Deriving Repetitive Readings with Additive Focus Particles in Blackfoot

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1.0 Introduction Frantz & Russell (1989) gloss Blackfoot *mattsista'-* as "again," however *mattsista'-* contrasts with English *again* in that it lacks a repetitive/restitutive ambiguity. The English ambiguity is illustrated in (1), where (1) can either presuppose that I opened the door before (repetitive), or that the door was open before (restitutive). (2) shows that *mattsista'-* is fully repetitive; the fact that the door was open before does not satisfy its presupposition.

(1) I opened the door again (REP: I opened the door before, RES: The door was open before)

(2) *omi kitsim* *íika-ikowaistsii* *nit-á'-it-ipi-ssi* *it-yohkohpápoka*
dem door perf-be.open.vii 1-when-rl-enter-vai-cj rl-blow.shut.vii
"That door was aleady open, and when I went in, it blew shut."
\# *ki* *ni-**mattsista'**-ikowai'piksi-'p*
and 1-**again**-open.vti-1>inan
"So I opened it **again**." (Consultant: "**That means YOU opened it before")**

2.0 The Proposal I propose that the unambiguity of *mattsista'-* is derivable from its morphological complexity, specifically that it consists of two morphemes *matt-* and *ista'-*, where *matt-* corresponds to an additive VP-focusing *also*/*too.* This is shown in (3); informally, *matt-* presupposes that the subject of the asserted event was also the subject of another salient event:

(3) a) *nit-á-okska'si* b) *ni-**matt**-á-okska'si*
1-impf-run.vai 1-**add**-impf-run.vai
"I run." "I run **also**."(eg. I ride horses, I also run)

Evidence for this decomposition is shown in (4); other morphemes can occur inside *mattsista'-*:

(4) a) *nit-áák-**matt**-ohkott-**ista'**-waasai'noto-ok* b) *ni-**matt**-ooht-**ista'**-yistsini-'p*
1-fut-**add**-able-**again**-make.cry.vai-3>1 1-**add**-means-**again**-cut.vti-1>inan
"She will be able to make me cry **again**." "I cut it **again** with a knife."

Assuming *ista'-* encodes the basic meaning of *again* – i.e, that some event, whose properties match the asserted event's properties, precedes the asserted event - I propose, in the spirit of Beck 2006, that the event presupposed by *matt-* is identified as the same event presupposed by *ista'-*. This event-identification forces a repetitive reading. This is compatible with either a structural or lexicalist view for *again/ista'-*, where the structural view (von Stechow 1996) holds that there is only one *again,* ambiguity being derived via different syntactic positions: *again* can either scope over i) the entire predicate (yielding a repetitive presupposition) or ii) just a result state (yielding a restitutive presupposition). The lexicalist view (cf. Dowty 1979) proposes only one syntactic position, but that repetitive and restitutive *again* are separate lexical items, each giving rise to their respective presuppositions. In §3 I give a formal analysis and show how event-identification forces a repetitive reading, no matter which view is adopted for *ista'-*.

3.0 Formal Analysis I adopt an analysis for *matt-* as in (5):

(5) $||\text{matt-}||(p)$ is defined only if C provides p' where $p' \in ||\alpha||^F$, $p' \neq ||\alpha||^o$, and $p'(w) = 1$
Where defined, $||\text{matt}||(p)(w) = 1$ iff $p(w)=1$ ($||\alpha||^o = p$, C = the context)
(cf. Rooth 1992, Kartunnen & Peters 1979)

Like the English additive focus particles *too/also*, *matt-* attaches to a proposition p and presupposes that a focus-alternative to p is true. Assuming default focus to be on the predicate P, where p=P(x), p's focus-alternatives consist of the set {P(x), R(x), Q(x),...}where the predicate varies, but the subject, x, remains a constant. Because *matt-* presupposes that one of these focus alternatives is true, we effectively presuppose that x also participated as the subject of some other event. The analysis I adopt for *ista-* is as in (6):

(6) Let P be a property of eventualities and let e be an eventuality.
||*ista*'-|| (P)(e)(e") defined only if [|| MAX|| (P) (e") =1 & e" < e].
Where defined, ||*ista*'-|| (P)(e)(e") =1, iff P(e) =1. (cf. von Stechow 1996)

Like *again*, *ista'-* encodes a presupposition that the context, C, provides was some maximal event, e", which temporally precedes the asserted event e, such that P(x) holds for both e and e". I analyse this presupposition as specific and anaphoric, as opposed to being existential (cf. Soames 1989, Heim 1990, Beck 2006) - e" is not existentially quantified over, but a free variable that must be supplied by the context as an argument to *ista'-*/*again*.

Now, let p stand for the asserted proposition, p' for the proposition presupposed by *matt-*, and p" for the proposition presupposed by *ista'-*; let e, e' and e" be the events described by these propositions respectively.When *matt-* and *ista'-* attach to a proposition p = "x opened the door," there are two presupposed propositions to consider: from *matt-,* p'="x did something else." From *ista'-* either i) p"="x opened the door before" (a repetitive reading), or ii) p"="The door was open before" (a restitutive reading). However, because the presupposition associated with *ista'-* is anaphoric, *ista'-* looks for the most salient event in C for satisfaction. As p' has been made salient by the addition of *matt-*, its corresponding event e' is the most salient event, and is therefore picked up by *ista'-*. This results in event-identification such that e'=e".

(7)assertion(p)	*matt-* event presupposition (p')	*ista*'- event presupposition (p")
e=X opened the door	e'=X did something else	e"= X opened the door before (rep)
e=X opened the door	e'=X did something else	e"= the door was open before (res)

Consider the requirements on e' and e", summarized in (7). The only way e' and e" can be identified is if *ista'-* is interpreted as fully repetitive – i.e., if the event of "x having done something else" is identified as the same event as "x having opened the door before." If *ista'-* is interpreted as restitutive, its anaphoric properties require the event of "x having done something else" to be identified as the same event as "the door having been open before." This is pragmatically incoherent, assuming that in order for events to be identified, they must have the same external arguments and aspectual type.

4.0 Consequences I have argued that the unambiguously repetitive reading associated with Blackfoot *mattsista'-* is compositionally derived. This suggests that full repetition is not a conceptual primitive, arguing against a cross-linguistic lexical distinction between repetitive and restitutive *again.* Thus while some languages may lexicalise the two notions separately, the compositional complexity associated with *mattsista'-* suggests that these languages should not be used to make a universal claim for lexical ambiguity.

Beck, S.2006.Focus on again."•Dowty, D.1979.Word Meaning and Montague Grammar•Frantz, D&N. Russell.1989. Blackfoot Dictionary. •Heim, I.1990."Presupposition Projection"•Karttunen,L.,& S.Peters. 1979."Conventional implicature."•Rooth, M. 1992."A theory of focus interpretation."•Soames, S.1989. "Presupposition"•von Stechow, A. 1996 "The different readings of *wieder*/*again*:a structural account"