BOOK REVIEWS — COMPTES RENDUS

BODY AND MIND, By Keith Campbell. Doubleday Anchor Books, Garden City, N.Y., 1970; 150 + vi. $1.45

This book is a good text for an introductory course in the philosophy of mind. Perhaps its most striking feature is the methodological assumption that "The philosophical inquiry takes its material from the sciences" (p. 12), so that while the scientist establishes particular truths, the philosopher has "the role of making from those truths, by critical reflection and review, a coherent world vision" (p. 12). In consequence Campbell's book is primarily a review and critique of philosophical theories. He confines his treatment to a single important problem in the philosophy of mind, the mind-body problem, "What is the relation, in a man, between his mind and his body?" (p. 1). In Chapter I his first project is to define the problem: "As a first step, we must get clear what we are thinking about in using the terms 'body' and 'mind'". Then he sets out and explains a group of reasonable assumptions which he expects any satisfactory theory to justify. For example, his "assumptions of individuality" is simply the assumption that "each normal adult has a mind, has only one mind, and has a mind nobody else has" (p. 6). He also stresses the importance of the Mind-Body problem, with regard for instance to the fact that the study of it can teach us how different issues come to be linked together in philosophy. When we see their connection with the Mind-Body problem we can understand why some men really care about such questions as "What is a cause?" 'What is a substance?' 'What is a disposition?' which at first sight are academic, dusty, and pathologically irrelevant to human concerns (p. 10).

Chapter 2 ("How the Mind-Body Problem Arises") is a discussion of an "inconsistent tetrad": (1) The human body is a material thing; (2) The human mind is a spiritual thing; (3) Mind and body interact; (4) Spirit and matter do not interact. (We note here that this tetrad is not formally inconsistent. Two more premises are needed, namely that a human body exists and that a human mind exists. The former is not problematic, but surely behaviourists do not object to (2) as Campbell says, but rather to the very existence of a mind.) Spirituality and materiality are defined; consciousness and intentionality are rejected as marks of the mental; and a case is made for the initial plausibility of all four propositions in the tetrad, with the result that a wide variety of matters is discussed, including "category mistakes", the nature of causality, and parapsychology.

Chapter 3 ("Dualisms") is a critique of dualist doctrines, which either affirm the interaction of spirit and matter, pace proposition (4) in the tetrad, or else deny that mind and body interact, contra (3). Campbell's criticisms concentrate on familiar difficulties with spiritual substance — identifying it, individuating it, scientifically investigating it, reconciling its causal efficacy with the increasing inadequacy of physiological explanations of behavior, and so on.

Chapter 4 ("The Behaviorist Solution") explains the behaviourist's characteristic dispositional analysis of mental terms. Campbell's major criticisms are two. Behaviourism does not account for the causal efficacy of the mind (since angry-behaviour, say, is not caused by anger, but is rather an exemplification of it); nor does it account for the existence of introspectible mental episodes.

Chapter 5 ("Central-State Materialism") is the best chapter in the book. Campbell argues for "the Causal Theory of mind", the theory that "mental states are typically states with a causal role in disposing men to certain forms of behavior (p. 79)". Then he considers interpreting the Causal Theory as the Central-State Materialist does, that is, viewing mental states as material. He considers a number of objections to Materialism, but he gives the greatest weight to an argument from an "imitation man", whose behaviour is like ours, and the internal causes of that behaviour are like ours, but he lacks the kind of awareness that we have. He tries to show that Materialism "leaves us with a set of seemings, acts of imperfect apprehension", which the imitation man, who satisfies the materialist's theoretical demands, does not have.

This conclusion leads him into a speculative venture in the final chapter ("The New Epiphenomenalism"), in which Central-State Materialism is modified to make room for a non-material class of epiphenomenal seemings (also called appearances, experiences, acts of imperfect apprehension, awarenesses). The mind is now both physical — as pain is, and non-physical — as the awareness of pain is. Campbell is aware of some of the odd consequences of this theory, as when he admits that, if the New Epiphenomenalism is true, "it is not the hurtfulness of pain which causes me to shun it nor the sweet taste of sugar which drives me to seek it (p. 111)."

Many would wish to shun the New Epiphenomenalism and seek another theory, and with good reason. Besides the odd consequences that Campbell notes, the theory is seriously flawed by
the lack of an adequate analysis of the alleged class of seemings. He does not explore or even acknowledge the possibility that the experience of going abroad might just be the experience, going abroad; that the awareness of being in pain might simply amount to being in pain; that a pain might seem to be excruciating because one has an excruciating pain, not because there exists a separate "thing", a "seeming".

If this line of attack is successful then Materialism is back in business. At least one version of Dualism is also still available, namely the Double Causation variant, which Campbell describes as the theory that "both spiritual and material conditions are separate but complete causes of some particular brain events (p. 52)". He dismisses this far too quickly as 'an incoherent idea'. Double causation is clearly not in itself incoherent. We run into it in everyday life all the time: a car parked on a hill might be prevented from rolling down both because the emergency brake is on and because it's in gear (and each separately would prevent it). Perhaps Campbell should say that in such a case we have independent grounds for believing that each would prevent it separately, and that's why we can believe in double causation. But that in the mind/body case we have no such independent justification and hence cannot rationally posit double causation. However, his discussion of the "imitation man" would seem to indicate that the idea is coherent, for the "imitation man" has only one of the causes operating. Thus dualism in this form would be back in the game. The fact is that such a theory has been developed coherently and plausibly by Alvin Goldman and others (See for example Chapter 5 of Goldman's A Theory of Human Action, where the doctrine of Double Causation is introduced in the idea that mental and physical events are "simultaneous nomic equivalents"). As for the Behaviourist, he will undoubtedly quarrel with Campbell's confident assertion that "A doctrine with which it is hard to quarrel is that in our very understanding of what a mind is there proves to be an idea of the inner causation of behaviour" (p. 98).

Then of course there are those who reject the whole procedure of constructing philosophical theories, as well as those who would take exception to the view that "Science and philosophy are related as ingredients and cake" (p. 12).

University of Alberta

W.E. Cooper
F.J. Pelletier