Implementing Integrated Land Management in Western Canada: Policy Reform and the Resilience of Clientelism

JEREMY RAYNER* & MICHAEL HOWLETT**

*Department of Political Science, University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan; **Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada & Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore

ABSTRACT   Much attention in recent years has been focused on the idea of replacing patchworks of public policies in specific issue areas with more coordinated or ‘integrated’ policy strategies (IS). Empirical work on such strategies, however, shows the remarkable resilience of pre-existing policy elements, often leading to policy failures and other sub-optimal outcomes in policy reform efforts. Case studies of Integrated Land Management (ILM) reform efforts in Western Canada reveal the continuing problems pre-existing clientelistic political arrangements cause for governments attempting to replace sector-specific plans with more integrated frameworks.

Introduction

Proposals to use government actions to alter large-scale policy systems have proven to be challenging projects with a very mixed track record of success. This is true of many such efforts, including those designed to enhance cross-sectoral policy integration in order to promote broad goals such as sustainability. Integration involves the alteration of specific elements of existing policy ‘mixes’ or ‘regimes’—the goals, objectives, and calibrations of existing policy tools—in order to produce a new policy mix, in the expectation of avoiding the counterproductive or sub-optimal policy outcomes associated with the old regime. In such cases, policy design is always about re-aligning or de-aligning and replacing certain elements of established regimes. Overcoming the contextual ‘stickiness’ of earlier regime elements is critical to the success of policy integration reform efforts (Saglie, 2006; Keysar, 2005).

In this article, several cases of the latest effort at resource and land policy integration, Integrated Land Management (ILM), or the idea that resource policy and planning should be undertaken to account for the cumulative impacts of different resource users on large-scale ecological systems, are evaluated. Recent ILM planning experiences in the four western provinces of Canada highlight the persistence of a set of political relationships that developed over many decades of single industry planning and regulation, where
most industries eventually acquired close relationships with the relevant government departments regulating them (Howlett & Rayner, 2001; Howlett & Brownsey, 2008). The resulting ‘clientelistic’ (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989) policy networks, in which governments adopted the policy goal of promoting the health of the industry as a surrogate for larger public goals such as regional development, continue to provide powerful political support for single-industry regulation, and are identified as a key obstacle to the adoption of ILM.

**Integrated Strategies: A Brief Overview**

Policy-making at all levels involves the attempt to match policy goals and means, so that high-level policy goals and programme-level objectives, and general sets of policy instruments and their more precise calibration (Hall, 1993; Howlett & Cashore, 2009) are coherent, consistent, and congruent. The challenge of policy-making, however, is multiplied when (1) policy goals and means exist in a complex arrangement and (2) developing new policies involves reforming or replacing existing elements in such a policy mix (Cashore & Howlett, 2007; Howlett & Rayner, 2007).

Integrated policy designs are one example of such complex policy situations and involve efforts to (re)construct policy mixes in order to better match the relationships between multiple policy goals and means (Briassoulis, 2005). They are specifically intended to address the perceived shortcomings of previous, more ad hoc policy regimes by ‘rationalizing’ multiple goals and combining policy instruments in new ways, so that these instruments support rather than undermine one other in the pursuit of policy goals (Grabosky, 1995). Thus they attempt to integrate existing, and sometimes competing, policy initiatives into a cohesive strategy; to coordinate the activities of multiple agencies and actors; and, generally, to substitute a more holistic approach to a problem for one that has decomposed policy into a set of multiple and loosely linked problems and solutions (May et al., 2005; Briassoulis, 2004, 2005; Stead et al., 2004; Meijers & Stead, 2004).

Thelen and others have identified five typical processes through which complex policy mixes have evolved over time (Thelen, 2003; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Hacker, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005). Layering is one such process whereby new goals and instruments are simply added to an existing regime without abandoning previous ones, typically leading to both incoherence amongst the goals and inconsistency with respect to instruments used (Thelen, 2003). Drift is a second type which occurs when the social underpinnings of a policy change, thereby altering its impact even if the policy itself does not formally change (Hacker, 2004a, 2005). In terms of policy goals and tools, this means the goals of the policy regime have changed without changing the instruments used to implement them. Tools which were previously consistent may become inconsistent in the face of the de facto new goals (Torenvlied & Akkerman, 2004).

In addition to these two very common processes, three others have also been identified in this literature. These include conversion, which involves the significant redeployment of existing policy tools towards new goals, altering the relationship between instrument mixes and outcomes (Beland, 2007; Thelen, 2003). Displacement describes a process of rediscovering alternative logics and possibilities inherent in a complex policy regime and its fundamental restructuring in terms of both goals and means (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Hall & Thelen, 2009). Finally, exhaustion occurs when policy regimes gradually lose both goal coherence and instrument consistency over time (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).
Implementing Integrated Land Management in Western Canada

The main purpose of this literature has been to show how these processes of change can, over time, lead to a transformation of the policy regime. Drift, conversion, and layering, however, typically will result in new tools and/or objectives being piled on top of older ones, most often creating a palimpsest-like mixture of inconsistent and incoherent policy elements. These disorganized (and often exhausted) policy regimes have been widely observed in many policy domains (Bode, 2006; Butler, 2009) and become the starting point for attempts to re-impose coherence and consistency in a domain through ‘displacement’ or policy replacement processes.

Integrated Land Management as an Integrated Strategy

Integrated Land Management (ILM) is an example of a policy reform that attempts to replace the disparate elements of just such a disorganized policy regime with an integrated strategy. ILM designs aim to create or reconstruct a policy domain to produce coherent policy goals and a consistent set of policy instruments that support each other in the achievement of large-scale land use and land management goals, such as eco-system sustainability, in the face of conflicting resource-use demands. Ideally, ILM comes about by conversion in a process of consciously re-aligning instruments and goals, or displacement if a regime is exhausted. However, it is also very possible that, instead, processes of layering and drift can be at work, restricting the potential for a new integrated regime to emerge or limiting its value if it does.

In Canada, ILM-type designs have been proposed as the solution to a number of natural resource management problems (Appleby et al., 2004; Canada, Policy Research Initiative, n.d.; CILMC, 2005; Demulder & Thorp, 2007; Farr et al., 2004; Hanna & Slocombe, 2007; Mackendrick et al., 2002; NRTEE, 2005). There is general agreement that the current system of policy and management for natural resources is based on a long legacy of distinct single industry regulatory regimes which contain mutually exclusive or inconsistent policy elements. Even where existing policies have called for ‘multiple use’ or ‘integrated resource management’, the regime in place has always been one designed to allow a dominant use constrained in various more or less complex ways by secondary ones. The unanticipated outcomes include a neglect of cumulative impacts, leading to unplanned environmental changes, and an unnecessarily large resource-use footprint caused by duplication of infrastructure and waste. However, as the four case studies below reveal, replacing the dysfunctional elements of these regimes is by no means a simple process.

Four ILM Case Studies

Policy-makers in the four western Canadian provinces in the late 20th century were confronted with a whole new set of problems arising from increasing numbers and intensities of land use conflicts as resource supplies became finite and resource users more entrenched. A growing realization of the limits of what could be achieved by ever more intensive local or sectoral resource use plans was the starting point for the attempted transformation of land use policies in this area, as it was elsewhere in the world, in the last decades of the 20th century and into the first decade of the 21st. Critics of land use policy increasingly argued for a comprehensive reordering of land use priorities and a more holistic approach to the interactions of different uses across broad landscapes that would be capable of dealing with cumulative impacts. This, in turn, would require a systematic
overhaul of the existing regulatory framework and administrative apparatus inherited from the spatially-segregated past. The specific responses found in each jurisdiction and the patterns and drivers of change are described below, along with an assessment of their success or failure in promoting enhanced integrated land management.

**British Columbia**

In many ways, British Columbia’s efforts at ILM provide the most complex and sustained example of an attempted integrated policy transition among the four cases described in this article. While the politics of the all-important forest sector dominated all BC integration efforts, the variety of drivers of policy change in this sector, including the persistent financial weakness of an export-dependent forest industry, the growing internationalization of forest policy, and the unique position of BC First Nations with respect to aboriginal title and rights, all make the BC case an especially significant one in illustrating the difficulties and challenges of enhanced land management integration.

The long running series of Social Credit governments (1952–91 with a brief interregnum from 1972–4) created a land and resource management regime designed to attract investment, promote regional economic development in a sparsely populated province, and fill the provincial treasury. Predicated on the abundance of land and resources, the policy regime followed a typically Canadian ‘clientelist’ model (Wilson, 1998). Each resource industry gained access to public land and resources in a process of closed negotiation with their sponsoring ministry that developed into separate and overlapping processes of planning and implementation. The regime was maintained over a 40-year period despite growing discontent with its substance and process on the part of an emerging environmental movement and increasingly empowered First Nations.

Ultimately, this long-standing land use regime was re-shaped by a series of confrontations between the forest industry and the environmental movement in the 1980s and early 1990s known locally as ‘the war in the woods’. The existing situation was exacerbated by the Brundtland-inspired push to set aside 12% of the provincial land base as protected area, a call which catalyzed both the environmental and land claims movements. Protection from resource extraction posed a particular challenge to the forest industry and its government sponsors. In theory there seemed plenty of land to go around to meet the 12% target but it was often the same scarce, low-elevation, accessible areas coveted by the forest industry for their easily-accessible mature stands of timber that environmentalists wanted to protect for their wildlife and other ecological values. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, environmentalists and First Nations conducted protests, formed blockades, and obtained court injunctions to obstruct forest industry activity, drawing unwelcome international attention to the province and undermining the legitimacy of the existing clientelist regime (Wilson, 1998).

Faced with increasingly unacceptable levels of conflict after its election in 1991, a new social democratic NDP (New Democratic Party) provincial government attempted policy transformation. Land use policy was reformed through a classic process of *layering*. A new land use planning regime was created with the overriding goal of conflict resolution but it sat on top of an initially unchanged set of regulatory regimes for the resource industries themselves, including forestry. The new land use regime featured a variety of innovative, but also experimental, procedural policy instruments that stressed ‘shared decision-making’ at regional-level land-use and resource planning tables. A new
implementing integrated land management in western canada

institutional structure featured an arms length ‘commission on resources and environment’ (CORE). CORE was initially charged, not just with managing the new regional planning processes, but also with recommending extensive legislative and regulatory changes. Lacking adequate support for its ambitious planning mandate (Mason, 1999, p. 117), and increasingly embattled with deeply entrenched interests, CORE failed to produce such changes, reinforcing the pattern of un-integrated policy layering.

Of the four flagship regional land use plans that were supposed to be arrived at by shared decision-making, only one was achieved by consensus. The other three planning tables failed to arrive at agreement on future directions and plans, which were then imposed by the provincial government. The plans themselves, while laying the foundations for achieving the 12% protected area objective, employed a number of expedients that would cause significant implementation problems. Most notably, the plans made extensive use of a ‘Special Management Zone’ (or similar) designation for contested areas that were not offered protected status, without ever agreeing on what this designation actually meant (Cashore et al., 2001).

Far from ending the ‘war in the woods’ the plans were met with widespread protests, and shared decision-making was soon abandoned in favour of the re-creation of the more traditional government-led clientelist planning model. Planning took place on a smaller scale than in the Social Credit era, however, and featuring some local input into decision-making through the formation of a large number of Land and Resource Management Plans (LRMP). The role of CORE was gradually reduced until it was wound up in 1995. In its place, and as part of the retreat from shared decision-making, the government moved from an arms-length coordination model to one orchestrated by a powerful new central agency, the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) that attempted to impose some order on an increasingly disorganized regime.

The LRMP model proved more successful at achieving the goals of conflict resolution and financial certainty for resource industries than did its predecessors (Day et al., 2003, pp. 68–69). By 2001, four regional land use plans and 13 completed LRMPs had received government approval and BC’s protected areas increased from 5.6% to 12.5% of the provincial land base (Pierce Lefebvre, 2001; Jackson & Curry, 2004, p. 33). While these processes were successful in increasing protected areas, they were not in terms of reaching consensus and abating conflict in the woods.

In areas where forestry was the major resource activity, implementation was conducted by the same clientelist forest policy network that had existed prior to CORE and throughout the 1990s, this network fought a rearguard action against what its members regarded as an overly-prescriptive set of forest management regulations (Cashore et al., 2001). They were especially successful in preventing any regulatory linkages between land use designations and forest practices that would have created more stringent practices in the arbitrary designated special management zones (Wilson, 1998).

With a new Liberal government in power after 2001, a new Forest and Range Practices Act (FRPA) was designed to replace prescriptive regulation with an outcomes-based approach which further entrenched clientelist policy processes. After 2001, land use planning in BC was presented as the incremental task of ‘completing’ the work of previous governments by finishing the outstanding LRMPs and then focusing planning on conflict resolution at smaller scales. While the government eventually demonstrated considerable flexibility to complete the more contentious LRMPs, notably those on the North and Central Coast, the overall project was to let consensus-based planning die by a process of
exhaustion. To do so, the government converted an existing planning instrument to its new purpose. Sustainable Resource Management Planning (‘SRMP’) drew together a number of smaller scale planning processes providing more detailed implementation of land-use plans (e.g. LRMPs). The nature and extent of public involvement and consultation in SRMPs, however, is determined at the discretion of government staff and is generally less than that found in LRMPs. Thus, in spite of a commitment to better integration and the creation of an Integrated Land Management Branch, the government retreated from the layered goals of integration in favour of simplified, ad hoc dispute resolution and a renewed emphasis on clientelism.

Alberta

While the pattern in BC has been one of policy layering in response to new challenges to the policy regime, Alberta, after the year 2000 and after a long period of drift, placed the highest priority on reforming its land management and planning processes through a fully-fledged conversion process. The reforms were aimed at reducing land use conflicts and re-establishing some control over a resource boom that came to be widely regarded as excessive, while retaining the income and employment that the oil and gas industry, especially, brought to the province. This pattern has been driven by the very long-standing governments typical of the province, which has been ruled by only two parties since before the Second World War (Social Credit, 1935–71 and Conservative, 1971 to present).

The province had pioneered land use zoning in the 1940s and generally followed a resource planning orientation throughout the 1960s and 1970s, creating a number of local and regional plans and planning processes. However, by the early 1990s, resource use plans had ceased to lead resource and agricultural development but had become reactive, responding to conflicts rather than attempting to anticipate them. As in the other provinces, resource development proceeded in a series of single-industry ‘silos’, featuring closed policy networks in which government agencies treated industries as clients, with the health of the industry the overriding policy goal (Pratt & Urquhart, 1994).

As in British Columbia, a stable modus vivendi which had existed for several decades between the province’s major land users—notably agriculture and the energy industry—was threatened in recent years by conflicting land-use claims. However, unlike BC where this process was driven by the emergence of new policy actors such as environmental groups and First Nations, in Alberta the main driver of reform efforts was the oil and gas boom which followed the rapid run-up in energy prices of the first decade of the 21st century.

Unlike in BC, where a new government attempted a substantial province-wide reform of land-use decision-making, the Alberta government of Ralph Klein had engaged in intentional policy drift. Klein’s government reduced planning requirements during a downturn in the provincial economy in the late 1990s in order to promote recovery and then kept this hands-off approach in place as the spike in world energy prices touched off a frenzy of oil and gas development. The substantial investments that this boom attracted to the development of the mineable Athabasca oil sands in the northeast of the province was accompanied by significant environmental impacts, resulting in conflicts between the energy industry and other established resource users as well as between the provincial and federal government. In addition to long running conflicts between farmers and the oil and gas industry, the energy boom put increasing pressure on the forest industry. The latter had
been encouraged throughout the 1980s to develop the hardwoods in the northern boreal forest to create a substantial pulp and paper and newsprint sector but now found itself sitting in the middle of a series of oil and gas plays that threatened to overwhelm its access to the far less valuable forest resource base (Pratt & Urquhart, 1994; Mackendrick et al., 2002; Schneider et al., 2002).

As land use conflicts became more common in the Alberta resource sector, regional experimentation with alternative land use management practices and planning tools occurred, creating the classic disorganized policy mix described by Bode (2006). Local innovation took place as land use managers and resource users grappled with the problems of unplanned growth without state direction (Demulder & Thorp, 2007, pp. 32–45). A series of transitional policies and institutions were created and subsequently abandoned as ineffective, notably the 1999 policy statement *Alberta’s Commitment to Sustainable Resource and Environmental Management* and the interdepartmental SREM steering committee that attempted to coordinate it. But ultimately, the incoherence of the regime frustrated piecemeal reform efforts, leading to widespread planning fatigue and ultimately a demand for more systematic policy change in the direction of strategic integration (Kennett, 2002).

An unusually broad coalition demanded this change, including the resource industries themselves, coordinated in this policy area by an umbrella organization, the Alberta Chamber of Resources; interests inside government, especially the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Development (SRD) that hoped to assert its leadership in this area; and a range of environmental interests including conservation biologists, the environmental law community, and local conservation groups. Beginning in May 2006, the Alberta government began consulting with these groups about a new provincial land use policy that could address the disorganization and frustration experienced by resource users and other members of the land use policy network. The following year, the consultations were broadened to include the interested public at 15 public sessions and through a ‘workbook’ survey available online. On the basis of the public input, the policy network developed a draft strategy that was released in May 2008, with the final document released in December of that year (Alberta, Government of Alberta, 2008) and proposed seven strategies; the most important details being, like BC, a focus on regional level planning and the creation of regional land use objectives as key priorities, the creation of permanent Regional Advisory Councils for each planning region and both a Cabinet Committee and a Provincial Land Use Secretariat to coordinate planning activities. Cumulative effects management, footprint reduction (operational-level integrated land management), and improved baseline data gathering, monitoring and reporting were all identified as the preferred policy instruments to achieve regional land use objectives.

Whether this effort at transformative change can overcome the key policy legacies from the old province-wide zoning regime is doubtful. While observers have generally welcomed the new mechanisms to promote policy integration within the government, they continue to point to the absence of a statutory framework capable of defining and supporting the process of land use planning and minimizing political interventions on behalf of one user or another. Without clearly defined procedures, back-stopped by mechanisms to ensure compliance and accountability, planning initiatives may continue to fade quietly into obscurity, as they are currently doing in BC, or to become mired in intractable multi-stakeholder processes once difficulties are encountered in implementation, as was the case in BC in the 1990s (Kennett & Schneider, 2008, p. 11).
Saskatchewan

Saskatchewan, the least populous and, until recently, the most economically depressed of the four western provinces, provides a contrast to both BC and Alberta. Lacking either exogenous shocks capable of transforming the planning system from without, as was the case with Alberta’s tar sands after the international oil price increases, or serious political pressures for institutional change, such as the rise of aboriginal rights and title in BC, that could set in motion policy change, the province continues to drift, exhibiting what might be called the ‘pre-history’ of an integrated land use governance regime.

The key components of the existing provincial land-use policy regime were put in place in the mid 1990s in response to a federal-provincial shared cost forestry programme that required participating provinces to have more explicit long-term forest management plans than were then current in Saskatchewan. In response, Saskatchewan Environment released a framework document in 1995 that provides general guidelines and context for government participation in integrated land use planning and resource management (Saskatchewan, 1995). The document defines integrated forest resource management as a key goal required by sustainable development, conflicting land uses and increased public awareness of resource activity but it contains no explicit objectives or other means for determining trade-offs between conflicting uses.

Later that same year, however, the province released the Saskatchewan Long-Term Integrated Forest Resource Management Plan and statutory change followed, in line with developments in other provinces. Overall, the new framework significantly expanded forest planning requirements and provisions for public participation. The goal of a set of new Integrated Land Use Plans was to strike a balance between competing values to ensure a healthy environment and sustainability of forestry resources but, once again, explicit objectives are notable only by their absence.

While the changes described above succeeded in meeting the requirements of the federal provincial shared-cost forestry programme, Saskatchewan’s land use policy regime was, for a time, merely a solution in search of a problem. The latter duly arrived in the shape of a proposal to expand the province’s forest industry, announced by the provincial government in the spring of 1999. The programme was ambitious, embracing 15 new projects with an estimated value of $850 million, and a goal of creating about 10 000 indirect and direct jobs. Several of the projects were intended to have significant First Nations involvement and provide employment and income for economically depressed First Nations’ communities in the north.

The expansion triggered the development of a series of regional land use plans. At the political level, and certainly in the eyes of the government of the day, the employment objective, especially the potential for aboriginal employment, was the real goal of the expansion. Land use planning was clearly understood as a vehicle to achieve this goal and both the forestry expansion and the jobs it was supposed to create were announced by the government long before any environmental impact assessment or consultation with stakeholder groups took place.

The subsequent failure of the expansion because of high costs and depressed markets rendered the plans themselves largely redundant. Planning nevertheless continued but in a context where any sense of urgency was lacking. Successive provincial governments have revisited the planning framework from time to time, adding new goals and instruments in an ad hoc way, so that the final snapshot is a picture of general incoherence and lack of
coordination. The new initiatives include the Saskatchewan Representative Areas Network (RAN) launched in 1997 and intended to conserve representative and unique landscapes in each of the province’s 11 eco-regions and a Biodiversity Action Plan. Concrete objectives, however, are still largely absent (Saskatchewan, 2009).

Without a clear set of policy objectives, timelines and enforcement mechanisms, it is not surprising that many land use plans have dragged on for several years, remain incomplete, or not implemented. The result, despite much rhetoric about integration, is less an integrated strategy than the classic disorganized policy mix that proved to be the starting point for integration in Alberta and British Columbia.

**Manitoba**

Unlike neighbouring Saskatchewan, and more like Alberta and British Columbia, Manitoba, the eastern gateway to the Canadian prairies, has in recent years experienced a rapid transformation in its approach to integrated use land planning. Like BC and Saskatchewan, at the centre of this transformation is a concerted effort by the Manitoba NDP provincial government to consult with aboriginal people and their communities in the resource management decision-making process. While this particular driver of change has been present in all the other provinces, however, its effect has been diminished by the simultaneous pursuit of other policy goals, which is less the case in Manitoba. As a result, in Manitoba integrated land management has been transformed from the kind of disorganized vehicle to promote vague commitments to sustainability found in Saskatchewan into a regime with a much more carefully focused set of goals and instruments.

Previously, Manitoba had been insulated from pressure for a more integrated approach to land use for many of the same reasons as Saskatchewan. The provincial economy has been dominated by agriculture and transportation industries, which long ago worked out their conflicts during the railway-building boom in the last decades of the 19th century. While hydroelectric and mining-led development in the province’s north was substantial in the 1970s, the areas affected by this development were largely unpopulated. In addition, the province lacks a substantial forest or oil and gas industry, minimizing the number of potential land-use conflicts found in BC and Alberta.

Again, like its neighbour, Saskatchewan, Manitoba undertook a significant review of its planning regime in the 1990s, attempting rapid transformative policy change that would have created large-scale ‘broad area plans’ of a recognizably integrated kind. These reforms proceeded in three stages. Between 1993 and 2000, planning efforts were provincial in scope and focused on strategies for implementation of sustainable development. The desire to follow through on the sustainable development idea persisted in the 2001–4 period but the focus narrowed to an area known as the East Side of Lake Manitoba affected by hydro-transmission line and highway construction. Finally, planning efforts in 2004–8 remained focused on the East Side of Lake Manitoba but policy goals shifted to the integration of aboriginal governance through the development of community-based Traditional Land-use Plans.

As in BC, the initial pattern was layering. There are two key pieces of legislation promoting integrated planning: the Planning Act and the Sustainable Development Act. The Planning Act has evolved significantly with four amendments since it was assented to in 1964. The Act makes provisions for and encourages regional strategies that address transportation and infrastructure development, commercial, industrial, and recreational
development, protection of the environment, and economic and social development. In the early 1990s there was a flurry of interest in incorporating sustainable development in planning activities. In 1993, The Manitoba Round Table on the Environment and Economy (MRTEE) developed the *Manitoba Principles and Guidelines of Sustainable Development* followed by the 1997 MRTEE *Sustainable Development Strategy for Manitoba*, resulting in the *Sustainable Development and Consequential Amendments Act* that layers sustainability ideas onto the old planning framework and reinforces an emphasis on regional or ‘broad area’ planning.

The shift described above took place after the first attempt to implement the new regime revealed that the initial transformation had been incomplete. Planning and consultation efforts under new legislation initially designed to promote environmental policy integration failed its first practical test, to resolve a high profile dispute with environmentalists and First Nations over the construction of power line (‘BiPole III’) from northern hydro facilities to Winnipeg. One of the most controversial aspects of this proposed development was the requirement to construct the roads required to maintain a hydro line in an otherwise largely roadless area. While some industrial resource users, particularly the forest industry, saw roadbuilding as an opportunity for future expansion, there was a much more equivocal reaction from isolated aboriginal communities. Community leaders were torn between the attractive economic benefits of increased economic activity that roads would bring and the desire to protect and control their traditional lands. Environmental groups, in particular Manitoba Wildlands, have been active opponents of industrial expansion but the contested area has not until very recently attracted the kind of international attention that has had such an impact in the BC case. Attention dramatically shifted from industrial expansion to increasing preservation recently, however, with the proposed establishment of a World Heritage site in the area.

At least partially in response, the province has undertaken a Provincial Land Use Policy (PLUP) Review in order to enhance the *Planning Act* to support a regional integration orientation. Section 5(3) of the *Act* provides for a regional strategy which may well emerge in the province as it has in both BC and Alberta, and to a lesser extent, Saskatchewan (Manitoba, 2008). However, the first efforts to use this framework to resolve the planning issues on the east side of Lake Winnipeg revealed its limitations. A layered policy mix is always less than the sum of its disparate elements and neither government nor civil society had the capacity to engage at the level required for a regional integrated strategy. Disappointing though this may be for advocates of ILM, the Manitoba government, aided by the withdrawal of the hydro line proposal, has retreated from its ambitious planning goals and worked instead to build aboriginal planning capacity through a number of smaller scale projects within the original planning area. By disaggregating the issues, addressing them on a local rather than a regional basis, the effects of past layering are reduced or eliminated and planning goals become attainable again.

**Conclusion**

Land use policy in the four western provinces of Canada provides a particularly clear set of examples of the challenges faced by governments attempting to implement ILM (Kennett, 2006). These challenges also apply more generally to efforts to develop and implement integrated policy strategies in the natural resource and environmental policy areas.
All four provinces display a pre-history of attempting to develop particular resource industries as engines of regional economic development, particularly in their sparsely-populated northern or interior areas, creating legacies of unrelated, clientelist single-industry policy regimes which were allowed to drift for several decades or longer and then reformed through layering.

This pattern occurs because drift and layering are the default forms of policy change in durable clientelist networks. As Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue, drift and layering are both responses to the perception that tackling problems in an open and transparent way, for example through a conversion strategy, poses unacceptable political risks. The ILM cases suggest that clientelism is an important source of political risk, creating as it does a political alliance between a resource industry, resource-dependent communities, labour unions, and even an administrative structure that stands ready to oppose the adoption of new goals or updated policy instruments.

And, as the case of the Alberta oil and gas boom shows, while the goals may once have been perfectly rational, policy drift in circumstances of rapid social and economic change can create unintended and deeply dysfunctional consequences leading to demands for change but not the wholesale displacement desired by proponents of increased integration. The organizational structure within each government was characterized by sectoral ‘silos’ with weak linkages across sectors and among decision-making processes. This sectoral focus, powerfully supported by clientelist policy networks, was the origin of many difficulties in attempts to reform policy processes to better deal with interconnected issues. When the fragmented and incremental decision-making processes characteristic of those policy regimes were challenged by any number of policy problems—ranging from federal government demands to the emergence of new policy players such as environmental groups and First Nations or the re-weighting of provincial priorities in booming energy markets—they proved unequal to the task. In particular, they failed to uncouple the policy elements of the earlier regime from their political support in order to replace or convert the regime to a more integrated one.

Thus, each province faced the problem of balancing new land use demands in the context of an existing regime which favoured a particular industry or industries. In addition, provinces tended to have planning processes focused at the provincial level with weak or non-existent provisions for local input or implementation. ILM emerged as a tempting policy option for each government and, as a result of separate reform efforts in each jurisdiction, land use policy in Western Canada underwent a major upheaval after a century or more in which the basic policy orientation was how to log, mine, clear, farm, and otherwise settle an apparently inexhaustible land and where land use planning regimes were typically almost a half-century old.

The reality revealed by the cases is a gradual shift in each province towards a regional form of planning which recognizes the persistence of sectoral clientelism but is still searching for the appropriate scale on which to resolve sectoral conflicts and manage cumulative impacts. Efforts to define the appropriate scale geographically have had to accommodate social and political factors such as policy capacity and community boundaries. This tension between, on the one hand, the ecological imperatives to capture and manage large-scale processes that take place beyond the site (Hawkins & Selman, 2002; Foster et al., 1998) or to find ‘natural’ management units such as the watershed (Gregersen et al., 2008) and, on the other, the political imperative to find a balance between national, provincial, and local interests is likely to dominate integration efforts for some time to come.
Notes

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2. Under the NDP-era Forest Practices Code’s Forest Development Plans, licencees were required to conduct an array of site-specific planning and preparatory measures prior to receiving logging authorization. New Forest Stewardship Plans (‘FSPs’) only require licencees to satisfy forestry officials that their strategies are consistent with objectives in FRPA.

References


Implementing Integrated Land Management in Western Canada


