

**Canada After 9/11: A Land of Deep Ambivalence**

**The Divergent Canadian Response to American Primacy and the ‘War on Terror’, But Ever Deeper Continental Economic Integration**

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for presentation at 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of Bilateralism from Trilateralism Grant  
Villanova University  
Philadelphia, PA  
Oct. 2006

**Version updated to 18 Sept, 2006**

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This paper examines the Canadian response to the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9/11), and other US policy and institutional changes that ensued as well. These changes are potentially profound in terms of both domestic and regional governance and in terms of their potential impact on economic prosperity in Canada. Thus far, much of the literature on Canada after 9/11 has been reactive about what such changes may portend for the future of Canadian-US relations in long-term perspective (Netherton 2005). Our goal in this paper is to examine more systematically what changes have occurred with respect to foreign policy, domestic security, economic and immigration policy, as well as the institutional adaptations that have flowed from these 9/11-induced policy shifts. There is a profound tension at the heart of contemporary Canadian governance. Continentally integrationist forces in the economy remain very powerful, and a broad trend toward diverging Canadian and US identities as expressed through foreign policy, domestic laws, immigration policy and social attitudes is now being reversed (see Farson, 2005).

The analysis here is aimed at a wider international audience, thus necessitating the provision of contextualizing material on Canadian history and foreign policy. Some background discussions among Canadian intellectuals and non-governmental groups also are included, as these reflect the wider ongoing debate that concerns adjustments Canada can and should make in response to 9/11. Finally, a brief analysis of the new Harper Government's response to the changed security environment is also included, as well as discussion about the possibilities that this divergence may be bridged. The paper is based on our own analysis of primary and secondary sources, as well as off-the-record interviews with Canadian officials. At the end of the paper, we draw out the conclusions of the theoretical portion of the broader project.

With respect to foreign policy, our findings are that there has been a marked divergence in Canadian thinking and behaviour from the global strategy developed by the Bush Administration. Canadians rejected the U.S.-driven invasion and occupation of Iraq and have adhered to that view strongly three years after the overthrow of Saddam's regime. A Canadian role in the stabilization of Afghanistan was accepted only because it has enjoyed unanimous support from NATO, and latterly significant support from the U.N. as well. Ottawa rejected US pressures to support its Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defence vision, and rejected too the US approach to nuclear strategy which entails the attainment of complete nuclear 'primacy' over all other nuclear rivals, preferring to continue to support the core goal of eventual denuclearization that is at the heart of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

Regarding issues of domestic security and border security there has been much more congruence in the two national approaches post 9/11, but even here differences have been manifest. With respect to immigration and refugee policy both countries have clearly tightened their frontiers over the past five years, but on this issue the US government continues to see Canada as a weak link in its own security perimeter (Koring, 2006a), despite growing efforts by the Canadian Government to address the issue. Finally, on the economic front there remains a deep and broad consensus on both sides of the border about the necessity and desirability of maintaining a border that is as open as possible for trade, investment and business travel.

#### Historical Differences on International Security: Iraq and prior conflicts

Historically, Canadians have had mixed feelings about major directional shifts in US international security policy, particularly when this led to intensified US military intervention overseas. It is not at all surprising that Canadians are not yet full-fledged allies in the 'war on terrorism', or that they have preferred to take a more pragmatic and case-by-

case approach to instances of state-supported terror. Neither are Canadians interested in supporting the US's determinedly unilateralist approach to the challenges of nuclear proliferation. Canadian governments have seen a vital if not critical role for major international institutions such as the U.N., the IAEA and NATO. Some unilateralist supplementary actions may from time to time may be necessary by the U.S. or Europe to deal with specific threats, but in the long term most Canadian policymakers prefer to rely on multilateral responses to major international security challenges. With respect to the special challenges pertaining to the diffusion of nuclear weapons technology, for example, an issue area of major policy divergence from the current US leadership, Canadian governments have consistently upheld the validity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's ultimate goals as stipulated in Article 6: negotiations in good faith by the nuclear weapon states towards complete nuclear disarmament, followed ultimately (and admittedly, probably in the distant future) by the relinquishing of all weapons of war (for detailed Canadian views see Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, 2005; and Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT], 1998). Current US preferences for the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, and for their further refinement and improvement as warfighting instruments sufficient perhaps to wage preventive nuclear first-strikes on Russia and China (Lieber and Press, 2006) are seen as deeply destabilizing and therefore quite unwise.

In this respect, Canadian leaders have supported a 'transformation' of world politics—but one that is to be achieved through an incrementally built up multilateral consensus and a patient elaboration of universally binding international treaties, conventions and norms. Simply trying to eliminate the 'bad guys' in world politics, the declared policy of George W. Bush's administration, is seen as provocative, unnecessarily and imprudently bellicose, and highly corrosive to the effort to build and extend the reach of a global regime of arms control and disarmament. Many Canadian leaders may harbour hopes of an eventual global victory for democratic transformation, but they do not think democracy can be forced on other nations. New democracies are more likely to endure if they spring from authentic domestic roots, rather than imposition through foreign military occupation and external fiat.

The conflict in Iraq is not the first time that fundamental differences have arisen between Ottawa and Washington about the merits of overseas intervention. During the Cold War, wars in Asia were viewed highly skeptically or critically. Ottawa reluctantly sent a small, symbolic Canadian contribution to Korea from 1950 to 1953 (only some 5000 military personnel rotated through that conflict over three years of fighting in contrast to over 5 million US citizens who saw duty there), and Canadian governments chose to remain on the sidelines in a 'truce supervisory role' throughout the US intervention in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from 1954 to 1975. In both of these 'limited wars' Canadian governments aimed to restrain their superpower allies through persuasion and diplomacy—for the most part in vain at the tactical level (see Stairs, 1974, and Ross 1984). Canadian leaders never found the domino 'theory' credible and they were totally opposed to hawkish elements in the U.S. who were inclined towards anti-communist 'rollback' in Asia—in effect, war with (and advocacy of regime change in) communist China. Containment, multilateralism and international institution building were at the heart of the Canadian approach to waging the Cold War (Keating, 2002).

All US direct and 'covert' interventions in Central and South America and the Caribbean were viewed with considerable disfavour from the era of Louis St Laurent through Jean Chrétien: the lengthy history of intervention in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961-62), the Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1970), El Salvador and Nicaragua in the early 1980s, and Panama (1991) were all criticized widely in the Canadian press and seen by the senior civil service and political levels of successive Canadian governments as a strategically irrational and at times wholly immoral usage of US 'special operations' military or CIA personnel. The repeated

interventionary actions by the United States in effect kept Ottawa from joining the OAS until the Cold War was clearly drawing to an end in 1988-89--because of the certainty of a direct collision of views over Washington's Latin US policies prior to that time.

Canadian involvement in bilateral security measures were needed during the Cold War to set constraints on the intrusive and demanding presence of the United States (Mahant, 1999). More than a little of the intensity of Canadian economic nationalism during the Cold War stemmed from fears of a "silent surrender" of sovereignty through the progressive expansion of US corporate control over key sectors of the Canadian economy. The integrating tendencies of geography, culture and the vision of an unimpeded continental division of labour, however, proved to be irresistible. When Trudeau's efforts to implement a National Energy Policy and to restrict and reduce levels of foreign (i.e., US) investment collapsed under pressure from the Reagan Administration and unhappiness at the redistribution by contributing Western provinces in the early 1980s, nationalist economic fervour was spent. Only four years after Trudeau's retirement, Canadians narrowly approved the regional free trade concept in the 1988 national elections. This turnaround was based on the hope that both the bilateral Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (and later NAFTA) would end problems with selectively protectionist behaviour by Congress on behalf of US special interests. Both agreements failed to achieve this goal, although they did stimulate a rapid growth in bilateral trade overall. Nevertheless, many Canadians came to resent US pressures on their country, which seem to have worsened since Mulroney and Chrétien backed free trade, first continentally then hemispherically. On refugees and immigration, internal security, and public policies involving health care, pharmaceuticals, or different approaches to state regulation of private enterprise (as in the forest products industry, ranching or agriculture), US political and economic pressures to conform to U.S. approaches have not been happily received.

Post-9/11, neither the Canadian government nor Canadian public opinion approved of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The decision by Prime Minister Chrétien to reject any contributory role in Iraq first evidenced in 2002 and firmly rejected 2003 is still seen as both correct and presciently wise given the considerable problems that have arisen in the US attempt to create stable democratic governance in Iraq with a gravely inadequate occupation force. As in most other countries, the U.S. intervention in Iraq is seen as having increased the risk of international terrorist acts, not diminished them (in Canada 69% think it has increased the risk, 22% think it has reduced it: Oziewicz, 2006). In 2005 a classified CSIS report concurred with that judgment, as did the head of CSIS, Jim Judd, in a public statement in October of that year (Sallot, 2005).

On the other hand, the far more authentically multilateral removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001, and the now NATO-led effort to stabilize Hamid Karzai's elected government in Kabul, have enjoyed, until recently, substantial majority support from Canadians. Since the fall of 2001, Ottawa made a major commitment of both 'special force' commandos (elements of the JTF2 unit) and regular force troops first to Kabul (and parts of the eastern provinces), and recently to Kandahar (polls indicated 66% support for a combat role in 2002, but only 54% in March 2006: Blanchfield, 2006; Den Tandt and Clark, 2006 ). An early survey indicated that 62% of Canadians opposed sending troops to Afghanistan, and only 27% approved such a deployment (Laghi, 2006). To combat falling support for the mission the Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, waged an unusually active publicity campaign to promote the importance of Canada's Afghan role—so much so that Prime Minister Harper felt compelled to assert that the Canadian involvement would be determined by civilian leadership, not the senior officer corps (Blanchfield, 2006). Harper's March 2006 visit to Kandahar, Kabul and Islamabad saw him

commit his government to what seems to be unqualified and possibly indefinite support for the mission.

With respect to international security issues, many analysts have complained that there has been no clear Canadian national security framework, vision, or long-term strategy (Macnamara 2005). The first such policy statement was made in 2004, however it is too early to say if there is any consensus on the goals set out in that short document. This absence is natural enough for a middlepower lacking grand strategy ambitions. In terms of foreign policy, as outlined below, Canada has traditionally relied upon an involuntary US security guarantee to cope with potential threats from all third countries. From the US perspective this has often been a source of frustration because of perceived Canadian 'free-riding' at the expense of the US taxpayer—a problem that has intensified since the last decade of the Cold War. Canadian governments, however, have simply accepted what they have perceived to be an involuntary commitment from Washington that the US cannot avoid extending. The chief problem for Canadian security planners then, from this 'free rider' perspective, is one of 'defence against help' in those situations where Ottawa wants to protect its sovereign control over national territory and ocean approaches during peacetime (for the original statement of the 'defence against help' thesis see: Orvik, 1984). Far too little time is spent actually scanning the international horizons for trends and events that may eventually threaten Canadians' welfare.

Up to 1968 Canadian governments tried to contribute usefully and responsibly to Western international security debates. But with Pierre Trudeau, and with popular Canadian disillusionment with the US intervention in Vietnam, came a progressive decline in Canadian international security activism. This decline had actually begun in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis when the U.S government, from the Canadian perspective, had failed to honour the NORAD agreement's obligation to "consult" meaningfully prior to imposing its air-naval blockade, and when it later assisted in the electoral demise of the Diefenbaker government via a well-timed press conference by an US general and a still more calculated press release (Maynard Ghent, 1979). The inability to influence US actions with respect to either nuclear arms control issues or crisis decisionmaking, coupled with steady escalation of violence in Vietnam during the 1960s, led to a retrenchment and disengagement from 'high policy' security issues by Ottawa that was probably inevitable. It certainly fed impulses in the Canadian elite that can only be termed either "free-riding" or "functionally isolationist" (Ross, 1999).

While Canadian differences with US international security policies grew deeper in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s (the latter decade often referred to as the 'second Cold War'), security cooperation with Western Europeans also was becoming more difficult. As the peoples of Europe drew more together, Canadians were incrementally excluded from an active or effective role in NATO. Trudeau's cuts to Canada's force deployments in NATO in the early 1970s had exacerbated the country's waning influence and had contributed to a fading of interest in a 'North Atlantic Community'. So too did the utter failure to secure any meaningful boost in trade and investment relations with Europe under a "contractual link" negotiated with the EU in 1976. While still an active middle-ranking power on the international stage in the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian governments cultivated other venues for multilateral engagement such as the Commonwealth, *la francophonie*, and later the WTO. Canadian commitments to U.N. peacekeeping in the 1980s and early 1990s helped induce many Canadians to lose sight of the fact that their military forces were at root created for lethal defence or coercive diplomatic intervention. Peacekeeping was seen as a 'better' way to use military force, and a further way to differentiate peace-loving Canadians from their more bellicose superpower neighbours.

During Lloyd Axworthy's tenure as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Canadian government tried to "brand" itself not only through a greater rhetorical support for peacekeeping but also under a broader doctrine built on the notions of "human security" and "soft power" (a term developed by the US international affairs analyst Joseph Nye). Human security involved basic universal rights for safety and security of person and access to essential social services; as a policy it entailed an international responsibility to promote attainment of these goals wherever they were not being met—even to the point of engaging in humanitarian intervention as part of an international "responsibility to protect" (later referred to as 'R2P'). As Foreign Minister, Axworthy led a 'soft power' campaign to ban the use of land mines and secured a modest level of Canadian funding to help pay for their removal globally. The treaty was pronounced a success, although the U.S., Russia, China and India refused to endorse the treaty, citing overriding security needs for landmine use. Seven years after the conclusion of the treaty it is not clear that the total number of buried mines has in fact been reduced to any significant degree.

In the wake of the Ottawa Treaty, Axworthy's Liberal successors went on to back international efforts to constrain the dissemination of small arms but with much less success. Under both Chrétien and Prime Minister Paul Martin, Liberal governments took pride in promoting "good governance" and sent jurists to China and RCMP officers to Haiti and elsewhere to try to foster improved respect for the rule of law and a more sensitive administration of justice and law enforcement. One of the most notable virtues of such human security initiatives were their very low cost: training judges or police is decidedly less costly than training armed forces—or equipping them, or dispatching them on 'peace enforcement' missions. During the Chrétien-Martin years, spending on both defence and foreign aid fell sharply as a percentage of GDP from some 2.5% to less than 1.5%. In fact the elimination of the federal government's year-to-year deficits during Paul Martin's tenure as Finance Minister was accomplished in large measure by sacrificing the country's international force projection and aid provision capacities (see Ross, 2003: 539-40).

Canada's foreign policy responses after 9/11 had to be pursued both multilaterally and bilaterally with Washington. On some issues, mostly economic, one set of reactions were driven by the need to express solidarity with the US to reduce potentially punitive action from Congress; on other issues, mostly related to international security, another pattern of advocacy demanded greater distance from US policies that were perceived to be threatening international instability. Some business groups, such as the Conference Board of Canada and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives claimed that Canada could not afford to alienate its largest trading partners by indulging in an independent approach to international security issues.

Scholars were predictably divided ranging from historian Jack Granatstein who suggested the need for greater solidarity with US policies, including Iraq, to an array of critics such as Stephen Clarkson who criticized accommodation with the US (Clarkson 2003; Granatstein 2003). Michael Ignatieff, currently in the running to succeed Paul Martin as Liberal leader after resigning from the E.H. Carr chair at Harvard, pointed out that Ottawa's unwillingness to adequately fund military, peacekeeping, and aid activity left the Canadian government with little recourse for independent action, a stance that touched off considerable criticism inside the Liberal Party (Ignatieff 2004). Though Canada's performance does not match its self-image as a peace-keeper (the country ranked 34<sup>th</sup> in terms of numbers of troops committed to U.N. peacekeeping in 2004 and 50<sup>th</sup> by 2006), Canada did provide very modest financial support for multilateral initiatives to fight AIDS in Africa.

While willing to support the multilateral 'stability operations' in Afghanistan with US and European NATO forces, Prime Minister Chrétien pointedly refused to support the US war in

Iraq because it lacked the legal authority of a U.N. Security Council resolution. Chrétien's preference for a commitment to Afghanistan over Iraq was highly controversial and prompted one Canadian army general to resign in protest. Business groups feared, quite incorrectly as it turned out, that the US might retaliate against Canadian economic interests (Boag, 2006), while activist, academic, and policymaking groups enthusiastically supported the Canadian "no" to participation in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Liberal leaders were prepared to support the 'war on terror' but only up to the limits allowed by the U.N. They were not prepared to endorse George Bush's proposals for an open-ended and largely unilateral crusade against nuclear proliferation. Bush's effort to deny the 'world's most dangerous weapons' to the world's most irresponsible governments was seen to fly in the face of Canadian efforts to build a stable structure of international law anchored by the U.N. and applied universally. The Canadian 'no' with respect to Iraq was guided less by superior intelligence assessments about the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam's Iraq, than by a political determination that Bush's counterproliferation unilateralism was likely to be deeply corrosive to international order (on the counterproliferation imperative in US policy, see McDonough, 2005). Other Canadian officials think the intervention in Iraq is likely to create more terrorists than it will eliminate (Farson, 2006). The decision also played well in domestic politics, underscoring Canada's ability to say "no."

#### The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate:

In recent years one bilateral issue in particular has frustrated both Ottawa and Washington greatly: what to do about ABM defence cooperation? The evolving Canadian stance vis a vis participation in US plans for a layered missile defense strategy for North US reflected both considerable ambivalence and a long history of discussion of the issue inside the Canadian government and a broader defence policy community. The Chrétien decade, 1993-2003, saw Ottawa reject US calls for missile defence deployments and support the indefinite retention of the Soviet-US (later Russo-US) ABM Treaty that had banned extensive ABM deployments and highly constrained ABM technology development since 1972. The Clinton Administration's effort to neutralize Congressional Republicans' advocacy of ABM deployments was applauded quietly in Ottawa, and Prime Minister Chrétien even went so far as to make his preference for Al Gore over Bush known in the run-up to the presidential elections in 2000.

Paul Martin, by contrast, took up the reins of the Liberal Party with an open mind on the subject of missile defence coupled with anxiety about the consequences of Chrétien's 'no' on Iraq. Accordingly, with the support of three other members of his first Cabinet (John McCallum, Bill Graham and David Pratt), Martin was ready to endorse specific arrangements for limited involvement in the summer of 2004 just after the election that had reduced his government to minority status. In August of 2004, Martin's government approved the use of NORAD's infrastructure to facilitate the tracking and attack assessment of any missile re-entry vehicles headed for North America from across the polar region. But this agreement, which was of considerable practical consequence to US authorities, was coupled with an explicit statement that such cooperation did not constitute endorsement of US plans to deploy a thick, multi-layered area defence of North America against ballistic missile attack (though Canada was nonetheless partially covered by the system). Under pressure from the Quebec wing of the Liberal Party, Martin retreated from endorsement despite a visit to Ottawa by President Bush to try to extract such an open-ended commitment (Quebeckers were the most ardently opposed to missile defence of all provincial electorates, just as they were the most ardently opposed to Canadian support for intervention in Iraq; see Ross, 2003, p. 535 n. 5; and Ross, 2005, p. 42),

Canada has participated in the North US Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) since 1958. But over the nearly fifty years of cooperation in air and aerospace defence, Canadian

authorities have never agreed to participate in US plans for missile defence. In 1969 an ABM exclusion clause was written explicitly into the NORAD renewal agreement concluded that year. This clause was removed in 1981, when the Reagan Administration pressed for its excision. But even a Conservative government under Brian Mulroney did not endorse the grand scheme for thick missile defences called for by President Reagan in his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) speech of 23 March 1983 that called for rendering the ballistic missile threat “impotent and obsolete”. Mulroney formally gave a ‘polite no’ to an US invitation to participate in SDI in 1986 with no adverse consequences for Canadian-US relations—just as his Liberal predecessors had done seventeen years earlier. NORAD cooperation remained undiminished despite these rejections of an important US ‘grand strategy’ preference.

Since 2002, the Canadian Forces have developed a good working relationship with the new US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and, under the auspices of a binational planning group, and have developed plans to add maritime security operations to NORAD’s mandate in the 2006 renewal (Koring, 2006), which are almost certain to be approved by the Harper government. But the inherent indecisiveness of the Canadian government concerning US requests for a broad ‘in principle’ endorsement of missile defence continues to the present day (for a review of such indecision see: Richter, 2004, 152-61; Fergusson, 2005, 9-11, 28-30; and Ross, 2005, 35-43). Prime Minister Harper and his Minister of National Defence, Gordon O’Connor, have indicated that they are willing to consider any new but specific proposals from the Pentagon, but there is no indication to date that they are prepared to give any sort of unqualified support to any and all ABM development plans that Washington might adopt (Den Tandt, 2006a). This development marks a return to the interest expressed by Paul Martin’s government in late 2003 and early 2004. But the Conservatives’ invitation seems to be still well short of what the Bush Administration was hoping to elicit in the way of support.

Since well before 2000 officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT, now Foreign Affairs Canada) were strongly opposed to the concept of comprehensive missile defences, fearing that that they would undermine strategic nuclear relationships between the U.S. and Russia and between the U.S. and China, and thereby resuscitate rivalries in nuclear arms deployments. The case on behalf of unconditional missile defence cooperation with the U.S. was made discreetly by officials with DND during the 1990s and softly still even after 9/11. But DND’s political influence was weak with a Liberal Cabinet in no way disposed to supporting ‘militarism’ or ‘nuclear arms races’—or undercutting its own electoral appeal among strongly anti-ABM voters in Quebec.

Supporters of missile defence have argued that defences only against small-scale ‘rogue states’ are not going to be destabilizing vis a vis Russia and China. Canadian opposition to US plans just might lead to a severe marginalization or even termination of NORAD defence cooperation with very adverse and expensive implications for the Canadian government’s ability to know what is happening in its own airspace in peacetime. Third, cooperation on the missile defence issue is likely to soften Congressional attitudes on protectionist trade measures against Canadian softwood lumber and beef imports; and it certainly would help protect existing levels of Canadian aerospace export trade under the Defence Production Sharing Agreements. Fourth, Canadians need to be in on the design phase of any comprehensive layered ABM systems because intercept engagement may sooner or later take place over Canada. Fifth, a closer defence relationship with Washington would augment not diminish Canadian international standing (Ottawa’s greater access to decisionmaking in Washington would give Canadian policy statements more credibility). Sixth, some level of layered ABM defences could save millions of lives in the event of an accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles (due to either technical malfunction, or events ensuing after civil war in some nuclear-armed country—Russia

or in the future Pakistan might be cited). Seventh, modest ABM defences *held multilaterally* would undercut the feasibility of crisis scenarios of limited counterforce attacks to ‘show resolve’, thus reducing the risk of great power nuclearized ‘skirmishing’. Lastly, the weaponization of space would not mark a qualitatively huge jump in the international military exploitation of space: existing satellites are used for reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting of fixed and moving targets on earth with the attacks launched from weapon systems on the ground or from aircraft. Would it really matter if space-to-space strike capabilities or space-to-earth strike capabilities were added to the great power arsenals, when the U.S. is already exploring the prospects for conventionally armed ICBM strikes?

Critics in Canada, including officials within Foreign Affairs Canada, have consistently argued that a two-dimensional race in offensive and defensive strategic nuclear arms will accelerate the arms race, block further reductions in nuclear stockpiles and deployed nuclear systems, and, worst of all, *will* likely worsen crisis instability by creating perceived incentives to strike first in any developing confrontation. For the foreseeable future any US rush into layered ABM defences cannot be matched by any other nuclear weapon state. None have the requisite economic resources or technological capabilities. A world with an asymmetrical ABM defence advantage held by the U.S. is only likely to stimulate further offsetting offensive deployments by Russia, China and any other countries who might feel threatened by an US capacity to engage in nuclearized coercive diplomacy. This is all the more true when US strategic analysts begin to predict reasonably confidently that the U.S. now possesses strategic nuclear primacy and an ability to carry out a disarming first-strike against the highly vulnerable nuclear arsenals in both China and Russia (Lieber and Press, 2006).

As a result of the U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty in 2002, some 1500 to 2000 more Russian warheads remain in service targeted at North America than would have been the case had abrogation not occurred and had START III been implemented. Russian defence planners have accelerated the development of long-range nuclear capable cruise missiles, have already tested the world’s first Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs) for new ICBMs that have remained in serial production. The Russian long-range bomber force has been refurbished rather than retired as seemed likely a decade ago, and long-range bomber patrols over the Arctic near Alaska were reinstated several years ago. Worse, the Russian government has refused to discuss its immense inventory of tactical nuclear weapons and the Cooperative Threat Reduction security measures that are needed to reduce the risk of stolen ‘loose nukes’ (see Allison, 2005)—largely because of fears of an emerging US nuclear first-strike capacity (on the progress towards first-strike nuclear dominance over Russia, see Lieber and Press, 2006).

Equally problematic, Moscow has taken no steps to dismantle its so-called ‘Dead Hand’ fully computerized retaliatory launch system that was first deployed in the mid-to-late 1980s in an effort to neutralize what Soviet defence planners saw as an emerging US surprise command decapitation capability (Blair, 1995). If turned on because of Russian fears of surprise attack (large gaps exist in Moscow’s early warning capability because of budgetary shortfalls and satellite and ground radar breakdowns), the ‘Dead Hand’ is incapable of distinguishing between an US missile warhead attack and a stolen terrorist atomic bomb set off by Chechen rebels or al Qaeda agents. In either case many hundreds of warheads would be launched without any further human intervention towards North America.

US ABM defences in space pose special problems that threaten crisis stability and arms race stability simultaneously. An US capacity to strike at other countries’ satellites is likely to touch off a competition in ground-based anti-satellite systems and later space-based as well. For any country fearing an US first strike, the temptation to strike first with nuclear weapons to

destroy US space-based assets would be quite powerful; that risk in turn would increase the pressure on US leaders to make sure that US forces preempted any such efforts by destroying adversary ASAT systems before they could be used. The stage might then be set for a race across the threshold of nuclear use and an early end to the existing 'taboo' on nuclear detonations.

The ABM file will not be an easy one for Prime Minister Harper to handle. The various arguments for and against are technically complex and filled with political uncertainty, and therefore are not suited to public elaboration. Welcoming a full-scale US deployment without any sort of treaty defined *arrangement* on a cap for interceptor deployments of the type that were embodied in the ABM treaty would be quite hazardous. Among other things it could lead to Ottawa being ensnared in sharing the cost of a massively expanded air defence system capable of handling new generations of stealth bombers and cruise missiles that sooner or later will be able to reach North America. An ABM 'roof' is quite pointless, after all, without capable air defence 'walls'.

#### Canadian Domestic Security Responses After 9/11: Security Culture Divergence?

While skepticism has restrained Canadian participation in US efforts at 'draining' all the 'swamps' of international terrorism, on the domestic and bilateral front the response has been far more cooperative and positive. Canadians have long enjoyed the benefits of largely unconstrained economic access across "the world's longest undefended border". Cooperation with the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been considerable and it continues to grow.

US policy changes after 9/11 led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and a host of other legal and intelligence shifts. The DHS embodies the newly heightened concern about the potentially unlimited reach of terrorism, not only mixing domestic with international concerns but also including functional areas that were traditionally considered at arm's length from security. DHS's purview includes emergency relief; cyber-terrorism and countermeasures; travel, transportation, and infrastructure security; and immigration and border security. DHS took over the former Immigration and Naturalization Service. DHS also sought to coordinate the work of various agencies across domestic/international and function lines, ranging from the Dept. of Energy to the FBI and CIA. This was in response to the major gaffes revealed in intelligence sharing as a result of Sept. 11. *Securing Our Homeland*, the DHS strategic plan for 2004, contained a wide panoply of objectives and concerns, along with a few of particular interest to this project (DHS 2004).

Objective 2.1 states that the DHS will create 'smart borders,' which will monitor and prevent the importation of drugs, terrorists, and "other illegal activity." Objective 6.4 stated that the DHS will "facilitate the efficient movement of legitimate cargo and people." Furthermore, the document noted: "The border of the future must integrate actions to screen people and goods abroad prior to their arrival in sovereign US territory to ensure compliance with entry and import regulations. Agreements with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors are central to this effort. America's borders will be made more efficient, posing little or no obstacle to legitimate travel and trade." The report stressed the vital importance of international cooperation to prevent future terrorist threats. This aspect is the central focus of the Canadian response to 9/11, namely the creation of a smart border agreement that would not threaten trade with the US, as we discuss in the section below on migration issues. In pursuit of this goal of reassuring US trading partners, Canada shook up its institutions and policies.

In fact, the Canadian security and intelligence apparatus has been under sustained scrutiny since the 1985 Air India bombing that killed 331 people on a flight from Toronto to

London. The bombing was the worst single terrorist attack before 9/11 and has sparked a host of ongoing investigations. The bombing also led to stricter Canadian security in airports.

Canada's preoccupation with accommodating the US without losing sight of its own independence led to the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-23), passed on Dec. 18, 2001. The Act is designed to facilitate domestic monitoring and actions against potential terrorists. It allows for the labeling of groups and individuals as terrorist in nature, and allows for investigative hearings to prevent potential acts of terrorism and terrorist activities. It also broadens the possibility for domestic monitoring of activities, including financial transactions and other communications. It has been highly controversial, with domestic minority groups (obviously including Canadian Muslims) concerned that the legislation would erode civil liberties, similar to current charges against the Patriot Act in the US. Kent Roach suggests that it may unduly target religious groups; has a "preventive arrest" and investigative hearings provisions whose effects on civil liberties are unclear; as in the US, waters down privacy protections (Roach 2003), 48-50, 90-92). The Act is presently under a regular five-year review.

Such fears were reinforced in 2002 with the case of Maher Arar. Arar, a Syrian Canadian, was deported by the US back to Syria with Canadian complicity in response to US concerns about potential terrorist activity. His claims of innocence and mistreatment while there has created a legal case as well as questioning about Canadian procedures for handling US intelligence/security requests. Three other individuals are also alleged to have been abused in Syria or Egypt because of requests for information by Canadian security personnel who, it is alleged, sought to have the suspects interrogated under torture (Krauss, 2005). As a result, the Act and RCMP behaviour are under close scrutiny. The release of information that some 74 CIA flights had landed in Canada since 9/11 in February 2006 aroused public misgivings that Ottawa has been complicit in a good many instances of "extraordinary rendition"—a process that is widely acknowledged to be quite inconsistent with civil liberties attitudes in Canada (AP, 2006). There is also some question about data on Canadian consumers which was being processed by US companies, but was also vulnerable to US DHS seizure under the Patriot Act. At the same time, there are concerns among Canadian officials that the US was not giving full intelligence from Iraqi-based sources that were relevant to threats at home, because of Canada's non-involvement in that war. Such issues point to the seemingly out-of-date institutional and legal infrastructure that pre-dates 9/11.

Notwithstanding the abuses that may have occurred, internal security spending has continued to rise. Canadian governments have begun to invest heavily on improving immigration screening to try to identify potential terrorists, on improved airport and air travel security, more thorough inspections of cargoes at major ports. Transportation security spending increases have been a high priority. Canada's transport industries handle over Cdn\$ 1 trillion in goods annually. One in 15 jobs in Canada is in the transport business. Almost 80 million passenger trips are made on airlines, almost 40 million a year on ferry trips. Four million people a day use rapid transit or rail services. Of the Cdn\$ 9 billion allocated for better transportation security since 9/11, some 3 billion went to transportation security improvements.

There has been considerable consolidation and change in Canada in regard to agencies related to security. The Privy Council Office (PCO) is the key advisory organization on security for the Prime Minister. Within the PCO is the office of the National Security Advisor. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, and Correctional Services Canada. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service covers both domestic and international intelligence, while the RCMP remains the police force, with some intelligence capabilities. . The Department of Citizenship and Immigration covers

migration issues, while the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is involved with customs and security at border crossings. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), which monitors electronic communications, reports to the Dept. of National Defence. Foreign Affairs Canada and International Trade Canada cover diplomatic relations and international economic affairs. The Department of National Defence, besides being home to Canada's military is also the administrative home to the Communications Security Establishment (CSE: provider of electronic intelligence and information protection). Transport Canada covers security threats in that area. Since 9/11, Canadian agencies have been meeting on a regular basis with their US counterparts. A Bi-National Planning Group is coordinating efforts to match Canadian DND with the US DOD. DND also set up Canada Com, which is a liaison and policy group that specifically responds to requests for DND help by PSEPC for domestic natural disasters or security threats.

In the months after 9/11, the then Canadian Foreign Minister, John Manley, worked hard to complete a series of 'smart border' improvements that would ensure sustained movement of goods and services across the border—even in crisis circumstances. The agreement, while marking a significant step forward did not presage substantive improvements in the physical security of key border crossing points that have been identified as points of exceptional vulnerability, but it did establish pre-clearance and notification procedures that helped to speed up commercial transits of the border. In this area, in particular, it is easy to see the nexus between economic and security interests in the new global war on terror. For instance, in a statement to the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2003, an aviation corporation owner stated:

There is a huge amount of money for everyone if the public is placated and huge losses if people believe that anything bad might happen...Everyone makes money selling fuel and it is all predicated on an illusion. In one sense, we know it is not safe...."(Defence 2003, 112)

A Senate report on airport security concluded that coordination remains a serious problem. "The RCMP does not have overall responsibility for security at airports. Right now, no one is in charge." The report goes on to note that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is the delivery agency for pre-boarding screening of passengers, baggage, and personnel, but does not report to the RCMP. CATSA follows guidelines set by Transport Canada. Meanwhile, local airport authorities actually deliver the physical security services at airports (Defence 2004, 184-6)

The same concern has been expressed about the lack of security measures through the mail service among other areas (Defence 2004, 5) Of particular concern is port security. Since the early 1980s Transport Canada has gone through a dramatic organizational retrenchment. With the privatization of many functions, market-driven imperatives asserted themselves across the country's transportation grid. The department workforce shrank from 25,000 to 5,000. Departmental staff no longer ran security operations at airports or ports. The federal government's port police force was dismantled and private port operators were tasked with providing security. The main focus of the scaled back department became one of regulating standards of security, licensing and certifying pilots, certifying airlines for safety, conducting inspections to ensure timely compliance and so forth. Nearly 4 million cargo containers enter Canada each year. Thus, as in other agencies like DND that were formally reeling, Transport Canada is struggling to adapt to its new responsibilities to ensure safety. Around 4 percent (national rate) are screened in any way (Defence 2004, 134) and of those, only a small fraction are actually 'destuffed' and searched thoroughly. Very few ports have any ability to X-ray significant numbers of containers while simultaneously checking for radiation emissions. This extremely low level of screening is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future. Captain Peter

Avis of the DND points out that the low percentage of port security is comparable to that of other countries such as Australia.

With respect to the control of Canada's territorial waters the situation is even worse than the gaps in coverage in port security. In 2003 the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence found that "Canada's coasts are virtually undefended" (Canada, SSCNSD, 2003, p. 81). The Canadian Coast Guard has been seriously under-funded for decades and it would take a major infusion of capital to rectify the inadequate number of ships and personnel with which they are expected to control Canadian coastal regions. The land-based law enforcement backup to the Coast Guard is even less capable. In 2003 only 13 RCMP personnel were available for law enforcement along 7,400 km. of Nova Scotia coastline. Ships under 300 tons did not have to have transponders identifying them. As a Senate Report states, "The Coast Guard does not have a constabulary function, it is not armed and it reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, all of which contribute to a focus away from coastal security. Despite its name, the Coast Guard doesn't play a serious role in guarding our coasts (Defence 2004, 41). Exacerbating this situation are questions about coordination between the Coast Guard, the RCMP, and local authorities (Defence 2004, 3). The Harper Government has moved to address this criticism by establishing Marine Security Operations Centres, on each coast, where the different agencies will have a physical location in order to share information. However, it is not clear how information will be shared and how decisions will be made in crisis situations. There is also a new bilateral initiative to patrol the Great Lakes with US counterparts, yet, here again, there seems to be no clear jurisdiction, protocols, or institutional chains of command across the different binational institutions.

As in Mexico, Canadian society has been strongly influenced by US economic influences. But far more than in Mexico, Canadian popular and 'high' culture have been greatly shaped by US cultural trends. This cultural impact has been somewhat mitigated by strong regional identities and by provincial control over education. Canada's national (federal-level) commitment to bilingualism and biculturalism is supplemented by a de facto 'multiculturalism' that is the product of continuing extraordinarily high levels of immigration (some 250,000 to 300,000 per year on a population base of some 30 million), with many of these people from Asia and only a small fraction coming from French-speaking countries of origin. Almost all such immigrants have preferred to integrate into an English-speaking society. Not surprisingly this has added to internal tensions between francophone Quebecers and the rest of the country and fed separatist sentiment in that province. Aboriginal communities in the western provinces and the north also have expressed concern about the impact of such immigration on their position within the national community, despite a fairly flexible federal structure which has permitted a high degree of provincial autonomy and has even accommodated aboriginal self-government to an unusual degree by international standards.

The heavily Asian component of Canadian immigration and the equally heavy component of Latino immigration to the United States has already produced significant cultural divergence between the two countries. It has also led to demands that the Canadian with the U.S. be tightened up because of populist anti-Latino sentiments in southwestern US states who have managed to make illicit Latino immigration into a major issue in the 2006 Congressional elections. In an effort to avoid charges of ethnic bias, US immigration exclusionists have demanded a new wall along the Canadian border to keep out 'illegals', even though estimates of the numbers of illicit entrants from Canada are fewer than 5 per cent of the 400-500,000 illegal migrants per year who cross the southern border of the U.S. (Swarns, 2005).

For Canadian observers the most important aspect of the US immigration debate is its almost certain massively negative impact on US tourism and convention business in Canada. The imminent requirement for all returning Americans to have passports is certain to damage Canadian tourist-related industries quite dramatically as it takes effect over the next two years. The hardening of the border in this respect has been treated as something of a national insult by some Canadians, as a reflection of an unjustified US perception that Canada is a 'weak link' in U.S. security. The hardening border may also be feeding the sense of inferiority in some quarters as well.

While some Canadians may feel inferior to their US neighbours, other Canadians have celebrated their commonalities—but often by differentiating themselves from US methods and approaches to public institutions, values and foreign policy. Canadians strongly support their national health care system, even as they demand better service; they also have supported more generous welfare, social security, and educational benefits. Most Canadians strongly support the abolition of capital punishment and see its continuance in the U.S. as morally retrograde and racially discriminatory (see comments by Senator Celine Hervieux-Payette: Woods, 2006 ). Because Canadians have experienced lower rates of crime and violence, and fewer problems with guns and narcotics, most Canadians feel they enjoy a more peaceful and equitable existence than do most Americans. For Canadians who share such sentiments, there is often a subtext of anti-Americanism in political discussions, so much so that one senior political commentator noted during the runup to the January 2006 national elections with respect to outgoing Prime Minister Paul Martin's campaign that "dwelling on the failures of Americans is our favourite way of feeling accomplished and virtuous" (Fulford, 2005).

Such attitudes have led many Canadians to oppose any strong dependence upon the US. A good many nationalists in the centre and left of the political spectrum fear the "Americanization" of societal values and thus resist any further acquisitions in Canada by US corporations (Hurtig 2002). Stephane Roussel summarized the situation as a "Triangular Contradiction," where Canadians feel they are pulled by three competing goals: security, sovereignty and prosperity (Roussel 2002).

#### Economic & Trade Effects of 9/11 on the Canadian Economy

Differences in resource endowments and the geographic isolation of some areas have weakened Canadian unity. Claims of "Western alienation" among the people of the prairie provinces and B.C. have been reinforced by Alberta's burgeoning oil- and gas-derived wealth and a sense of political disengagement by the people of these provinces from federal Liberal governments that have struggled to win seats for MPs in the West.

If any such inferiority is widespread, it would likely be the product of a sense of constrained economic opportunities. One cannot exclude from consideration the integrative impact of US direct investment in Canada since the 1930s, which has accelerated the importation of additional economic, scientific and technological processes originally developed south of the border. Primarily because of the highest levels of foreign ownership of any developed country, the Canadian economy has been (and remains) the weakest among the G7 countries in terms of private sector spending on research and development. Few if any US or other foreign corporate subsidiaries have product development or global marketing mandates; such work is reserved for headquarters, somewhere in the U.S. Given this persistent structural aspect of Canada's 'branch plant economy' during the Cold War, and the failure of CUSFTA and NAFTA to reduce in any significant way the levels of US ownership of the leading sectors of the economy, many talented and highly educated Canadians continue to feel they must leave for the U.S. if they are ever going to realize their full economic potential. Each year a considerable number of Canadians emigrate

to the United States seeking greater economic opportunity, although not on a scale that provoked fears of a “brain drain” in the 1960s. Nevertheless the trend throughout the 1990s was for some 22,000 to 35,000 young, highly educated Canadians to leave for employment in the U.S. each year, about 0.1% of the adult population (Statistics Canada, 2000).

Canada’s population is heavily urbanized but, with the exception of Edmonton and St. John’s, the larger urban centres are all located close to the US border, a geographic reality that contributed enormously to a pattern of north-south economic integration with the U.S. economy. The fact that for four-fifths of the country trade and investment with USs was facilitated by a common language and legal-business culture reinforced what geographic proximity had initiated. One analyst has speculated that some additional impetus favouring continental economic integration flowed from Canadians’ chronic inferiority complex vis a vis US society, a society that has been seen as consistently more prosperous and productive, and that has enjoyed a higher standard of living (Molot 2002).

The Canadian economy continues to have an interesting dualistic nature. While large parts of the economy, including parts of urban Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia have well-diversified industrial and service sectors, other regions in Canada, including Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, and the Maritime provinces are dominated by traditional natural resource exports, ranging from fisheries to wheat and cattle to minerals, forest products and fuels. The Canadian economy originally revolved solely around these “staples,” with all the incumbent problems of commodity price and earnings fluctuations. Canada is also highly trade dependent- by geography and infrastructure, the sparse population is oriented more along North-South rather than East-West corridors. The idea of locking in the dominant customer market, namely the US, in order to avoid disturbances in economic growth was consummated, amidst great dispute with the NAFTA agreement in 1992 under the Conservative Mulroney government. Since NAFTA, Canadian dependence upon US trade and investment has only increased. In several sectors, such as mining, energy and automobiles, there are industrial clusters that overlap the border, with heavy US investment in key companies.

The Canadian business sector’s reaction to 9/11 was swift and certain. The Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders was created by over 40 business associations and individuals to push Canadian policymakers towards reassuring the US on border security. This was backed up by several reports by the Conference Board and the Canadian Council for Chief Executives.

The Canadian relationship with the US is easily clarified with some basic statistics. Table 3-1 below shows the overwhelming Canadian dependence upon the US as the major trading partner is virtually unchanged since Sept. 11.

**Table 3-1: Canada’s Dependency on the US is Unchanged**

|        | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
|--------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| US     | 81%  | 82%  | 85%  | 87%  | 87%  | 87%  | 87%  | 86%  | 85%  | 84%  |
| OTHERS | 19%  | 18%  | 15%  | 13%  | 13%  | 13%  | 13%  | 14%  | 15%  | 16%  |

Source: Author calculations from Statistics Canada

Table 3-2 shows that this holds regardless of whether we look at exports or imports. It is interesting to note that dependency for exports is significantly greater than dependency for imports.

**Table 3-2: % of Exports and Imports by Partner**

| Exports | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

|                              |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| US                           | 83.6% | 83.7% | 83.8% | 82.6% | 81.7% | 81.4% |
| Japan                        | 2.6%  | 2.4%  | 2.5%  | 2.4%  | 2.3%  | 2.3%  |
| UK                           | 1.7%  | 1.6%  | 1.5%  | 1.9%  | 2.2%  | 2.1%  |
| Other EEC                    |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|                              | 3.9%  | 4.0%  | 3.9%  | 4.1%  | 4.1%  | 4.2%  |
| Other OECD <sup>2</sup>      | 2.8%  | 2.9%  | 3.0%  | 3.2%  | 3.4%  | 3.4%  |
| Other countries              | 5.3%  | 5.4%  | 5.3%  | 5.8%  | 6.3%  | 6.5%  |
| <b>Imports</b>               |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| US                           | 73.6% | 72.7% | 71.5% | 70.1% | 68.9% | 66.8% |
| Japan                        | 3.2%  | 3.0%  | 3.3%  | 3.1%  | 2.8%  | 2.9%  |
| UK                           | 3.4%  | 3.4%  | 2.9%  | 2.7%  | 2.6%  | 2.4%  |
| Other EEC                    |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|                              | 5.8%  | 6.6%  | 7.2%  | 7.6%  | 7.4%  | 7.6%  |
| Other OECD <sup>2</sup>      | 5.3%  | 5.3%  | 5.5%  | 5.7%  | 6.1%  | 6.2%  |
| Other countries <sup>3</sup> |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|                              | 8.7%  | 9.0%  | 9.5%  | 10.7% | 12.2% | 14.2% |

Source: Author Calculations from Statistics Canada

Table 3-3 demonstrates a small dip in total value of both exports and imports from 2001-3, but the absolute amount of trade volume has resumed its positive trajectory from 2003-4 onwards.

**Table 3-3: Total Amounts of Canadian Exports and Imports by Partner**

| <b>Exports</b>          | 2000              | 2001              | 2002              | 2003              | 2004              | 2005              |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Total</b>            | <b>429,372.20</b> | <b>420,730.40</b> | <b>414,056.00</b> | <b>400,175.40</b> | <b>429,134.20</b> | <b>453,600.20</b> |
| US                      | 359,021.20        | 352,165.00        | 347,072.10        | 330,468.30        | 350,769.30        | 369,284.10        |
| Japan                   | 11,297.40         | 10,120.80         | 10,146.90         | 9,770.30          | 9,958.00          | 10,488.10         |
| UK                      | 7,273.30          | 6,910.30          | 6,182.20          | 7,699.70          | 9,439.70          | 9,692.00          |
| Other EEC               |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|                         | 16,846.30         | 16,688.90         | 16,353.00         | 16,423.60         | 17,461.70         | 19,211.90         |
| Other OECD <sup>2</sup> | 12,059.00         | 12,172.50         | 12,460.50         | 12,679.60         | 14,394.40         | 15,238.40         |
| Other countries         | 22,875.10         | 22,672.90         | 21,841.30         | 23,134.00         | 27,111.00         | 29,685.70         |
| <b>Imports</b>          | <b>362,336.70</b> | <b>350,071.20</b> | <b>356,758.60</b> | <b>342,608.00</b> | <b>363,075.80</b> | <b>386,906.90</b> |
| US                      | 266,511.10        | 254,330.70        | 255,259.70        | 240,291.90        | 250,064.40        | 258,430.00        |
| Japan                   | 11,729.80         | 10,571.90         | 11,732.60         | 10,644.90         | 10,018.90         | 11,182.60         |
| UK                      | 12,289.30         | 11,954.10         | 10,180.90         | 9,166.10          | 9,461.20          | 9,111.60          |
| Other EEC               |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|                         | 21,136.50         | 23,197.10         | 25,862.10         | 25,999.70         | 27,014.60         | 29,247.70         |
| Other OECD <sup>2</sup> | 19,067.60         | 18,649.80         | 19,685.60         | 19,692.00         | 22,217.10         | 24,115.20         |

|                              |           |           |           |           |           |           |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Other countries <sup>3</sup> | 31,602.50 | 31,367.60 | 34,037.60 | 36,813.40 | 44,299.60 | 54,819.80 |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|

Source: Statistics Canada, C\$ millions

Table 3-4 below demonstrates that the general product mix of Canadian exports to the US remains the same. The most significant difference is the increasing value of oil exports, and to a lesser extent plastics derived from petroleum, presumably due primarily to increases in the international price of petroleum.

**Table 3-4: Top Canadian Exports to US, Pre- vs. Post- 9/11**

|   | Ave1996-00 |   | Ave 2001-05 |
|---|------------|---|-------------|
| 87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles               | 70,807     | 87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles               | 78,302      |
| 27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes                     | 31,695     | 27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes                     | 62,796      |
| 84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances                           | 25,690     | 84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances                           | 26,822      |
| 85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment   | 17,733     | 44 - Wood and Articles of Wood (Incl. Wood Charcoal)  | 16,952      |
| 44 - Wood and Articles of Wood (Incl. Wood Charcoal)  | 15,057     | 85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment   | 15,491      |
| 48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials                                 | 13,275     | 48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials                                 | 14,151      |
| 39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof  | 7,816      | 39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof  | 11,853      |
| 94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings | 6,354      | 88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts  | 8,266       |
| 76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof  | 5,943      | 94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings | 7,764       |
| 88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts  | 5,201      | 76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof  | 7,534       |

Source: Author Calculations from Industry Canada, current C\$ millions

Table 3-5 below of Canadian imports from the US demonstrates again remarkable stability in import product mix from before and after 9/11. Tables 3-4 and 3-5 together indicate that much of Canadian-US trade is of Lindert (like products) intra-industry nature. This suggests a deep vertical integration (suppliers to buyers in the production process) of the two economies.

**Table 3-5, Top Canadian Imports from the US, Pre- and Post 9/11**

|   | Ave 96-00 |   | Ave 01-05 |
|---|-----------|---|-----------|
| 87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles               | 44,106    | 87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles               | 48,962    |
| 84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances                           | 39,129    | 84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances                           | 38,157    |
| 85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment   | 22,360    | 85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment   | 17,922    |
| 39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof  | 8,310     | 39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof  | 10,421    |
| 90 - Optical, Medical , Photographic, Scientific and Technical Instrumentation                | 6,942     | 90 - Optical, Medical , Photographic, Scientific and Technical Instrumentation                | 7,022     |
| 73 - Articles of Iron or Steel  | 4,405     | 27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes                     | 6,530     |
| 48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials                                 | 4,392     | 48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials                                 | 5,247     |
| 40 - Rubber and Articles Thereof  | 3,358     | 73 - Articles of Iron or Steel  | 4,883     |
| 27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes                     | 3,278     | 40 - Rubber and Articles Thereof  | 3,688     |
| 94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings | 3,051     | 72 - Iron and Steel   | 3,581     |
| 29 - Organic Chemicals (Including Vitamins, Alkaloids and Antibiotics)                        | 2,880     | 29 - Organic Chemicals (Including Vitamins, Alkaloids and Antibiotics)                        | 3,536     |
| 88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts  | 2,716     | 30 - Pharmaceutical Products  | 3,501     |
| 76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof  | 2,704     | 76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof  | 3,067     |
| 49 - Printed Books, Newspapers, Pictures, Manuscripts and The Like                            | 2,697     | 94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings | 3,066     |
| 72 - Iron and Steel   | 2,614     | 88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts  | 2,922     |

The tables above reflect the deep economic dependency of Canada on the US. Indeed, Canadian trade with non-US partners, including Mexico, is insignificant. Nonetheless, Canada

also has attempted at various times to follow a more multilateral route to reduce its dependence on possible political changes in US economic policy. Canada was a leader in the creation of the WTO and participates in a variety of other multilateral groups, such as the Cairns group of agricultural-producing nations. Canada has also supported the floundering FTAA, and has signed a variety of bilateral free trade agreements outside of NAFTA, including with Chile. Canada has more recently sent and received diplomatic missions to and from China, seeking to become a “Pacific gateway” of resources and investment capital for that fast growing economy. Canada’s attempts to diversify its trading partners have not reduced its vulnerability to US pressure. In a sense, economic vulnerability gives the US government enormous indirect leverage if it wishes to press Ottawa for compliance with its security policy wishes.

The data on physical crossings are quite limited. Table 3-6 below shows that there was a roughly stable rate of truck crossings at the major Canada-US border crossings, though some variation by crossing occurred. It is interesting to note, in contrast, that the number of cars and other vehicles crossing has gone down steadily over the same period.

**Table 3-6: Truck Crossings by Border Station, 2000-4**

| <i>Crossing</i>                            | <i>Province</i>  | <i>Millions</i> |             |             |             |             | <i>Per cent</i> |             |             |             |             |
|--|------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|  |                  | <i>2000</i>     | <i>2001</i> | <i>2002</i> | <i>2003</i> | <i>2004</i> | <i>2000</i>     | <i>2001</i> | <i>2002</i> | <i>2003</i> | <i>2004</i> |
| <b>Windsor - Ambassador Bridge</b>         | Ontario          | 3.54            | 3.38        | 3.48        | 3.41        | 3.49        | 26              | 25.6        | 25.9        | 25.8        | 26          |
| <b>Sarnia - Blue Water Bridge</b>          | Ontario          | 1.48            | 1.47        | 1.56        | 1.61        | 1.71        | 10.9            | 11.1        | 11.6        | 12.2        | 12.7        |
| <b>Fort Erie - Peace Bridge</b>            | Ontario          | 1.45            | 1.35        | 1.31        | 1.27        | 1.27        | 10.6            | 10.3        | 9.7         | 9.6         | 9.4         |
| <b>Niagara Falls - Queenston Br.</b>       | Ontario          | 1.04            | 1           | 1.05        | 1.01        | 1.01        | 7.7             | 7.6         | 7.8         | 7.7         | 7.5         |
| <b>Lacolle</b>                             | Quebec           | 0.79            | 0.79        | 0.78        | 0.77        | 0.78        | 5.8             | 6           | 5.8         | 5.8         | 5.8         |
| <b>Pacific Highway/ Douglas</b>            | British Columbia | 0.87            | 0.79        | 0.78        | 0.75        | 0.75        | 6.4             | 6           | 5.8         | 5.7         | 5.6         |
| <b>Lansdowne</b>                           | Ontario          | 0.53            | 0.5         | 0.53        | 0.49        | 0.49        | 3.9             | 3.8         | 3.9         | 3.7         | 3.6         |
| <b>Top 20 (trucks)</b>                     |                  | <b>12.1</b>     | <b>11.7</b> | <b>12</b>   | <b>11.8</b> | <b>12</b>   | <b>88.9</b>     | <b>88.9</b> | <b>89</b>   | <b>89.2</b> | <b>89.3</b> |
| <b>Other crossings (trucks)</b>            |                  | 1.51            | 1.47        | 1.48        | 1.43        | 1.44        |                 |             |             |             |             |
| <b>Total All border crossings (trucks)</b> |                  | <b>13.6</b>     | <b>13.2</b> | <b>13.5</b> | <b>13.2</b> | <b>13.5</b> |                 |             |             |             |             |

Source: Transport Canada

However, a consultants report to Transport Canada, released in 2005, revealed that Canadian truckers' found that their expenses had increased substantially as a result of US post 9/11 security measures at crossings. Trucks haul 70 % of trade with the US (57% of exports and 80% of imports) These measures include the need to gather information for the new Pre-Arrival Processing System (PAPS) as well as Food and Drug Administration information for agricultural shipments prior to arrival, and security compliance with the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which is required for approval for FAST border clearance. Additional costs were required for FAST cards, driver training, upgrading information systems, and new security equipment. In addition, there are costly delays while awaiting FAST approval of shippers and drivers. The study also suggests that there likely has been an increase in waiting times at the border. The study estimates total costs at a minimum of C\$ 178.9 million per year (Inc. 2005).

Canadian economic vulnerability has come to the forefront in recent years with the softwood lumber dispute, finally settled in 2006, with Canada surrendering a large proportion of US duty charges, part of which went directly to the White House for "meritorious objectives." In addition, a major blow was suffered by cattle producers in the West when the US banned imports because of concerns regarding BSE infestation. These disputes revealed as much about domestic US politics as about foreign policy, as competing producers in the US of lumber and cattle were better organized than importers. On the other hand, Canada has some cards in its hands in terms of negotiations. Fears of potential privatization of health care and of water have led to Canadian leaders reassuring the public on those fronts. Similarly, the unquenchable US appetite for energy resources has it looking northward amidst policy fiasco in the Middle East. Canada is now the largest supplier of petroleum to the US. Unfortunately, the federal-provincial structure has prevented Canadian policymakers from capitalizing on such possibilities. Alberta's strong policy independence and refusal to use the oil card to extract concessions for other areas in Canada's national interests, such as softwood lumber, has, in combination with the inherent split with Francophone Quebec, prevented the development of a consistent national trade and investment strategy.

#### Canadian Responses in terms of Immigration, Refugees and Border Security

With Canada's dependence on the US economy, Ottawa naturally feels compelled to ensure the ease of crossborder traffic flow all along the border. More than 200 million people and 14 million vehicles cross the border every year. The Ambassador Bridge in the busiest corridor, Windsor-Detroit, home to the auto industry, witnessed more than 12 million vehicle crossings in 2000 alone (Canada 2001). In the months after 9/11, then Canadian Foreign Minister, John Manley therefore worked hard to complete a series of 'smart border' improvements that would ensure sustained movement of goods and services across the border—even in crisis circumstances. The agreement, while marking a significant step forward did not presage substantive improvements in the physical security of key border crossing points that have been identified as points of exceptional vulnerability.

The main feature of Canadian and US responses to 9/11 is to work towards "compatibility" and cooperation in terms of information sharing, screening, and enforcement measures along the border. Canada feels it suffers a "credibility gap" in terms of US policymakers, dating from the 1998 Rexam arrest in Port Angeles Washington border crossing, and false beliefs that many of the 9/11 hijackers came through Canada (Sands 2001).

The efforts at reassurance explain Canada's attempt to develop stricter border control measures to reassure the US. The Ridge-Manley accord of December 2001 called for a "smart

border,” meaning one in which stricter security would not prevent the convenient flow of goods, services, and people. The implication is that with some greater investment in technology and border infrastructure, there would not be such a tradeoff. The idea is to tighten inspection of goods and people before they arrive in North America (“the perimeter concept”), and to facilitate traffic of both within North America through pre-clearances. In the same month, a Joint Statement on Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration Issues followed. The Joint Statement placed Canadians on the US Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, agreement to review visitor visas, agreement to develop common biometric identifiers for travel documents, increases in immigration officers overseas, and enhancement of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs). In 2002, Canada and the US established the Bi-National Planning Group for enhancing cooperation among military, intelligence, emergency response, and maritime surveillance. The group has 50 staff members, including 20 Canadian military personnel and 1 member of PSEPC and is located at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. The mandate of this temporary group was extended until 2006, though there has been some discussion of making it permanent (Defence 2004, 97-8). In addition, the GOC and the GOUS have agreed to pre-screen ships entering the St. Lawrence seaway in the port of Montreal, and to coordinate marine security regimes. There are joint operations at major ports to screen shipments (Defence 2004, 117-8). One major feature of smart borders is the NEXUS pass system, which allows for more rapid clearance by frequent border crossing people. There is also the FAST (Free and Secure Trade) program, a pre-clearance programme for companies that frequently ship cargo across the border. Despite a few incidents and griping by US officials over lax security, there has not been any major change in the basic nature of the border relationship thus far. This has led to criticism of under-funding and under-training of Canadian border agents as well as discussions around whether they should be armed. Moreover, a number of border posts continue to be manned by a single officer, and others do not have adequate access to security databanks (Defence 2005, 19 & 37)

In more concrete terms, the US has increased its security presence on the Canadian border. It has tripled agents on the border, and the Coast Guard now stops all boats and escorts oil and gas tankers in the Great Lakes. So far, efforts have been concentrated at the major commercial crossing points, such as Detroit-Windsor, and Vancouver-Blaine (Andreas 2003, 9). The Windsor-Detroit crossing is by far the most important conduit, being the location where 23% of bilateral trade passes. For 2004, the total value of trade through that border crossing was \$141.67 billion Canadian. The vital importance of this physical link has raised alarm about its possibility of becoming a target (Defence 2005, 47) In turn, Canada has increased the border security budget by C\$280 million, including beefed-up border presence, additional security and intelligence personnel (including 2000 re-assigned RCMP officers) and airport security measures. In addition, Canada further tightened its visa regime, requiring visas from Saudis and Malaysians. Canada also increased refugee screening, and detention and deportation capacity, and introduced a new tamper-resistant permanent resident card for new immigrants (Andreas 2003; Hristoulas 2003). A variety of more under the radar changes have also ensued in terms of increasing cooperation with the US security apparatus. Besides greater information sharing, the number of US agents, including customs, FBI, and immigration officials operating in Canada has tripled (Hristoulas 2003).

The possibilities of more stringent US enforcement of borders has disquieted some Canadians. The US introduced the provisional idea that Canadians would need to carry passports to cross the border. Discussions have also centred around various digital voice, fingerprint, and iris recognition equipment for screening visitors. Former Canadian Ambassador to the US Allan Gottlieb, echoing the sentiments of several in the business community has suggested in response the idea of forming a “common perimeter” and customs union, in other words a fully integrated

border (Cody 2003). Again, nationalists such as Stephen Clarkson would see this as an end to the differentiating factors of Canada, including public rights to access to health care, lower crime and inequality, and greater public-private partnerships in production, a process which they fear has already begun under neoliberalism (Clarkson 2003).

On the domestic side, there are concerns that Canada is not living up to its self-image as a place for refugees, and that conditions for them may worsen with 9/11 fears. The 1976 *Immigration Act* was the principal guiding framework for immigration law before 9/11. The 1976 Act removed all explicit traces of discrimination against the physically and mentally-handicapped and along the lines of sexual preference, however maintaining denial clauses for health, criminality, safety and national security reasons. The Act was touted as an excellent example of Canadian liberalism. Since 9/11, several important policy changes have taken place. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was created in December 2003 as part of the new Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) portfolio. PSEPC was created as anew department in April 2005. The CBSA is designed to coordinate border security agencies, including) customs, the Intelligence, Interdiction, and Enforcement program of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Import Inspection at Ports of Entry program from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). Further coordination occurs with the Department of National Defence (DND), the RCMP, the Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and local public and infrastructure officials. These programs are now under the jurisdiction of the solicitor general, who now has the titles of deputy prime minister and minister of public safety and emergency preparedness (Pratt 2005). One way to understand the central challenge of the 9/11 failures is the failure of coordination, when intelligence clues were passed over, not passed along, or action upon them was simply delayed until it was too late. *In the post 9/11 world, there is an action to coordinate across economic and security lines, and across geographic lines, from local to regional to national to international in unprecedented ways.* In the US, the DHS experiment has received major critiques in terms of the capability of the agency to coordinate action, as well as the highly politicized nature of its budget expenditures. In Canada, the attempt to consolidate security under the Privy Council and the PSEPC has also received criticism. For instance, during Senate testimony regarding responsibility for security training for aircraft crew, there was a split between 2 branches of Transport Canada, security and civil aviation, over jurisdiction (Defence 2003, 120). There is a high probability that the rather ad hoc bilateral coordination with the US on security matters will become more institutionalized over time. It is unlikely that a unified “North US Security Perimeter” that does away with borders between Canada and the US will happen, for the various reasons stated in this analysis. However, the idea of a North US “layer” of coordinated security seems likely and would follow traditional Canadian strategic reliance on the US for its national security (Defence 2005, 7). As one interviewee stated, it is not enough merely to create PSEPC, a major change in the culture of each organization in the public sector is also needed.

#### Canada’s Stance Towards Mexico post 9/11

Despite the existence of NAFTA, Canada’s relationship with Mexico remains under-developed. Though there are obvious parallels in terms of reducing strategic dependence on the US, these have yet to be developed. Canadian trade with Mexico remains a small pittance of total trade. Canada receives some Mexican migrants, however for a variety of reasons the nature of immigration is quite different in Canada than in the US. First, Canada has no long-standing history of Mexican settlement, unlike the Southwestern US, seized from Mexico in the 19th century. Second, with no border contiguity, distance makes reaching the Northern border more difficult and expensive. Third, Canadian immigration laws are enforced at the workplace, and the national health care system requires proof of citizenship for access. For all of these reasons, the

family and institutional networks that facilitate Latin US immigration in the US are just beginning to spring up in Canada.

In terms of strategic cooperation, trade and investment diversification, and Canada's interests in multilateral rules of law regarding NAFTA, Canadian policymakers have recognized the desirability of greater cooperation with Mexico. Before Sept. 11, in parallel with discussions around the FTAA, there was discussion of the creation of a "NAFTA plus" arrangement which would move towards a common market, allowing for the free movement of goods, services, investments and freedoms. Mexican President Fox even briefly suggested a common currency, though this idea does not have strong support in Canada. However, by 2002, the Canadian government had backed away from this idea, moving instead towards the idea of a bilateral customs union with the US as a step forward. The idea did not gain much traction within the Bush Administration (Campbell 2003). In other words, Canadian policymakers seem to recognize the strategic value of extending and strengthening trilateral relations and NAFTA regimes (which one group of executives called the North US Security and Prosperity Initiative), but do not see this as feasible in the short-term given Washington's security concerns (Executives 2004).

Most experts note that the relationship with Mexico remains very much on the backburner. Canadian policymakers remain focused on the bilateral relationship with the US, following the lead their economic interests dictate, despite Mexican efforts to forge a more trilateral relationship (Hristoulas 2003). Since much of the Canadian left has a sense of nationalism (even if unrequited), there is a strong reluctance to consider the idea of entering into a North US citizenship, which they fear would lead to US dominance (Welsch 2004).

### New Conservative Government

While the new Harper Government was lauded in the US as pro-US, there are not yet any signs of major changes in Canadian security policy—certainly not with respect to Iraq. Prime Minister Harper's March 2006 visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan has clearly cemented his government's support for the NATO ISAF mission for at least one year and possibly much longer. According to Margaret Purdy, Special Advisor to the Deputy Minister for Transport Canada (public talk at SFU, Feb. 23, 2006), the new government has made a number of promises in regard to security. Their main focus is on quelling Canadian fears about crime, including issues of drugs, organized crimes, and gun violence. In terms of national security, the new Government will: appoint a new National Security Commissioner to coordinate the activities of all relevant agencies, through a National Security Review Committee; establish a Canadian agency for foreign intelligence; re-establish port police; and create a new enquiry into the Air India bombing. Purdy notes that the Canadian Government continues to struggle to convince US that "we are not a weak link." During the January election campaign, the Conservatives also pledged to issue firearms to Canadian border inspectors at all land crossings and end the practice of having single officers on duty at remote locations for long periods of time. Coast Guard ships would be replaced in a more timely fashion and

In response to the need for better coordination among security branches, the Harper Government set up a new 24 hr. Government Operations Centre, as well as the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre. There is also an annual meeting and a permanent high-level forum among the ministers to coordinate action on emergencies, and the intention to create a national emergency response system. It also created a new Public Health Agency of Canada, in part to manage the possibilities for the spread of disease. Partly in response to worries about the new

intrusiveness into privacy, the Government set up the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to encourage citizen input (Office 2005, preface).

With respect to international security policy, the Harper government has indicated that it will try to increase the strength of the regular forces from 60,000 to 75,000; that it will look seriously and with sympathy on any specific new proposals for cooperation on ABM defences; and that it will renew NORAD with an expanded mandate to include the surveillance and control of all maritime approaches to North America (Koring, 2006); and that it will provide the necessary early upgrades to sustain the existing force projection capacity of the Canadian navy and air force. The Harper Cabinet will be facing a major budgetary challenge to make good on its declared commitment to refurbish the capital equipment of the Canadian Forces, but given the budgetary surplus position that his government has inherited it is in a far better position to contemplate major increases in defence spending than any other G7 country. Indeed, the Harper Government announced a \$1.1 billion increase in spending by the armed forces in 2006 over 2 years, and increases in international aid. A renewed effort to shore up the security issues around NAFTA trade led to the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), announced on Mar. 23, 2005. The agreement covers cooperation in security, transportation, the environment, and public health, and the Harper Government announced in 2006 that of C\$1.4 billion towards security over the next 2 years, including C\$73 million towards securing the financial system; C\$202 million towards the border security components of SPP, and \$101 million towards arming border officers and eliminating sole officer posts. The SPP also contains coordinating commissions in the North US Competitiveness Council (NACC), geared towards coordinating regulatory policies, North US Emergency Management, Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza, North US Energy Security, and North US Smart and Secure borders. The Harper Government signaled the possibility of a possible move away from the multilateralist tradition with its stance against Hezbollah in the 2006 invasion by Israel.

### Conclusion

Canada's main concern following 9/11 remains to ensure steady economic flows with the United States (Senate of Canada, 2005). This is a reflection of the Canadian reality of economic dependence upon the US for trade and investment flows. Canadians continue to balance the desire to maintain their social and governance differences from the US while reassuring its dominant partner. That ambivalence is illustrated by the contrast between Canadian security of public building and that of the US. For example, Canada's DND headquarters, sharp contrast to the Pentagon, occupies a large office building in the middle of Ottawa, with a mass transit bus loop in front of the building and a shopping mall, the Rideau Centre, across the street. There are no metal detectors, although there are some security gates for guests. There is an underground garage and the parking lot is easily accessible without identification. The state of affairs for these domestic policy buildings is in sharp contrast to the beefed-up security at Canadian airports, key conduits to trade with the US.

This paper brings several issues forward that warrant further investigation, issues that apply not only to Canada but to all countries in the new security environment. First, 9/11 has begun to change the nexus between security and economic linkages in Canada and the US (and in Mexico). In key sectors such as energy, migration, and transportation, 9/11 is forcing cooperation between security and economic institutions and coordination of policies within key sectors where these were previously separate. At this point it does not seem to threaten economic commerce in Canada, yet fears of potential US reactions following another attack are widespread. A relatively small incident (as compared to the damage, say of a natural disaster or highway fatalities) could have profound economic reverberations as the news spreads and stokes fear throughout the population. The hugely magnified effect, which we saw with 9/11, which precipitated not only a

new era of institutional governance, but 2 wars and a massive expenditure for non-economically productive security (except for those receiving such contracts), reverses the normal rules of power in international relations, namely that power is cumulative, based on military force and economic production fungible into military force. Thus, a handful of people with relatively low expense can create havoc at the largest levels, especially in an atmosphere in North America unaccustomed to such incidents. The effect is akin to the herding effects of stock market crashes such as that in East Asia in 1999, where there is an emotional reaction to the loss of confidence by one significant holder that magnifies into a massive flight of capital. This scenario should push us to think more carefully about what we mean by terrorism and by security. In the new security scenario, where any target is vulnerable, though higher profile targets are preferred, what is the appropriate calculus for achieving adequate security at a reasonable cost? To our knowledge, there is no real discussion of this issue thus far, yet, it is not a purely existential question but one which must be engaged in order to set priorities and move from a reactionary, fear-based milieu to one in which we can become pro-active. Our discussions with Canadian officials so far present the scenario in which Canada can balance the need to do enough to reassure the US not to close borders or fear a “weak link” to the North without wrecking its hard-won budget surplus and reduction of long-term debt.

Second, since 9/11 required a rethinking of both domestic and international institutions in terms of the nexus between security and economics. Concerns for domestic civil society protection, sovereignty, and an independent foreign policy need to be balanced with concerns regarding terrorism, smooth economic commerce, and security cooperation. Thus far, institutional changes appear to be ad hoc efforts with no particular level of organizational coordination between Canada and the US, mirroring the lack of coordination on the regional (eg there is no security counterpart to NAFTA) and international level (NATO separate from WTO) despite the new reality of security-economic linkage. These efforts are occurring on the federal level through inter-agency coordination, joint teams and task forces, and attempts to compatibilize security measures. They are also occurring on the provincial, regional, and municipal levels, and between, public, private, and non-profit organizations and with individuals. It is interesting to note that there is ongoing activity at the subnational level. For example, annual summits have been held between Quebec and New York since 1983 (Lubin 2003). One of the primary challenges is the problem of information sharing and coordination of various efforts. In regard to the overall question of the project, it is clear that 9/11 has pushed Canada away from its support of multilateral and trilateral institutionalization towards more focused bilateral relations. Despite the strong efforts to centralize management under the PSEPC, mirroring the development of DHS in the US, the same problems as DHS faces lurk around the corner for Canada. PSEPC is a coordinating agency covering a very wide gamut of different partners, from RCMP to emergency management to health threats to CSIS in terms of intelligence sharing. In theory, centralization should ease information flow and make coordination easier. In practice, however, PSEPC is dealing with long-standing agencies who have a naturally strong sense of turf. Our interviews with public officials revealed a great deal of trepidation and uncertainty in regard to what information could be shared without violating privacy protection in Canada. As a result, the individual pieces of information, such as immigration, FBI, and CIA information in 9/11, that may, when put together, reveal important threats, could very well be missed. Moreover, PSEPC as a purely policy advisory and coordinating agency, in covering so many different areas does not have a clear sense of mission, objectives, prioritization, or measurement of results. As in the case of DHS, PSEPC does not have either carrots or sticks to get agencies to work together. Most interviewees in Ottawa noted that PSEPC was overwhelmed, under-staffed (and suffering from turnover), and under-resourced for such a monumental task. This is compounded by the muddling of the security with economic agencies as well as domestic and international ones. In a crisis situation, there is no clear set of protocols or guidelines about a clear chain of command. In

a situation such as an unusual ship on the high seas, the Coast Guard which scans domestic waters would have to report back to the RCMP, the RCMP would then need a warrant, and then the RCMP would have to use the Coast Guard vessels to intercept the vessel. If the ship by then moved back to international waters, DND would now have to be brought in and summon naval vessels. This is a recipe for disaster in the minute-by-minute world of terrorist threats, such as the US military's inability to launch jets to protect either NY or the White House during 9/11. Similar scenarios, such as Canadian citizens linked to terrorist activities abroad, or foreign citizens attacking a domestic military base, bring into further relief the inadequacy of the new institutional relationships. The problem is compounded when one considers the need to coordinate across provincial lines and down to the provincial and municipal levels, where, as one interviewee put it, there is not much political capital in spending on security rather than road and other local priority projects. A couple of interviewees in the Canadian public service suggested that within particular issue areas, communication across geographical levels is competent, however, across issues and within the Federal government across agencies, it is still problematic. In sum, while the new working groups bringing together different individuals from across agencies, and the idea of a coordinating agency in PSEPC make sense, these are only interim steps.

The problems are compounded in the lack of clear long-term thinking about the role of the military in the new age of terrorism. The military is still geared towards fighting conventional wars. The situation in Afghanistan is far from amenable to that type of institutional response. There is no conventional enemy to fight, but rather a population that relies on illegal drug production for its livelihood and is infiltrated with Taliban influence in the face of insecurity and the presence of foreign armies. The lessons of Vietnam to win "hearts and minds" and the political nature of such struggles have been lost in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no clear mission or way to gauge progress without thinking more clearly about these key contextual factors. Soldiers with no local language capability, no history or background in the region, and no understanding of the local politics have very little chance of success. Add to this the challenges of supporting a weak national government and the depth of the economic issues there, and there seems little probability of long-term success without an integrated approach. The clear lesson of the lack of "humint" or human intelligence in 9/11 seems to have been lost so far in terms of our forces' priorities. Also, the shortcomings of police forces to deal with actual scenarios of terrorism (such as multiple armed attacks simultaneously), or even the inability of the US to organize itself to evacuate Katrina victims, means that some re-thinking of DND's purely external mandate should take place. Is the potential poisoning of domestic fisheries from international waters a domestic or international issue? In a situation such as the upcoming Vancouver Olympics, DND is taking orders from PSEPC, however, if a crisis situation occurs in which military expertise is predominant, there is a need for a field general. One interviewee suggested that the Privy Council could serve this function, however, even though it includes a National Security Advisor, it is hard to see, unless there is a clear chain of command through DND and PSEPC hierarchies, who would be in charge of making quick decisions.

A more serious long-term plan based on protocols for action and a clear chain of command need to be developed. This type of thinking is hard to come by in Ottawa and Washington, where timelines are short-term in response to the political climate. However, it is particularly important for Canada to further develop its institutional and policy priorities in order to coordinate with the US from a strong basis of self-assuredness. This basis will provide for a more confident and mutually beneficial relationship in the long-run rather than one based on Canada reacting to the particular demands of the US at any given moment and dampen the vulnerability to over-reaction based on singular incidents of terrorism. As one interviewee put it, we can't view every single event through the prism of terrorism. Another, Captain Peter C. Avis

of DND states that there are lessons from other countries, such as the Netherlands' defense of its territorial waters, where civilians and military officials work together on an issues bridging economic and security issues; he also cites Australia as a place where the coordination problem has been tackled more effectively with the setting up of a unified civilian-military decision making chain of command (Avis, 2005). Emotionally-and politically-charged thinking explains our mixed and incoherent reaction thus far. Canada lacks a clear plan and continues to be reactive rather than pro-active.

## Application to Theoretical Questions of Project

We can now evaluate the primary theoretical questions of this study, focusing on Canada-US relations:

**TABLE X.3: CATALYZERS OF POLITICAL/SECURITY INTEGRATION  
COMPARED**

| <i>Dimensions:</i>   | <i>Pre-9/11:</i>   | <i>Post-9/11:</i>  |
|--|--|--|
| <i>1. Occurrence of purposeful orientation shift?</i>  | Yes: Canada sought to increase facility of economic access to US               | Yes: appeasement of US sought in new security measures to ensure economic access |
| <i>2. Institutionalization of orientation shift?</i>   | Yes: eg SAGITS and new trade institutions                                      | Yes: new security consolidation and institutions                                 |
| <i>3. Gresham's law in integrative instincts (bad instincts driving good instincts out):</i> | rules-oriented   | Canada remains rules-oriented  |
| <i>4. Safeguarding against external shocks?</i>  | a big issue given dependence on US   | Canada continues to seek diversification (eg China initiatives)                  |
| <i>5. Exploring new avenues of collaboration:</i>  | Yes, discussion of NAMU  | Yes, citizenship/border coordination   |
| <i>6. Compatible leadership?</i>   | some disagreements with Liberals, but relatively minor (mostly foreign policy) | Harper govt. is expected to be more US-friendly                                  |

Source: Adapted and extended from James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., "Theories of international integration, regionalism, and alliance cohesion," *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, eds. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 431-459.

Table X.3 summarizes that not much has really changed in Canada as a result of 9/11 in terms of general orientation. The main changes have been in institutional arrangements and attention paid to border security.

**TABLE X.4: SECURITY COMMUNITY TENETS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11**

| <i>Dimensions:</i>                       | <i>Pre-9/11:</i>                   | <i>Post-9/11:</i>  |
|--|------------------------------------|--|
| <i>1. Value compatibility:</i>           | Yes                                | Yes- expected to increase with Harper govt.  |
| <i>2. Behavioral predictability:</i>     | Yes                                | Yes  |
| <i>3. Mutual responsiveness:</i>         | Yes                                | Yes, though Canada still finds key remaining issues- softwood lumber, US- foreign policy |
| <i>4. Value complementarity:</i>         | Yes                                | Yes  |
| <i>5. Distinctiveness of lifestyles:</i> | Yes, eg crime & public health care | Yes, increasingly  |

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| 6. <i>Reward expectations before burden sharing:</i>                       | Yes  | Increasing friction- ABM, Iraq                             |
| 7. <i>Increasing political and administrative functions:</i>               | Yes  | Yes, albeit in an ad hoc manner                            |
| 8. <i>Economic growth distinguishing core areas from peripheral areas:</i> | Yes, differentiation along regional and sectoral lines | Yes  |
| 9. <i>Geographical and social communication linkages:</i>                  | Yes  | Yes  |
| 10. <i>Multiplication of communications and transactions:</i>              | Yes  | Yes  |
| 11. <i>Decreasing barriers to mobility across political boundaries:</i>    | Yes  | No: increasing barriers                                    |
| 12. <i>Increasing political elites:</i>                                    | Yes  | Yes, though polarization of attitudes towards US continues |

Source: Adapted and extended from James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., "Theories of international integration, regionalism, and alliance cohesion," *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, eds. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 431-459.

Table X.4 demonstrates that the Harper Government represents a step towards the security tenets of the US. However, the distinctions at the domestic level are decreasing in a few areas, eg business regulation and taxes, but the sacred cows of the social welfare system will remain as differences. The Harper Government has not clearly revealed how far this shift will be.

**TABLE X.5: NEOFUNCTIONALIST TENETS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11**

| <b><i>Dimensions:</i></b>                                  | <b><i>Pre-9/11:</i></b>                           | <b><i>Post-9/11:</i></b>                                   |
|--|---|--|
| 1. <i>Economic symmetry among units?</i>                   | No, US dominates                                  | No   |
| 2. <i>Elite complementarity?</i>                           | Yes and no- divided                               | Yes and no- Canadian elite divided in attitudes towards US |
| 3. <i>Pluralism?</i>                                       | Yes   | Yes  |
| 4. <i>Capacity to adapt?</i>                               | High  | High   |
| 5. <i>Spillover?</i>                                       | High  | High   |
| 6. <i>Growing transactions?</i>                            | Yes   | Yes  |
| 7. <i>Growth in intergovernmental relations?</i>           | Yes   | Yes  |
| 8. <i>Transnational growth?</i>                            | Yes   | Yes  |
| 9. <i>Elite socialization?</i>                             | Yes   | Yes  |
| 10. <i>Growth in ideological-identity?</i>                 | Polarized   | Polarized  |
| 11. <i>Increasing interaction with external actors?</i>    | Limited and constrained                           | Limited and constrained                                    |
| 12. <i>Benefit distribution higher and more equitable?</i> | Yes, NAFTA increases benefits to Canadian economy | Yes, commodities prices, but unevenly shared (eg Alberta)  |

|   |                          |                                    |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
|   | as a whole, but unevenly |                                    |
| 13. <i>Converging perception of external problem?</i> | No                       | No- still no movement towards Iraq |
| 14. <i>Integration as cost-free?</i>                  | No                       | No                                 |

Source: Adapted and extended from James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., “Theories of international integration, regionalism, and alliance cohesion,” *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, eds. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 431-459.

Table X.5 points to a basic *continuity* in terms of the economic dimension of US-Canada relations. Polarization of attitudes among Canadian elites continues, and differentiation in perceived benefits by region and sector also continues. Canadian academics tend to be more nationalistic.

**TABLE X.6: INTERDEPENDENCE TENETS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11**

| <i>Dimensions:</i>   | <i>Pre-9/11:</i>  | <i>Post-9/11:</i>  |
|--|---|--|
| 1. <i>Channels of communications?</i>                                      | Multiple: economic most important   | Multiple: economic and security  |
| 2. <i>Hierarchy of issues?</i>   | Yes: economic issues at top   | Yes: economic issues a priority, but security issues increasing                    |
| 3. <i>Subordination of military?</i>                                       | Yes   | No   |
| 4. <i>Nature of institutional membership?</i>                              | Voluntary, emphasizing a wide range   | Voluntary  |
| 5. <i>Catalyst?</i>  | Competitive markets and investment and trade dependence (reducing transactions costs) | reducing potential transactions costs increases from US concerns about security    |
| 6. <i>Placement of regionalism along levels of policy-making analysis?</i> | Bi- and multi-lateral issues are both important; bi-lateral more important            | Bi-lateral relations are increasingly the priority; multi-lateral issues secondary |

Sources: Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 3-37; and Henry Nau, “From integration to interdependence: gains, losses, and continuing gaps,” *International Organization* 33, no. 1 (Winter 1979):119-147.

Table X.6 reinforces our conclusion that security concerns have become an important concern insofar as they threaten Canadian economic interests. Canadian policymakers are concerned about increasing transactions costs and keen to pre-empt any American action that reduces market access on security grounds.

**TABLE X.7: NEOREALIST TENETS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11**

| <i>Dimensions:</i> | <i>Pre-9/11:</i>             | <i>Post-9/11:</i>        |
|--------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
|                    | Yes, provincial consultation | Yes, and more pro-active |

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <i>1. State as dominant actor?</i>  | begins  | engagement with NGOs                                |
| <i>2. Policy reflecting internal considerations or international competitiveness?</i> | Policy reflects international competitiveness | Policy reflects international competitiveness       |
| <i>3. Is international competitiveness orderly or anarchic?</i>                       | Orderly: market competitiveness               | Orderly, but fear of change from US security policy |

Source: Adapted and extended from Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics* (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), ch. 5.

Our last Table, X.7, points to the fact that Canadian policymakers have been making pro-active attempts to engage with Canadian civil society, partly in response to anti-globalization protests, which registered quite importantly in Canadian media during meetings in Vancouver (APEC), Kananaskis (G-7); and Quebec (Summit of the Americas) in recent years. Canadian NGOs are also becoming more active and organized, working with international partners. The divisions in Canadian society dating from the 1970s and piqued by NAFTA continue to be worked out peacefully.

### Acknowledgements

We are grateful to PIERAN (*El Programa Interinstitucional de Estudios sobre la Región de América del Norte*) of the Government of Mexico for sponsoring this paper and the field research as part of a collective effort organized by Imtiaz Hussein of the Universidad Iberoamericana to study the effects of 9/11 on each of the NAFTA countries. Field Research was conducted by Andy Hira in Ottawa in Sept. 2006. Off-the-record commentary was received from officials of the PSEPC, the Privy Council, DND, the Ministry of Finance, and the Coast Guard. Special thanks are owed to Alex Leger of PSEPC and Aaron Hywarren of DND for their kind assistance in arranging some of the interviews. Interviews were requested but denied in several other agencies, including: Justice, RCMP, Senate Standing Committee on Security and CSIS. Previous versions of this paper were delivered in Mexico City in April 2006, where they benefited from the commentary of Drs. Edward Mansfield and Mtra. María Pfa Taracena Gout. Imtiaz Hussein also provided editorial suggestions. A revised version of the paper was presented at the Anchorage, Alaska, ACSUS meeting in Sept. 2006.

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