CHAPTER THREE

ARISTOTLE’S ENTHYMEME, THYMOS, AND PLATO

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“Enthymeme” is the central term of Aristotelian rhetoric, yet Aristotle offers precious little indication why he found this term so striking. Namely, an enthymeme (enthymêma) should be the “result or effect” of an action “in the thymos”. The thymos was for Aristotle, as it was for the Greeks in general, the seat of the emotions, particularly anger. The word itself is related to thisis, the word for (generally burnt) sacrifice, and to thisis, meaning “seething”, or, to use a Latin cognate of thymos, “fuming”. The word thymos seems therefore to refer to excited states of the soul or at any rate to the place where that excitement, that “fuming”, takes place. That would make the enthymêma the result or effect of an action in the place where the soul is excited.

The term enthymêma appears in authors as early as Sophocles, and it entered into the technical terminology of rhetoric already by the early teaching career of Isocrates (13.16). Alcidamas also uses the term (19). But none of these authors reveals any precise meaning. In the generation before Aristotle, however, although Plato did not use the term enthymêma itself, he did appropriate the term thymos

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1 Smyth 1920 841.2: “The result or effect of an action is expressed by the primary suffixes 1. ει and 2. ματ.”

2 Cf. Plato, Cratylus 419d–ε οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἀνάμια διόλον ὅτι τότε ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα. ἢθικὸς δὲ ἀπό τῆς δεξαίης καὶ ξέως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔρχεν ἄν τότε τὸ ὄνομα. Nor is there any difficulty about epithumia (desire), for this name was evidently given to the power that goes on upon (ἐπὶ) the soul (thymos). And thymos has its name from the raging (θύσις) and boiling of the soul.

3 Soph. Oc 1198–1201 τῶν κατὰ λεύσσες, οὖν ἐγὼ γενόμενον διομοῦ τελευτήν ὥς καὶ προορίζοντα, ἔχεις γὰρ ὁπότε μεια τάνθυμηματα, τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδέρφων ὁμόνοιαν τιμῶμεν. (If you look at those things, I know that you’ll understand the consequence of an evil spirit, that it turns out evil. For you have no scanty enthymêma ta, heed of your unseeing gods.) 292–294 τοιαύτα μὲν, ὦ γεραί, τάνθυμήματα πολλὰ ὅτ’ ἐνάγη τάπο ων’ λόγοι γὰρ σὺν ἐνόμισαι βραχέως. (There is great compulsion, old man, to respect the enthymêma ta from you; for they have not been set forth in light words.) Burneyat 1994 11 suggests that enthymeme “refers to the ideas expressed in a speech as contrasted with the language.” That seems particularly true of Alcidamas’ usage (Soph. 3–4, 18–20, 24–25, 33).
to describe one of the three elements in his psychology, the one intermediate between reason (nous) and appetite (epithymia), the second of which, of course, literally refers to something, or some activity, “on top of” (epi) the thymos, as he says in the Cratylus. Plato assigned specific roles to the class of people who were dominated by the thymos, the thymoeides; he associated them with certain martial values, as well as with a somewhat limited intellectual capacity. It seems entirely possible, therefore, that in his choice of this term for rhetoric, Aristotle was influenced by this striking usage by Plato. It is the primary goal of this paper to explore this possibility.

The orators contemporary with Plato and Aristotle, with the exception of Isocrates, do not generally use the noun enthyméma, but several do use the verb enthymeisthai. It occurs as regularly as other logical terms, such as tekméria or eikos. The verb often appears as an imperative, and it is almost always directed to the judges in a law court. The speaker demands of them that they “think” or “consider”—we might now say “fume over”—some point of the speaker’s. It seems as if enthymeisthai might be stronger in its emotional force than other verbs for thinking that could be used in its place, such as nomizein, oiesthai, skopein, or hegeisthai, and the point to be considered is usually somewhat complex. But there really is no sense in which an emotional force is a necessary aspect of each usage. The relationship of the verb enthymeisthai to the noun thymos seems therefore to reveal a dead etymology, one no longer in the minds of the verb’s users or listeners. The speaker’s point, however, seems to be identifiable, from a rhetorical point of view, as an enthynéma, at least in the fairly vague sense in which theoreticians such as Isocrates and Aecidamas use the term (see e.g. Isoc. 9.10, 12.2, and 15.47).5

When Aristotle came to engage in rhetorical theorizing and had gathered the various rhetorical handbooks then in circulation into his Technón synagóge, he must have given close attention to the range of terms used by his predecessors to describe forms of thought, terms including eikota, paradigmata, tekméria, enthyméma ta, gnomai, semeia, and elenchoi (cf. Rh. Al. 7.2). When deciding how to distinguish them, besides observing common usage, he must have

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4 The number of instances of the verb ἐνθυμέομαι in the corpus of Attic orators in every 10,000 words: Aeschines 0, Androcles 5.16, Antiphon 3.31, Demosthenes 2.2, Demades, Dinarchus and Hypereides 0, Isaeus 3.15, Isocrates 4.96, Lycurgus 2.77, Lysias 11.74.
6 On the Technon synagoge, see Schöpau 1994.
been struck by the term *enthymêma* and by its etymology, just as he makes a point of understanding the word *tekméron* in terms of its etymology (see 1.2 1357b9–10 ὁ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταυτόν ἐστι γιὰ τὴν ἄρχουσα γλώσσαν tekmar and peras are the same in the old language), even if this was a dead etymology among current users of the term. He cannot have failed to notice that the term’s etymology (in the “old language”), if not its then current usage, implied the engagement of the *thymos* and its close association with emotional response, just at a time when he was himself forming the view that the emotional response of the listener was in fact integral to and philosophically appropriate for rhetoric. Here he was turning the corner that he does at *Rhetoric* 1.1.11 (1355a2), where, after conceding all of rhetoric’s warts, he begins to formulate what belongs to it nevertheless as an *entechnos methodos*. From the same list of terms for logical thought, his contemporary Anaximenes gives the *enthymêma* no privileged status. Anaximenes’ definition of the term, moreover, is even more idiosyncratic than Aristotle’s, associating it specifically with “contraries” and with his “investigative species” (*eidos exotastikon*), for use only in attacking the opponent’s position (*Rh. Al.* 10).7

Aristotle makes *enthymêma* his central term, criticizing writers of other rhetorical handbooks for saying nothing about enthymemes (1354a1.4) and calling the enthymeme at various times the “body of *pistis*” (1354a15), “a rhetorical demonstration” (1355a5–6), “a rhetorical syllogism” (1356b3), and the “most authoritative of the proofs” (1355a7–8). He even makes it a point of rhetorical excellence that someone might become “enthymêmatic” (1354b22). By

7 Conley 1984 173 nicely outlines Anaximenes’ discussion of enthymemes, although I cannot share his view that Anaximenes influenced Aristotle regarding them.

8 Various interpretations of the phrase “body of *pistis*” have been offered. Kennedy 1991 30 n. 10 writes, “Body is here contrasted with ‘matters external’ in the next clause. Though Aristotle does not say so, one might speculate that the soul, or life, of persuasion comes from ethical and emotional qualities.” McCabe 1994 339 sees the passage referring to the body as opposed to clothing. My own understanding sees the enthymeme as body as opposed to the head alone. That is, the *pistis* involves both a statement, the head, and the support for that statement, the enthymeme, the body. Of course, there is a sense in which the head both is and is not a part of the body. But see the next note.

9 Kennedy 1991 33 translates *kurion ton pisteon* as “strongest of the *pistis*”, but perhaps we should understand *kurion* rather as “most genuine” in the sense that the enthymeme *embraces* what is most properly a *pistis*. Aristotle also calls the enthymeme a “syllogism of a kind” (*syllogismós tois* 1355a8, 1400b17); see Burnyeat 1994 12. 30. At 1350b4–5 Aristotle contrasts it, as a deductive proof, with an example.
emphasizing the term "enthymêma" (whose etymology is linked to the
*thymos*) Aristotle seems to acknowledge that rhetorical discourse is
pervaded by emotion just as he is criticizing his predecessors for
discussing only emotional manipulation.

There have been divergent views about what constitutes an Aristotelian enthymeme, and colleagues including Tobias Reinhardt in
this volume can pursue the logical aspects of the enthymeme that
Aristotle explores at the end of book 2 without touching on its emo-
tional aspects.\(^\text{10}\) Here I would like to promote an understanding of
the enthymeme as a form of cognitive activity that takes place within
the context of emotional response and to extend the analysis of Bill
Fortenbaugh’s *Aristotle on Emotion*, particularly with regard to the
irrational aspects of emotion. He explains that for Aristotle emotion
belongs to the alogical side of a bi-partite soul, but that it neverthe-
less has a cognitive capacity. In fact thought is the effective cause of
emotion.\(^\text{11}\) The sort of reasoning of the enthymeme, the “rhetorical
syllogism”, thus differs from that of the dialectical syllogism in being
constrained by the limited rational, but still cognitive capacities of the
emotions. One way that emotions might influence judgments would
be simply that they entail certain judgments. Opposing judgments
could thus not be held simultaneously, by a law of non-contradiction.
But that is a law of logic. It holds equally well for dialectic. It thus
tells us little about the alogical aspect of the enthymeme.

Emotions are for Aristotle *logoi enuloi*, en-mattered statements
(*De anima* 1.1 403a25). A natural scientist would define an emotion
differently from a dialectician: the dialectician gives one account—
“anger is an appetite for returning pain for pain, something like that”
(403a30–31)—and the natural scientist gives the material account—
“(anger) is a boiling of the blood surrounding the heart” (403a32–
b1). The material account of emotions is significant. In the process
of experiencing emotions, the material cause, the human physiology,
changes in ways that lead to different judgments: “the emotions
are those things because of which people (when) changing (them)
differ with regard to their judgments (and) which are accompanied
by pain and pleasure” (*Rhet.* 2.1 1378a20–22). A lover judges his
beloved differently than a non-lover would (2.1 1377b30–1378a4,
2.4 1380b35–81a2). The lover has certain physiological activity
associated with thoughts of the beloved that affects his judgment. A

\(^{10}\) See Conley 1984 and Burnyeat 1994, who nicely dismiss the view that
the enthymeme is simply an abbreviated syllogism, and survey a range of other views.

\(^{11}\) Fortenbaugh 1975 23–44, 115.
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group with its anger satisfied and cooled feels less vindictive against those with whom it still feels angry (2.3 1380b11–14). In a rhetorical context, Aristotle says that a speech actually has the power to put judges into a state in which it is impossible for them to feel an emotion like pity.12

How then are the rational capacities of the emotions limited? One way does have to do with the connection of emotions to the body and in particular to its feelings of pleasure and pain (De Anima 1.1 403a16–24, Rhet. 2.1 1378a20–21). In Aristotle’s definitions of the emotions, the presence of pleasure and/or pain with the holding of a belief is the major distinction between a thought and an emotion (Eth. Nic.2.5 1105b21–23; Eud. Eth. 2.2 1220b12).13 Each emotion entails a disposition of the emotional people (pós te diakeimenoi), which describes its material aspect, as well as an object (tisin) and conditions (epi poiois) (Rhet. 2.1 1378a24–26). Pleasures and pains reflect the disposition, which inhibits the cognitive capacity.14 Aristotle at one point faults the emotional manipulation of hearers by likening it to the bending of a ruler, a kanon, and this metaphor can be employed here. Pain is felt when the ruler is bent out of its natural shape, pleasure when it is returned to normal. Of course, the natural shape is itself pleasureful, but not noticeably;15 one only notices a pleasureful feeling as the ruler is being returned to its natural shape from an unnatural shape, as thirst is satisfied, a tightened muscle is massaged, or a lost loved one is found again. Thus, when the kanon, the soul of the hearer, is being moved out of and back into its natural shape, the hearer’s judgments, and even his perceptions, are affected, irrationally (On Dreams 2 460b3–16; cf. De anima 2.6 431a8–

12 Rhet. 2.9 1387b18–21. Cf. 2.10 1388a26–29 and 2.2 1379a23–24; one emotion can also set up another.

13 In the Eud. Eth. passage, Aristotle introduces some qualifiers, saying the “in general (ὁκὼς) perceptual” pleasure or pain for the most part (ὁς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) follow” emotions. I agree with Fortenbaugh 2002 109, 119 that Aristotle has in mind particular emotional episodes rather than, as Leighton 1982 135–138 argues, “emotions” such as hatred, which lack pleasure and pain.

14 Here I would disagree slightly with Bill Fortenbaugh 1975 110–111 about the relationship between the emotion and pleasure and pain. He sees the emotion causing pleasure or pain, a relationship of cause and effect. I would say that the pleasure or pain reflect, through the biological faculty of sensation, the physiological aspect of the emotion, that is, its material cause. If Aristotle were doing physics instead of rhetoric, he might describe unpleasant heart palpitations (see Fortenbaugh 1975 112–113), but for the purposes of rhetoric it is enough for him to mention only the pain (that results from such palpitations). Cf. Leighton 1982 155–157, who emphasizes that pleasure and pain are part of the concept of emotion.

15 Rhet. 1.11 1359b52–1370a39.
Although emotions are affected by rhetorical speech, once they provoke feelings of pleasure and pain, these feelings—or rather the bodily dispositions that they reflect—influence judgment without regard to their logical basis in ways that are analogous to drinking alcohol. The peripatetic author of Problems 30 notes that wine may make people feel emotions, an indication being the drinker who is induced to kiss someone whom no one would otherwise kiss (30.1 953b16–18). In these conditions, like a person asleep, a person may have some knowledge, but temporarily not have it (Eth. Nic. 7.3 1147a11–18). In rhetorical practice, the enthymeme is directed toward the current and defined judgments of assemblymen and judges, who are affected by immediate emotions, such as love, anger, and desire, not the general, dispassionate questions of legislators. The rhéor thus necessarily takes into consideration pleasure and pain, Aristotle’s indication of the physiological aspect of emotions.

Now this sort of explanation is consistent with Aristotle’s views on emotion and Bill Fortenbaugh’s explanation of them. It indicates that emotional reasoning, enthyméma tic reasoning, is different from dialectical, dispassionate reasoning because of its material cause, human physiology. But we need to go further in explaining Aristotle’s appropriation of the term enthyméma, and here Plato seems instructive in ways that may not yet have been fully considered. In the Gorgias, Socrates says that the part of the soul in which the desires (epithymiæ) are located is most susceptible to persuasion (493a). These are the basest of human drives, and Socrates is very critical of them. But in the Phaedrus he is saying that a rhetorical technê must “classify the kinds of logoi and of souls and the emotions (pathémata) of them, describing all their causes (aitias)” (271b). Plato is setting the stage for Aristotle’s philosophical rhetoric.

In the Republic, Plato seems to form his characterization of the high-spirited person, the thymoeides, partly with a view to his criticisms of the Homeric values he wishes to transcend. His guardians themselves are to be high-spirited, thymoeideis, every bit as invincible as an Achilles or an Odysseus (2 375b). But they are to be guided ultimately not by thymos but by nous, reason. In Plato’s psychology, as Bill Fortenbaugh16 has pointed out, each of the three parts of the soul brings with it values, particular ethical points of view, and cognitive abilities. The person whose thymos is dominant is motivated, like a Homeric hero, by love of honor, which leads to envy, and by love of

victory, which makes him sometimes violent (8 548c, 550b, 9 581a, 586c). Spirited people are simple, more suited to war than peace (8 547e). They like physical training and hunting (3 410b, 8 549a). The well trained will become gentle to their friends and the opposite toward their enemies (2 375ε, 3 410ε–411ε). Socrates likens the thymos to a lion, a brave animal that, like the human, rational, part, might be dominated by the multiform beast of the appetites (9 588d, 590b). In particular, thymos is associated in the Republic with defending justice, as when Socrates asks, “when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his thymos in that case seethe and grow fierce ... and make itself the ally of what he thinks just?” (4 440c–d).

Aristotle has his own views of the thymos. In a famous passage, he explains that the thymos mishears speech somehow; he gives as analogues servants who run off before hearing everything said, so that they mistake their orders, and dogs who bark at a knock before seeing whether it is a friend who is knocking. Because of its heat and the swiftness of its nature, the thymos hears without understanding and so springs to vengeance (Eth. Nic. 7.6 1149a24–31). Like Plato, Aristotle sees the thymos as integral to a person’s sense of justice, as well as to courage. He grants that actions done under the influence of thymos are voluntary (Eth. Nic. 3.1 1111a29–30) but denies that they involve deliberate choice because the thymos does not have reason (Eth. Nic. 3.2 1111b18). Unlike Plato, however, he does not assign ethical values to the thymos, but simply talks in terms of its mean disposition between being overly gentle and overly irascible.

The rhetorical audience must be somewhat like Aristotle’s slave, who can perceive reason even if he does not have it (Pol. 1.5 1254b23–24, 7.14 1333a16–18). The audience’s role is likewise passive. To say that it is passive is not to say, however, that it is simply a blank sheet ready to be stamped by the speaker. Emotions also involve complexes of thought, developed through habit, that also react in somewhat active ways to rhetorical stimuli. Besides their material cause, the human physiology, emotions also have effective (epi poiais)

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17 One passage adds “control” (kratein) to victory and high repute (9 581a). Like the appetites that must be satisfied (but no more) before the philosopher goes to sleep, the spirit must be soothed so that anger does not disturb him (9 572α). Cf. Arist. Pol. 7.7 1327b39–40a7. For a recent discussion of thymos in Plato, see Hobbs 2000.

18 Justice Eud. Eth. 2.5 1222b5–8, 3.3 1231b10–26; courage Eud. Eth. 3.1 1229b26–34, 3.8 1116b25–30, citing Homer, 1117a4–5.

and final causes (tisin), both of which result from complexes of thought patterns developed through habituation.

For Aristotle, as for the handbook writers from whom he began his thinking, forensic oratory is the paradigmatic genre of rhetoric, the primary listeners are law court judges, and the primary emotion is anger. Aristotle certainly argues against this paradigm in Rhetoric 1.1—he wants to make deliberative oratory primary (1354b23–27)—but he never escapes it. Throughout the first chapter of the Rhetoric he uses the law court as his model even as he rails against the current formulators of rhetorical handbooks devoted to forensic oratory. In forensic rhetoric, other people’s affairs, not those of the judges, are at stake (1354b29–33). It thus runs against a basic Greek value of minding one’s own business. Here special consideration must be given to the engagement of the listeners’ emotions, which can only be engaged when they feel that they themselves, or those they perceive as close to them, are involved.

For Aristotle, the enthymeme must deal with the pragma of the speech, its proper subject matter (1354a16). If Aristotle assumes that the word enthymêma has the connotation of emotional involvement, he must be at pains in 1.1 to dissociate enthymemes from emotional distortion of judges. Of course, in Aristotle’s scheme, one of the three entechnoi pisteis is directed at the emotional state of the judge. But the force of his statement that the enthymeme is the body of proof seems to be that all three entechnoi pisteis always apply simultaneously, that every argument must give consideration to the emotion of the listeners, the character of the speaker, and to the logical construction of the words.20 That would give the entechnoi pisteis a status altogether different conceptually from that of, e.g., the atechnoti pisteis. The atechnoti pisteis of Rhet. 1.15 clearly come into play only where laws, witnesses, etc. are being discussed. Moreover, Aristotle devotes book 2 of the Rhetoric to discrete treatments of ethos, pathos, and logos, as if they were discrete. Nevertheless, every rhetorical situation does simultaneously involve the credibility of a speaker’s ethos, the emotional reaction of the audience, even if it is not always a vehemently emotional reaction, and a logical structure to the logos. Aristotle’s enthymêma tic rhêtor seems to need to be aware

20 Rhet. 1.1 1354b14–22 oĩdêν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοὶς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴρ ὅπως τόν κρῆτην λοιπὸν τινα πειρᾶσαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οἱδὲν διευκρίνειον, τούτῳ δὲ ἐντὸν ἑνῶς τῆς ἐνθυμεταξιάς They concern themselves with nothing except how to put the judge in a certain frame of mind, and about the entechnoi pisteis they show nothing, but this is how one may become enthymemotic. Cf. 1.2 1356a14–16.
of all three in order “to observe the potentially persuasive in each situation” (1.2 1355b25–26). Book 2 deals thus with the ethical, emotional, and logical aspects of enthymemes, even if he refers to them as enthymemes only in the logical section.

Aristotle uses the term enthymêma in several senses. In the broadest sense, I suggest, in the sense in which he calls it the most authoritative/genuine (kuriotaton) of the pisteis (1355a6–7), he means by it a properly constructed rhetorical argument, one that, being used in a particular speech on a particular occasion, is formulated with consideration to all of the entechnoi pisteis. Only in a second sense does Aristotle distinguish the enthymeme from a paradeigma, an example (1356b6–7). In this sense, the enthymeme is the rhetorical analogue to a deductive proof.

Jeffrey Walker has written a stimulating paper on the psychology of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I came upon the paper after the essential points in my own were worked out, but our approaches have much in common, so I would like to devote attention to some of his points here. Walker argues that “by attempting to include an account of pathos in his theory of rhetoric, Aristotle … commits that theory to a recognition that all practical reasoning is pathetic reasoning, that all enthymemes are enthymemes of pathos” (91). On these points I wholly agree with him. But when he says that Aristotle does this “implicitly if unintentionally”, I would disagree, as I think my foregoing discussion would indicate. Aristotle appears to me fully aware of his commitments to pathetic reasoning. Walker puts too much emphasis on passages like that in Eth. Nic. 10.9, in which Aristotle reflects on the challenges facing those who wish to bring “the many” to virtue. The pathos that Aristotle is discussing when he says that “passion does not seem amenable to reason, but to force” (1179b28–29) does not seem to be the passion belonging to the thymos, but that of epithymia, which is entirely irrational. Hunger and sexual desire are not reliant on beliefs for their existence in the way anger is. Walker also puts emphasis on Aristotle’s talk about audience mochthêria (75, 88, cf. 3.1 1403b34–35 and 1404a8). But Aristotle’s complaints about the deficiencies of the audiences in tragedy are actually much more common. These deficiencies are an aspect of these popular media that the practitioners have to deal with. As Walker acknowledges, the word mochthêria need not have a particularly moral force.

22 Walker 2000 75.
Walker draws Aristotle’s views on the *katharsis* of emotions into his discussion of rhetoric in a very interesting way, and if we are to have a clear understanding of Aristotle on emotions we should certainly be able to say how *katharsis* relates to rhetoric. Walker’s view is that *katharsis* does not involve emotion being purged away, but rather its becoming manifest with an appropriate conceptual frame (78), one that is a purification of otherwise diffuse emotional turmoil (83). The task of the speaker, therefore, would be to achieve such a *katharsis* of emotional responses by shaping them appropriately. At least two points need to be made in response. First, in the brief mention of *katharsis* in the Poetics, Aristotle says that the *katharsis* of emotional states (of such emotions as pity and fear) is to be achieved “through” the pity and fear. Whatever this admittedly unclear passage means, it surely implies that the pity and fear may exist without their *katharsis*, as well as with it, so that *katharsis* cannot be only the manifestation of such emotions, ordered or disordered. Second, Aristotle does not actually mention *katharsis* in the Rhetoric, though he lacks no opportunity to do so. Its place as a goal of tragic mimesis in the Poetics suggests, however, that it lies more in that realm, a *katharsis* of aesthetic and religious observance (*theoria*) rather than the pragmatic needs of rhetoric. While *katharsis* of emotions may be a positive good, it would seem to lie outside the persuasive goals of rhetoric, though perhaps a place might be found for it in the response of the epideictic *theoroi* (Rhet. 1.3 1358b5–6).

In the opening chapter of the Rhetoric, Aristotle seems to have to steer a course between his students trained in dialectic, for whom he has written his treatise, and the rhetorical *technai* assembled in his *Technôn synagogê*, which are the raw material for his own thinking on rhetoric. Dispassionate dialectic is the reference point from which he develops his view of rhetoric as its *antistrophos* (1.1 1354a1). He must also consider the stimulus of Plato, whose Gorgias and Phaedrus, however, show an increasing appreciation of the emotions. Aristotle’s students in dialectic will have taken a dim view of the *technai*, which prescribed ways of evading the truth, or making the weaker argument the stronger, and of manipulating listeners’ emotions. From the Academic tradition, they may have gained more than a healthy distrust for “rhetoric” entirely. Aristotle must therefore acknowledge their concerns about emotional manipulation and character assassination (thus the inclusion of the word *diabolê* 1354a16).\(^{23}\) But he also

\(^{23}\) On *diabolê*, see Isoc. 11.5; Pl. *Phdr.* 267d.
points out the necessity for rhetoric, the fact that groups of people must take decisions within short spaces of time and in emotionally charged situations (Rhet. 1.2 1357a2–4; cf. Pl. Grg. 455a). He must thus impress upon his students that rhetoric is philosophically, and practically, worth their attention. They are not budding orators, anxious to learn tricks from a handbook, but they do appreciate the worthiness of philosophical and practical, political problems.

Aristotle’s use of the term “enthymeme” is striking in Rhet. 1.1, when he declares, seemingly out of nowhere, that enthymemes are the body of pístis. He appears to assume that some of the terminological issues have been settled in the now lost Methodics (Rhet. 1.2 1356b20). But with the term enthymêma Aristotle appears, without explanation, to resurrect a dead etymology and to assign the democratic listeners of the assembly and law courts the martial and timocratic dispositions that Plato associates with his spirited class, the thymoeides. Like the slaves of Aristotle’s Politics, these massed thymetic and epithymetic listeners can apprehend reasoned speech, though they cannot produce it. The former will be responsive to it, the latter less so. They are disposed, however, to orient themselves to issues of justice and gain, and they follow not necessarily the truth, but what resembles the truth, employing commonly held opinions, endoxa (1.1 1355a17), and being guided by the enthymêma τα fashioned by a speaker. There was doubtless some rhetorical handbook that put the enthymeme in the foreground before Aristotle did, but as with so much else, Aristotle’s work has completely overshadowed it.

Works Cited


24 Burnyeat 1994 13 words it as follows: “certainty and proof are not to be had (1.2 1367a7–8, 1357a1–2), yet a judgment must be made (1.3 1358a36–b8, 2.1 1377b21–78a6, 3.18 1391b8–20, 3.19.1420b2–3)... There are things to be said on either side (2.25 1402a31–34).”

Schöpsdau, K. (1994) ”Das Nachleben der Technon synagoge bei Cicero, Quintilian und in den griechischen Prolegomena zur Rhetorik,” in Forstenbaugh and Mirhady = RUSCH 6: 192–216