Course Overview

     What is there, really? Both metaphysics and philosophy of science, as fields within philosophy, endeavor to answer this question. But they differ, often starkly, in key regards: how precisely to formulate questions about the fundamental nature and constitution of reality; the acceptable tools, philosophical and especially epistemological, for exploring these questions; the range of answers that are considered acceptable or even meaningful; and where to locate the boundary of appropriate investigation between metaphysics and philosophy of science themselves. Two of the hallmark and most influential trends in 20th C. philosophy, logical positivism or empiricism and pragmatism, both originated from explicit and wholesale rejections of metaphysics as a legitimate field of philosophical inquiry. Recent decades have been marked by a deep skepticism towards, and often dismissal of, metaphysics by philosophers of science. In the other camp, many (although certainly not all) metaphysicians have thought that science, as the factual description of what happens to be actual, had little or nothing to offer metaphysics in its exploration of logical possibility.

     It is striking to then find parallel independent developments of similar views such as structuralism in metaphysics and structural realism in philosophy of science. Metaphysicians are increasingly acknowledging the relevance of scientific discoveries and theories for their work, and philosophers of science are increasingly willing to acknowledge that some of their own views carry metaphysical implications or even entire metaphysical accounts buried within them. This course will consider the relationship between metaphysics and philosophy of science from a number of perspectives. To what extent, and in what regards, should metaphysics and philosophy of science constrain or inform one another? Are there areas of discourse that belong properly to one or the other field only? We will also consider some particular cases, such as modality and laws, and structuralism/structural realism: what is the difference between how these views are formulated in either field, what their implications are for ontology or for epistemology, and what assumptions do they share or fail to share?