In Praise of Fire:

Responsibility, Manifestation, Polemos, Circumspection

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Ethics may be investigated philosophically, as can any other subject matter, but it pervades philosophy in a deeper sense as the ethic immanent in philosophy that animates any particular investigation and orients the activity of the philosopher. The ethic immanent in philosophy, no more than that of any other activity, does not present itself with clarity in that immanence itself but must be thematized through philosophical investigation of the activity of philosophizing itself. Such reflexive clarification does not prescribe an ethic to philosophers but uncovers the ethical dimension of the task of philosophy as it is practiced. It also permeates all humanities education insofar as philosophy is key to such education.

The present investigation of the ethic immanent in the task of philosophy takes the ethic of philosophy articulated by Husserl as the point of departure for a reflexion that is not primarily textual but philosophical. It traces a trajectory from Husserl’s self-responsibility, to Heidegger’s manifestation, through Heraclitus’ *polemos*, toward what I will call ‘circumspection,’ seeking to substantiate the claim that circumspection defines the ethic of the speech of the philosopher. Such circumspection cannot, however, deliver the philosopher from *polemos*. In this respect I will find the positions of Husserl, Heidegger and Heraclitus all wanting. The philosopher practices circumspection within *polemos*.

1. Ethics of Rules versus Ethics of Responsibility

Every society requires, enacts and enforces an ethical code which governs ordinary activity and defines certain activities as extraordinary, unacceptable, or illegal. Perhaps the word ‘code’ is too restrictive. While there is a certain coherence to the ethical rules existing in a given society, so that they do not produce flagrant contradictions, neither is it the case that the given set of rules is utterly consistent. There may be grey areas or overlapping
jurisdictions within a relatively coherent body of rules of conduct, some of which have the sanction of law while others do not.

A large part of our childhood is given over to learning these rules and the sanctions pertinent to each one. It is by no means arbitrary to think that the subject-matter of ethics deals with rules for conduct. As our apprenticeship in following rules comes to maturity, we learn to take responsibility for the choice and application of rules themselves. One can ask what rules are appropriate, when they are appropriate, how they interact, which rules predominate over others, and so forth. It is a key part of adulthood that one approaches rules of conduct not merely as a follower but also as a formulator and legislator of rules. Thus, Kant’s conception of enlightenment consists in the capacity of all adults to become both legislator and follower and thereby escape the condition of “self-imposed tutelage.” To be an autonomous human not under the sway of another is to give oneself the rule.

Rules are, on the whole, handed down from the past because they have worked well enough thus far. They are traditional, indeed, the main content of tradition. They are formulated in the third-person in the grammatical sense; they pertain not to me as a specific individual but to me insofar as I am any adult, any teacher, any member of the relevant class. When Hannah Arendt referred to the loss of the authority of tradition she did not mean the loss of such rules of conduct. Indeed, no organized society could exist without rules. It is rather that, as she says, “we can no longer fall back upon authentic and indisputable experiences common to all.” The rules that we have are not common—that is to say, they are not knitted together into a coherence but have fallen apart like threads of a torn sweater. They are not authentic—that is to say, we experience rules as impositions on our behaviour not as necessary guideposts in forming it correctly. They are not indisputable; nowadays as soon as someone says that a certain ethical experience is commanding or universal someone
else will immediately reply with reference to some group that does not think so. This is the
moral relativism which, however problematic as theory, is the fundamental background
ethical experience of our time. In this situation, which corresponds to what in philosophy is
called the ‘loss of foundations’ and the ‘end of metaphysics,’ the limitation of any rule-
oriented ethics become both palpable and concrete. No rule can have written within it when
it is a good moment to apply this rule. No rule can say when, in a case of conflict between
two rules, which rule should preclude the other. Or, more exactly, when such a rule of
preclusion is stated, the indeterminacy between stated rules will appear at a higher stage of
abstraction. Since rules are prescribed universally and in the third person, they never contain
the conditions for their own application to here-and-now situations. Consequently, in a post-
traditional time the question of whether any of the rules validly apply here-and-now extends
to a universal skepticism that rules—indeed ethics outright—are nothing more than
projections of power: the problem of nihilism. In Nietzsche’s words “that the highest values
devalue themselves.”

This situation necessarily arises and cannot be evaded.

To a rule-oriented ethic can be contrasted an ethics of responsibility. An ethic of self-
responsibility is formulated in the first person in the present tense. It is precisely concerned
with the question “why should I in this here-and-now situation act in such-and-such a way?”

Thus, also with the question “who am I?” Consequently, it cannot avoid the question of why
should I be ethical at all: should I respond to my desires, my appetites, my fears, or should I
focus in clarity upon the question “what should I do?” It must address the question of
nihilism, not by proposing a rule, but by confronting my existence myself and giving a
reason, an apology, for answering in the way that I do. An ethics of responsibility is not
concerned with rules as such and, indeed, if pursued with some diligence cannot help but
undermine an ethic of rules since it “is not a matter of formulae. It is a matter of maieutics.”
When, in his last work, Edmund Husserl addressed the problem that he called both “the crisis of European sciences” and “the crisis of European humanity” he began by recalling the Renaissance project of self-knowledge and its relation to philosophy.\(^5\)

According to the guiding ideal of the Renaissance, ancient man forms himself with insight through free reason. For this renewed ‘Platonism’ this means not only that man should be changed ethically [but that] the whole human surrounding world, the political and social existence of mankind, must be fashioned anew through free reason, through the insights of a universal philosophy. … In a bold, even extravagant, elevation of the meaning of universality, begun by Descartes, this new philosophy seeks nothing less than to encompass, in the unity of a theoretical system, all meaningful questions in a rigorous scientific manner, with an apodictically intelligible methodology, in an unending but rationally ordered progress of inquiry. … [Such that] The problem of God clearly contains the problem of ‘absolute’ reason as the teleological source of all reason in the world—of the ‘meaning’ of the world.\(^6\)

The modern project of a universal self-knowledge which began in the late Renaissance was guided by an idea (in the Kantian sense) of a unified, rigorous, consistent and apodictically founded reason, that provided the ground for Husserl’s conception of responsibility, of the responsibility of humanity for itself, such that the “inner personal vocation” of the philosopher was as a “functionary of mankind.”\(^7\) Self-clarification consists in an actualization in which it is possible “to decide whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy—that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeks its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature”\(^8\) is a
contingency of one civilization or an unfolding of what is essential to humanity as such. Humanity becomes itself through reason. Reason is no imposition but a movement from latency to manifestation. An endless process of self-clarification creates a parallelism that fuses the philosopher’s activity with humanity at large. In such a manner, the philosopher might rescue “the ‘meaning’ of the world” from the crisis into which it had entered.

This parallelism between the investigations of the philosopher and humanity as such depends upon one of the basic methodological and substantive principles of science: that what is seen by one researcher at one place and time can be repeated by another who looks in a similar manner. Knowledge is not idiosyncratic to neither place, time nor investigator, but repeatable in other places and times by the same researcher and others. “In accord with the essence of science, then, its functionaries maintain the constant claim, the personal certainty, that everything they put into scientific assertions has been said ‘once and for all,’ that it ‘stands fast,’ forever identically repeatable with self-evidence and usable for further theoretical or practical ends—as indubitably reactivatable with the identity of its actual meaning.” Such iteration is essential to the meaning of science as valid knowledge. Failure of attempts at repetition require either rejection of the attempt as itself failed, or rejection of the knowledge claim as false—consigning it to either opinion or error.

The reliance on philosophy to generate self-responsibility both for the individual philosopher and for European civilization itself depends upon the recognition of philosophy as an anti-traditional force. “If he is to be one who thinks for himself … he must have the insight that all the things he takes for granted are prejudices, that all prejudices are obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of tradition … .” The task of philosophy is thus to uncover the assumptions inherent in practical activity and bring them to clarity. Its goal is thus the replacement of tradition with insight, the replacement of the domination of the past with an
insight grounded in the present. This seeing-for-oneself Husserl called the “principle of principles” in which “every originary presentative intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.” Seeing-for-oneself what is manifested, letting the manifestation manifest itself as it is, according to the limits within which it is given: this is the ethos of the philosopher. It rests on a decision taken by the philosopher as a human individual not to simply swim within the current of practical activities, accepting their sedimented meanings as such, nor to simply accept the traditional legitimations of such sedimented meanings, but to accept only what presents itself, as it presents itself, within the limits within which it presents itself. “Self-reflection serves in arriving at a decision and here this naturally means immediately carrying on with the task that is truly ours … set for us all in the present.” Such a decision tears the philosopher away from both practical activities and tradition as sources of validity. Of course, the philosopher still lives within the world of practice, tradition and power but the decision that institutes the philosopher as philosopher deprives these of any claim to be sources of insight. They become merely factual components of the philosopher’s situation. The decision to become a philosopher occurs with the transcendental reduction whose “epoch creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy” such that the philosopher is saddled with both a transcendental and a concrete ego and the difficult problem of their difference and identity.
2. Husserl's Gnoseological Horizon

For Husserl, the decision instituting a philosopher was exclusively a decision for knowledge as such. Knowledge, science, was the essence and ideal of philosophy. In his programmatic essay *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1911), which summed up the *ethos* of his earlier researches into the foundations of arithmetic and logic, Husserl criticized the temptation to slip into ideals from outside the theoretical sphere in response to demands from the social and historical situation of the philosopher. Already aware of the ‘lack of meaning’ into which scientific civilization has fallen, he counselled patience in the face of pressing demands, insisting that “for the sake of time we must not sacrifice eternity” and that “only science can definitively overcome the need that has its source in science.”

The decision that turns the philosopher toward insight resting exclusively on a seeing-for-oneself initiated for Husserl an impersonal seeing, a seeing valid for anyone who looked without prejudice and was, in that sense, science. The rigours of science must prevail of the concerns of the moment. Indeed, the rigours of science were all that, in the end, could adequately address the concerns of the moment.

This *ethos* developed and radicalized in Husserl’s work, but it never changed. By the time of his last work on *The Crisis of European Sciences*, he was more concerned with the striving for knowledge than knowledge itself, more intensely aware of the waiting that the impersonal edifice of science demanded. He described his own “plight” of “existential contradiction” as a “faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is something we cannot let go.” Universal knowledge presupposes that the separate contributions made by individual researches can be summed-up, as it were, into a scientific architectonic in which every piece has its place. It is, as Husserl recognized, an infinite task, an idea (in the Kantian sense) which modern science and philosophy contribute.
to but which one will never see entire. But if only the striving for knowledge, not the completed edifice of knowledge itself, is presented as such to the philosopher, we are required to ask whether the wait is worth the while, especially since it will be an infinite wait. Postponing practical involvements for the certainty of science is only viable if the knowledge will one day arrive. Even so, one may well wonder whether it will arrive in time and we may also ask whether this wonder is necessarily un-philosophical.

When the essence of knowledge has been recognized as the striving for knowledge, such that the actual edifice is never complete, to be asked to postpone infinitely concerns embedded in practical involvements can be maintained without contradiction, but only at the price of severing philosophy from ever addressing practical concerns. It consists in an ethic in which only knowledge itself is of worth to philosophy, no longer knowledge that will eventually also serve the needs of practical life. Such a striving for knowledge for its own sake, while not without its own grandeur, is cut off from self-responsibility, which requires that the striving for knowledge return to orient practical action. In the end, I claim, Husserl’s phenomenology thus tragically succumbs to the crisis of European humanity that it intended to diagnose and address. Here one encounters again the basic problem of philosophy articulated by Socrates: how to act when one’s activity is structured by the desire for knowledge but without knowledge itself. This is the point at which Husserl’s encyclopediac conception of philosophy encounters its gnoseological horizon.

The characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology as a ‘gnoseology’ emerges as a critical circumscription of its orientation to the theory of knowledge. It has been deployed by Emil Lask and Jan Patočka, for example, in order to distinguish the orientation toward a theory of knowledge, or judgment, from an aletheological orientation toward manifestation. However, it is not just the difference of these two orientations that is at issue. It is the
dependence of a theory of judgment on the manifestation of the world and the things within it that is paramount. Thus, Patoka argues that “the foundation of manifesting itself, the foundation of the manifestable—that the world not only is but also shows itself—does not result from any activity, does not result from this activity of judgment. The action of judgment must tie into this primeval fact, to the primeval situation that the world shows itself.” While my use of the term gnoseology draws from this characterization of its dependence on manifestation, usually drawn from Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl, it actually requires a more specific rendition.

Husserl’s gnoseology can be illustrated by a passage from paragraph 50 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* where his concern is, as the title suggests, “the broadening of the concept of sense (Sinn) to cover the whole positional sphere.” Remarking that the entire sphere of doxic reflection is oriented toward a thematic sense (Sinn), or meaning, of some sort—whether it be perceptual, valutational, or practical—he claims that “identifying synthesis in the sphere of judgment has as its analogues identifying synthesis in the other positional spheres. … Thus, the formal logic of certainties can not only be enriched by taking in the form of <doxic> modalities, but can also absorb, in a certain manner, the modalities of emotion and volition.” Husserl’s claim is that the various positionalities of the doxic sphere can be incorporated into a theory of judgment because “any extra-doxic sense can at any time become the theme of a doxic act and thus enter the doxic sphere—and, in particular, the apophantactic sphere.” He compares this to modalized judgments of the sort of possibility, probability, etc. and claims that this is similar to the case of the beautiful or the good. In short, Husserl claims that aesthetic and moral positionings, as well as practical judgments, can be treated as modalities of judgments of certainty. This “opens up the
possibility of broadening the idea of formal logic to include formal axiology and a formal theory of practice.”

Husserl’s explicit concern in this passage is to extend the theory of judgment to include the entire sphere of doxic positings of whatever sort and thus to take the theory of judgment beyond straightforwardly logical concerns toward those traditionally designated as aesthetic, moral, and practical. I want to make two observations about this move, which is fundamental to his late, critical conception of phenomenology. One, the extension of the model of judgment, through an enlarged conception of modalization, to cover doxic consciousness as a whole is asserted to apply “in a certain sense.” Other modalities can be treated as if they were doxic positionings, but this qualification of “in a certain sense” is not clarified any further. It is not asked whether anything is lost, or transformed in a problematic manner, by this treatment. Second, a more subtle issue concealed by the focus on the enlarging of judgment is obscured. It is not asked whether these other ‘modalities’ of doxic positioning which are manifested in phenomena of will, morality and beauty might contain different relations to the extra-doxic or pre-doxic spheres or whether such a relation might be constitutive of the fact that this enlargement pertains only “in a certain sense.” To put it polemically and thus one-sidedly: The broadening of the concept of judgment still begins from the concept of judgment and fails to ask whether its description of the doxic sphere in these terms does indeed render other phenomena to be like judgments in all relevant respects and thus miss other, perhaps more relevant, respects in which they differ.

Husserl’s broadening of the concept of judgment thus serves (in the absence of any other cognate investigations of volition, morality, and practice) not only to disparage and specific differences between these ‘modalities,’ but also to render irrelevant the issue of their relations to extra-doxic or pre-doxic experience. The use of the term gnoseology by Lask and
Patoka pertains solely to the Heideggerian claim that Husserl’s phenomenology was restricted to the theory of cognition and obscured the dependence of judgment on manifestation. It amounts thus to a straightforward assertion of the superiority of the standpoint of Being and Time. In the present context of an exploration of the ethic of philosophy, even the dependence of a theory of judgment on manifestation does not comprehend fully the phenomenon that I designate as the ‘gnoseological horizon’ of Husserl’s phenomenology. My use of the term gnoseology is intended to capture more specifically the sense in which Husserl’s phenomenology can be said to be circumscribed with respect to the ethic of philosophical inquiry. I use it to refer to the function of a theory of knowledge that has come to substitute for a connection to action. This substitution occurs both through the ‘broadening’ whereby specific characteristics of practice are left uninvestigated by the expanded theory of judgment and also through the absence of investigation of the doxic sphere, including these specific characteristics, to that of manifestation. My claim is not, like that of Lask and Patoka, the global one that judgment depends on manifestation. It is specific to the ethic of philosophy. Self-responsibility, when it is based on a striving for knowledge rather than its possession, cannot fail to thematize the relation between this striving and the requirements of practice. Without such clarification the expectation that the striving for knowledge leads to self-responsibility is groundless. This groundless belief is the gnoseological horizon of Husserl’s phenomenology. It is, of course, also deeply rooted in European philosophy prior to phenomenology. What is important here is that it is this gnoseological horizon that prevents Husserl’s phenomenology from resolving the crisis of the European sciences, a task which it set itself, and from which emerged its ethic of philosophical practice.
Not that philosophy can ever be severed from the striving for knowledge. Gnoseology, in my usage, does not refer simply to the theory of cognition, but rather consists in putting off achieving a productive relationship between the striving of knowledge and all other human pursuits until the striving is satisfied. But the arrival of complete and coherent knowledge is always delayed. Thus, gnoseology consists in the denial and denigration of practical concerns within philosophy such that they can be addressed only unphilosophically as *merely* practical without any relation to the striving for knowledge. The task, therefore, is to think practical concerns in fundamental relationship with the striving for knowledge such that they can be addressed from within the striving itself without awaiting the arrival of completed knowledge. This is the Socratic core of the ethic of philosophy.

3. The Striving for Knowledge as Coming-into-Presence

When, in the introduction to *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger described the seeing-for-oneself of what is intuitively given that characterizes phenomenology, he initially put it in very similar terms to Husserl, as “to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself,” but this description was limited to what he called “the formal meaning” of phenomenology. In further elucidating this ‘showing’ in a deeneralized way, he claimed that showing becomes the theme of phenomenology because originally something is concealed and that such concealment “essentially belongs to what initially and for the most part shows itself, indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground.” Phenomenology thus becomes not only, in Husserl’s terms, cognition legitimated by presentative intuition, but also, and more fundamentally, the elucidation of manifestation as a revealing-concealing structure in which what is concealed is the Being of beings. This is the root of overcoming gnoseology in phenomenology: the point at which evidence is
understood not only as intuition, or the presence of the present, but as coming-into-presence, unhidden-ness, or manifestation. It grasps the striving for knowledge at the precise point of the striving, not as a prior condition for arrival, though what Husserl calls in rather subjectivistic language ‘striving’ is phrased in terms of the phenomenon itself as the coming-into-presence of the manifestation of entities. Such coming-into-presence is Being which is both revealed and concealed in manifestation.

Accounts of the relation between Husserl and Heidegger usually attribute to Heidegger an abandonment of Husserlian phenomenology due to an insistence on the primacy of the question of Being in distinction from the focus on meaning in Husserl such that being can only have the meaning of being-as-meant relevant to either regional ontologies such as ‘physical thing,’ ‘culture,’ etc., or as a formally abstract and thus empty category applying to all entities in general. According to what has been aptly called this “received view,” Heidegger rejects the transcendental-phenomenological reduction to meaning and, correlatively, the subjectivism of Husserl’s phenomenology, its reflective orientation to the validity of judgments, and the primacy of intentionality, therefore replacing a descriptive, scientific methodology with an interpretive one.

The received view claims that Heidegger abandons the transcendental reduction to meaning and thus introduces extra-phenomenological concerns when he raises the question of Being. This view thus asserts that the question of Being as posed by Heidegger is not a question of the meaning of Being (in a phenomenological sense) but of a naively assumed Being that would determine from the outside the phenomenological investigation of intentionality. Burt Hopkins diagnoses the (supposed) misunderstanding of Husserl by Heidegger in these terms as possible only “if the ‘phenomena’ of phenomenology lose their phenomenal status as the ‘exhibitive manifestation’ of the matter or matters themselves, and
are understood, thereby, to be structurally coincident with that which, prior to their
phenomenal (reflective) exhibition, manifest themselves as having been ‘reflexionlos (without
reflection).’ This state of affairs can only be understood, from the Husserlian prerogative, in
terms of the ‘ontologizing’ of the transcendental Sinn of the essence of intentionality, which
misunderstands Sinn to be equivalent with the pre-transcendental, factically determined
exemplars that serve as the phenomenal field for the exhibitive manifestation of
transcendental Sinn.” However, this diagnosis simply assumes that the question of Being
can be raised only as a factual question and not as a transcendental issue concerning
manifestation itself in distinction from that which is manifested in manifestation. Further, it
seems to be a related misunderstanding to suggest that hermeneutical insight into Being is
grounded simpliciter in the “advance regard” toward being of Dasein in its everyday
comportment. It is so grounded, though not simpliciter, but also in the decision that makes
the human being a philosopher. It is this decision that enables the ‘advance regard’ based in
the everyday comportment of Dasein. If, as I claimed above, the question of Being for
Heidegger is the question of coming-into-presence, or the manifesting of manifestation in
distinction to what is manifested, the assumption that the question of Being must be a
mundane interruption of phenomenological reflection is shown to be unfounded. This does
leave one with the difficult issue of whether, or in what sense, manifestation as such can be
disengaged from the manifestation of specific existents and the significant implications that
this has for the concept of philosophy and its relation to religion. This is one aspect of the
issue that I address below as ‘circumspection.’

The received view of the relation of Being and Time to Husserlian phenomenology thus
comes to grief on the related unfounded assumptions that any investigation of Being must
be mundane and that such investigation is based simply on Dasein’s everydayness. I would
thus agree with Reiner Schürmann and Steven Galt Crowell who argue that the shift to manifestation is not a rejection of the Husserlian problematic of validity, nor the transcendental reduction that is its consequence, by Heidegger in *Being and Time* but rather a further step back into what originates appearing as such. Schürmann claims that “the mutation of transcendentalism from Husserl to Heidegger thus has to do with the role of man: the condition of our knowing and experiencing is no longer sought purely in man, but in his relation to the being of entities in their totality. The origin is no longer sought in the formal structures of consciousness through which indubitable representations are obtained, but in the ontological structures through which the entity we are is said to belong to being as such.” Similarly, Crowell refers to the “new, specifically transcendental-phenomenological ontology” which “attempts to define the sense of the reality of something real insofar as it manifests itself in consciousness.” Such a transcendental ontology cannot help but *displace* the centrality of validity as asserted by Husserl in favour of the essence of manifestation itself, but it is no rejection that disrupts the continuity and unity of transcendental reflection.

However, the issue of whether the manifestation of Being refers to Being-as-meant or mundane being does not exhaust the difficulties of the relation between Heidegger and Husserl. The attempt to assert a continuity between Husserlian ‘evidence’ and Heideggerian ‘manifestation,’ as I have above, may be regarded as an issue solely of interpretations by Husserl and Heidegger and not of the things themselves. Thus, Crowell asserts that the real difference consists in Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s *interpretation* of the achievement of the transcendental reduction as giving an absolute ground of constituting consciousness which was based on Husserl’s exclusive concern with epistemological issues. This, however, does not root the difference deep enough. The project of achieving a ground for science was not a mere interpretation on Husserl's part. It constituted the driving force of
his work. As Ludwig Landgrebe has demonstrated, it is the radicalization of the search for a grounding of science that propelled Husserl's work from 1] a revision of the theory of knowledge and science that required the transcendental reduction (Ideas I, 1913), to 2] the motive for the passage from the natural attitude to the transcendental reduction (First Philosophy, 1923-4), toward 3] a justification of the striving for knowledge as such (Crisis, 1934-7). The teleology of Husserl's questioning of the ground of science is thus an ethical question of the justification of the striving for knowledge by the philosopher and its role in European civilization as I have described it above through the concept of self-responsibility. The limitation of Husserl's perspective with regard to the essence of manifestation is rooted in his gnoseology not merely in an interpretation and thus Schürmann is right to point to the shift away from man toward manifestation even while the continuity of transcendental inquiry is maintained.

4. Phenomenology as the Critique of Metaphysics

The assertion of a continuity between Husserl’s gnoseological phenomenology and Heidegger's ontological phenomenology does not suggest that the standpoint of Being and Time was a coherent or stable one. Schürmann indicates this in his account of a development in Heidegger’s thought “from the subject to Dasein (from Husserl to Being and Time); from there to the ‘destiny of being’ which ascribes to any given collectivity or type its historical locus; and finally to the ‘event’,”  similar to the way in which I will notice in the next section how Being and Time is succeeded by the thesis about Plato’s inauguration of metaphysics and the subsequent opening to Heraclitus’ polemos. The condition for understanding this later development correctly is the transcendental continuity and gnoseological discontinuity—both founded on the decision to become a philosopher—
between Husserl and the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. It is this problematic of continuity and discontinuity that allows one to follow the phenomenological ethic of philosophy into Heidegger’s post-metaphysical encounter with *polemos*.

Insofar as Husserl was oriented to the scientific, repeatable, description of judgments, including both the explicit judgments of established scientific domains and the implicit judgments embedded in practical activities, his concern remained with the entities manifested in the modes of their manifestation, not with the phenomenon of manifestation itself. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Husserl’s project was the extension of the enlightenment scientific ideal to the whole of experience in order to bring it under the sway of this ideal. The ethical significance of this extension was to expect that self-responsibility in the sense of giving a scientific account would adequately and sufficiently address the crisis of the European sciences as the loss of the meaning of science for human life. Heidegger’s shift of attention within the phenomenological description of manifestation from that which is manifested to the phenomenon of manifestation itself, toward coming-into-presence as the Being concealed in the presence of entities, shows that self-responsibility must extend beyond self-knowledge toward the guardianship of manifestation itself, to the open-ness that grounds any showing as such. Such a shift of attention cannot but push to the foreground the entity whose character is such as to experience the open-ness which ground the unhidden—*Dasein*, human being, that being whose character is at issue for itself.

It is important to clarify exactly in what sense *Dasein* comes into the foreground, especially since it is exactly this issue that drives the unstable standpoint of *Being and Time* toward the subsequent critique of metaphysics. Crowell argues in a critical vein that Heidegger’s “metaphysical decade” after *Being and Time* was concerned to provide an “ontic ground” for ontology which did not merely refer to “*Dasein*, the inquirer, as the inescapable
starting point for philosophy” but rather “stands poised to make a move that has since become familiar in philosophy, namely, to relativize such [ontological] knowledge to some aspect of the context in which it arises.”  

While such a move has indeed become familiar, I will claim in opposition to Crowell’s view that it has done so due to a misunderstanding of Heidegger’s work based in the received view that he abandoned phenomenology in *Being and Time*. This move itself cannot be attributed to Heidegger precisely because his concern with ontology was indeed a phenomenological concern with the essence of the manifestation of the beings present in intuition.

In the introduction to *Being and Time*, section 3 on “The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being,” Heidegger defines the question of Being not only as referred to regional ontologies investigated by the sciences but more primordially as “the condition of the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them.”  

The next section on “The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being” asserts that “fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can originate, must be sought in the existential analysis of Da-sein.”  

Not only does the ontological determination, which is defined in terms originating from the Husserlian enterprise, precede the ontic determination, but the ontic determination derives from the ontological one. The ontic-ontological priority of Da-sein consists in its ontological, not ontic, priority because “on the basis of its determination as existence Da-sein is in itself ‘ontological.”  

While ontic priority pertains to the question of access, such priority is itself ontologically determined. In *Being and Time*, therefore, the ontic ground refers precisely to the starting point for philosophy in the inquirer and not, as Crowell asserts, to the relativization of ontological knowledge to its ontic origin. The instability of *Being and Time*, which led to the later unconcealing of manifestation as *polemos* must therefore be located differently than Crowell suggests.
The problem in *Being and Time* that grounds its instability such that Heidegger had to break with its formulation in order to proceed further into the ‘appearing of the appearing as event’ or the ‘event of manifestation,’ and which also grounds the attempts of commentators like Crowell to pull back the existential analytic into a Husserlian gnoseological framework, is indeed situated in the ontic-ontological relation of that text but certainly not in a priority of the ontic that could lead to a later problematic of relativization of ontology to its contextual origin. The problem consists precisely in the *in principle* separation of ontic and ontological domains such that they are combined only accidentally in the being of *Dasein* which repeats without significant variation Husserl’s *in principle* distinction between eidetic necessity and factual contingency. In short, there is an insufficient overcoming of gnoseology in *Being and Time*. This accidental combination of ontic and ontological domains grounds the priority of *Dasein* such that while Heidegger asserts that “*Dasein* has proven to be what, before all other beings, is ontologically the primary being to be interrogated”39 no such proof is actually ever offered. Only the existential analytic of *Dasein* as presented in the text of *Being and Time* in its entirety could fulfill this proof which is asserted at the outset. This is not a hermeneutic circle but the assertion of a systematic completion, such as that asserted at the beginning of the Hegelian phenomenology, which can only be redeemed by a systematic explication terminating in the justification of the starting point and thus achieving a unified and self-enclosed totality. *Being and Time* not only does not culminate in such a systematic totality but could not in principle do so because it moves toward an ontological temporal analysis that contains no motive for a return to *Dasein’s* ontic existence. Put polemically, the problem is not that ontic access relativizes ontology but rather that ontic existence is relegated simply to access and is subsequently left behind so that ontology is entirely cut loose from its beginning point whose primacy is thus simply asserted and nowhere within the inquiry
justified. From this point of view, it is not at all surprising that when, much later (1962), Heidegger takes up the question of time again in *Time and Being*, he derogates not the ontological question but the ontic one. “The attempt to think Being without beings becomes necessary because otherwise, it seems to me, there is no longer any possibility of explicitly bringing into view the Being of what is today all over the earth, let alone of adequately determining the relations of man to what has been called ‘Being’ up to now.”

Both the received view, which locates Heidegger’s abandonment of phenomenology in *Being and Time*, and the view of Steven Galt Crowell, which locates the abandonment in the “metaphysical decade” after that text, claim that Heidegger abandoned the fidelity of Husserlian evidence to the things themselves and that this abandonment is the condition for the critique of metaphysics. To the contrary, I have argued that Being as understood by Heidegger is within the phenomenological horizon of ‘meaning,’ that the discontinuity between Husserl and Heidegger is rooted in Husserl’s gnoseology whose overcoming was already preceded in Husserl’s development from an apodictic foundation for knowledge toward the striving for knowledge, and, thus, like Schürmann, that the attempt to overcome metaphysics is inherent in the continuity of phenomenology in Husserlian and Heideggerian versions. Most important, my interpretation claims that this continuity and discontinuity is only correctly apprehended if one understands them as founded on the decision to become a philosopher and the ethic that this decision institutes. Heidegger’s critique of Plato and re-reading of the pre-Socratics was central to this continuing phenomenological task. That there is a continuity between Heidegger’s turning of phenomenology from intuition to manifestation in *Being and Time* and his later critique of metaphysics suggests a phenomenological logic in this development that begins with Husserl and extends through *Being and Time* into overcoming metaphysics. I thus understand the question of the relation
between ontic and ontological dimensions, between intuition and manifestation, as an intra-phenomenological debate not one pertaining to the abandonment of phenomenology. This intra-phenomenological debate pertains most fundamentally to the ethic of philosophy as a decision owing fidelity to manifestation (as both the evidence of entities and the clearing of a world).  

5. Manifestation as Polemos

When Heidegger subsequently took up the question of Being in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he was concerned to distinguish at the outset between an inquiry that “held itself within the purview of beings as such” from his own questioning which departs from *Being and Time* to ask about the “disclosedness of Being,” that by asking about the meaning of Being is not metaphysics as such but is the ground for uncovering the essence of metaphysics. The shift of attention within phenomenology grounds Heidegger’s subsequent (1931-2) argument that Western metaphysics began with Plato’s transformation of truth from unhidden-ness into “the correctness of apprehending and asserting.” Despite qualifications concerning the necessity of Husserl’s phenomenology for his breakthrough, this judgment cannot fail to extend to Husserl’s gnoseological phenomenology as the most recent re-statement of this metaphysics.

The conception of truth as unhidden-ness, *al theia*, in early Greek philosophy was replaced by truth as idea by Plato. As idea, truth is a constant presence that is given over to subjective representation, determination and assertion as a way of thinking about being rather than as a mode of being itself. “Nevertheless, in a certain way Plato has to hold onto ‘truth’ as still a characteristic of beings, because a being, as something present, has being precisely by appearing, and being brings unhiddenness with it. But at the same time, the
inquiry into what is unhidden shifts in the direction of the appearing of the visible form, and consequently toward the act of seeing that is ordered to this visible form, and toward what is correct and toward the correctness of seeing.”

This is the ambiguity of a transition in which something unsaid structures what is said in such a manner as to leave a trace within what is said.

Given his critique of metaphysics as a shift from coming-into-presence to full presence under the light of the idea, Heidegger proceeded to uncover the prior meaning of being in early Greek philosophy. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, which was given as lectures in 1935 though not published until 1953, this was his main task—though it was not an end in itself. Understanding the inception of Greek philosophy, and the end of this inception in Plato, was to be preparatory to a new inception rooted in the German language. From the many discussions of Greek philosophy and art in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, I want to single out only that of Heraclitus’ fragment 53—I will follow Diels’ numbering of the fragments throughout—which is translated in a common English edition by Kirk and Raven to read “War is the father of all and the king of all, and some it shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free.” The first word, translated as ‘war’ by Kirk and Raven, is the Greek word *polemos* that can also be translated as strife, conflict, confrontation or struggle. I will use the word ‘strife’ as the general term, because ‘war’ can be misleading. It is not that strife cannot be expressed at times as war, for it can. It is that strife is not always war, or, as Heidegger said, “the *polemos* named here is … not war in the human sense” but “allows what essentially unfolds to step apart in opposition.” The paradox of fragment 53 requires one to think together both ‘what essentially unfolds’ and ‘opposition.’

Strife is father and king, origin and ruler, that which holds all together in tension. This holding together creates division into relationships which are mutually defined and thus
cannot exist separately. Two examples, perhaps more than examples, are given of such relationships: the division and relationship between gods and humans and the division and relationship between slaves and free humans. Division between divine and mortal beings, given first, and division between humans, given second, on the ground of that which makes them most human—freedom or its absence. The struggle for freedom was the greatest claim of the Greeks to distinguish themselves in their life in the *polis* from what we might anachronistically call ‘oriental despotism,’ as they did in their defeat of the Persians. All humans are distinct from gods and are human in their relation to the gods. Free humans are distinct from slaves and are free in their relation to slaves. Strife is the name for this distinction and relationship that stands at the origin and rules the course of our lives.

When Heidegger interpreted Heraclitus in 1935, he began from *phusis* understood as “the emergent self-upraising, the self-unfolding that abides in itself” in which “rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originary unity.” This originary unity, *phusis*, names coming-to-presence, manifestation in its manifesting, or Being. He then translated fragment 53 in this way: “Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire (who lets emerge), but (also) for all the preserver that holds sway. For it lets some appear as gods, others as human beings, some it produces (sets forth) as slaves, but others as the free.” *Polemos* is thus the unifying division-and-relation in coming-to-presence which “allows those that struggle to originate as such in the first place,” which “first projects and develops the un-heard, the hitherto un-said and un-thought” which is later “sustained by the creators, by the poets, thinkers and statesmen” such that they “capture in this work the world that is thereby opened up” which becomes authentic history. Authentic history is the becoming of a world originally opened as strife. It is in and through strife that manifestation manifests. Later in the text, Heidegger returns to *polemos* to remind us that confrontation
“sets the essential and the unessential, the high and the low, into their limits and makes them manifest.”

The divergence from Husserl could not now be more complete. Instead of an encyclopediac, gnoseological accumulation of knowledge of manifested entities toward infinity, we have a manifesting that sets forth humans as humans, grounds the activity of creators, and opens up the authentic history of a world. We must understand that this interpretation is also a polemos, one designed to understand the first, Greek inception of philosophy toward the possibility of its second, German one. Does this fact explain the curious absence of any reference to fragment 53 in the post-war works? Gelassenheit surpasses not only certain engagements but engagement itself. This again is a failure of the ontic-ontological relation.

What becomes of human action in the world that opens up into strife? Knowledge does not simply add up, but is drawn into the opposition between humans. Action is not simply human, but is drawn into this same opposition. Humanistic education, to the same extent, inhabits the world riven by tensions and cannot ascend above human conflict. Human activities become factors in the oppositions that define our world, that stem from the strife presiding over its inception. Is this all? Not quite. Human activity and philosophy can attempt to sustain and address the strife itself, to speak of the origin and ruler that sets forth our world, thereby to address ‘what essentially unfolds.’ If Being is manifested as polemos, what possibilities remain for philosophy? If being is manifested as strife, then it appears that the striving for knowledge in philosophy, and in all humanities education insofar as philosophy is crucial for the humanities, cannot be summed up into an acquisition for all, but will rather enter into the strife itself, and even perhaps be consumed in that strife. It is this question that I want finally to consider, by coming finally to the embodied ethic of philosophy as circumspection.
6. End of Humanitas?

Is philosophy drawn into the strife between opposites that is opened up in manifestation? Has it become, will it become, should it become, agonistic? Since the transformation of Greek paideia into Roman tradition under the reign of a commanding and shared origin, and continued into modernity as a faith in the accumulation of scientific knowledge, it has attempted to mute, even stand above, conflict regarding this origin, reducing strife to the best result that contributes to the continuing reappropriation of the origin. Of course, barbarians were dealt with otherwise. This Roman transformation was prepared for by Plato and Aristotle who represented the end of Greek philosophy not its culmination. Strife in Heraclitus’ sense was rotated, as it were, from a horizontal conflict within which all human reality takes place, to a vertical ‘divided line’ in which appearance has a lesser reality than truth. Conflict can subsequently appear as a prelude to a passage upward in which conflict is in principle, teleologically, surpassed. This upward goal, the pure being contemplated by the philosopher, is matched by the Roman origin that holds philosophical ascesis within tradition. Heidegger’s rediscovery of polemos in the manifestation of being destructures this articulation of philosophy, presence and tradition. It should lead us to ask why, and whether, we expect the humanities to lead us toward a reconciliation of conflict and the re-appropriation of tradition. It demands that we confront the ubiquity of human conflict in the world in which we teach and learn.

While ‘humanism’ is a term that dates only from 1808, the root term humanitas goes back further. The connection of humanism to the end of polemos is made in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism.
Humanitas explicitly so called, was first considered and striven for in the age of the Roman Republic. Homo humanus was opposed to homo barbarus. Homo humanus here means the Romans, who exalted and honoured Roman virtus through the ‘embodiment’ of the paideia [education] taken over from the Greeks. These were the Greeks of the Hellenistic age, whose culture was acquired in the schools of philosophy. It was concerned with eruditio et institutio in bonas artes [scholarship and training in good conduct]. Paideia thus understood was translated as humanitas. The genuine romanitas of homo romanus consisted in such humanitas. We encounter the first humanism in Rome: it therefore remains in essence a specifically Roman phenomenon which emerges from the encounter of Roman civilization with the culture of late Greek civilization.53

On this basis one could argue, as did Hannah Arendt, that the modern age is characterized by a loss of authority based in the tradition of humanism. She pointed out that the Roman concept of a sacred foundation, a beginning which all subsequent activity returned to and re-instated, distinguished their Empire from the Greek capacity to found new colonies with equal claim to self-government, to begin again.54 It would be a mistake to turn this into an argument for the restoration of tradition—forgetting, as do all conservatives, that a restoration cannot be a continuation since it assumes the loss of tradition that it vainly tries to re-establish. A restoration is a new beginning that attempts to hide its newness. Arendt argued for a renewal of republican humanism: “the humanist, because he is not a specialist, exerts a faculty of judgment and taste which is beyond the coercion which each specialty imposes upon us.”55 The problem, which she well recognized, was that the only source of authority in the modern world was revolution but that modern revolutions failed because
they could not adequately establish the authority of a new foundation for tradition. For this reason her conception of judgment, which was initially proposed as an account of the political thinking of actors, became in her late work the province of a historian’s retrospective judgment. Without tradition to function like, as it were, the walls of the city, within which action could be contained, human action achieved no solidity, could not cohere into a continuous accomplishment but rather unraveled into a plethora of false and competing starts—an ontic relativism. Arendt excepted the American revolution from this assessment, a judgment that I will not discuss any further than to point out that she did so because the act of foundation preceeded the Declaration of Independence so that the Constitution “confirmed and legalized an already existing body politic rather than made it anew.” It succeeded, in other words, precisely to the extent that it was not a modern revolution at all but rather a confirmation of an existing state of affairs—which would drive us back to the rights of Englishmen rooted in tradition not to the modern universal rights of man. Thus, the problem remains: how can a post-humanist conception of judgment resist the dissolution of philosophy into a sheer plurality of polemical jousts without a conception of tradition to hold human activity within bounds? Is the only alternative the humanist evasion of polemos or a post-humanist general rhetoric? Must one reject the ‘end of metaphysics’ in order to enact the ethic of philosophy?

7. Thinking Polemos

I will give two answers to this question. My first answer will be a simple ‘yes’ to strife, or, perhaps more to the point, a ‘no’ to the late Greek loss of polemos for presence, later transformed by the Roman commanding origin into tradition and humanitas. A negation: this traditional formation begun in late antiquity and persisting into modernity is an illusory
escape from conflict that serves to hide the role that our institutions, including educational institutions, play in conflict. Every statement that one makes, including or even especially statements about the whole, enter into the strife of opposites which constitute the world. To expect otherwise is to dream of death with all the advantages of living. There is no escape from polemos and philosophy is wrongly understood if it is understood as such an escape, which is founded on a fixation with presence at the expense of coming-into-presence.

Consider fragment 80, “One should know that polemos is universal and right is strife and everything comes about by strife and necessity.” Everything comes about by strife and is drawn into strife. Remember, Socrates was a warrior and referred in his Apology to the virtue of warriors as constitutive of philosophy. Right, legitimacy, justice come into being by strife and are drawn into strife. Learning, knowledge, the humanities come into being by strife and are drawn into strife. Thus, the future of philosophy and the humanities is to be drawn into the strife with which our world presents us and if there is to be another, subsequent, world it will come from strife. Genuine philosophical teaching, I conclude, does not teach one to stand above the strife but to enter into it with eyes wide open, to embrace it as justice itself, to use one’s intelligence to determine what is the defining strife of one’s time.

My second answer, which is different but neither retracts nor ameliorates the first, can perhaps be introduced through recalling fragment 67. “God is day-night, winter-summer, polemos-peace, satiety-hunger. He undergoes alteration in the way that fire, when it is mixed with spices, is named according to the scent of each of them.” The opposites which originate and hold sway over a world are God itself and even God is not simply self-same but changes in the way that fire changes with the admixture of spice, such that God is named according to this admixture, has different scents and a plurality of names. The second answer with respect to the strife of opposites, and the world brought forth by opposites, has
to do with the fire that reigns in, and over, the strife. Fragment 66: “Fire, having come upon them, will judge and seize upon all things.” Fire, which is mentioned many times in the fragments that remain from Heraclitus, is the clue to the *logos* which is said to be “common to all” (fragment 2) and so deep that “you could not in your going find the ends of the soul though you travelled the whole way” (fragment 45). God, fire, *logos* does not appear apart from *polemos*, as an escape from the universality and ubiquity of strife, but as the law of strife itself. We may hear an echo of this in the nineteenth century, as the metaphysics instituted by Plato began to be dismantled, when Karl Marx claimed that “labour is the living, form-giving fire … the transitoriness of things, as their formation by living time.” Fire is not normally form-giving, but form-destroying. To assert that it is form-giving is to discover form-giving in form-destroying and through form-destroying, which is to displace the primacy of form in favour of the strife from which form is made and into which it disappears. The second answer, in speaking of the universality and ubiquity of fire, in no way retracts the first answer that pulls philosophy, because it pulls all of human life, into strife. But it does add, and that which it adds, it adds in and through the human capacity to speak of the strife of opposites from within that strife, to speak of the fire even as we are consumed by it. In this resides the ecstasy of humans.

8. A Necessary Self-Referentiality

Here I will take issue even with Heraclitus. Fragment 130 asserts that “It is not proper to be so comic that you yourself appear comic.” Comedy, like other effects, is not equally visible from all locations within the disposition of opposites, but, from the perspective of my
writing-desk, the comedy of my present discourse is palpable and I cannot maintain what is proper. Is it but an accident that Aristophanes, who made fun of Socrates in *The Clouds*, nevertheless appears in *Symposium*, and in a not unflattering light? I will not digress into the ‘hey nonny nonny’ whose profundity Shakespeare revealed in *Much Ado About Nothing*, but only point out that even Heraclitus, for whom *everything* was manifested in the strife between opposites, ruled out the reference of comedy to oneself, thus safeguarding the seriousness of the speech about *polemos*. But *polemos* might also be a joke and ‘the dark one’ too surrounded by light to be properly seen. The danger of opposites is cancelling self-reference. It seems that this danger even Heraclitus was determined to expel. The scandal of the Greeks was the Cretan who said “all Cretans lie.” In this, Heraclitus anticipated by 2400 years Bertrand Russell’s attempted exorcism of self-referential paradox by his ‘theory of logical types’ that would ban classes from being members of themselves. My second answer cannot postpone any longer some reflection on the reflexive paradox that would speak of fire as the law of strife from within the strife itself. Ecstacy, comedy, tragedy: all enter into philosophy as it seeks its speech of the whole. Philosophy cannot escape *polemos* but does speak of the fiery essence of manifestation.

Notice that the opposites of Heraclitus, and also the other pre-Socratics, are substantive. They are opposites not contradictories. Thus, there is a pull in each direction upon the human riven space in between rather than a simple fullness at one side and a mere absence at the other. If substantive opposites are understood wrongly as contradictories, such that the riven space is stretched only between fullness and absence, then the metaphysics of presence is secretly re-instated. In contrast, substantive opposites speak of day and night, not day and not-day, not night and not-night, as a merely logical opposition would. Substantive opposites each exert a pull upon the human riven space, a pull dependent on its own specific content.
The logical concept not-day has no content of its own to set in opposition to day. Night is not merely the absence of day; it is the substantive opposite of day and, as such, exerts an influence on day such that day is not merely day but coming-from-night and turning-into-night. Thus day is not just the presence of what is manifested but coming-into-presence and retreating-from-presence, not just what is manifested but the essence of manifestation.

Substantive opposites, in their pull upon each other, open a space riven with tension such that one can speak of this tensional space itself as fire, as sacred. But this fire, and speech about fire, this speech touched by the sacred that is philosophy, is the riven space itself and promises no escape from strife. At the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, Being is confronted not with its substantive opposite but its contradictory Nothing. Indeed, it is so presented because Being itself has been purged of any substantive Being to become a merely empty concept of Being. “Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more or less than nothing. … Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as pure being.” Empty Being and its contradictory Nothing are sublated, transcended and preserved, Aufgehoben, into Becoming such that no return to either Being or Nothing ever occurs. Contradictory opposites promise becoming, change, progress, with philosophy on the side of this progress without any pause for the un-progressive, the forgotten, lazy existence. Though conflict generates becoming, it is left behind as becoming becomes. Not so with substantive opposites. Their pull on each other can never be merged and harnessed. It is a tension without direction, a tension within which all directions appear and are pursued.

And remember, opposites are themselves multiple: day-night, winter-summer, polemos-peace, hunger-satiety. Day-night might be inscribed within winter-summer, as winter is the night of the year, but not without remainder. Hunger-satiety could also be so inscribed:
winter is the hunger of the year. The remainder is more apparent here. What I call the ‘remainder’ refers to the heterogeneity of the pairs of opposites. The whole world can be put on a continuum between wet and dry. Similarly, it can be characterized throughout by hot-cold. But wet-dry and hot-cold are heterogeneous. The manifold dimensions of the world emerge from the indefinite plurality of such pairs. But the pairs are neither merely external, incomparable to each other, nor fold into one grand encompassing opposition. They can speak of each other, but in becoming comparable, the substantive content determines a remainder—that which would have emerged if the comparability had been manifested in a different comparison.

Opposites, being substantive, can say something substantive about other pairs of opposites if they are allowed to speak of them by addressing the whole. To address the whole from within opposites is to address it with opposites, or with a member of a pair. This is the problem of Husserl’s ‘transcendental subjectivity’ which “is actually called ‘I’ only by equivocation—though it is an essential equivocation.”°68 The concept of an ‘essential equivocation’ has yet to influence the conception of philosophical language in phenomenology. It finds its place in necessary self-referentiality. The equivocal nature of the philosopher’s ‘I’ is that he philosopher speaks as this person immersed in these conflicts and allegiances here and now and simultaneously as philosophy itself apart from any particular philosopher. Fire speaks the whole, and the sacredness of the whole, but it cannot be insulated from its death by water. Thus emerges the conflict and the uncertainty: should one speak of the whole as fire, or as water as Thales had it? Polemos intrudes upon the whole. The fire tribe and the water tribe, no longer simply tribes in conflict, but armed with the whole as their emblem, they fight not only as opposites but in the name of the tensional space itself. And this cannot be simply avoided, because there is no speech of the whole that does not
draw from the language of opposites and use the substantive content of the opposites to
give content to the manifestation of the whole. Note the example of ‘care’ in Heidegger,
which does not mean ‘you do, or should, care for others,’ since ‘care’ here applies equally
ontologically to ignoring or hating. But still, I have yet to encounter a reader for whom these
primary polemical meanings do not constitute a basic, even if introductory, level of
appropriation of the text. Care and other features of Dasein are, in Heidegger’s terms,
ontological, not ontic, but the ontological descriptions of the text could not work without an
ontic appropriation that must necessarily be inadequate. I conclude, and this conclusion is
part of my second answer: Any concept of philosophy that understands its language as the
only correct or possible language for philosophy fails to incorporate the task of philosophy
into the form in which this task is given expression. I cannot exempt Husserl’s technical,
encyclopaedic language of philosophy from this judgment. Nor Heidegger’s attempted
separation of terms between ontological and ontic. Nor Heraclitus’ expulsion of comedy.
The language of philosophy can never escape an essential equivocation which is based upon
its necessary self-reference.

9. Manifestation of the Riven Space as Such

Let me finally turn to the pair polemos-peace. Polemos speaks of the nature of the tensional
space itself, of the relation between the opposites that fill it and give it substantive content.
It thus bears a close relation to fire, which speaks of the scent of the whole itself, though it is
not the whole but the strife between opposites through which, and in which, the whole is
manifested. Can the strife, polemos, between opposites of fragment 53 also be called a ‘peace,’
according to the pair polemos-peace in fragment 67? Or, we may even ask, can the right or
justice of polemos mentioned in fragment 80 be also spoken as injustice, as it appears in the
one surviving fragment of Anaximander, since even justice, as every other appellation, takes its meaning from its opposite (fragment 23)? With what circumspection is a word that itself is a member of an oppositional pair taken to refer to the relation between oppositional pairs itself? Is this circumspection the ethic of philosophy itself? Is this why metaphysics is an inevitable residue of philosophy that comes to degrade it from within? That the riven space within which opposites appear can only be described in terms calling upon one of these opposites and will thus seem (to those who do not follow the thought itself) to be *only* polemical.

My second answer concerning the relation between philosophy and *polemos* is this: in speaking of the whole with a language formed within the strife of opposites, philosophy addresses the essence of manifestation and as such touches the sacred, though this touch cannot be expressed without profaning that very sacred. It is within the limitation of such necessary profanity that philosophy operates. When being is manifested as strife, the striving for knowledge in philosophy cannot be summed up into an acquisition for all, but will rather enter into the strife, but is not consumed in that strife insofar as it speaks of the strife itself with responsible circumspection. Philosophy is the circumspection to address the whole through that within the opposites that most needs to be said. It is the work of such circumspection when Heidegger, who had spoken of the pair unconcealedness-concealedness with which Being is manifested as a *polemos, Auseinandersetzung*, confrontation, strife—after the confrontation with Nietzsche that registers his distance from National Socialism, a distance that indicates a remaining too great proximity—begins to speak of manifestation as *Gelassenheit*, releasement. In order to discuss this circumspection, we have to speak of its style or manner, and the pairs within which its speech of the whole is manifested. For this reason, I would venture in our time to speak of the tensional space as
peace, of a setting-free of opposites to be substantively opposite and of pairs to be heterogeneous, of a necessary maintaining of the world through such peace, in a world where strife has come to mean a war of elimination, an elimination that would eliminate the ground of strife itself. This is the warning bequeathed to us by Jan Patočka who noted that the twentieth century is

an epoch of the night, of war, and of death [in which] humans glimpse … something like the end of all of the values of the day. … No sooner do humans confront the shaken world than they are … mobilized for a new battle. … The war against war … uses in the service of the day what belonged to the night and to eternity.\(^\text{71}\)

Patočka grasped the mobilization that metaphysics in the form of technology imposed on \textit{polemos} such that the striving for peace engenders the war machine and the war machine operates in the name of peace. This demonic mobilization depends upon metaphysics for the separation of day from night as opposed to their mutual opposition and intermingling in manifestation. If day is only day, it can be mobilized against night. If night is only night, one can dream of expelling it from human affairs. To step out of this cruel intermingling, in which philosophical dialectics is not innocent, one must allow again a releasement into substantive opposites as opposites such that they may clear a world.

The first step, my first answer, is an abandonment of the attempt at redemption from the world. Such redemption, in philosophy, is called metaphysics. This clearing of a world through releasing substantive opposites may be the “hidden harmony” of which Heraclitus speaks in fragment 54.\(^\text{72}\) To understand the relation between opposites as a peace, one would have to part company with the view of peace in Kant which defines war as the natural state and peace simply negatively as the absence of war, as “the end of all hostilities.”\(^\text{73}\) Of all
modern philosophers, only Spinoza had a positive concept of peace as grounded in freedom and as “guided more by hope than fear.” Peace would have to be understood as the beginning of a harmony that sets opposites into the tensional field such that they can manifest the human world as riven by such opposites and the manifestation of Being through these opposites. Such peace requires the acceptance of polemos, even of conflict, as a condition of human existence. Philosophy speaks of the opening of a world as polemos so that those within the world address its conflicts without the possibility of escape from the risk that is politics.

The second step, the second answer, is addressed to those who follow the path of thinking without reservation, who seek to speak the logos while consumed by its fire. They experience truth as coming-into-presence and Being as the tensional space of opposites where one cannot ascend to one’s ‘true home’ but remains on an interminable path. They speak of fire as they are consumed by fire. This is their ecstasy. The path of thinking must continually be won and protected against those who would subsume it into tradition. Self-responsibility, manifestation, polemos, circumspection: circumspection incorporates and completes this trajectory. Circumspection must judge how to speak the whole from within the strife of opposites without denying the strife of opposites. Circumspection in the speech of the whole is on the interminable path that is the responsibility of the philosopher to thought. It is brought forth by the split within the self that is co-extensive with the decision that institutes a philosopher, a decision which is not one and for all but continually renewed, so that, in Husserl’s words, “true being is not something he always already has, with the self-evidence of the ‘I am,’ but something he only has and can have in the form of the struggle for his truth, the struggle to make himself true.” But after gnoseology, the struggle will require a continually renewed encounter with the foundation of the essential equivocation:
the struggle with, through and in clarification of ‘what is mine as mine’ to discover ‘what is true as such.’ The split in the philosopher’s ‘I’ instituted by the decision that institutes a philosopher renders the struggle for truth a struggle for oneself—oneself speaking for oneself and oneself as speaking the truth—that is the way the unity of opposites comes to form the philosopher. Transcendental and concrete ego, ontological and ontic description, comedy and *polemos*, cannot be simply divided once and for all without a fall into gnoseology, *humanitas*, metaphysics—some form in which the struggle is set aside for certainty and security. Here we face the paradox from which the philosophical ethic emerges: philosophy demands decision and action precisely so that that which is subject to neither decision nor action may become manifest, and simultaneously, philosophy gives voice to that which is not subject to decision and action precisely to free decision and action for politics. The struggle to negotiate this paradox, understood this way, I call circumspection. It encompasses the ethic of responsibility to the appearing of that which appears that inheres in the unity of phenomenological manifestation and points to the divided voice that speaks both within and of the *polemos*. This divided voice divides the identity of the philosopher with a constitutive paradox.77

Despite the manifestation of Being as *polemos* that is uncovered in Heidegger’s work, there is a systemic misunderstanding of its significance for philosophy. My first and second answers to the question of the meaning of *polemos* for philosophy attempt to separate, in a manner whose expression will always be necessarily equivocal, the political acceptance of conflict within the riven space from the philosophical orientation toward the manifestation of the riven space itself. Without this separation, philosophy would simply become polemical and surrender its speech of the whole, that is to say, philosophy would come to an end. This tendency, the submergence of philosophy into rhetoric, politics, must be counted one of the
major tendencies of our time—a tendency which reveals what our time itself is. Heidegger succumbs to this tendency and thus fails to capture the task of philosophy in our time when he understands philosophy itself as conflict, *Auseinandersetzung*.

Philosophical interpretation, as my second answer suggests, orients itself to the manifestation of Being in the substantive opposites that characterize the riven space, that give it the specific form and remainder which constitute a world. Heidegger suggests, however, that philosophical interpretation is *polemos* itself, not the speech of the world within which *polemos* appears. In seminar notes on Schelling from 1941-3, refers to “interpretation as dis-cussion (*Aus-einandersetzung*)”\(^78\) Similarly, in his book on Parmenides he refers to “the essential domain of the strife between concealedness and unconcealedness.”\(^79\) Already in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he characterized his relation to Greek philosophy as a confrontation.\(^80\) But there is no such strife. Strife occurs between the two faces of that which emerges into unconcealedness. Heidegger’s view of philosophical interpretation confuses *polemos* and the manifestation of Being as *polemos* and thus inserts *polemos* into the manifestation of Being. But philosophical interpretation must hold to the manifestation of Being in the words and actions of philosophers. Dialogue between philosophers as philosophers is thus not a confrontation. When confrontation appears it is because philosophers are not only philosophers, but are necessarily and inescapably also beings within *polemos*. While philosophy does not rise above the *polemos*, neither is it confined to it insofar as it speaks of the polemical space itself. It is Heidegger’s circumspection in this regard—or, as I may now say, his failure of circumspection—that grounds the shift from unconcealedness-concealedness understood as strife to its understanding as *Gelassenheit*, releasement. The “too great proximity” to National Socialism, apparent even in this shift away from it, consists in the confusion of philosophical interpretation with *polemos*—a
confusion which is still negatively evident in his turn to releasement. The style or manner of this shift is such as to obscure the inter-twining of polemos and manifestation, politics and philosophy, and to substitute an either/or in which one or the other must prevail. They are degraded from substantive opposites to mere contradictories. The double pull is reduced to a choice. The riven space is in either case evacuated. The two answers with which one must respond to the question posed by the demise of metaphysics express more fundamentally the divided voice of circumspection which holds more faithfully to the ethic of philosophy.

10. Coda

The way was paved for a recovery of Being as strife by Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato as the institution of metaphysics whereby “the inquiry into what is unhidden shifts in the direction of the appearing of the visible form, and consequently toward the act of seeing that is ordered to this visible form, and toward what is correct and toward the correctness of seeing.” Manifestation becomes correctness of representation with Plato such that the new German inception must reach behind Plato to confront the early Greek manifestation of Being as polemos. In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” published in 1969, Heidegger retracted this reading of Plato as the institution of metaphysics, saying that “[i]t is often and justifiably pointed out that the word alethes is already used by Homer only in the verba dicendi, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment,” and admitting that “the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness is also untenable.” Does this retraction undermine the recovery of Being as strife? Does it make the interpretation of Plato only a step on Heidegger’s way to releasement and not a milestone in the phenomenological release from metaphysics?
To say that truth is experienced equiprimordially as unconcealment and as presence does not require abandonment of the thesis that metaphysics consists in the transformation of unconcealment into presence. It requires only that one abandon the thesis that this transformation occurred at a determinable point within the history of philosophy and thus the thesis that the institution of metaphysics occurs originally in Plato. One may still maintain that the institution of metaphysics occurs in Plato, though not originally, and that the institution of metaphysics co-exists with unconcealment at the origin. Plato’s transformation of truth becomes thus an instance of a primordial transformation of truth co-extensive with philosophy itself. I said above in commenting on Plato’s institution of metaphysics that strife in Heraclitus’ sense was rotated, as it were, from a horizontal conflict within which all human reality takes place, to a vertical ‘divided line’ in which appearance has a lesser reality than truth, such that conflict can subsequently appear as a prelude to a passage upward in which conflict is in principle, teleologically, surpassed. A hierarchy of Being as presence displaces the tensional space of the strife between opposites. Recall that this late Greek transformation was the condition for the transformation of Greek paideia into Roman tradition and humanitas. We must now say that this transformation, though it came to predominate with Roman dominance, is a primordial possibility of philosophy. Indeed, the notion that a ‘fall’ could occur at a determinate point within philosophy, prefiguring a ‘redemption’ from such a fall, is at bottom incoherent. The danger of metaphysics is co-extensive with philosophy. Philosophy is rent at its origin by these two possibilities which exclude each other: a tensional space versus a hierarchical ladder. One attempts to escape the essential equivocation that derives from the necessary self-referentiality of philosophy through the establishment of the quasi-religious discourse of metaphysics. The other embraces the necessary profanity of philosophy in order to preserve intact its contact with
the sacred. That this is a conflict does not present any problem for the philosophical life which I have attempted to articulate, though it would for an adherent to the hierarchy of Being. Circumspection does not evacuate the riven space of concrete-transcendental, ontic-ontological, comedy-seriousness, day-night, male-female as it speaks of the manifestation of their unity that opens the space itself. This is the philosopher’s ecstasy.

Footnotes:


Ibid, p. 17.

Ibid, p. 15.


*The Crisis*, p. 72.


*The Crisis*, p. 72.


Ibid.

Ibid.

I have used this phrase before to designate a certain circumscription of Husserl’s phenomenology with respect to the issue of practice. In that context, it pertained to the contribution that Levinas made to such a circumscription. See Ian Angus, *(Dis)figurations: Discourse/Critique/Ethics* (London and New York: Verso, 2000) pp. 188-91.


Ibid, p. 31.

This is the characterization of Steven Galt Crowell in *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, pp. 131, 182, 195.


Ibid, p. 203.
While Hopkins does correctly realize that the decision to become a philosopher grounds this description of everyday comportment, this realization does not inform his use of the term ‘simpliciter’ here. Ibid, p. 207.


31 Ibid, pp. 201-2.


33 While Crowell clearly shows the basis of Heidegger’s concerns leading up to *Being and Time* in Husserl’s phenomenology, and thus the continuity underpinning their work, it seems to want to justify pulling back *Being and Time* into a Husserlian problematic and severing it from the later development of Heidegger’s work. While each stage of Heidegger’s development, like Husserl’s in this respect, can of course been seen as raising basic problems in its own right, and should not be assumed to be an inevitable unfolding, nonetheless this should not be an excuse for simply substituting an abandonment-rejection chasm later in Heidegger’s work for one between Husserl and Heidegger. This interpretation is not entirely clear in Crowell’s interpretation due to the limitation of his consideration of Heidegger’s work to the
early period of its intersection with Husserl, but is suggested by the remarks that Heidegger’s “later thought contains strong elements of postphenomenological or postmodern suspicion regarding both the matter and the method of philosophical inquiry” and that “the demise of *Being and Time*, its end, was only the end of the inconsistency still infecting its concept of philosophical reason giving.” Steven Galt Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, pp. 204, 243.

34 Reiner Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*, p. 76.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


41 Crowell suggests without much discussion in conclusion that “Heidegger never got so far as to see that the ontic ground of ontology is exclusively ethical” but in that case everything of course depends of the term ‘ethical,’ which is the meaning of the investigation that I carry out here. Thus Crowell interprets Heidegger’s political engagement with National Socialism as a falling away from “the ethical space of phenomenological reasoning” toward an ontic anchor thus opposing *this* engagement to the vocation of phenomenology. But how can one know that this is not an appropriate ontic engagement? How is it manifested as such? Surely this would require some substantiation unless one simply falls back on retrospective pieties rooted in the end on history’s victors. In contrast, my interpretation would not base itself on the ethics versus political action (even if National Socialist) opposition but rather reckon
with Heidegger’s polemical stance in the moment. Crowell’s formulation gives aid and comfort to those ‘philosophers’ who take today’s liberal pieties for granted because it is easy to do so and disparage other engagements not because they take an opposite stance but because they are engagements at all. Steven Galt Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, p. 242.


44 Martin Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” p. 177.


47 Ibid, p. 64.

48 Ibid, p. 65.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid, p. 120.


56 Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” p. 139ff.

57 This shift is embedded in her association of thinking with the present, willing with the future and the implication (due to the unfinished nature of the work) that judging is associated with the past. See Ronald Beiner, “Hannah Arendt on Judging” in Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) pp. 128-131.


59 I have developed the term ‘general rhetoric’ to describe the contemporary background and reformulate the task of philosophy in Ian Angus, (Dis)figurations: Discourse/Critique/Ethics, especially chapter 8.


61 Apology, 28d.

62 In this case I have used Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 191 but have also consulted Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 29.

63 Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 29.
64 Ibid, pp. 24, 27.


66 Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, p. 34.


69 See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Part One, Division One, Section Six.

70 Compare Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) pp. 159-60, which was Heidegger’s 1942-3 lectures, where he speaks of “the essential domain of the strife between unconcealedness and concealedness” with *Discourse on Thinking* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) p. 79ff., published in 1959, which asks that one “wait in a releasement through which we belong to that-which-regions, which still conceals its own nature.”


77 On constitutive paradox, see Ian Angus, *(Dis)figurations*, pp. 36-49, 51-2, 161-2.

79 Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, pp. 159-60.

80 Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 75.

81 Martin Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” p. 177.