Plato on Not-Being: Some Interpretations of the ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ (259E) and Their Relation to Parmenides’ Problem

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INTRODUCTION

We have witnessed,” says Mourelatos (1979: p. 3), “in the ’sixties and ’seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus.” This interpretation is so agreed upon that “one may even speak of a standard Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides.” One of the presentations counted by Mourelatos as standard, indeed one of the paradigms, is that of Furth (1968). According to this interpretation, Parmenides’ infamous ontological views follow as corollaries from his implicit views about language and meaning. I will briefly present this Parmenidean view about language, but I will not here try to justify the attribution (for these sorts of arguments see Furth, 1968; Mourelatos, 1979; and Pelletier, forthcoming).

In this paper, I am interested in the Platonic response to Parmenides, especially the response that occurs in the middle portion of the Sophist (249–265). Since I am going to evaluate this as a response to the “standard interpretation” of Parmenides, it is clear that I owe a justification for my belief that Plato understood his opponent to be our “standard Parmenides.” This issue, too, I will avoid here (further discussion can be found in Pelletier, forthcoming, which discusses the “Parmenidean” arguments of Sophist 237–241, Theaetetus, 188–189, and Cratylus 429–430, with an eye toward showing that Plato was aware of these types of argument.)

In the middle portion of the Sophist itself, Plato states that his opponents cannot overcome his position because he has made allowance for a symploke eidōn tōn allōn (‘interweaving of the forms with one another’) and that it is this symploke eidōn that makes all discourse possible. Presumably, then, Plato views his opponents—in particular “Father Parmenides”—as producing unsound arguments that would have the effect of making discourse impossible. As we will see, the argument attributed to the standard Parmenides does exactly that. Thus, one can use the standard

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interpretation to bolster one's account of Plato's refutation and also use facts about Plato's refutation to bolster one's belief in the standard interpretation of Parmenides.

It seems that one way to clarify the details of the interpretation of Parmenides is to investigate the symplōkē eidōn of the Sophist. Unfortunately, Plato's position is also open to a variety of interpretations and cannot be convincingly elucidated in the absence of a precise account of what Parmenides' argument was. One, therefore, wishes to set up all the possible interpretations of Parmenides and all the interpretations of the symplōkē eidōn and then to inspect these lists to discover which pairs of Parmenidean/Platonic interpretations mesh the best. This, it seems to me, would provide the best evidence possible that one had finally gotten both Plato and Parmenides right. I will not attempt that Herculean task. Rather, I will state one interpretation of Parmenides, Furth's, and ask which of the many ways to understand Plato's position best accords with that interpretation of Parmenides.

Let us start then with what I will call Parmenides' Problem. The premises are:

1. Either a declarative sentence is true or it is not true, but it is not both.
2. (a) The meaning of a sentence is the fact to which it refers.
   (b) The meaning of a singular term (or a predicate) is the object(s) to which it refers.
3. Whatever ("really") is, can meaningfully be stated by true sentences.
4. There are no "negative facts."

The first conclusion, that there is at most one meaningful sentence, can be reached in a number of ways. Furth (1968) gives one way, Mourelatos (1979) another. Here, without any of the intermediate details, is another.

1. $S_1$ and $S_2$ have distinct meanings if and only if there is a true and meaningful sentence $S_3$ that claims that $S_1$ and $S_2$ have different meanings (from premise 3).
2. $S_3$ is true if and only if $S_1$ does not mean the same as $S_2$.
3. if $S_1$ does not mean the same as $S_2$ is either false or meaningless (from premises 1 and 4, plus a hidden application of premise 2).
4. $S_3$ is not true (from premises 2 and 3).
5. $S_1$ and $S_2$ do not have distinct meanings (from premises 1 and 4).
6. But $S_1$ and $S_2$ were chosen at random from the true sentences, and so every true sentence means what any other one does.

It is clear that such an argument effectively does away with the possibility of meaningful discourse, and it is an argument such as this that I think Plato wishes to prove unsound. Given this preliminary linguistic conclusion, the ontological conclusions for which Parmenides is infamous follow from repeated applications of premise 3. (If there were motion, then some sentence such as 'A thing is at one time at some place and at another time not there' would be true. But in light of premise 4 it cannot be. For details see Furth 1968.)

It seems to me (as it has to many others before me) that Plato's resolution of this paradoxical position is the construction of a 'philosopher's language'—a language that accurately mirrors reality and in which Parmenides' Problem would not arise. It
is almost as though Plato had granted that Parmenides' Problem seems to arise for natural language, but this appearance is due to the fact that natural language embodies certain "shorthand" abbreviations that do not truly correspond to reality.

One feature the philosopher's language will have is what may be called the naming principle: every general term will name something, which something is the meaning of the term. This would seem to be an endorsement of premise 2b of Parmenides' Problem, and, indeed, I think this is the proper way to look at the matter. The difference between Parmenides and Plato is in what Plato takes the general terms of the philosopher's language to name. For him, it is the forms. With just this sketch of the philosopher's language, we can see that certain things we were automatically forbidden to say (by the Parmenidean argument) are now permitted. 'Unicorns have one horn' is no longer ruled out on the grounds that there are no unicorns, so there is no meaning to 'unicorns' (via premise 2b), hence no meaning to any sentence containing 'unicorns'. Perhaps the sentence is still meaningless but at least not on these grounds.

Plato's altering of the force of premise 2b to talk about the Forms suggests that we change premise 2a in a similar manner: The meaning of is the fact about the Forms to which it refers. But just saying this will not solve any of the problems that are involved in, say, the sentence 'Bachelors are not mothers'. If this sentence is to have any meaning (according to the new reading of premise 2a), there must be some fact about the Forms, of bachelors not being mothers. In light of premise 4, what meaning can we attach to this? Are we to say that there are negative facts in the world of Forms? If Plato still holds his earlier "orthodox" views about the relationship between Forms and the physical world, then there will also be negative facts in the physical world, since the world of Forms is "mirrored" (imperfectly) into the physical world. On the other hand, we could follow up recent discussions about "Pauline Predication" and claim that 'Bachelors are not mothers' is somehow an expression to the effect 'All instances of the form Bachelor are not mothers'. We still have the problem—what could this mean but some negative fact? It is clear that a satisfactory answer to this will depend on some reasonable account of Plato's discussion of 'Not-Being' at 257-258.

I want to explain how I am going to proceed. I claim that Plato denied premise 2a and, furthermore, that he replaced it with a different analysis of the meaning of such sentences. The commentators have attributed (at times unwittingly) to Plato a number of different analyses, and I want to adjudicate among them. My criteria are these: (a) the analyses attributed to him must, in fact, not still involve Plato in Parmenides' Problem, and (b) the analysis must also account for Plato's claim that any discourse we can have owes its existence to the interweaving of the Forms with one another. If these two conditions are satisfied, then we will (c) look to the general philosophical acceptability of this analysis and (d) judge its textual plausibility.

I broadly classify interpretations of Plato into four camps. The first group, the "nonstarters," either take Plato to be doing something different from answering Parmenides and these accounts cannot be converted into such an answer, or else they say they are showing how Plato answered Parmenides but they have a very strange
understanding of Parmenides. (This is so because it is clear that the answer they supply on Plato's behalf would be scoffed at by Parmenides.) Among these nonstarters I include three groups consisting of A: Peck (1952, 1962) and Xenakis (1959); B: Hackforth (1945) and Robinson (1950); and C: Lee1 (1972) and Frede1 (1967).2 These writers will be discussed below, at least in enough detail for me to indicate why I think they should be classified as nonstarters.

The second group, the "correspondence theorists," are those who make the claim that for every sentence of natural language Plato has some specific sentence of the philosopher's language that "corresponds" to it (and is to be taken as what the natural language statement "really means" and "really asserts about reality"). These theorists advocate, in effect, the replacement of premise 2a by something else. In particular, they want to show that Plato had a translation (into the philosopher's language) of the troublesome negative sentences and that this translation shows how Parmenides' Problem is to be avoided.3 I detect thirteen correspondence theorists:

I. Cornford1
II. Ross, Alan
III. Hamlyn
IV. Schipper, Bluck
V. Moravcsik, Runciman
VI. Owen, Lewis1
VII. Cornford2
VIII. Wiggins1
IX. Wiggins2
X. Philip, Ackrill1, Kostman
XI. Sayre
XII. Frede2
XIII. Lorenz and Mittelstrass1

The third group, the "backdrop theorists," take interweaving to be something "behind" language in general. That is, they do not view Plato as giving a determinate sentence of the philosopher's language to replace (say) the ordinary negations, but rather they view Plato to be claiming that there exists some reality or other that gives a "ground" for the meaningfulness of statements in general. These "grounds" might be viewed as the presuppositions of language—what must happen in order for there to be language at all. Here I will discuss Lorenz and Mittelstrass2, Lee2, and Lewis2.

The fourth group I call "mixed theorists." Their theories have both a correspondence component and a backdrop component. These theories hold Plato both to be giving some reality that is a "ground" or presupposition for language in general and to be giving a specific sentence of the philosopher's language that corresponds to any chosen ordinary statement. These theorists might profitably be viewed as saying (with respect to some particular sentence) what part of the "ground" or backdrop is responsible for that sentence's meaning what it does. Here, Ackrill2 might point to Ackrill1 and Frede3 might point to Frede2.

NONSTARTERS

I have three different kinds of nonstarters in mind. The first kind think that Plato is doing something entirely different than I think. Peck (1952, 1962) and Xenakis (1959)
do not believe that in the *Sophist* Plato is talking about any theory of Forms, whether it be his theory or anyone else's; although I think this wrong, it would take us too far afield to consider the idea in detail. (Peck thinks that the whole *megista genē* section is "dialectical" and that Plato is only answering the sophists by pointing out relationships among those concepts that they themselves will admit exist and by showing where their theories lead. Xenakis denies that the *Sophist* is about the Forms at all rather than about the conceptual framework of language. Of course, the way I am treating the matter the two overlap, but Xenakis denies that we should understand any of this to be about Forms and then draw conclusions about language or to understand it to be about language and then draw conclusions about Forms; rather, we should just understand it to be about rules for language *simpliciter.*)

The second group of nonstarters I wish to exclude from the general discussion, on textual grounds. Hackforth (1945) and Robinson (1950) both take Plato to be talking about *words* when he says *eidē,* and never about Forms, once the section starting at 259 has begun. In fact, they take these words to be akin to proper names. Therefore, the "interweaving of the Forms with one another" becomes "the interweaving of words with one another," which becomes (Robinson 1950: p. 11) "Each sentence is a compound of one noun and one verb. It asserts that this thing signified by its noun has the attribute signified by its verb." The problem with taking this view is that it affords no link between all the earlier work on the *megista genē* (which both Hackforth and Robinson admit is about the Forms) and the present work supposedly on words and sentences. At 259e there begins a self-contained discussion, they say, on the Being of speech that is independent of 251 through 258 on the relations of Forms with one another. The *symplōkē* *eidōn* at 259e is translated as "interweaving of parts of speech" by them in looking forward to the *symplōkē* mentioned at 262c6 and d4. Lorenz and Mittelstrass (1966b) claim that this forward looking is not sound since there was an occurrence of *symplōkē* earlier at 240c, where it clearly signals a combination of something other than parts of speech. I would not wish to decide the issue merely on this basis, but it does add to the overall difficulty in attributing this sort of strategy to Plato. Further, the translation of *eidē* here as "parts of speech" means that the distinction carefully drawn at 261a1-2 between *eidē* on the one hand and *grammata* ('letters') and *onomata* ('words' or 'names') on the other is empty wordplay. And this is not the best thing to attribute to Plato.5

The third group of nonstarters is to be ruled out on philosophic grounds. I insist that Plato did not invent "negative" Forms; that is, the mere addition of a negative prefix to a predicate does not directly generate a name for some Form. For instance, Plato would not answer Parmenides' objections to 'John is not a cat' simply by saying that its meaning is that John partakes of the Form Non-Cat. However the analysis of negation comes out in the end, it is nothing so simple as that. If the analysis given by the standard interpretation of Parmenides' argument is anything nearly correct, such a gratuitous addition of Forms would merely amount to Plato's replying to Parmenides: "Of course we can make negative predications—you see, there are these Forms . . . ." Parmenides would scoff at such a suggestion. It does not get to the root of Parmenides' Problem, as Plato himself saw; the whole program
of the *Sophist* is aimed in a different direction—that of convincing Father Parmenides on his own grounds. Furthermore, *Politics* 262 explicitly states that there are not necessarily Forms corresponding to a simple negation. (Also, see the Aristotelean comments on Plato: *Metaphysics* 990b13–14, 1079a9–10; Alexander’s commentary [in *Meta*. 80, 15–81, 7] in which he quotes from *Peri Ideon*.)

Both Lee (vide, inter alia, 1967: p. 275) and Frede (1967: pp. 92–94) embrace the notion of a “negative” Form. Frede, however, gives an account of negative predication that does not presuppose them; this account will be considered in the next section. Lee makes such Forms essential, however. They are “derived” and “intensional”—the Form Otherness, when directed to the Form X, yields the “sense” of “not-X.” Thus, these negative Forms are not part of the basic ontology of Forms but are “intentionally constructed” out of the basic, positive ones with the aid of the Form Otherness. Lee (1972: p. 292) makes a considerable point about claiming that such Forms are “definite.”

What ‘x is not brown’ says is that x (which is) partakes of a certain Part of Otherness (a Part which fully and securely is . . . ); it says that x partakes of that Part of Otherness whose “name” is “(the) not-brown” and whose determine nature consists in Otherness—precisely-than-brown.

No doubt most commentators would want to hold something like this as a part of their view, but Lee (1972: pp. 293, 295) wants it to be all of his view.

... it is no part at all of the sense of the negating proposition that it should refer to any (much less all) particular entities or predicates other than the negated predicate. ... [The negating statement simply] says that the subject’s partaking lies outside of the predicate negated ... just that it lies outside- that-predicate. ... The determinate sense of ‘x is not brown’ thus lies precisely, but lies entirely, in its saying that brown is what x is not. What the statement will signify—and all that it signifies, on Plato’s analysis—is that the subject does not partake of that predicate.

(This position is in some ways similar to Schema I below, but, in view of the differences between Lee and the holders of Schema I, it is perhaps best to separate them.)

Given this statement of Lee’s and the Parmenidean argument of above, it is difficult to see how Lee can believe that such an account could possibly “vindicate the sense of negative expressions by showing that the understanding of any negative statement involves the apprehension only of ‘existent,’ positive, determinate contents” (1972: p. 291), for it does not remove the difficulty that Parmenides finds with Not-Being.

**CORRESPONDENCE THEORISTS**

A correspondence theorist is one who is going to show how sentences of ordinary language are to be translated into the philosopher’s language so as to exhibit reality correctly. To do this, the theorists must offer us some uniform translation procedure. For example, ordinary sentences such as ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ might be said to
translate into 'Theaetetus partakes of (the form) Sitting' or 'Theaetetus partakes of (the form) Sitting, which blends with (the form) Being.' These latter sentences, being part of the philosopher's language, mean whatever (fact) they name or describe (or, alternatively, name the fact that they mean). Correspondence theorists thus deny the simple naming principle for ordinary language; instead, they translate the ordinary statement into a philosophic one and apply the naming principle to it. One way to put this is: correspondence theorists find Plato assigning meanings to ordinary sentences that are not "on their sleeves." I will adopt the convention that such theorists are attributing to Plato the view that the ordinary sentence means what is named by its philosophic translation. Thus, 'Theaetetus is sitting' means (according to some correspondence theorists) the fact of the referent of 'Theaetetus' (viz., Theaetetus) partaking of the referent of 'sitting' (viz., the form Sitting).

For simplicity of exposition, I will use quasi quotes; phrases like 'Ref (φ)' are to mean "whatever the referent of φ is." In the schemata to be given below as explications of what various commentators have attributed to Plato, I intend the terms to be understood in a nontechnical way. Plato uses metexein, koinonia, summeixis, and other terms in what I think is a fixed pattern; here, however, I rather indiscriminately followed several authors at once and generally use 'partakes of' as a relation between individuals and forms, 'belongs to' as a way of saying the converse of 'partakes of,' and 'blends' (for the most part) as indicating some relation holding among forms. I use 'blends with the Different from' in a specific manner, indicating "is not identical to"; when I want this phrase to mean something else (e.g., "is incompatible with"), I use a formulation explicitly invoking the notion of an incompatibility range (see Schemata IX, X, and XI).

Cornford (1935) sometimes (pp. 300-301) holds a position like Schema I; that is, he claims that Plato could refute Parmenides' difficulties about Not-Being if he were merely to recognize that he needs to give separate sorts of translations for positive and negative sentences.

Schema I (Cornford, 1935: pp. 300-301):
2a₁. The meaning of is is φ is the fact of Ref (α) partaking of Ref (φ).
2a₂. The meaning of α is not φ is the fact of Ref (α) not partaking of Ref. (φ).

Immediately, however, we see that this does not solve the problem. Consider 'Theaetetus is not flying': Under the proposed analysis, this would have as its meaning the fact of flying not belonging to Theaetetus; but by premise 4 this purported fact does not exist, so the sentence has no meaning, etc. Thus, we can reject Cornford's account of negation as well as his account of the "interweaving of the Forms," since they do not adequately show that Plato has solved the problem he set for himself. Furthermore, Schema I does not account for the statement at 259e5–6 in which "the interweaving of the forms with another" is claimed to be necessary for the possibility of discourse. On this point, Ross (1951: p. 115) claims that it was an "oversatement," i.e., that it is false; and Cornford (1935) simply does not translate allelón ("with one another") and claims (p. 314) that the sentence at 259e5–6 means that every sentence mentions at least one form-name. Such moves violate
our Principles of Charity of Interpretation and should, therefore, be rejected. Such readings of 259e5-6 have been attacked by many people, and I will not repeat their criticisms; we should note, however, that even if there were no other reason, we should be justified in rejecting this interpretation of interweaving because it does not supply us with an account of how to solve Parmenides' Problem. (I might mention that Cornewall does not always hold Schema I; I will give another schema to which he sometimes resorts later.)

There is another way along the same lines to make sense out of the "interweaving of the forms with one another" in these sentences in which the subject is a proper name. This can be done without resorting to Cornford's mistranslation of "with one another." Ross (1951: pp. 115-16) says, "In sentence 'Theaetetus is not flying' Theaetetus exists and Flying (the Form or universal of flying) exists, so in saying the sentence we are not asserting of him something that does not exist, but simply something that does not belong to him." And Allan (1954: p. 285) says:

[A true statement] describes things as they are; i.e., its components must (a) stand for real entities and (b) in their relation to one another, depict the relation between those entities. . . . In the false statement, the terms will likewise stand for entities—that is why it is significant—but they will represent them as related in a way which does not correspond to the facts.

It thus seems that such commentators are attributing the following schema to Plato.

**Schema II** (Ross, Allan):

2a1. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is \( \phi \) is the fact that Ref (α) partakes of Ref (φ) and of Ref (φ) existing (and Ref (α) existing?).

2a2. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is not \( \phi \) is the fact that Ref (α) does not partake of Ref (φ) and of Ref (φ) existing (and Ref (α) existing?).

I said that such a view makes some sense of the interweaving of forms with one another since the philosopher's sentence will contain reference to two forms: Being and Ref (φ). Whether such a relation between Being and Ref (φ) should be said to be "interweaving" in Plato's sense of the word is another question, one that I will defer until later. It is sufficient for us to notice that the proposed (2a2) still has not helped us solve Parmenides' Problem, for the problem will now reappear in the philosopher's language. Thus, Schema II must be rejected, in accordance with the Principles of Charity of Interpretation, from being Plato's account.

In their anxiety to satisfy the apparent requirement that each sentence of the philosopher's language somehow mention at least two form-names, a number of authors have resorted to supposing the existence of forms that are nowhere mentioned by Plato. One such method of finding enough forms to perform an interweaving in sentences (apparently) about particulars is to look "behind" the subject-term, e.g., behind 'Theaetetus'. According to the view of Hamlyn (1955), there are no names except those for forms in the philosopher's language. What appears to be a proper name of a physical particular is actually a mark of what Hamlyn calls a "characteristic,"
and this is a form that applies to exactly one single entity. Therefore, the "interweaving" behind the sentence 'Theaetetus is sitting' is that between the (unique) form indicated by 'Theaetetus' and the form Sitting. The recommendation for meaning is:

**Schema III (Hamlyn):**

2a1. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is \( \phi \) is the fact that A blends with Ref (\( \phi \)).
2a2. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is not \( \phi \) is the fact that A does not blend with Ref (\( \phi \)), where A is the Form or "characteristic" of Ref (\( \alpha \)).

Such an account cannot stand up under scrutiny of Plato's use of proper names in the *Sophist*, and, hence, it is already implausible as an account of the *Sophist*. In 263, the name 'Theaetetus' is explained as being "about the Theaetetus with whom [the Stranger] is talking now"; this is distinguished from those things that hold of him. The only place I have never found Plato to be talking of the unique character of a particular is *Theaetetus* 209, but even then there is no hint that Plato is talking about the Forms as opposed to some person's concept of the particular. (Some claims about proper names being akin to predicates are made in the *Cratylus*, but I will not discuss them now. See Schema XII.) Furthermore, such a view cannot possibly account for negative predication in the manner needed, for consider 'Theaetetus is not Flying': this sentence asserts (according to Hamlyn) that the Form of Theaetetus does not include anything of flying, i.e., 'Theaetetus' Form does not blend with the Form Flying. But, as we can immediately see, this does not solve Parmenides' Problem.

No one that I know of has explicitly taken Hamlyn's Characteristic-Form theory (although Turnbull's [1964] interpretation has something like it), but it has suggested various emendations to some. Schipper, for instance, holds that there are no true individuals at all. What 'Theaetetus' refers to is precisely the set of Forms that can truly be said to characterize Theaetetus. Thus, there are no individuals who partake of some unique Form, but rather there are sets of Forms corresponding to each proper name. Schipper (1964: p. 44) makes the point that particulars exist only by dint of the Forms that characterize them. In *Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues* (1965: p. 40), she says:

> Though the name 'Theaetetus' may be the grammatical subject of statements about him, the experienced Theaetetus is not a substantial subject existing independently of forms, about whom forms are predicated. . . . Theaetetus may be specified of, not as an existing object beyond the forms, but as described by the interrelated forms. *Logos* is about them, only.

Bluck's (1957) view is similar but does not include the notion that individuals exist only by dint of their characterizing Forms. He starts with 262c9-d6, which is taken to give a syntactical definition of meaningful sentences. ("Sounds uttered signify nothing until you combine verbs with names. The moment you do that the simplest combination becomes a statement. . . . It gets you somewhere by weaving together verbs with names.") It is *we* who interweave words together to make a sentence, and (he says) it is therefore *we* who interweave the appropriate Forms; 259e5–6 now
becomes (p. 182) "that in any statement we make we are in fact weaving Forms together, either correctly or incorrectly, and that only so is discourse possible." But now what will "incorrectly weaving the Forms" come to? And how will that become a solution to Parmenides' Problem? The Forms involved in the sentence 'Theaetetus is sitting' when we utter it are all the Forms Theaetetus partakes of plus the Form(s) that "this-individual-sitting-here" partakes of. Thus, in weaving together 'Theaetetus' with 'sitting' we are also weaving together 'this particular man with such and such properties' and 'this-individual-sitting-here', and, therefore, we are weaving together the Forms Man, etc. (all of Theaetetus' properties) and the Form Sitting. And when we utter 'Theaetetus is Flying', we interweave the words and so interweave the Forms, but there is not an individual-flying-here, and so we have a false sentence. I doubt that this is going to solve any of the problems raised earlier on in the text about falsity, but here I will just note that, even though his focus is on falsity rather than on negative sentences, Bluck commits himself to the view embodied in Schema IV (for true sentences). For, since the meaningfulness of sentences in general is taken to be syntactically defined and since 'Theaetetus is not flying' satisfies that criterion, the relationships among the forms behind this sentence must be just those behind any meaningful sentence, and that is just whether or not the Forms holding of the subject are blended with that indicated by the predicate. These views may be represented by Schema IV; version (i) is Schipper's (1964: p. 42), and version (ii) is Bluck's (1957).

Schema IV (i—Schipper, ii—Bluck):

2a₁. The meaning of  \( \alpha \) is  \( \emptyset \) is that Ref (\( \phi_1 \)), Ref (\( \phi_2 \)), Ref (\( \phi_3 \)), . . . blend with Ref (\( \phi \)).

2a₂. The meaning of  \( \alpha \) is not  \( \emptyset \) is that Ref (\( \phi_1 \)), Ref (\( \phi_2 \)), Ref (\( \phi_3 \)), . . . do not blend with Ref (\( \phi \)).

i. Ref (\( \alpha \)) = Ref (\( \phi_1 \)), Ref (\( \phi_2 \)), Ref (\( \phi_3 \)), . . .

ii. \( \phi_1 \), \( \phi_2 \), \( \phi_3 \), . . . are all the predicates truly applicable to Ref (\( \alpha \)).

Schipper's view clearly contradicts Plato's use of proper names at 263, where Theaetetus is distinguished from the things that are true of him, and what is being talked about by 'Theaetetus' is exactly the entity before the stranger and nothing else. Against both Schipper's view and Bluck's view, we can point out that it does not solve Parmenides' Problem and thus cannot be a correct analysis of 'Not-Being'; even though it can give some sense to the "interweaving of forms with one another," it just does not give the right sense. (This can also be seen by noting that the analysis of positive sentences makes them be necessarily true, if they are true. In 'Theaetetus is sitting', Sitting is presumably one of the Forms that Theaetetus partakes of or is defined in terms of. Thus, the proposed semantical theory gives no account of the difference to be found in 'man is man' and 'man is good', a difference Plato clearly believes his account to cover, 251.)

Another place to look for forms that Plato does not mention is the copula. Moravcsik (1960) and Runciman (1965), for example, suppose that there is a Form corresponding to the copula and one corresponding to the negative-copula; these

**Schema V** (Moravcsik, Runciman):

2a1. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is \( \phi \) is that Ref (\( \alpha \)) blends with Relational Being with respect to Ref (\( \phi \)).

2a2. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is not \( \phi \) is that Ref (\( \alpha \)) blends with the negative counterpart of Relational Being with respect to Ref (\( \phi \)).

We should first notice that Schema V does provide a solution to Parmenides' Problem since the meaning of a "negative sentence" is no longer a "negative fact" but rather "something positive," viz., Ref (\( \phi \))'s blending with the negative counterpart of Relational Being. But there are difficulties with this solution. First, we should look at some textual difficulties. I said that Moravcsik merely invented these Forms. He points to 255d3-8, where it is said of Being that it participates in two *eidē*, *to katb' auto* and *to pros allo*, and he says that these two Forms, when combined with Being, are represented by the copula and its negative counterpart (p. 125). Now, in order for Moravcsik's interpretation to go through, *to katb' auto* and *to pros allo* must be understood as two-place relations. But this is impossible when we consider what use these concepts are put to in the text; viz., 'is' is said to have two uses: a *to katb' auto* use (an example of which is 'motion is') and a *to pros allo* use (an example of which is 'motion is the same [as itself]' or 'man is a learner'). Further, even if Plato did understand Forms as sometimes being two-place relations, there is no evidence that he ever took them to be Forms "behind" the copula, for if he did it would be strange that he did not directly state this (it being a rather important point). 10

Furthermore, there is a serious philosophical objection to this purported solution. If we are to take seriously the rationale behind the attempt to give a justification for the meaning of predicative statements in terms of some ontological counterpart, we find that we will have to have something that works like glue in holding the reality together, similar to the way the copula works as a "syntactical glue" in holding sentences together. Usually, Plato is considered to have held that the ontological glue was "blending" or "partaking" (and Aristotle so takes it while demanding a further explanation). Moravcsik takes the glue to be "blends with . . . respect to . . . " Now consider negative sentences; could there be any such glue between Theaetetus and Flying? Obviously not, since the point of the denial of Flying's blending with something with respect to Theaetetus is merely a denial of there being any "ontological glue" here. Therefore, the proposed Schema V certainly could not satisfy anyone; and, following our Principles of Charity of Interpretation, this is good grounds for denying that Plato held it.

Another thing to notice about Schema V is that it does not justify itself. We are told that the interweaving of the Forms underlies rational discourse; when asked how, we are told that (a) for statements of identity (or nonidentity), the Form Sameness (or Difference) interweaves with Relational Being and (b) for statements of
positive (or negative) prediction, Relational Being (or its negative counterpart) interweaves with the Form indicated by the predicate. In what sense can this be said to explain how sentences have meaning? There is no plausibility to it other than that it does make the "interweaving of the Forms" claim seem true. The explanation given by Moravcsik (1960: p. 127) is simply: "... the meaning of any statement involves an attribute and a connector, and this is surely the essential point that Plato makes." But surely it is not the essential point. Plato is trying to overcome a logical problem presented by Parmenides. It is not enough to say in response that the problem is indeed a problem and what it shows is that we need to add more Forms to our ontology so that we can give negative statements meaning. What would be enough would be to show that on the basis of already accepted Forms, and certain plausible relations between them, we can account for the meaningfulness of negative statements exactly as we do for the positive statements that we accept.

Finally, the Moravcsik/Runciman interpretation of Plato's view does not explain truth and falsity of sentences. One of the things we are supposed to be able to do by means of an inspection of a sentence in the philosopher's language is to see why a sentence is true (or why it can be true). One should be able to inspect the sentence and say, "I see what reality this sentence is asserting." But consider the true sentence 'John is not a dog'. According to the Runciman/Moravcsik interpretation, the only reason we can give for this sentence being true is that the Form Dog is blending with the negative counterpart of Relational Being to John. Certainly this is not a very convincing reason—it strikes one as being merely a repetition of the original (if he understands it at all).11

I view Schemata I through V as exercises in futility. Somehow we all know (but I will not try to tell you how we know it) that the analysis of negation should bring in the form The Different. The most simpleminded way to bring it in is Owen's (1970: pp. 232, 237-38) and Lewis's (1976: pp. 104-5, 108).12

**Schema VI** (Owen, Lewis1):

2a1. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is \( \phi \) is that Ref (\( \alpha \)) partakes of Ref (\( \phi \)).
2a2. The meaning of \( \neg \alpha \) is not \( \neg \phi \) is that Ref (\( \phi_1 \)), Ref (\( \phi_2 \)), Ref (\( \phi_3 \)), ... blend with the Different with respect to Ref (\( \phi \)), where Ref (\( \phi_1 \)), Ref (\( \phi_2 \)), Ref (\( \phi_3 \)), ... are all the forms Ref (\( \alpha \)) partakes of.

Although Schema VI solves Parmenides' Problem by assigning a "positive fact" as the meaning of ordinary negative sentences, it seems to me wrong for the following three reasons. First, it does not account for the apparent force of the *symplóke* at 259E, viz., that each sentence mention at least two forms (because 2a1 only mentions one form). There are various ways that Owen and Lewis1 could take around this objection, so perhaps it is not all that important. (They could say that the doctrine of vowel-forms does the requisite blending or that Plato was trying to stop Parmenides' Problem from even getting going and for that we need the interweaving of 2a2.) Second, we should note that Plato is explicitly drawing some analogy between the ontological "Not-Being" and the sentential "Not-Being" (i.e., falsity). Under Owen's view, this analogy becomes this: in order to determine the falsity of
'Theaetetus is flying', we have to find out all the predicates that hold of Theaetetus in order to show that Flying is not one of them. It is not sufficient merely to find out that he is sitting, for according to Owen's analysis one cannot infer from this that he is not flying. Rather, to show he is not flying we must examine every predicate and show that it is not identical to flying. As Owen himself remarks, this makes falsifying statements an interminable business (p. 238 fn.). Owen finds no difficulty here, but this clearly shows that the analogy has broken down and, hence, that his analysis of the ontological "Not-Being" is incorrect. Third, and most telling, although singular affirmative statements are, according to this analysis, synthetic (the notion of "partaking" being somehow synthetic), we find that true singular negative statements are all analytically true. For, under Owen's analysis of "blends with the Different with respect to," two forms do so exactly in case they are not identical; therefore, whether or not Ref ($\phi_1$), Ref ($\phi_2$), Ref ($\phi_3$), . . . are identical with Ref ($\phi$) (in our singular negative statement) is a matter already settled by our semantics (i.e., by statements about how many, and what kinds of, Forms there are) and, thus, is logically necessary. Surely, whether it is true or false that Theaetetus is not standing is not a matter for our semantics to decide upon.

One way around the objections that Schema VI makes falsification an "in-terminable business" and makes singular negative sentences analytic (if they are true) is to adopt a view sometimes held by Cornford.


2a₁. The meaning of $\bar{\alpha}$ is $\bar{\phi}$ is that Ref ($\alpha$) partakes of Ref ($\phi$).

2a₂. The meaning of $\bar{\alpha}$ is not $\bar{\phi}$ is that Ref ($\alpha$) partakes of some form F, which blends with the Different with respect to Ref ($\phi$),

where "blends with the Form Different with respect to X" is to be understood as not being identical with X.¹³ Cornford's explanation of "Not-Being" when he is discussing falsity (pp. 314–15) exactly fits this schema. He is still committed, by dint of 2a₁ not mentioning two forms, to understand (per impossible) 'interweaving of Forms with one another' as 'at least one Form', but at least it does not commit him to other difficulties found in Schema I (which he otherwise advocates).

There are some difficulties with this kind of account because it does not assign the correct properties to negation. For example, this account makes contradictory sentences true. Suppose Socrates is a white man; 'Socrates is a man' is true by 2a₂, and, since White blends with the Different from Man (i.e., they are not identical), it follows that 'Socrates is not a man' is also true. As Wiggins (1970: pp. 293–94) notes, this account cannot be correct for another reason. Simple difference between Ref ($\phi_1$) and Ref ($\phi_2$) cannot suffice to make them exclude one another. Theaetetus' having some quality distinct from flying can hardly in itself rule out the possibility that Theaetetus flies. He would have a distinct quality even if he were flying.¹⁴

We can avoid at least some of the difficulties raised in connection with the Owen/Lewis and Cornford views by reimporting a Form behind the copula a la Moravesik (but not one for the "negative copula") and always mentioning that the
subject is partaking of these Forms (as is not done by Owen). The following is one of the accounts given by Wiggins (1970: pp. 288–90, 294).

Schema VIII (Wiggins1):

2a1. The meaning of \( \alpha^\phi \) is that Ref (\( \alpha \)) partakes of Being with respect to Ref (\( \phi \)).

2a2. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is not \( \phi \) is that for all forms \( F \), if Ref (\( \alpha \)) partakes of Being with respect to \( F \), then \( F \) blends with the Different with respect to Ref (\( \phi \)).

Schema VIII, unlike Schemata VI and VII, satisfies the criterion that each sentence mention an interweaving of the Forms (here, the Form Being and at least one other Form). Second, again unlike Schema VI, the meaning of negative sentences is not such that they are logically true or false,¹⁵ nor does it make contradictory sentences true. Furthermore, we might note that this account actually does solve Parmenides' Problem since the meaning of a negative sentence is now some “positive fact.”

What can be said against it? Well, first, it still makes falsification of sentences “an interminable business.” Wiggins (1970: p. 301) is sensitive to this sort of objection and wishes that Plato had replaced it by Schema IX.

Schema IX (Wiggins3):

2a1. The meaning of \( \alpha^\phi \) is that Ref (\( \alpha \)) partakes of Being with respect to Ref (\( \phi \)).

2a2. The meaning of \( \alpha \) is not \( \phi \) is that there is a form \( F \) such that \( F \) belongs to the same incompatibility range as Ref (\( \phi \)) and Ref (\( \alpha \)) partakes of Being with respect to \( F \),

where “belongs to the same incompatibility range as” is taken to imply that nothing can be characterized by two predicates in the same range at the same time. (The existential quantifier in [2a2] makes the procedure terminate.) However, Wiggins just does not believe that Plato makes this move, even though all his examples (not-large, etc.) are consistent with it.¹⁶ I think it quite clear that Schema IX is preferable to Schema VIII on philosophical grounds, and, as I've tried to show in Pelletier (1975), there is no legitimate textual reason to prefer one over the other. We, therefore, should apply the Principles of Charity of Interpretation and attribute Schema IX to Plato (at least provisionally, pending investigation of any other interpretations or considerations).

Yet, there are some problems with Schema IX that seem to me to show the desirability of finding some other account. When I discussed Moravcsik, I pointed to two difficulties in understanding there to be Forms corresponding to the copula and the “negative Relational Being.” The first was that a distinction between “positive Relational Being” and “negative Relational Being” could not be gleaned from the text; i.e., that to katb' auto did not mean “positive Relational Being” since it corresponded to a “complete” use of ‘is’, not a two-place relation. The second objection was of a more philosophical nature: it seemed to involve a misconstrual of the point of constructing a philosopher's language. It made all the words of a sentence be names and,
hence, made the sentence be a list. What is needed is some kind of "ontological glue" to hold the "ontological building blocks" together, with the "ontological glue" corresponding to the "syntactic glue" (provided by 'is' and the like in ordinary discourse) that holds the "syntactic building blocks" (the onomata and the rhemata) together.

Here Wiggins is not making Moravcsik's distinction between kinds of "Relational Being" (he, in fact, agrees that these must be "complete" and not relative); rather, he is pointing to to pros allo (Moravcsik's "negative Relational Being") as needing to be understood as "being with respect to something else" and then is glossing this as "the Form Being blending with some other Form." All this seems quite unobjectionable until he applies this distinction to particular sentences by parsing 'Theaetetus is a man' into 'Theaetetus partakes of the Form Man' and then claiming that this is merely a contraction of "Theaetetus partakes of the Form Being blended with the Form Man". Wiggins's argument is, therefore, vulnerable to the second of the objections to Moravcsik. Either Wiggins is claiming (on Plato's behalf) (a) that we have to look "behind" the copula to find a Form, (b) that Theaetetus is partaking of "some special version of the Form Being, namely the Man version," or (c) that 'partaking of F' is always equivalent to 'partaking of Being blended with F'.

I cannot see that Plato ever said any of these things, although I do not take this as decisive against Schema IX. It is certainly true that Being is a vowel-form and hence "runs through all forms," but it is far from clear that this is equivalent to (c) of the last paragraph. It is also true that, when Plato discusses "the Different" (another vowel-form), he claims that "running through them all" gives rise to "parts of the Different" (257C-D), but I still do not see that this implies (b). Furthermore, such a view merely pushes various philosophical problems one step further back. Since 'is' is our "syntactic glue," if the ontology-sentence analogy is to hold up, we will not want to assign 'is' a "building-block" ontological role but rather a "glue" role. In Wiggins's account, we had to invent another glue, viz., "partaking" glue, a glue that does not correspond to any syntactical element." For these sorts of reasons, I think we should look for another interpretation.

To avoid the sort of objections described in the preceding paragraphs, one might consider simply dropping the reference to Being in the formulations of (2a₁) and (2a₂). This would result in the sort of view held by Philip (1968: p. 319) and Kostman (1973). (I also call it Ackrill₁, although Ackrill is not a correspondence theorist but rather a mixed theorist. I attribute it to him merely because he might be willing to point to that part of reality indicated by the schema if he were asked "what portion of the backdrop makes this sentence true?")

Schema X (Philip, Kostman, Ackrill₁):

2a₁. The meaning of $\Box \phi$ is that Ref (α) partakes of Ref (φ).

2a₂. The meaning of $\Box \phi$ is that there is a form F such that F belongs to the same incompatibility range as Ref (φ) and Ref (α) partakes of F.

This schema does not involve us in the difficulties associated with assigning to 'is' some entity that plays a "building-block" role rather than a "glue" role, but it fails at making sense of the "interweaving of the Forms with one another." On this point
Philip (1968: p. 231) gives the following peculiar comment: "[This doctrine of blending] puts a stop to eristical discussions. . . . To argue in the eristical way is quite barbarous and would put an end to philosophical discourse, which comes to pass 'through the mutual (or two-way) weaving together of kinds.'" Presumably then, ordinary discourse is not affected by the "Parmenidean denial of not-being, [whereby] identity is denied, difference is ignored, and opposite predicates are attached without regard to the principles [of blending]." This is clearly a misunderstanding of Parmenides. On the other hand, if Philip does not mean this but rather means something along the lines I have been indicating all along, he is indeed unable to account for the interweaving, for not every sentence specifically illustrates an interweaving of Forms. Kostman's (1973) view of the matter is considerably better thought out but, so far as I see, still has this unfortunate consequence: it cannot account for the interweaving of the forms with one another. If one is a correspondence theorist, the interweaving must be indicated in every sentence, and Schema X just does not do the job. (Of course, the backdrop portion of the mixed theory of Ackrill is not subject to this criticism. It is a hallmark of such theories that not every individual sentence must indicate a specific interweaving; only the backdrop must.)

Sayre (1969: p. 210) offers an account that has the advantages of (2a₂) of Schema X but explicitly embraces an interweaving for its (2a₁). (Actually, his account is not quite like the one I give here as Schema XI; he has negative forms. But his explanation of negative forms in footnote 89 on p. 210 and the discussion on pp. 195–96, especially in footnote 68, seems to make it clear that he would allow this paraphrasing away of negative forms.)


2a₁. The meaning of $\phi$ is $\phi$ is that every form $\text{Ref} (\alpha)$ partakes of is compatible with $\text{Ref} (\phi)$.

2a₂. The meaning of $\phi$ is not $\phi$ is that there is a form $F$ such that $F$ belongs to the same incompatibility range as $\text{Ref} (\phi)$ and $\text{Ref} (\alpha)$ partakes of $F$.

I wish to reject this schema even though it has all the advantages of Schema X and none of the disadvantages (viz., the disadvantage of not being able to account for the *symploke* requirement). One reason for casting a wary eye on it is that it makes "tritification" an interminable business: we have to look to every one of the properties of $\text{Ref} (\alpha)$ in order to decide whether it is in fact $\phi$. This seems a little too much. One can directly observe that Theaetetus is sitting without having to know or even to take cognizance of any other property of Theaetetus. I think it safe to say that Plato nowhere discusses any such necessity; neither does it seem "to constitute a likely and reasonable interpretation of Plato's own distressing brief discussion," as Sayre (1969: p. 211) would have it.

It simply looks (so far) as though we will have to face the fact that there is insufficient interweaving happening to account for the *symploke* requirement.

Frede (1967) advocates a different sort of view. Instead of locating the difference "behind" the predicate (or copula), he finds it "behind" the subject. 18
Schema XII (Frede2):

2α1. The meaning of μα is φ is that Ref (α) partakes of Being in relation to Ref (φ).

2α2. The meaning of μα is not φ is that for all x, if x partakes of Being in relation to Ref (φ), then x is different from Ref (α).

Frede recommends this (2α2) over the (2α2) of Schemata VI through XI because his specifically illustrates Not-Being as a difference from Ref (α), not simply as something different from something that applied to Ref (α) (as Schemata VI through XI would seem to have it). Frede claims that this is decisive (p. 79), but in the spirit of Keturn we can say that at best this is an indicator. Such a move on Frede’s part requires understanding 257b10-c3 in a particular way. It reads: “... what we get by placing ‘not’ before a term indicates something other (tōn allōn ti) than the following words; or rather, from the things indicated by the words pronounced after the negation.” The qualifying clause admits of at best two interpretations, that corresponding to Frede’s interpretation—where the “things indicated” are the (physical) entities falling under the negated concept—and the Owen-Wiggins-Lewis-Philip-Kostman-Cornford interpretation—where the “things indicated” are the Forms corresponding to the predicate. Now, both interpretations can make sense of Not-Being as a particular kind of difference: Frede as “difference from the subject” or alternatively “difference from what falls under the predicate which was negated,” and the opposition theorists as “difference from the predicate which was negated.” I fail to see how the first alternative is so clearly Plato’s meaning that the second alternative can be decisively ruled out.19

One point in favor of (2α2) in all of Schemata VI through XI is that they give a clear-cut understanding to “interweaving of the forms with one another” in negative predications. All the Forms blend with the Different in relation to one another, thereby making discourse possible. The weakness of VI and IX is that their (2α1) does not illustrate an interweaving. A weakness of Schemata VII through IX seems to me also to lie in (2α1), where interweaving amounts only to the Form Being blended with the Form corresponding to the predicate. In Schema XII, (2α2) is the same as it was in Schemata VII through IX; furthermore, here (2α2) reduces even the interweaving for negative sentences to this same weak thing. The only interweaving in (2α2) is exactly that of (2α1): the Form Being with the Form corresponding to the predicate when unnegated. The difference between its (2α1) and its (2α2) is merely in which subjects partake of this blending. It is hard to see why such a “weak” type of interweaving should be so important as to “make all discourse possible.” Frede, too, notices a difference between these two notions of interweaving. On p. 43 (1967), he gives them as:

1. The interweaving between predicate-forms and the Form of Being.
2. The interweaving between the forms which are mentioned in the sentence.

The first kind of interweaving, says Frede, is presupposed by all sentences. The predicate must always have an associated Form that exists. The second type of interweaving,
he continues, is not presupposed by all sentences, e.g., not by 'Theaetetus flies'; thus, Plato must have been thinking of only the first type when he insisted that all discourse is due to such interweaving.

Let us first note the similarity between this and the explanation given by advocates of Schemata I and II. Recall Ross (1951: pp. 115-16): "In the sentence 'Theaetetus is not flying' . . . the Form or universal of flying exists, so in saying the sentence we are not asserting of him something that does not belong to him." Now, Ross's position has been refuted already by many people, one of whom is Frede (1967: p. 80), who says that any interpretation that identifies the meaning of 'is not' with that of 'is different from' will not be able to find an adequate analysis of negative predication, but only of negative identity claims. The interweaving presupposed by the (2a₂) of Schemata I and II, on the one hand, and Schema XII, on the other, are identical; thus, Schemata I and II are no more susceptible to Frede's criticism than his own Schema XII is.

The distinction Frede makes between, on the one hand, the interweaving of the predicate-form and the form of Being and, on the other hand, an interweaving between forms named in the sentence, and his claim that not every sentence illustrates the latter, seem to me to make his final and official position one of a backdrop or mixed theorist. Enough people (e.g., Keyt and Lewis) have, however, interpreted him as a correspondence theorist to make it worthwhile to explore the possibility of attributing Schema XII to Plato and comparing its virtues and defects with those of Schemata VI through XI.

I can see two other rather serious philosophical difficulties with Schema XII that should make us chary of attributing it to Plato. First, let us notice that according to (2a₂) of Schema XII, if neither Socrates nor Theaetetus flies, then 'Socrates does not fly' and 'Theaetetus does not fly' have the same meaning. This is because of (2a₂)’s reference to the class of flying objects, which will be the same in the two cases. Second, and again against the consequent of (2a₂), Frede (1967: p. 78) has paraphrased this consequent as 'x is not y' means '(x is different from z) and (z is y)', where 'z' stands for the class of things that fall under y or else the Form y itself. Thus, some sense must first have been made of (say) 'Theaetetus differs from the members of the class of flying things' before 'Theaetetus is not flying' can be understood in the way Frede gives as his (2a₂). Now, I think it fair to say that Plato nowhere in the megista geni section discusses difference between individuals or between an individual and a class. Frede's evidence for this is 257c1-3, where 'the not x' could be taken to denote the class of things that are not large. But, as I mentioned above, this is not the only interpretation possible. And, though it is not so forced here to read this in Frede's manner, so reading it lends itself to reading other areas in the same way where it is truly implausible (e.g., 256e7 [see Frede, 1967: p. 80] and 257b3-4 [see Frede, 1967: pp. 83-84]). Furthermore, as Wiggins points out (1970: pp. 299-300), such a view will inevitably lead to contradiction because it presupposes the well-definedness of the complement of every class. We can bring this criticism down to a more Platonic level by wondering how it is that Plato thinks (as he would have to if he accepted the present view) he can identify an individual
well enough to be able to distinguish it from others when he has no identifying characteristics or properties to help him. Given that, for example, in ‘Theaetetus is not flying’, we have absolutely no characterizing properties with which to pick out Theaetetus, how is it that we can ever know that the consequent of \(2a_2\) is satisfied?—as we are able since we can (according to Plato) understand the original negative predication. Such considerations show the implausibility of attributing to Plato any interpretation in which ‘is different’ holds between physical objects.\(^{21}\)

Lorenz and Mittelstrass (1966b) are backdrop theorists. Like all such theorists, they believe that language is given legitimacy in virtue of some preexistent blending that occurs among the forms. They are, however, quite certain that for any specific sentence they can indicate some blending. In this sense, they can (for the time being) be classified as correspondence theorists.\(^{22}\) In order to make each sentence indicate specifically an interweaving, they claim that we must understand what we call proper names as examples of a Kind: that to an individual must be specified a characteristic Kind under which the individual falls. They say that the word ‘Theaetetus’ refers to the man Theaetetus and that the word has sense only insofar as one knows a priori that Theaetetus is a man. They give the following schema.

*Schema XIII* (Lorenz and Mittelstrass):

\[
2a_1. \text{The meaning of } \alpha \text{ is } \phi \text{ is that Ref (A}_\alpha \text{) blends with Ref (} \phi \text{).}
\]

\[
2a_2. \text{The meaning of } \alpha \text{ is not } \phi \text{ is that Ref (A}_\alpha \text{) blends with some form } F \text{ in the same incompatibility range as Ref (} \phi \text{).}
\]

where by ‘A’ we are to understand something analogous to “the man Theaetetus” (if “Theaetetus” were substituted for \(\alpha\), “blends with” means “is compatible with,” and “blending with the Different from” means “is incompatible with.”) It is the “A part” of ‘A\(\alpha\)’ that does the blending with Ref (\(\phi\)), and so it is somehow “Man blends with Sitting” that gives the “ground” for the meaning of “Theaetetus is sitting”—but not the sufficient grounds. For that, say Lorenz and Mittelstrass, we need to add the “necessarily true” ‘Theaetetus is a man’.

There seem to me to be several difficulties with Schema XIII. First, even if it is necessarily true that Theaetetus is a man, the blending of the Form Sitting with the Form Man will not be a sufficient “ground” for the truth of ‘Theaetetus is sitting’, for he could be standing while he is still a man and while the Eleatic Stranger (who is also necessarily a man) is sitting. Thus, the supposedly sufficient “grounds” are satisfied, although the sentence is false. Lorenz and Mittelstrass, want to separate the truth and falsity issue from the meaningfulness issue, but can they? If the sentence were ‘Theaetetus is flying’, the meaning should include that the Form Man was blending with the Form Flying. But this does not happen. What we want to say, therefore, is that the sentence is false; however, Lorenz and Mittelstrass, must say that it is meaningless. The relationship between truth and falsity, on the one hand, and the meaning of positive and negative predications, on the other, is clearly this: a sentence is false just in case its negation is true. Thus, if we are to account for the truth or falsity of sentences, we will first have to assign a definite meaning to them. It cannot be sufficient in affirmative sentences to use “compatible” as Lorenz and
Mittelstrass\textsuperscript{1} do in (2a\textsubscript{1}), for this will give rise to precisely the same problem that allowing 'blends with the Different' to mean 'nonidentical' in (2a\textsubscript{2}) of Schema VII (Cornford\textsubscript{2}) did.\textsuperscript{23}

A second difficulty, of course, is their assertion that one is unable to understand a proper name unless one can fit it under a characteristic Kind. Two questions arise: Does Plato hold such a doctrine? And can any sense be made out of it? To the first, the authors refer to the Cratylus, where such a proper name as 'Hermogenes' supposedly occurs clearly as a predicate. I do not propose to discuss that issue here,\textsuperscript{24} but I think we can see that, even if Plato did hold that silly position then, he no longer holds it in the Sophist. He gives the example of the proper name 'Theaetetus' as being of the one who is here before me now, and not necessarily as being characterized as a man. Further, Plato is fairly clear on the distinction between onoma and rhema so that an onoma names an entity to which we will then attribute some rhema. But, if Lorenz and Mittelstrass\textsubscript{1} are right, Plato is horribly confused, since there are no onomata but rather everything is (at least in part) a rhema. And this clearly contradicts Plato's present use of the terms. (Compare the criticisms above of Schema IV.) Thus, it seems clear that Plato did not hold this view in the Sophist. Furthermore, the whole view seems incoherent. Why was 'Man' picked out for Theaetetus? Perhaps Lorenz and Mittelstrass have some view about "essential properties"—something that I think no one has ever attributed to Plato, something that is acknowledged to be new with Aristotle. In a confusing footnote (p. 138), they say that the Form Wise or perhaps the Form Philosopher might be used for Socrates. If so, it would be tautological to say that Socrates is wise or that he is a philosopher, and surely that will not do. Why did we not use the Form Sitting in talking about the sitting Theaetetus? Obviously, Lorenz and Mittelstrass\textsubscript{1} do not hold anything like Aristotle's doctrine of essential properties nor anything like anyone has ever held (an essential property of X must at least be a property of X that X always has, and their examples of 'philosopher' and 'wise' do not fit this). We should not saddle Plato with an indefensible theory that in any case does not appear in the text under consideration. For similar remarks, see Guthrie (1978: p. 161) and Sayre (1969: p. 209, fn. 87).

**SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CORRESPONDENCE THEORIES**

What then should be our conclusions concerning correspondence theories? That is, if we were to grant that Plato's thought here is to be explicated as his use of the philosopher's language in the way called for by a correspondence theory, which of Schemata I through XIII should he be viewed as holding? I think that, if we continue to view the Sophist as a refutation of Parmenides' Problem in the form presented by the standard interpretation, we can apply Principles of Charity of Interpretation to come up with an answer. Reasons have been adduced along the way, but perhaps we should here adjudicate among them.

First, it seems clear, we should rule out Schemata I through IV on the grounds that they do not solve Parmenides' Problem (this alongside any textual problems one
may find with them). The other schemata all give some solution to Parmenides' Problem, and so we must look to other features of these schemata to determine whether Plato is to be credited with them. Schema V is to be ruled out, I think, for various reasons. For one thing, there is some textual difficulty in attributing to Plato a "negative counterpart of to pros allo." Also, on philosophical grounds, there are the problems involved with finding a "connector form" (this "negative counterpart") for sentences concerned with denying that there is any connection (e.g., particular negatives) and those problems concerned with introducing forms that the "opposition" would not recognize. Schema VI makes all true negative sentences necessarily true and makes the determination of the falsity of false affirmative sentences "an interminable business." For these reasons, it should be rejected if a better account is available. (We might also note in passing that, according to Schema VI, not every sentence explicitly mentions an interweaving of two forms. For a correspondence theorist, this failure amounts to an inability to account for the symplōkē eido'n. I will return to this issue shortly.) Schema VII is inadequate because it assigns the wrong properties to 'not'. (And it, too, cannot account for the symplōkē eido'n.) Schema VIII is inadequate because it, too, makes falsification "an interminable business." It furthermore assigns to 'is' an ontological correlate, the form Being, thereby leaving us with no syntactical correlate to the "ontological glue" of partaking of. I find this quite a serious problem; so serious that in discussing Schema IX (which I found to have only this one drawback) I recommended against it in favor of Schema X even though Schema X is unable to account for the symplōkē eido'n. Identifying the role of "building blocks" versus "glue" both in syntax and in ontology is crucial to a proper understanding of the point of the philosopher's language. I find that commentators who assume that the form Being will turn the trick for symplōkē eido'n just have not thought enough about the whole point of a "correspondence theory of language/ontology," or else they would realize that this move effectively undercuts the whole project. (More on this point in the "mixed theories" section below.) I found Schema XI inferior to Schema X even though it could account for the symplōkē requirement and even though X and XI had the same account of negative predication. Its fault was making the meaning of a positive sentence intolerably difficult. Schema XII makes 'α is not φ' and 'β is not φ' mean the same, even if Ref(α) and Ref(β) are distinct. It furthermore guarantees inconsistency because it assumes the well-definedness of the complement of every class and thereby commits Plato to thinking he can identify "all members of the class of nonflying objects" in the complete absence of any other identifying features. Therefore, I reject Schema XII. Schema XIII would attribute to Plato some (incoherent) doctrine of essential properties; it furthermore confuses falsity with meaninglessness and (if taken strictly as a correspondence theory) confuses truth with presupposition-satisfaction.

In sum, then, the best of the correspondence theories is seen to be Schema X, in spite of its inability to explain the symplōkē. We have still, however, to consider backdrop theorists and the whole question of whether Plato is to be considered a correspondence theorist or a backdrop theorist.
BACKDROP THEORISTS

Officially, I have characterized (Platonic) backdrop theorists as those who believe that the world of forms exhibits some particular interweavings that give legitimacy to language but that these interweavings are not to be correlated in any one-to-one way with individual sentences as demanded by the correspondence theorists. In fact, though, different commentators have taken this route for different reasons. One reason to take it would be if one wanted to be a correspondent theorist but felt that \(2a_1\) did not mention enough forms to perform a **symplekê**, for instance, Schema VII or Schema X. And then such a commentator might point to the backdrop to show that, nonetheless, the predicate-form blended with Being (for example) and, hence, the **symplekê** requirement is satisfied.\(^{25}\) The other sort of justification for a backdrop theory is the view that the backdrop gives us **preconditions** for the use of language. Behind no sentence should we look for a particular **symplekê** \(eidôn\). Rather, we should view the relationships among the Forms as general presuppositions for the possibility of a language at all. There must be concepts available for us so that we can use them in comparing two things and other concepts available so that we can distinguish things in order for us to carry on discourse. Ackrill\(^{2}\) (1955) officially views the role of the Forms and their interconnections as providing us with just that; the general words in language that refer to the Forms that “pick up” these interconnections guarantee meaningful discourse. The “interweaving of Forms” is in a way antecedent to language, and, thus, we need not force ourselves to look at each sentence to find some interwoven Forms lurking about. In a similar vein, Lorenz and Mittelstrass\(^{2}\) (1966b) view the interweaving behind (say) singular affirmative sentences in which the subject is a man as being given legitimacy by the form **Man** -participating\(^{26}\) in the predicate form. This is a **presupposition** of the sentence in this sense: if the sentence is true, then this participation must happen. But it is unclear what Lorenz and Mittelstrass\(^{2}\) attribute to Plato in case the requisite participation does not hold—whether the sentence is simply false, necessarily false, or meaningless or “the issue of truth and falsity does not arise.” Finally, there are the views of Lee\(^{2}\) and Lewis\(^{2}\) who hold that

Plato is little concerned either with the truth-conditions of a negative sentence, or with supplying the details that will give a materially adequate account of such sentences. Instead, he is concerned almost exclusively with stating what is needed if we are to understand a negative predicate, and if it is to have a determinate meaning (Lewis, 1976: p. 105).

The idea here is that Plato will construct enough of the backdrop (“say what is needed if . . . [a negative predicate] is to have a determinate sense”) that the details of “a materially adequate account” of negative sentences could be straightforwardly formulated.

The first two kinds of backdrop theories mentioned in the last paragraph—those in which a **symplekê** \(eidôn\) is achieved by virtue of Being interweaving with the predicate-form but in which the determinate meaning of a sentence can be given a la \(2a_1\) and \(2a_2\) and those in which the **symplekê** \(eidôn\) is more pervasive than
this and yet the determinate meaning of a sentence is still to be accounted for by a
(2a₁) and (2a₂)—type of correspondence—are more profitably viewed as mixed theo-
ries and will be treated in the next section.

Let us deal here with the other two theories, which are properly called "back-
drop theories." We should spend some time trying to decide whether any of these
theories can form an answer to Parmenides' Problem.²⁷ The question we must ask
is how these theories propose to deal with the troublesome negative sentences. It is
rather difficult to deal with backdrop theorists here, since they could all have a very
complex backdrop in mind—one complex enough to embrace a large number of the
interweavings mentioned by our correspondence theorists. Thus, Ackrill, for example,
might not only believe that there is the sort of interweaving mentioned explicitly in
Schema X but also that there is interweaving of Being with every form and also the
interweaving mentioned explicitly in Schema VI.²⁸ When the theory has so many
possible kinds of interweaving that could be worked into it, it is difficult to know
exactly where to criticize it. For this reason, we will attribute to the theories under
consideration only the minimal interweavings that are mentioned by their authors
and act as though the theory denied any further interweavings. Possibly this is un-
fair to some of the theorists, but at least it will have the effect of forcing such the-
orists to be more explicit in their account of the symplokē eidoù.

The backdrop theory of Lorenz and Mittelstrass³⁰ does not, it seems to me,
show either how the philosopher's language can be said to exhibit reality or how
Parmenides' Problem is to be solved. According to premise 3 of Parmenides' Pro-
b lem, if some state of affairs exists in the world, some true sentence can express it.
And, by premise 2, this true sentence will exhibit the meaning of that sentence. In
a god-school—those antimaterialist philosophers (including Plato) opposed to the
"giants" of 248—this will amount to showing the relations among particulars and
forms and among the forms. The fault with the Lorenz-Mittelstrass³₀ backdrop is
that it does not give sufficient structure to do this. Consider again 'Theaetetus is
sitting'. The relevant part of the backdrop has Theaetetus partaking of Man and
Man I-participating with Sitting. But, far from giving the meaning of the original
sentence, this backdrop does not even get sufficient truth-conditions (since the
sentence could be false and the backdrop occur anyway). What needs to be added
to their account is that it is the Theaetetus "part" of the form Man that blends with
Sitting.²⁹

The views of Lee³¹ and Lewis³² can be similarly criticized. Lewis does not really
hold the view expressed in Schema VI; indeed, he thinks that any such "particulariza-
tion" drastically overinterprets the text and that Plato should not be seen as trying
to formulate any such account that might be "materially adequate." According to
Lewis³², it is an inappropriate criticism of an interpretation of Plato here to point
out that its account of negation will not work; rather, he says, Plato is only trying
to give "a definite sense" to negative sentences and is not trying to give their truth-
conditions. However, according to the standard interpretation of Parmenides' Pro-
b lem, the two cannot be separated. According to that formulation, it is required that
any successful counterproposal be able to specify precisely the "fact described by
the negative sentence.” This simply amounts to giving the truth-conditions for a negative sentence.

It appears that the ploy taken by Lorenz and Mittelstrass, by Lewis, and by Lee of understanding the backdrop to give necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of sentences (i.e., for the possibility of their being either true or false) cannot serve as a solution to Parmenides’ Problem. Such a backdrop simply does not touch upon the heart of the difficulty as stated in the problem. What is further required is precisely what these writers deny: a statement of the precise configuration of “reality” that gives meaning to the troublesome sentences. Without this, Parmenides’ Problem continues undiminished in force in precisely its original form.30

**MIXED THEORIES**

The upshot of the preceding discussion would seem to indicate that backdrop theories are doomed as accounts of an adequate response to Parmenides’ Problem, since, if a backdrop theory does give “a precise characterization of reality” for every sentence, it is no longer a backdrop theory but instead is a correspondence theory. This is not quite right. One can have a correspondence theory “tacked on” to a backdrop theory. The backdrop is to give the “grounds” or “presuppositions” of language in general (and incidentally account for the **symplōkē eido̱n**), while the correspondence part is to give a determinate portion of the backdrop as the meaning of each ordinary sentence.

Let us start by recalling the remarks of Frede (1967: p. 43). He says that there are two types of interweaving,

1. The interweaving between predicate-forms and the form of Being.
2. The interweaving between the forms which are mentioned in the sentence.

Frede points to the first type of interweaving as meeting the requirement that discourse demands an interweaving of forms with one another. Any commentator who holds a correspondence theory can adopt this view and become a kind of mixed theorist. For example, the holders of Schemata VI and X, who do not explicitly make Being part of their correspondence theory, might adopt this in order to account for Plato’s insistence on a **symplōkē eido̱n**.

But will it do the job? What is at issue with these kinds of mixed theories is not how well they solve Parmenides’ Problem, for that is a job for their (2a4) to tackle. Instead, they have to show how the interweaving of Being with every form would lead Plato to say that “the possibility of any discourse we can have **owes its existence**” to this kind of interweaving. As I said in discussing Schemata IX and XII, such a weak requirement simply does not give sufficient reason for Plato to make this bold assertion. After all, this kind of interweaving was introduced without objection as being “obvious” to everyone; if that were all there was to Plato’s insistence on interweaving, he could have deleted the intervening parts of his discussion. I will not dwell further on this “weak” backdrop theory; at the very least it needs to have further kinds of blending included in its backdrop in order to account for
the necessity of having such a symplokē eidōn. One way to add such further blendings is in the manner of Ackrill2, to which I will now turn.

Ackrill2 (1955, 1957) claims that the backdrop contains all of the various relations that hold among the forms. For example, it includes the blending of Being with every form, it includes the establishment of incompatibility ranges of forms by their blending with the Different with respect to one another, and it perhaps also includes the relation among forms that has variously been called "Pauline Predication" (by Peterson [1973] and Vlastos [1972, 1973]) or "A-participation" (by Lorenz and Mittelstrass [1966b]) or "B-participation" (by Lewis [1974] and by myself in Pelletier [forthcoming]). The structure of this backdrop is more fully investigated in Pelletier (forthcoming), especially in connection with how it is to be expressed in the philosopher's language. For now I will simply note that, according to this mixed theory, the Platonic insistence upon a symplokē eidōn is understandable. If there were none of this kind of interweaving, then indeed language would be impossible. It is quite clear, therefore, that this mixed theory is preferable to the other mixed theory mentioned above. And, since it accords symplokē such a prominent role in accounting for discourse, it clearly is preferable to those correspondence theories that do not have a sufficient amount of interweaving (i.e., do not have at least two forms blending for every sentence), such as Schemata VI and X.

I had said before that Schema X is the best of the correspondence theories. The present considerations make the Ackrill2 mixed theory preferable to any of the correspondence theories, so long as it retains all the advantages of Schema X. It does, of course, retain all these advantages because the correspondence portion of this mixed theory is precisely Schema X. The backdrop is to give all the relations among the forms, but for sentences about physical objects (e.g., Theaetetus) Schema X yields a translation into the philosopher's language that shows what "partakings" and so on are to be superadded to the backdrop in order to describe reality adequately. For this reason, the Ackrill2 mixed theory is clearly preferable to any of the pure backdrop theories, since they do not address themselves to the issue of sufficient truth-conditions (or, as we might say in light of Parmenides' Problem, to the issue of sufficient meaningfulness conditions).

A few more things in favor of this view should be mentioned before I attempt to deal with the traditional criticisms: (a) It solves Parmenides' Problem. A part of the "concept-network" provided by the Forms includes the relation of incompatibility of certain predicates. Thus, 'Theaetetus is not flying' can be treated as though it meant that Theaetetus did something incompatible with flying. (When applied to some particular sentence, the account looks very much like Schema X. But it is incorrect to say that this account is merely an account of interweaving "behind" each individual sentence; it is rather an account of what happens "behind" language in general.) (b) The account of the truth of such sentences is at least as straightforward (in contrast to, say, Moravcsik's or Lorenz and Mittelstrass—in Schema V or Schema XII): Theaetetus is sitting (say) and that precludes his flying. (c) It does not make "synthetic" sentences "necessary," as some of the other semantical accounts did. (d) It does not force recourse to properties known a priori or to "unique characteristics."
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(c) It does not force us to look to "all the properties a thing has," nor does it assume the well-definedness of the complement of every well-defined class—thereby neither making falsification an ineliminable business or "trivialization" an ineliminable business nor guaranteeing a contradictory system. (f) It does not gratuitously add new Forms to the ontology, in the way either Moravcsik (Schema V) or the believers in "negative" Forms (Lee, and Frede) want to add some unusual Forms. Remember that the existence of Forms has not really been granted yet by the Sophists—they are waiting to see whether a coherent theory can be built up out of them. If we had to make up unusual Forms, especially ones Plato's opponents would naturally be inclined not to believe in ("negative" Forms), the Sophists will have won. Ackrill's account merely makes Plato have to point to relations that we are prepared to admit prior to philosophical wondering.

Let me now mention some of the traditional criticisms of this view and try to ease anxieties on at least a few points. The usual criticism is that Ackrill's account presupposes an "incompatibility" reading and that this is impossible. I have already dealt with this objection in Pelletier (1975), trying to show that it is possible to read the account of negation given in the Sophist in an "incompatibility" manner (although it is not necessary to do so). It is true that Ackrill did not try to justify it, but he could have, possibly along the lines I suggested. The same criticism, although perhaps from a slightly different perspective, is made by Lorenz and Mittelstrass (1966b). They object that, though there is incompatibility presupposed in 251–259, "interweaving" cannot be taken to include "incompatibility" since the blenders, partakings, communions, etc., mentioned in 251–259 are all "positive" and never meant as "separation" (pp. 121–22). Moravcsik makes a similar objection (1960: p. 122). He claims that the "blending and communion of Forms" in 253–258 is nonsymmetric, whereas "incompatibility" is symmetrical. Thus, interweaving cannot mean any of the relations to be found earlier.

The answer to this problem was already to be found in Ackrill (1957). The phrase 'weaving together of Forms' is obviously supposed to be a very broad concept (i.e., to contain many different subconcepts), and the concepts so contained are all the relations that have been mentioned as holding between the Forms (e.g., 'partakes of', 'blends with', 'blends with the Different from'). Even though the first relation might not be symmetrical, the second sometimes is and the last clearly is. This last, which is explained in 257–258C, is part of the key to the concept of 'weaving together to the Forms'. Although the first two show which (and how) Forms blend together, the last shows which (and how) Forms do not blend together. With this full sense of 'weave together', we can see how it is that this relation can be symmetrical and yet the particular subrelations into which it can be broken up (like 'partakes of') might not all be symmetrical. And, furthermore, we now know where the "separation" sense of "interweaving" is to be found: in "blending with the Different from." (Ackrill's example of this is 'is a relative of', which is symmetric, whereas particular kinds of relations, e.g., 'is a father of', are not.)

Lorenz and Mittelstrass (1966b: p. 122) also object that Ackrill's account cannot explain the later discussion of falsity. Above, I objected that Lorenz and
Mittelstrass’s Schema XIII, or their backdrop theory, either cannot make sense of the meaningfulness of affirmative singular sentences or else it cannot make sense of the falsity of them. Ackrill can make sense of both. First, Ackrill’s account gives direct sense to affirmative singular sentences; second, his account of Not-Being gives an indirect sense to negative singular sentences that in turn allows the falsity of an affirmative singular sentence to consist in its negation being true. As the formula at 260C puts the matter, falsity consists in Not-Being combining with logos.

CONCLUSION

It is clear, therefore, that a mixed theory is preferable to either a pure correspondence theory or a pure backdrop theory. Pure backdrop theories are unable to deal adequately with Parmenides’ Problem because they do not give a determinate sentence of the philosopher’s language (which displays the “reality” asserted by the ordinary sentence of which it is a translation) that will show how the Parmenidean argument can be avoided. Pure correspondence theories either have Plato giving philosophically implausible accounts of how to avoid Parmenides’ Problem (and are thus to be ruled out by the Principles of Charity of Interpretation) or, if they give adequate accounts of this matter, find themselves unable to explain Plato’s insistence on the symploke eidoí. Only the mixed theories can do both; and, of the two mixed theories considered, Ackrill’s is clearly superior.

We have found a way around Keyt’s textual problems. Just because a number of divergent readings can be given to the text, all of which are self-consistent, it does not follow that there is no way to choose among them. We find the problem Plato thought he solved, and the Principles of Charity of Interpretation tell us that, of the textually possible solutions, we should pick the best. In my opinion, of the published works this is still Ackrill’s.

There are, however, some problems remaining. I have occasionally mentioned in passing that the structure of the backdrop needs to be more fully specified. I would lump all these sorts of deficiencies under the heading “What is the meaning of sentences with form-names in subject position?” Another problem as yet unresolved is: With what shall we replace premise (2b) of Parmenides Problem? These questions will be answered in Pelletier (forthcoming), but for now this is as far as I can go.31

Notes

2. The subscripts indicate different interpretations of our commentators.
3. Some of the correspondence theories to be discussed do not, in fact, extricate Plato from Parmenides’ Problem. This is presumably because they do not see Parmenides’ argument to be the one given by the standard interpretation. I include them nonetheless on the grounds that we can now give a definite reason why they are incorrect in their interpretation of Plato.
6. As Frede (1967: pp. 92–94) points out, the Politics is later than the Sophist and therefore may represent yet another shift in Plato’s theory of forms.
7. Lewis (1976) holds a view very similar to Lee's. (See Lewis's fn. 40.) I later entertain this view, calling it Lewis, and Lee.

8. For discussion of this and how it affects the philosopher's language, see Pelletier, forthcoming.

9. Again, the various possibilities will be discussed in Pelletier, forthcoming.

10. See Lorenz and Mittelstrass, 1966b; p. 126, fn. 81.

11. Moravcsik has apparently changed his mind on some of these matters. See Moravcsik, 1976: p. 744, fn. 4.

12. This is not really Lewis's view of the matter but rather one that results from forcing him to be a correspondence theorist. His true view is what I call Lewis, which is discussed under "backdrop theorists."

13. Keyt's (1973) comment that Cornford's explanation here is "incomplete" and Cornford really meant "contrariety" and "non-identity," seems to me incorrect. Cornford explicitly wants "blending with the Different from" to be nonidentity (1935: p. 290) — however, it is true that his later discussion of "falsity" on pp. 311-17 does not make much sense for the reasons noted in the text.

14. Frede (1967: pp. 78-79) makes a related criticism based on his analysis of two uses of 'is' in the Sophriz. He claims that there is such a use of 'is not' but that it is so rare and artificial that one can hardly expect Plato to try to interpret all uses of 'is not y' according to it. (Schema VII 2[a] is Frede's 2[b] on p. 78.)

15. Note that (2a₂) of Schemata VI and VIII are not the same in spirit of their superficial similarity. Schema VI says, "Here is a number of Forms, \( φ_1, φ_2, φ_3, \ldots \); are they distinct from each?" The answer is "yes (or no) — and necessarily so." The parenthetical remark after (2a₂) merely tells us how to take hold of the Forms \( φ_1, φ_2, φ_3, \ldots \) but is not a part of the condition proper. This is not the case with Schema VIII. Here, thanks to the bound variable 'F', we have a nonnecessary claim in spirit of the fact that the consequent is necessary for all substitution instances of 'F'. Of course, it is possible that Owen intended (2a₂) of Schema VIII instead of that of Schema VI. In such a case, this "third objection" would not hold of his view, although the first and second still would.

16. Keyt (1973), of course, claims there is no decisive way to resolve the issue on textual grounds. He feels that an ambiguity in beteros will allow both sides to have their day in text. Many writers (e.g., Owen, Frede) find absolutely no justification for (2a₂) of Schema IX. Frede (1967: p. 79) says that beteros can never be replaced by 'incompatible' and that it is neither compatible with the train of thought nor justified by the text. I think I have adequately refuted this view in Pelletier, 1975.

17. I am not sure exactly how this argument should run. In the sentences given by Plato, there is no word corresponding to 'is' (the sentences could best be translated 'Thetetetus sits', 'Thetetetus flies'), and thus the so-called "syntactic glue" is not there as a unit but merely in the words' interweaving. So, we have to invent our "ontological glue" anyway. But, if this is the case, it is indeed unclear why anyone would want to put the Form Being into every predication. (Moravcsik's reason was to get it "behind" the copula, but, if there is no copula, there seems no reason to get it at all.)

18. For cases I am considering, where a is taken to indicate an individual, Frede (1967) uses '... is, ...', which indicates that the predicate does not express what belongs necessarily to the subject (p. 33). And this I have expressed by 'partake of Being in relation to', which seems to be what follows from his discussion on, e.g., pp. 33-44, especially pp. 37-38 and 43, and p. 82. (2a₂) is stated on p. 79 as his (1'), but see also his discussion on p. 78. The 'partakes of Being in relation to' in (2a₂) may be slightly incorrect, for Frede intends not only '... is, ...' but also his '... ...', where the predicate indicates precisely what is indicated by the subject. For the case of individuals as subjects, however, this seems to make no difference. In any case, it is probably more accurate to treat Frede as a mixed theorist.

19. In a previous publication (Pelletier, 1975), I tried to justify yet another possible reading
of this passage in terms of "incompatibility." I think that the strict textual evidence does not rule any of these out. For similar feelings, see Keyt, 1973.

20. I will here treat this term (Prädikatsbegriff) as though it meant the Form corresponding to the predicate, since his explanation immediately after seems to demand it ("Die erste Art von Vergildung von Formen wird von allen Sätzen vorausgesetzt. Dem Prädikat muss in sinnvollen Sätzen immer eine Form zugeordnet sein, die ist.") But he does not always seem to have this in mind. Immediately before (p. 42), he seems to distinguish 'Begriff' from 'Form': "If there is no concept or no Form corresponding to expressions like 'summtexis', 'blending,' etc., in virtue of which they are meaningful, then to that extent all these theories are meaningless." This seems to presuppose a "building-block" role for 'blending'—something we have already discarded. Frede goes on to say (p. 43): "... the interweaving of motion and rest on the one hand and Being on the other in the first argument [251E7-252A11] is to be understood exactly as the interweaving between blending and Being in the second argument [252B1-252B6], namely as an interweaving between the predicate-concept and the Form of Being. As the preceding discussion on 242-250 has shown, these last two are different whenever the predicate '... is being' is not word-for-word used. Only on the grounds of this interweaving are sentences, wherein the corresponding predicate is used, meaningful."

21. I believe that Frede, (1967) actually attributes to Plato the idea that the complement of every well-defined set exists. On p. 86, he says that 'not-y' belongs to the things that have a proper essence (eigenes Wesen). This may also account for his belief that the Sophist makes use of "negative" Forms.

22. That is, we will here concentrate on the blending they think gives legitimacy to language and treat it as though it gave the precise sentence of the philosopher's language that would be required if they were correspondence theorists. Thus construed, they are Lorenz and Mittelstrass, to be distinguished from the actual position they hold. Lorenz and Mittelstrass,.

23. Thus (2a,) does not give the required correspondence for (say) 'Theaetetus sits'; rather, it gives something like "Man is compatible with Sitting" (or in their terminology, Man I-partakes of Sitting). In some sense, this gives the "grounds" for the truth of the sentence or gives a presupposition of the sentence; but it does not give necessary and sufficient truth-conditions; nor does it give the meaning of the sentence. Since Lorenz and Mittelstrass are really backdrop theorists, such objections need not tell against them, but they do tell against our straw people Lorenz and Mittelstrass, who take Schema XIII as a correspondence theory.

24. See Lorenz and Mittelstrass, 1966a; Pfeiffer, 1972; Weingartner, 1970; and Richardson, 1976 for further discussion of this matter.

25. It is possible to read many of our correspondence theorists in this manner, e.g., the holders of Schemata VII through IX, but none of them are explicit enough on the point for me to be able to decide how to take them, and so I have simply read them as correspondence theorists.

26. Reminder: (form) A I-participates in (form) B if and only if A is compatible with B (that is, if and only if some A is B).

27. It might be objected here that I have begged the question against Leò and Lewis, since (as Lewis says in the quotation given) they hold that Plato is not concerned with trying to formulate truth-conditions for negative sentences (i.e., is not trying to give any replacement for Parmenides' premise [2]). The charge against me is accurate but is one that any of the commentators under consideration might bring up in his defense. (I suppose all the commentators would think that the failure of their schemata to solve Parmenides' Problem merely showed that Plato was not concerned with Parmenides' Problem as I gave it. To them I reissue my challenge: give a possible interpretation of Parmenides so that your schema shows how the problem is to be solved.)

28. Since the Schema VI interweaving is a logical consequence of the Schema X interweaving.

29. Lorenz and Mittelstrass (1966b) note that they have not given sufficient conditions (e.g., see pp. 142-43), but they do not see a problem here. They apparently have a different conception of what the philosopher's language is supposed to be like than what I am advocating here. (See their discussion on pp. 133-34, which, nonetheless, does not seem to me to confront the
issue adequately. Indeed, it seems only to be an argument in favor of having some backdrop or other and not an argument about whether correspondence theories are a necessary adjunct.) Again, I place the burden upon them to interpret explicitly Parmenides in such a way that their remarks about a backdrop (and, in particular, their specific kind of backdrop) become relevant.

30. Again, of course, a different understanding of Parmenides might make this sort of backdrop theory relevant. These writers, therefore, must give us an account of Parmenides that does this.

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