About the Institute

The Institute for the Humanities at Simon Fraser University, now twenty years in existence, initiates, supports and promotes programs devoted to the exploration and dissemination of knowledge about traditional and modern approaches to the study of the humanities.

The Institute sponsors a wide variety of community-based activities, along with its university-based academic programs.

Institute for the Humanities
Simon Fraser University
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6
Telephone: 604-291-5855

The Mural Cover Design

The mural depicted on the covers of Humanitas, “Writing, Figures, Shelves and the Humanities, 2000” can be seen in the Humanities Department at the southeast corner of the Academic Quadrangle. It is a life-size, digitally constructed and composed series of images that represent each of the faculty members and programs in the Humanities area. A collaboration of all the faculty in Humanities, it is based on an idea by Jerry Zaslove and Steve Duguid and was composed and designed by Jerry Zaslove, Department of Humanities, and Greg Ehlers, Learning and Instructional Development Centre, SFU. Photography: Greg Ehlers, Spring, 2000.
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For further information contact Donald Grayston at grayston@sfu.ca, telephone 604-291-5516 or Trish Graham at grahama@sfu.ca, telephone 604-291-5855.

Visit our website at www.sfu.ca/humanities-institute/

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Director’s Letter

The Humanities in a Less-Than-Humane Time

Again I am glad to be in touch with you, the readers of Humanitas. Many of you teach or study at SFU, some live and work in the community of greater Vancouver or elsewhere in British Columbia, and some in the great world beyond this province of great physical beauty and political, economic and social diminishment. Wherever you work and think and hope, we greet you, and invite you to work and think and hope with us as we study and act on the fourfold mandate of the Institute: Violence and its Alternatives, Human Rights and Democratic Development, the Humanities and Contemporary Culture, and Community Education. Together these emphases stretch us to explore the limits and the capacities of the humanum in what I find myself calling a less-than-humane time, a time in which the geist of the zeit is querulous, fearful and distracted.

If we have ever had second thoughts about our work on the theme of Violence and its Alternatives, for example, the year of grace 2003 would have settled them for us. It was the year in which the unelected president of a powerful nation, possessed by the archetypes of warrior and savior, sent the young women and men of the armed forces of his nation into action against a nation laughably weaker, in search of weapons of mass distraction. It was the year in which the cuneiform tablets of The Epic of Gilgamesh, arguably the world’s oldest narrative, were looted from the Baghdad Museum. It was also the year in which Canada took the road harder to travel, and declined to join the coalition responsible for these travesties. In this connection, two speakers generously funded by the Leon and Thea Koerner Foundation, and offered to the community in co-operation with Burnaby Mountain College, were Senator Douglas Roche and the CBC’s Eleanor Wachtel, both of whom, in different ways, addressed the theme “The New World Order After Iraq: Negotiating Citizenship.” The fourth annual Joanne Brown Symposium addressed the related motif of exile, which with leadership from David Kettler, Martha Langford and Jerry Zaslove proved highly stimulating to the 14 of us very willingly cooped up on Bowen Island during the heaviest rainstorm in BC since 1883.

The mention of Burnaby Mountain College moves me to commend to you this nascent effort at the creation of a residential community of scholars and grad students here on the Burnaby campus, similar in ethos to Green College at UBC. I represent the Institute on the BMC steering committee; and the goals and objectives of the College so nearly approximate those of the Institute that it is increasingly clear that a strong element in our future must be more joint planning and programming with the College. Here I would also mention the Community Education Program of Continuing Studies at Harbour Centre, the splendid work of which in the public program entitled “Seeking Justice: Human Rights in our Communities”, we have been proud to support in pursuit of another dimension of our mandate. We also see the Laurier Institution, with its concerns around citizenship, as another organization with which we hope to develop closer co-operation. Partnership and co-sponsorship, then, must mark our future.

This year the Institute marked its 20th anniversary; and so significant a milestone has moved us to approach the University Advancement Office, and to explore the possibilities of a funding campaign which would enable us to take a quantum leap from our present level of activity. I mentioned to the Faculty of Arts advancement officer that a major donor had given our sister institute at the University of Washington $5 million dollars (US, sans doute!) as an endowment. When she calmly asked me what we would do if someone gave our Institute the same amount (even Canadian!), I found myself launched into a process of brainstorming which will continue as 2003 ends in meetings of our faculty and community associates. Together with them, and with the steering committee of the Institute, I hope to put into the three-year plan requested by the Dean of Arts, proposals both reasonable and imaginative. I offer here only one such possibility: a fellowship program for community activists, comparable to the Southam Fellowships for journalists, which would enable them to spend six months at SFU as fellows of the Institute, nourishing their vision from the many resources which a University of our calibre has to offer.

As I re-read the letter I wrote in last year’s Bulletin, I am gratified to realize that we have indeed taken steps in each of the areas which our workshop of last December with Kathleen Woodward, director of the above-mentioned Simpson Institute for the Humanities at the University of Washington, had recommended: an increase of funding, a raising of our profile within the University, a focus on citizenship and more involvement in community education. Please read the rest of the Bulletin with these concerns in mind; and please feel free to contact me directly if you have ideas of how the Institute might act upon them further, alone or in consort with other organizations of like mind and heart.

As usual, I close with greetings to the many of you with whom we have worked over this past year and with whom we hope to work again. I also wish to thank each of you who has donated to the work of the Institute, attended our programs, served on our committees, worked with other associates, written for this Bulletin, and in many other ways tried to strengthen our modest efforts to nourish the human in a less-than-humane time. We welcome, as last year, and, we trust, as next year, your sharing in the opportunities which the Institute seeks to offer you, in ways both engaging and engaged.

Donald Grayston, Ph.D.
Director, Institute for the Humanities
The Joanne Brown Symposium on Violence and its Alternatives

—Jerry Zaslove

The 2003 annual Joanne Brown Symposium on Violence and its Alternatives invited three guest speakers and eleven participants to address the issue of “Exile as an Alternative to Violence”. There is a long history in the humanities on the use of exile as a way to eliminate and control violence and to banish dissidents from the state. But exile as an alternative to violence is not so clearcut an issue. From biblical times and throughout the culture of the Greek city-state, complex societies have practiced ostracism and exile as a means of isolating slaves, intellectuals, artists, unusual personalities, misfits, tyrants and dictators. Exile is not just a subject common to our epoch of nationalism when mass migrations and emigrations arising from conditions of violence and persecution, economic or environmental catastrophes are common. Exile in international law does not just encompass conditions when states expel, banish, ostracize, scapegoat and isolate individuals and groups from home or native land. The term “exile” covers much ground in identifying how a society understands itself while also creating a geographical ghetto-space for those who don’t or can’t belong. At the same time, the host country enables the second identity of the exile to become associated with culture-building and the laws of citizenship. Flight, exile, refuge, asylum and forced emigration was the framework for discussion of those premodern, modern and contemporary conditions that make this subject crucial in understanding the displacement, settlement and isolation of peoples in the contemporary world.

David Kettler, Scholar in Residence at Bard College, presented on “Et les émigrés sont les vaincus”. Kettler, renowned for his writing on the German sociologist Karl Mannheim, is currently writing on the German-speaking exiles in the United States 1933 – 1945, and the continuing effect of the exile story on a generation of scholars, artists and theorists. Kettler cautions “against a romantic abstraction of exile from the contexts of power, notably political power.” In his words, there must be a structural analysis of the concept. The exiled in this basic sense correspond to political émigrés. In the paradigm case, exile refers to an act of expulsion, a condition of banishment, and an active orientation to return. Each element of this structure can take a variety of forms and be subject to change over time, but all types play out in the realm of power and resistance, with violence always present, if only as possibility. Second [he says], I lay out a simple typology of political exile and reflect on several examples of the outstanding types, notably the violent confrontation in the Middle East between two populations both constituted by narratives of exile. Third, I reflect on some different modes of displacement, notably the contrast between exiles who have names and refugees who have only numbers. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the appeal of exile as a trope for the situation of the artist/intellectual in a world of dislocation.

Kettler’s presentation included reference to several of his essays on this subject. Ian Angus of the Department of Humanities, who has written extensively on philosophical issues related to nation-formation, responded to Kettler with a discussion of the place of exile in the formation of sociology as a discipline itself, especially in the way ideological critique displaces settled notions of interest and knowledge.

Martha Langford, now an independent curator, was invited to present on how photography and the reception of photographs of violence and war in contemporary culture could be placed within the exile paradigm. Martha Langford is the founding Director and Chief Curator of...
the Canadian Museum of Contemporary Photography (1985-1994) and was the Executive Producer of the Still Photography Division of the National Film Board (1981-1984). She has written and lectured extensively on Canadian photography, European and North American art and architecture, cultural theory, and museology. Her presentation combined a number of her current interests that have been explored in her exhibitions: the photographic grotesque, the expression of memory, and most recently, pathways of spectatorial involvement. Many of these themes are present in her book Suspended Conversations: The Afterlife of Memory in Photographic Albums, recently published by McGill-Queens (2001). Her presentation of “Images of Violence in Exile” addressed many “works of art that are supposed to be contributing to the discourse of violence and exile.” Langford began her presentation with a critique of Susan Sontag, “who has suggested that only the prosecutors, victims, and witnesses of war (or, we may say, flight and exile) can understand what [war] . . . is about (Regarding the Pain of Others, 2003).” Langford’s presentation pointed out that artists and curators try to document, or somehow to convey these events: their immensity and hopelessness; their internalized pain and their subjects’ movements toward recovery. We should start … by looking at the pictorial repertoire of violence, always divided into two categories, graphic and symbolic representations—the works of the journalists and the works of the artists . . . This division seems to break down when the vernacular (snapshots and snapshot effects) is taken into account, but possibly not—the goal remains the same—it is dissemination through the universalizing force of abstraction. Violence, summoned by collective memory, is thus exiled to the imagination. Pictorial typography does the same trick by camouflaging the specifics of place and time—we are the world. If exile is to be considered as a form of violence, then we might well wonder how its representation will fare. Is it (somehow) doubly exiled? Is there anything to be retrieved from the contemplation of absence besides fellow-feeling, or the guilty pleasures of melancholy before the human ruins?

Adrienne Burk, who recently defended her doctoral dissertation on women, memorials and monuments in Vancouver, responded with a commentary on the difficulty of applying any degree of empathic understanding to victims of violence and loss of identity through displacement. Jerry Zaslove, who co-edited a recent issue of West Coast Line on Cultural Memory, Photography and Community with Martha Langford, then presented a paper on the background
Violence and its Alternatives—Institute Programs

contexts to a 2002 UN Installation in Prague on “Flight and Exile In Art.” The UN installation was sponsored by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees and attempted to show the historical if not epic sense that exile as part of our political and moral landscape cannot be avoided.

In collaboration with Martha Langford’s depictions of violence, I showed a series of images, culminating in Jeff Wall’s epic portrayal of war, death and dialogical experience in Wall’s “Dead Troops Talk (A Vision After an Ambush of a Red Army Patrol Near Moqor, Afghanistan, Winter, 1986), 1992.” My presentation, entitled “The Antigone Principle’ and Exile,” was based on Sophocles’ understanding of the post-exilic violence that accompanies intellectuals and artists whose own experiences — for example, Edward Said — are touched deeply by the consequences of the 19th century’s migrations and emigrations, emancipations from slavery and hankering for revolution, even as exile has a pre-history embedded in ancient cultures and inquisitions, wars and persecution. I asked:

How can exile studies and refugee studies be politicized today? Statelessness is mirrored and imagined in the public sphere in the photographic history of victims of war. I call this the doubling of violence at the borders, where the state and exclusion meet at a crossroads of violence and state formation—the “Antigone Principle”. Our very definition of culture is a repository of fragile symbolic associations connected with exile. The self-organization of parallel realities to exile can be understood in the ways we negotiate the boundaries in the arrival and departure of groups and individuals who are dislocated and subjected to violence as the origin of their identities. For example, the origins of the classic avant-garde in Europe, England and North and South America can best be understood through the exiles’ cross-cultural influences. Exiles carry—and disrupt—their home cultures, and drive themselves into trans-national and anti-national styles of expression as culture-builders and memory bearers. The historiography of the exile movements must be related to the epical story of European modernism and its legacies, even as the conditions of “exile” change shape under the forces of mobility today, as we witness how the UN and other refugee and enclave protectorships struggle with the problems of exile and displacements.
Peyman Vahabzadeh, whose doctoral and post-doctoral work explores the phenomenology of violence in society, responded. He has written deeply and personally on the subject of exile—most recently in his compilation of exilic meditations and poems by Iranians who have fled tyrannical statemaking in Iran. His issue of *West Coast Line* has been expanded into a book-length exposition of his own exile that was reflected in his commentary on his own personal and theoretical displacement from home and language.

As David Kettler remarked, “Once one raises the wider question about the cultures in which exiles figure, however, the view expands to include negotiations about the exiles in which they play no part as ‘exiles’ since they have become ‘refugees’ and then ‘citizens’. They variously figure as counters but not necessarily as players.”

As it turned out, all participants realized that in their own lives they or their pasts figured as both counters and players and “strangers” and agents of change.

*Jerry Zaslove is Director Emeritus, Institute for the Humanities, SFU*
Gandhi Jayanti and the Thakore Visiting Scholar Award

The legacy of Mahatma Gandhi has been honoured at Simon Fraser University since the unveiling of his memorial bust in Peace Square in 1970. Since 1991, The Institute for the Humanities, the Thakore Charitable Foundation and the India Club, as co-sponsors, have presented the Thakore Visiting Scholar Award to outstanding persons who have made society’s well-being their lifetime work.

This year the thirteenth Thakore Visiting Scholar Award went to War Child Canada for its work with children affected by war. Accepting the award on behalf of War Child Canada was Dr. Eric Hoskins, president of War Child Canada. The following is a transcript of the address he gave at the ceremonies on October 2, 2003, at SFU. (Co-recipient Dr. Samantha Nutt, Executive Director, War Child Canada, was unfortunately unable for family reasons to attend the ceremonies.)

It is an honour to be here tonight and to accept, on behalf of War Child Canada, the prestigious Thakore Visiting Scholar Award. First, I want to apologize. I believe many of you were expecting my wife, the charity’s co-founder and Executive Director, Dr Samantha Nutt, to be speaking with you tonight and that I’m no substitute for the real thing (at least, that’s what she tells me), but unfortunately her father was undergoing hip surgery today and I know you join me in wishing him a very speedy recovery.

I would like to begin by saying how truly humbling it is for me, and indeed for everyone at War Child Canada, to be the recipient of an award given to such wonderful and inspiring people as Aung San Suu Kyi, Ursula Franklin, and Douglas Roche, to name a few…and it would be remiss of me not also to mention my old boss, Lloyd Axworthy, who as many of you may know, recently defected to this part of Canada. When we read through the names of previous recipients to the War Child Canada staff the response was unanimous: “Wow, that’s fantastic. Those are great people! So why are they giving it to us?” To which my only answer was “Well, I don’t know, I guess they think we’re doing something right.”

I have to admit, around our office, particularly over the past year, we have spent a considerable amount of time watching news reports and wondering if in fact we are doing anything right as war once again dominates our political and economic landscape. I am sure many of you in this room have wondered the same thing, including people I have a great deal of admiration for, people like Jennifer Simons, to whom War Child Canada owes a great deal of gratitude (Jennifer Simons, you should know, gave War Child its first grant at a very critical early stage, and it is no exaggeration to say that without it I am not sure the charity would even exist today). “Security” has become the permission slip of the 21st century, in the name of which wars have been launched, international laws abandoned, democratic principles strangled and missile programs expanded, all within two brief years.

In the midst of it all, notions of effecting social change can seem anachronistic: better suited to another time, another place, long before terrorism garnered the top spot on the political and policy agendas. In other words (and I have to give credit to Lloyd Axworthy here, as this is something he wrote on several of the policy proposals put forward by his staff in the Minister’s office): good idea, not very realistic.

But if Sam and I have learned anything from our work with War Child Canada, and the sometimes long and difficult process of starting something new, it’s that idealism and activism are just as necessary now as they were at any other time in our history, and making a tangible difference to the lives of those affected by war is a question of will, and not a question of opportunity. The opportunities certainly are there, but the real question is: are Canadians concerned enough to ACT? And the answer, we believe, is YES.

Providing opportunities for Canadians, and in particular youth, to get involved and make an important difference on a global level is precisely what War Child Canada aims to do. We really have a dual mandate: to provide humanitarian assistance to children and their families in war-torn countries, and to promote awareness and action in support of those affected by war. War Child Canada has humanitarian projects in war-torn countries around the world, working exclusively with local partners to implement educational, health, human rights and psychological support programs, for thousands of children and youth. Our overseas and domestic programs go hand in hand—the passion, energy and dedication of our many youth supporters generates both awareness for the cause and the much-needed resources for the projects we’re...
involved with internationally. Such projects are helping to provide skills and literacy training to women in Afghanistan, assisting with a children's hospital in Karbala, southern Iraq, and providing counselling and support to former child-soldiers in Sierra Leone, to name a few.

In the past two years alone, War Child Canada has directly engaged more than 100,000 young Canadians through its domestic programs. These programs include initiatives like Keep the Beat, a non-stop music marathon and educational program in support of war-affected children that last year involved more than 25,000 high school students and will launch again this November; "Just Act," a youth leadership program in support of the International Criminal Court and social justice issues; and No War Zone, an online community that provides opportunities for youth in Canada, and war-affected youth involved in our international projects, to work together to promote human rights, peace and sustainable development. No War Zone is a youth-to-youth, school-to-school initiative that aims to bridge geographic, social, religious and economic barriers by enabling participants to actually work together on development projects and see first-hand the impact of their efforts.

We also partner with teachers across Canada and around the world, providing creative ways, through lesson plans and curriculum development, to engage youth in their classrooms. As some of you may know, War Child works quite closely with the Canadian music industry and as such has been involved in several large music fundraising and outreach initiatives, the most recent of which was the Peace Songs CD which came out in April.

In short, I feel privileged to be involved in an organization of very dedicated people from across the country—staff, volunteers, teachers, music artists, youth leaders—and around the world who get up every day and are concerned enough to act!

Now, so far this evening I have talked about the importance of having the will to act on international issues, and of War Child Canada's work to effect social change by channelling that will into action. But what I haven't talked about is why?

Simply put, our common humanity should be, indeed must be, what compels us to act, because war is the greatest of all human tragedies. The scars are lifelong; the deaths, the damage and the depravity of war incomprehensible—what more reason do we need, as a global community, to strive for peace?

Along the same lines, and because this award recognises Gandhi's ideals of truth, non-violence, social justice, religious tolerance, education and ethics in politics, I want to share with you one very recent, and very personal, story of a friend of mine caught up in the tragedy of war whom I believe exemplifies these important values.

Two weeks after George W. Bush declared the war between Saddam Hussein's regime and the America-led "coalition of the willing" to be over, Sam and I knocked at the gate of an old and dear friend of ours, Dr Aquila Al-Hashimi, at her home in Baghdad.

Aquila, who was from a prominent Shi'a family near Karbala in Southern Iraq, held a PhD in French literature from the Sorbonne in Paris and was well respected among Iraq's educated elite. Although she worked in the Ministry and, by extension, for the Ba'ath party, she was not a member of Saddam's regime. Her primary responsibilities included monitoring the urgent food and medical needs of Iraqi civilians and negotiating humanitarian aid under the United Nation's Oil for Food Program since its inception in 1998. Most of my relief work in Iraq fell under Aquila's portfolio, and I knew she worked hard to secure visas and permissions on my behalf, facilitating my frequent entry into the country on humanitarian grounds.

Why does it matter that an estimated 23 million people have died in wars since the end of World War II, or that every day war kills or injures at least 2,000 children? We all know the U.N.'s estimates of the more than 300,000 child soldiers in the world, and of the 10,000 people in Sierra Leone who experienced amputations of their hands and feet because of the war in that country, which was, in large part, a war over diamonds. And many of us are aware that more than 3 million people have been killed in the past five years in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I could go on. None of this information is really new, and in my mind these numbers are so profoundly shocking in scale that it is too easy to forget that, in the end, we are talking about people.
One of my most vivid memories of Aquila is from a meeting at her office one evening in January, 2001, when she spoke to me about the Oil for Food Program and what she called the “indignity” (you may or may not agree with her) of the United Nations approval process. Not once did she accent her speech, as most bureaucrats were apt to do at that time for their own protection, with pledges of allegiance to the “benevolent” or “merciful” Saddam Hussein. By the time we finished drinking tea and catching up it was close to midnight. Aquila walked me to the front entrance of the Ministry and secured a driver for my return to the hotel. “It’s a question of money and business”, she reflected, as we said goodbye, “It is not about principles, this matter of Iraq.”

On this occasion more than two years later, the gate opened and a security guard ushered Sam and me into the front courtyard. Aquila emerged from her home in her dressing gown (we caught her by surprise) and she was anxiously tightening her belt and flattening her tightly coiled dark hair. She was fifty years of age and had never married. Aquila was so happy to see us—she hadn’t yet ventured out in the aftermath of the war. She lived with her brother and two nieces, six and ten years of age, who spoke briefly in impressive French, then giggled off to the kitchen to prepare tea. It was almost impossible to believe that only a few short weeks before our visit, this family was hunkered down in the living room while bullets ricocheted off the walls and grenades exploded all around them.

I noticed Aquila’s passport was on the coffee table. She said proudly, “I was showing my nieces my entry stamps from France and the United States from the 1980s. They could not believe it. Since before they were born, Iraqis have not been allowed to travel because of the sanctions. I explained to them that soon they will be able to go wherever they want—to visit the Eiffel tower or to go swimming in the Mediterranean. It is beyond their imagination.”

Aquila and I had known each other for more than 12 years. I knew that amid the extensive corridors of the regime’s intelligence operations she had, without a doubt, been my guardian angel. It was far too easy to misstep and get thrown out of the country, or into some invisible Iraqi jail never to be heard from again. In all that time, however, I had never been able to have an honest conversation with her. What did she truly think of Saddam? Why did she choose to work for the Iraqi government? Why did she risk rousing suspicion, and possibly death, on my behalf?

Aquila said, “I cannot tell you how many times [intelligence officials] came to me about you. What were you doing? Who did you work for? What did I know? But under Saddam, everyone suspected the next person. You could not even have a conversation in front of your children, in case they repeated it to their teacher or a neighbour, who might tell the Republican Guard. The only way to get things done was to play the game. Apart from Saddam’s inner circle, no one knew who might be ‘connected’, and at the lower levels of government very few wanted to be responsible for making decisions that they could later be blamed for. I would just say to anyone inquiring about you, ‘why are you so interested, how do you know Dr Eric? I will put in the file that you are the one who refused him permission to enter. I think [the officials] will be very eager to hear your explanation.’”

Then there was the “big” question. As someone in receipt of numerous confidential documents who also oversaw virtually every application to the United Nations to import goods into Iraq, she must have known, or at least entertained rumours about, whether or not Saddam Hussein was in possession of weapons of mass destruction. “I swear to you”, Aquila told me, “if they had them, I would have heard about it. I was in that Ministry every day until late at night. I overheard many conversations at the highest levels. We had the weapons in 1991, I promise you that. Everything was destroyed after the Gulf War, but that doesn’t matter. You will not find one Iraqi who believes this was a war about Saddam’s weapons.”
As we were leaving, she turned to me and said, “I feel like the last thirty years have been confiscated from me. Now I want to live my life.”

A few weeks after our visit to her home, Aquila became one of three women appointed by the US administration to Iraq’s 25-member Governing Council. Despite her post-war yearnings for the “simple life”, Aquila was not the kind of woman who took a back seat to the political process. She was an activist—a courageous champion of the rights of Iraqi women and children—and I know she would do anything in her power to help her country when it needed her.

What surprised us most was that it was widely speculated among the western media that Aquila was to become Iraq’s new ambassador to the United Nations. We could only assume, in view of her previous criticisms of the U.N.’s treatment of Iraq, that what motivated her was an overwhelming desire to control a process that had controlled her for so long. It is not a question we ever had the opportunity to ask her.

On September 20th, 2003, as she left her home in Baghdad, Aquila was brutally gunned down by six men firing assault rifles from a Toyota pick-up truck. She was planning to attend a key United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York four days later, at which President Bush was expected to seek support for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Her assailants were never identified, but many theories regarding who the assailants might be were put forward: Ba’ath party loyalists displeased by her association with the American administration in Iraq, or members of one of a myriad of terrorist networks that infiltrated the country in the aftermath of the war. She was hit in the right side of her abdomen, causing extensive injury to her liver and pancreas. Her brother and driver were also shot in the attack. Footage of the scene carried by CNN, the BBC and other major networks included close-ups of a roadside dripping in blood. In one of the camera shots, two little girls could be seen in the distance holding hands and watching on in horror. Sam and I recognised the two little girls as Aquila’s nieces. On September 21, the Toronto Star carried a full-page interview with former United Nations chief weapons inspector Hans Blix. From his home in Stockholm, Sweden, Blix asserted, as many others have done recently, that the U.S. and Britain “overinterpreted” intelligence reports that “claimed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction”, adding: “They do not seem to have come up with any evidence that [Iraq] retained weapons of mass destruction. I’m inclined to think that they were destroyed (by Iraq) in 1991… the threat is not what it was made out to be.”

I am not sure if any of us will even know the truth or whether, at this point in time, it even matters, because it does little to change the daily reality of Iraqi civilians. And I am not for a minute suggesting that Saddam Hussein was not the very brutal dictator everyone knew him to be (in fact, I have witnessed his brutality first hand). Nevertheless, on the same page as Blix’s interview there was a three-paragraph insert from the Associated Press entitled “Iraqi Council Member Wounded.” And four days later, precisely one week ago today, Aquila Al Hashimi died at a U.S. military hospital in Baghdad.

Sometimes the amount of suffering that exists in the world can seem insurmountable, but it isn’t. Sometimes finding a way to help can seem impossible, but it isn’t. And while the world may not always agree on whether war is “inevitable”, “necessary”, “unnecessary”, “avoidable” and the like, there is one thing we can all agree on: the need for more peace in the world. With more than 30 wars currently raging, peace is not a political statement—it is an aspiration—and one that deserves our constant attention and recognition. Gandhi once said: what difference does it make to the dead, the orphaned and the homeless, whether the mad destruction was wrought in the name of totalitarianism, or the holy name of liberty and democracy?

No one understood this better than Aquila, and Sam and I would like to dedicate this evening’s award to her.

Thank you Jennifer Simons, Simon Fraser University, the Thakore family, the India Club, friends and colleagues.
Attention to violence and its alternatives forms a major element in the mandate of the Institute for the Humanities. Many SFU faculty and graduate students are also researching specific aspects of violence and our responses to it in our culture. In the Spring and Fall of 2003 the Institute for the Humanities hosted a number of lectures and presentations on this topic.

The Culture of Violence and the Politics of Hope: Community Mobilization around Media Risks

—Stephen Kline and Kym Stewart

Introduction

Emmanuel Kant, audacious author of the essay Perpetual Peace, suggested that there are only three questions that matter. The first is What can we know? The second is What may we do? But the third, and most difficult is What should we hope? Anticipating the growing cynicism and frustration of democratic movements struggling with the increasingly concentrated cultural power of corporations in market society, Raymond Williams believed it was especially important for cultural critics and educators to remember the politics of hope by envisioning the positive alternatives to the growing hegemony of popular culture. Those concerned with peace education have clearly learned this lesson. Frustrated by the 50-year struggle to establish regulatory policy for the media's contribution to the socialization of aggression and admitting the growing difficulties of bringing new media-like video games into the ambit of cultural regulation, this paper explains the rationale for our development of a Canadian media education strategy designed to reduce the anti-social attitudes of youth through a community-based risk reduction initiative.

Paradox of Empires and Culture of Violence

One perplexing issue facing all would-be empires is how to recruit and train soldiers who will fight the enemy. To this end, cultures from Sparta to America have celebrated individual military prowess as a quality of manhood. Yet there is a paradox that underlies a militaristic empire's need both to train and motivate some youth to fight the enemy, while maintaining the cultural mechanisms for control of violence and maintenance of order at home. To this end, the values of self-restraint and obedience are also traditionally privileged in imperial cultures and cultivated in families and in schools, so that the nations’ youth become good law-abiding citizens, play by the rules, and exercise control over their aggressive impulses.

“The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton”, proclaimed the Duke of Wellington, musing on the successes of the British Empire in this regard. Wellington believed that games and field sports were an excellent means for training young soldiers mentally and physically—in both obeying orders and in fighting the enemy. Games were an effective venue of imperial socialization, he felt, not only because play rehearsed and consolidated martial skills and trained the physical body in rugged endeavour, but also because it fostered disciplined attitudes, team spirit and strategic sensibilities. And, like their British cousins, America too has encouraged martial play cultures among boys, celebrating in games, sports and generally in popular culture the values of the frontier entrepreneurialism which forged the American nation. Guns in particular have had a special place within the American socialization of militarized masculinity, not only as a useful skill and a right of self-defence, but arrogantly as the technical means projecting the Pax Americana throughout the world.

This American culture of violence, as we now call it, was amplified after the Second World War by the mass media. Marshall McLuhan (1964) foresaw a problem emerging from the growing mediation of ‘war’ not only in the TV news and films, but within the ‘play’ cultures of the nation. Noting how two New Guinea tribes, the Willigiman-Wallawula and the Wittaia, had transformed centuries of confrontation into a surprisingly bloodless ritual that looks like a dangerous field sport, McLuhan remarks: “These people... detect in these games a kind of model of their universe, in whose deadly gavotte they participate through the ritual of war games”. Games, he notes, are not just for entertainment and distractions, but a mass medium reinforcing collective models “of inner psychological life”. McLuhan also suggested we must realize that there is a new dynamic of war and peace in the mediated global village that reveals the important place of war games in American culture. Underlying this fascination for war games, he warned, was the force of mass media consolidating the mentality of tribal
conflict which undermined enlightenment hopes for a culture of perpetual peace.

Few heeded McLuhan’s warning: cars sprouted missile wings, scientists turned their militaristic gaze to the stars, and boys played with ray guns, robot warriors and video games, making the last fifty years into a period of unprecedented expansion of the children’s cultural industries in the entertainment economy. As the mass-mediated marketplace was transformed into the military-entertainment complex, the cult of militarized masculinity was augmented by action toys like G.I. Joe, and shooters like Soldier of Fortune (Kline, 2003). Video games have in fact added a strikingly new level of intensity to the culture of violence, growing into a 10 billion dollar industry, which enables children, as young as seven, to experience first hand the conflicts of drug lords and the counter-terrorist man-hunts.

War play has persisted therefore as a theme in children’s popular culture for economic as well as cultural reasons: as U.S. Senator Fritz Hollings stated recently, “Violence sells, and money talks, and no amount of self regulation and no amount of antitrust exemptions is going to change the profit incentive.”

From Critiquing the Military-Entertainment Complex to Risk Reduction Strategy

As McLuhan predicted, the triumphalism of the Pax Americana has been undercut by the mean streets of ‘Die Hard’, leading many parents to fret anxiously about the growing aggressiveness at the heart of American children’s culture. In the face of rising post-war youth crime rates and violence in the playgrounds of the nation, the U.S. Surgeon General launched a research programme in the 1960’s to study the relationship between media and anti-social and aggressive behaviour among children and youths (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Hamilton, 1998; Pearl et al., 1982). Acknowledging that the psychological processes are complex and diverse, the U.S. Surgeon General (2001) recently summarized forty years of research stating that heavy media consumption can be viewed as a significant risk factor in the development of aggressive and anti-social behaviour in children: “a substantial body of research now indicates that exposure to media violence increases children’s physically and verbally aggressive behavior”.

Viewing media as a risk factor, they point out, does not mean that every child will jump up from a video game console and immediately shoot a schoolmate; but rather, that boys, especially those who find long term pleasure in watching violence repeatedly, and who identify with aggressive characters, may over the long term become desensitized to the implications of aggression (U.S. Surgeon General, 2001). Most researchers recognize that media violence is only one of the contributing factors in the socialization of aggression, which is why as Garbarino (2001) states, “an accumulation-of-risk model is essential if we are to understand where televised violence fits into the learning and demonstration of aggressive behavior.” But in a media saturated culture, even a small desensitization or attitudinal effect can have a huge impact when spread across the whole child population. Several researchers have even compared the level of risk found in media studies to those which link smoking to lung cancer, where the mechanisms explaining the risk are still not known.

Not all smokers get lung cancer, nor do all heavy consumers of violent media become instant killers. The American Psychologists and Paediatricians Associations recently came to a similar conclusion noting that the cultural mechanisms by which media influence children’s knowledge, attitudes and behaviours are rather well understood —social learning, “mean world”syndrome, desensitization, identification and modelling of behaviour.

Although the correlations are complex, a series of recent longitudinal studies have added weight to scientists’ claim that violence is a too-predominant theme in children’s fictional programming, and that heavy viewers of TV violence, are more likely to be aggressive and anti-social later in life (Murray, 1995). One especially well designed longitudinal study published in Science recently confirmed that young boys who watch a lot of television are particularly vulnerable to violence in media: whereas 45% of the boys who watched television more than 3 hours per day at age 14, subsequently committed aggressive acts involving others, only 8.9%, who watched television less than an hour a day were aggressive later in life (Johnson et al., 2002). These researchers noted that even after controlling for other factors known to contribute to aggressiveness in young people “like childhood neglect, growing up in an unsafe neighborhood, low family income, low parental education and psychiatric disorders” there remain “significant associations between television viewing during early adolescence and subsequent aggressive acts against other persons” later in life.

In the wake of a number of school yard slayings by avid video game players, military psychologist Lt. Col. David Grossman became a leading US critic of the entertainment industry, arguing that “the main concern is that these violent video games are providing military
quality training to children” (Grossman and DeGaetano, 1999). Like the training of soldiers, Grossman (1999) believes that violent video games break down the psychological barriers that prevent killing: “children don’t naturally kill; they learn it from violence in the home and… from violence as entertainment in television, movies and interactive video games”. The disturbing blend of participation, engagement, rewards and practice that video games provide is the perfect instructional environment for soldiers. Moreover, as in army simulations, the repeated shooting at targets in the video games not only enhances weapons skills, but also desensitizes some young people to the horror of killing by turning enemies into dehumanized targets. In other words, the aggression-training effect of simulators requires that killing be experienced as a game—as a pleasurable and enjoyable act of imaginary entertainment. Like soldiers, and with constant practice, players of violent video games will eventually have extremely low or even no empathy towards victims of their brutality. One of the central thrusts of Grossman’s argument is that the rise of violent video gaming may be an even more risky medium than television.

With the burgeoning of media, the politics of youth culture has increasingly hinged on these issues of violence with battle lines drawn between the opponents of perpetual war and the increasingly deregulated media industries. The peace advocates maintained that the media’s constant celebration and promotion of militarized masculinity constitutes a profound threat to our civil society: boys especially raised to identify with combative heroes can also direct that aggression against their peers — not to mention legitimate authority.

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Confronting Media Risks
The Canadian public has long been convinced that heavy consumption of violence from American media is a significant ‘risk factor’ contributing to aggressive attitudes and behaviours in Canadian children (Josephson, 1995; Gosselin et al., 1997). The Canadian Standing Committee on Communications, Culture, and Television Violence concurred: “We have clearly found that the violence portrayed on television reflects and shapes unhealthy social attitudes. It cannot be ignored” (Bird, 1993). In the globally deregulated mediascape, however, the Canadian public’s calls for action concerning media violence have run aground on the shores of media deregulation. The hope that a legislative cordon sanitaire could be developed around children under 12 years of age, who are considered, in at least Canadian law, to be especially vulnerable to marketing pressures, has dissolved into cynicism and frustration. Recent policies—including Spicer’s 9 o’clock watershed, industry self-regulation, anti-violence advertising campaigns and the V-chip—have been ineffective in reducing the risks to children. The Clinton’s Children’s Broadcasting Act has also had little effect in the U.S. on the levels of violence in TV programming available (Cole, 1995), or on children’s access and exposure to violent and anti-social themes in media (Kline & Stewart, 2000). Moreover, the industry has successfully kept state regulation of the Internet and video games out of the public sphere (Kline, 2000). In spite of the convincing scientific evidence and continuing public anxiety, solutions to blocking the flood of American violence into Canada have not been found. The most recent example of the industries’ muscular approach to deregulation was the world leading legislation for regulating video game violence that was fought for by a coalition opposing violent entertainment (COVE) in BC, and which was subsequently dismissed by the Liberal government under pressure from the industry lobby. Indeed, it seems increasingly difficult for even concerned Canadian parents to monitor, let alone
TV violence increased the risk of aggressiveness, then "reducing the amount of time that grade-school children spend watching television and playing video games can make them less aggressive toward their peers." In a carefully controlled experiment, these researchers found that at the end of this eight month study, children in the intervention group had reduced their TV viewing by about one-third and their ratings of peer-judged aggression were about 25 percent lower than those at the control school. The reduced media consumption school also engaged in about half as much verbally aggressive behaviour—such as teasing, threatening, or taunting their peers—on the playground when compared with students at the control school.

Both boys and girls benefited from the intervention curriculum, and the most aggressive students, according to the study, experienced the greatest drop in combativeness (Robinson, 2001a). Comparing students at the same school that received the media education curriculum with those at the control school, Robinson found that the media risk reduction treatment significantly reduced the risk of obesity associated with heavy viewing of media (Robinson, 2001b). Other studies suggest using media less may enhance creative play, improve self-esteem, promote social skills and strengthen pro-social values implying that targeting media risks may be a very effective way of intervening in a cluster of interrelated developmental risks necessary for improving the health and safety of children (Kline, 2000).

Robinson's promising research indicates that targeting media consumption through the schools may be a highly effective way of diminishing the interacting developmental risks associated with aggressive and anti-social behaviour. With the help of the Crime Prevention Community Mobilization Fund of Canada, we have launched a media education pilot project in North Vancouver which sets out to mobilize the community around reducing the risks associated with violent media consumption. The initiative involved the schools, police, community groups, and families in an effort to break the cycle of violence by diminishing peer 'acceptance and valorization' of media violence within the elementary school setting. We chose elementary age children because they are still in the throws of regularizing their media consumption habits, are subject to peer influence, and generally their parents still monitor and guide their media use (Kline and Botterill, 2001). By targeting the families of elementary children between 7-11 years, this preventive programme sets out to denormalize the culture of violence before children have fully consolidated aggressive attitudes and behaviours.

Beyond The Canute Complex: Media Education as Cultural Judo
A media education strategy underwrites our hope that we can intervene in the culture of violence: this strategy acknowledges that contemporary socialization is now
profoundly influenced by the media colonization of domestic space and leisure time. This means that children's experience is caught between three powerful agencies of socialization: the schools, the family and the peer group steeped in popular culture. Since young people on average spend more than five hours using media daily—the imprint of popular culture is experienced within each of these domains. As Daniel Bell pointed out, in a postmodern world the core cultural contradiction of capitalism lies in the tension between the work ethics and civilizing mission of the schools, and the leisure values and consumerist cultural preoccupations of the mediated popular culture. The former stresses traditional industrial values prescribing a curriculum of critical and analytic skills as the core competence of the literate subject. The later emphasizes the pleasures associated with cultural consumption and the psycho-social benefits of sharing stories and social play.

For a long time, parents and educators worked hard to buffer the schools' educational mandate from the encroachments of popular entertainments with a "check your Ninja Turtles at the door" standoffishness. Since this approach failed, more and more educators recognized it was impossible to stop kids from bringing popular culture influences with them into the classroom. Children consume media because they share experiences and get peer support for doing so. Their influence is articulated in the drawings, stories and play of children. Many concluded that the schools had to learn to work within the changing social landscape of the postmodern world by developing a 'media education' strategy. Discussions of programs and video games are becoming a topic in children's peer interactions, and need to be allowed into the schools as well (Potter, 2001). Rather than building barriers to popular culture, our media education strategy welcomes media into the classroom in order to help children understand their own current use of it, and it also challenges them to explore what they can do if they did not rely on media so much to entertain themselves. Although there are competing interpretations of how to do this, our own position amounts to a kind of cultural judo. We believe that the mandate of education in the schools can now only be protected by teaching kids to be critical of popular culture in their lives. But it is hardly adequate to deconstruct media in a way that denies that children take pleasure in watching stories and playing games. If we only condemn their popular culture, we will be seen as prohibiting something that is fun and part of their peer culture. To change peer interactions we need to make alternatives to media, if not cool, then at least acceptable for many children. The task then must be to challenge them to change their leisure, without asking them to give up an element of their leisure activities they truly value.

**Media as part of Family Life:**

Our strategy has been based on research studying the family dynamics that surround Canadian children's media use. We know that there are many circumstances in family life that make media the easiest solution to boredom and loneliness. Children develop their habits within a family dynamic, in which parents model and negotiate limits to media consumption as part of the family solution for a busy life. For example the conflict over what to watch is resolved by giving kids a TV of their own, often in their bedroom. Not only do many parents not know what their kids are doing with media, but few families regard TV or video games as a way of talking about moral and aesthetic attitudes with children. The majority of parents in our communities take a laissez faire attitude to their children's media use, and never bother to communicate why playing or watching too much is not acceptable.

**Media Risk Reduction Strategy:**

Our media risk reduction strategy used a social marketing approach combined with a media education approach. The pilot project spanned over 7 weeks, with the final experimental question asking: ‘What would you do if you turned off TV,
video games and PC's for a whole week? The pilot project enlisted the help of four elementary schools, therefore researchers access to eight classes ranging from grade 2 to grade 6. A carefully constructed curriculum was developed to allow the students full freedom to express their preferences for media programmes and games without judgment from the researchers. It became essential that the program challenge the students to change their habits, rather than condemning their media-rich leisure habits.

What is it that we can do to motivate children to watch less TV? Children spend more time with media than they do in the classroom. But they cannot check the knowledge, attitudes and social behaviours they are exposed to in popular culture at the school door. Since children bring their fascinations and interest in popular culture with them into the school, media educators developed strategies for dealing with media within the framework of a curriculum. The approach this project is based on views media education as a kind of ‘judo’ that absorbs the force of popular culture on children by critically reframing their relationship to it in the classroom.

A week long media diary was used to get students to study and discuss their own media usage patterns. Parents were encouraged to participate in the media audit to help promote discussions about media use within the family. The audit asks students to estimate how much time they spent with a variety of media related activities, from reading to chatting online. They were also asked to report their choices of TV programmes and games for that week.

The media risk reduction strategy pilot project developed a five phase curriculum which uses learning exercises to promote further understanding of the role that media plays in the lives of children today. Each lesson combines critical media education and approved curriculum goals, which includes research, art, writing, social skills, math and creative problem solving. These projects and assignments were given in-class or as homework assignments when their application corresponded with current in-class modes of learning.

Heroes and Heroines: This unit examines the role of heroes and heroines in the lives of the students. In-class discussions asked children to define a real life versus a fictional hero or heroine. These discussions were combined with written and art work to allow the students to express their selection of their favourite heroes or heroines.

Scripting and Re-scripting: This unit continues with the idea of heroes and heroines and adds a new dimension, a commonly seen dichotomy: hero versus villain. The discussion allows for student led definitions of heroes and villains and the examination of real life villains: bullies. The class focused on stereotyping and media contrived resolutions of conflict as compared to real life resolution. In order to fully understand the difference, the student were asked to role play either a real life bullying situation or a fictional hero versus villain conflict resolution pattern. Older students are taught to analyze the conflict resolution patterns found in the media as part of a content analysis activity. This application and analysis was based on the students’ perceptions and allowed them to examine the violence on the screen rather than ‘zone out’ and accept the violence as part of their leisure activities.

Fair Play as moral principle: This lesson takes a historical approach to games by asking the children to interview their parents about the games their parents played as children. This information was shared and used to develop a game list which the students added their current favourite games to. The objective of this lesson was twofold. First we wanted the children to brainstorm non-media activities that might be used as alternatives to media use during the upcoming Tune Out week. Second, we wanted to ask for game preferences to lead into the examination of ‘rough and tumble’ play, boundaries, rules and regulations and elements of games that make playing fun. The unit explores the difference between conflict and cooperation in games and the way limits and rules promote both fair and fun game play. As part of the game session the students were asked to develop their own games using five commonly found household objects: cup, string, ball, marbles and bean bag. The development of games included the invention of rules and regulations, game playing penalties as well as goals.

Tune Out Preparation Week: The second last week was used to prepare for the upcoming Tune Out the Screen Challenge. Activities included making Tune Out posters, writing stories or advertisements to encourage others to Tune Out the Screen. The students were asked to select a level of participation in Tune out week from three choices: will not participate, will decrease time spent with the media and the final choice was to fully participate in the Tune out week (going cold turkey). Alternatives to media use were encouraged and the
class designed Tune Out week alternatives posters to have in their classrooms as references. Parents were asked to support their children in finding alternative activities and to promote healthier lifestyle choices.

_Tune Out Week:_ Children were asked to keep time diaries which will be used in the evaluation of how well their actions correlate with their intended plans. Both parents and children were asked to take part in the challenge of Tune out week, the evaluation of the project as whole and the process of altering any sections of the program.

For full results visit our website at www.sfu.ca/media-lab/risk

_Stephen Kline is a faculty member in the School of Communication at SFU and his areas of particular interest include social communication of advertising and children's culture._

_Kym Stewart is an MA candidate in the School of Communication at SFU who is focussing on children's culture, interactive media, and more recently New Media usage in South Korea._

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alternative means both to maintain and to change the social order. It is the veritable double-edged sword, commonly utilized by the state as well as by those in opposition to it, in the United States as elsewhere. Similarly, so has "counter-terror" been the response of power-holders and the state to anticipated and assumed threats as well as to actual acts of terror.

Nineteenth-century America shows us that terrorism is not the aberration, and peace the norm. Rather, it reveals that terror can be undeniably effective in accelerating and shaping social change. Moreover, it is not the exclusive province of crazy antisocial forces. Terrorism is often an extension of mainstream values and goals by violent means: it is a political tool that can liberate, and a political tool that can repress. After all, in the United States, a nation presumptively based on a creed of liberty, equality of opportunity, and due process before the law, terror has often been used to curtail or eliminate what the majority (and especially the powerful) has perceived as challenges to basic norms by other classes, races or political ideologies. In a nation based equally on civil Protestantism and Republicanism, those employing terror have almost invariably justified themselves by combining universalistic liberal beliefs with Christian ethical standards, twisting both together to serve violent means meant to secure, in their view, higher ends.

I do not think anyone can argue with the notion that terrorism has been a major transformative force in American history, in essence helping to make Americans who they are. When Europeans came to their New World, aboriginal peoples opposed and fought them, with both sides engaging in protracted terrorist campaigns to eliminate the other. At the dawn of American national history, the darker side of the Revolutionary War was a terrorist campaign against Tories; in turn, British and Tory forces frequently employed terror strikes against the revolutionaries. Only after the conquest of the Tories through terrorist means, not merely the defeat of the British army, could the Constitutional Fathers sit down in peace and sort out a binding and effective legal framework for their new nation.

But the nineteenth century is the best period to see the ways in which American terrorism consolidated both society and state. Other historians have clearly delineated what helped make them what they are today—the spread of liberty, industrial growth, and the rise of world power. It was terrorism and counter-terrorism that lay at the root of this national establishment: terrorism made acceptable by the ways in which it appealed to traditional, mainstream beliefs, and terrorism that created pathways to change in our society.

Start with the 1850s, and there is a clear trail of terror that shaped many of the most pivotal events of that time. Could a nation claiming a heritage of freedom and justice for all continue to exist half slave and half free? Abraham Lincoln urgently asked that question in 1858, as did most of his fellow citizens North and South. Abolitionists in the North and fire-eaters in the South had long fanned the flames of sectional division with their angry words and symbolic attacks. Threats of slave insurrection, and in the case of Nat Turner in 1831, an actual rebellion in which slaves killed some eighty-five whites (there was a reprisal hanging of some four hundred African-Americans), had always underlined white anxiety about the implicit threat of their black labor force. And one could argue that slavery always had been based on systematic terrorizing of the slaves.

But it was John Brown's act, his raid on Harper's Ferry, Virginia, on October 16, 1859, that polarized the nation through terrorist means.

John Brown, the most dramatic and effective terrorist in American history, was a man who, by attacking human slavery through direct action, changed his society in fundamental ways that most Americans now find positive. Brown's brand of libertarian Evangelical Christianity—his startling and violent anarchist application of the dominant religious and civil values of his day—was as much a fighting faith as modern fundamentalist Islam. Back on May 23, 1856, at Pottawatomie Creek, Kansas Territory, he led seven men, including four of his sons, in bludgeoning five proslavery settlers to death with broadswords. Three years later, at Harper's Ferry, he seized a federal arsenal, expecting hundreds of slaves to join him spontaneously in igniting a
massive and bloody slave rebellion that would destroy the hated system. No revolution materialized, and within a day, Brown's men were surrounded, killed or captured by federal troops. But the impact of the raid had only begun: Brown's words were in the end even more important than his acts, although his credibility was based on what he had done and had intended to do. At his trial, Brown played to both the idealism of northern Evangelical Christians—a far broader public than the abolitionists themselves—and the deepest fears of slaveholding southerners—the threat of a massive slave insurrection. At his trial and while awaiting his hanging, he anticipated the enormity of the impact of his deed, successfully seeking by his words to stretch the sectional divide to the breaking point. In particular, he understood the powerful symbolism of reenacting a Christlike death in the name of the brotherhood of man. As he stood before the judge who would sentence him to hang, Brown spoke to the nation: “Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice and mingle my blood further with the blood...of millions in this slave country whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments—I submit; so let it be done!” It was as if a new Isaiah or Jeremiah had emerged in the Promised Land to scourge the nation of evil.

This direct physical and moral attack on slavery helped convince southerners to secede and northerners to fight that secession. Indeed, when the Republicans were elected a few months later, the Deep South seceded in large part because, as one prominent politician put it, Lincoln would “John Brownize us all.” And soon enough, Union soldiers would march into the Confederacy singing, “John Brown's body lies a moulder in its grave, but his truth goes marching on.”

Was Brown a terrorist or a “freedom fighter?” He was an ideological and religious zealot, a “borderline personality,” an undeniable believer in the higher value of violent means, righteously applied. He was not a foreigner but very much a native-born American, twisting American Protestantism and republicanism to the service of a Jesus militant. Any analysis of him inevitably opens up troubling questions about the American character and the building of the American nation, since it requires looking at terrorism from within and not just from without mainstream values. Then there is William T. Sherman. In Citizen Sherman, I discussed at considerable length his Civil War raid into Georgia and the Carolinas, and his accompanying, brilliant, war propaganda. But I would also like to align his actions with deeper American patterns in the use of military terror, many of them developed in the American military tradition of fighting Indian irregular wars, a second long-term mode of controlling another race through terror, parallel to the treatment of black slaves. As well as destroying the logistical base of much of the Confederate military effort, Sherman sought to undermine civilian morale, the foundation of the Confederate citizen army. At this he was successful through word as well as deed. He showed restraint in terms of inflicting civilian casualties, but he attacked every other element of civilian property and life. And he calculated his damage coolly, even while he—a spiritual agnostic—used heated Protestant biblical language in shrewd psychological fashion, coupled with physical terror, to debase and destroy the fundamental security of his enemy in ways they and his northern brethren would also comprehend. While it is true that Sherman's army did not slaughter civilians, it drove thousands from their homes, often to exposure and death by hunger and disease, and always to depression.

Although Sherman—a virulent racist and social reactionary—was at the opposite end of the political spectrum from John Brown, when he broadcast his message of war to the southern people that accompanied his giant raid he too employed the language of the King James Bible, humiliating his enemy as he trampled them. “You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will,” he wrote to the mayor of Atlanta, who was protesting Sherman's expulsion of the civilian population of that city. “War is cruelty and you cannot refine it, and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out...You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop the war, which alone can be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.”

What Sherman could not foresee was the use of some of his tactics by southern white nationalists when they struggled to regain control of their region. After losing their war for an independent nation, these nationalists regrouped and regained power in their states through legitimate political activity closely linked to the use of widespread paramilitary terrorism. Night riding, threats, banishment, beatings and lynching were frequently the first resorts of the clandestine branch of this political movement, particularly in the Deep South where the black population was...
especially numerous. Klansmen used extremist forms of traditional Christian imagery, most notably the burning cross, as they sought to purge their notional white republic of all hints of the social pollution they believed assertive black people threatened to bring with them should they gain significant political power and social independence. This campaigning was coordinated with more genteel forms of political activity by other white leaders, in conscious if not always explicit collusion with the terrorists.

In 1871–72, the federal government was able to break the Klan in several states. But it soon wearied of perpetual use of the army and the federal courts to enforce Reconstruction. Far from disappearing, white terrorists regrouped during the next three years, using even more massive terrorist means that proved both indispensable and effective in securing the southern white triumph essentially completed by 1877. The subsequent, decades-long formalization of segregation was continually reinforced by terror. In general, white terror was a purification ritual carried out in the name of a white man’s country—of which the Klan was one of several organized devices. There were to be about 5000 recorded lynchings in the late nineteenth century South—in the end five to ten times that number were probably lynched—and systematic race discrimination including violence lasted nearly a century, with lynching but the most overt form of terror. Terror was at least as much psychological as material for both attackers and attacked, providing a force that blacks could not counter.

One of the reasons that southern whites could impose such a draconian caste system on blacks is that northerners, including the Republicans, had grown deeply concerned with immigration and labor unrest in their midst. Both caused considerable strife in the 1870s and beyond. Distracted, the Republicans abandoned the southern lower orders to the “natural leaders” of that region, focusing their anxieties on the growing dangers within urban industrial society. In 1877, a national railroad strike turned violent, and both the National Guard and federal troops were called out to put down the workers.

Unionization, socialism and anarchism grew among the workers, many of them recent immigrants, threatening a sort of class war most Americans deeply feared as an insidious, foreign invasion of unassimilable peoples and un-American ideologies.

These anxieties climaxed in Chicago in 1886. On May 3, the police fired on strikers at McCormick’s Reaper Plant, killing at least six and probably more strikers. In reaction, the small (and mostly German) anarchist movement of Chicago called for a meeting at Haymarket Square for the following day, their leaflet urging, “Workingmen Arm Yourselves and Appear in Full Force.” When that meeting was held, a phalanx of police appeared, and someone in the crowd threw a bomb. The police opened fire and eight policemen were killed, mostly by the “friendly fire” of their own colleagues. A larger number of workers also died. Eight anarchist leaders were arrested and tried for murder. Though almost all had convincing alibis, they were convicted and sentenced to be hanged after instructions from the judge to the jury that the anarchists may not have had any actual “personal participation in the particular act,” but “had generally by speech and print advised large classes to commit murder,” leaving the actual acts to the whim of some unknown individual who listened to their advice.

This judicial violation of the most basic civil rights was part of a widespread assault on workers and the union movement, much of it coming from the pulpit. In a widely reprinted sermon, “Christianity and the Red Flag,” Rev. Frederick A. Noble of Chicago’s Union Park Congregational Church took Isaiah 59 as his text. “Their feet run to evil, and they make haste to shed innocent blood; their thoughts are thoughts of iniquity; desolation and destruction are in their paths.” This, declared Noble, “is an ancient description of an anarchist... They have said, with a fiendish tone that blood must be spilled; blood has been spilled; let their own veins and arteries furnish the further supply.” Charles Carroll Bonney, a leader of the Chicago bar, linked religious standards to civil standards in another pamphlet: “the state does not deal with religion or infidelity, as matters of belief or doubts, but only as they are concerned with morals and conduct, and so concern the peace and good order of society. If anarchy can have possession of the
workman on Sunday, it can laugh at the efforts of law and order to control him during the week.”

This first great Red Scare stemmed from an anonymous act of terror by an anarchist or an agent provocateur, which led in response to a far larger act of counter-terror. The police, the courts and the churches whipped up popular sentiment, all defining labor organizations and strikes as alien, undemocratic and unchristian. State counter-terror served to purge the threatening alien other, as power holders imagined him to be, as a means to try to regain their notion of law and order. Although a protest movement developed in resistance to the post-Haymarket hangings, reprisals against striking workers remained violent for decades to come, as those in governmental and social power continued to consider them to be essentially anti-American.

When the United States finally entered the international imperialist era in 1898 by beating up on the Spanish and seizing most of their remaining empire, one unintended consequence was the necessity of fighting a Filipino terrorist campaign with counter-terrorist methods. At first the Filipino nationalists believed the Americans had arrived to help liberate them from the Spanish; but when they learned of the American determination to colonize their land, they took to the bush, using guerrilla warfare, the only sort of military option available to badly outnumbered forces in such colonialist wars. It was in fact a strategy used and perfected by the American rebels in their own War of Independence. The Filipinos used stealthy attacks against American soldiers and terror against their own civilians, while the Americans used terror in parallel fashions, as both sides fought to control the countryside. Though the usual statistic is that the American army inflicted 10,000 to 20,000 deaths, this might be undercounting, but even more importantly, the Americans pulverized the material and psychological structures of the Philippines as a potential nation. The American State could present this use of force as a normal deployment of state police power, justifying a variety of terrorist means as legitimate suppression of outlawry. And governmental leaders believed that they had a moral obligation to bring Christianity and modernity with them in order to uplift the ignorant lower race of Filipinos, a mission that justified the use of terror.

Until this point, Americans had avoided what were to them European forms of imperialism by conquest and colonization. And even in 1898, President William McKinley hesitated about moving in that direction. He later told a group of clergymen, that after the defeat of the Spanish fleet, “I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then the other islands…. I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance….and one night it came to me…(1) That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government…and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize* them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could.”

Of course, this moralistic policy accorded with American material and geopolitical interests: the Philippines would provide a big naval base in the Pacific, to help protect and expand American trade. But McKinley was neither a cynic nor a hypocrite. Quite to the contrary, his motivations were as much those of mission as of markets, and if his army would use water torture and massacres as later Senate hearings demonstrated had been the case, American idealism nevertheless was congruent with terrorist means, if the outcome supported high American purpose. The ends justified the means.

Clearly this pattern is echoed repeatedly in twentieth and twenty-first century events. The KKK was reborn in 1915 as a self-proclaimed white Protestant army, enacting terror against Catholics and Jews as well as African-Americans. During and after the Red Scare of 1919, dissent was suppressed, often with violent means, in defense of what was then called “100% Americanism.” Thousands of radical activist immigrants were deported (while an overtly racist immigration policy barred more from entering the nation), and World War I veterans organized to terrorize industrial unions, particularly the anarchist Industrial Workers of the World. In 1927, the Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were electrocuted, ostensibly for payroll robbery and murder, but really for their political opinions and ethnic origins. In the 1930s, the police and private security forces battled strikers, often using terrorist methods. Following the Second World War, J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, the

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House Un-American Activities Committee, McCarthyism, and the execution of the Rosenbergs terrorized once more those alien, Communist, filthy dissenters into silence. Using the same shibboleths, the KKK and other white terrorist groups, often with the support of local and state officials in the South, opposed the Civil Rights movement with burnings, bombings and other forms of terror. In Vietnam, American forces often terrorized and sometimes massacred villagers in a pattern eerily reminiscent of the earlier Philippine campaigns. And the response to alien terrorists after 9/11, including the stereotyping of persons of color at the borders as all potential terrorists, resembles the response of Chicago authorities to the Haymarket anarchists in 1886.

It is too soon to determine where the new homeland security legislation and the doctrine of pre-emptive war might lead. But with normal civil rights suspended for whole categories of people, the state is twisting the use of police powers with new tools of secret coercion, and, sensing potential terrorist attacks, initiating war to head them off.

Twisting the Cross throws open a new window on American views of race, class, mainstream values and the state by analyzing the role of terror in shaping American history. I believe this innovative discussion will provide a provocative look back at the past with clear implications for the present and the future. Some might call what I do here counter-patriotic, but in a time where fear may cloud the public perspective, I believe it is essential to look at the deep structures of American history in a well-researched and clear-eyed manner, the better to understand terror at the root of nation building.

I am not new to the analysis of violence and American life. In my previous four books I addressed many of the connections between violence and the moral structure at the core of American society, chiefly by exploring the lives of civilians, soldiers and military leaders caught in the middle of the American Civil War. Warfare destroyed their security and fundamentally challenged their value structures. Yet they were able to rework those structures in ways that kept them sufficiently integrated personally and socially to carry on both in war and the ensuing peace. Despite their psychic wounds, they learned to integrate their violence with received values, to attack the alien Others while defending the True People of God, including, of course, themselves. Through such ideological constructions, they justified terror as a means necessary to serve higher American ideals, thereby defending themselves against the viciousness of the means they sometimes used.

The crucial lesson of Twisting the Cross is that American terror and counter-terror, while pushing humans to the very limits of the morally comprehensible, are under the right circumstances, for most of us, a defense of peacetime social values. Placed in an acceptable framework (and of course never called that by name), terror is often useful in furthering social and political ends, in the United States as elsewhere. Terror is widespread; terror is common. But if we ever hope to abandon its uses, having experienced the full force of its savagery, we must begin to challenge its acceptability, even when legitimated as a means to preserve society; we must look to peaceful alternative means of social change in multicultural, judicial and international frameworks. If there is anything I hope Americans learn from this book, it is that terror can come from “them,” and it can come from “us.”

To write this book, I will analyze a variety of printed archival and primary sources, including stories and novels, photographs and paintings in order to tease out the relationship of terror and mainstream values. I am neither a theorist nor an ideologue, so I intend to write a clear narrative braided with analysis of the moral and structural meanings of homegrown terrorism. This project grows from my earlier work on moral structure, violence and war in nineteenth-century America, but at the same time it is a new and challenging topic, one that will prove quite synthetic in argument and composition. I see it as a culmination of my past twenty-five years of scholarship, and as a means to address some of the most troubling aspects of nation-building.

Michael Fellman is Director of Graduate Liberal Studies and Professor of History at SFU. His lecture was derived from the earlier stage of his next book project about terrorism and the American mainstream in the nineteenth century, tentatively entitled “Twisting the Cross”.

*[Ed. note: The entire Filipino population was in fact already Christian, just not the kind of Christians McKinley had in mind.]

Twisting the Cross
Violence and the Literature of War
—Kate Scheel

What is the appropriate response to violence? After 9/11, how should we react? What can we do to witness and acknowledge the trauma that it caused? In an examination of these questions, I undertook to teach a 20th century second-year survey course on the topic of war literature. As a class, we looked at texts whose subjects were some of the major conflicts of the century: both World wars, the Korean war, the Viet Nam War, and conflict in Latin America. Half of the works were by women writers and the majority of the authors were American; some were about battle experience and some about the trauma experienced by those more peripheral to battle, some were autobiographical and some fictional. What I’m going to do today is talk about three of the authors and their texts, in particular, the experiences of violence and conflict they relate and what that might offer to us in terms of strategies for our own experiences.

We began our study with several W. W. I poets: Rupert Brooke, Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen, Rose Macaulay and Kathleen M. Wallace, among others. On the one hand, it is somewhat misleading to refer to Brooke as a war poet since he never actually made it to the war, dying of blood poisoning en route to the Dardanelles. However, his book of poems, *1914 and Other Poems*, published posthumously, was so well read during the war years that he is inevitably associated with the war. I want to look at one of those poems, in particular.

**The Soldier**

If I should die, think only this of me:
That there’s some corner of a foreign field
That is for ever England. There shall be
In that rich earth a richer dust concealed;
A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware,
Gave once, her flowers to love, her ways to roam.
A body of England’s, breathing English air,
Washed by the rivers, blest by the suns of home.

And think this heart, all evil shed away,
A pulse in the eternal mind, no less
Gives somewhere back the thoughts by England given;
Her sights and sounds; dreams happy as her day
And laughter, learnt of friends; and gentleness,
In hearts at peace, under an English heaven.

This poet is nostalgic for a simple, pastoral time. Sacrifice in battle is seen as noble and necessary to protect this bucolic, yet fleeting vision of English life. The soldier’s death ensures the continuation of English ideals as if the burial of his English body, even on foreign soil, would be a Dionysian act of renewal of English culture. The traditional values that the poem supports are reinforced by its conventional structure.

In contrast to Brooke, the lesser-known Siegfried Sassoon was on the battle field, and his poetry reflects the sights, sounds, smells and feelings of trench warfare. For example, his poem “Counter-Attack” begins thus:

We’d gained our first objective hours before
While dawn broke like a face with blinking eyes,
Pallid, unshaven and thirsty, blind with smoke,
Things seemed all right at first. We held their line,
With bombers posted, Lewis guns well placed,
And clink of shovels deepening the shallow trench.
The place was rotten with dead; green clumsy legs
High-booted, sprawled and grovelled among the saps
And trunks, face downwards, in the sucking mud,
Wallowed like trodden sand-bags loosely filled,
And naked sodden buttocks, mats of hair,
Bulged, clotted heads slept in the plastering slime
And then the rain began, — the jolly old rain!

The comparison between this poem and that of Brooke’s is particularly telling. As my students were quick to note, Brooke’s poem treats war as an abstraction—there is no ‘blood and guts,’ and his focus is a somewhat sentimental patriotism. Sassoon’s poem, on the other hand, describes the procedural details of an early morning counter offensive, the language conversational, concrete yet poetic: “We’d gained our first objective hours before/While dawn broke like a face with blinking eye”. While the men are “Pallid, unshaven and thirsty”, “Things” are still “all right,” suggesting that the norm for a day in the trenches is a harsh one. The first 6 lines average 10 beats a line, in a standard rhythm, but there are no end rhymes, which gives the lines more of a narrative quality, as if someone were speaking. Then Sassoon begins the discussion of the digging of the trench. My understanding is that the soldiers dug three parallel trenches in a zigzag formation to form a fire trench, a support trench and a reserve trench, with connecting communication trenches between them. Soldiers stood in the fire trench to shoot. Typically soldiers spent about half a month in the trenches during which time, they slept, ate and relieved themselves there, rain or shine. Many men succumbed to “trench fever”, spread by lice. Sometimes the trenches had boards along the bottom to prevent the soldiers from sinking into the mud. It is interesting that when Sassoon’s
attention shifts to the trench, the lines are indented, as a narrative aside. Previously given to believe that things were ‘all right’, Sassoon shifts from his factual account to the shocking announcement that “The place was rotten with dead”. The trenches, which were always there, seem to have only now come into Sassoon’s view and he portrays them in graphic detail. The mud becomes animate as it tries to suck in the soldiers who are still alive and trying to get a firm stand. The legs of the living mix with the bodies of the dead so that you can’t tell them apart. The confusion and urgency of the situation is mirrored in the structure, with each line of poetry spilling over into the next. It is as if the inherited, poetic form cannot contain the full extent of the speaker’s impressions or attest to the unspeakable nature of the experiences. Brooke’s symmetrical, rhyming lines could not do Sassoon’s experience justice. Where Brooke is reassuring, Sassoon’s anger and frustration are apparent in the sarcasm of the last line: “and then the rain began,—the jolly old rain!” There is nothing glorious nor high minded about the situation—it’s a pragmatic discussion of how to meet the objective, which in the end, fails. The concepts of the “objective” and the “counter-attack” are undermined by Sassoon’s insistence on including the personal experience of the soldier. And the contrast between those two segments of the stanza—both in content and structure—disrupt and interrogate the sacrifice that Brooke enshrines.

From all accounts, Sassoon was a daring soldier, whose exploits earned him the nickname “Mad Jack”. He was wounded twice and awarded a Military Cross for bravery on the field. While convalescing from his wounds in 1917, he became convinced that the war had shifted from one of “defence and liberation” to one of “aggression and conquest” and that it was being unduly prolonged at great cost to the troops. In his letter stating his concerns, which was published in The Times, he writes:

I am not protesting against the military conduct of the War, but against the political errors and insincerities for which the fighting men are now being sacrificed.

On behalf of those who are suffering now, I make this protest against the deception which is being practised on them. Also I believe that it may help to destroy the callous complacency with which the majority of those at home regard the continuance of agonies which they do not share, and which they have not sufficient imagination to realize.

(Sassoon in Copp 251)

We can see Sassoon’s frustration with the public perception of the war that elides the actual suffering that he has experienced, and his accusation that the government has no regard for the lives of the fighting men that are presumed disposable since they are not officers and are therefore, lower class. Sassoon expected to be court-martialed for making such a statement until Robert Graves, another poet and soldier, whom Sassoon had met in France, intervened at the War Office and convinced Sassoon to attend a Medical Board hearing where it was determined that Sassoon was suffering from shell shock. He was sent to Craiglockart War Hospital under the care of Dr. W.H.R. Rivers.

Shell shock was not well understood at the time, but was believed to occur following extreme psychological stress. Often there were no immediate symptoms, but once removed to safety, soldiers would begin to have recurring nightmares, flashbacks, insomnia, violent outbursts, and heightened sensitivity to noises. Contemporary trauma theory, as articulated by Cathy Caruth, Judith Herman, Juliet Mitchell and others has built on these early observations to argue that experiences of helplessness and terror, loss of control, fear of death, or exposure to the point of exhaustion cause, in addition to physical infirmities, a psychic wound. This wound exists because the traumatic event so compromises our means of survival, that it cannot be fully assimilated when it occurs. Further, trauma theorists argue that the ordinary response to a traumatic event is to bury or repress it, a response that exists simultaneously with the desire to reveal the vent and acknowledge the psychic wound. The dual impulse to repress and reveal the trauma is evident in survivors’ accounts of their experience. Herman writes: “People who have survived atrocities often tell their stories in a highly emotional, contradictory, and fragmented manner which undermines their credibility and thereby serves the twin imperatives of truth-telling and secrecy.” In her clinical practice with trauma survivors, Herman has noted that the survivors often alternate between “feeling numb and reliving the event.” Often, the events are so traumatic as to be unspeakable. For
example, Mitchell has noted that the most prevalent symptom of shell shock among veterans of World War I was mutism.

Healing for a trauma survivor requires a full integration of the event into the body and the mind. This is a complex process. First of all, the survivor must be assured of safety. It is significant that Sassoon wrote his letter of condemnation of the war after having been back in England and convalescing for several months. Second, it is not enough to merely tell the story—there also must be a witness. Dori Laub notes that the trauma story is “not yet memory” (69)—in other words, it hasn’t been fully processed. In order for it to become part of the survivor’s life story, it must be heard and acknowledged. Within the psychoanalytic framework, the therapist fulfills the role of the listener. However, James Pennebaker, in his article, “Telling Stories: The Health Benefits of Narrative,” notes that “the act of converting emotions and images into words changes the way the person organizes and thinks about the trauma.” Constructing a narrative allows the person to integrate the emotional reaction with their existing experience. But it is not enough to recount the events dispassionately; the speaker must relay, as Sassoon does, the smells, sounds, and sights of the experience.

Sassoon’s recovery involved both the therapeutic encounter with Dr. Rivers as well as his own writing, of which we have seen a sample. Unfortunately, his recovery resulted in his return to battle, although he survived to publish his poetry in 1917 and 1918. But while Sassoon’s poetry received little attention, Brooke’s book of poetry, on the other hand, went through 20 printings during the war. The contrast between the reception afforded Brooke’s work and that of Sassoon reveals the way in which the private, “realistic” account of battle was stifled because it contradicted the established culture of war. Sassoon’s testimonial could only be admitted into culture as an artifact of mental instability, while Brooke’s *pro patria mori* and championing of a disappearing British life was popular because it reinforced the public culture of war. Remembering is thus dually compromised—firstly, because the nature of the psychic wound is such that the survivor pushes the event out of consciousness, or represses it, and, secondly, because the culture refuses to acknowledge that the trauma exists.

I want to turn now to a civilian’s account of war trauma—that of the poet, Hilda Doolittle, known as H.D. Although an American, H.D. lived through both world wars in London, England. The Great War was very debilitating to her; she lost her brother in France, her father died soon after, her first child was stillborn, her marriage failed and she herself nearly died in the influenza epidemic that followed the war. Then, during W.W. II, she endured bombings by the Germans almost every night for nearly nine months between September 1940 and May 1941. During the bombings, she and other Londoners would be forced out of their flats onto the streets, now covered with broken glass, wondering if the shaking walls of the buildings would hold. Her survival strategy was to write, and she composed two texts during this period: her long poem, *Trilogy* and her autobiography, *The Gift*, both of which take up the war, but in very different ways. It’s the latter that I want to discuss today. In *The Gift*, H.D.’s reminiscences of her childhood in the safety of Pennsylvania are interspersed with her immediate reactions to the destruction around her. The accounts of the trauma, however, are not foregrounded as one might expect, but rather leak into the dominant narrative of the childhood. Often, she makes only occasional, rather oblique paragraph references to the war. One of the first substantial entries occurs about half-way through the text, where the account of the war experience shifts from the background to become the dominant narrative. I want to quote from one of these longer passages to give you a feel for the strategies which H.D. uses to render her experience:

The noise is not loud enough, the planes follow one another singly, so the mind is still held in the grip of vital terror. Tonight there may be fire, how will we get out? Is it better to stay in bed or crawl out to the hall in the dark, open the flat-door and wait in the entrance, even run down the four flights of stairs and crouch in the air-raid shelter? There are purely mechanical questions, mechanical intellectual reactions, for I know what I am going to do. I listen to hurried footsteps on the pavement outside my window, the clang of fire engines making off from a near-by station. There will be interminable silence, and then that whizz and the wait for the crash, but that will be the world outside.

When the noise becomes intolerable, when the planes swoop low, there is a movement when indecision passes, I can not move now, anyway. I am paralysed, “frozen” rather, like the rabbit in the woods when it senses the leaves moving with that special uncanny rustling, that means the final, the almost abstract enemy is near.

My body is “frozen;” nerves, tendons, flesh are curiously endowed, they re-gain the primitive instincts of the forest animal. I can not move now. Like the rabbit, like the wild-deer, a sort of protective “invisibility” seems to surround me. My body is paralysed, “frozen.” But the mind has its wings. The trick words again. It works every time now. Fate out of an old Myth is beside me, Life is a very real thing.
Death a personified Entity. I am on my own, as at the beginning. I am safe. Now exaltation rises like sap in a tree. I am happy. I am happier than I have ever been, it seems to me, in my whole life (110).

This passage shows both the urges to reveal and to repress. It begins in an impersonal voice: it is not her mind but “the” mind that is held in the grip of terror.

The pronoun “we” is inserted in the second sentence, where she imagines herself as part of a group of people trapped in a burning building; the event having occurred so frequently that her anticipation of it alone is fraught with fear and anxiety as she tries to decide in advance how to respond. Her sensory experience is auditory: the noise of the planes, the sounds of fire engine sirens, the explosion, and the footsteps outside. She then shifts to the singular pronoun, “I” as she moves from a state of hyper-arousal to one of numbed self-paralysis. This “trick” she has mastered of being “frozen” is one in which she dissociates from her body and moves into the safety of her mind. Here, she is outside of linear time and incapable of being harmed. Her last two sentences are joyful in her complete denial of her situation and her affirmation of her safety. Those last sentences belie the anxiety she states in the first paragraph and were we to take her final statement of joy as indicative of her full response to the situation, we would miss the impact the situation had upon her.

Not long after the war, H.D. had a complete breakdown, imaging that W.W.III had begun and that bombs were dropping in her backyard. She was hospitalized in Switzerland, her friends told that she had meningitis. While I would argue that H.D. was likely suffering from what we would now call post-traumatic stress disorder, conventional wisdom has it that H.D.’s fragile, artistic temperament was overwhelmed by work, which led to her illness. Her biographer, Barbara Guest, has written of H.D. that “She never expressed fear of the bombs” (265). Yet even a cursory reading of the original, edited version of H.D.’s autobiography contains lines, such as: “I could visualize the very worst terrors. I could see myself caught in the fall of bricks and I would be pinned down under a great beam, helpless. Many had been. I would be burned to death”(215). In a similar eliding of H.D. ’s experience, several sections dealing with her war experiences, including the one that I read, were omitted from the first edition of The Gift, excised by the editors. It is only in 1998 that the entire text of The Gift was restored. How are we to make sense of these refusals to acknowledge H.D.’s own account of her experience?

One explanation is that while I have foregrounded H.D.’s accounts of the bombing here, they are less evident in the total work, comprising only about 10% of the text. Another may have to do with the difficulty of the role of the witness. Laub has noted that to listen to an account of trauma is to partially experience that trauma. To “read” H.D.’s trauma narrative then is to experience her fear and readers may elide the story to protect themselves. It is not uncommon for trauma survivors to be ignored when they tell their stories.

The final work that I wish to discuss is Dispatches, Michael Herr’s account of the Viet Nam War. Herr’s account is interesting as he is there, as he says, “to watch” (20). He’s a journalist whose goal was to reveal the Vietnam that was not portrayed in the usual media accounts. As Herr quickly ascertains, there are always at least two accounts of any activity—one for public consumption stateside and the private reality:

A twenty-four-year-old Special Forces captain was telling me about it. “I went out and killed one VC and liberated a prisoner. Next day the major called me in and told me that I’d killed fourteen VC and liberated six prisoners. You want to see the medal?” (172)

Herr opts out of the regular media scrum with the military brass, which he disparagingly refers to as the “Five O’clock Follies”… “an Orwellian grope through the day’s events” (99), implying that much of the media was an unwitting accomplice to the construction of the stateside version of the war. Unwilling to accept blindly the military account as the full story, Herr refuses to stay with the other media in comparative safety. He prides himself on going into the field with the “grunts”, the common soldiers.

But like many trauma survivors, Herr was troubled by the inability of existing literary forms to adequately convey his experiences and those of the “grunts.” As he says in an interview, we had “to find an expression for a very extreme experience…. We had to find this in order to save our lives” (Schroeder 40). Herr utilizes the genre of ‘new journalism’ in which the author blends his observations with novelistic technique in order to present a fuller understanding of the experience to the reader. As a result, Herr’s account is a combination of the factual and the fictional, by his own admission, which hasn’t prevented it from being hailed as the “finest documentation” of Vietnam in the 1960s (Contemporary Authors).
Herr quickly bonds with the men in the field, switching from the personal pronoun "I" to "we" about 60 pages into the narrative. It seems important to Herr, a "heavy-set" guy (54) who suffered from asthma as a child, to demonstrate his ability to go the distance, to be one of the guys, even if he doesn't intend to pull the trigger. It becomes apparent that in the world of the 'grunt,' the distinction is not between male or female, but man or coward. Fighting is eroticised and welcomed:

"‘Quakin’ and Shakin’," they called it, great balls of fire, Contact. Then it was you and the ground: kiss it, eat it, fuck it, plow it with your whole body, get as close to it as you can without being in it yet or of it, guess who's flying around about an inch above your head? Pucker and submit, it's the ground..... Amazing, unbelievable, guys who'd played a lot of hard sports said they'd never felt anything like it, the sudden drop and rocket rush of the hit, the reserves of adrenaline you could make available to yourself, pumping it up and putting it out until you were lost floating in it, not afraid, almost open to clear orgasmic death-by-drowning in it, actually relaxed" (63).

Herr has been lauded for his uncensored, physical descriptions of battle conditions. He has also been critiqued by some feminists as having claimed war as the great proving ground for men. I think that both of these analyses miss the subversion and interrogation to which Herr subjects the cultural construct of war, even as he is implicated in it. It is culture that teaches men that war is, as Herr says, "a John Wayne wet dream" (20), referenced to Hollywood movies where "Nobody dies" (46). Part of the trauma of the Viet Nam experience is how unprepared the green recruits are, despite boot camp, because the culturally-constructed version of war is so sanitized. For example, as he notes facetiously,

The Soldier's Prayer came in two versions: Standard, printed on a plastic-coated card by the Defense Department, and Standard Revised, impossible to convey because it got translated outside of language, into chaos – screams, begging, promises, threats, sobs, repetitions of holy names until their throats were cracked and dry, until some men had bitten through their collar points and rifle straps and even their dog-tag chains. (58).

Like Sassoon, Herr's account is one of homage to what men endure and rage at, the indifference of military command for the lives of ordinary men. But it also portrays the addict waiting for the next adrenaline fix—one of "those poor bastards who had to have a war on all the time" (243) and the nostalgia, upon returning home, for the drama: "A few extreme cases felt that the experience there had been a glorious one, while most us felt that it had been merely wonderful. I think that Vietnam was what we had instead of happy childhoods" (244). What Herr's nostalgia doesn't include are the nightmares he experiences when he returns to New York, awakened by dreams in which his living room is full of dead Marines. The war trauma deepens when, a couple of years after he returns, three of his journalist friends from Vietnam are killed. Their death triggers what he refers to as a "massive physical and psychological collapse. I crashed…. I was having these recurring post-apocalyptic war dreams, but they were all taking place in New York, and it was a jungle. Just going out in the streets required the cunning and skill of special forces."(Ciotti 25).

Herr was probably suffering from the delayed effects of trauma. As Herman points out, despite what was known about war trauma, the first systematic, large scale investigation of the long term psychological effects of war trauma was not done until after the Viet Nam War. Called shell shock in W.W. I and battle fatigue in W.W. II, it was not until there existed a substantial anti-war movement that the deleterious effects of the Vietnam war could be acknowledged. Just as Sassoon's protest was minimized, H.D.'s trauma written off as an artistic temperment, Viet Nam vets found their experiences trivialized. The first 'rap' group was formed by a group of vets, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, who met with two psychiatrists in 1970, to talk about their experiences. Many of them, distinguished for bravery, returned their medals as they gave accounts of their war crimes. The movement spread and the Veterans' Administration was forced to develop an outreach program for psychological counseling. It wasn't until 1980 that post-traumatic stress was acknowledged by the American Psychiatric Association as a medical disorder and as something which, we know now, can affect anyone suffering a traumatic experience.

Herman has noted that one of the final stages of healing from trauma is to ask the question "why me?" and ultimately, "why?" One of the reasons that experiences of trauma are so disturbing to the survivors, long after the experience is over, is that everything previously believed to be solid and fixed, is now revealed to be tenuous. Survivors often find themselves questioning their identity, their relationships, their belief systems and their faith in an orderly universe as they struggle to make sense out of what may be random occurrences. Yet, in asking those questions, survivors often find ways, as we have seen, in which to transform their experiences into a testimonial. And some, as Herman notes, seek to transcend the making of art can be a means of transforming the experience and allowing the survivor to move the static experience of trauma into time and history, so that the survivor is no longer held hostage to the trauma's haunting effects.
the trauma “by making it a gift to others”, offering up their experience. In this way, the trauma may be redeemed so that it is no longer meaningless. We see this in Sassoon’s letter of condemnation of the war, when he uses his personal experiences as a vehicle to address social justice. And, as H.D. writes in *The Gift*, it was only with the onset of a second World War that she felt compelled to offer her gift of a syncretic religious vision of healing (166). Their work becomes what Shoshana Felman has called performative, in that it enables change (53).

This raises the pedagogical question of whether these poems and narratives are performative for students. Are the students changed? Is a topic such as war literature in itself traumatizing? Several students from the class noted that they couldn’t really comprehend the personal accounts of war that they read. As one individual put it, “Reading a novel about war is sort of like reading a novel about social life in the 19th century. While you can understand what life must have been like, you can’t truly appreciate it without the first hand knowledge.” What students can comprehend, I think, is the power of the cultural construction of war, the isolation of those who refuse it, and the need to practice discernment when confronting it. I think possibly they also develop an appreciation for the testimonial and for their own role as witness.

In response, then, to the question, “What is the appropriate response to war and violence?” I am reminded of the picture of Nancy DiNovo on the cover of the *Globe and Mail* a few days after 9/11. She is weeping as she plays her violin at a memorial service at Christ Church Cathedral in Vancouver. This picture stayed with me, more than the oft-repeated images of the twin towers. It seems to me that her actions acknowledge the pain and grief she experienced, but also transform and transcend the trauma. In this sense, her art becomes performative. It is not a soothing anodyne of forgetfulness. Rather, the making of art can be a means of transforming the experience and allowing the survivor to move the static experience of trauma into time and history, so that the survivor is no longer held hostage to the trauma’s haunting effects. But that often can’t be done without the acknowledgement of the trauma by society.

How we mourn as a society is a complex question. For example, the construction of the Vietnam Memorial in the United States was a political as well as a psychological process. The proposed memorial for the World Trade Centre site is even more contentious. As you probably know, the Daniel Liebeskind design is conceived such that every year on “September 11th between the hours of 8:46 a.m., when the first airplane hit and 10:28 a.m. when the second tower collapsed, the sun will shine without shadow” (www.structure.de/en/projects/data/pro117.php). There are still 19,000 body parts, including those of the terrorists, that have been recovered from the site, which are to be freeze dried and buried at the location. It seems to me that a monument has the curious function of serving both as a testimony to a traumatic event of mass proportions, allowing the public to acknowledge their grief and thus come to terms with it, while at the same time, it locks the past in time so that it can never be forgotten. So I want to close the formal part of this presentation with a question for discussion—what is the difference between grieving and fetishizing a traumatic event?

Kate Scheel is a Ph.D. candidate in the English department at SFU.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction and the End of War?
—Douglas Alan Ross

The surprising and unexpectedly non-violent end of the Cold War—the simple collapse of the Soviet state and its associated empire without the catalyst of major warfare—persuaded many commentators that the human species does have some real hope of escaping doom from the vast arsenals of nuclear and biological weapons developed with such energy and expense during the last half of the 20th century. The absence of great power warfare during the so-called ‘long peace’ of the atomic and thermonuclear led scholars of international relations such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mueller to speculate that all-out war had become both unthinkable and ‘un-doable’.

Waltz opined that the prospect of nuclear warfare had become so utterly dreadful, and therefore powerfully deterring, that the further spread of nuclear weapons to governments beyond the original five was not cause for worry. India and Pakistan with nuclear weapons would act, he believed, in much the same way as the Americans and Soviets had during most of the Cold War—extremely prudently. Caution, conflict avoidance with nuclear armed neighbours and mutual deterrence would, he argued, become the standard widely emulated pattern of behaviour by ‘new’ nuclear powers.¹

Mueller, another American international relations specialist, went even further suggesting that even major war without the use of nuclear or biological weapons had become unthinkable. War itself was becoming illegitimate and because it is just another learned human ‘institution’ it can be unlearned and discarded as an inappropriate, distasteful and ultimately uncivilized state instrument. Like slavery, dueling (or smoking) such behaviour can be collectively discarded in the 21st century as an unnecessary and archaic social activity.² For Mueller, the history of warfare suggests that war as an institution is as much an ‘affectation’ as it is a collective affliction. Warfare in the industrial age has become so horrific—even without the use of nuclear or biological weapons—that it is probable, not merely plausible, that with respect to the future of war we may say with confidence that even if its days are not numbered, its years surely are. Is such optimism unwarranted?

The purpose of this short lecture is to lay out some of the reasons why I have not been able to share this fin de siècle optimism about the human future. Where others have expressed guarded hope that we may be on the verge of a great ‘transformation’ in international behaviour that will end war, I see such claims as more the product of wishful thinking than persuasive empirically rooted analysis of concrete evidence. The shadow cast by the first detonation of an atomic bomb in anger at 8:15 AM on August 6, 1945 still lingers. It has been reinforced by the much magnified terror of vastly larger thermonuclear weapons (typically ten to a hundred times the explosive yield of the now merely ‘tactical’-size Hiroshima bomb). The ‘game’ of interstate deterrence has been expanded to include many covertly held arsenals of appallingly destructive biological weapons (scientifically enhanced anthrax, smallpox, pneumonic plague and so on), especially by those states who lack a nuclear deterrent to offset that held (or thought to be held) by their enemies or rivals, or who fear they may be ‘falling behind’ in their arms rivalry with various principal opponents. But most citizens of the advanced industrial states have only the vaguest awareness of the meaning of the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (hereafter referred to as WMDs).

Indeed a survey of American opinion conducted some three years ago found that 70% of respondents when asked to give some association with ‘Hiroshima’ were unable to give any response at all. I infer from this disturbing bit of information, as well as from the profound ignorance of my own students who arrive at SFU with little or no understanding of the history of the nuclear arms race, that forgetfulness and psychological denial seem to be the social norm with respect to the ‘bad news’ of WMDs. University students are not alone in their lack of systematic exposure to the dark side of modern industrial civilization. Many of our politicians seem remarkably ill-informed about the continuing risks posed by WMDs and have willfully ‘tuned out’ periodic complaints from Washington that defence issues still matter and that there is an international community problem ‘out there’ with respect to the continuing spread of WMDs to smaller states—and an associated risk that some of these devices might be conveyed to organized terrorist cells for use against the developed world.

The technologies involved in building atomic bombs are widely known and have been accessible internationally for many years. While the vast majority of states have rejected the nuclear option, the number of atomic or nuclear powers has continued to rise: American, Russian, British, French and Chinese arsenals were well underway by the time the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970. Shortly after it went into force, or perhaps even before, Israel acquired its first atomic weapons. In May 1974 India detonated its ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’. Twenty-four years later, ‘peaceful explosions’ gave way to a full series of weapons development tests; a few weeks later Pakistan followed suit. Both India and Pakistan have several tens of weapons ‘operational’ as well as fighter bombers and short- and medium-range missiles able to deliver them against each other with virtually no warning. A ‘limited’ nuclear war between New Delhi and Islamabad that escalated from ‘battlefield’ use at the outset, might easily kill 100 million people in a few hours.1 Over the past two years American analysts have worried about the ability of Pakistani President Musharraf to maintain central control over the country’s weapons and fissile materials, invoking the spectre of al Qaeda sympathizers in the armed forces and scientific community handing over weapons to terrorists. In October of 2001 the American and Russian governments developed contingency plans for the rapid deployment of special forces into Pakistan to seize and safeguard the Pakistani atomic arsenal if they judged the risk of al Qaeda gaining control of some of these weapons to be high.4

The U.S. and its coalition allies invaded Iraq twice in 1991 and 2003 to halt further development of nuclear weapons in that country. Meanwhile North Korea has moved ever closer to its first atomic test, and the Iranian government has continued to move towards the acquisition of an independent nuclear arsenal. If Iraq, Iran and North Korea are not seen plausibly by most Canadians as an ‘axis of evil’, they most assuredly do constitute an axis of potential nuclear weapons proliferation—and both an increased risk of nuclear use and a stimulant to further proliferation by neighbours of these three states. The current Bush Administration’s commitment to strategic ‘preemption’ (in fact more properly described as ‘preventive war’) is the direct consequence of fears that new nuclear proliferators might develop atomic bombs and either hand them over directly to terrorists (or alternatively HEU fissile material) or might attempt to covertly introduce such weapons into the United States.

A crude 10 to 15 kiloton atomic bomb could be made from about 45 kilograms of HEU shaped into two metallic hemispheres that when driven together would be about the size of a cantaloupe. Smuggling several dozen 23 kilogram ‘cantaloupe’ halves encased in lead-lined containers would be certainly a dangerous and risky undertaking, but there is public evidence suggesting that past Soviet governments may have already done it.5 American borders were quite porous during the Cold War and they have not been tightened appreciably since the events of 9/11.6 Even though the U.S. defence budget is larger than the next 12 countries’ military spending combined, and even though the American military is far ahead of all other armies in the development of the Revolution in Military Affairs (complex information processing networks for the battlefield, remote sensing from satellites or robotic aircraft, stealthy aircraft and missiles, and the acquisition of inexpensive ‘precision guided munitions’), American citizens are far from being safe inside their own borders. Aerial robots, 2 billion dollar stealth bombers and even anti-ballistic missile defences costing tens of billions of dollars are irrelevant to the threat posed by smuggled atomic devices in the trunks of rental cars.

Thus the contemporary context for any supposed ‘transcendence’ of war is—at least from my perspective—decidedly unpromising. Weapons of mass destruction continue to spread to more countries. While the reduction in the number of actual deployed nuclear warheads from 1986 to 2003 has been impressive...the danger of such weapons actually being used has been increasing according to most strategic analysts.

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1 A point made by former American ambassador Richard Burt in one of President George W. Bush’s pre-election policy seminars.

4 A claim made by Bruce Blair, head of the Center for Defense Information in Washington. See his various columns over the last two years for the CDI at www.cid.org.


6 Roughly a million cargo containers a month enter the U.S. but only 2 to 3 percent receive any screening or X-raying, and of that small fraction only a very few are actually ‘destuffed’ and scrutinized. And despite the ‘war on drugs’ being close to twenty years old, the volume of illegal drugs entering the U.S. each year still amounts to hundreds of tons.
A small Hiroshima-sized bomb of about 15 kilotons (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT—the 1995 Oklahoma City blast for comparison was roughly equivalent to 2 tons of TNT) detonated at SFU Harbour Centre would have a radius of complete destruction of buildings out to about 1.5 to 2.0 kilometers. The downtown and half of Stanley Park, most of East Vancouver over to Clark St. would be devastated. While North Vancouver would escape blast and thermal effects, the centre city would be utterly devastated across the Burrard and Granville bridges south to about 4th Avenue. A terrorist detonation in the middle of a working day of a crude Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) bomb—perhaps for proof-of-capability demonstration purposes as part of a campaign of attempted blackmail of the American government—might kill 100,000 people or more promptly and cause probably an equal number of deaths in the weeks and months that followed due to burns, other injuries or radiation poisoning.

Faced with such an act of atomic terrorism and the then highly credible threat of it being repeated in many American cities shortly thereafter, unless Washington conceded whatever the terrorists were demanding (withdrawal from the Middle East of all U.S. forces, cessation of all aid for and trade with Israel etc.), it is not clear how the American government would react. One can only hope they will never be confronted with such blackmail. But that scenario, dire though it may be, is not the worst plausible imaginable scenario.

While groups like al Qaeda or elements of Hezbollah might think in terms of driving the new Anglo-American ‘Crusaders’ out of the Middle East, that at least would be subject to negotiation and avoidance of an absolute catastrophe by involving some opportunity to comply (at least on an interim basis) with the terrorist demands and preclude the loss of a five or ten American cities. A far worse prospect would arise if a foreign government, fearful of overwhelming American might and a threatened campaign of ‘regime change’, decided to simply inflict grievous and possibly irreparable damage to the American will and ability to intervene overseas by killing several million Americans while destroying most of the key port facilities on both coasts of the continental U.S.—while decapitating American political and military leadership at the same time. Perhaps a dozen HEU ‘cantaloupes’ could accomplish that horrific goal (with at least two being used to destroy the White House, Capitol Hill and the Pentagon), by careful siting of the blasts near key navy yards and civilian nuclear reactors in or near large cities (thus to increase a thousand fold the subsequent radioactive contamination).

The tide of scientific and engineering genius applied to the instruments of warfare shows no sign of abating any time soon. The Indian and Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons may well help incite or inspire Iran or Indonesia to follow suit. North Korea’s neo-Stalinist regime may yet catalyze either South Korean or Japanese decisions to move towards nuclear weapons status. The American abrogation of the ABM treaty that for three decades acted as the foundation of Soviet-American and then Russo-American nuclear arms control has unleashed deep anxieties in Beijing to the point where a new nuclear arms expansion is now imminent. Russian responses to American post-9/11 nuclear unilateralist and declarations of American intent to ‘weaponize’ space have included threats to once again put multiple warheads on its largest rockets, the repudiation of several key terms of START II (specifically the obligation to eliminate all ‘heavy’ SS-18 ICBMs), and a decision to revive nuclear bomber flights in the high Arctic as well as the announcement of plans to acquire a new generation of nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missiles able to threaten targets all across North America. Worries about an American drive for a disarming first-strike capability against the shrinking Russian nuclear arsenal have also led to Russian retention of the fully automated ‘Dead Hand’ nuclear launch system that was created in the mid-1980s to guarantee retaliation against North America in the event that Moscow leaders were killed suddenly in a no-warning surprise attack (by stealth cruise missile, stealth bomber or by a short-warning forward deployed ballistic missile such as the Pershing II).

Maintaining a Strangelovian ‘doomsday’ launch system raises the risk of an inadvertent or accidental nuclear war considerably.

Thus the contemporary context for any supposed ‘transcendence’ of war is—at least from my perspective—decidedly
Weakened efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have also withered. The entire arms control and disarmament picture thus is very bleak. While governments in Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia have deployed Washington’s new WMD unilateralism, there is not much that they can do to limit the damage to the international arms control regime. Both the Japanese and Europeans are now urgently buying and developing missile defence technologies. With both the Russians and Chinese arsenals either staying far larger than was hoped (Russia) or actually about to grow quickly (China), more and more high technology investment in Japan and Europe will fall to defence and aerospace firms.

These developments may portend something much more profound than a new round of nuclear/WMD anxiety of the type Western nations experienced powerfully during the early 1980s. Jonathan Schell recently posed a disturbing question for which there is no confident, quick, optimistic reply: Is it possible that 2001 will come to be seen like 1914—a year that marked the end of a long period of political liberalization, economic globalization and peace and stability among the great powers? Are we about to witness the collapse of the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ and the onset of the re-nationalization of defence policies and the re-militarization of many national economies? Might 9/11 trigger a truly revolutionary shift in American (and allied) domestic politics that sees civil liberties and democratic rights permanently curtailed?

Schell’s worry list is as long and troubling as what I have laid out above: the possibility of tens of millions of dead arising from an inadvertent Indo-Pakistani nuclear conflict; the detonation of nuclear terrorist bombs in one or several European or North American cities; uncontrollable escalation of warfare between Israel and its neighbours such that both Israeli nuclear and Arab biological weapons are used with catastrophic effects and tens of millions of fatalities; major war on the Korean peninsula with the North Koreans killing several million South Koreans in their initial onslaught; a Sino-American war arising from the unforeseen escalation of the China-Taiwan conflict leading to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against American carrier task forces sent to aid the embattled Taiwanese.7 Schell goes on

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to note: "...the principal sources of danger today are not, as before [in 1914] the mass conventional armies and systematized hatreds of rival great powers; they are above all, the widespread, unappeased demons of national, ethnic and class fury; the prospect that a single superpower, the United States, will respond to these dangers by pursuing a strategy of global military supremacy and the persistence or spread of biological or chemical weapons. It is impossible to predict how and when these elements might intersect to push history over the precipice." 

American paranoia (or legitimate fears), rising anti-American hatred across the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world, and the accelerating diffusion of the technologies of mass death have created a qualitatively different geopolitical context than existed in the 1990s. As Schell observed, "September 11, although not itself the point of no return gave notice that such a moment may be approaching quickly".

Schell is not, however, a prophet of doom—far from it. His essay argues that the time is now right for the achievement of Woodrow Wilson’s dream of a collective security system that would actually work. Now the futility, the apocalyptic futility, of war is starkly evident, and thus he declares “the bomb ruined world war by turning it into annihilation”. And at the same time as people worldwide are appreciating this risk as never before, there is also a democratic wave rolling across societies and political systems that have hitherto never had any semblance of democracy at all—Russia being the most prominent exemplar of this phenomenon. The spread of liberal democracies, Schell suggests, will add to demands that an authentic collective security system be established. The liberal democratic peace is entirely real, he believes, and will bear fruit in terms of fostering a critical majority of the world’s population in support of peaceful change and community enforcement of norms of non-aggression and repudiation of weapons of mass destruction.

Schell’s argument is appealing, but it is less than convincing. While it is true that the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II led to the virtual destruction.

Few critics of the American intervention have given much thought to Israeli nuclear weapons (about 200 of which are usually said to be available) or the risk that they might be used. Both the interventions of 1991 and 2003 have in effect bought time for the negotiation of a tolerable armistice and ‘settlement’ between Israelis and Palestinians. Without the enforced de-weaponization of Iraq, the risk of an Israeli preemptive attack on Iraq would have loomed ever larger as an Iraqi arsenal moved towards full operational status. And any preemptive attack on suspected Iraqi WMD sites in the 1990s or after would probably have entailed the use of at least a few low-yield nuclear ‘bunker busters’ that would have inflamed the Middle East and world opinion still further while politically validating a headlong...
The central point that needs emphasis is that the 'nuclear peace' is far from secure—indeed it is getting more insecure with each passing year. The tide of technological innovation is sweeping around the world just as fast or faster than the tide of democratization. Viewed from this perspective the risk of repeated wars in which nuclear and/or biological weapons are used is probably rising, not diminishing. And once the first true 'two-way' nuclear/biological conflict occurs the floodgates on proliferation may really open—thus setting the stage for repeated wars of genocidal attack. The risk of self-induced human extinction is thus also likely to be rising, not falling.

It is worth considering that the SETI researchers (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence) have been studying the heavens for several decades without finding any evidence of 'broadcasting' in any part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Some pessimists have ventured the depressing thought that perhaps big-brain evolutionary experiments never last very long: such creatures tend to destroy themselves by creating 'tools' they cannot control. Intelligence may be in some fundamental sense self-liquidating. In other words, there is little or no hope that humanity will ever come close to matching the longevity record of various dinosaur species. Other philosophers have noted the many other ways (many environmental, many psycho-social) in which the human future might vanish almost overnight and concluded that our departure from Earth's history is not only a very real risk, it may also be very imminent. Species mortality is a serious issue.

In light of these discouraging thoughts there is a need to reaffirm that they are only possibilities. Humanity's collective self-extinction is only a contingent risk; it is not a certainty. What is important to realize, however, is that a failure to assess the world realistically and pragmatically can speed the world's population down the path of 'doom soon' rather than 'doom deferred'.

Taking control of the nuclear/biological/WMD proliferation issue is the central issue of world politics—despite the fact that George W. Bush is attempting to lead the charge on this issue. For North American and European liberals and social democrats, the idea that Bush whom they dislike so viscerally may actually be right about something so fundamental is simply 'not on'. But a psychological (as opposed to an authentically intellectual) rejection of American policy may be precisely the sort of imperfect 'rationality' that leads to regional and later global catastrophes. Bush unilateralism is not the only way to deal with the proliferation crisis. But developing a coherent multilateral alternative requires universal recognition of the gravity of the problem and a shared willingness to assume the financial and human costs of resolving it. To date such a response is lacking.

Douglas Ross was founding director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in 1983 and served on the national policy advisory group for the Canadian Ambassadors for Disarmament from 1986 to 1993. He is a professor in the Political Science Department at SFU.

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10 Terms used by Leslie in *ibid*. 

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In this Spring 2003 series hosted by the Institute for the Humanities three SFU doctoral candidates shared their dissertation research.

Overcoming Onto-theology: George Grant and Religion without Religion

—Peg Peters

Religion has come to an end but people are still hungry for spirituality. George Grant believes that western Christianity has contributed to its own demise, allowing religion to be an agent of the will to power that flourishes as modern technology. God too often has been something that we have tried to explain and control. Religion, which is a human practice, is always deconstructible in the light of the love of God, which is not deconstructible. Using Grant as a guide, I will try to suggest a way forward for religion in a pluralist society.

To talk about religion today is risky. The topic is so diverse and potentially alienating that most don't even attempt to enter the waters. From discussions of personal spirituality to incidences of violence perpetrated by religious believers, the air is charged with tension. George Grant is a Canadian prophet who warns and guides those who would embrace the mystery of the divine. Drawing from his reading of Martin Heidegger, Grant saw that much of modern religion was becoming a dangerous hybrid of philosophy and theology which was destructive to faith. This hybrid Heidegger called 'onto-theology.'

What is wrong with onto-theology in Grant's view? Three things. First, it deprives the world of its mystery. Second, it makes God into a controllable being, and therefore not worthy of worship. Grant often referred to a famous passage from Heidegger where he complains that before the causa sui (a name for the God of onto-theology that emphasizes the need for an explainer that doesn't need to be explained) no one would be tempted to pray or to sacrifice and that this God evokes neither awe nor music and dance. Onto-theology is hostile to piety. Third, having deprived the world of both its mystery and of a God worthy of worship, onto-theology opens the way for the unfettered self-assertion of the will to power in the form of modernity, namely the quest of science and technology to have everything at human disposal.

In response to onto-theology, Grant offered three correctives for religion: faith, hope and love. For Grant, faith was in contrast to onto-theology and the religion of control and power; hope was in contrast to the will to power that resulted in religious violence; and love was in contrast to the propensity towards individualized and private faith that is not concerned with justice and the sense of the other.

George Grant, considered one of Canada's foremost political philosophers, believed that the modern paradigm of knowledge in its silencing of anything transcendent left people empty and confused. Through his teaching at Dalhousie and McMaster from 1950-1988, he argued that faith and religion were different and that western Christianity as a religion needed to come to an end because of its associations with a certain way of thinking that Martin Heidegger called 'metaphysics.' Heidegger in his essay called “What is Metaphysics”, wrote that the term "metaphysics derives from the Greek which means to inquire in a way that extends out 'over' beings, as such.

Metaphysics is inquiry beyond or over beings, which aims to recover them as such and as a whole for our grasp.”(1) For Heidegger, metaphysics stands for a way of thinking that seeks to ‘grasp’ and stand ‘over’ and it is this way of thinking that has developed into modern scientific rationality or what Heidegger calls ‘calculative thinking.’ Grant agreed with Heidegger that modern science reduced all thinking to calculative thought. Calculative thought is a way of thinking that construes reality as material for human control. As such, reality becomes value-free material. We have purposes to impose on it, but it imposes no purposes on us. Grant agreed with Nietzsche and Heidegger that there was a controlling motive behind all of our attempts to know the world.
The calculative thinking which characterizes modern science is itself only possible on the basis of having a subject that can calculate and a “world” or object which is “placed before” it, a world that is easily manipulated, controlled and contained. Heidegger called this world technology. For Grant, metaphysics, calculative thought, and technology were all words and concepts to describe the modern paradigm of knowing which assumes that the subject (myself) is able to see everything as an object for consumption and control. (2)

For Heidegger calculative thinking is the how of onto-theology rather than the what. Onto-theology is the outworking of religion as technology in the modern world. The goal of technology is to have the world at our disposal. Grant believed that Heidegger’s fullest account of calculative thinking as placing the world at our disposal was his book on Leibniz called *The Principle of Reason*. (3) Calculative thinking begins as the demand for reasons and completeness. Since an unexplained explainer (i.e. God) leaves things ultimately unexplained, the principle of reason becomes an appeal to God as *ultima ratio*, the ultimate reason. God exists so that human reason can give ultimate explanations or so that God can be seen as the final explanation. Heidegger believed that the language of onto-theology had actually allowed the human subject to surpass God as the supreme authority and final arbiter of truth. Heidegger interpreted Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power as the final stage of onto-theology. The metaphysical attempt to control and ground everything, albeit not in God but in the will of the subject, is the final stage of religion as onto-theology. Heidegger, in lectures on Nietzsche, wrote:

As an ontology, even Nietzsche’s metaphysics is at the same time theology, although it seems far removed from scholastic

metaphysics. The ontology of beings as such thinks *essentia* as will to power. Such metaphysical theology is of course a negative theology of a peculiar kind. Its negativity is revealed in the expression ‘God is dead’? This is an expression not of atheism, but of onto-theology, in just that metaphysics in which nihilism proper is fulfilled. (4) The final result of religion as onto-theology is a religion where the other is silenced and neglected. Religion becomes privatized, individualistic and ethical responsibility is denied. Justice for the oppressed is overlooked amidst individualistic passion for spirituality. Onto-theology is first about me, and my desires. It is a way of thinking that shuts down the other’s infinite demand on me… All radical otherness ceases to exist under the religion of onto-theology.

If technology is a paradigm of control, then onto-theology is the name given to that system when it enters religion. It is religion as technology. Religion where the subject is in control through the assertion of the will always results in violence being done to the ‘other’ or that which is outside the subject. Grant, again drawing from Heidegger, warns that religion can often become violent because of its notion of truth as correctness. Religious people often fall victim to the onto-theological tendency to confuse themselves with God and so to threaten the civil liberties and sometimes the lives of anyone who disagrees with them, which is taken to be the equivalent of disagreeing with God. Some of the worst acts of violence in recent history were committed in the name of religion. Grant condemns these kinds of acts as onto-theological pursuits of power through correctness. This only arises with an understanding of knowing that claims certainty. This onto-theological pursuit of power and control is often seen in forms of religious fundamentalism.

The final result of religion as onto-theology is a religion where the other is silenced and neglected. Religion becomes privatized, individualistic and ethical responsibility is denied. Justice for the oppressed is overlooked amidst individualistic passion for spirituality. Onto-theology is first about me, and my desires. It is a way of thinking that shuts down the other’s infinite demand on me. If the subject is ultimate then all others become merely objects over which the individual subject stands in control. All radical otherness ceases to exist under the religion of onto-theology. Although Grant appropriated Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics and the calculative thinking that resulted, he tried to offer a way of thinking about God that overcame what Heidegger termed ‘onto-theology’?

In light of these three critiques of onto-theology, many have come to believe that God is dead, and that religion is finished as a dispenser of meaning. But Grant asserts that it is indeed possible to speak of God meaningfully after taking the Heideggerian critique seriously. Grant believes that Heidegger was attacking the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ of religion. Heidegger was not out to disprove God or displace Christianity with nihilistic atheism; rather, Grant suggests that he is warning us about the
language that we adapt when we speak of God. (5) The how under attack is religion as technology, the man-made philosophical system that attempts to control and explain the mystery of the divine. Grant often quotes from Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’, where Heidegger writes: "With the existential determination of the essence of man, therefore, nothing is decided about the ‘existence of God’ or his ‘non-being’… Thus it is not only rash but also an error in procedure to maintain that the interpretation of the essence of man from the relation of his essence to the truth of Being is atheism.”(6)

In contrast to religion as technology, Grant points to the openness in the mystery that occurs in lived faith. Grant distinguishes faith from onto-theology or metaphysics. Often faith has been talked about in technological terms by reducing faith to ‘correctness of belief’ which is based on a set of propositions. Although Grant admits that much of religion is guilty of the errors of onto-theology, he nonetheless believes that there is still a way to speak about faith that does not degenerate into ‘metaphysics’. Nietzsche reminds us that humans are always embedded within a particular perspective—we are finite—and thus we cannot achieve the kind of knowledge that exists outside of a specific place or time. Theologians need to be reminded of this, according to Grant, for theology is tempted by the fallacious assumption that since it speaks of the Absolute it must speak absolutely. The ultimate implication of this hermeneutical practice is that theologians are to speak with humility, avoiding the conceit that when they speak of God, they are thereby adequately explaining the world. In one of Grant’s final essays he alludes to what he gained from Nietzsche.

One of Nietzsche’s superb accounts of modern history was that Christianity had produced its own gravediggers. Christianity had prepared the soil of rationalism from which modern science came, and its discoveries showed that the Christian God was dead. That formula gets close to the truth of western history, but is nevertheless not true. The web of necessity which the modern paradigm of knowledge lays before us does not tell us God is dead, but reminds us of what western Christianity seemed to forget in its moment of pride: how powerful is the necessity which love must cross. Christianity did not provide its own gravedigger, but the means to its own purification. (7)

Detailing what this purification might look like for faith was one of Grant’s final challenges. Part of the purification process is to develop ways of speaking about God that are shielded from the criticism of onto-theology. Part of this requires an understanding of human finitude in our approaches to knowledge. Grant, drawing from Heidegger, speaks of faith in a way that distances it from calculative thinking. He speaks of faith in terms of ‘tradition,’ as something to which I am first delivered, am proper to, as that to which I am connected by way of relationship. Faith, in this sense, has to do with the ‘how’ as well as the ‘what’ of me being a believer. Religion in this sense ceases to be ‘assertion’—what I assert is true—but instead is understood as prayer or as relationship.

Grant sees that the violence emanating from religion stems from a western metaphysical notion of the will. Grant, like Heidegger, believes that most western religions have incorporated into their thinking the Cartesian subject-object paradigm where the subject stands over the object and compels it to give up its reasons. This paradigm led to the Nietzschean notion of the will to power where the subject became the final ground for all meaning and therefore the one who creates values through the assertion of the will. While many religious people are likely unaware of the ideas of Nietzsche, Grant believes that the concepts have nonetheless been pervasive in most modern expressions of religion. In contrast, Grant sees in Simone Weil’s notion of ‘attention’ a way to think about faith and God that does not result in violence. In his personal journal on Simone Weil he writes:

Within the general philosophic tradition the place where I find writings very close to what she means by attention is in the late writings of Heidegger…When he says that meditative thinking is the “letting it lie before you and taking it to heart, the ‘to be’ of beings”…whatever that may mean, it seems to me to take one closer to what Simone Weil means by attention. Or in Heidegger’s writing about...
In contrast to religion as will and violence, Grant argues that faith is about loving rather than willing. Grant writes, “belief or unbelief is never a matter of choice or commitment, but of intellect and attention. As the West has been without faith, faith has often been interpreted by men of faith who wished to get on with understanding as if it finally came down to an act of committal by the will.” He goes on to say that “religion is talked about in the West as if it were some kind of choice or opting, despite or even against the evidence.” (Introduction to Simone Weil” in Reader, 251) For Grant, following Weil, a person of faith is called to live with attention. True attention means an emptying of the self, a letting go of the self, whereby the other appears in the truth of its beauty. To pay attention truly is not to contract muscles etc.—but to leave oneself empty, disposable, open to that which we wait upon...Attention is finally attention to the void...It is a waiting for something to appear, to manifest itself, to reveal itself. In contemplating a picture...the beauty of the picture only appears to us when we have surrendered to something external and real—one has to open oneself to the void so that one can let something appear as itself. (9)

If modern religious violence stems from disagreements about claims to absolute certainty, Weil's concept of attention begins from a place of uncertainty. Attention is about listening and recognizing that the other is before you. Having faith means testifying to the love of God, which for Weil must translate into justice for the other. We do not live in isolation as individuals; rather, we are called upon to be attentive to the other, first and foremost.

Weil's concept of attention as a corrective to violence pushed Grant to realize that the modern understanding of religion was very individualistic and therefore tended to silence the voice of the other. If faith is a corrective for a religion of onto-theology and power, and hope is a corrective to a religion of violence, then love is a corrective to a religion of individualism. Love requires an acceptance or consent to the fact that there is authentic otherness. This 'authentic otherness' is that part of anything that cannot be reduced to scientific data. Without love, knowledge is condemned to a scientific mode of knowing alone. Grant writes that “Plato proclaims the dependence of intelligence upon love in a much clearer way than Aristotle...the modern apprehension of will ...implies that we stand over against love.” (10) Grant believes that the only response to the hegemony of calculative thinking is to revive the older understanding of 'knowing in love.' Only love, Grant maintains, can counter the objectifying effects of modern rationality. The ancient biblical term of ‘knowing’ (11) has this deeper connotation. Grant believes that we encounter otherness whether through sexual love or spiritual longing—we experience it as something ultimately beyond our capacity to manipulate or transform. (12)

According to Grant, the chief defining character of religion is its view of justice. If love is defined as consent to otherness, then the other demands something of me. Grant speaks of the idea of 'owingness.' Others demand something of me even if they are silent. To speak of justice is to speak of what one ‘ought’ to do and any sense of ‘ought’ implies a sense that one ‘owes’ others the dignity of justice. Grant says that in the modern world, “Goodness is now apprehended as a way which excludes from it all 'owingness.'” What is true of the modern conception of goodness is that it does not include the assertion of an owed claim which is intrinsic to our desiring. Grant's concept of 'owingness' is connected to his understanding of faith, which posits an order of justice beyond human desire.

To 'owe' something or someone means that you are not in control of them. You are not standing over an object summoning forth its reasons; instead, you see in that other something of the Good that demands your response or obedience. Grant maintains that the idea of obedience does not close down openness when it is in response to that which you appreciate and love. To consent to otherness is to agree that you owe something to everyone you encounter. It is here that Grant points...
to some weaknesses in Heidegger’s meditative thinking. For Heidegger there was no Good beyond Being and therefore nothing to be obedient to. Grant says that this is precisely what is missing in Heidegger: “the greatest writer on what technique is turns his back on obedience.” (13) J.S. Porter in his brilliant chapter on Grant asks, “Can you think of anything more bizarre to write about in our time than obedience? To what or to whom would we be obedient? What or whom do we reverence enough, stand in awe of enough, to proffer obedience? What could be more anti-historical, ahistorical, than obedience?” (14) It is only the life of faith, hope and love that can give content to justice.

Grant pushes the idea of justice a little further when he speaks of forgiveness. If justice is giving someone their due, what do you do when what is owed is punishment? Echoing Hannah Arendt, Grant argues that punishment, which is the opposite of forgiveness, pulls the strings of the social order tighter and tighter, locking us into narrower and narrower constraints and blocking freedom so that we are caught up in a vicious cycle. The desire for retaliation and vengeance often fuels violence committed in the name of religion. Forgiveness is the way to cut those bonds, to release us and free us and open up new possibilities. Forgiveness opens up or frees the past so that the past can be altered. Grant argues that sometimes what is owed a person is forgiveness and to withhold it is actually a form of violence that continues the cycle of hate. Grant often quotes from the Gospel of Matthew when Jesus says from the cross to his punishers, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.” This was one of the highest expressions of forgiveness from an innocent victim, showing a new way of responding to violence. The religious expression of love has the power to confront our modern tendency to privatized and individualized faith and to root us in the other through justice and grace.

I have argued that Grant, drawing from Heidegger’s critique of western metaphysics, gives three correctives to the practice of religion in our modern or post-modern era. By moving away from onto-theological expressions of power, and avoiding Nietzschean religions of violence and will, Grant arrives at a religion which is guided by a love that expresses itself in justice. It is through the living out of these three correctives that Grant seeks to create the space for a language and understanding of the ‘Other’. His use of words like attention, owingness, and obedience are his attempt to find a language that is not grounded in western metaphysical notions of control and objectification. It is in this overcoming of western metaphysics or onto-theology that Grant sees a renewed place for ethics, God and the Good. By rooting his thinking in love, Grant is able to ward off the calculative reductionism of modern science and the morally neutral responses that leaves no place for justice. Justice, as understood by Grant, leads one to obedience, but this is not an obedience that is blind and destructive to individual freedom. Instead it is obedience to that which is lovable. This understanding of justice consents to otherness because it sees the other as lovable. Grant writes that “for Plato the opposite of knowledge is not ignorance, but madness, and the nearest he can come to an example of complete madness is the tyrant, because in that case otherness has disappeared as much as can be imagined.” (15) The religious tyrant is the embodiment of onto-theological systems of power and control, a religion of violence, and a self-serving religion that fails to see otherness and practice justice. For Grant, the best defense against the religious madness of onto-theology is faith, hope and love.

NOTE: A complete list of works and notations cited in this document, but not included here, is available from the editor; e-mail grahamaf@sfu.ca

Randy (Peg) Peters is a Special Arrangements Ph.D. candidate at SFU.
Becoming Non-Rational: Christianity Today And The Evangelical Response To Science

—Bruce Hiebert

The following is an excerpt from the transcript of Bruce Hiebert’s lecture of February 13, 2003, at SFU.

Transforming Beliefs

“Theology is the science of God and of the relations between God and the universe.” So begins Augustus Strong’s 1907 edition of Systematic Theology. (1) It was a view that put Strong at odds with both the opposition to science emerging on the most conservative side of the Western Protestant theological spectrum and the “separate but equal” views of science and religion on the liberal side of the spectrum. Instead Strong argued that all science had as its goal the reasoned, empirical understanding of God’s objective revelation. And science was therefore the foundation for all faith and practice. (2) In the middle of the century, as evangelicals began to separate themselves from fundamentalism, they took Strong’s position to heart and used it to hammer out an intellectual platform that separated them from their fundamentalist predecessors and allowed them to engage the forces of Western culture. They intended a carefully reasoned attack on what they perceived to be an errant and increasingly irrational civilization.

Following Strong, the Bible was the divinely revealed, rational, and absolute guarantee of truth and the foundation from which a confidant evangelicalism could call North America to account. The intellectual centre of this new evangelicalism was Fuller Theological Seminary in California. Founded in 1947 under the leadership of Harold J. Ockenga (1905-1985), the school combined strong academics with a commitment to engaging American culture. At the same time, the evangelist Billy Graham emerged from fundamentalism and into popular American culture with a message of evangelical conversion. Throughout the United States he held large public meetings that combined entertainment and an address by Graham in which he called on those in attendance to come forward and commit themselves to Christ and an adoption of evangelical beliefs. After the press coverage of his 1949 campaign, Graham became a recognized national figure and the central figure of the new evangelical movement. Building on his presence as a public figure, he encouraged the formation of a global network of evangelical intellectuals. In order to provide a cohesive vehicle for these intellectuals and their point of view, together with his father-in-law, L. Nelson Bell, and Fuller faculty member and theologian Carl Henry, he founded Christianity Today magazine in 1956. As Graham said in the 40th anniversary issue, “Repeatedly in [the 1940’s and 1950’s] I came across men and women in virtually every denomination who were committed to the historic biblical faith, believing it was not only spiritually vital but socially relevant and intellectually defensible. And yet they had no standard around which they could rally…” (3)

With substantial foundation support Graham and his associates set out to produce a mass appeal magazine with solid academic credentials that would present an evangelical point of view on news, events and issues of the day. The initial publication schedule was for 25 issues per year. Contributors, almost without exception, held earned doctorates and included the Dutch theologian G.C Berkouwer, the English and subsequently Canadian theologian J.I. Packer, and the American theologian Bernard Ramm.

In 1956, the year Christianity Today began publication, Western society was anxious about the H-bomb and the cold war. Urbanization was expanding rapidly and the US economy was booming, though there remained deep fears of a return to the depression of the 1930’s. Within science and philosophy, the determinism of Darwin and the naturalism of Dewey were being confronted with the indeterminism of Heisenberg and the collapse of Logical Positivism. Within Western Christian theology, the neo-orthodox works of Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr were giving way to an existentialist liberalism framed by the German theologian Rudolf Bultmann.

Over the next 45 years this American publication would face the election of a Catholic President, the Vietnam War, waves of economic boom and stagnation, the sexual revolution, environmental degradation, and the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War. In the sciences Thomas Kuhn would deconstruct the idea of scientific progress; Kurt Gödel would prove that mathematics was a “religion;” astronomers would declare that the universe had an “origin;” and sociologists and psychologists would find positive correlations between religious beliefs and personal and social
well-being. Philosophy moved from existentialism to deconstructionism. Christian liberals moved from existentalist theologies to varieties of liberation theology, to “post-liberal” theologies. Post-modernism, only a bud in 1956, was in full anti-foundational bloom by the end of the century.

*Christianity Today* changed over the same period by reducing its publication schedule from 25 to 15 issues per year and becoming less academic in content and more popular in style. In part this was the necessary response to a shift from foundation to advertising-based funding in the 1970’s. The magazine’s publishers also spun off a family of associated journals and magazines, and eventually established a major web site, ChristianityToday.com. Through their home computers, by 2001, interested evangelicals could have a daily news update delivered; participate in web forums; buy books, videos and other merchandise; join a matchmaking service; search for a job; or donate to international causes. And they could subscribe to *Leadership* or another of the additional eleven magazines published by Christianity Today International. Along the way Christianity Today International developed its position as the leading source of evangelical news, opinion, and information in the English-speaking world. *Christianity Today*, with a paid circulation base of over 150,000 subscribers, remained its flagship publication. In 2001 its list of editors and contributors included leading theologians and academics such as the Canadians Loren Wilkinson, John Stackhouse, Jr., and J.I. Packer, and the Americans Mark Noll, Thomas Oden, Richard Gallup, Jr., Nancy Murphy, Michael Novak, and Richard John Neuhaus.

While Strong’s rationalist, scientific conceptualization of Christianity undergirded the initial approach of *Christianity Today*’s editors and contributors, the subsequent 45 years of cultural change left their mark. This is evident by the contrast between the use of the concept of science in the major articles, columns, lead book reviews, and editorials in the first ten full years of publication (1957 to 1966), with its use at the end of the century (1992-2001). While far from representing all of the evangelical community, or even all the voices audible within the *Christianity Today* (6) of this period, this approach tells us how the leading voices in the evangelical world wanted evangelicalism to be perceived by its adherents. Reviewing references to science shows that while by the end of the century a post-evangelical theology had not emerged in the pages of *Christianity Today*, there were clear signs of major theological transformation. The evangelicalism of *Christianity Today*, in a move that demonstrates the impact of the postmodernism of its cultural context, had become non-rational. While it continued to call a straying culture to truth, at play in its pages were both an encultured fideism and a postmodern narrative constructionalism.

In the next two sections of the full text of his paper, Hiebert examines for comparative purposes two decades of publication of *Christianity Today*, what he calls the early years, 1957-66, and what he calls the contemporary period, 1992-2001. In his concluding section, he summarizes his findings, and concludes with a consideration of the future of the “evangelical project.”

**Transformations**

Over the 45 years covered by this study there are a number of obvious changes. Between 1992 and 2001 in any specific issue, readers are far less likely to come across references to science than in the earlier period, 1957 through 1966. But those references readers do come across in the later period are more likely to be descriptive of specific scientific research, especially social scientific research. In addition we find that references to Christian perspectives on science, by far the most common type of reference in the early period, have declined by a power of 10 in the later period (from 114 to 15). The gross numbers suggest that in contrast to the early years, it is not science itself, but the results of scientific research, that interest evangelicals at the close of the 20th century.

However, on closer reading, this misstates the gap between these two periods. In looking at the results of the scientific research, contemporary readers are likely to be given the ethical
implications of the research or told that the research supports an evangelical worldview. So while the subject matter seems to have changed, in fact, the reporting is still primarily concerned with the relationship between science and evangelical faith. The locus has shifted from theoretical concerns to the practical, but still, evangelicals want to know where science and evangelical faith do and do not work together. And in both periods, the editors and contributors to Christianity Today want their readers to read and believe that there is no fundamental conflict between science and evangelical faith. Looking at the articles on Galileo in both periods suggest that in fact any opposition that is now perceived to exist is the result of the internal inconsistency and confusion of science and not the necessary result of Christian beliefs.

There has also been no change in the way evolution is covered. In both periods it is attacked as poor science and poorer morality. Nor has there been a change in the intensity and level of the coverage. Readers are just as likely to find a strong attack on Darwinian evolution in any later issue as they were in the earlier period. There is something about Darwinian evolution that still represents a threat to evangelicalism, despite almost half a century of scientific and religious change.

But some things have dropped out of the discourse. Significantly, no longer are readers told that theology is a science. Readers are also not exposed to formal theological reflections on science, or analyses of how perspectives on science influence contemporary theology. Nor is there a significant formal discourse on the relationship of science to western culture, though the informal material on this relationship suggests that in the later period, as in the earlier, evangelicals perceive science as having a negative impact on culture.

The pattern that can be discerned within this constancy and change suggests that something profound is happening within evangelical faith, that there is a transition in the basics of the faith that are being reflected in the way science is articulated. The existence of the complementary model of relations between evangelicalism and faith, in place of the earlier “theology as science” model of relations, implies that the foundationalism of the earlier evangelical project is gone. By adopting a complementary model evangelicals are accepting that Christian thought is in important respects different from scientific thought. But this is not a move toward deconstructionist post-modernism. Gordon Clark’s work on science in the early 60’s was clearly deconstructionist but there is no extension of Clark’s approach in later work. Instead the model adopted by the contributors appears to be something closer to critical realism: both science and evangelicalism speak of reality in ways that correspond approximately, reasonably, and usefully to reality. This may be why the editors, unlike those of thirty years earlier, are now prepared to publish material that posits an unbridgeable gap between evangelical faith and the world depicted by science.

Two articles from the later period stand out in the clarity with which they illustrate this pattern. In 2001 Christianity Today published Walter Wangerin’s “Small Beneath the Firmament.”(10) The article is full of references to the first three chapters of the book of Genesis as Wangerin describes the connection to the land experienced by his farmer father-in-law. Wangerin is a minister and storyteller and this story is about the truth of the world as God’s creation. But, at no point does Wangerin enter into dialogue with rationalist, naturalist, or propositional approaches to the biblical texts he invokes. Instead with great power he evokes a sense of transcendence out of the utterly ordinary. A sensitive reader experiences awe at the transcendence he finds hovering between the molecules of ordinary existence. The other article is J.I. Packer’s 1999 contribution, “Did God Die on the Cross?” Packer is one of the leading evangelical, propositional theologians, a distinguished member of the Christianity Today editorial board, and one of the few people to have made contributions to both portions of this study. In this late contribution, Packer makes a claim for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus based upon a cross-cultural consensus regarding life after death. He says, “On the nature of postmortem life there are great differences, but on its reality, agreement has been so widespread that current Western scepticism about survival seems a mere local oddity.”(11) On the surface this appears to be another empirically based attack on the religious blindness of Western culture. But, for such a prominent evangelical to base his attack on widespread cross-cultural agreement, rather than on the basis of an a priori Christian truth claim indicates that the Bible no longer functions as the only foundational insight into reality even within the evangelical community.
Even the critique of Darwinian evolution shows this transition. While both earlier and later periods call it bad science, later criticism includes prominent mention of the concept of “Intentional Design.” Intentional design is the theoretical position that the planetary geological and astrophysical data are best made coherent by positing an intelligent designer of the cosmos who continues to intervene in the development of the universe at all levels in order that life may prosper and intelligent life may grow. While the concept was not ignored in the earlier period, its prominent presence in the later period suggests, once again, that a Christian a priori has given way to either a “bottom-up” empirical attempt to create a religiously directed consensus, (12) or a complementary approach where evidence from nature speaks as an independent source of divine information. However, as Van Till’s response to the concept of intentional design indicates, not all evangelicals are prepared to embrace this approach. Van Till continues to hold the traditional priority of the biblical worldview. But by doing so without the support of an independently revelatory nature, Van Till is supporting a new approach to evangelical understandings of truth. In keeping with Hengel and Burge’s responses to other facets of science, he places science and evangelical faith in a hierarchical relationship, with evangelical faith taking precedence.

The complexity of this transformation and the range of views encompassed within it, support Ian Barbour’s contention that applying typologies to the conceptualizations of the relationship of science and religion is a point well made. (13) The relationship between evangelical faith conceptualizations and science is a complex and not necessarily a consistent affair. Instead the views reflect religious a priori’s and a wide range of views can be held and change based not on the evangelical community’s study of science but on the range and transformation of the underlying body of beliefs. Thus Henry and Clark or Wangerin and Packer reflect not alternative views about the relationship between science and evangelical beliefs, but alternate strategies for working out the implications of evangelical belief commitments.

An evangelical community deploying empiricism is an evangelical community seeking power. There is an historic connection between evangelicals and the religious right in the United States. (18) In this context, the appearance of empirical validation of evangelical beliefs supports evangelical political claims within the arena of American public life, especially when science is one of the few shared languages.

The future of the evangelical project

These strategic deployments of the concept of science in Christianity Today in two ten-year periods reveal two emerging and opposed strategies for a post-modern evangelicalism. The first strategy, based on a complementary understanding of science and Christian faith, is a bottom-up empiricism that looks at current science for indicators of the truthful nature of reality as already described by evangelical theology. Thus a “big bang” origin of the cosmos is seen as in keeping with the creatio ex nihilo doctrine of divine creation. The anthropic principle is suggestive of a God who places human beings at the pinnacle of creation. Statistical correlations of evangelical beliefs with human health, marital longevity, happiness, and prosperity, are indicative of the truthfulness of evangelical understandings of humanity as God’s creation and Jesus as the source of the good life.

This bottom-up empiricism is a strategy very much in keeping with the empiricism of contemporary evangelicalism’s founders, Ockenga, Henry, Smith, and Ramm. Both earlier and later evangelical strategies accept that science is an avenue for human perception of God’s reality. Where the more recent writers differ is that, having let go of the biblical foundationalism of the founding fathers, science is now used to add plausibility to the worldview of an evangelical community of belief. This is a sharp change from the earlier period where science was true because it revealed a world consistent with the world God made and revealed through the Bible. This explains why evolution remains such a point of conflict. As an empirically validated meta-narrative, evolution calls into question the legitimacy of an evangelical community that intellectually has come to depend on empirical validity. Inasmuch as evolution is a coherent and popular, non-miraculous explanation for all-that-is, it is not only bad science but more truly evil religion. This also explains why in the later period the evolutionary agnosticism of an Addison Leitch and the deconstructionism of a Gordon Clark no longer appear. Because a specific set of scientific perspectives is now the intellectual support for a community of belief, any questioning of those perspectives threatens the community itself.

Scientist and theologian John Polkinghorne has argued for a similar approach to Christian theology. (14) Based on his review of the findings of science he has suggested ways of reconceptualizing traditional Christian dogmas so that they remain coherent in a world where science is a powerful set of practices. However, Polkinghorne has in the process found it necessary to conceptualize the God who stands behind Christian dogma in ways that are not in keeping with traditional evangelical points of view.
Polkinghorne's God has set in motion a dance of chance and necessity, a dance where God takes risks. This breaks away from traditional evangelical dogmas of the all-knowingness of God, and, for some evangelicals, the predestined nature of human life. (15)

At this point the evangelical community does not seem amenable to the direction of Polkinghorne, despite his affinity for much traditional dogma. This suggests that there is a fideism (16) at work despite the apparent empiricism. Evangelicals who confess a bottom-up empiricism in fact have an irrational commitment to a specific faith perspective, and science is a construct deployed to cover up this irrationalism. As those familiar with the work of Michel Foucault will immediately recognize, deployment is an issue of power. (17)

An evangelical community deploying empiricism is an evangelical community seeking power. There is an historic connection between evangelicals and the religious right in the United States. (18) In this context, the appearance of empirical validation of evangelical beliefs supports evangelical political claims within the arena of American public life, especially when science is one of the few shared languages. Imagine the effect on the school science text-book debate if evangelicals were forced to place divine creation against not only evolution (where they claim evangelicism belongs as an empirically verifiable worldview) but against the creation accounts of the ancient Babylonian Enuma Elish, or the Hindu Vedas. At that point the debate would become meaningless. Similarly, right across the spectrum of social issues, the loss of the appearance of empirical validity would loosen the bonds between evangelicals and American culture and thereby significantly reduce their access to political power. The shared language would dissipate and evangelicalism would become one fideism among many fideisms.

However, the political gains of this strategy risk opening evangelicalism to “natural theology.” Once scripture and science are seen as complementary, with science legitimating current practice—the balance between them can quickly shift from the “biblical” to the “scientific.” Especially as science expands its explanatory power and coherence, its validating function could become directive of the community’s practice. Church history is littered with the remains of theologies that have suffered this consequence. “Scientific” justification for current practices is a tool that moulds its user in subtle and destructive ways. For example, evangelical thought is currently wedded to a position that homosexual behaviour is an absolute aberration, because it says so in the Bible. But what happens to this doctrine when the scientific research indicates that homosexual orientation is in some respects a genetic trait, and thus a “natural” part of divine creation? Must evangelical scientists work to debunk these research results and produce science that supports traditional anti-homosexual doctrines? And what if such research results are not generated? Do evangelicals abandon their doctrine? Or worse, what happens when “science” appears to support eugenics programs, or racism, or the use of nuclear weapons, or foreign wars of aggression, all actions that are not literally opposed by the Bible? Must evangelicals follow this “science”? These are not actions that “biblical” Christians have found easy to resist in the past, and in the future, more tightly-argued “scientific” rationales could raise up these or similar terrors to haunt evangelical orthodoxy.

This strategy, as approached by some practitioners, also risks leading evangelicalism into becoming “post-Christian.” The obvious attraction of some evangelicals to the concept of “intelligent design,” as a hypothesis for cosmic and human origins, suggests that this is not trivial speculation. Intelligent design practitioners are attempting to develop a “scientific” frame of reference that allows “God” back into the cosmos as the necessary source of what are determined to be otherwise inexplicable data. But, it is a concept that claims validity without a specific religious framework such as Judaism or Christianity. Therefore the constructed god of intelligent design, as based on the gaps in naturalist explanations, may ultimately have no relationship to evangelical convictions about God. (18) At that point evangelicalism faces the choice of either accepting this empirically-validated god and becoming post-Christian, or of dramatically reconstructing evangelicalism’s meta-narrative in ways that do not need empirical justification—a difficult task for a community that has refused to disclose its fideism.

The alternative strategy, one I call narrative constructionalism, (20) is found in the work of Van Till, Hengel, Burge, Willimon, and Wangerin, and may
be more likely to provide the long-term direction for evangelicalism. (21) By positing the Bible as the source of evangelical faith and practice and identifying science as one practice within this worldview, the possibility exists of creating a community that has integrity, plausibility and direction. (22) The broad public plausibility of the scientific meta-narrative, however, means that science will have to be integrated carefully, with special attention paid to the points of conflict that are certain to arise. The religious framework within which science will be required to function must be coherent, must integrate most scientific findings, and must be plausible at least to evangelicals working within the sciences. Evolution, as the most powerful of science's meta-narratives, will need clear critical integration. However, by arguing biblical precedence, this point of view faces attack from three points of view. First, it is non-rational in its core practices (23) and thus reduces its own plausibility in a conceptual world where modernist discourse is still prevalent. Second, the institutions that nurture science will in all likelihood object strenuously to any efforts to place their endeavours within religiously determined perspectives. Third, the Bible that forms its core will be subject to deconstruction from a wide range of existing linguistic, historicist, and theological perspectives.

The risk also exists that the tension between the evangelical faith and practice so enjoined and the world as described by the sciences and manipulated by technology will be so great as to make the belief-construct untenable to its practitioners. While human beings can hold together much that is contradictory, the dissonance can become so great that one set of beliefs is discarded. In order to manage the risk this approach will require great sensitivity to the changing world of science and the willingness to constructively modify the operative understanding of biblical faith and practice. The community must develop accepted practices for theological modification. This will not be easy because evangelicalism was built upon a foundational conviction that the Christian faith, as interpreted through the Protestant Reformation, is unchanging. If the only emphasis in continuity between this perspective and evangelical tradition is the text of the Bible, and that in ways that would appear unimaginable to the tradition's founders, then this road runs in a direction that can only be called post-evangelical.

On the other hand, from within this framework the possibility exists that (post-) evangelical theology can work creatively with science by suggesting new areas of research based on the conviction of the practicing community that its narrative accurately indicates the fundamental nature of the universe. A biologist functioning from such a perspective might start looking, based on their understanding of God's actions through Jesus, for places where life forms sacrifice their existence so that new forms of life can come into existence. (24) A sociologist functioning from such a perspective might look for the ways in which prayer changes the emotional make-up of individuals and communities in constructive ways.

As we have seen, looking at the way the concept of science is used in the pages of Christianity Today has opened a window into the way a community of religious practice has profoundly modified its discourse. The evangelical community in Canada and the United States has not remained static in the face of the massive changes in Western culture over the last half of the 20th century. Instead it has modified its internal discourse in response to the philosophical and cultural forces at play, essentially abandoning the modern project and exploring competing modes of future self-articulation. Despite obvious similarities in the way the concept of science has been used over that entire period, the differences indicate that radically different conceptual systems are being worked out, and, ironically for a community with its origins so solidly in the modern project, these new conceptual systems reflect not the carefully reasoned intentions of the founders but the non-rational constructs of the emerging post-modern culture.

On the one side we see an enculturated fideism: an ideological belief-construct attempting to deploy itself as empirically validated and therefore able to remain engaged with North American culture as a normative force. But evangelicalism goes this route at the loss of the priority of the Bible that was the foundation of the tradition.

On the other side we see a narrative constructionalism that seeks to build a biblically centred community of practice. But this approach risks losing internal coherence and abandoning formal engagement with the broader culture of North America.

That there are two competing conceptual systems indicates that the final direction of community transformation has not yet been selected. Given that other approaches have been tried and discarded along the way, neither of these may yet be the way forward for North American evangelicalism. Regardless, evangelicalism over the last half of the 20th century changed from being a modern to being a post-modern enterprise. The most conservative rationalists of Western Christianity are now firmly, and probably permanently, non-rational.

NOTE: A complete list of notes works cited in this document, but not included here, is available from the editor; e-mail grahama@sfu.ca

Bruce Hiebert is a Special Arrangements PhD candidate at SFU, and a former Mennonite pastor.
Aristotle, Derrida, Girard  
—Christopher S. Morrissey

The following is an excerpt from Christopher Morrissey’s February 27, 2003 lecture at SFU entitled “Human Difference and Religion: Girard, Derrida, and Postmodern Anthropology”

René Girard’s mimetic theory lays the greatest stress on his hypothesis of the scapegoat mechanism as the generative principle of all religion and human culture. While Girard claims a scientific status for his hypothesis, Girard admits he has left the philosophical implications of his hypothesis to others, and this is fertile ground for original research.

To this end, my project is a re-reading of Aristotle in the light of Girard. But my research begins from a more recent starting point: Eric Gans’ comparison of Girard and Jacques Derrida. This ongoing comparison has continued in Gans’ most recent book, Signs of Paradox (1997), but it is perhaps best articulated in Gans’ early article “Differences” in Modern Language Notes (May 1981), an article which I will draw upon here as I explain the approaches to the problem of human difference made by Derrida, Girard, and Aristotle.

Gans has observed that Derrida’s redefinition of human difference as différence radicalizes metaphysics. That is, Derrida is still metaphysical in recognizing the problem of the origin of human difference, although Derrida’s redefinition of human difference as différence denies the possibility of a solution to this problem of origin. Derrida deconstructs philosophy’s solutions to essential questions (“what is X?”) and concludes that no solution is possible concerning human difference, because language cannot discover its own origin. Derrida thus overlooks the possibility of a generative origin.

Girard’s proposed solution, however, is that the source of human difference lies in mimetic capacity. From mimesis, rivalry is generated, which creates mimetic crises that are only decisively resolved by scapegoating, with the scapegoat being the first significant and sacred object, and historically the inauguration of hominization. Gans observes that Girard’s hypothesis is in one sense the same as Derrida’s (Girard is more anthropological than Derrida, but he is no less metaphysical, albeit in a more radically anthropological way): in a word, says Gans, Girard anthropologizes Derrida’s deconstructive notion of différence. Derrida’s French neologism suggests a diachronic deferral in time, as opposed to only a synchronic difference of presence. In Girard, it corresponds to the scapegoat’s diachronic deferral of conflict, and its sacred synchronic differentiation of meanings for the community. Both for Girard and Derrida, therefore, human difference is absolutely arbitrary; for Derrida, such that no origin can ever be made present, because language always already defers such an origin and offers only supplementary traces; for Girard, such that the scapegoat chosen by any cultural lynch mob is only arbitrarily guilty.

Thus the absolutely arbitrary difference of the human is for both Girard and Derrida problematically metaphysical in nature. For Derrida, it is a difference never chosen because it is never made present (only absence founds presence). For Girard, the motivation for scapegoating is always only relative to a concrete historical situation. Both these hypotheses (Derrida’s non-hypothesis and Girard’s generative hypothesis) are still too “metaphysical” because, however temporal, they stage this temporality on the representational scene of language. That is, for Derrida, difference is “always already” the deferring representation in language; for Girard, difference (however similarly temporal, relative and arbitrary) is nevertheless what first founds representation.

Girard’s breakthrough is nevertheless less metaphysical and more resolutely anthropological, and it establishes, moreover, a link between religion and science with its generative hypothesis of the sudden origin of language. The generative function of scapegoating in culture potentially offers a scientific explanation of the emergence of human culture and language. While gradual evolution indeed occurred, evolution does not account for the sudden human transition from prehistory to history that religious myth dramatizes. The refinement of the evolutionary hypothesis only offers a more accurate horizontal temporal yardstick, but it does not answer the question of the vertical problem of culturally significant meaning, which Girard, in his breakthrough, argues could be generated by the scapegoat who becomes the first deity, that is, the first locus of significance for the now-human community.

While gradual evolution indeed occurred, evolution does not account for the sudden human transition from prehistory to history that religious myth dramatizes. The refinement of the evolutionary hypothesis only offers a more accurate horizontal temporal yardstick, but it does not answer the question of the vertical problem of culturally significant meaning, which Girard, in his
breakthrough, argues could be generated by the scapegoat who becomes the first deity, that is, the first locus of significance for the now-human community.

The limitations of Girard’s theory become clear in light of Gans’ comparison of Girard’s différance with Derrida’s. Girard’s original event of scapegoating tries to explain the birth of human difference with his breakthrough anthropological hypothesis of generative violence, that is, of violence that generates sacred meaning. But his original event nevertheless conflates three things in its account of the origin of human difference: (1) the original object that generates a mimetic crisis (e.g. meat, i.e. a dead animal as a food source); (2) the victim-as-scapegoat (e.g. the member of the community lynched at the pinnacle of the crisis, i.e. scapegoated in the rapidly escalating communal aggression over the food); and (3) the victim-as-signifier-of-the-sacred.

In Girard’s understanding, these three have to be connected in one event. But note that the transition between the first two defers resolution of conflict (i.e. if hominids are no longer fighting over the meat, but all beating up on one member of the community, why would the death of that scapegoat stop the continuation of the violence to another?), whereas the transition between the last two is the resolution of conflict by deferral (i.e. the fascination with the scapegoat as a deity is what defers the continuation of the violence, because the defiled scapegoat is the signifier of a restoration of peace and order after the aggressive discharge of tensions on a scapegoat). Empirically, the yoking of these three events, while harmonious with Girard’s exegesis of texts, especially Biblical ones, is, however, less than parsimonious as a scientific hypothesis. Scientifically speaking, Girard’s hypothesis seems to require another swipe of Ockham’s razor. But the parsimonious solution is not to separate these three moments according to the common consensus of either contemporary science or contemporary deconstruction: that is, either by dissolving the three moments so far apart that they disappear into the horizontal timeline of evolutionary gradualism, or to dismiss outright the anthropological question by turning Derrida’s insight into language’s deferral of origins into a still-metaphysical dogma. Similar to Gans, I would venture to refine the Girardian hypothesis the following way: to recognize that the transition from (1) to (2) is still within the physical realm of the animal and its appetitive objects (e.g. animals fighting over food), whereas the transition from (2) to (3) is metaphysical in the generation of human difference through the recognition of significance. The distinction can be phrased this way: both transitions are transitions of mimesis, but the former as a transition of mimesis understood as imitation, and the latter as a transition of mimesis understood as representation.

Aristotle’s conception of mimesis, as Stephen Halliwell argues in his recent book The Aesthetics of Mimesis is underrated and misunderstood, and it can account for both these kinds of mimesis. There is a dual aspect to Aristotelian mimesis that has not yet received adequate recognition. As Aristotle says in the Poetics, humans are the most mimetic (mimetikotaton: most imitative) among animals, yet they also learn (representationally: tas mathesis poieitai dia mimeseos) through mimesis (Poetics IV. 1448b4-9). The latter activity, learning, is an activity humans desire by nature and in which they take pleasure (cf. Metaphysics 1. 980a22: pantes anthropoi tou eidenai oregontai phusei).

My own research works with Girard’s hypothesis to see how the one mimesis could anthropologically be generative of the other mimesis: (animal) imitation as generative of (human) representation. In contrast with evolutionary science, which methodologically assumes that human difference evolved gradually, and in contrast with Derrida, whose différance shows the absent origin of human difference in language, the generative hypothesis of Girard achieves a notable breakthrough. Where does human difference come from? It comes from a sudden event (neither a metaphysical a-temporal essence nor a deconstructionist non-essence), an event which is the origin of language and thus of all cultural form. In the postmodern era, we are just now learning how to think a hypothesis about this event, and to refine it.

Christopher Morrissey is a Special Arrangements Ph.D. candidate at SFU
In the Spring of 2003, the Institute for the Humanities hosted two lectures which approached the exploration of Islam, both as an historic religious tradition, and as a contemporary reality.

Democratizing Shi’ism: The Theoretical Foundations of Iran’s Reform Movement

—Peyman Vahabzadeh

The landslide electoral victory of the moderate Shi’i cleric Seyyed Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential election in Iran inaugurated a new era in Shi’i political practice. Known for his leniency as the Minister of Islamic Guidance, Khatami owed his presidency primarily to Iranian women and youth who mobilized to vote for him by the millions. While Khatami’s presence and the expanding reform movement his victory ensued must be credited to Iranians’ will for radical but peaceful change, the very idea of reforming Iranian politics should conceptually be traced back to the founding moment of Islam, or, to state it precisely, to the death of Prophet Mohammad in 632 CE.

Guaranteed by the aura of prophecy, the uncontestable authority of Mohammad, who was at the same time the spiritual and temporal leader of the community, was quickly disintegrated upon his death, for he neither appointed a successor nor established a method for the selection of a leader. As is well known, the majority of Muslims of the time followed the first three Caliphs, all Mohammad’s trusted senior associates, and became known as the followers of the Prophet’s “narrated or documented traditions,” or Sunnis. Upon Mohammad’s passing, however, a small minority advocated the idea that the line of succession should be traced through the Prophet’s descent—that is, through his daughter, Fatima, and his son-in-law, Ali. The followers of the “party” of the First Imam, Ali, or Shi’is, witnessed the caliphate of Ali (as the forth Caliph) until his assassination by a member of a rebellious, underground group. The two powerful subsequent caliphaties, the Umayyads and the Abbasids, kept Shi’ism a marginal tendency within Islam. In the meantime, the Shi’is experienced three splits as a result of disagreements on the line of succession. These are (1) the Zeydis or Fiver Shi’is; (2) the Isma’ilis or Sevener Shi’is; (3) and finally, the focus of our discussion here, the Ja’fari or Twelver Shi’is.

Deemed as potential threats to authority, all of the eleven Ja’fari Shi’i Imams were murdered by their contemporary Caliphs. The Ja’fari Shi’i line of succession came to a halt when, due to the impending danger that threatened his life, the infant son of the eleventh Shi’i Imam, Hassan al-Askari, reportedly went into a Lesser Occultation between 874 and 940, during which time he was connected with his followers through four select deputies or vakils. Upon the death of the last vakil in 940, the Hidden Twelfth Imam went into the Greater Occultation to return on the Day of Judgement as Mahdi, the Guide of the faithful community.

The Greater Occultation not only left Shi’i believers with the problem of guidance, it forced the entire Ja’fari Shi’i theory of governance to face a profound crisis, as it was based on the premise that only an infallible leader (the Prophet and later the twelve Imams) should lead the Muslim community. Naturally, following the Greater Occultation, the Shi’is turned to quietism based on a recorded hadith or dictum of the sixth Imam, Ja’far Sadeq, who recommended to the faithful total abstention from temporal affairs in the absence of an infallible leader. In the absence of an infallible leader, a shadow of illegitimacy covers over all worldly activities, above all those of government. Consequently, a doctrine of dissimulation emerged, making it a duty of Shi’is to feign religion in order to protect their Faith and community. Until the coming of Mahdi, there would be no legitimate authority, only force. Here one can clearly observe that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was an attempt at reviving legitimate authority in the absence of the Occult Imam.

Interestingly, the absence of an infallible leader forced upon Shi’ism a certain separation between church and state, which is quite often missed or misunderstood by Western scholars. This separation should not be analogized with the separation between spiritual and temporal authorities of the Christian Roman Empire. Rather, this separation stems from an impasse in the Shi’i political thought: while Islam recognizes that, although chosen, the Prophet (and the Imams) were only mortal and finite human beings, the principle of infallible leadership knows no temporal finitude. The separation between church and state in Shi’ism stems from an unbounded theoretical requirement that the finitude of life can
never accommodate. One might call the Shi’i separation of church and state orthodox or fundamentalist in order to emphasize that no secular framework can capture the essence of such separation.

Back to history: although in the sixteenth century the formidable Safavid dynasty founded in Iran the first Shi’i state, the doctrine of illegitimacy of government persisted in the Shi’i political thought. However, this period witnessed the rise of official rank of Shi’i clergy (the ulama) that would strictly deal with issues of legality and jurisprudence. The emerging experts of jurisprudence, or mujtahids, were now to provide guidance for the Shi’i community in the absence of Mahdi. Given that attentiveness to the exigency of time stands as one of the highest principles of Islam, the task of the mujtahids was to provide logical proof through analytical reasoning for the applicability of jurisprudential principles.

The absence of infallible leaders necessitated the gathering and compiling of canonical laws or shari’a. In the 16th century, the eminent Shi’i jurist, Ibrahim al-Qoteifi, proposed the principle of emulation according to which one must emulate the highest jurist’s judgement on matters over which there cannot be consensus. The principle of emulation granted unprecedented power to the Ulama. In reaction to this new elite of Shi’i clergy around the turn of the 17th century an orthodox school of Shi’i jurisprudence called the Akhbaris argued in favour of the abolition of the division between the jurist and the lay Muslim, forbade emulation, and advocated a return to The Koran and the Sunna. In the decades to come, two challenges arose in the shrines of Iraq against the Akhbaris.

The emergent Sheikhi School refuted the adequacy of the mujtahid, the Shi’i cleric-scholar, to function as an intermediary between the Shi’i community and the Hidden Imam. In the mujtahid’s stead, the Sheikhis proposed a more authoritative incarnation of the divine guidance, which they called the “Perfect Shi’i” —a concept that unwittingly played a decisive role in the unfolding of the Ayatollah Khomeini's revivalist movement centuries later.

In the 18th century, another school of Shi’i thought, the Usulis, or Followers of the Principles, gradually dominated the holy shrines of Iraq. The Usulis revitalized the idea of emulating the mujtahid by the Shi’i layman. The Usuli scholars came to believe that in every era one cleric-scholar could be considered as the most knowledgeable. As such, they gradually expanded the notion of the mujtahid into a new concept: marja-e taqlid or the Source of Emulation.

Historically, the Shi’i clerics maintained quietism for the most part under the three-century rule of the Shi’i Safavid Dynasty. With the rise of the Qajar Dynasty in the early 18th century, they received support from Qajar kings in return for spiritual support. The Usuli School of jurisprudence rose to provide the Qajars with clerics who would supervise over the exercise of the religious laws, or shar’, in courts. But the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909 proved the internal diversity of Shi’i clerics who turned out to be divided over antagonistic political visions: while some prominent clerics supported the autocratic monarchy and some remained quietist, a major part of prominent Shi’i clerics supported the ideas of Constitutionalism, a few even republicanism. With the 1925 coup d'état of Reza Shah, an autocratic, at times brutal, secularism dominated Iran until 1979.

Born in 1902, Ayatollah Khomeini came of age experiencing the force of state under Reza Shah, while receiving his religious education with an emphasis on the hadith (the Tradition of the Prophet and Imams) and irfan (Islamic mysticism). He received his certificate and became a mujtahid in the early 1930s, only to become a close entourage of the politically-quietist Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, the single uncontested Source of Emulation in the entire 20th century Shi’i world.

With Ayatollah Borujerdi’s death in 1960, Ayatollah Khomeini’s swift confrontation with the Shah in 1963 forced him to exile in the holy shrine of Najaf in Iraq. In the next 15 years, he worked to formulate a theory of the Islamic state, based on his Islamic mysticism that emphasized the possible unity of the self with the divine. Influenced by the Sheikhi idea of the Perfect Shi’i, as well as the Platonic concept of the philosopher-king, Ayatollah Khomeini developed a revivalist concept of Velayat-e Faqih (the Guardianship of the Supreme Jurist) which he presented in a series of lectures given in exile in 1969 and 1970. After the 1979 Revolution, the Guardianship of the Supreme Jurist found its way into the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, along with democratic institutions such as an elected President, parliament, and city and village councils. The constitutional recognition of democratic institutions under the mantel of a non-democratic higher office, as we shall see, later turned out to be the Islamic Republic’s worst nightmare. In 1988, the ailing Ayatollah hurriedly called for an Assembly of Experts (Iran’s constituent assembly) to rubberstamp the elevation of the institution of the Guardianship of the Supreme Jurist into an absolute power supported by the buffer institutions of the Expediency Council (shora-ye tashkhiis-e maslehat-e nezam), that would decide the good of society, and the Council of Constitutional Guardians (shora-ye negahban-e qanun-
Khatami makes a distinction between the Western and Islamic notions of civil society. However, he agrees that these two historically divergent concepts could converge on the outcome. Having its roots in the Medina of the Prophet Mohammad, his Islamic civil society symbolizes for all Muslims across the world a pan-Islamic utopia—the spiritual place of peace and security for all Muslims of all times. The arch characteristic of the Islamic civil society—which, admittedly, did not last beyond the Prophet's lifespan—is the complete harmony of humanity with the will of god. According to Khatami, the citizenship of the Islamic civil society is decided not based on one's faith, but on one's humanity and the inalienable right of all humans to determine their destiny and form of government.

Mohsen Kadivar, an outstanding reformist and scholar of Shi'i political thought, supports constitutionalism based on a forceful differentiation between the original 1979 and the amended 1989 Constitutions. While the original Constitution emphasizes the "constitutional and elected Guardianship of the Supreme Jurist," the amended Constitution marks a shift toward "absolutist and appointed Guardianship of the Supreme Jurist." According to Kadivar, the two Constitutions express the dual character of the source of legitimacy in Shi'i political thought: in the first Constitution people are the source of legitimacy, and authority is exercised from the bottom up; in the second Constitution God is the source of legitimacy, and authority is exerted from the top down. One, however, should not err by seeing a democratic tendency in the first Constitution: in both views, the laws of jurisprudence override the will of people, should the latter run contrary to the former. Kadivar also identifies another current that runs against the principle of Guardianship of the Supreme Jurist: the principle of republicanism. He traces the source of contradiction back to the two Ayatollah Khomeinis he identifies: the Khomeini of the shrine city of Najaf in the 1960s and 1970s who advocated absolutism, and the Khomeini of Paris in 1978, who, in response to the exigency of time and the republican demands of revolutionary Iran at the time, recognized the principle of republicanism to be the foundation of Guardianship, which in turn necessitated a concept of the constitutionally-elected Guardian.

Mohsen Kadivar acknowledges the fundamental ambivalence in Khomeini's theory of the Islamic State, but he clearly advocates the constitutional and elected jurist by...
Aghajari refers to Shari’ati’s distinction between the “essential Islam” and the “historical Islam.” The retrieval of the essential Islam, which contains the liberating teachings of the faith, out of the historical Islam that is tainted by rulers, Shi’i clergy and blind subscription to traditional ways of life, necessitates the cultural project of Islamic Protestantism. Aghajari obviously undermines the clerical prerogative in interpreting The Koran and the tradition and makes this formidable hermeneutical task one of every concerned citizen of every generation...

His advocacy of “Islamic humanism” places Aghajari on a crash course with the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic. Clearly, what Aghajari advocates is nothing short of a secularized Islam, an ideology and a framework for critical thinking and social justice.

during the heights of revolutionary uprising in Iran in 1978: that no generation should decide for the next the kind of government it recognizes suitable for itself. Sazgara finds both absolutist and constitutionalist defenders of the Guardianship of Supreme Jurist as detrimental to Iran’s progress as a modern nation. He expressly points out the limitations of the Iranian Constitution, which he believes, supports an oligarchic and maximalist reading of the Shi’i teachings. He calls the Islamic Republic a “complete failure” of Iranian Islamists and blames religious maximalism for Iran’s isolation, terrorism, despotism, loss of national prestige, loss of economic and trade opportunities with the rest of the world, pervasive unemployment and the concomitant embezzlement, poverty, crime and substance abuse, and above all, the alienation of Iranians from government.

Sazgara calls for civil disobedience, perceived as a process of democratic education and participation, that would press the rulers of Iran to accede to holding a referendum and creating a new constitution in the end.10

Dr. Hashem Aghajari draws on one of Iran’s most influential original thinkers, Dr. Ali Shari’ati (d. 1977), a Sorbonne graduate in sociology who was in contact with Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon in the late 1950s. Shari’ati’s efforts at minimizing the role of Shi’i clergy, as well as his adherence to a Marxian notion of social justice based on the redistribution of property, made him the intellectual forefather of secular-leftist Islam in Iran in the 1970s. Aghajari refers to Shari’ati’s distinction between the “essential Islam” and the “historical Islam.” The retrieval of the essential Islam, which contains the liberating teachings of the faith, out of the historical Islam that is tainted by rulers, Shi’i clergy and blind subscription to traditional ways of life, necessitates the cultural project of Islamic Protestantism. Aghajari obviously undermines the clerical prerogative in interpreting The Koran and the tradition and makes this formidable hermeneutical task one of every concerned citizen of every generation. He questions the very
necessity of the bureaucratic supervision of Muslim affairs by Grand Ayatollahs. In Aghajari's words: “Shari’ati held that in the essential Islam we have no such class as the clergy. The latter comes from the historical Islam, [in essential Islam] we have no religious hierarchy.” His advocacy of “Islamic humanism” places Aghajari on a crash course with the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic. Clearly, what Aghajari advocates is nothing short of a secularized Islam, an ideology and a framework for critical thinking and social justice.

Akbar Ganji, Iran's bold journalist, wrote several books on the pathology of religious autocracy in Iran, before he was sentenced to five years in prison for having insulted the Supreme Jurist three years ago. He wrote The Republican Manifesto, a turning point in the Shi'i political thought, in prison and sent it out secretly. The text was immediately widely published on the Internet and warmly received by the secular opposition in Iran and in exile. In his Manifesto, Ganji refers to the generational-historical character of political programs in order to launch a devastating critique of all Constitutionalist delusions and to call for a referendum to decide the future political system in Iran based on a new, secular Constitution. A self-declared devout Muslim, Gangi exposes the normative morality that links the Constitutionalists to the autocratic rulers of the country. He clearly rejects the Islamic Republic, mainly because for him a “republic” must be non-ideological to be worthy of the designation. Religion, he asserts, must never become a political force. This calls for a liberal interpretation of the Shi'i jurisprudence. Gangi's proposed "republican impulse" reflects the demands and expectations of the alienated younger generation, women, urban middle class, and secular-nationalist intellectuals. In the long run, Ganji believes, republicanism will outlive both dominant absolutists and their Constitutionalist opposition.

The electoral victory of the reformist President Khatami indeed opened the Pandora's Box of political vistas in Iran. The continuous suppression of the reform movement and its advocates in the past several years only reports the increased disintegration of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sincere constitutionalists such as Kadivar have already arrived at the conclusion that "the separation between religion and institutions of state and power will inevitably be realized, while people will remain faithful [Muslims]." Gangi started one of his earlier essays with a quote from The Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels—a warning about the specter of communism. A few years later, the coming of a somewhat analogous specter was sharply articulated in an open letter that a former reformist Member of Parliament wrote to Iran's Supreme Jurist, Ayatollah Khamenei: “In any event, the logical and inevitable outcome of the failed experience of your theocracy will be a Renaissance, the collapse of [this] religious state, and eventually the establishment of a laic and secular system that will assume the form of a full-fledged republic.” And the mass boycott of the city and village council elections on 28 February 2003, in which 25 million eligible voters refused to cast ballots, marks a turning point in moving in that direction.

NOTE: A complete list of works cited in this document, but not included here, is available from the editor; e-mail grahamasfca

Peyman Vahabzadeh is a Sessional Instructor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at SFU and an Associate of the Institute.
The Ethical Crescent
—Amyn B. Sajoo

“Exploring Islam” is the reverse of searching for a needle in a haystack. In the Muslim world the subject has long been omnipresent, reposing in popular and high culture, in the public square and the most discrete private quarters. In the West, since September 11, 2001, and reinforced by the Iraq crisis, “Islam” is everywhere too—glaring at you in bookstores and at newsstands, or draped suspiciously from your gaze. On television, day and night, there is no escaping it. On streets it seems to be on a thousand faces that are now often subject to more than just ordinary scrutiny, when not being “profiled” by security men.

Ironically, then, Islam has become in the West a “way of life”—the very expression customarily used to characterize a faith tradition that straddles the sacred and secular. That concept has meant that civic culture in the history and contemporary experience of Muslim societies has been variously tied—from formal institutional to loosely quotidian ways—to a living Islam. The West defines civic culture very differently, stemming from its experience and understanding of the Modern. It is a quintessentially secular, liberal view with its assumptions about citizens, the State and the public sphere that fall under the rubric of “civil society.” Since it’s tied to the economic, political and cultural presence of the West in the world, there is no ready escape from its impact, benevolent or destructive; it is there in all its overwhelming weight. This view has harbored an image of the non-Western Muslim Other that in key respects reflects our own discontents, especially about ideas of the public square and the rule of law, rationality, and violence.

“Exploring Islam,” if it is to be a serious exercise, is also about exploring our own constructions of the civic, self and society. I propose to uncover from images of the Other some of Islam’s own ideas and practices of the civic, and to show that they are driven by an ethics that stems from its complex history and heritages. Indeed, that impetus resonates not only with quests in the Muslim world, but also with those of many in the liberal West, non-Muslim and Muslim alike.

Durkheim remarked a century ago that “God, who was first present in all human relations, pulls out progressively, leaving the world to men and their conflicts.”¹ Our brand of secularization today is depicted by Charles Taylor as “post-Durkheimian,” after phases in which the individual citizen had a formal affiliation with a given institutional religion (“paleo-Durkheimian”), and then came to freely choose an affiliation (“neo-Durkheimian”).² For Taylor, the material difference in our post-Durkheimian age is the replacement of the institutional link between the individual and religion with a strictly personal “expressivist” preference that glories in the label of “spirituality.”

In Durkheim’s time, Europe was in the throes of consigning substantive ethical discourse to the private sphere linked to religious wellsprings. Laïcité was enshrined in French law in 1905 to put the Catholic Church in its place—together with public spaces for moral discourse. In America, the religious conscience was deemed subordinate to the authority of the State, even as in matters such as conscientious objection to war.³ The steady erosion of institutional (as opposed to personal) links with religion in the post-Durkheimian age also means the loss of a connection through religion with the state, since their interplay defines our secularity. That dance was—and often still is outside the West—a tango for two; here it has become a solo performance by the State. The governing ethos is one of individual space, and rights-talk is
liberalism’s civil religion, displacing the aspirations of public moral discourse and competence.

Civil society, whose modern conceivers in the Enlightenment saw it as the edifice of ethics—a status to which it still had pretensions in Tocqueville’s America of the 1830s—is effectively being reduced to an edifice of law and equal citizenship. This model enjoys in our time the benefit of export by globalization, foreign assistance or outright force. I shall return to some of its discontents at home, after venturing into the landscape of the Other that serves as the principal counter to our post-Durkheimian vista. The Other in question, “Islam,” is seen to lack modernity’s vital attachments to the rule of law and privatized ethics, in effect, to civic rationality.

This approach to Islam may appear to endorse the popular polarity that stems from what Samuel Huntington referred to as a “clash of civilizations” in which Islam and Muslims are put in a box destined to collide with the box of the West. The events of September 11 have fuelled that perspective to the point of rendering the staple of portrayals by politicians, the media and prominent scholars of “the stakes at hand.” Indeed, the earliest official responses to September 11 insisted categorically that this was all about the integrity of our civilization, which was being subjected to a militant “crusade” (President George Bush’s term) which had nothing to do with the content of Western foreign policies.6

Officaldom was asserting not that the assaults were ethically odious in the extreme and that the proffered rationalizations of those responsible for them could not conceivably justify the acts. That would have been the kind of dignified anger on behalf of the victims—who, incidentally, included some 800 Muslims among the estimated 3,054 killed.7 Instead, nothing more than the irrational rage of the Other purportedly inspired the attacks; hence, to question the ethics and wisdom of acts that might have fuelled such rage would be to surrender to its irrationality. In its warped logic and expediency, this posture brings us to a theme that runs right through the Occidental depiction of Islam and Muslims.

The Rational is tied to secularity as a hallmark of modernity, defined by post-Enlightenment experience. Rejection of that secular modernity unavoidably yields a judgment of the irrationality of the Islamic Other. There is no redemptive value to this particular embrace of irrationality, with its benighted universe where women are trampled on as second-class citizens, adulterers are stoned, petty thieves have their hands amputated, and despotic sultans build palaces and armies from an oil wealth that eludes toiling subjects. Civility is at the mercy of anger in the streets.

Violence is a pervasive characteristic of this Irrational Other, whether in the confines of the private sphere or the public square or the domain of external relations. Samuel Huntington invokes this “violence propensity” in his book as evidence of Islam’s incompatibility with Western civilization—the very civilization that has given us intercontinental ballistic missiles, advanced chemical and biological weapons, two world wars and the Holocaust, the genocide of native populations in grand colonial ventures, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and urban violence whose casualty rates can rival those of wartime.

The term “propensity” is telling. It suggests a disposition, tendency, reflex—responses that can only be devoid of rationality. No inquiry ensues about what these are responses to, such as grievances about political and economic hegemony, colonial occupation, the brutality of secular rulers whose power is underwritten by Western establishments, and expressions of the crudest racism in words and acts. Nor does the generalization allow for pluralism within the universe of 1.2 billion Muslims whose cultural heritages are among the most complex of any faith tradition.
The flipside is Huntington's plaintive lament about excessive diversity within Europe and America which he fears is sapping their strength. "When Americans look for their cultural roots, they find them in Europe," he says; the more than one-third of American citizens with roots in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America don't count. For its part, Europe must cultivate politico-cultural unity with America or risk becoming "an inconsequential landmass at the extremity of the Eurasian landmass." Recall that this analysis came prior to September 11, the "war on terrorism," and the Iraq crisis. It requires little imagination to see how useful it has since become in the rhetoric and calculus of "Othering."

There is, however, a deeper layer of Muslim identity in which the propensity to violence has been located by scholars like Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer, before and since September 11. Lewis commands special attention as an "authority" on Islam, despite the fact that his corpus of writings have a proclivity to lazy generalizations that would seldom pass the test of serious scholars like Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer, before and since September 11. Lewis commands special attention as an "authority" on Islam, despite the fact that his corpus of writings have a proclivity to lazy generalizations that would seldom pass the test of serious scholarship on Jewish and Christian traditions and their implications. His latest book, What Went Wrong, seems as popular as Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and purports to offer a sophisticated appraisal of historical and political currents in the Muslim world. There have been spin-offs from this slim volume in the mainstream media to "educate" the public on what lies behind September 11, including a lecture by Lewis broadcast on CBC Radio under the title "The Revolt of Islam,"—a variation on his article in The New Yorker magazine, "Islam in Revolt."

Now the "rage" and violence propensity are said to stem from the doctrine of jihad, claimed to justify aggressive behavior by Muslims since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This perspective is something that one encounters routinely in the popular media, where jihad is becoming shorthand for any kind of violent tendency associated with religion or even political causes.

Yet a cursory acquaintance with Muslim scripture and teachings would indicate that jihad is first and foremost the striving against nafs or baser instincts, the tussle of conscience and spirit at the heart of any religion. Lewis reduces this to jihad-as-warfare, then treats it as a dominant thread that supervenes theology, culture, law and ethics. For "intransigent" Islam has difficulty adapting from texts to secular modernity because of "a rigid, poorly developed understanding of the world, and of its relationship to the ultimate." McClay is apparently innocent of the allure of other-worldly texts to legions of influential Christian fundamentalists in his own country—or of the Sufi understandings of ultimate realities and the world that continue to attract thousands of ordinary Christian and Jewish Americans.

But what, one may inquire, gives an idea like jihad—the militant version—such an enduring claim for Muslims? Why would the likes of Osama bin Laden command the loyalty of his far-flung al-Qaeda organization and its terrorist cohorts? The formal response from Lewis and Huntington and others of their ilk can be captured in a word—shari'a. To quote Lewis, for example: "Because war for the faith has been a religious obligation within Islam from the beginning, it is elaborately regulated"—by the shari'a or religious law, that is. And for bin Laden, "this is a religious war, a war for Islam and against infidels." Huntington's Clash of Civilizations informs us that the "underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism" but "Islam, a different civilization" in which "a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice." The whole matter of violence and jihad relate finally to religious law.

The assumption is that Islam enshrines rules and norms of conduct in its shari'a, which has the binding force of law for all believers—and that this legal tradition is itself a defining feature of the faith and its civilization. This perception is standard in Western accounts, finding its way into daily media reports. Shari'a is scriptural, hence its binding force and rigidity. If punishments like the amputation of hands for theft and the stoning of adulterers still hold, the
The object here is not to set up a normative or historical contest among the ethical traditions of Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Rather, it is to argue that judgments about the locus of ethics and fidelity to them is complex in all faith traditions; and seizing upon a particular episode or historical phase as emblematic or conclusive in this regard is an exercise in ideological manipulation. Yet it has potentially serious consequences inasmuch as the manipulation can influence not only the drift of general scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, but also the opinions of establishment elites that shape public policy and the general public whose support they seek.

It requires only a moment’s informed reflection to see that the Qur’an and the Prophet were not licensing but limiting the grounds upon and the manner in which even defensive warfare could be waged. There is an absolute prohibition on “compulsion in religion” in the Qur’an (2:256), capped by the argument, “If your Lord had so willed, all those who are on earth would have believed; will you then compel mankind against their will to believe?” (10:99). When fighting “in God’s cause against those who wage war on you do not transgress limits for God loves not the transgressors.” (2:190). There are injunctions about harming noncombatants as well as women and children, granting safe passage, preserving religious sanctuaries, and the treatment of prisoners (47:4, 8:67, 2:217, 9:6)—remarkably akin to modern humanitarian norms. The quote from Muhammad on fighting “in the path of God” comes from a hadith—an attested report—in which he sets forth the need for integrity and honor even in adversity, to the point of physical protection for unbelievers if they pay their taxes, and not vainly giving pledges of peace.15

War is a last resort, a child not of virtue but necessity: “The requital of evil is an evil similar to it: hence whoever pardons and makes peace, his reward rests with God … If one is patient in adversity and forgives, this is indeed the best resolution of affairs” (Qur’an, 42:40-43). Scholars like Sohail Hashmi, James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay have shown that the ethics of warfare as they evolved in Islam are parallel to the just war doctrines of Christianity.16 Kelsay regards Bernard Lewis’s reading of Muslim doctrine as contrary to the clearest evidence.

It is worth noting as well that the Qur’anic references to conflictual violence pale in comparison with those in Jewish and Christian scriptures. The Book of Joshua lyrically narrates the serial slaughter of “every living creature” by a compliant prophet in the name of Yahweh’s vision of Israel (10:28-40, 11:14). The Book of Deuteronomy ordains, “You shall destroy all the peoples ... showing them no pity.” (7: 16), and “You shall put all its males to the sword. You may, however, take as your booty the women, the children, the livestock, and everything in the town—all its spoil—and enjoy the use of the spoil of your enemy which the Lord your God gives you” (20:14-15). Christians and Jews have on occasion taken such verses at face value against the doctrinal counter-provisos and contexts at hand.

We have, for instance, this eyewitness testimony of the Provençal Raymund of Aguiles on the aftermath of the First Crusade in Jerusalem, when in the space of three days in mid-July 1099 an estimated 30,000 Jews and Muslims were slaughtered:
Piles of heads, hands and feet were to be seen ... In the Temple and the Porch of Solomon, men rode in blood up to their knees and bridle reins. Indeed, it was a just and splendid judgment of God that this place should be filled with the blood of unbelievers since it had suffered so long from their blasphemies. After there were no infidels left to kill, the Crusaders washed and sang hymns—crowned by the recital of liturgy around the tomb of Christ... “This is the day that the Lord hath made, let us rejoice and be glad therein,” for on this day the Lord revealed himself to his people and blessed them. 

Muslims, as we know, were to have an opportunity to reciprocate and display the “violence propensity” and *jihad-as-warfare* spirit that Huntington and Lewis credit them with. But in *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths*, Karen Armstrong records otherwise: “when Saladin led the Muslim reconquest of Jerusalem on October 2, 1187, not a single Christian was killed, in keeping with the conqueror’s undertaking to rich and poor alike.” Saladin refused even to confiscate the ostentatious wealth of Patriarch Heraclius; “Christians everywhere will remember the kindness we have done them,” he insisted. 

Jews were welcomed back into the city from which the Crusaders had excluded them, pouring in from North Africa and as far away as Andalusia. Still, a narrowness tinged their gratitude: Jerusalem was their city, in which Muslims and Christians had made a home. Judah Halevi and Maimonides, men of learning who had known the pluralism of Muslim Andalusia, insisted that Jerusalem was sacred to the Jews alone and the proper site of a “reclaimed” Kingdom with the Temple Mount as its heart.

No doubt many would be inclined to dismiss all this as so much water under the bridge. Jewish and Christian ethics have since metamorphosed into a radically different mold, it might be argued. That is not, however, the interpretation offered in our own time by Yitzhak Shamir before he became prime minister of Israel:

Neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of combat ... We are very far from having any moral qualms as far as our national war goes. We have before us the command of the Torah, whose morality surpasses that of any body of laws in the world: “Ye shall blot them out to the last man.”

The object here is not to set up a normative or historical contest among the ethical traditions of Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Rather, it is to argue that judgments about the locus of ethics and fidelity to them is complex in all faith traditions; and seizing upon a particular episode or historical phase as emblematic or conclusive in this regard is an exercise in ideological manipulation. Yet it has potentially serious consequences inasmuch as the manipulation can influence not only the drift of general scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, but also the opinions of establishment elites that shape public policy and the general public whose support they seek.

There are two related elements at work here in the process of depicting the Other. First, as already stressed, there is the insistent construction of a tradition wedded to a rigid legal code, resistant to civility and pluralism as virtues of modernity. Second, there is the assumption which holds that image together, linking Muslim tradition with contemporary behavior in a determinism—conscious or not—about the impact of Tradition on those somehow “programmed” or “wired” to passively follow it. Together, these two elements bring us to the central argument: that the content of the image of the Irrational Other that comes out of the post-Durkheimian West belies the play of ethics and reason in Muslim scripture and historical experience. I will conclude by considering some of the
The opening words of the Qur’anic revelation, dating to 610 C.E., enjoin the Prophet—and by extension all who encounter the text—to “Read” in the name of a God “who teaches humanity by the pen … that which it knew not” (96: 1-5). Thereafter, the text repeatedly exhorts the reader with phrases like “What! Would you not reason out?” or “They might perchance reflect!” or “Perhaps you may exert your mind!” Argument abounds in the verses or ayat, as they are called. And the term ayat also means “signs,” a double meaning that is no accident. For the act of reading the Qur’an was to be an exercise in discerning the signs of the divine, unraveling the truths in the ayat. The invitation to “Read,” then, was emphatically not the kind of exercise to be pursued without the fullest acuity or proper engagement of the human intellect.

For Muslims, scripture and its attendant civilization from the outset signaled that aesthetics, ethics, human and physical sciences, no less than philosophy and theology, were exercises in discerning “the signs,” ayat, in a myriad encounters with the Divine Intellect. The game is played by a text filled, to quote George Hourani, with “semantic depth, where one meaning leads to another by a fertile fusion of associated ideas.” As such, the scripture is less a doctrinal or juridical text than “a rich and subtle stimulus to religious imagination.”

An example of the dialogical, ironic and ethical at the same time is the ayat from Medina when Muhammad and his community, or umma, faced the practical burdens of fostering a civic and not just a religious community. The text reads: “We offered the trust of the heavens, the earth, and the mountains to the spirits and the angels, but they refused to undertake it, being afraid. But the human being undertook it—humankind is unfair to itself and foolish” (33:72). We have a cosmic narrative from which is derived the concept of human vicegerency or custodianship of nature (khalifat Allah fi’l-ard), a trust that makes rigorous demands in perpetuity. For willingly taking this burden on where angels fear to tread, the verses offer a “tender rebuke” to humans who let pride get the better of wisdom. The moral and intellectual capacity to fulfil that trust is also, of course, a divine gift. Frailty, courage and humility are conjoined in this custodianship, which becomes a foundational principle in the development of Muslim ethics.

In a graphic 10th century Arabic fable from the spiritual and intellectual fraternity known as the Ikhwan al-Safa (Brethren of Purity), a company of animals asks whether human beings are superior to them, and if so, then why. They put this question to the King of the Spirits—whose verdict is that human beings are indeed superior but only for their higher burden as Allah’s regents and nature’s custodians:

‘Let man not imagine . . . that just because he is superior to the animals they are his slaves. Rather it is that we are all slaves of the Almighty and must obey His commands . . . Let man not forget that he is accountable to his Maker for the way in which he treats all animals, just as he is accountable for his behavior towards his fellow human beings. Man bears a heavy responsibility. . . .’

The Qur’an’s constant challenge to apply intellect and faith to reading and acting on its passages spawned an empowering ethos in which Muslims were encouraged to see themselves not as pawns but as players in a cosmic game. When the early community finds itself surrounded by tribal practices that violate the dignity of the individual—ranging from female infanticide and the lex talionis of blood revenge for killing, to the taking of unlimited wives, hierarchies of caste, and usury—Islam's response could not be one of putting up and letting be. That would be a travesty of the lofty motives attached to faith. A social conscience was part and parcel of the larger
custodianship of the individual because social justice—the sense of fair play and balance—was simply the flipside of natural justice, the norms of harmony with the cosmos.

This argument was taken to its logical conclusion by Muslim theologians as early as the eighth century, when the Mutazili school began to argue that the tenets of justice, both natural and social, were universal and preceded revelation itself. Indeed, the Mutazili philosophers saw no conflict between reason and revelation: they were intertwined in God and his creation, including the mind of man. The intuitive sense of right and wrong—taqwa in the Qur'an, which summons time and again—required rationality as much as piety. This is manifest in the hundreds of books authored by Al-Kindi (795-866), al-Farabi (878-950) Ibn Sina or Avicenna (980-1037), Hamid al-Kirmani (d. 1068), and the greatest of the neo-Aristotelians, Ibn Rushd or Averroes (1126-98), who gave birth and ascendancy to an intellectual culture that shaped law, ethics, the sciences and arts. Europe was indebted to them for reviving Greek learning and casting it in a light that fuelled the Renaissance.

A potent illustration of the impact of this age on rational ethics comes from Ibn Tufayl’s (d. 1184) allegorical tale Hayy ibn Yaqzan, in which a child is marooned on an island without humans. Through his relationships with animals and nature the boy constructs a set of norms about appropriate behavior—and proceeds eventually to develop acute philosophical insights about the interplay of the human and divine intellects. Tufayl doesn’t stop there: the boy’s physical isolation mirrors a spiritual loneliness and spurs a longing for the divine, in keeping with the ideals of the Sufis. When he finally makes contact with the outside world, it turns out that their ethics are largely congruent; the world even has lessons to learn from the boy’s intuitions. Tufayl’s allegory made quite an impression on Daniel Defoe, the author of Robinson Crusoe.

Muslim ethics had become a distinct and elaborate discipline by the time Ibn Tufayl wrote his allegory, in the hands of Miskawayh (d.1078), al-Mawardi (d.1058) and Ghazali (d.1111)—all influenced in one or another by neo-Platonist thought as refracted by Arab commentators. And Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 1274) was to follow with his Persian-language text in the Shi’a tradition that had imbued even more fully both the Sufi and the rational philosophical spirit; Tusi’s work became a common text for religious institutions. The values of integrity, generosity, solidarity and forbearance (hilmin) defined the ideal umma as both religious and civic association impelled by humane reason.

Among the greatest beneficiaries and proponents of this rational culture were men of science, from al-Khwarizmi (780-850) who gave us algorithms, al-Battani (858-929) who first wrote of annual solar eclipses, and Ibn Haytham (965-1039) who virtually established optics as a proper field of study in the Mediterranean, to Ibn Sina with his Canon of Medicine and Ibn al-Nafis (d. 1288), who elaborated on the principles of pulmonary blood circulation long before William Harvey. The results included the world’s first hospitals, the introduction of paper-making to the Mediterranean that allowed Gutenberg to develop his printing press in the 15th century, Arabic numerals drawing on Indian innovations, and the earliest systems of commercial credit. Enormous libraries fed this quest, from Andalusia to Cairo and Baghdad, enjoying special status in Islamic culture under the ethic precept of waqf, or endowment for public purpose. When European collections had at best between 500 and 700 books, Cordoba needed a 44-volume catalogue for a library of 400,000 books. That figure is dwarfed by the collections of the Fatimids in Cairo, which in 1171 amounted to 1.6 million books, with over 18,000 on the sciences alone.

No history of civilizations, of course, is without counter-currents. The freethinking Mutazili school inspired the Asharis, conservatives who denounced philosophical speculation in favour of a literalist theology. Still, their greatest figure, Ghazali (1058-1111), wrote not only the Incoherence of the Philosophers but also a sophisticated ethical tract, the Balance of Moral Action and a splendid commentary on Aristotle logic. Amid political factionalism and the splintering of once-dominant dynasties in the Near East and Central Asia, conservative doctrines that opposed innovation and creative legal reasoning gained ground. Yet to dismiss the free thinkers as spurts in a history of anti-rationalism, or to claim as Lewis does that for Muslims (and Christians) “tolerance is a new virtue,” is to willfully misconstrue history. In Muslim-ruled Andalusia—as in Fatimid Cairo and Ottoman Istanbul—the scope of accomplishment from architecture to medicine to philosophy was matched only by the culture of pluralism that allowed Christians, Jews and Muslims to forge a genuine social synthesis. Hrotsvitha of Gandersheim, a Saxon writer visiting Cordoba in the 10th century, called it “the...
This is precisely the thrust of civic reform movements across the Muslim world, in campaigns for gender equality in Nigeria and Pakistan, for accountable government rather than clerical dominance in Iran, for tolerance of dissent in Egypt and Syria, for the right to express religious affinities in public spaces in Turkey and the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia. While orthodox revivalists (fundamentalists/Islamists) invoke the *shari’a or fiqh* as a criterion that governments must meet, and secular politicians respond by stifling human rights, the middle ground is increasingly occupied by activist intellectuals and their associates who invoke civic ethics.

True, there has been plenty of ideological Islam going around in defensive reaction to the assaults of Western ideological criticism. Yet in the writings of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), Fazlur Rahman (1911–88), Abdullahi An-Na‘im and Abdolkarim Soroush, for example, one finds deeply interlocking fidelities both to modernity and to Islamic rationalism. It is well to remember how far in history the antecedents go in this vein, that not all is reducible to a mere reacting to the West. It is no less significant, surely, to locate the tides of pluralism, civility and rational innovation that swept through the history of Muslim civilizations long before the modern encounter with the West—and the likes of Kemal Atatürk in post-Ottoman Turkey felt the need to don a Western mask.

Historical retrieval shows, as the late Fazlur Rahman argued so cogently, that in the cross-currents of liberal and conservative forces, Muslim ethics has failed to receive the attention that it merits as the “essence” of scripture and the civilizational endeavors flowing from it. After all, Muhammad is pointedly reminded in the Qur’an that he is one of a line of prophets in the business of delivering a universal message—*hudan lil nas*—in which the key moral concept is *taqwa*, the sense of right and wrong. The ethical imperative is distinguished by its pluralism, religious and civic, as in the oft-quoted verses, “We have made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another” (49:13), for “If God had made you a single people” (5:48).

Over and over again it draws specific moral lessons from universals, and universal inferences from the particular. In recalling the allegory of Cain and Abel, it warns, “Whoever kills a human being it is as if he has killed all of humanity. And whoever saves a life, it is as if he has saved all of humanity” (5:32). This was never lost on Muhammad. Once when he witnessed a funeral procession while seated with his companions and respectfully stood up, one of the others remarked that the deceased was a Jew. “Is he not a human soul?” was the Prophet’s reply. Christians and Jews were part of the civic *umma* that Muhammad formed in Medina in 622 C.E., under what is arguably the world’s first formal constitution, accompanied by
mechanisms of implementation through consultation (shura).

It is vital to recognize that the supposedly distinct and rigid corpus of law—often wrongly termed shari’a, which simply means “the proper path”—is actually a set of ethical guidelines. Neither the language nor the structure of the vast and highly pluralist norms developed from the verses of the Qur’an and Prophetic guidance would serve as “law” in the sense of enforceable juridical rules. More specific and practical injunctions traditionally acquired the status of fiqh, practical rules that served the rapidly expanding realm of Islam that needed a rule of law. The mix of morality and law gave legitimacy and higher motivation to those who lived by these norms. But as noted, conservative tendencies came to underplay the role of creative reason that drove the early development of this tradition. Law and the wider shari’a often became political instruments, whether for rulers or clerics—the ulama—seeking to assert independence from State control. Such as it was, law overshadowed ethics.

Which doesn’t mean that the humanistic reason underpinning any ethical system worth the name was lost. Outside the formal bounds of fiqh, ordinary men and women, as individuals and communities, faced the daily challenge thrown up by the Qur’an to all believers to perform that which is transparently good (ma’ruf) and to abjure that which is harmful (munkar)(3:104). As an obligation that was social and personal, this spurred rich discourses and critiques—including critiques of the behavior of establishment elites, political and clerical, that controlled the corpus of law. Whatever fossilization may have curtailed the development of modern rights and obligations in the framework of traditional law, the springboard of ethics has remained to contest tradition. As Ann Elizabeth Mayer puts it in Islam and Human Rights,

[T]he Islamic heritage comprises rationalist and humanistic currents that is replete with values that complement modern human rights such as concern for human welfare, justice, tolerance, and egalitarianism. These could provide the basis for constructing a viable synthesis of Islamic principles and international human rights ...

This is precisely the thrust of civic reform movements across the Muslim world, in campaigns for gender equality in Nigeria and Pakistan, for accountable government rather than clerical dominance in Iran, for tolerance of dissent in Egypt and Syria, for the right to express religious affinities in public spaces in Turkey and the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia. While orthodox revivalists (fundamentalists/Islamists) invoke the shari’a or fiqh as a criterion that governments must meet, and secular politicians respond by stifling human rights, the middle ground is increasingly occupied by activist intellectuals and their associates who invoke civic ethics. Consider the popular call by Syria’s Muhammad Shahrur for independent reason in reading the Qur’an and for modernizing the rules that purport to be derived from it. His 1990 book on the subject—an adamantly pluralist critique that lends itself to liberal demands against governments and clerics alike—became a bestseller for a readership in secular as well as theocratic regimes.

More directly confrontational has been the dissent of Hashem Aghajari, the reformist Iranian academic who risked the death penalty for declaring, “We are all capable of interpreting the Qur’an without the help of the clergy.” Aghajari has compared the excesses of the “ruling class” with the worst excesses of the Catholic papacy. Like Shahrur, he locates his critique in the ethical fold of Islam, in this case Shi’i. Also in a recent critique of the theocratic narrowing of liberal thought in Iran, Abdolkarim Soroush appeals to the ethos of “an art-loving God” against political tyranny, which also reminds us how important Iranian cinema has become as a vehicle for a liberating cultural ethos, and the search for a post-revolutionary identity. Abbas Kiarostami, Majid Majidi, Bahman Farmanara and Mohsen Makhmalbaf are internationally celebrated auteurs with their incisive yet subtle portrayals of repression and longing; official constraints on viewing their films in Iran are subject to the challenges of a thriving market in pirated videos.

A populist trend is also visible among Turkish activists like Fethullah Gülen and the Nurcu movement founded by the late Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1873-1960), stressing themes of independent religious thought, tolerance and civic engagement. In a country that is living down Ataturk’s legacy, it is not fundamentalism that appeals but a homegrown, quite liberal Islam. That is what the Nurcu and Gülen have long
offered, and what the newly elected Development and Justice Party (AKP) represents. Even the headscarf (türban) campaign that had earlier been waged in a robustly religious vocabulary and met no success in the courts or the legislature, has come to grips with a human rights discourse as an extension of religious affinity. Again, that affinity is finding expression (and is integral to the AKP’s agenda) in a rational ethics of social tolerance, not in a demand for “religious law” to be enacted.

A similar trend developed in Jordan, when a group of civic activists sought to put a stop to the “honor killing” of women, which the country’s legal system effectively condoned by imposing light punishments, if it prosecuted the killers at all: fully a quarter of all homicides in Jordan have been ascribed to honor killings. The campaign appealed not only to human rights law but also to the ethics of accountability and of “self-educated” citizenship. The activists made a point of not registering themselves in order to emphasize their political and legal autonomy, yet managed to get royal attention and support—as well as international media and activist interest in a cause that remains a major issue in Jordan.

The appeal to civic ethics is stronger still in war-torn societies, especially where religious extremism is a factor in the conflict. In post-civil war Tajikistan, Aziz Niyazi and Daulet Khudanazarov have been at the forefront of cultural and intellectual renewal to foster a modern civic identity in which the country’s diverse Muslim groups can share. Khudanazarov (an ex-presidential candidate) happens also to be a writer and filmmaker. In a country where the rule of law remains frail, ethical tenets rooted in cultural identity, I was often told, urgently needed to be propagated in schools and mass media—a conclusion endorsed by a leading scholar, Shirin Akiner, as the main hope for civil society. Akiner has also pointed to the success in the autonomous Badakshan region in creating civic institutions “unique” in their sustained commitment to self-reliance and volunteerism. Meanwhile in Afghanistan, where the rule of law has but a tenuous hold, there is again dependence on ethical norms both to uphold order and to anchor commitments to nonviolent change. Activists like Sima Samar and Nasrine Gross have been speaking up not only for women’s autonomy but also for a broader liberal culture.

None of the public intellectuals or movements discussed stand for a merging of church or mosque and state, despite their summoning of faith-based public ethics. Nor are they exclusive in a social, ethnocultural or religious sense. And in response to the question, “What does it mean to be a Muslim?” it is improbable that any would offer a response that would have been recognizable a mere three to four decades ago. Quite aside from the dynamics of post-colonial and post-Cold War identity, the impact of globalization and the new media is evident virtually everywhere.

Muslim identities three or four decades ago would also have been significantly different from what they were a century ago, at least in urban areas. Responses to new colonial and hegemonic Western encounters that were making themselves felt at the dawn of the twentieth century were products of different mindsets on the part of the individuals and communities concerned. This may seem axiomatic, yet the larger point is that it wasn’t only the social choreography or imaginings that had evolved but “Islam” itself in terms of what it means to Muslims. The content of shari’a and fiqh may be stable but the understanding of what they mean and how they influence the experience of modernity and tradition, is hardly an idée fixe. Rather, it’s contextual, a function of time, space and circumstance.

To speak of “Islams and modernities” is not only to underscore the experiential and confessional diversity of Muslims but also to acknowledge the reinvention of tradition itself through history. This means rejecting stock images of Muslims being tied to a rigid law, or as permanently removed from their heritage of humanistic reason. Nowhere
is a deterministic perspective on Islam less persuasive than in the West, where Muslims are a conspicuous feature of the landscape. Issues of diaspora identity and public religion have influenced and been influenced by the law, political economy and sociology.\textsuperscript{53} Globalization and the Internet allow the diaspora to interact more than ever with ancestral communities as part of what Gary Bunt calls the “digital umma.”\textsuperscript{54} Greater access to communications technology means that the diaspora has a vast presence in cyberspace, on satellite television channels, on radio airwaves. The diaspora itself is as diverse as the Muslim world, and inhabits secular environments that are not uniform in expressions of public religion and civil society. There is the extraordinary level of public religiosity in the United States, including a leadership that articulates its foreign policy in “Judeo-Christian” terms. Jose Casanova argues that the “process of the Americanization of Islam is already taking place,” including symbolic expressions such as the presence of imams at state and federal functions; a Muslim chaplain is even attached to the armed forces.\textsuperscript{55} Yet there is also the perspective that Muslims are an “out” group, especially in relation to perceived national security concerns. A further complication, to cite Casanova again, is that “Islam has perhaps resisted better than any other religion the modern colonial logic of racialization” with all its “corrosive” effects on the formation of religious identity among immigrants. Muslim arrivals don’t fit into a fixed geo-ethnic box or two: they’re Afghan, Albanian, Bosnian, Chechen, Indo-Pakistani, Iranian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Palestinian, Somali, Sudanese, among others—along with large clusters of indigenous African-American and other converts.

One recalls that multicultural policy in Canada, as in most of Western Europe, is also based primarily on ethno-cultural pluralities rather than religious ones. Modern democracies face a pluralist challenge beyond merely that of ensuring that legal and political frameworks meet the appropriate human rights standards of equality on grounds of colour, race and creed. In France with its \textit{laicité} and the Netherlands where officialdom takes a similar position, there is the issue of how secular spaces will accommodate expressions of public religion that are different from those of the mainstream.\textsuperscript{56} A lesson from the nature of public religion in the U.S., where the evangelical right strongly impacts politics (including violence at abortion clinics, and a Middle East policy driven by theological convictions that deny Palestinian rights), is that separation of church and state alone is not a guarantee against fundamentalist extremes.\textsuperscript{57} If this is true of a “mature democratic culture, it must give pause to those who assume that institutional walls are a universal panacea for social peace. Equally, the vibrant Christian-democratic parties in Europe are a reminder that formal engagement by overtly faith-inspired actors is consistent with secular democratic culture. However, assorted human rights protections from “ Theo-political coercion” in the public square are vital, beyond the tenets of mere equality.

The discourse of human rights and civic culture has found fresh respect among Muslims who must depend on the empowerment of citizenship for equality and equity in the diasporas of the West—but clearly also in Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria and beyond, where ethical discourse meets demands for the rule of law. So much for the rhetoric of orthodox revivalists who dismiss human rights as an “alien” idea, until of course they require its protection against secular tyrants. Or the claims of relativists and Orientalists who ascribe to an imagined, monolithic Islam a rejection of anything modern, from human rights to civil society.

To be sure, there are limits to what the rights to equality and free conscience and expression can accomplish in constraining theo-political coercion. Moreover, the secular, liberal rights ethos has been subjected to a range of sobering criticism from within—above all, for polarizing the individual and society in the quest for liberties that must ultimately be shared if they are to have meaning, and which can’t mean everything in and of themselves. The discontents include voices across the ideological spectrum—Stephen Carter, John Gray, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Robert Putnam, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Margaret Visser, Michael Walzer, to name a few. To these must be added the present Chief Justice of Canada, Beverly McLachlin, who delivered the annual LaFontaine-Baldwin lecture on March 7 in Halifax, entitled “The Civilization of Difference.”\textsuperscript{58} The obsessive determination to ignore our similarities as individuals and communities and stress the minutest differences, McLachlin argues, comes
from “the inescapable human need to construct one’s identity within a social context.” So we “discover our distinguishing attributes—those elements in ourselves, our history, and our culture that we value,” and “bind ourselves to others who share these attributes and values.” But groups necessarily exclude when they include—which is why we require human rights to create a “protected space for difference within society; a space within which communities of cultural belonging can form and flourish under the broad canopy of civil society.” In Canada’s experience the structure that protects difference is “not merely law” or some other imposed order. “Inclusion and equality cannot be achieved by mere rights” but by “a nation’s values... accepted as a means of brokering our differences and finding accommodation.” To which we can add “attitudes of tolerance, respect and generosity.”

McLachlin’s is an appeal in which individual and collective dignity is sustained not only by law but also by commitments to civility and solidarity. The claim she articulates to a “universalized ethic of respect and accommodation” is meaningful because it finds expression not just in formal institutions and norms but in a myriad acts by citizens in varied contexts. The public spaces in which this accommodation occurs can’t be defined by discrete categories of “secular” and “religious;” they fail to capture the intertwining purposes and motivations of active citizenship that generates the social capital of civil society. Nor during heightened political tensions have rights alone protected citizens or societies from arbitrary exercises of power by ostensibly accountable governments—as Muslims know first-hand in the diaspora and in the Islamic world.

A landscape that recognizes the intertwining of secular and religious, the ethical and the legal, resonates with the ideals of leading Muslim activists and intellectuals. But it will not come about by default or accident; it will be realizable only if a pluralist ethic of inclusion and rational civic dialogue is consciously pursued. The ethical content of this type of discourse is surely an appropriate antidote to theo-political coercion, in emergent and advanced democracies.59 “Discourse” here is used advisedly: it establishes a link to a reflective ethics, regardless of the particular secular or faith tradition, anchored in more than arbitrary claims of absolute moral choices.60 This in turn recalls the importance of the individual’s civic and institutional moorings, especially in the post-Durkheimian order of liberal individualism.

For all intents and purposes, it is becoming untenable to speak of “Islam and the West,” much less “Islam versus the West.” The plurality of Islams and modernities demands that we speak of “Islam in the West” compared with, say, “Islam in Central Asia” or “Islam in South Africa.” Equally, we ought to recognize that it is Muslims we actually refer to when we speak of “Islam” in context—individuals and communities, not ciphers or automatons, whose identities and aspirations are as pluralist as the world itself. This may not please the clash of civilization warriors or those who persist in clinging to fixed images of the Other. But it would be ethically—as opposed to politically—correct.

NOTE: A complete list of endnotes cited within the text, but not included here, is available from the editor; e-mail graham@sfu.ca

Amyn B. Sajoo is the editor of Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives (2002) and author of Pluralism in Old Societies and New States (1994). He has served as an advisor with various departments of the federal government in Ottawa, and is a frequent media commentator on Islam on both sides of the Atlantic.
So overpowering is the culture of war that it discourages many from even thinking that they could be instruments of change. A deep cynicism and mistrust are deeply imbedded in populaces. Many who do speak up for change are dismissed as idealists. Yet despite a political and societal climate that supports the entrenched culture of war status quo, there are significant signs that “a culture of peace” is being born. Already the ideas and formulation of a culture of peace have taken shape and been given a structural basis. A culture of peace may still be a goal rather than the dominant reality, but, just as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King’s principles of non-violence were taken up by many, so too the programs for a culture of peace are slowly taking shape.

A New Vision of Peace
The idea of a culture of peace to overcome—in a non-violent way—the culture of war was first taken up at a conference of scholars in 1989 at Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, as a “new vision of peace” constructed “by developing a peace culture based on the universal values of life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights and equality between men and women.”

The conference emphasized that violence is not an endemic part of the human condition.

UNESCO then began to formulate a culture of peace as a set of ethical and aesthetic values, habits and customs, attitudes toward others, forms of behaviour and ways of life that draw on and express:

- Respect for life and for the dignity and human rights of individuals.
- Rejection of violence.
- Recognition of equal rights for men and women.
- Upholding of the principles of democracy, freedom, justice, solidarity, tolerance, the acceptance of differences, and
- Understanding between nations and countries and between ethnic, religious, cultural and social groups.

A culture of peace is an approach to life that seeks to transform the cultural roots of war and violence into a culture where dialogue, respect, and fairness govern social relations. In this way, violence can be prevented through a more tolerant common global ethic. The culture of peace uses education as an essential tool in fostering attitudes supportive of nonviolence, cooperation and social justice. It promotes sustainable development for all, free human rights, and equality between men and women. It requires genuine democracy and the free flow of information. It leads to disarmament.

The culture of peace is, at its core, an ethical approach to life. It recognizes that the world is experiencing a fundamental crisis. Though this crisis is often expressed in economic, ecological or political terms, it is fundamentally a crisis of the human spirit. It is a crisis of all humanity which, in the journey through time, has reached the point where we are capable of destroying all life on earth just at the moment when the recognition of the inherent human rights of everyone is beginning to take hold. A choice in how we will live, which path we will follow, is illuminated. The culture of peace offers the vision of a global ethic toward life in full vibrancy; the culture of war offers the prospect of misery and annihilation.

When he was UNESCO Secretary-General, Federico Mayor dedicated himself to three initiatives to develop a culture of peace: a proposal for an International Year for the Culture of Peace (2000); a proposal for a U.N. Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace; and an initiative of the Nobel Peace Laureates’ “Campaign for the Children of the World” that would eventually become the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-10).

The centerpiece of this work is the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace adopted by the U.N. General Assembly September 13, 1999. It is
The work already accomplished in the United Nations system to develop the concept of the human right to peace is one of the world’s best kept secrets. The culture of war so pervades public opinion that it has drowned out voices asserting that the human right to peace is a fundamental right of every human being and is, in fact, the major precondition for all human rights. The time has come to emphasize that the peoples of the world have a sacred right to peace.

- Respect all life: Respect the life and dignity of each human being without discrimination or prejudice;
- Reject violence: Practice active non-violence, rejecting violence in all its forms: physical, sexual, psychological, economical and social, in particular towards the most deprived and vulnerable such as children and adolescents;
- Share with others: Share my time and material resources in a spirit of generosity to put an end to exclusion, injustice and political and economic oppression;
- Listen to understand: Defend freedom of expression and cultural diversity, giving preference always to dialogue and listening without engaging in fanaticism, defamation and the rejection of others;
- Preserve the planet: Promote responsible and development practices that respect all forms of life and preserve the balance of nature on the planet;
- Rediscover solidarity: Contribute to the development of my community, with the full participation of women and respect for democratic principles, in order to create together new forms of solidarity.

The culture of peace should not be considered the technical solution to every world problem; rather it supplies the moral foundation for a better individual and global order, and a vision which can lead people away from despair and society away from chaos. However, just as the Programme was starting, chaos struck in the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Since September 11, a deep sense of fear has pervaded the general populace. We have been violently attacked. We have been told that we do not know where the next attack is coming from. We must be ready. We must prepare ourselves for this new kind of aggression. If preemptive attacks are necessary, so be it. War against this unseen enemy must be fought. Media relentlessly feed us images of destruction and ceaselessly convey the
message that the military’s might is now necessary to protect us. The culture of war was given a great gift by the terrorists of September 11. If you want peace, the Romans said, prepare for war. The terrorists have apparently confirmed this.

In this environment, the culture of peace can hardly be heard let alone obtain the political attention and government funding to make an impression on electorates. In addition to being fearful, many are cynical about peace ever being achieved in such a turbulent world. The arms manufacturers, who mount such powerful lobbies in the legislative halls of Western countries, discount the elements of peace as so much naïveté. To challenge militarist thinking is to run the risk of being considered unpatriotic. The fences enclosing creative thinking are indeed high.

But the machinery of war has not in the past built the kind of world in which people everywhere can achieve human security. Why can it be expected to do so in the new conditions? Rather, it is the slow, painstaking construction of a new culture of peace that offers hope for a better future. The values of such a culture are well worth the time it takes to develop them. The momentum of history, buttressed by new life enhancing technologies, is on the side of the culture of peace.

Peace: A ‘Sacred Right’

The work already accomplished in the United Nations system to develop the concept of the human right to peace is one of the world’s best kept secrets. The culture of war so pervades public opinion that it has drowned out voices asserting that the human right to peace is a fundamental right of every human being and is, in fact, the major precondition for all human rights. The time has come to emphasize that the peoples of the world have a sacred right to peace.

That very sentence—“the peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace”—was inserted into the first operative paragraph in the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly November 12, 1984. One does not need to be reminded of the countless deaths in wars that have occurred in the almost two decades following it. Such a recounting does not invalidate the U.N. Declaration; it only underlines the point that this right needs to be better understood before procedures are developed to enforce it under the rule of law.

The intimate linkage between human rights and peace was first recognized in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter, and Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two Covenants on Civil and Political and Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights. The Preamble to the Charter, in stirring language evoked by the ashes of World War II, affirms that the peoples of the United Nations are determined “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.” Article 1 proclaims as the first purpose of the U.N. the maintenance of international peace and security.

Written a few years later, the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “The recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” These documents affirm the right of states to peace through a “peace system” with the primary goal being the preservation of peace and a respect for human rights as essential to the development of friendly relations among nations.

The Oslo Draft Declaration

A meeting convened by the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights in Oslo June 6-8, 1997, prepared a draft Declaration for UNESCO’s General Conference later that year. The Declaration’s aim was to broaden the human dimension of peace and divide the right into three interrelated components. The first defines peace as a human right, understanding that all human beings have a right to peace inherent to their humanity. War and violence of any kind, including insecurity, are considered “intrinsically incompatible” with the human right to peace. The section calls on states and members of the international community to ensure its implementation without discrimination. The second section elaborates on this task by making it a “duty” for all global actors, including individuals, to “contribute to the maintenance and construction of peace,” and to prevent armed conflicts and violence in all its manifestations.

The third section elaborates the “Culture of Peace”—the means by which the right to peace is to be achieved. As we have seen, the culture of peace is a strategy that seeks to root peace in peoples’ minds through education and communication, and a set of ethical and democratic ideals.
In essence, the right to peace is a global ethic of non-violence and reverence for all life and offers a blueprint to identifying the roots of global problems and checking conflict in its early states. It is an attempt to move beyond the day-to-day crises that make the headline news and address their deep-seated causes.

The power of this draft declaration is in its challenge to the hypocrisy dominating the world order today, and it was here that the codification of the right to peace came to a halt. A remarkable debate on the Oslo Draft Declaration took place in UNESCO’s General Conference on November 6, 1997. One European country after another either attacked or expressed reservations about the right to peace and accused Mayor of over-stepping his mandate. Countries from the South struck back, accusing the North of wanting to protect their arms industries. At the end, Paraguay stated, “This rich discussion shows that the culture of peace is the central issue…and that the Human Right to Peace is needed for individuals and states.” Noting that the debate split North and South, Paraguay added, “Perhaps peace is a greater concern in the South where scarce resources are being diverted to war.”

Failing to achieve a consensus, Mayor did not press further with the issue. Skepticism about the human right to peace continued to echo for years after. In the informal discussions at the U.N. in 1999, concerning the Draft Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, the U.S. delegate stated, “Peace should not be elevated to the category of human right, otherwise it will be very difficult to start a war.”

Whether this statement was intended or a malapropism, the delegate had put his finger precisely on why a human right to peace is needed.

Efforts are continuing at the U.N., but they still lack the necessary Western backing. In 2002, the U.N. Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee adopted a resolution calling for the promotion of the right to peace. The resolution would have the U.N. affirm that the peoples of the planet have a sacred right to peace, and resources released through disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all peoples, particularly those in developing countries. Although the resolution had 90 votes in favour, a hefty 50 negative votes (mostly Western countries and the new East European members of NATO) were cast against it, and 14 abstentions were registered. Such division renders the resolution practically inoperable.

When language is softer, the idea of moving away from war as a means of resolving conflict meets less resistance. For example, in 2003, the U.N. General Assembly concluded five months of negotiations by adopting by consensus a resolution on the prevention of armed conflict. The resolution called on parties to a dispute threatening international peace to make the most effective use of existing and new methods for peacefully settling disputes, including arbitration, mediation, other treaty-based arrangements, and the International Criminal Court, thus promoting the role of international law in international relations. It reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. And it called on Member States to support poverty eradication measures and enhance the capacity of developing countries; to comply with treaties on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and to strengthen their international verification instruments and eradicate illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The resolution was hailed as a landmark in efforts to move the world body away from a culture of reacting to crises to one of preventing them from reaching critical mass.

Though shying away from any implication that the prevention of armed conflict sets the stage for a full-scale discussion of the “right to peace,” the resolution contains within it important elements of the culture of peace. Far from being anodyne or just another resolution, it is infused with an obligation to the victims of violence and challenges states to move from rhetoric to reality in preventing violence. It is a significant step forward by the U.N. in preparing the way for the right to peace.

Meanwhile, attention in UNESCO shifted back from a “right” to peace to
the “culture” of peace. This was easier to digest for those who did not want their “right” to make war impeded. Everyone, after all, could be for peace in general. UNESCO showed its wisdom by treading slowly and developing the concept of the culture of peace into a series of programs that would, at least in the minds of those who truly understood the dimensions of the culture of peace, prepare the groundwork for a later acceptance of the human right to peace.

‘Human Rights Have Come a Long Way’

In considering the difficulties of enshrining the human right to peace in law, it is helpful to consider the overall progress made on the human rights agenda. Starting with the Universal Declaration followed by the covenants, the various conventions on women’s and children’s rights, and then such instruments as the Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty, the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals and the International Court of Justice, the whole field of human rights has taken centre stage. As Mary Robinson, former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (and former President of Ireland) puts it: “Human rights have indeed come a long way.” Even though many governments do not necessarily observe human rights standards, most at least acknowledge that human rights have a role to play. The forward-minded nature of the U.N.’s work on the delineation and implementation of human rights is seen particularly in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Convention is a universally agreed upon set of non-negotiable standards and obligations. It spells out the basic human rights that children everywhere—without discrimination—have: the right to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cultural and social life. The Convention protects children’s rights by setting standards in health care, education and legal, civil and social services. These standards are benchmarks against which progress can be assessed. States that are parties to the Convention are obliged to develop and undertake actions and policies in the best interests of the child.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the first legally binding international instrument to incorporate the full range of human rights—civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Two Optional Protocols to strengthen the Convention entered into force in 2002, and address the involvement of children in armed conflict, the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography. The Convention is the most universally accepted human rights instrument in history. It uniquely places children at the forefront in the quest for the universal application of human rights. By ratifying this instrument, national governments have committed themselves to protecting and ensuring children’s rights and they have agreed to hold themselves accountable before the international community. Every country in the world has ratified it except two: the U.S. and Somalia.

The subject of the human right to peace has clearly entered circles of discussion at the U.N. Some hold that it is already a component of developing international law. This is a signal moment because a full discussion of the right to peace puts a new spotlight on the age-old question of the abolition of war itself. In the new era of weapons of mass destruction, the viability of war as a legal means to resolve disputes is clearly over. War today can lead to the obliteration of humanity. Unfortunately, the world community, held in check by the forces of the culture of war, is a long way from outlawing war. The debate on the human right to peace, therefore, is a step forward. As it is pursued, it will force the political system to face up to its responsibility to at least avoid war.

The debate inevitably will centre on the deeply controversial question of the future of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice has already given its view on this matter: it says nations have a legal obligation to get rid of them. While the abolition of nuclear weapons will not by itself guarantee peace, it is an elementary fact of the 21st century that as long as nations brandish nuclear weapons there can be no peace.

The proponents of nuclear weapons do indeed know which way the debate on the human right to peace is headed. That is why they will use every argument they can think of, every political device they can find, and every form of intimidation they can invent to derail the debate. They derailed the debate in UNESCO. They have rendered nuclear weapons abolition resolutions at the U.N. inoperative. They have used the tragedy of September 11 to scare the populace into believing that only gigantic amounts of weaponry can head off the terrorism of the future. They have already caused an erosion of civil liberties in the guise of combating terrorism.

These proponents of militarism as the route to peace appear to operate today from the commanding heights of public opinion. But against this insidious thinking that war equals peace is rising a new army—not of soldiers but of highly informed, dedicated, and courageous citizens of all countries who do see the perils ahead. There is a blossoming of both understanding and action in the new phenomenon of an alert civil society calling governments to account for paying only lip service to their human rights commitments. Buttressed by the dynamic means of electronic communication, they are bringing new energy to the global quest for peace.

Douglas Roche is an internationally recognized expert on nuclear disarmament and arms control issues. Currently sitting as an Independent Senator, he was a long-standing member of the Foreign affairs Committee of Parliament.
Responses to Violence: Peaceful Resistance in Palestine

—Melissa Mullan

SFU graduate Melissa Mullan’s article is a powerful follow-up to Terry Gibbs’ article, “Opinion Peace,” in the 2003 issue of Humanitas (pp. 39-40). In that article, Terry Gibbs described her work with CEPAL (the Canadian-Palestinian Educational Exchange), and her experience working with refugee camps in Beirut. It also connects strongly with Marc H. Ellis’s “A Revolutionary Coincidence” (p. 37 in the same issue), his reflections on the present situation in Israel and Palestine.

It was six o'clock in the morning as I walked down the dusty main street of the camp, here and there turning sideways to squeeze through the claustrophobic alleyways. Despite the early hour, the sun was shining brightly, warming the empty streets. I was the only person up at such an early hour. As I neared the end of the camp I sat down and glanced towards the entrance. At first, I thought that I was seeing things—that my eyes, still heavy with sleep, were not focusing correctly. Unfortunately, this was not the case: what I was looking at was in fact a large, earthen mass blocking the entrance to the camp. The other entrance was sealed off by heavy cement blocks. Half an hour later I was standing on the roof of a nearby house as an armored personnel carrier and army jeep entered the camp and parked directly below me. The army presence would not leave the camp completely until much later that night.

During the spring of this year I spent a month working as a peace activist in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. I was working with I.S.M., The International Solidarity Movement, a Palestinian-led movement made up of a diverse group of internationals from around the world striving to end the occupation. During my time in Palestine I was working with people from such varied backgrounds as a recently graduated high school student, a labor union representative, and a seventy-two year old grandmother. I.S.M. is devoted to the use of non-violent direct actions to challenge the Israeli occupation. We also document the human rights abuses in attempts to educate our home countries by telling a side of the conflict that is rarely reported in the regular media.

Most of my time in Palestine was spent in the city of Nablus, living with a family in Balata Refugee Camp located just outside the city. The camp is more a suburb of the city than an area separate and on its own. Two main streets run through the camp; they had once been paved but little remains of what asphalt formerly covered them. With a population of 20,000 in an area of 2.5 square kilometres, Balata is the largest refugee camp in the West Bank. It also has the reputation of spawning many suicide bombers and resistance fighters, causing it to receive a large amount of military presence.

The day before the roadblocks, appeared the Aqaba Summit had finished in Jordan and the infamous Road Map to Peace was implemented. What better way to inaugurate the Road Map (which promises to ease restrictions on movement for Palestinians) than by erecting eight roadblocks, completely sealing off all roads into Balata Camp? That day the activists in Balata along with the local community set about removing the roadblocks. With only a few donated shovels and the use of scrap pieces of metal and plastic, we dug out the large rocks, car pieces and other bits of trash buried in the mound of earth.

Not long after beginning our work the army appeared. Though the busy main street of the camp was full of children, women and men going about their daily routines, the army first used tear gas to dissuade us and when that failed, they resorted to firing both rubber coated bullets and live ammunition down the street. Our shovels were confiscated directly out of our hands. The community continued to work after the loss of our shovels, using only our bare hands to move the earth. By this point our gestures were largely symbolic as we could accomplish little without tools. However, the energy was that of defiance; we would not allow the army to close in the camp. Eventually the roadblocks were all removed successfully with the help of a bulldozer, only to be replaced again that night. Over a period of days we continued to remove the roadblocks during the day and the army filled them in at night. Eventually however, the army gave up and the roads remained open. This is just one example of the many examples of what non-violence achieved while I was in Palestine.

One concern in Balata Camp, and everywhere else in Palestine for that matter, is finding ways for the children to escape from the violence and hatred they experience in their every day lives. Conditions in the camps for children are
dismal. There are few recreational possibilities, and schools are often closed or classes cancelled because of army activities; and for most children, leaving the camp, even for an afternoon, is impossible. Death and injury are alarming normalities to these children, many of whom live in a constant state of fear. It is not surprising, then, that in these conditions there is little hope for the future. It is of utmost importance to provide the children with an alternative to the violence that surrounds them and to show them that there is more than one way of dealing with their current situation.

While in Balata, along with the Palestinian leaders of the local youth center, we organized a series of non-violence workshops. Our plan was to allow children the opportunity to discuss their feelings and to teach them about the peaceful resistance used in the First Intifada, which most of them are too young to remember. A video series entitled A Force More Powerful was to be shown to demonstrate examples of how peaceful resistance had worked in other situations, ranging from Gandhi’s India to Martin Luther King’s United States. During my last semester at Simon Fraser University, I had been exposed to these videos through a humanities course on Gandhi that I took. It was impressive to see the same videos half way around the world, translated into Arabic and reaching a completely different audience. Unfortunately and somewhat ironically, our non-violence classes had to be postponed because of an increase in army incursions into the camp, during which the safety of the children might have been put at risk.

Through my course work at Simon Fraser University I was exposed to many examples of peaceful resistance around the world. It was an amazing experience to be part of this movement and to see the results that peaceful resistance can achieve. Many people question the value of peaceful resistance, believing that it can accomplish little. Facing one of the world’s strongest militaries with few weapons of their own, the Palestinian people have little real choice but to act in peaceful resistance to the occupation. For many of these people, waking up every day and continuing on with daily routines is in itself an act of resistance.

As an international I know that my actions are having an effect because of the large number of arrests and deportations of peace activists by Israel. Many activists are not allowed entry into the country. These actions taken by the government have made me realize that my actions are having an impact by impeding the army’s ability to carry about its operations. Non-violent actions are possible for everyone to take part in, and do have a positive effect. Only with peaceful actions can we hope to achieve peace. Through non-violence the violent actions of the aggressors are called into question and become unacceptable. In the current bleak situation, non-violence has the power to mobilize people for positive change.
Merton Conference Celebrates 25th Anniversary

—Judith Hardcastle

Two hundred and fifty Merton enthusiasts from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia gathered at the University of British Columbia from June 5 – 7, 2003 for the Eighth Conference and General Meeting of the International Thomas Merton Society. Hosted by the Thomas Merton Society of Canada, the conference delighted delegates and guests with its richness of scholarship, its calibre of speakers, and its warm hospitality.

Major speakers included Douglas Burton-Christie, James Finley, Richard Rohr, and Mary Jo Weaver. The program featured an address by ITMS President and author Jonathan Montaldo, a panel on Merton and the East, and twenty-five concurrent sessions and workshops. The conference marked the 25th Anniversary of the first major Merton conference held in Vancouver in 1978 and organized by two graduate students, Donald Grayston, now Director of the Institute for the Humanities, and Michael Higgins, now President of St. Jerome's University in the University of Waterloo.

Douglas Burton-Christie, Professor of Theology at Loyola-Marymount University in Los Angeles and editor of Spiritus, the journal of the Society for the Study of Christian Spirituality, delivered the Springboard Address on Friday morning. He is the author of The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism as well as a forthcoming book on landscape and the sacred.

James Finley, who spoke on Saturday morning, was a novice under Thomas Merton at the Abbey of Gethsemani, and is presently a psychotherapist in private practice in California. He is the author of the best-selling Merton’s Palace of Nowhere, as well as The Contemplative Heart and other works on contemplative spirituality.

Richard Rohr, OFM, is founder of the Center for Action and Contemplation in Albuquerque, New Mexico, a popular speaker, and author of more than a dozen books, including Hope Against Darkness: The Transforming Vision of Saint Francis in an Age of Anxiety, Everything Belongs: The Gift of Contemplative Prayer, and Jesus’ Plan for a New World: The Sermon on the Mount. He spoke Saturday afternoon on Merton and the landscape of the desert.

Mary Jo Weaver, Professor of Religious Studies at Indiana University, has published books on the modernist controversy, on the women’s movement within the Catholic Church, and on divisions within American Catholicism at the turn of the millennium. Most recently, she authored Cloister and Community: Life Within a Carmelite Monastery. A featured speaker at the 1978 Vancouver conference, she delivered the 25th Anniversary Address on Thursday morning.

Concurrent sessions were diverse, reflecting the broad range of topics that Merton explored in his lifetime. While many focused on the conference theme—Thomas Merton's Sacred Landscapes—others presented scholarly papers on other aspects of Merton's life and thought, including interfaith dialogue, poetry, technology and social critique.

The Thomas Merton Center at Bellarmine University in Louisville, Kentucky, mounted a special exhibit of thirty-one photographs—a sampling of over 1300 photographs taken by Merton—entitled The Paradox of Place: Thomas Merton’s Photography. These images provided a glimpse into another aspect of Merton’s prolific work and, along with the quotations selected to accompany the exhibition, an insight into “Merton’s seeing eye.”

Evening hospitality featured poetry readings and music by some outstanding Canadian artists—poets Hannah Main van der Kamp, Susan McCaslin, Catherine Owen, Allan Brown and Doug Beardsley, and musicians/songwriters Ian Tyson, Rob Des Cotes, Peace in the City Band, and La Candela.

Sixteen youth scholars from Canada and the United States, including SFU students or former students Lindsay Graham, Catherine Owen, Rani Sandhu and Sarah Taylor attended the conference as recipients of Daggy Scholarships, offered each two years to young people in memory of the longtime director of the Merton Center in Louisville.

The 8th ITMS Conference and General Meeting was truly a memorable event—and The Thomas Merton Society of Canada acknowledges its gratitude to the Institute for the Humanities at Simon Fraser University for the generous financial support which contributed significantly to its success. The 9th ITMS Conference and General Meeting is scheduled for June 2005 in San Diego, California.

Meanwhile, Merton studies continue in 2004 in co-operation with the Humanities Department, SFU International and the Thomas Merton Society of Canada, which are offering two pilgrimage programs in 2004—Thomas Merton’s New York (April 25 – May 3 in New York City); and Thomas Merton in France (June 24 – July 4 in Prades, France, Merton’s birthplace). For more information about these programs, please contact Don Grayston at donald_grayston@sfu.ca or Judith Hardcastle at judithhardcastle@telus.net or visit www.sfu.ca/international or www.merton.ca

Judith Hardcastle is coordinator of the Thomas Merton Society in Vancouver
Grace MacInnis Visiting Scholar

In honour of Grace MacInnis and her history of social and political service as a Member of Parliament for the New Democratic Party, a Grace MacInnis Visiting Scholar Program was initiated through the Institute for the Humanities at Simon Fraser University in 1993. Grace MacInnis was the first woman from British Columbia to be elected to Parliament, and was the only woman in Parliament from 1968 to 1972. She was appointed an Officer of the Order of Canada in 1974; was among seven women to be granted the first Governor-General’s Persons Awards in 1979 for their work in advancing the status of Canadian women; and was honoured in 1982 by the Canadian Labour Congress with a sculpture and an award for Outstanding Service to Humanity. Previous Grace MacInnis speakers at SFU include: Shirley Williams (1993), Joy Kogowa (1995), Lynn McDonald (1997) and Myrna Kostash (2002).

This year, the Institute for the Humanities was proud to honour Dr. Elaine Bernard as the Grace MacInnis Visiting Scholar. Elaine Bernard discussed labour rights as human rights at the “Seeking Justice: Human Rights in Our Communities” Symposium held at the Wosk Centre for Dialogue on November 8, 2003.

Social Justice Series:
Elaine Bernard, Grace MacInnis Visiting Scholar
—Shanthi Besso

Dr. Elaine Bernard is Executive Director of the Labour and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School. The Labour and Worklife Program is Harvard’s forum for research and teaching on the world of work and workers. Before being recruited by Harvard in 1989, Bernard was the Director of Labour Programs at Simon Fraser University. Bernard has a BA from the University of Alberta, an MA from the University of British Columbia, and a Ph.D. from Simon Fraser University. Bernard’s current research and teaching interests are in the area of international comparative labour movements and the role of unions in promoting civil society, democracy and economic growth.


Dr. Bernard began her presentation with a personal reflection on the ways in which the FLQ crisis of 1970 shaped her professional and personal growth. She explained that when then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act in response to the kidnappings of British diplomat James Cross and Quebec’s Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte, and the subsequent murder of M. Laporte, it was a speedy and shocking lesson in how fragile our rights actually are. It taught her that it is impossible to tell in advance how people or organizations will react in times of crisis, and it ingrained in her a belief that “we” (citizens) are the sole guarantors of civil liberties and human rights.

Thirty years later, Elaine Bernard has honed these initial ideals into a succinct and passionate set of theories and goals around labour rights. In addressing the first question she had posed at the beginning of her presentation, Dr. Bernard’s answer was simple and to the point: Labourers are humans, and therefore labour rights are human rights.

She explained why it is valuable to frame labour rights as a specific category within the broader discourse of human rights. The workplace is a major part of most of our lives, and is also the location of huge rights violations. Dr. Bernard argued that the workplace is the only space where human rights are systematically suspended. We relinquish rights as a condition of employment, not voluntarily, but so that we may have the “privilege” of having a job. She went on to say that we give up such rights as freedom of speech and association, as well as some basic safety and health rights, even in developed nations such as Canada, and that workplace conditions seem to be declining as unions lose strength because of what Bernard calls the modern day Nuremburg defense: “The Market made me do it.”

Dr. Bernard argued that labour rights have a great deal to bring to human rights discourse, as they have a history of creating vehicles that allow workers to both win and exercise rights. After all, rights do no good if they remain on theoretical wish-lists and are never put into practice. Bernard gave a great analogy for this concept: A driver’s license gives one the right to drive a car, but unless there is a vehicle to drive around in, one cannot exercise that right. Unions and collective bargaining are the vehicles through which workers are able to assert their human rights in the work place.

Although Dr. Bernard is obviously a strong advocate for labour rights discourse, she also offered some concerns around the limits and dangers of using rights terminology and theory. Rights discourse can over-emphasize individual rights to the detriment of collective rights; rights are meaningless abstractions with no ability to exercise.
themselves; and the universality of rights ignores the asymmetry of power in our society. By this, Dr. Bernard was referring to the co-optation of rights language and theory by the powerful and privileged. This can be seen in the advent of such concepts and language as “reverse discrimination,” and in protectionist policies enacted by First World countries to ensure that Third World countries cannot compete for trade, thus protecting the “rights” of the rich and powerful.

In the end, however, Dr. Bernard comes out firmly in favour of labour rights discourse, and offered some ways that she believes the labour movement can contribute to the greater human rights movement. She sees the workplace as a space where rights intervention can happen; where truly democratic self-organizing can occur; where solidarity can be fostered and encouraged; and where we can address the difficult task of focusing on economic, rather than political, rights.

Dr. Bernard also believes that broader human rights discourse can bring valuable concepts to the labour rights movement. Human rights discourse can offer lessons regarding the value of universality; it can speak from a high moral plane; and human rights discourse has the power to mobilize people and take action on a broader social and political plane than labour rights on their own.

The lecture was not only informative, but also funny, passionate and thought provoking. Dr. Elaine Bernard ended, appropriately, with a quotation from J.S. Woodsworth, who, in addition to founding the CCF (which evolved into the NDP), was also of course Grace MacInnis’ father. The quotation, a variation on the golden rule, is a beautiful summary of what it means to be a human rights defender: “What we demand for ourselves, we desire for all.”

Shanthi Besso is Event Coordinator of Community Education Programs at SFU Harbour Centre

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The SFU Field School in Prague

The SFU Field School in Prague has been in existence for ten years and owes much of its present form, and success, to the leadership of Jerry Zaslove. Retirement rules being what they are, Jerry was not able to continue leading the Field School in 2003, and I had the daunting task of trying to fill his shoes. The Prague Field School runs over eight weeks from early May to early July. Students receive eleven credits, the equivalent of three courses at SFU, but there are actually different instructors in Czech language, visits to historical and architectural sites, studies in art history, politics, literature, film, and the intellectual tradition. The program is organized through the Office of International and Exchange Student Services and the Humanities Department at SFU. —David Mirhady, Humanities, SFU

In 2003 The Institute for the Humanities provided a stipend to assist a travel study student to attend the Prague field School. Jessica Denning was the 2003 recipient of the award and the following reflects her experiences while in Prague with the school.

Learning in the Czech Republic: Transforming Perspectives

—Jessica Denning

Now, I wake up in the morning and I forget that I am the only one in the room. After spending eight weeks with a roommate, in a suite with three other women, and spending five out of seven days with twelve other classmates that up until three months ago were strangers, I am still not used to living alone. I am definitely experiencing some sort of re-entry culture shock, and every day I wake up I remember less and less what my life was like while living in Prague. After searching through my emails and journal entries, and scanning through my eighteen rolls of film (some people are obsessive), I came to some sort of compromise with myself. After returning home and having time to reflect on Prague, I realize it is unreasonable for me to provide a thorough explanation of a life changing experience; only glances at personal and specific moments of my time in the Czech Republic are possible.

Jessica Denning

Vancouver, August 2003

Shanthi Besso is Event Coordinator of Community Education Programs at SFU Harbour Centre

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Prague, May – July 2003

Every morning I invariably wake up to some cacophonous sound. Most mornings it is the chambermaids who stir me from my slumber at 6am, but who, because we are still sleeping in them, never change our sheets. Other mornings it is my roommates, awake and getting ready for the day. But every so often, I awake to the sound of the recycling truck picking up the glass bottle receptacle. No one in Prague has individual recycling containers, so the sound of a thousand beer and other miscellaneous bottles crashing into the back of the truck sounds like the end of the world. After reluctantly gaining the strength to push off my lead-like pink comforter, I get ready and head downstairs for breakfast.

Breakfast at the dorm is complimentary. It is very European, with meats and cheeses, breads, fruit, vegetables, hard-boiled eggs, some kind of pastry, yoghurt, and various beverages. Invariably every morning I open the lid of my yoghurt and get squirted on—so much for the four hours I spent doing laundry the day before.

On Tuesdays after breakfast, we meet our teachers, David and Vaclav, for a fieldtrip outside of Prague. I board our OK Bus Praha, and grabbing a jahoda (strawberry) candy, wave good morning to Michael, our bus driver. Michael used to be a race-car driver, so once we hit the highway out of Prague the speedometer ranges between 110-160 kilometers per hour. He is frequently on his cell phone making connections about where we are going, and when we return to the bus from a long day he often greets us with candies, pastries or chocolate. Vaclav begins every class, standing in the aisles of the bus, recounting in his thick Czech accent, where we will be going and what we will see. He takes us to many places tourists never go, or know about, and the breadth of his knowledge astounds me every week. He always wears suspenders.

Strangely, the atmosphere of each place we visit infiltrates my group, and depending on where we are, we often adopt the roles of the people who used to live in castles, fight in battles, perform theatricalities for the community, or hide from the enemy. Of the many places Vaclav took us, I found the greatest pleasure among the arts, the ruins and nature. It is admittedly a strange combination, but it is a reflection of my entire education, and as Prague is the final step in obtaining my degree, I find it fitting that the third day we spent in Southern Bohemia fulfilled these passions, and was most inspiring.

Cesky Krumlov is located on a merchant trade route. In the sixteenth century it was a mining town for silver and graphite. Almost all of the architecture is Renaissance, including the castle that was transformed from its earlier medieval style. The Rosenberg family, who had the castle transformed and were almost as rich as the Bohemian king, built the first theatre in Cesky Krumlov as a demonstration of their wealth. Sometimes it seemed difficult to grasp how old something is, and that it has miraculously survived such a long history. It is interesting how space can envelop you, generating feelings of awe, privilege, fear, happiness, jealousy, anger, sadness, and causing you to realize you are sharing a perspective of history with thousands that have long perished.

The Baroque Theatre, Zamecke Divadlo, was built in 1682, and then rebuilt in 1766. Having previously studied technical theatre I was able to appreciate the sophisticated level of machinery still in operation. The theatre houses over five hundred and seventy costume pieces and accessories, and three hundred and fifty scenery flats and decorations to make thirteen complete scenes. Baroque theatre was based on miracles, illusions and special effects. In terms of the aural spectacle, the sound machines, orchestra, and use of gunpowder were all integral to theatricality, and I was most impressed with their technical function in scene changes. The tour of the theatre was fascinating, though somewhat disappointing. The only piece of machinery we were shown was the equipment for making a storm. Despite the fact that I have worked backstage for so many years, I was not allowed to participate in creating the storm because the equipment was heavy and I was a woman. I was not only frustrated, but also surprised to find such prejudice. The storm equipment was surprisingly realistic, and the machinery backstage...
had been completely restored. The theatre, which has been under renovations since 1997, will unfortunately never be used again for public performance, as it is a valuable heritage site.

After the tour, and a lunch, we reconvened for the second half of our fieldtrip. It began with a long drive through a countryside that progressively became less and less inhabited until Michael dropped us off in the middle of the Sumava Forest. The hike was long and steep to begin. There was a cool breeze in the air, and plenty of shade from the sun. We stopped along the way to have a beer (“Czech tradition” Vaclav said) and wrestle with a puppy.

After the refreshments, we made an unexpected stop at a church. The elderly man inside spoke Czech and German and so was able to communicate with both our teachers. After listening to him speak, Vaclav turned to us to translate: “So he is a little crazy.” Apparently, this man, acting on divine prophecy, had taken it upon himself to save the church from complete destruction after the Second World War. He kept shouting things like, “Discipline!” He grabbed my hand and placing a coin in it, showed us all where to donate to the church collection plate. While examining the fine craftsmanship of the rafters he had built, an unexpected, definitely not holy, sound came soaring up through the beams: “Is that the ice-cream truck song?” A group of us raced down the steep and narrow staircases to the nave of the church, and sure enough, our classmate was playing “The Entertainer”, on the church organ. Vaclav eventually hustled us out of there, and was heard to remark: “They will erect a sign here of comparisons between geography, architecture, religion, and politics are made all the time in our classes, and it is interesting to gain a historical perspective that acknowledges how everything is interconnected.

Admittedly, I now know more about the history of the Czech Lands, than I do about Vancouver, the city I have grown up in for the past twenty-three years.

Sitting amongst the ruins of the castle, listening to Vaclav, the atmosphere of the past permeating my thoughts, I felt extremely satisfied with my decision to attend the field school. It was a most enjoyable way to finish my degree. But I hardly had time to contemplate this thought, before the lecture was over and we were heading down the mountain, back to the bus. Grabbing sticks along the way, a bunch of us ran down the mountain, sword-fighting and screaming like children. Though sweaty and dirty, I was smiling and feeling alive.

We arrived back at the Chateau in time for dinner. That night, after games of pool, walks through the forest, and watching the sun set from the lookout tower, a group of us moved into the cottage bar to have a couple of drinks and play cards before bed. A couple of games turned into a marathon and soon it was midnight. Our teacher called for a bottle of champagne to celebrate my birthday. The bartender, Filip, who had stayed up with us after last call, took it upon himself to celebrate my birthday with me in true Czech fashion. I believe it must be a custom that the birthday person to get drunk, so drunk, in fact, that she does not see what is coming. Czech humour is difficult to figure out, and is ironic and dark. With a language barrier, it is especially hard to translate the exact meaning. The most universal jokes are practical, and Filip was a master. After feeding me free beers for a while, he suddenly had me facing the group, with a funnel in my pants and cheering me on to drop a Krone from my head into the funnel. “Why am I doing this?” I asked myself, as I went to drop the Krone from my forehead into the funnel for the second time, and Filip poured a glass of water down the funnel, soaking my pants. He called me “inkontinencni vlozky” (“piss-pants”) for the rest of the trip. Of course, my initial shock and anger eventually subsided, and I was finally able to laugh at the situation – “you got me, Filip” – we had another bottle of champagne in celebration.

Now, as I reflect on my summer, I realize that I experienced one of the most wonderfully intellectual, positive, action- packed birthdays ever in the Czech Republic. My summer days were full of adventure and risk, and every moment I feel compelled to acknowledge how my perspectives of the world and my position in it have changed.
Institute for the Humanities Travel Study Award

$1500 awarded spring or summer semester

Awarded to a third or fourth year student who has completed two Humanities courses, to assist them to attend a travel-study/field school program offered by Simon Fraser University. Letters of application should be sent to the Director, Institute for the Humanities, SFU and must include:

- a resumé
- a copy of university transcript
- a statement describing the relevance of the program/field school to the student’s academic program and goals
- two letters of reference from Simon Fraser University faculty.

The application deadline is March 15 each year
More To Academe Than Making Money

—Tom Nesbit

However reluctantly, universities are being forced to change. Rapid technological development allied with the pressures of economic globalisation are requiring them (and those who pay for their services) to redefine the role and purposes of higher education in what’s increasingly being called a “knowledge” or “learning” society. No longer quiet enclaves for the pursuit of truth, far removed from the busy world of commerce and industry, universities are now closely linked with national economic and scientific objectives. They are regarded as the chief source of the elements essential for society’s continued growth and prosperity: highly trained specialists, expert knowledge, and scientific advances that can be turned into valuable new products or procedures. The demand for university services related to their mission of teaching, research, and community service is expected to grow significantly in the next 10 years. In Canada, the AUCC (the principal association of universities and colleges) projects several changes: a 20-30% increase in demand in student enrolments (particularly amongst adult and other “non-traditional” learners), a significant increase in research performance to make Canada one of the top five countries in the world for research and development, increased interactions and partnerships between universities and industry, more international collaboration and competition, and a tripling of gross revenues. Such growth is expensive; already costs are spiralling while financial support from governments steadily declines. Clearly, new sources of revenue need to be found to pay for universities’ expanded role. The pressures upon academic institutions to commercialize and upon their scholars to become entrepreneurs are becoming intense.

These issues are comprehensively examined by former Harvard University president Derek Bok in _Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education_ (Princeton University Press, 2003). Reflecting on a lifetime’s experience of higher education administration, he probes university efforts to profit financially from an increasing range of activities—not just athletic endeavours but educational and research work as well—and shows how such ventures are undermining core academic values. He details the ties between corporations, universities, and faculty and the growth of commercial activities in both scientific research and educational programming. In sum, Bok finds the enterprise of commercializing the academy decidedly risky. The promise of financial gain often leads to conflicts of interest, unnecessary secrecy, and corporate attempts to influence research results. Although Bok focuses primarily on US higher education with its extraordinary mix of public and private institutions, his overall cautions will resonate in Canada as well. Higher education here has also seen its share of challenges to academic freedoms stemming from the clash between commercial and academic values (as the recent experiences of David Healy, Nancy Olivieri, and David Noble will attest).

Bok examines competing explanations for increased commercial activities in the academy: university presidents and senior administrators intent upon expanding the size and reputation of their institution; the growing influence of the market throughout society; the increased legitimacy of private enterprise and corporate approaches; institutional competition fostered by questionable but nevertheless popular magazine league tables; a lack of clarity in academic values and a loss of institutional purpose and any mission “beyond a vague commitment to excellence”; cutbacks in government funding; and attempts by the businessmen and others who sit on boards of trustees and governors to commodify education and research, reduce faculty status, and push universities towards serving corporate rather than scholarly interests. Bok sees all these explanations as influential. Yet, for him, no attempt at commercialization would bear much fruit were it not for the rapid growth in opportunities to profit from the production of knowledge provided by a more technologically sophisticated and knowledge-based economy.

Bok finds that the supposed benefits of increased commercialism—extra scholarships, more library books, new laboratory equipment, endowed chairs, faculty incentives—often prove illusory in the long term. Hoped-for private amounts don’t always materialize, rising costs eat up anticipated gains, and the level of public funding declines. He also sees threats to core academic values: admission and educational standards are undermined, vocationally-oriented programs are promoted at the expense of more traditional liberal arts, collegiality and trust can be undermined, and the basic canons of independent scholarly and scientific enquiry can suffer. These have moral and practical consequences: the
concerns for character- and citizen-building are subjugated to more commercial and competitive values and the reputation of universities for objective and unbiased teaching and research is impaired. Most importantly, the philosophical underpinnings and social mandates of universities suffer if their activities follow only what is lucrative.

As might be expected, the rise of academic entrepreneurism has not met with universal enthusiasm on campuses. Universities’ attempts to commercialize rarely seem to meet with approval from either faculty or students. Some complain that universities have turned into knowledge factories where intellectual ideals are routinely compromised for the sake of money and senior administrators respond more to political and market forces than to faculty, students, and staff. For others, learning and research come to be valued in terms of their ability to be translated into cash or merchandise, and not in other ways, such as aesthetic, intellectual, or recreational pleasure. The dangers in this are readily apparent: the idea that there are other kinds of value than the economic eventually gets downplayed or even lost. And, once essential values are sacrificed they become difficult to restore. This remains the single most compelling argument against unfettered academic commercialism: envisioning universities as economic agents rather than educational institutions threatens to change their character in ways that limit their freedom, sap their effectiveness, and diminish their integrity. Although not all ties with industry are suspect and universities need not refuse every opportunity to earn financial reward from their work, commercial ventures are decidedly risky…not only in themselves but also to the academic standards and scholarly values that universities maintain and to the integrity and independence they hold.

Tom Nesbit is the Director of the Centre for Integrated and Credit Studies, Continuing Studies, SFU.

Navigating A New World: Canada’s Global Future by Lloyd Axworthy

—Nancy Harris

For those who have been fortunate enough to hear Lloyd Axworthy speak, his account of a viable and just place for Canada in a rapidly shifting global politic is a continuation of his regular public speaking theme. While he describes the way he sees us—individuals who give shape to this country—we hear his voice, consistently courageous and inclusive as he points out the path that runs through challenging bureaucratic processes, international opposition and made-in-Canada partisan politics to a place where Canadians can lead with their best skills. This is not a comfortable text. It is weighed down with our failure to act out of humanitarian intent. Mr. Axworthy articulates his desire to see Canada move ahead using “soft power”—advantages of wealth, good education and a generally secure stable society—to establish humanitarian intervention in the context of traditional state sovereignty. Defining sovereignty as the responsibility to protect must, Axworthy states, become accepted international behaviour.

The imperatives for the use of soft power are the atrocities committed around the world.

With an excellent reputation at home and on the world stage, Dr. Axworthy can now be found at the Liu Institute at the University of B.C. This is an ideal time to document an impressive public life. Still, one might ask to whom this navigational instruction is addressed. Given that Axworthy has retired from politics, his opinions now might have greater acceptance in the broad Canadian community than they did while he was in public office. This is one of the problems in Canada. We love to find politicians incredible and hold their ideas suspect of political agenda. If there is a challenge outside the boundaries of Canada to resolve major issues without resorting to a partisan or protectionist politic, there is an equal challenge within Canada to do the same. The challenge within Canada’s boundaries is one that could be addressed in public dialogue. When Axworthy criticizes “Canadian academics [who] tend to be detached and at times disdainful of involvement in the political process” (p. 32), I see an opportunity for universities to be part of community-based dialogue. While this concept might seem a natural fit for intellectual interest it must be appreciated that universities have their own internal dynamics and inside/outside political mechanics that need to be retooled for a discussion intended to build solutions. Many academics struggle with the uncertainty of where to begin community-based discussions involving politics and stand mute as a result of that struggle. In addition, it must be acknowledged that universities are entities that market a product, that product being credit courses. Any project involving community outreach requires funding.

A solution might be found in Dr. Elizabeth Jareg’s commentary quoted by Axworthy. When asked if it is possible for young people caught in the tragedies of Uganda to recover, she emphasizes the “importance of being accepted back into the
community, and then being given something useful to do” (page 22). A community-based initiative facilitated by an Institute for the Humanities attached to a university might explore how the university community could discover something useful to do. The concept of community articulated by Dr. Jareg seems to have a holistic character; it is a collection of all people coincidentally gathered in a particular place. Dr. Jareg is referring to an Ugandan village, with all of its integrated components. It is her hope that the young people from this village can be reintegrated back into their community. In contrast, “community” in Canada can often mean a collection of people bound together by a particular concern or interest. We see in Canada groups of people gathered to lobby various levels of government. We also see a community of concerned individuals, organizations, business interests, NGO’s and government bodies able to raise funds to develop or re-develop community in areas such as those described by Axworthy. Various differences in our definition of “community” create challenges: one must ask where the Canadian community might be. Is this “political” enough to satisfy Axworthy’s criticism of lack of academic involvement? That question can only be answered when we see the discussion about community participation unfold with all that it entails.

From my point of view, the value of this book cannot be found in a political or economic assessment of statements made. Canada’s ability economically to sustain the bureaucratic infrastructure through which decision-making information is collected and presented, maintaining Canadian consulates and establishing a peace keeping presence aside, the value is in the answer to the question, does this book kindle the imagination of Canadians as to Canada’s place in the global arena? Key to Canada’s ability to navigate in this new world is an political leadership. When Axworthy states that this is the choice that Canadians must make, and then asks if we are ready for such an undertaking, we can identify his intended audience. I hear Axworthy speak to me as a member of a community geographically described by electoral boundaries. Axworthy goes into great detail building his case for the need to do things differently, to change the focus of discussion so that real solutions are developed. He builds his case as he gives an account of his time in Sudan and Uganda and Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, Rwanda; these are areas we are familiar with from news accounts of horrible atrocities. His description of the Ottawa Process on Landmines and the challenges in getting 143 signatures on a treaty banning the manufacture, use and export of anti-personnel land mines illustrates the moral imperative and the confidence that that imperative can be met. It builds in the reader a confidence that even as the quiet neighbour to a superpower there is opportunity for Canadians to have a place in the world, to participate with our own agenda.

The overwhelming concerns for many Canadians are issues of autonomy given our economic, cultural and social proximity to our neighbour. Axworthy points out in his discussion of American “Treaties and Transactions: Rules or Power,” that there is opportunity to negotiate sustainable solutions. Given the complexities of NAFTA, the challenge becomes one of ensuring that a Canadian design would be part of this evolving North American fabric. In his account of relationships between the U.S. and Mexico one begins to see the consistencies in Axworthy’s Canadian design. Our relationship with the US and Mexico must be navigated with the same skills and instruments as those required in the broader expanse of the world stage. The choice of tools is a political one. Canadians must make decisions at the polling station based on sound information regarding our country’s potential at home and internationally. It is imperative to lead with what Axworthy refers to as soft power because the alternative would be the loss of Canada to an overwhelming US agenda.

Nancy Harris is an associate of the Institute for the Humanities who works in the field of conflict resolution and bridge building in the development of her company, “Project Continuum.”

One Man’s Justice: A Life in the Law by Thomas R. Berger

— Philip Bryden

Few Canadians can lay claim to a legal career as remarkable as that of Tom Berger. In addition to more than thirty years of practice as a lawyer, Berger had a brief career as a politician (serving as a Member of Parliament, a Member of the British Columbia Legislative Assembly and Leader of the British Columbia New Democratic Party). He spent twelve years as a justice of the British Columbia Supreme Court. He also served as a commissioner of inquiry in places as far flung as the Mackenzie Valley, Alaska and India. One Man’s Justice is Berger’s account of his life in the law, and a fascinating account it is.
**One Man's Justice** is not a conventional autobiography (if there is such a thing) because so little of the focus of the book is on Berger himself. He offers the reader occasional glimpses of his background and family life, but the book is really about the cases in which he appeared as counsel. Berger's political career barely rates half a dozen paragraphs in the 332 pages of text. Even Chapter 6, which is entitled "To the Bench and Back", is less a discussion of Berger's years as a justice of the British Columbia Supreme Court than it is a defence of the actions that led him to resign his judicial office and return to the private practice of law in 1983. *One Man's Justice* might well have been entitled *A Barrister's Tale*, since it is mainly the story of Berger's search for justice for his clients, rather than his reflections about justice in the abstract.

Anyone who has read *One Man's Justice* will quickly come to understand why Tom Berger is so well respected as a lawyer (and also why he is so successful). He demonstrates the barrister's art of pruning the facts of the cases he describes to their essential elements, while adding just enough detail and colour to keep the reader's interest. He marshals his legal arguments with care. He is scrupulously fair in his presentation of the arguments raised by his opponents. Nevertheless, he inexorably draws the reader toward the conclusion that the courts were correct in finding that justice lay on the side of his clients (or that the courts erred on the rare occasions when they found against him). He has a way of taking complicated legal ideas and expressing them in simple and understandable terms that a law teacher like myself can only envy and hope on occasion to emulate.

Berger organizes his reflections into twelve thematic chapters that roughly follow the trajectory of his career as a lawyer. On the whole this structure works well, since it allows Berger to explore in each chapter a number of lawsuits that raise related questions without worrying about when they occurred during the course of his legal career. The decision to organize the material in this way does, however, tend to exacerbate what seems to me to be the major weakness of the book. It is that while each of the chapters is interesting in and of itself, the collection of them together is unsatisfying either as a portrait of Berger's life as a lawyer or as a coherent picture of his views about justice. The book offers the reader fascinating glimpses of both Berger's life and times and his views of justice, but at the end of the day these themes are overwhelmed by the legal arguments Berger puts forward in championing his clients' causes. As interesting as these arguments are, I suspect that most readers of *One Man's Justice* will share my view that we would have appreciated the opportunity to know less about the arguments themselves and more about the man who made them.

My favourite chapters in the book are the first three, which concentrate on the early part of Berger's career as a lawyer, before his appointment as a judge in 1971. They include the story of Berger's work as a criminal defence lawyer in Vancouver in the late 1950s and 1960s, the account of his representation of the Ironworkers Union in the strike that took place during the construction of what is now known as the Ironworkers Memorial Bridge, and the tale of George Jones, the chairman of the British Columbia Purchasing Commission, who was fired by the government of W.A.C. Bennett and who retained Berger to bring a successful action for slander against Bennett. What particularly appeals to me about these chapters is the insight they offer into the world of British Columbia law and politics. In addition to being an outstanding barrister, Berger is an insightful observer and a skillful storyteller, and his portraits of the individuals who occupied centre stage in these legal dramas left me eager for a more extensive account of Berger's life and times.

In Chapters 4 and 5, Berger tells the story of the cases that originated his lifelong advocacy for aboriginal people and for legal recognition of their treaty rights and title to land. Chapter 4 is the story of an aboriginal hunting rights case, *R. v. White and Bob*, in which Berger successfully appealed the convictions of two members of the Nanaimo band for hunting deer out of season on the basis that they were exercising rights conferred on them by an 1854 treaty. In Chapter 5, Berger describes the efforts of the Nisga'a people to obtain legal recognition of their title to their lands which culminated in the signing of the Nisga'a Treaty in 1998. Berger was counsel to the Nisga'a in the landmark case of *Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia*, in which the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973 first recognized aboriginal title, albeit in a split decision that did not uphold the Nisga'a claim itself. Berger was appointed as a judge after this case had been argued, and his colleagues Don Rosenbloom and then Jim Aldridge took over the role of legal advisors to the Nisga'a during the lengthy negotiations that ultimately led to the signing of the Treaty itself. After Berger's resignation from judicial office in 1983, however, he did return to represent the Nisga'a (along with Aldridge) in resisting then Opposition leader Gordon Campbell's legal challenge to the constitutional validity of the Treaty.

As noted above, Berger writes in Chapter 6 about his years as a judge, but the bulk of the chapter is a discussion of the circumstances that led him to resign his judicial office. Berger had made a speech to the Canadian Bar Association in 1981 endorsing Prime Minister Trudeau's constitutional proposals, including their guarantee of Aboriginal and treaty rights. When the Prime Minister, under provincial pressure, altered these proposals later that year, Berger felt he had a duty to speak out against the changes, and did so in a speech at Guelph University and an op-ed piece for the Globe and Mail. The latter comments sparked a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council, and Berger describes in detail the unfortunate manner in which this complaint was dealt with by the Council, and most importantly by Chief Justice Bora Laskin. This chapter stands apart from the others. In it Berger openly struggles with the question of what a judge ought to do in the...
face of political action that he believes is a violation of minority rights that he is uniquely well positioned to address. Were Berger’s comments an example of a judge meddling in politics, as Chief Justice Laskin clearly believed, or were they an example of a judge speaking out to defend minority rights and the rule of law? Berger reflects on the possibility that he was wrong to speak out, yet he ultimately concludes that he was right and would do it again, even though Chief Justice Laskin’s criticism of him made him decide that he could not maintain those views and continue to serve as a judge. Berger offers some deep insights into the role of a judge in a democracy, and momentarily steps outside his role as a barrister to give us a glimpse of his thinking about justice as something more profound than justice for his clients.

The last six chapters of the book describe Berger’s more interesting cases since his resumption of legal practice. In them Berger the barrister reasserts himself, though not, in my own view, to such good effect as he did in the earlier chapters. Berger offers up an eclectic mix of cases in these chapters. They range from his representation of Dr. Jerilynn Prior in her efforts to seek a declaration that the requirement that she pay taxes that might be used for military purposes violated her freedom of conscience and religion to his defence of the decision of the B.C. College of Teachers to refuse approval of Trinity Western University’s teacher education program because of the University’s denunciation of homosexual behaviour as sinful. While these chapters provide a very interesting discussion of a series of legal subjects, the material in them is too diverse to present anything like a coherent picture of the practice of law in Vancouver in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Berger’s observations about the environment in which he worked, which so enlivened the first part of the book, become more indistinct here. Likewise the threads of a theory of justice that were inchoate in the early part of the book and came to the surface in Chapter 6 seem, to me at least, to disperse in the second half of the book.

Tom Berger has made an outstanding contribution to Canadian law, and his description of this contribution in One Man’s Justice makes for interesting reading. If the book itself is not quite as remarkable as its author, it is because the glimpses Berger offers us of his life and times and his ideas about justice suggest that he has more insights to offer than his account of his cases reveal.

Philip Bryden is Associate Professor in UBC’s Faculty of Law.

West Coast Line

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writing • images • criticism

edited by Glen Lowry and Jerry Zaslove

Violence and its Alternatives: A Special Section edited by Trish Graham, Coleen Gold, and Jerry Zaslove

This volume of West Coast Line contains a special section which captures some of the papers and the discussion at the 2001 Joanne Brown Symposium on Violence and its Alternatives, an annual Institute for the Humanities symposium supported by Joanne Brown.

Contributors
Ian angus, Brett Enemark, Trish Graham, Coleen Gold, Larry Green, Stephen K. Levine, Gary McCarron, David Mirhady, Christopher S. Morrissey, Myler Wilkinson, Jerry Zaslove

Contributors to New Work in the same edition: Catherine Daly, John Doheny, kari edwards, Peter Jaeger, Reg Johanson, Lydia Kwa, Sophie Levy, Wendy Lu, Dorothy Trujillo Lusk, Wolf-Dieter Narr, Natalie Simpson

Cover image: Jeff Wall The Drain 1989 229 x 287 cm
West Coast Line

NO. 41

Woodsquat
guest edited by Aaron Vidaver

This up-coming issue contains new writing, primary documents, images, and criticism pertaining to the Woodwards Squat action in Vancouver (14 September – 14 December 2002). The issue includes short prose, interviews, speeches, and poems by Maxine Gadd, Shawn Millar, Nathan, Kaspar Learn, Skyy, Ivan Drury, Bev Meslo, Jim Leyden, Chris Livingstone, Craig Ballantyne, Zeus, Chrystal Durocher, Ann Wilden, Toecutter, Chris Forth, Lacey Rainer, A Native Man, Claude Maurice, Insurgent-S, Roy Gladiator Archie, T. Forsythe, Lyn Tooley, Joey Only, Tony Snakeskin, Adam Murray, Hidden in Dark Well, Taun Danberger, Kathy May Lee Rattlesnake, Hazel Hoyle, Ace, Angel, David Cunningham, Jewel and Theresa D. Gray. Primary documents include letters, press statements, affidavits, witness statements, and appeals by The Peoples’ Opposition, Anti-Poverty Committee, Jim Leyden, Azad & Marwan, Friends of the Woodwards Squat, Debbie Krull, Coalition of Woodwards Squatters and Supporters, Andrea Neigel, Shane Davis, Determined Housing Affinity Group, Woodwards Squat Emergency Response Team, Rev. Davin Ouimet, Woodwards Legal Defense Committee, A Squatter, Western Aboriginal Harm Reduction Society, Dayl Scheltgen, and Calvin Woida. Excerpts from confidential City of Vancouver and Vancouver Police Department documents (obtained through a long process of Freedom of Information requests) detail the particulars of the neutralization of the squat. There are over 50 images in the volume—video stills, reproductions of posters, flyers and graffiti, linocuts and photographs—as well as an 11-page comic by Trevor M. The critical essays consist of pieces on the history of the Downtown Eastside (Jeff Sommers), squatting as an organizational tool (Lisa Wulwik), the function of demands (Mike Krebs), the relation between the civic election and the housing movement (Shannon Bundock), the failure of the squat legal strategy (Noah Quastel) and media representation of the squat and “compassion fatigue” (Diana Leung), as well as two reviews of books on the international squatting movement (Jeff Schatz; Peyman Vahabzadeh).

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2027 East Annex
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Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC
V5A 1S6.

Telephone 604-291-4287
Fax 604-291-4622
E-mail wel@sfu.ca
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Humanities Department: Some recent publications and related activities

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Invited Keynote Speaker.


Lynn Elen Burton

In the past year, Dr. Burton’s attention has been focussed on confirming interest in establishing the Applied Foresight Network as an independent transdisciplinary tool for addressing critical issues on the horizon. To this end, she has made presentations on Applied Foresight at the New Directions for the Humanities Conference in Rhodes Greece, the World Future Society Conference in San Francisco, and the Global Futures – Alternatives for Mexico conference in Mexico City. As well, she has prepared papers for The International Journal for the Humanities, Futures Research Quarterly, the World Future Society Conference Compendium, edited by Howard Didsbury, and On the Horizon journal.

Samir Gandesha


Donald Grayston

“Thomas Merton, the Holocaust and the Eclipse of Difference,” in Beatrice Bruteau, ed., Merton and Judaism: Holiness in Words / Recognition, Repentance and Renewal (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 83-103. (See also Karl A. Plank, “An Open Letter to Donald Grayston,” 105-08.)


Christopher S. Morrissey


Institute for the Humanities Associates. Affiliation and Humanities related interests.

Ian Angus
Department of Humanities, SFU. The public sphere, democracy and equality, philosophy and the humanities.

Debbie Bell
Community Education, Continuing Studies, SFU. Community education, social change, participatory international development

Nick Blomley
Department of Geography, SFU. Community, violence and contemporary culture.

Adrienne Burk
Adjunct Faculty, Dept. of Geography, SFU; Centre for Writing-Intensive Learning, SFU.

Lynn Elen Burton
Department of Humanities, SFU. Future studies, creativity and visionary thinking, activating the social movement and adult education.

Michael Clague
Director, Carnegie Community Centre. Ideas of social progress and what the arts and humanities can tell us about learning from our mistakes and our achievements.

Rita DeGrandis
Spanish American Literature, Comparative Literature, UBC. Politics, ideology and the national imaginaries in Latin America.

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Department of Humanities, SFU. The humanities and the natural world, Corrections and modernity, Scottish Studies.

Paul Edward Dutton
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School of Criminology, SFU. Global human rights and transformative justice.

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Michelle Gibson
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Art Therapist. Violence and its alternatives, psychoanalysis, community education.

Donald Grayston
Director, Institute for the Humanities, SFU. Teaches religious studies in the Humanities Department. Violence and its alternatives, Gandhi, Merton, Holocaust, rites of passage and citizenship.

Larry Green
Psychotherapist. Conflict resolution, art and cultural approaches to alternatives to violence.

Enzo Guerrerio
Director, Britannia Community Centre. Creating places for social action, places where universities and communities meet to discuss local and neighborhood issues.

Bob Hackett
School of Communications, SFU. Media research and politics.

Nancy Harris
Conflict resolution and bridge building in the development of her company, “Project Continuum” which offers the coordination of fundraising events and the facilitation of public dialogue.

Margaret Jackson
School of Criminology, SFU. Immigrant and refugee girls and their perceptions of violence; dialogues between academics and the community.

Martin Laba
Director, School of Communication, SFU. Research, design and implementation of communication/education strategies and media around urgent and critical social issues. The colonization/exploitation of social issues in the marketplace, corporate claims of social beneficence, and current and growing trends in selling with social issues.

Christine Liotta
Communications and Liberal Studies, BCIT. Community education, liberal studies and technology education.
Jennifer Simons  

Mary Ann Stouck  
Emerita, Department of English and Humanities, SFU. Medieval studies.

Peyman Vahabzadeh  
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, SFU. Social and Political Theory, Social Movements, Continental Philosophy, Iranian Studies.

Alan Whitehorn  
Political Science, Royal Military College, Kingston. First holder of J. S. Woodsworth Chair in the Humanities. Canadian political parties, comparative politics and political theory.

Myler Wilkinson  
Centre for Russian and North American Studies, MIR Centre for Peace, Selkirk College. The systemic potential for human interactions beyond violence, and the structural and social forms which are obstacles to thinking about peace.

Jerry Zaslove  
Emeritus Director, Institute for the Humanities, SFU. Humanities and modernity, human rights, violence, the avant-garde and intellectuals, community education and the public sphere, the social history of art and cultural memory.
About the Institute

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Institute for the Humanities
Simon Fraser University
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6
Telephone: 604-291-5855

The Mural Cover Design

The mural depicted on the covers of Humanitas, “Writing, Figures, Shelves and the Humanities, 2000” can be seen in the Humanities Department at the southeast corner of the Academic Quadrangle. It is a life-size, digitally constructed and composed series of images that represent each of the faculty members and programs in the Humanities area. A collaboration of all the faculty in Humanities, it is based on an idea by Jerry Zaslove and Steve Duguid and was composed and designed by Jerry Zaslove, Department of Humanities, and Greg Ehlers, Learning and Instructional Development Centre, SFU. Photography: Greg Ehlers, Spring, 2000.

Institute for the Humanities
Simon Fraser University
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6
Telephone: 604-291-5855