An Auction Model of Canadian Temporary Immigration for the 21st Century

Don J. DeVoretz*

ABSTRACT

Temporary Canadian immigration has grown beyond traditional programs for students, caregivers and agricultural workers to include trade-related temporary visas under NAFTA and the GATS. Current Canadian debates envision supplanting Canada’s permanent immigration programme with a temporary visa programme to remove skill shortages. Several questions emerge under these temporary schemes including who should choose the number of temporary immigrants and under what employment conditions. This paper offers an alternative policy to the current government-determined quota on temporary visas to answer these two questions. Under the proposed scheme offered in this paper, a Canadian worker can place a job voucher up for auction on the Internet. If the Canadian worker finds an acceptable offer for his one-year (or less) voucher, then the temporary immigrant is permitted to seek a job in Canada. Thus, under this auction scheme Canadian workers are compensated for the presence of temporary immigrants, and the actual number of temporary immigrants admitted depends on the total number of Canadian workers who sell their vouchers, not on a government fiat.

* Metropolis British Columbia, Simon Fraser University.
INTRODUCTION

“We can make our immigration policy more equitable…if we accept a market solution. To wit: sell immigration visas to the highest bidders.” J. Simon (p. 322, 1998)

Temporary immigration issues have recently arisen in Canada as a focal point in the debate surrounding new Canadian immigration policies. The inadequacies of Canada’s permanent immigration programme in filling short-term skill needs have led the current Conservative government circa 2006 to propose an extensive temporary visa programme. This proposal has been met with opposition from labour unions as this quote from Wayne Peppard, President of B.C. Building Trades Council, attests.

“We’re not against skilled workers coming to start a new life, but if temporary foreign workers become the norm, rather than investing in training here, then that can cause problems. They are no solution in the long run”. (Atkinson, 2006)

In addition, the continued debate over the size and permanence of the Canada-U.S. brain drain is predicated on the existence of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) TN temporary visa.1 On a more mundane level, niche positions in the Canadian labour market have been historically filled with temporary foreign workers, and the possible expansion of these programmes are now subject to debate. In addition, the unskilled agricultural worker and foreign caregiver segments of the Canadian labour market have been historically filled by temporary visa holders.2 Other temporary visitor permits have become more permissive. In the last decade, foreign students and their spouses have been granted temporary work permits while in Canada in order to earn funds for subsistence purposes and to gain valued Canadian labour market experience.3 Finally, Canada’s membership in various trade agreements (NAFTA, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)) has given rise to growing demands by some member countries to expand the immigration visa provisions to permit temporary admission into Canada. Specifically under NAFTA’s section 16, in addition to admissions of U.S. citizens, Mexican and Chilean citizens have gained prolonged temporary access to the Canadian labour market through the provision of a NAFTA-based TN visa.4 Also, new forces have arisen to expand temporary mobility provisions to a much wider group of Canadian trade partners under the GATS agreement. Under the existing GATS trade agreement, limited temporary admission to Canada of foreign traders and professionals amongst GATS’ 63 signatories is allowed.5 At the World Trade Organization meetings in Doha circa 2001, less-developed countries who are signatories of GATS argued for the increased mobility of so-called ‘natural persons’ to Canada and other

© 2008 The Author
Journal Compilation © 2008 IOM
developed countries. If approved, this provision for the movement of ‘natural persons’ would allow unskilled temporary workers to have access to the Canadian labour market under the same provisions as traders and professionals.

In sum, the current state of temporary immigration legislation in Canada is complex in terms of tenure, eligibility, and, most importantly, labour market standards which must be satisfied before admission. At one extreme, the temporary admission of foreign agricultural workers to Canada is permitted only after strict labour market wage and working conditions are met. At the other extreme, Canada issues NAFTA TN visas without any labour market tests or caps on total numbers. What is missing is a coherent labour market analysis of the effect of these current temporary immigration programs on resident Canadian workers. I will argue in this essay that without a theoretical construct it is impossible to decide on the optimal number of temporary admissions and measure the associated welfare impacts on resident Canadian workers. The overriding goal of the paper is to point to an alternative policy for admitting temporary foreign workers to Canada given the new pressures in the Canadian economy to fill rapidly rising unskilled and skilled job vacancies.

STANDARD MODEL OF IMMIGRANT IMPACT ON THE LABOUR MARKET

I have argued elsewhere (DeVoretz, 1999a & 1999b) that the Rawlsian goal of maximizing economic gain to resident Canadians without reducing the welfare of the bottom fifth of Canadian society is one possible evaluation framework for an immigration program. Even if we accept some version of this Rawlsian framework, it is still necessary to isolate the exact components of this general welfare principle to provide analytical principles to ensure that temporary immigration to Canada will realize a Rawlsian optimum state.

The positive or negative impacts of immigrants on the labor market and on the treasury are often cited in the literature as welfare assessment criteria to ensure a positive Rawlsian outcome (DeVoretz, 2006). I will argue that the direction of these labour market and financial effects as a consequence of temporary immigration are unknown a priori. In Canada’s public finance sector, temporary immigration can enhance or reduce the tax base and lead to a treasury gain, depending upon the temporary immigrants’ demand for public monetized services. In turn, the exact public finance outcome - gain or drain - depends on the temporary workers’ stage in the life cycle, as well as eligibility requirements for social programs (DeVoretz and Pivnenko, 2004).
Depending on shifts in the intercepts and the supply and demand elasticities embedded in Figure 1, the labour market outcomes of resident Canadians can be enhanced or harmed by the influx of unskilled temporary workers. In other words, either wage compression or growth, and job displacement or creation, can occur after a temporary immigrant arrives.

**Figure 1: Temporary Immigrant Impact on Canadian Labour Market**

Figure 1 indicates that, under a static curve, resident Canadian workers must absorb either labour displacement, wage compression, or both when a temporary worker is admitted. The key assumption in this view of the world is that the labour supply curve in the rest of the world \( S'' \) lies everywhere below the Canadian supply curve \( S_c \), and is horizontal. In addition, given that the intermediate supply curve \( S'_c \) represents the number of temporary immigrants plus the domestic supply forthcoming at each wage rate, it is now possible to determine the wage and employment effects of temporary immigration. For example, the equilibrium wage rate \( W_c' \) in Figure 1, \( ab \) foreign temporary workers are admitted by the government, and these immigrants displace \( ae \) domestic workers. The wage rate of \( W_c' \) however still exceeds the foreign wage rate \( W_e \), so that the admitted foreign workers’ welfare is increased. In addition, the decreased domestic wage rate \( W_c to W_c' \) increases the return to Canadian employers as the wage costs decline by an amount of \( XZRT \). The three agents involved in the temporary immigrant marketplace are the immigrants, the Canadian employers, and, finally, the Canadian employees. Clearly, both the employers
and contemporary immigrants will gain from a temporary admission, as Figure 1 illustrates. However, there is no economic gain to displaced Canadian workers since they experienced wage compression or job loss.

Given this outcome, the Canadian government invokes the criterion that a net economic benefit must appear to justify temporary immigration. The net economic benefit criterion in this context implies that each temporary immigration program must provide, on balance, a positive benefit to all resident Canadians. Thus, given that workers experience a loss and employers gain, it is clear that we require a methodology to assess workers’ loss to calculate net benefits.

In addition, there exist world-wide several temporary worker models for unskilled inflows (DeVoretz, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Lowell, 1999; Straubhaar, 1999); these suggest caution in allowing the uncritical growth of temporary immigration provisions if national net economic benefits are the sole criterion for a successful program. Germany, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, and the United States all permit temporary inflows, and their experiences should direct critical thinking in this area. All of these countries historically started with modest temporary admissions programs when there existed worker “shortages” in the policy makers’ minds, and their version of the net economic benefit criterion was met. However, all these programs were later abandoned after they had grown in size and their labour market implications became evident. Canada’s current temporary worker program for either skilled or unskilled is small and well-served from a management viewpoint (Greenhill and Aceytuno, 2000; Pascoe and Davis, 2000). However, efficient management alone should not be the sole objective of Canada’s temporary worker program. Several broader economic goals must also be met including equity, and, as noted, a more fulsome test for net economic benefits. Equity issues in terms of the labour market impacts on Canadian resident workers are of paramount concern to complete the calculation of net economic benefits. Most current Canadian temporary-immigrant legislation contains some provisions to protect resident Canadian workers, since a labour market test is required for all but NAFTA-based TN visa issuance. But how much protection is required? Should temporary immigration to Canada be halted if wages (or unemployment rates) fall (rise) by 5 or 10 per cent or some other preordained number? Moreover, how do the potentially-affected Canadian resident workers express their agreement to any set of preordained unemployment/wage guidelines on an individual basis?

In sum, both economic theory as well as the cross-country comparative experiences alluded to above suggest that any particular temporary immigration program may or may not realize the Rawlsian goal of conditioned maximum net benefit to resident Canadians.
A CANADIAN ECONOMIC MODEL OF TEMPORARY MOVERS

Current Canadian Memoranda Of Understanding (MOU) with temporary immigrant-sending countries reflect the myopic managerial model that has served Canada well in the past, with its limited non-permanent foreign-worker programs. These MOU arrangements reflect the apparent policy imperative of setting standards and conditions in the relevant labor markets to satisfy the net economic benefit criterion. For example, wage floors (i.e., minimum wages), housing standards, food provision, and maximum deductions for employer-provided benefits are all incorporated in the MOU. These conditions in turn are presumed operational equivalents to insulating Canadian residents from wage or (un)employment effects, while mitigating any impacts on the publicly-financed health and social benefits. However, two crucial questions are begged in this managerial approach. First, what is the optimum number of temporary immigrants in any sector? Secondly, who do we compensate, and by how much, when substantial labour market impacts arise?

The market offers an alternative to the current Canadian management model for temporary immigration admission to answer these questions. An auction market should be legally created to ascertain the value of Canadian jobs that are offered to foreigners. In turn, equilibrium in the auction market will allow us to determine the optimal number of temporary immigrant visas allocated. Under the current temporary admission system, three of the four agents in the temporary worker market (i.e., the Canadian employer, a broker, and the foreign worker) clearly gain. However, if a foreign worker arrives under the supply conditions in figure 1, the Canadian worker incurs a loss that equals either:

a. The difference between his\(^{12}\) marginal product and the minimum wage paid to a temporary migrant worker, if the Canadian worker absorbs the wage compression outlined in figure 1 or

b. The loss of his job \((ae)\) in figure 1.

How can this potential loss to the resident worker by the admission of a temporary migrant be measured and compensated for? How large should this compensation be and how many Canadian resident workers should be compensated? Furthermore, how many unskilled temporary workers should be admitted and in what occupations or industries? These are complex questions which existing management agreements attempt to answer in an \textit{ad hoc} manner by proposing an orderly management system under existing MOU arrangements. However, the auction market proposed in this paper offers an alternative method that would yield internally-consistent answers to these questions.
Below I present a stylized version of the auction model that highlights its resulting equity and efficiency gains. Under the proposed Canadian auction scheme, all previously-employed or currently unemployed (un)skilled Canadian resident workers are issued a voucher by Revenue Canada as part of their tax statement; this voucher entitles them to auction off the job(s) that they held in the preceding year to an approved list of foreign workers. The implicit trade-off facing the Canadian worker is the yearly value of his current job, or leisure, plus benefits and job security, compared to the gain from a prospective new job, plus the voucher auction price. Thus, the Canadian worker can offer his voucher on an Internet site to see if his “reservation auction price” is met. The voucher that is sold entitles the foreign worker to apply for the existing Canadian job but does not guarantee that this person will be hired. In fact the voucher only allows the prospective temporary immigrant the right to apply for a temporary position in Canada for which the employer has the ultimate right of hire. The actual conditions of the auction, legal statements, any bonding or vetting are under the control of Revenue Canada and/or Citizenship and Immigration Canada. A small processing fee is charged to the person who places the offer. Any potential broker or foreign worker also pays a fee to Revenue Canada to use the service. These fees are adjusted to ensure that the auction board is cost-free to Canadian taxpayers, so that enforcement costs are absorbed by auction-market participants. The fee is set to provide an actuarially-sound insurance fund to compensate for any malfeasance arising from fraud on the auction board, and to ensure validation of both job offers and the bona fides of the foreign bidder. Furthermore, full information on terms and conditions of successful auctions is supplied daily to any registered Canadian who has a job offer on the job website. This information consists of the terms of successful auction transactions, i.e., number of hours sold, where, when, in what industry, and at what price. Thus, a Canadian worker can re-offer the voucher obtained from Revenue Canada daily if there has been no previous taker. He can also remove it from the website and continue to work if the voucher price offered for his job falls below his reservation price. Given that the voucher is only valid for a maximum of 365 days annually, the value of the voucher fluctuates over a calendar year, if the offered job is seasonal, and as the number of calendar days declines. This possible rise or fall in the voucher price may permit a futures market in vouchers to appear. For example, with a futures market, brokers buy vouchers from Canadian workers early in the calendar year, and assume all the downside risk as they search the world for temporary foreign workers that employers will hire at a wage below the auction price. If these brokers are unsuccessful, they pay more to the Canadian jobholder for a one-year job than they obtain on the auction market. Finally, in both the spot and futures market, the optimal solution on the web-based auction market arises daily, as both forward and spot contracts appear under various job matches.
At this point, the motivation of the employer must be made clear to participate in this auction scheme. There are two explicit motivations underlying the employers willingness to hire offshore. First, if domestic workers have a relatively high reservation wage rate (above $W_c'$), then paying the foreign temporary worker ($W_e$) leads to an added profit of ($XTSZ$) in Figure 1. More importantly, if the Canadian worker’s reservation wage exceeds ($W_c$) then no domestic labour would be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, in the absence of foreign labour willing to work for a wage below ($W_c'$) this employer would move offshore if possible or go out of business.\textsuperscript{16} Again, it must be remembered that the employer does not have to employ any one worker that has obtained a job permit to work. The permit is an option which allows the foreign worker to enter the labour market but does not guarantee a job.\textsuperscript{17}

In spite of this sophisticated auction market, short-run disequilibria could still arise, for example, if there are mismatches in the offer-bid process between foreign workers and Canadian skilled or unskilled voucher-holders. If no transaction takes place between foreign migrants and Canadian voucher-holders, then a longer-run optimal solution could be achieved by actions of the Canadian employer. Continuous short-run disequilibria will lead the Canadian firm to relocate to where the foreign temporary workers reside (i.e., outsourcing). This result is a corner optimal solution when no temporary workers enter Canada.

What of industries or sectors previously 100 per cent dependent on foreign temporary immigrants? One example in Canada is caregivers. Here, the service firm cannot relocate abroad since the service provided by the temporary worker is tied to Canada. In this case, with no history of past Canadians with a reservation wage above the minimum wage in the job market, the auction market could still be used. Vouchers would be issued to existing Canadian firms that have provided these services with foreign workers, since they have already diverted Canadian unskilled workers from the industry. At this point, a two-stage market would appear. The first stage of the auction would be reserved for Canadian workers with a previous attachment to this portion of the labour market. The evidence for the latter would be a two year old or less employment-earnings stub, or T-4 slip. In the first stage, the employer would offer a job and/or voucher to a Canadian in the form of an hourly wage and number of hours offered per year. The Canadian worker can either accept this job offer or buy the equivalent voucher from the firm and offer it on the auction board to a foreign temporary worker. Thus, the Canadian worker still has the option to take this previously unfilled job, and/or usurp a portion of the rent that would normally accrue to the employer. If no offers were made by previously unemployed Canadian workers with attachment to the labour market, then the firm would lower its voucher price such that the net gain to the unemployed Canadian after the resale of the voucher.
to a foreigner is sufficient to induce a trade with a temporary foreign worker. In the extreme, the Canadian firm would pay the previously-unemployed Canadian worker to take the voucher to complete the job match for the firm. In effect, the previously-unemployed worker would act as a broker and search for the foreign worker with the prospect of earning a rent between the cost of the voucher and the lower-contracted wage for the temporary foreign worker.

**CONCLUSION**

In sum, this paper offers a new policy option for deciding on the size and conditions of admissions for temporary Canadian workers. The auction market offered in this paper simultaneously provides a daily temporary wage rate for a specific job by a prospective temporary foreign worker, and the yearly number of temporary visas offered (from zero to 100 per cent) for all jobs previously held by Canadians. It also determines the location (i.e., in Canada or offshore) of the unskilled intensive Canadian-owned firm that depends on temporary foreign workers. All these transactions arise without the necessity of a government official trying to calculate an ephemeral net benefit value for a particular number \((ab)\) of temporary workers entering in a particular occupation. Moreover, in a world of free exchange, all agents gain as Simon (1998) predicted. Employers reap a surplus by paying a lower wage, foreigners earn a higher wage than their opportunity cost, and Canadian workers receive partially compensated leisure time in addition to any employment benefits they collect. Thus, the Rawlsian imperative of welfare improvement with no harm inflicted on low-income earners would be satisfied. Many administrative issues: types of visas, conversion rights, and employment authorizations still remain and must be resolved and placed in any contracted offer posted on an auction website. I outline these issues in Appendix I. In addition, as Simon (1998) notes, there exist ethical questions surrounding an auction system which he alleges rewards the rich. This paper clearly reverses that result since it is the Canadian workers who gain under this scheme.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The critical comments of D. Coulombe and two anonymous referees helped clarify the underlying arguments. This paper was presented to an inter-ministerial seminar hosted by Human Resources Development Canada in May 2000.

NOTES

1 The TN visa arises out of Section 16 of NAFTA which permits Canadian (Americans) to live for an indefinite period in the United States (Canada) if they have a bona fide job offer in one of 72 occupations which require at least a B.A. degree. It is estimated that 100,000 Canadians lived in the United States circa 2000 with this visa (see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2002a).

2 The caregiver program allows the provisional admission of workers to Canada who, after a 3-year period of satisfactory employment, are allowed to convert their temporary status into a permanent or landed status. The agricultural worker program employs approximately 60,000 workers under contract (see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2002b).

3 Upon completion of their degree, foreign university students in Canada can apply for a temporary work permit in an occupation related to their education. If approved, these students can work for up to one year in this position. Mobility rights with this visa are restricted, a separate visa is needed for each new job, and the tenure is limited to one year. Of course foreign graduate students are issued student visas which allow them to study and work as teachers or researchers at the institution they attend. Foreign undergraduates and secondary students are also given temporary work permits with strict controls regarding the number of hours worked, but are not restricted to on-campus activities.

4 The United States does not consider Chile a member of NAFTA and no TN visa is issued to Chileans by the Americans. In addition, the United States limits the number of TN visas issued to Mexicans, and applies a series of additional measures to restrict entry into the United States under this visa provision.

5 Under the GATS agreement, traders and professionals are admitted to Canada for only six months if they can convince Human Resources Development Canada that no Canadian will lose a job as a result of their admission.

6 In the agricultural sector the Canadian employer, the migrant broker who arranges for contracted foreign workers, and the worker face a myriad of restrictions. The most dramatic restriction, however, is that no one can re-contract for workers in the next season if they fail to abide by the substantial regulations. For example, if workers do not leave Canada in a timely manner at the end of the current agricultural seasons, they are not eligible to re-enter in the next season.
With the exception of a NAFTA temporary visa, all temporary Canadian visa requests require a certification by Human Resources Development Canada that no significant Canadian wage compression or job loss results from the issuance of the temporary visa.

Under the NAFTA agreement the optimal number of temporary immigrants is equal to the number of arrivals since there is no numerical limit. The NAFTA temporary visa holder in effect only needs a job offer to enter. Even though this visa is demand-driven by the employer, the terms and conditions on the offer are unrestricted. Hence, the wage can obviously be less than that offered to a Canadian, and no labour market impact test is required. The NAFTA visa can thus be used to hire a temporary foreign worker to substitute for a more highly-priced Canadian worker.

This work follows in the tradition of Grubel (2005) who argues that temporary visas are a policy option for permanent immigrant entry.

In fact this is what the Canadian government does when it puts a yearly quota on all temporary visas except the TN visa. It consults both labour and employers, and defines terms and conditions to insure a minimum wage in the sector; it then admits those numbers of temporary immigrants consistent with the stated demand of employers at the stated minimum wage.

There are conditions under which no displacement would occur if the supply curve were horizontal and the wage rate were at \( W_e \). This industry would employ only foreign-born workers.

The masculine is used throughout to facilitate reading.

Foreign candidates for this programme must provide health certification and be security screened. The candidates must pay for this screening as they currently do in the permanent admissions system by paying a “landings fee”. This approved list could be simplified and minimize government intrusion if a pedigree list is developed under which previous entry and exit histories would automatically place one on the approved lists. This is in fact what Canada does in the agricultural workers programme.

Since a positive price for a voucher acts as a subsidy for the price of leisure (i.e. the wage rate), any worker will consume more leisure (sell a voucher) if the income effect resulting from a loss in one hour or more of work is less than the price effect. Note that the demand for foreign workers \((ab)\) exceeds the number of displaced Canadian workers \((ae)\), which insures an excess demand for vouchers. This excess demand is closed by a rising price for vouchers and a greater willingness of Canadian workers to give up their jobs at this higher price. This higher voucher price is in fact a subsidy to the price of leisure and more leisure will be consumed by the Canadian worker whose utility in turn will rise.

In the Canadian context this would include most caregiver services, the wine industries in British Colombia and Ontario, agricultural workers in general in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec and low skilled service workers in Alberta to name a few sectors.

Circa 2006 the spread between the Atlantic Provinces reservation wage and the high wages in the oil sectors has induced a few migrants and immigrants to northern Alberta and British Columbia. According to news accounts, the difference between the real wages in the Atlantic Provinces and western Canada for service workers exceeds 100 per cent. Clearly a large potential gain exists for Atlantic Province workers to sell off
their job search rights in Alberta to a foreign worker in exchange for their actual job in the Atlantic Provinces.

17 Presumably the foreign worker who purchases the entitlement to work will incorporate this uncertainty in his or her bid.

REFERENCES

Atkinson, C.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
2002a Temporary Entry to Canada under NAFTA, http://www.gc.ca/English/visit/nafta02e.html

DeVoretz, D. J.
1999b “Malaysian immigration issues: an economic perspective”, RIIM Special Issues 99-S4. Center for Excellence, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C.
2000 “Temporary migration: an overview”, RIIM Special Issues 99-S0. Center for Excellence, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C.

DeVoretz D., and S. Pivnenko

Greenhill, D., and J. Aceytuno
2000 “Managed migration and the seasonal agricultural worker-program”, RIIM Special Issues 00-S7. Center for Excellence, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C.

Grubel, H.
2005 “Immigration and the welfare state in Canada: growing conflicts and constructive solutions”, A Fraser Institute Occasional Paper, Public Policy Sources No. 84. Vancouver, B.C.

Lindsay L.B.
1999. “Skilled temporary and permanent immigrants in the United States”, RIIM Special Issues 99-S2. Center for Excellence, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C.
Pascoe, B. and B. Davis  
2000  “Canada’s temporary foreign worker program: a new design”, *RIIM Special Issues* 00-S8. Center for Excellence, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C.

Simon, J.L.  

Straubhaar, T.  
PROPOSITION D’UN SYSTÈME DE MISE AUX ENCHÈRES POUR L’IMMIGRATION TEMPORAIRE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE AU CANADA

L’immigration temporaire au Canada est sortie de son champ traditionnel – étudiants, personnel infirmier et travailleurs agricoles – et concerne désormais les travailleurs sollicitant une admission temporaire au titre de l’ALENA et de l’AGCS. Dans le débat en cours actuellement au Canada, il est envisagé de remplacer le programme d’immigration à caractère permanent par un programme de visas de durée limitée devant permettre de faire face aux pénuries de personnel qualifié. Ces régimes temporaires soulèvent cependant plusieurs questions, et notamment celles de savoir qui devrait fixer le nombre d’immigrants temporaires et selon quelles conditions. L’auteur de cette étude propose une alternative au système de quotas actuel en matière de visas temporaires, qui est fixé par le Gouvernement. Dans le système qu’il propose, un travailleur canadien met un bon pour emploi aux enchères sur l’Internet. S’il reçoit une offre acceptable pour ce bon valable un an (ou moins longtemps), l’immigrant temporaire est autorisé à solliciter un emploi au Canada. Par ce système, les travailleurs canadiens se voient “indemnisés” de la présence d’immigrants temporaires, et le nombre réel d’immigrants temporaires admis sur le territoire est fonction du nombre total de travailleurs canadiens ayant vendu leurs bons, et non d’un décret du Gouvernement.
LA INMIGRACIÓN TEMPORAL CANADIENSE PARA EL SIGLO XXI:
AL MEJOR POSTOR

La inmigración temporal al Canadá ha aumentado, superando con creces los programas tradicionales para estudiantes, proveedores de cuidados y trabajadores en el sector agrícola, para incluir visados temporales relacionados con el comercio en el marco de los acuerdos TLC y AGCS. Los debates en curso en el Canadá prevén el reemplazo de los programas de inmigración permanente del Canadá por programas de visado temporal a fin de colmar las brechas a nivel de competencias. En el marco de estos mecanismos temporales cabe plantearse distintas preguntas, inclusive quién ha de fijar el cupo de migrantes temporales y bajo qué condiciones de empleo. Este artículo ofrece una alternativa política al actual cupo de visados temporales fijados por el gobierno a fin de responder a las dos preguntas planteadas. En el marco del mecanismo propuesto en este artículo, un trabajador canadiense puede subastar en Internet una oferta de trabajo al mejor postor. Si el trabajador canadiense recibe una propuesta aceptable para su oferta de un año (o menos), entonces el inmigrante temporal podrá buscar un empleo en Canadá. Por tanto, en el marco de este mecanismo de subastas los trabajadores canadienses se ven compensados por la presencia de inmigrantes temporeros cuyo número real dependerá del total de trabajadores canadienses que ofrezcan trabajos al mejor postor, y no de una autorización gubernamental.
APPENDIX 1: ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES:

In addition to satisfying the Rawlsian-DeVoretz welfare criterion, an ideal evaluation model for temporary migration must also address the following issues:

1. **Types of Visas**
   a. Optimal length of stay
   b. Spousal sponsorship
   c. Minor sponsorship
   d. Renewal from within or outside

2. **Employment Authorization: Alternatives**
   a. Individual or industry-wide authorizations
   b. Private-firm issuance of authorization under an audited and bonded scheme
   c. Government employment authorization with expedited service by fee class

3. **Conversion Rights**
   a. Mobility rights across firms, industries or broad occupational groups
   b. Ascension to full mobility rights
   c. Conversion rights from limited employment-earned benefits to generalized social benefits after an assessment period
   d. Spousal working permits after an assessment period
   e. Conversion to permanent immigrant status after an assessment period

Once each issue is settled by debate or fiat, the implied necessary side conditions arising from the resolution of these debates can be inserted in the voucher offered in the auction market. As the conditions become more stringent, the price of the voucher will rise, and the number of temporary workers will decrease.