


Econ 802

Answers to First Midterm

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
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The isoquant set $Q(n)$ consists of the shaded points, including the lower boundary but not the upper boundary. Assuming free disposal, the input requirement set $V(n)$ includes all $x \in Q(n)$ plus all points with $x_1 \geq n+1$ and $x_2 \geq n+1$.

(b) A profit maximizing firm would only operate at the corners in part (a) where $y = x_1 = x_2 = n$ for some integer n , because otherwise the firm is spending more than necessary on inputs. Profit can be written as $py - w_1x_1 - w_2x_2 = pn - w_1n - w_2n = n(p - w_1 - w_2)$. This problem has no solution if $p - w_1 - w_2 > 0$ because there is no upper bound on n . If $p - w_1 - w_2 = 0$ then any integer is a solution, and if $p - w_1 - w_2 < 0$ then the solution is $n = 0$.

(c) Yes, There is always a solution as long as $w_1 > 0$ $w_2 > 0$.
 It is clear from the graph in part (a) that the lowest possible isocost line for $y = n$ is reached at the corner where $x_1 = x_2 = n$.



2. (a) We want to maximize $p[\ln(x_1+1) + \ln(x_2+1)] - w_1x_1 - w_2x_2$
 This can be broken into two separate problems:
 Choose x_1 to max $p \ln(x_1+1) - w_1x_1$
 and choose x_2 to max $p \ln(x_2+1) - w_2x_2$

Consider the first problem. The derivative with respect to x_1 is

$$\frac{p}{x_1+1} - w_1$$

If this is ≤ 0 at $x_1 = 0$ then it is < 0 for any $x_1 > 0$ and the (unique) solution is $x_1^* = 0$.

Since the same argument applies to x_2 , we conclude there is always a solution $x^* = (x_1^*, x_2^*)$ and it is unique.

If the derivative is > 0 at $x_1 = 0$ then clearly there is some (unique) $x_1^* > 0$ at which $\frac{p}{x_1^*+1} - w_1 = 0$, and this is the solution.

(b) Write $p \ln(x_1+1) + p \ln(x_2+1) - w_1x_1 - w_2x_2 + \mu_1x_1 + \mu_2x_2$

FOC are $\frac{p}{x_1+1} - w_1 + \mu_1 = 0 \quad x_1 \geq 0, \mu_1 \geq 0, \mu_1x_1 = 0$

$\frac{p}{x_2+1} - w_2 + \mu_2 = 0 \quad x_2 \geq 0, \mu_2 \geq 0, \mu_2x_2 = 0$

If $x_1 > 0$ Then $\mu_1 x_1 = 0$ implies $\mu_1 = 0$ and

$$\frac{p}{x_1+1} = w_1 \Rightarrow \frac{p}{w_1} = x_1+1 = \frac{p}{w_1} - 1 = x_1 \geq 0$$

So we must have ~~$p > w_1$~~ $p > w_1$

If $x_1 = 0$ Then $\mu_1 \geq 0$ implies $\frac{p}{x_1+1} - w_1 \leq 0 \Rightarrow p \leq w_1$

Likewise, $x_2 > 0$ iff $p > w_2$ and $x_2 = 0$ iff $p \leq w_2$

(c) The argument in (a) shows that this is really a combination of two separate one-variable optimization problems, and it is easy to check that a sufficient SOC holds in each case. But let's use the more standard approach of computing the Hessian matrix of the production function. This can be written as

$$\frac{\partial^2 f(x^*)}{\partial x^2} = \begin{bmatrix} f_{11}(x^*) & f_{12}(x^*) \\ f_{21}(x^*) & f_{22}(x^*) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{where } f_{11} &= -(x_1+1)^{-2} < 0 \\ f_{22} &= -(x_2+1)^{-2} < 0 \\ \text{and } f_{12} &= f_{21} = 0 \end{aligned}$$

so diagonal elements are negative and the overall determinant is $f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}f_{21} = f_{11}f_{22} > 0$.

So the Hessian is negative definite at x^* . This is sufficient for x^* to solve the problem (of course it also satisfies the necessary condition).

3. (a) Suppose x^* solves the profit max problem at prices (p^*, w^*) .

This implies $p^* f(x^*) - w^* x^* \geq p^* f(x) - w^* x$ for all $x \geq 0$

If all prices are multiplied by $t > 0$, we have

$$(tp^*) f(x^*) - (tw^*) x^* \geq (tp^*) f(x) - (tw^*) x \text{ for all } x \geq 0.$$

Therefore x^* also solves the problem at the new prices.

Since (p^*, w^*) was arbitrary it must be true that $x(p, w) = x(tp, tw)$ for all $(p, w) > 0$ and $t > 0$.

(4)

(b) Suppose x^* solves the cost min problem at prices w^* . This implies that $w^*x^* \leq w^*x$ for all $x \geq 0$ such that $f(x) = y$. If we multiply all input prices by $t > 0$, we have $(tw^*)x^* \leq (tw^*)x$ for all $x \geq 0$ such that $f(x) = y$. Therefore x^* also solves the problem at the new prices tw^* . Since w^* was arbitrary, it must be true that $x(tw, y) = x(w, y)$ for all $w > 0$ and $t > 0$.

(c) We can write $\pi(p, w) = pf[x(p, w)] - wx(p, w)$ and $\pi(tp, tw) = (tp)f[x(tp, tw)] - (tw)x(tp, tw)$. But we already know from (a) that the optimal input bundle does not change. So

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(tp, tw) &= (tp)f[x(p, w)] - (tw)x(p, w) \\ &= t[pf[x(p, w)] - wx(p, w)] \\ &= t\pi(p, w)\end{aligned}$$

So the profit function is homogeneous of degree one.

Likewise the cost function is $c(w, y) = wx(w, y)$


and $c(tw, y) = (tw)x(tw, y)$

But we know from part (b) that the optimal input bundle does not change. So


$$\begin{aligned}c(tw, y) &= (tw)x(w, y) \\ &= tc(w, y)\end{aligned}$$

So the cost function is homogeneous of degree one.

4. (a) In periods when $p_1^t < p_2^t$ The firm's profit was $2p_2^t - 2p_1^t = 2(p_2^t - p_1^t) > 0$.
 if the firm had instead chosen $(0,0)$, its profit would have been zero.
 In periods when $p_1^t \geq p_2^t$ The firm's profit was zero. If the firm had instead chosen $(-2, +2)$ its profit would have been $2(p_2^t - p_1^t) \leq 0$.
 Therefore WAPM is satisfied.



Monotonicity implies that any point along the horizontal line to the left of $(-2, +2)$ is in YI , and so are all points below the upper boundary such that $y_1 \leq 0$ and $y_2 \geq 0$. So YI is the shaded area.



would prove that Y is larger than YI but it would not violate WAPM (it would not have been optimal to choose y^{T+1} at any of the previous price vectors p^t).

$$5(a) \quad e(x) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \cdot x_i}{f(x)}$$

where $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_1} = \frac{1}{n} x_1^{\frac{1}{n}-1} (x_2 x_3 \dots x_n)^{\frac{1}{n}}$

$\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_2} = \frac{1}{n} x_2^{\frac{1}{n}-1} (x_1 x_3 \dots x_n)^{\frac{1}{n}}$

and so on. Therefore

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \cdot x_i = \frac{1}{n} (x_1 x_2 \dots x_n)^{\frac{1}{n}} \text{ for all } i=1 \dots n$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \cdot x_i = (x_1 x_2 \dots x_n)^{\frac{1}{n}}$$

$$\Rightarrow e(x) = \frac{(x_1 x_2 \dots x_n)^{\frac{1}{n}}}{(x_1 x_2 \dots x_n)^{\frac{1}{n}}} = 1$$

So the elasticity of output with respect to scale is a constant equal to one everywhere.

Interpretation: The production function is homogeneous of degree one (it is just a Cobb-Douglas function with n inputs)

$$(b) \quad \sigma = - \frac{\partial \left(\frac{x_1}{x_2} \right)}{\partial \left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)} \cdot \frac{\left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)}{\left(\frac{x_1}{x_2} \right)}$$

Solve the cost min problem by using a Lagrangian:

$$L = w_1 x_1 + w_2 x_2 - \lambda \left[x_1^{\frac{1}{2}} x_2^{\frac{1}{2}} - y \right]$$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_1} &= w_1 - \frac{\lambda}{2} x_1^{-\frac{1}{2}} x_2^{\frac{1}{2}} = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_2} &= w_2 - \frac{\lambda}{2} x_1^{\frac{1}{2}} x_2^{-\frac{1}{2}} = 0 \end{aligned} \right\} \text{Divide to get } \frac{w_1}{w_2} = \frac{x_2}{x_1}$$

$$\text{So } \frac{x_1}{x_2} = \left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)^{-1}$$

$$\frac{\partial \left(\frac{x_1}{x_2} \right)}{\partial \left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)} = - \left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)^{-2}$$

$$\text{So } \sigma = \left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)^{-2} \cdot \frac{\left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)}{\left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)^{-1}} = 1$$

Interpretation: The elasticity of substitution is constant and equal to 1 for all prices and input output levels. This is not surprising: $y = x_1^{1/2} x_2^{1/2}$ is a Cobb-Douglas function which we know has a constant elasticity of substitution equal to one.

(c) It would stay the same. You can prove this using the fact that $\sigma = 1$ or you can use the FOC from the cost min problem:

$$\frac{w_1}{w_2} = \frac{x_2}{x_1} \Rightarrow w_1 x_1 = w_2 x_2$$

Expenditure on input 1 as a fraction of total cost is

$$\frac{w_1 x_1}{w_1 x_1 + w_2 x_2} = \frac{1}{2}$$

Clearly this is a constant that does not depend on input prices (the firm always spends 1/2 of total cost on each input.)