and Longing" were well attended and exposed participants to the underlying nature of medieval art.

After examining the general purposes and assumptions of medieval art, the speaker moved the audience through a series of specific objects: the stained glass of St. Denis, the mosaics and paintings of 12th century Italian churches, and a variety of objects. Slowly peeling back the layers of meaning and artifice that cover these objects, Professor Kessler restored a context to these works of art that would not be possible if we had approached them 'cold' as though we were tourists merely passing through some medieval church. But, and perhaps more importantly, he provided us with a technique or, better still, an approach that we postmoderns can take when faced with 'alien' art, alien because full of assumptions and intentions we no longer share or immediately understand.

Medieval men and women, for instance, decorated reliquaries (the shrines in which they stored saints' bones) with gold and semi-precious stones not just to praise God, but to echo the symbolism of the *Bible* and to invoke the heavenly Jerusalem to come; ironically, then, theirs was an immaterial and symbolical art, even if today we see in such displays something slightly baroque and gaudy. Those richly ornate objects were made by the same artists and patrons (men such as Abbot Suger of St. Denis) who were exploring the immaterial and divinizing properties of light as cast through stained glass windows, pointed arches, and even onto the manuscript page.

In the end, then, Professor Kessler suggested that all art needs to be understood on its own terms with as full an engagement with its particular context and intellectual world as possible, at least, to 'get it' as its makers meant it to be experienced.

Paul Dutton, Department of History and Department of Humanities, SFU

Classical Leanings
—David Mirhady

On February 22-23, 2002 an interdisciplinary conference hosted by the Classical Association of the Canadian West on the theme 'Classics and the Humanities' took place at SFU's Harbour Centre campus. The conference was supported by both the Institute for the Humanities and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. David Mirhady, faculty member of the Humanities Department and an associate of the Institute for the Humanities, was the co-ordinator of the conference.

"Classical Leanings" brought together approximately seventy classicists and other humanists from twelve institutions in Canada and four in the United States. It forged new ties in the teaching and research of ancient philosophy, literature, rhetoric, science, and law. The conference enjoyed a tremendous *esprit de corps* as humanists from diverse disciplines came together with classicists and took delight in finding common cause. It thus fulfilled entirely its original objectives.

Many of the papers took a form different from traditional academic papers, as the presenters dealt particularly with interdisciplinary and pedagogical issues. This sort of working 'outside the box' came as a bit of a revelation, I think, especially to the classicists, as they sought to make contact with other humanists. The conference web site at www.sfu.ca/cacw2002/final.htm remains available and presents a mechanism for the dissemination of the papers, though fewer participants have taken this opportunity than might have been hoped. Most seem to want to rework their papers for presentation within their own disciplines, where, I suspect, they get better recognition. Participants included graduate students from several universities, college and university instructors, and several members of the public, who were especially welcome.

There were several highlights in the program for me, including Matthew

Clark's presentation on using classical rhetoric in understanding contemporary literature and Bella Vivante's comparison of Homer's *Odyssey* with contemporary Native American literature. But Brent Shaw's plenary presentation on "The Image of Spartacus," a *Rezeptionsgeschichte* tracing the understanding of Spartacus from the early modern period until now, offered participants a tremendous model of interdisciplinary scholarship for emulation. An ancient historian, Shaw traced out the background to several novels and theatrical productions in various European and non-European contexts, and even shed light on a couple of Canadian angles to the story.

Kootenay School of Writing Fall 2002 Program
—Ted Byrne

Andrew Klobucar conducted a seminar entitled "The Jargon of Eden: Investigation in Digital Poetics." This seminar surveyed the technological and material, or objectivist, aspects of text production within modernism. It argued for a text-generational based digital poetics rather than the simple use of the computer to extend the graphic aspects of earlier technologies. It included a demonstration of Klobucar and David Ayre's work in related software development.

Greg Placanouris, a student at SFU, conducted a seminar entitled "Aetheric Mask/Rausch: Psychopharmacology and the Life and Work of Walter Benjamin." This seminar examined Benjamin's use and theorization of his experiments with hashish and mescaline. We read and discussed the recently translated "Protocols" of these experiments.

A book launch took place with

reading and discussion of *Surrealist Subversions* (Automedia 2002), edited by Ron Sakolsky. Sakolsky is a co-founder of Black Liberation Radio (now Human Rights Radio) and co-editor of a number of important anthologies and of a recent special issue of *Race Traitor,* "Surrealism: Revolution Against Whiteness."

Readings were given by Robert Mittenthal and Vancouver poets Judith Copithorne and Jacqueline Turner. Robert Mittenthal, a Seattle poet and member of the Sub-Text collective, also led a discussion of Hardt and Negri's *Empire* and of a paper recently read in Seattle by Michael Hardt, "Twilight of the Peasant World."

Upcoming events include a launch of a new issue of *W* magazine with work by Roger Farr and Brian Carpenter and a presentation and discussion of Margot Butler's "Swarms in 'Bee space'" (*West Coast Line* #35). Roger Farr is Managing Editor of *West Coast Line* and teaches at Capilano College. Margot Butler is currently teaching at SFU.

Ted Byrne is a director at the Trade Union Research Bureau in Vancouver and is a member of the Kootenay School of Writing Collective.

The Institute for the Humanities was pleased to continue its support of programming at the Kootenay School of Writing in 2002.

The Prague Field School and the Travel Study Award
—Jerry Zaslove

In 2002 The Institute for the Humanities provided two stipends to assist humanities students to attend the Prague Field School. The program is organized through the Office of International and Exchange Student Services and the Humanities Department. In this eighth year of the credit program with Charles University, twenty students were resident in Prague for eight weeks of in-depth study of Central European culture, art and society. The program includes courses in language, art history, film, literature and political science. In two short essays, Tim Came and Keir Niccol— SFU undergraduates and recipients of the stipends—reflect on aspects of their experience and their encounters with the contemporary European world and its legacies. Information about this program can be obtained through the Office of International and Exchange Student Services. Information about the Travel Study Award can be obtained through the Institute for the Humanities.

Jerry Zaslove and Prague Field School students at Rimov in Sumova —"Stations of the Cross"

Keir Niccol

Shades of Apprehension
—Keir Niccol

Driving away from the airport and down an unnamed highway, more like a byway, the bus veers around a corner into what I surmise to be a suburb. Rolling down the small road, I gape at the brown and tan stucco residences on either side, trying to glean as much as possible from these first few, crucial moments of fatigue-filtered, jet-lagged impression. Rounding the road's arc, I glance to my left and notice a single slender figure atop a pillar. The pillar's grey stone culminates in a same-coloured nymph, balancing in a moment of stride upon one nimble, slight leg. A ribbon, trapped against the motion of her chest, streams behind the figure's torso, her arms rising above to push the moment—of victory, celebration, emancipation. In fact, it is not at all clear that it is a she; the form of the androgynous body's willowy limbs plies the light air in a frozen moment of flight.

The pillar passes from view, vanishing beneath rising fingers of flora scattered in the yard around the statue. The bus continues its meandering introduction to Prague's streets, its welcome includes a shake shuddering up from thousands of cobblestones. Another corner, another trance-inducing vision atop the horizon—St. Vitus's Gothic spires prick the sky, tearing the heavens into a soot black and brown stone cascade of crockets, gargoyles, bowing and falling priests, kings and peasants, all spilling from its rent. The cathedral, surreal and stunning in sudden rearing stasis, seems to be slowly rotating upon a dais, aging aspects appearing in full, each in turn. A moment imbued with old time expires, a new excitement occurs, belying even St. Vitus's longevity. The building nears, then disappears, its four corners and sky-spearing spires are like pillars and pilings demanding eternity of their foundations.

There is a path in the woods. It twists and breaks, sometimes forgetting splintered twigs in its wake. A stone wall or bench mark distance. In the dark, it's more the filtering orange city glow that defines movement. The path staggers between concrete and broken stone dirt. To the left, walk two hundred forty metres. Looming black metal on stone; the path widens like a river skirting an obstinate boulder. The moment of passing the bulk lasts longer; it nearly appears but slowly, immense with uncertainty. Stepping back to perceive its whole, not stepping in water, I gaze in concentrated incomprehension. The trees' shadows play across a heavy beard and fierce eyebrows. There are men moving in the forest some distance away.

Further along, descend left, then right then left, a fence draws attention to a sprawling palace. There are large, abundantly foliaged trees standing like ponderous sentinels. Between still shafts lurks a chimera—four legs beneath a tilting chassis. Golden and eastern European, the car is a Trabant. Thousands of these were filled with refugees of Communism—people fleeing East Germany after the curtain fell on the era of 'Normalization'. Legs of emigration—automobiles only ancillary to what still was a massive, human exodus to a mythologized west.

Catching (up) on History
Assigning some term to these monuments would come later; varied descriptions of convictions gripped in frozen forms, the eras traversed by epochs elapsed—these and other matters meted upon marble, granite and copper. I did not at first know but would soon understand the defining qualities of the Art Nouveau style of painting, statuary, architecture and more. During the late nineteenth century heyday of the Czech National Revival, a general sense of prosperity and progress pervaded at least the more affluent classes of Bohemia, Moravia, and Europe at large. The post-Romantic ideal of capturing

the essences of nature amidst the achievement of 'Man' infused this movement. Soft and waif-like human forms appeared like darkling visitations among the various other artful denizens of Prague.

The androgynous, non-aggressive, yet still celebrated Art Nouveau figures hearken to several enduring aspects of Czech culture. First, a consistent attention to convoluted and involved ornament: filigreed metal guardrails, spectral faces emerging from stones of many ages, building facades draped with spilling stone bouquets. The second,

> As a monument, (St. Vitus) is less ambiguous in its intention to honour God than some of the more obscure and camouflaged aspects of Prague monuments. Yet details are inevitably elided as only portions of stories are told, and the great mass of history remains absent from tourist boroughs, fully satisfied with their iconic representations of a city's cultural memory.

a refusal to engage in the aggressive symbols of domination, supremacy, and imperialism so characteristic of other major European centres. Instead, modestly proportioned structures culminate in a lowly undulating red roof vista. A hundred spires rise above the roofs of Prague, but never in a triumphal surge. The stewards of Bohemia have long borne a humble and beautiful creative urge.

St. Vitus Cathedral is as much and more to Prague than the ephemeral pillar angel. It is a different testament to the creativity of this small Slavic nation. Here, the weight of holy responsibility soaks the ancient stones. Angling down into the Mala Strana, Prague's

'Lesser Town', the Prazkyhrad palace forever descends from on high, at its centre the ancient heart, St. Vitus. This area of Prague has existed for over a millennium in some form or another. St. Vitus was built during many years of additions from the fourteenth century to the twentieth. As a monument, it is less ambiguous in its intention to honour God than some of the more obscure and camouflaged aspects of Prague monuments. Yet details are inevitably elided as only portions of stories are told, and the great mass of history remains absent from tourist boroughs, fully satisfied with their iconic representations of a city's cultural memory. Some systems of knowledge remain inherently arcane and allow us the Kafka-esque experience of the blindness of negotiating cultural remnants without explanation. The greatest historical legacies inevitably succumb to the future's reduced and fabricated vision of the past.

Visitation and Reprise
There are two places in Prague where I returned numerous times. One is central, the other relatively peripheral —peripheral in the sense of lying on the historical outskirts of the old and new towns, rather than miles from the Centrum. Both places endure as crucial sites of the tangible manifestation of the Czechs' cultural memory. One is frequented by thousands of visitors, the other is largely deserted. Both sites warrant a significant mention in any account of local history, yet only one is presented to foreigners as representative of the city. These two locations carry their own respective monuments, each containing a complex and contested story, ostensibly commemorating the same thing—the historical moment of the Hussites. Yet a profound difference exists between the two. The former was the site of two monuments, one that no longer remains, having been torn to the ground. The latter site contains one monument bearing at least two meanings merged in metal.

The first is Staromestske Namesti, the Old-Town Square, and the heart of Prague to many. The large plaza is bounded by some of the town's oldest

Photo by Eryn Holbrook

Statue on the Charles Bridge, Prague.

and most famous buildings—the Tyn Church and another small medieval building with vaulted windows and slanted façade, leaning upon the Kinsky Palace—near by is Franz Kafka's father's store, the town hall and its Orlej—the astronomical clock. Dominating the centre of the square is the Jan Hus monument, sculpted by Ladislav Saloun in 1915. It is an ovoid statue, with a number of figures in various postures, generally surrounding the tallest and most prominent figure of Jan Hus. The statue was erected to mark the 500th anniversary of the religious dissident's death at the stake in Konstanz. Hus was a religious reformer and Czech nationalist, and those surrounding him represent other persecuted Czech nationals, including those ruined during the Thirty Years' War two centuries later.

Across from Hus, falling directly beneath his gaze for three years, stood a 'Pillar of Our Lady'. Known as the Marian Column, the monument was erected in 1650 to commemorate the victory of the Hapsburgs' ejection of the Swedes at the end of the Thirty Years' War. However, in time it gathered other layers of meaning. By the end of the nineteenth century, many Czech nationalists perceived the pillar as a reminder of the stifling of Czech nationalist culture in the

seventeenth century, and the continued domination of Hapsburg hegemony. In 1918, following the announcement of the collapse of Hapsburg domination in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a throng of Czechs took the square and toppled the column that had become a focal point of so much resentment.

Both figures in the square occupied immensely important places in Czech consciousness. Both still signify as contested and intricate symbols (the Marian Column does continue to resound in the minds of some, and its former base is still marked in the cobblestones of the square). However, the monuments' more potent signification has at times overwhelmed the subtler points for some. The apparent contrast of Hus, representing the struggle against foreign rule, and the Marian Column, standing as a victorious finger counting off centuries of rule, constituted a disagreeable juxtaposition for the likes of Franta Kysela-Sauer and Jan Hasek. In this instance, the major clash of significations could be resolved through the demolition of the offending element (whether the monument should have been destroyed and the importance of leaving 'offending' vestiges as a *memento mori* of past regimes is an altogether different discussion). Not all connotative contradictions are so easily resolved.

The Zizkov monument serves as my second place of intrigue. This site now sits outside the radius of frequent tourist and native visits, though not because it is very far from the Centrum. Nearly six hundred years ago, when the battle of Vitkov Hill—as the mound was then called—occurred, it was on the outskirts of the, then, much smaller Prague. Foreigners do not miss this location because of distance, although there is no easy way to access the hill from the direction of most tourist activity—only a walk up a steep hill with no real indication of what path to pursue. Likely, most foreigners do not reach this location because they are not directed here by the local Czechs, who themselves rarely visit it.

The reasons for the Czech aversion

A hundred spires rise above the roofs of Prague, but never in a triumphal surge. The stewards of Bohemia have long borne a humble and beautiful creative urge.

to the Zizkov monument are a result of changing historical perspectives and ideologies, as is the case in Old-Town Square. Atop one of Prague's prominent hills, a massive rider and steed loom before a stark, mausoleum-like building. Jan Zizka was the Hussite army general who fought against the encroaching Catholic Hapsburg forces and won against all odds at Vitkov Hill. Recognized later as a nationalist hero, the Zizkov (combining his name and that of the hill) monument was conceived during the time of the Czech First Republic, after 1918. It was to be erected before the Second World War but was delayed for various reasons. Not until the communist government was in power after 1948 did the monument, created by sculptor Bohumil Kafka years before, actually reach its current site.

The great irony of the monument is that, though the figure of Zizka is recognized in a similar way to Hus— defender of Czech national culture against an oppressive foreign hegemony —the Zizkov monument is not. When the massive equestrian figure rose on the

above Prague, it was accompanied by a number of aspects provided by the Communist regime. In fact, the entire place has the feel of a Communist cathedral, for in the conception of the site, a great deal was borrowed from the rich legacy of Prague architecture. For example, on the doors of many European cathedrals, panels of relief characters depict religious tales, or accounts of the building of the cathedral, or some pope's coronation. The 'Communist Cathedral' presents a history from the Hussites to the Communists in square reliefs on the great copper doors standing behind the equestrian statue. The limited view afforded a visitor indicates a simple historical progression from the Catholic-fighting Hussites, to the events of the twentieth century leading to the installation of the Czech Communists, with no account of the four hundred years in between. The Soviets had a habit of invoking a highly reduced, narrow view of history to legitimate their presence in Czechoslovakia. The building itself was initially proposed as a mausoleum for the remains of the Czech Republic's first president T.G. Masaryk. It was hijacked by Czech Communists, who instead interned the mummified remains of Communist leader Klement Gottwald (the first "workers' president"), no doubt a tip of the hat to Lenin.

In appropriating the figure of Zizka and constructing a monument covered with overtly Communist sentiment, the state created a highly conflicted cultural monument. Although the statue was originally conceived and assembled long before the arrival of the Red Army, its location was meant as a shrine to Communism. Many Czechs associate Zizkov with this later manifestation, rather than its original conception. Adding to the general convolution of sentiment is the overall size of the hilltop memorial. A sense of aggression and violent power exude from the site as

Zizka sits astride his steed, bandage over one eye and mace raised above head, ready to charge Prague. Not far away stands the massive television tower, also erected by the Communists. This giant grey finger points heavenward in an absurd defiance of the rest of Prague's low-lying, almost rural landscape. This impression of a megalomaniacal urge to dominate the landscape, physical and mental, also resides within the Zizkov monument.

> In the Old-Town Square, the Jan Hus monument and the Marion Column stared each other down for three years, a juxtaposition of Czech and Hapsburg supremacy. There it was possible to remove one of the vestiges. At Zizkov, the Czech and Soviet ideological pasts are imprinted into the same edifice. It is impossible to tear one down without the other.

The monuments of Old-Town Square and Zizkov ostensibly hearken back to moments of Czech nationalist potency. Yet their current import and the respect each receives are very different. Hus was the 'original' dissident, predating even Martin Luther in his work to reform the church, and holds a more powerful place in the Czech imagination. However, this is hardly enough to eclipse the importance of Zizka, who took up the cause two centuries later. Perhaps the answer is in the different way the two places bear the history of the cultures that have passed over Bohemia. In the Old-Town Square, the Jan Hus monument and the Marion Column stared each other down for three years, a juxtaposition of Czech and Hapsburg supremacy. There

it was possible to remove one of the vestiges. At Zizkov, the Czech and Soviet ideological pasts are imprinted into the same edifice. It is impossible to tear one down without the other. There is irony in the current perception of the Zizka monument. Zizka was as committed to resisting Catholic hegemony as Jan Hus was, albeit following the by-then prescribed Hussite ideology, rather than pursuing a radically new reformation like Hus. Zizka was appropriated, along with the Hussites in general, for the purposes of legitimating Communist ideology. His figure became an icon of the dominant, oppressive ideology for the Czechs. This is exactly what Zizka's own idol, Hus, had tried to challenge and that he himself contended. The question still remains, however, whether it serves any positive end to destroy reminders of the past, even when they are painful.

Return and Reprise
Asked to reflect upon my time in Prague, I did not initially know how to respond. Then, insight developed, arranging a narrative of various refractions and angles of incidents to create a complete(r) story. Reflections of Prague means taking what was learned there and holding it up against what surrounds me here, in Vancouver. I am now treating the surrounding elements of sculpture, architecture, urban planning differently. Specific differences have been called to my attention in the ways 'we' and 'they' may view similar artifacts. In this particular moment, of course, it is 'we,' the Vancouverites, 'they', the Czechs.

Vancouver has its local monuments—the cenotaph at Victory Square, some invisible or appropriated totem poles. Then, there is the Grandview Park Obelisk, and down at around 70th and Oak, a nondescript park has pegged in its corner a small stone pyramid, solely to bear a placard revealing the place as the historical site of a 'midden'. Present at almost all of these and other monuments and statues in Vancouver, are plaques, placards, written treatises remarking upon the commemorative moment frozen in the bulk of stone an attentive observer stands at the foot of. The text may provide biographical information,

dates and times, or recount some long-since-invisible mark of a now-decimated society. How many of these monuments would make sense to me without their attendant text? How much do I understand of them anyway? Living always around them, local statues tend to blend into the urban scenery: while easy landmarks for meeting, they seldom sustain topics of conversation.

There are many, many more statues and monuments in Prague than Vancouver. Stumble down one corner, round a square or up and alley, there's bound to be some errant stone countenance peering after you. Public space abounds in a way never understood in modern urban Canada, and in every square is a central figure, fountain, or other forget-me-not. Next to the sheer abundance of ornate stonework, the most noticeable difference—perhaps aside from basic stylistic considerations—is the absence of edifying accompaniments. While there may be some epitaph scrawled (warning of the folly of abandonment, betrayal, and strife), nothing is provided of the knowledge necessary to comprehend the figures before one, their proximity and pose relative to one another, and all other possible historical, lyrical, or mystical considerations.

But the Czechs do not ignore their city, or its history. Rather than indicating a loss of knowledge, the absence of explicatory placards testifies to the higher general level of cultural memory common among the Czechs. The dearth of textual footnotes marks the expectation that position, form, content, and the stories of each monument will be known by those to whom the monuments should signify— namely, Czechs *qua* Czechs. The stone-still stolen moments of history laboriously erected in Prague were not conceived as drawing cards for the tourist set. Monuments bear immense import; hailing the ever-present population of the place they are immersed in, demanding that the mind return once again to that site of

struggle, victory, loss, or advance. More powerful is the interpretation of a thing internalized by the viewer, rather than vaguely recalled or always confronted anew upon observing an educational placard.

Continuing Footprints

The city of Prague has been called a "shrine to complexity." Passing through the region once contained by the ancient city walls, a visitor encounters an overwhelming array of cultural stimuli. Embarking upon an understanding of a foreign culture is an immense

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undertaking alone. In a place such as Prague, the path to knowledge of a civilization's customs and creations winds and often forks. Choosing to pursue one avenue of cultural memory ultimately leads back to another intrigue briefly avoided. The journey is never dull, but frequently bewildering because of the sheer amount of historical weight that resides within each artifact, piece of architecture, or monument.

When the residents of Prague walk out of the Centrum on Vitezna Ulice, over the Legii Bridge and into Mala Strana, they recognize several levels of signification in the recently installed "Memorial to the Victims of Communism" by Olbram Zoubek. The monument is located very close to a portion of the 'Hunger Wall', commissioned by Charles IV in the fourteenth century. (The King ordered the extensive town wall constructed during a time of poverty, when the extra work helped a legion of languishing labourers. The name derives from the necessity from which the wall arose, and the malaise it countered.) A large Soviet Star, prior to the fall of the Eastern Bloc, was set directly upon the site of the current monument. Nearby is the city hall, once surrounded by Russian tanks, emblematic of the Stalinistic Communism dominating the city and

Photo by Eryn Holbrook

A street in Prague.

nation. Zoubek has a style of sculpture widely recognized in the Czech Republic. The touches of Giacometti and Rodin can be felt in the disfigured cast of the memorial's five figures.

Zoubek began a rise to prominence as an adversary of the soon-to-be-toppled Soviet regime; his work signified the emergent force of a people in slow revolt. Ten years later, he takes commissions from banks and is counted by some as 'too popular' (mainly by the academics—always the ones to niggle over fine points). These and other questioned and questionable aspects of the sculpture are considered and are factored into the reality that not everyone who lived in Prague under Communism wants a statue commemorating the victims of Communism. For some, it dredges up old hurts, opens willfully buried wounds. And perhaps not everyone is convinced to the same degree that Communism is the Antichrist—after all, a quarter of Czech voters elected a Communist parliamentarian in the 2002 election.

All or some of these factors are known by Czechs and, with the exception of the first point, often experienced first hand. Internalization is not necessarily something that needs to be worked upon; living through some history is enough to generate sediment that will collect internally. The monument is merely a decorative stopper atop the past's decanter. Of course, virtually none of the tourists in this highly visited region of Prague know more than one or two of the palimpsest layers in any public edifice. Perhaps this leaves the statues open to more interpretation. Maybe even the Czechs never settle on only one interpretation of their own memories. This is not so different from the conflicted understanding of symbols that occurs in North American society. Except, perhaps, the lesson appears in stark contrast in Prague due to the marked difference of the Soviet and Hapsburg ideologies from the Czech. The loud discrepancies between political world views, next to the comparative invisibility of ideology in North America,

allows for the appearance of clearer schisms and ruptures in meaning. It is appropriate that there be, for the Czechs, a greater awareness of the duplicity of history, of victory and the dominance of aggressor states and their ideologies. In Sabine's paintings in Milan Kundera's *The Unbearable Lightness of Being,* another level of meaning always emerges through the Czechs' stories of their statues.

Another level of meaning always emerges through the Czechs' stories of their statues.

Keir Niccol and Tim Came

The Prague Experience: An Axe for the Frozen Sea
—Tim Came

Tim Came

At its heart, the Prague Field School represents a change of landscape, from one familiar, often taken for granted, and in at least some respects comfortable, to a richer and more complex world of experience. It is, to borrow an image from Franz Kafka, the kind of book that we should read, which is able to "wake us up with a blow on the head," and act as "the axe for the frozen sea inside us."[1] I could not hope in these pages to detail my Prague experience. Instead I will offer glimpses of a few encounters that served as axes for this frozen sea of things taken for granted. These powerful encounters served to awaken me to the artificial or constructed nature of how we as people relate to each other and the world around us in particular contexts. They pointed out that the way things are may be neither the best nor the only way. While these encounters affected me, they may speak differently to others or even not at all. After all, it is the first-hand nature of the encounter that gives such experiences their power. Nevertheless, it is my hope that relating these encounters will raise questions and encourage others to seek out such challenging 'texts'.

As part of my preparation to go to Prague I read a few short works by Kafka. The *Metamorphosis,* in which the traveling salesman Gregor Samsa awakens to find that he has transformed into a giant insect, seemed to resonate with how many relate to certain illnesses. Gregor remains hidden away in his room, almost without exception, from the time of his metamorphosis until his death. While his family takes care of him, even they fear him and come

to distance themselves. I believe that we saw something similar with AIDS, though time and education seem to be

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making a difference. Such barriers appear to remain strong with certain illnesses however, mental ones in particular. Despite rising rates and an increasingly medicated population it remains something alien and frightening, even tied to a visceral fear of contagion, though on a rational level we know this to be unwarranted.

I visited a psychiatric clinic in Prague that showed a concerted attempt

to challenge these barriers. At the suggestion of a student from Prague, I attended Mezi Ploty, a cultural festival which translates into English as "inside the walls." As the sun beat down rather mercilessly, tens of thousands of people wandered the grounds (though not the slightly run-down buildings) of Bohnice, the largest psychiatric hospital in the Czech Republic. I too wandered, taking in the festive atmosphere, the children, balloons, and jugglers. A variety of groups and individuals performed: I saw at least half-a-dozen bands, though there was also theatre and poetry, and a wide variety of people, especially young people. The organizers claim that it "helps break the taboos and prejudice against the field of psychiatry," a field that they claim has been "very feared" and "misunderstood".[2] They hope not only to break stereotypes about psychiatric problems and the people who have them, but by so doing, to break prejudices against seeking psychiatric help. While it remains to be seen how each will grow, this year's Mezi Ploty, like those before it, planted the seeds of change in a field of thousands. Our class visited a site at Kladno in Bohemia, a former centre of steel production at which 18,000 people used to work in shifts around the

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[1] Franz Kafka, "Selections From Letters to Friends," trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston, in   *The Basic Kafka,* ed. Erich Heller and Michael Kowal. New York: Washington Square, 1979.

[2] Information sheet compiled and translated from Czech primary sources by Pavlina Sachova.

clock, where machines had been in operation for more than a century, and where now almost all is silent. It is a powerful and complex place, but I believe that a central feature of what Kladno is, is the passing away of the vibrant social world of work that once existed there. Apart from a canteen and a few workers, it is a dead place now, and the death of its social world dramatically underscores its physical and environmental desolation. Its story was not unfamiliar; I had heard it before, not of Kladno, but those of many other tragedies brought in the wake of privatization across the post-communist world. The entrepreneur who bought the firm seized the opportunity to "tunnel," stripping it of most of its assets and bankrupting it within a few years, sending the town into a depression from which it is still seeking to emerge. Kladno is more than a cruel lesson in political economy, though. It is an indictment of human avarice and of belief in unfettered property rights supporting the freedom to cast thousands out of work, should that present itself as a necessary condition for personal or corporate enrichment.

While we were in Prague, a national election campaign unfolded around us. As a political scientist, I could not resist plunging into the midst of it, seeing the rallies of Communists and Thatcherites (Civic Democratic Party leader Vaclav Klaus is quite possibly her biggest fan)[3], of Democrats both Christian and Social. At each, amid the music, the balloons and posters, I saw the faces, far more than I could count, of people supporting—and at times questioning— their leaders, people whose lives would be dramatically affected by the outcome of the elections I had tended to treat as an interesting theoretical problem. By chance I came across a Communist

rally in Wenceslas Square, Prague's Champs Elysee, a few meters away from a small monument to the victims of Communism, perhaps even the spot at which Jan Palac lit himself on fire in protest of the policies of the day. Politics became real then, not an interesting puzzle or a paper topic, not even a fascinating system, though it may have been these things as well. I realized how much my focus on distant countries, my reliance on the computer screens and reams of paper through which I learn about these societies rendered me clinically detached from them, and from their people, who had, somewhere along

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the way, become abstract ciphers.

I came to the conclusion that many of us do this. On one level, the Western experience of the world has increasingly become a mediated one, with our world growing more distant even as it shrinks. Yet on another level, we as students and scholars often tend to draw lines between ourselves and our research, aggregating and abstracting those on its other side. Identifying with those on the other side of the window would compromise our objectivity, assuming that it left us in any condition to do such research at all. Yet,

on the other hand, the conversion of human subjects, or humans affected by our subjects, into abstractions has the potential to desensitize us and the studies that we produce to the real impact of the phenomena we study and the policies we recommend. Aware of both sides of this equation, we must each determine, according to the dictates of our consciences and the demands of our work, whether, and under what conditions, to make this pilgrimage. I only hope that more of us, knowing the implications, decide to do so.

The Prague experience, as an encounter with that which is foreign and its employment as an "axe for the frozen sea" is certainly not bound to Prague. As one powerful example, in St. Petersburg, I visited Kresty prison, a place that I had seen before through literature. I had encountered it in "Requiem 1935–1940," perhaps the greatest poem ever written by Anna Akhmatova, herself one of the greatest Russian poets. In the portion presented "Instead of a Preface," she recounts seventeen months spent in line outside the prison. When one of the other women discovered who Akhmatova was, she was asked if she could describe the experience that they shared. At Akhmatova's affirmative reply, she writes of the other woman "[t]hen something like a smile passed fleetingly over what had once been her face."[4] It was a powerful image, one that drove me on a cool July day amid faint drizzle to walk for a few hours to find the prison. At my hostel, someone had told me that crowds still stood outside the prison, trying to communicate, or at least catch a glimpse of loved ones inside. I had to see it, to silently pay my respects. And so I went.

Opposite the embankment, across a fairly busy street, Kresty stood, in spite

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[3] See for example Vaclav Klaus, "Transition—An Insider's View," *Problems of Communism* 41 (January-April 1992): 74.

[4] Anna Akhmatova, "Requiem 1935–1940" in *Poems of Akhmatova,* trans. and ed. Stanley Kunitz and Max Hayward. New York: Mariner, 1973, 99.

of a century of encroaching age. It was a ghastly place of sharp, if rusting, barbed wire, broken windows, and red brick; still solid for all that it appeared to be crumbling. One could almost have thought it uninhabited; that it was something we'd moved beyond as a species, but for two reminders that it is not. The first were a few pieces of cloth, hanging here and there from windows, bits of cloth that silently proclaimed, "I am here," "it is I," and "look here." These seemed to cry out against being forgotten, by loved ones, by the social world outside. The second reminder was even more poignant. Not a crowd, whose numbers could perhaps have anaesthetized feelings, but one young woman who stood that dreary Sunday afternoon on the sidewalk across the road from the prison crying out, above the noise of traffic, the name of someone inside. Now and again she would stop, perhaps waiting for a reply, though I never heard one. Frustrated, she would pace and smoke, and then begin her cries again. Finally, she walked away, dejected. Somehow I knew that she'd be back again, as would those who stood on the embankment fishing as if neither she nor the prison were there.

In this age of victim impact statements we may tend to forget the impact of incarceration on those connected to the convict. I had. Having seen this side of the coin, I will not again. I cannot forget this scene of basic human tragedy, this bereavement that we impose upon those who have done nothing wrong. At the time I wondered what this man had done, if anything (as Akhmatova's poem illustrates, the prison has an unsavory history with regard to 'political' offences), and found that to a certain extent it did not matter. It was still tragic. And I wondered, can we justly take such considerations into account, but also can we not, and still be just?

I later discovered, shocked and appalled, that Kresty in its current incarnation is what the Russian prison system calls a 'Special Isolation Facility' or SIZO, which despite sounding like some form of isolated prison for hardened dangerous offenders means a facility for those awaiting trial.[5] Its residents generally do so for at least several months, and often years.[6] At first, this seemed fundamentally unjust, that such conditions, which the US Department of State describes as "extremely harsh and frequently life threatening"[7] prevail in facilities dedicated to housing those not as yet determined to be guilty of anything. It is, but I realized that this distinction between the innocent and guilty can distract us from the simpler truth that inhuman conditions remain inhuman whether it is the 'innocent' or 'guilty' who are subjected to them.

I should point out that I am not advocating an end to incarceration, or claiming that there is some simple formula through which we can all live in peace and harmony. There are people at SFU qualified to comment on prisons, and I am not one of them. All that I am doing is relating one encounter, outside Prague but very much a part of my Prague experience, of that which wounds us and prods us to consider things that we had not before. For me, a visit to Kresty raised questions about how we employ mental constructs to condone, or if not to condone then to assuage the discomfort we feel at, the inhuman treatment of others.

In sum, I experienced 'Prague' both in the Czech Republic and elsewhere. Back in Vancouver, I discovered it once more, as the summer floods of the Vltava swept away our footprints and so much else. I found myself clinging to mental images of antediluvian Prague, pointedly

neglecting to seek out the images of the devastation. And it struck me just how quickly the ice, once disturbed, begins to form again. Prague, like any city, indeed any place touched by human narratives, is dynamic. We always rebuild, always renew, always write stories. And while nothing can ever be restored, for history happens and cannot be turned back, Prague endures; an ever-growing volume of these stories, so many axes for Kafka's frozen sea.

> Opposite the embankment, across a fairly busy street, Kresty stood, in spite of a century of encroaching age. It was a ghastly place of sharp, if rusting, barbed wire, broken windows, and red brick; still solid for all that it appeared to be crumbling.

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[5] US Department of State, *Russia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* 2001. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Released March 2002, Section 1 c. Available online.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

Prague

Institute for the Humanities Travel Study Award

$1500 awarded spring or summer semester

Awarded to a third or fourth year student who has completed two Humanities courses, to assist them to attend a travel-study/field school program offered by Simon Fraser University. Letters of application should be sent to the Director, Institute for the Humanities, SFU and must include:

- a resumé
- a copy of university transcript
- a statement describing the relevance of the program/field school to the student's academic program and goals
- two letters of reference from Simon Fraser University faculty.

The application deadline is March 15 each year

Institute for the Humanities Spring 2003 Lecture Series

Violence and its Alternatives: A Continuing Series

Attention to violence and its alternatives forms a major element in the mandate of the Institute for the Humanities. Many SFU Faculty are also researching specific aspects of violence and our responses to it in our culture. This spring we present the work of three SFU faculty members with long time interests in socio-cultural violence. Each presentation will take place at SFU's Burnaby campus. Please join us for this continuing series.

Evaluating a Media Risk Assessment Strategy For Children and Adolescents

Stephen Kline and Kym Stewart, School of Communication, SFU
Thursday, January 16, 2003
12:30–1:30 pm (Reception to follow)
Halpern Centre, SFU Burnaby

This project will allow for extensive investigation into the media risk factors through literature reviews as well as a pilot project in collaboration with the North Vancouver School district. The research will attempt to provide the schools, teachers, students, parents and surrounding community with media risk reduction strategies which may be used to analyze the role media has in issues of bullying and anti-social behaviour, decreasing health and fitness levels and decreasing school achievement and reading levels among school aged children.

Stephen Kline is a faculty member in the School of Communication at SFU and his areas of particular interest include social communication of advertising and children's culture.

Kym Stewart is an MA candidate in the School of Communication at SFU who is focussing on children's culture, interactive media, and more recently New Media usage in South Korea.

Hitting, Hurting and Having Fun: Why Violence is Essential to Life and

Different from Aggression

Ehor Boyanowsky,
School of Criminology, SFU
Thursday, January 30, 2003
12:30–1:30 pm (Reception to follow)
Halpern Centre, SFU Burnaby

Calls for the end of violence permeate the media, university courses and seminars such as this one. Part of the problem is that the terms violence and aggression are used interchangeably even in so called "scientific" textbooks, though some merely refer to violence as a nastier form of aggression. Nothing could be further from the truth. Violence is often railed against and bemoaned as ubiquitous in human society. Well, indeed, it is and for good reason. Without it nothing would exist, including life itself. In this study, I use the concept of *mens rea* to examine a wide variety of natural and social phenomena putting them into a multidimensional model that demonstrates the relationship among them and hopefully provides insight into the basis for our attraction to violence.

Twisting the Cross: Terrorism and the Construction of American society

Michael Fellman, Graduate Liberal Studies and History, SFU

Thursday, February 20, 2003
12:30–1:30 pm (Reception to follow)
Halpern Centre, SFU Burnaby

Terrorism haunts our dreams and dominates our national and international policies. 9/11/01 crashed on North America like a horrible visitation from afar. Yet terrorism is not always foreign, nor has its use always been considered an undivided evil, especially when employed by significant elements in society, including the state. Not only is terrorism often effective in causing social change, not only is it not to be dismissed as the exclusive provenance of crazy antisocial forces, it is often an extension by violent means of mainstream values and goals. Rather than surveying all forms of terror deployed during that century, I will focus on four nationally transformative episodes in American history.

Michael Fellman is Director of Graduate Liberal Studies and Professor of History. He is author of seven books, mostly on the American Civil War. His textbook, This Terrible War: The American Civil War and its Aftermath, *was just published by Longman's. His lecture will derive from the earlier stages of his next book project, about terrorism and the American mainstream in the nineteenth century, tentatively entitled* Twisting the Cross.

Institute for the Humanities Spring 2003 Lecture Series (continued)

Modernity, Secularity, Pluralism

As the 21st century opens, modernity and secularity in the West are strangely counterpointed by forms of Islam which reject them, and by new religious movements, para-Christian or New Age, which ignore them. In this series, three doctoral candidates will share their dissertation research, and together help us address the question of the future of religious faith and practice in our own culture and the cultures of others.

Overcoming Onto-theology: George Grant and Religion without Religion

Peg Peters
Thursday, February 6, 2003
1:30–2:30 pm (Reception to follow)
Room 5119 AQ, SFU Burnaby

Religion has come to an end but people are still hungry for spirituality. George Grant believes that western Christianity has contributed to its own demise allowing religion to be an agent of the will to power that flourishes as modern technology. God too often has been something that we have tried to explain and control. Religion, which is a human practice, is always deconstructible in the light of the love of God, which is not deconstructible. Using Grant as a guide I will try to suggest a way forward for religion in a pluralist society.

Randy 'Peg' Peters is a Special Arrangements PhD candidate at Simon Fraser and an ordained minister. He is currently working on The Collected Works of George Grant *and is writing his dissertation on Grant's religious appropriation of Martin Heidegger.*

Becoming Non-Rational: Recent Transformations in Evangelical Belief

Bruce Hiebert
Thursday, February 13, 2003
1:30–2:30 pm (Reception to follow)
Room 5119 AQ, SFU Burnaby

Evangelical Christians represent an early modern form of belief. But instead of dying out as the world becomes postmodern, evangelical faith is stronger than ever. Part of the secret of this strength is the evangelical community's ability to fill older rational language forms with newer non-rational content. The evangelical discourse on the subject of science is typical of this transformation, and will be the focus of this lecture.

Bruce Hiebert is a Special Arrangements PhD candidate, and a former Mennonite pastor. He is also the author of Good Work: How to Live Your Values in the Workplace *(Northstone, 1997).*

Human Difference and Religion: Girard, Derrida, and Postmodern Anthropology

Christopher S. Morrissey
Thursday, February 27, 2003
1:30–2:30 pm (Reception to follow)
Room 5119 AQ

In the postmodern era, there is a great debate about human science. What is the human? How are humans different from other animals? Anthropologists, sociologists, and paleontologists all represent one essential position on the origin of human difference: gradual evolution. But there are two other essential positions in the great debate about the origin of human language and culture: those of Jacques Derrida and René Girard. How can their approaches contribute to a more radical anthropology? What can the social sciences learn from the debate of literary scholars in the humanities?

Christopher S. Morrissey is a Special Arrangements PhD candidate at Simon Fraser University and has taught Ancient Greek, Latin, and Classical Mythology in the Department of Humanities.

Exploring Islam

Since the events of September 11, 2001, North Americans have become conscious in a new way of their ignorance of Islam. These lectures will offer different angles of entrée into an exploration of Islam, both as an historic religious tradition, and as a contemporary reality of many dimensions. In exploring Islam in these ways, we will both experience Islam as other to the West and ourselves as other to Islam, and from that recognition, move on to considering how we may envision a pluralistic future for our planet.

**Democratizing Shi'ism:
On the Theoretical Foundation of Iran's
Reform Movement**

Peyman Vahabzadeh
Thursday, March 13, 2003
1:30–2:30 pm (Reception to follow)
Room 5119 AQ

The idea of authority is an immanent part of Islamic thought. Iran's current reform movement embodies serious rethinking of the fundamental principles of authority in Shi'ism. As such, the reform movement is as much a political movement for democratization of the Iranian society as it is a cultural and intellectual renaissance.

Peyman Vahabzadeh is the author of Articulated Experiences *and teaches sociology and political theory at Simon Fraser University and University of Victoria. His poetry, fiction, essays, and papers have been published in English, Persian and German.*

The Ethical Crescent

Amyn B. Sajoo
Date, time and location TBA

Islam is widely understood as an ethos that encompasses the public and private domains. What is not well grasped is that the substance of that ethos turns on the evolving demands of a humanistic reason that constantly redefines tradition and identity. Ethics rather than law is paramount in Muslim scripture and civil heritage alike, a primacy that has critical implications. For it lends sustenance to a pluralist, nonviolent code that has long resisted the claims of orthodoxy and militancy— while nourishing civic, intellectual and spiritual cultures that are shared by Muslims as well as non-Muslims from Indonesia and Tajikistan to France and Canada.

Amyn B. Sajoo is the editor of Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives *(2002). He has served as an advisor with various departments of the federal government in Ottawa, and is a frequent media commentator on Islam on both sides of the Atlantic. He is presently based in Vancouver.*

All lectures take place at Simon Fraser University's Burnaby campus. To confirm dates and times for lectures, call 604.291.5855 or email grahama@sfu.ca

Institute for the Humanities Associates
Affiliation and Humanities-Related Interests

Ian Angus, Department of Humanities, Simon Fraser University.
The public sphere, democracy and equality, philosophy and the humanities.

Nick Blomley, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University.
Community, violence and contemporary culture.

Lynn Elen Burton, Department of Humanities, Simon Fraser University.
Future studies, creativity and visionary thinking, activating the social movement and adult education.

Michael Clague, Director, Carnegie Community Centre.
Ideas of social progress and what the arts and humanities can tell us about learning from our mistakes and our achievements.

Rita DeGrandis, Spanish American Literature, Comparative Literature, University of British Columbia.
Politics, ideology and the national imaginaries in Latin America.

Steve Duguid, Department of Humanities, Simon Fraser University.
The humanities and the natural world, corrections and modernity, Scottish studies.

Paul Edward Dutton, Departments of Humanities and History, Simon Fraser University.
Literacy, cultural and political history of the early middle ages, particularly the Caroligian empire and 12th century renaissance.

Karlene Faith, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University.
Global human rights and transformative justice.

Coleen Gold, Art Therapist.
Violence and its alternatives,

psychoanalysis, community education.

Donald Grayston, Director, Institute for the Humanities.
Teaches religious studies in the Humanities Department. Violence and its alternatives, Gandhi, Merton, Holocaust, rites of passage and citizenship.

Larry Green, Psychotherapist.
Conflict resolution, art and cultural approaches to alternatives to violence.

Enzo Guerriero, Director, Britannia Community Centre.
Creating places for social action, places where universities and communities meet to discuss local and neighborhood issues.

Robert Hackett, School of Communication, Simon Fraser University.
Co-director of NewsWatch Canada. Media, democratization as a social movement, and news as ideological discourse.

Nancy Harris, formerly on Burnaby City Council.
How communities are shaped and how the political arena and the humanities perspectives come together.

Margaret Jackson, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University.
Immigrant and refugee girls and their perceptions of violence; dialogues between academics and the community.

Martin Laba, Director, School of Communication, Simon Fraser University.
Research, design and implementation of communication/education strategies and media around urgent and critical social issues. The colonization/exploitation of social issues in the marketplace, corporate claims of social beneficence, and current and growing trends in selling with social issues.

Christine Liotta, Communications and Liberal Studies, British Columbia Institute

of Technology.
Community education, liberal studies and technology education.

Marilyn MacDonald, Women's Studies, Simon Fraser University.
Community education, feminist science studies, environmental activism and professionalisation.

Kathy Mezei, Departments of Humanities and English, Simon Fraser University.
Domestic space, translation studies, and Quebec literature.

David Mirhady, Department of Humanities, Simon Fraser University.
The Greek and Roman world, especially the legal system of the Athenian democracy.

Tom Nesbit, Director, Centre for Integrated and Credit Studies, Continuing Studies, Simon Fraser University.
Adult education and labour issues.

Anand Paranjpe, Professor Emeritus, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University.
Cross cultural psychology, humanities and psychology, approaches to health and healing in cross-cultural contexts.

Bob Russell, Mathematics and Statistics, Simon Fraser University.
Human rights, science and society, and science and human rights.

Allen Seager, Director, Canadian Studies, Simon Fraser University.
Canada, Canadian politics and labour history.

Jennifer Simons, Director, Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia.
Disarmament, arms control in relation to disarmament, international law and treaty regimes. Specifically, prevention of weapons in space, nuclear weapons issues, national missile defence, small arms and light weapons and landmines.

Mary Ann Stouck, Departments of English and Humanities, Simon Fraser University.
Current chair of the Leon and Thea Koerner Foundation; Medieval studies.

Alan Whitehorn, Political Science, Royal Military College, Kingston.
First holder of J. S. Woodsworth Chair in the Humanities. Canadian political parties, comparative politics and poltical theory.

Myler Wilkinson, Centre for Russian and North American Studies, MIR Centre for Peace, Selkirk College.
The systemic potential for human interactions beyond violence, and the structural and social forms which are obstacles to thinking about peace.

Jerry Zaslove, Emeritus Director, Institute for the Humanities.
Humanities and modernity, human rights, violence, the avant-garde and intellectuals, community education and the public sphere, the social history of art and cultural memory.

The Cover Design

The mural depicted on the covers of *Humanitas,* "Writing, Figures, Shelves and the Humanities, 2000" can be seen in the Humanities Department at the southeast corner of the Academic Quadrangle. It is a life-size, digitally constructed and composed series of images that represent each of the faculty members and programs in the Humanities area. A collaboration of all the faculty in Humanities, it is based on an idea by Jerry Zaslove and Steve Duguid and was composed and designed by Jerry Zaslove, Department of Humanities, and Greg Ehlers, Learning and Instructional Development Centre, SFU. Photography: Greg Ehlers, Spring, 2000.

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