(Pelletier)

We first should distinguish between those ethical theories that judge the rightness or wrongness of actions by means of the goodness and badness of the consequences of the actions from those theories that claim that rightness and wrongness is an inherent feature of actions (or, of people). The former theories are called teleological because they look to the ≥end≤ (telos) of the action, whereas the others are called deontological. Utilitarianism is a type of teleological ethical theory where the goodness and badness of the consequences is measured in terms of ≥happiness≤ (taken suitably generallyäsome theories equate this with pleasure, others with tranquility, others with general well-being). This general definition can be made more precise in various ways, according to which we get various species of utilitarianism.

Act-utilitarianism is generated if, in the above definition, we understand ≥actions≤ to mean ≥particular actions.≤ According to this, one assesses the rightness or wrongness of each individual action directly by its consequence.

Rule-utilitarianism is generated if, in the above definition, we understand ≥actions≤ to mean ≥sorts of actions.≤ The rule utilitarian does not consider the consequences of each particular action but considers the consequences of adopting some general rule, such as ≥Keep promises.≤ One adopts the rule if the consequences of its general adoption are better than those of the adoption of some alternative rule.

When discussing the adequacy of ethical theories, an important distinction is that between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. The former type of theory gives an analysis of how people in fact do think about conduct, while the latter type of theory is a proposal about how we ought to think about conduct. In discussing utilitarianism we can therefore talk about the adequacy of the theory as a descriptive theory or as a normative theory. This distinction is very unclear in Mill, and it is important since some criticisms of one will not necessarily be a valid objection to the other.

Descriptive ethics It is fairly easy to show that both act- and rule-utilitarianism are inconsistent with usual ideas about ethics, or what can be called the ≥common moral consciousness,≤ (although it takes different examples for the two conceptions of ethical theories) The principles of both systems will in some cases lead us to advocate courses of action which ≥the plain person≤ would regard as wrong.

1. Consider the case of a secret promise to a dying man. To ease his dying moments, I promise him that I will deliver a hoard of money, which he entrusts to me, to a rich and profligate relative of his. No one else knows either about the promise or the hoard. On act-utilitarian grounds, it would appear that I should not carry out my promise, because I can put the money to much better use by giving it, say, to a needy hospital. In this way I would do a lot of good and no harm. I do not disappoint the man to whom I made the promise, because he is dead. Nor, by breaking the promise, do I do indirect harm by weakening humanityπs faith in the socially useful institution of promise-keeping, for on this occasion no one knows about the promise. (Normally an act-utilitarian will keep a promise even when the direct results are not beneficial, because the indirect effects of sowing mistrust are harmful. This consideration does not apply in the present instance.) ≥The plain person≤, however, would be quite sure that the promise to the dying man should be kept. In this instance, therefore, we have a clear case in which act-utilitarianism is inconsistent with ≥the common moral consciousness.≤

2. The rule-utilitarian, on the other hand, would probably agree with ≥the plain person≤ in the above case, by appealing to the utility of the rule of promise-keeping in general, and not to the utility of the particular act of promise-keeping. But cases of the following sort can be brought up against the rule-utilitarian. Suppose the lives of a hundred people hang upon my telling a lie (especially, imagine it being a lie which has very little in the way of immediate undesirable consequences, and the only obvious one it has of a long-range nature is that my veracity might be called into question). It certainly seems that, in such a case I am morally bound to tell the lie, but the rule-utilitarian must say (following the rule that I am not to lie) that I cannot perform a good act by telling this lie. Note that he cannot say ≥follow the rules except in those cases where happiness would be better by not following them≤ for this is nothing more that act-utilitarianism.

Normative ethics: Thus both act- and rule-utilitarianism fail as systems of descriptive ethics. But considered as systems of normative ethics, act-utilitarianism would seem to have certain advantages over rule-utilitarianism. Even more strongly, the failure of act-utilitarianism as a descriptive system is the source of its interest as a possible system of normative ethics: if it had been correct as a descriptive system, then the acceptance of it as a normative system would leave most peopleπs conduct unchanged.

A system of normative ethics cannot be proved intellectually. One cannot deduce ≥highest principles≤ from anything, for then they would not be the highest principles. Mill sees this at the beginning of his book Utilitarianism, and therefore speaks vaguely about ≥considerations capable of influencing the intellect.≤ In putting forward act-utilitarianism as a normative system, we express an attitude of ≥generalized benevolence≤, and appeal to a similar attitude in our audience (see Millπs chapter on ≥ultimate sanctions≤). Note that this attitude of generalized benevolence is not the same as altruism. Generalized benevolence considers everyone (including oneself) as equal. Altruism considers only others.

In defending act-utilitarianism, then, we appeal to feelings, namely, those of generalized benevolence. Note that rule-utilitarians also appeal ultimately to feelings of generalized benevolence. But they are open to the charge of preferring conformity with a rule to the prevention of unhappiness. They are open to such a charge, since they advocate the rule-utilitarian principle (of following certain rules) because they think that these rules are conducive to human happiness. But they are then inconsistent if they prescribe that we should obey a rule (even a generally beneficial rule) even in those cases in which he knows that it will not be most beneficial to obey it. The rule utilitarian cannot respond that in most cases it is more beneficial to obey the rule than not. For it is still true that in some cases it is not most beneficial to obey the rule; and if we are concerned solely with benevolence, then in these cases we ought not to obey the rule. Nor is it relevant that it may be better that everyone should obey the rule than that no one should. For, there is another possibility that would be better than either of these: that sometimes the rule is obeyed and sometimes it is notãand this sounds like act-utilitarianism.

Right and Wrong vs. Praiseworthy and Blameworthy : Letπs adopt the (utilitarianπs) terminology that a right action is one that produces good consequences and a wrong action is one that produces bad consequences (on whatever utilitarian standard is being employed). Normally we would want to praise right actions and blame wrong actions. But this cannot always be done.

1. Suppose that only way in which a soldier can save the lives of a dozen companions is by throwing himself upon a grenade that is about to explode, thus inevitably killing himself. The act-utilitarian would have to say that it would be right for the soldier to sacrifice himself this way. Nevertheless, he would not censure the soldier or say that he acted from a bad motive if he had refrained from this act and his companions had been killed. There is nothing to be gained by blaming someone for the lack of extraordinary heroism. The act-utilitarian would say that the soldierπs act was wrong (because it led to more unhappiness than an alternative action) but not blameworthy.

2. A man with a head cold goes to the office, instead of nursing his illness at home. He is visited by an eminent statesman, who catches the cold, and in consequence, is not quite at his best in carrying out some delicate negotiations. These negotiations just fail by a hairsbreadth, whereas if the statesman had been fully fit they would have succeeded. In consequence, thousands of people die from starvation, a misfortune which would have been avoided if the negotiations had succeeded. These deaths would therefore not have occurred if the man had not gone to his office in an infectious state. Now we cannot blame the person for going to his office when he was sick ≠ it might even be praiseworthy. But in this case the action had very bad consequences, hence it is a wrong action.

So, according to the act utilitarian (and the rule-utilitarian) an action can be wrong but not blameworthy. Many examples can be put forward for actions which are right but not praiseworthy. You might try to think of some. Also, try to think of some which are right and blameworthy, and wrong but praiseworthy. (Warning: there may be none).