

<b>Friday, 13 October</b>	
<b>19.00-20.00</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>The Coercion Theory of Rape: A Reform Proposal</i></b> <b>Scott Anderson (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: Angela Cameron (Law, UVic; The FREDA Centre, SFU)
	Chair: Ann Levey (UofC)
	Recent efforts to reform the law of rape have focused on the non-consensual nature of the activity the assailant imposes on his victim. This talk urges instead that law focus on the assailant's use of coercion to achieve his sexual aims. After exhibiting the difference between these approaches, I argue that the coercion theory of rape better tracks the nature of the wrong of rape, including the role rape plays in sustaining male gender dominance.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Heidegger's Nietzsche on Technology</i></b> <b>Paul Catanu (Montréal)</b>
	Commentator: Steven Teubeneck (German, UBC)
	Chair: Bruce Baugh (TRU)
	Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as a point of access to his interpretation of modern technology: Martin Heidegger provided a series of lecture-courses during the period 1936-1944 on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The aim of this communicate will be to elucidate Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. We will assert that Heidegger instrumentalizes Nietzsche and attempts to reduce him to his great antipode Hegel in order to express his own project of a critique of the essence of modern technology.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Moral Schizophrenia: A Second Opinion</i></b> <b>Scott Woodcock (UVic)</b>
	Commentator: Evan Tiffany (SFU)
	Chair: Darren Domskey (UofC)
	In his landmark paper, 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,' Michael Stocker introduces an affliction that is, according to his diagnosis, endemic to all modern ethical theories. Stocker's paper is well known and often cited, yet moral schizophrenia remains a surprisingly obscure diagnosis. My aim will be to argue that if moral schizophrenia is properly understood then it is not necessarily as disruptive as its name suggests.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>True Contradictions and Deflationism about Truth: A Response to Dialetheism</i></b> <b>Jill Isenberg (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: Nicole Wyatt (UofC)
	Chair: Jim Young (UVic)
	Armour-Garb and Beall argue that deflationists not only can, but must be dialetheists. They provide well-reasoned arguments for why deflationism is compatible with dialetheism. However, their claim that dialetheism necessarily follows from deflationism, which turns on the status of the principle of explosion, is problematic. Armour-Garb and Beall provide no reason why arguments for explosion are invalid, and present arguments against its necessity that are question begging at best. Thus, deflationists need not be dialetheists.

<b>Friday evening, first set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Wittgenstein's Absurd Position on the Sense of a Mathematical Proposition</i></b> <b>Vic Rodych (Lethbridge)</b>
	Commentator: Sarah Hoffman (UofS)
	Chair: Vladan Djordjevic (UofA)
	On Wittgenstein's unorthodox view of mathematics, only algorithmically decidable concatenations of 'signs' are mathematical propositions and only decided mathematical propositions have mathematical sense ('Sinn'). On the received view, a mathematical conjecture, e.g., Goldbach's Conjecture, is a genuine mathematical proposition, with a fully determine sense (meaning), even if GC is independent of all existent mathematical calculi. I aim to (1) show why Wittgenstein adopts this radical position on mathematical propositions, and (2) consider some objections to Wittgenstein's view and how he does or might respond.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>All Too Superhuman: Philosophical Problems with Idealized Agents</i></b> <b>Organizer: Tim Kenyon (Waterloo)</b>
	A growing body of work in fields such as philosophy, psychology, and economics raises concerns about the kinds and degree of idealization that have been applied to humans as rational agents. The worry is that the idealized conceptions of agency employed within these disciplines do more than factor out inessential complications in the interest of theoretical simplicity. Rather, they may well depict agents in a significantly mistaken light, and send entire lines of inquiry down garden paths.
	<b>Patricia Marino (Waterloo) <i>The Normative Status of Coherence</i></b>
	One way of securing moral objectivity is by appeal to rationalism. On Michael Smith's recent formulation of this, you have "normative reason" to do whatever you would want yourself to do if you had full information and a maximally coherent, unified, set of desires. I show that Smith's arguments for the rational status of coherence fail, and that this route to moral objectivity therefore fails as well.
	<b>Paul Bartha (UBC) <i>Some Lessons From Infinite Decision Theory</i></b>
	What happens if we lift some human-centered assumptions internal to many conceptions of rational agency? Given the possibility of infinite utility, or an infinite set of possible choices, what happens to traditional decision theory? If it is to be complete, it should be able to handle such cases. What is more, there are connections between such situations and certain real-life choices that a proper theory of rational agency should accommodate.
	<b>Lorraine Besser-Jones (Waterloo) <i>Praise, Blame, and the Desire-Myth</i></b>
	The idea that agents can develop and maintain a consistent set of desires is widely attractive. Defenders of theories of rational agency, instrumentalist views of practical reason, & Aristotelian virtue theories often employ the "desire-myth", holding as ideal the agent whose desires are consistent, and marking as deficient those agents whose desires lack such consistency. But the desire-myth stands on shaky philosophical and empirical grounds.
	<b>Dave Devidi &amp; Tim Kenyon (Wat) <i>Rational Believers Don't Believe in Doxastic Logic</i></b>
	We defend the received view, but on non-received grounds, that certain puzzles about believability (e.g., Moore's) are pragmatic rather than logical paradoxes. We argue that they can't be logical paradoxes since there is no such thing as doxastic logic. The principles governing "rational belief" are pragmatic to the core, so there is nothing left that deserves the name "logic", doxastically speaking. Thus, belief is very different from, e.g., knowledge.

<b>Friday, 13 October (cont'd)</b>	
<b>20.00-21.00</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b>Author Meets Critics: Rob Stainton's <i>Words and Thoughts</i></b>
	Critic: Nicole Wyatt (UofC)
	Critic: Adam Morton (UofA)
	Respondent : Rob Stainton (UWO)
	Chair: Erin Eaker (UWO)
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Merleau-Ponty's 'Hero'</i> Andrew Robinson (Guelph)</b>
	Commentator: Bruce Baugh (TRU)
	Chair: Paul Catanu (Montréal)
	Drawing on Phenomenology of Perception, I outline Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the subject and freedom. Understanding the subject as situated, that is, as 'being in the world' and being with others, allows for an interesting complication of human freedom. I then draw out the ethical implications of Merleau-Ponty 'hero' and test these against passages from Sense and Non-Sense, which deal explicitly with issues of responsibility.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>The Common Structure of Thresholds for Rights and Thresholds for Options</i> Samantha Brennan (UWO)</b>
	Commentator: David Zimmerman (SFU)
	Chair: Evan Tiffany (SFU)
	Two features characterize commonsense morality: rights and options. These features might be responses to two of the ways in which consequentialist ethics can go wrong—allowing some actions which ought to be forbidden and requiring other actions which ought to be merely permissible. I argue that both rights and options have thresholds. First, I explain what thresholds mean in the context of rights and options and motivate the idea that both have thresholds. Second, I give an account of the structure of thresholds for rights. Third, I explore whether thresholds for options share a common structure with thresholds for rights.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Truth, Deflationism, and Correspondence</i> Jim Young (UVic)</b>
	Commentator: Allen Habib (St. Cloud State)
	Chair: Jill Isenberg (UBC)
	Deflationary or minimalist conceptions of truth are now the most widely defended. The correspondence theory of truth, once almost universally accepted, attracts comparatively few advocates. I argue that most, if not all, deflationary conceptions of truth are actually correspondence theories in disguise. The key to my argument is an analysis of T-sentences. I argue that these are not necessarily true and that acceptance of them as true commits one to a substantial theory of truth.

<b>Friday evening, second set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>You Can't Mean That: Yablo's Figuralist Account of Mathematics</i> Sarah Hoffman (UofS)</b>
	Commentator: Phil Hanson (SFU)
	Chair: Vic Rodych (Lethbridge)
	Burgess and Rosen argue Yablo's figuralist account of mathematics fails in saying mathematical claims metaphorical--it is implausible as an account of what mathematicians say and confused about literal language. I show their argument isn't decisive, briefly exploring some questions in the philosophy of language it raises, and argue Yablo's view may be amended to a kind of revolutionary fictionalism not refuted by Burgess and Rosen.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>All Too Superhuman: Philosophical Problems with Idealized Agents</i> Organizer: Tim Kenyon (Waterloo)</b>
	Continued from 19.00

<b>Saturday, 14 October, morning (first set of sessions)</b>	
<b>09.00-09.50</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Does Epistemic Luck Wear Off?</i> Kenneth Boyd (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Myron Penner (TWU)
	Chair: Eric Dayton (UofS)
	Gettier examples in epistemology have shown us that beliefs based solely upon evidence that just-so-happens to be true are not knowledge-worthy. I contend, however, that epistemic luck “wears off”: if premises that are true by matter of luck form only a small part of the basis of our beliefs, then we are intuitively inclined to count those beliefs as capable of producing knowledge.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Diversity and Dissent in Medicine</i> Kirstin Borgerson (UofT)</b>
	Commentator: Leslie Burkholder (UBC)
	Chair: Anito Ho (UBC)
	Diversity is in vogue. But should it be as celebrated in philosophy of science as it is in the political domain? In this paper, I argue that diversity is vital to good science, and, in particular, to good medical research, and that the evidence-based medicine movement has detracted from diversity within medicine. In light of this, I suggest that we have reason to be concerned about evidence-based medicine.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Wittgenstein and Musical Formalism</i> Béla Szabados (Regina)</b>
	Commentator: Stan Godlovich (UofC)
	Chair: Brook Pearson (Roehampton)
	In this paper I argue against the claim that Wittgenstein was a musical formalist. I argue that the attribution of musical formalism obscures, while the break with it I propose explains, the role that music played in the development of his philosophy of language. Rather than assimilating Hanslick’s and Wittgenstein’s views on music, I point to similarities and differences between them, so as to shed light on how they are related to each other.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Too Close For Comfort?: Psychosemantics and the Distal</i> Dan Ryder (Conn)</b>
	Commentator: Darren Abramson (Dal)
	Chair: Tim Schroeder (OSU)
	Naturalistic theories of intentionality typically fail to explain how our mental representations manage to denote distal things rather than mere disjunctions of proximal stimuli. In this paper, I present a neuroscience-based teleosemantic solution to the distality problem. The key observation is that distal entities - especially individuals and kinds - are selectionally relevant to the design of the representational network in the cerebral cortex.

<b>Saturday morning, first set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>An Investment Theory of Parenthood</i> Joseph Millum (UofT)</b>
	Commentator: Elizabeth Brake (UofC)
	Chair: Samantha Brennan (UWO)
	In this paper I develop an investment theory of moral parenthood, according to which parental rights are generated by parental work. This theory is derived from a principle of justice that applies to the acquisition of rights more generally. I argue that, contrary to many people's intuitions, genetic ties are irrelevant to parental rights, and that the investment theory is superior to alternative theories of parenthood. I then apply the theory to two problems in normative ethics.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>Nested Conditionals, Premises and Antecedents</i> Vladan Djordjevic (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Dave Devidi (Waterloo)
	Chair: John Woods (UBC/ King's College, London)
	In this paper I consider McGee's counterexample to modus ponens. I comment on several solutions proposed by other authors and propose my own.

<b>Saturday, 14 October, morning cont'd (second set of sessions)</b>	
<b>10.00-10.50</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Information, Internalism, and Testimony</i></b> <b>Roger Clarke (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: Martin Godwyn (SFU/BCIT)
	Chair: Patrick Rysiew (UVic)
	Recent papers by Graham and Lackey aim to replace the standard "transmission" model of testimonial knowledge with an information-theoretic model. Their arguments are built on several supposed counterexamples to the standard model; I examine these, concluding that they fail to do away with the standard model. I then offer a new example which I claim refutes the informational model.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Trusting Those Who Slice, Burn, and Poison Us: A Case in Bioethics</i></b> <b>Anita Ho (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: May Yoh (Brandon)
	Chair: Kristin Borgerson (UofT)
	Despite bioethicists' enthusiastic support for patient autonomy, many patients indicate in surveys that they trust their physicians and prefer to go along with their recommendations rather than deliberate and choose a particular medical option on their own. This essay explores Baier's and Kant's respective notions of the good will and argues that patients cannot make autonomous decisions without trust in the professionals, but trust is appropriate only if it enhances patient autonomy.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Fine Individuation</i></b> <b>Carl Matheson (Manitoba) and Ben Caplan (OSU)</b>
	Commentator: Bill Barthelemy (Kwantlen)
	Chair: Dom Lopes (UBC)
	Levinson argues that musical works are individuated as finely as the musico-historical contexts in which they are composed. We criticize Levinson's argument by arguing that one can mount an equally good argument for a conclusion that Levinson rejects: namely, that musical works are individuated as finely as the musico-historical contexts in which they are listened to.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Straightening the Crooked Stick: Perceptual Illusions and Direct Realism</i></b> <b>Nicolas Bullot (UofT)</b>
	Commentator: Don Dedrick (Guelph)
	Chair: Derek Brown (UofA)
	The article analyzes the nature of perceptual illusions according to direct and indirect realism. It presents an objection to a representative doctrine which assimilates the content of a perceptual illusion with a mind-dependent object analogous to a false propositional content. The objection is based on an examination of 'marginal' illusions which do not prevent the perceiver from performing attention tasks constitutive of the direct relation between a perceiver and a mind-independent object.

<b>Saturday morning, second set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Problems for Michael Smith's Theory of Moral Motivation</i></b> <b>Kyle Menken (UofT)</b>
	Commentator: Tim Christie (UBC)
	Chair: Arash Farzam-Kia (Queen's)
	The paper hopes to show that Michael Smith's rationalist moral theory does not deal with the problem of moral motivation in a satisfactory way. First, his theory is unable to accommodate an important intuition about moral people, namely, that they care non-derivatively about the objects of moral concern. Second, he has not shown convincingly that 'reason is not the slave of the passions,' which is of vital importance to developing an acceptable rationalist moral theory.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>Conditional Logic and the Significance of Tooley's Example</i></b> <b>Charles Cross (Georgia)</b>
	Commentator: Rafal Urbaniak (UofC)
	Chair: Ali Kazmi (UofA)
	Michael Tooley has argued that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis style comparative world similarity semantics for counterfactuals cannot be sound. Tooley's target is one particular type of semantics, but I show that the significance of Tooley's example goes well beyond its consequences for any one semantics for the conditional. Still, as I show, the example proves somewhat less than Tooley claimed for it.



<b>Saturday, 14 October, morning cont'd (third set of sessions)</b>	
<b>11.00-11.50</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Epistemic Agency &amp; the Non-Local Truth Goal: A Defence of Epistemic Value Monism</i></b> <b>Patrick Rysiew (UVic)</b>
	Commentator: Eric Dayton (UofS)
	Chair: Kenneth Boyd (UofA)
	Knowledge is more valuable than true belief, and we place higher value on the possession of some truths over others. Each of these facts has been said to conflict with 'epistemic value monism' (EVM) – the view that truth is the epistemic goal. I argue that a plausible version of the truth-goal, together with an acknowledgement of our cognitive-epistemic finitude, explains the valuations upon which these objections to EVM turn.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Demystifying Responsibility: History, Ownership, and Origination</i></b> <b>Arash Farzam-Kia (Queen's)</b>
	Commentator: Jonathan Katz (Kwantlen)
	Chair: Joe Campbell (WSU)
	I analyze Fischer and Ravizza's attempt to demystify responsibility by giving an account of ownership in terms of taking responsibility. Having outlined the importance, to both compatibilist and incompatibilist, of the historical component of the concept of moral responsibility, I highlight, in the first place, the importance to incompatibilist of the notion of origination, and in then argue that Fischer and Ravizza's account of ownership as taking responsibility fails to address this incompatibilist concern.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Are Belief Reports Ambiguous Between De Dicto and De Re Readings?</i></b> <b>Erin Eaker (UWO)</b>
	Commentator: Peter Alward (Lethbridge)
	Chair: Ben Caplan (OSU)
	This paper questions the assumption that there is a meaningful de re / de dicto ambiguity in believes that sentences. This distinction has informed not just our understanding of believes that sentences which contain definite descriptions, but our understanding of the verb believes itself. I show problems with two common ways of defining the de re / de dicto distinction and encoding it within the semantic theory.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Hearing and Seeing Musical Expression</i></b> <b>Vincent Bergeron and Dom Lopes (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: Tobyn DeMarco (Bergen)
	Chair: Stan Godlovich (UofC)
	Experimental psychology tells us that visual and auditory information combine in the perception of musical expression. This suggests that (1) if music expresses what we think it does, then its expressive properties are visual as well as sonic; and (2) if its expressive properties are purely sonic, then music expresses less than we think it does. And if (1), then musical performances are not what we think they are – they are not purely sonic events.

<b>Saturday morning, third set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Can Clark &amp; Chalmers Presuppose a Coherence Model of Belief Retrieval?</i></b> <b>Eric Hochstein (Waterloo)</b>
	Commentator: Fred Adams (Delaware)
	Chair: Martin Godwyn (SFU/BCIT)
	In their paper "The Extended Mind" (1998), Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that our explicit non-occurrent beliefs need not be located in our head and can be stored in our surrounding environment. In order for their theory to work, I argue that they must pre-suppose a very specific functional model of belief, which I term the Coherence Model of Belief Retrieval. In this paper, I show that such a model is implausible and problematic.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>Wild Card Valuations</i></b> <b>Bryson Brown (Lethbridge)</b>
	Commentator: Ray Jennings (SFU)
	Chair: Charles Cross (Georgia)
	Wild card valuations provide a way to 'suspend' the constraints that individual sentence letters impose on the truth conditions of sentences. These valuations allow us to arrive at three familiar logics in unfamiliar but illuminating guise: Graham Priest's logic of paradox, K*, and first degree entailment. The implications of this new approach to these logics indicate the dispensability of the third (and fourth) 'truth values' employed in their usual semantics, in the spirit of Scott (1974).
<b>Lunch--No Host</b>	

<b>Saturday, 14 October, afternoon (first set of sessions)</b>	
<b>13.30-14.20</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Farewell to Direct Source Compatibilism</i></b> <b>Joe Campbell (WSU)</b>
	Commentator: Evan Tiffany (SFU)
	Chair: Kadri Vihvelin (USC)
	Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. This paper is a critique of a kind of source incompatibilism, namely, direct source incompatibilism.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Communitarianism, Empirical Merit, and Moral Education</i></b> <b>Mark Young (Ottawa)</b>
	Commentator: Susan Turner (UVic)
	Chair: Trudy Govier (Lethbridge)
	Helen Haste contrasts liberal and communitarian positions on moral development and education. She proposes that liberals cannot provide prescriptions concerning moral education due to their inadequate descriptive psychology. Communitarians, though, can offer such prescriptions because they possess an accurate descriptive psychology. Empirical research concerning moral development and agency will be consulted to display that it confirms neither of the former descriptive theories. Nonetheless, it is the prescriptive position offered by liberals that appears vindicated.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Beautiful Surfaces: Kant on Beauty and Perfection</i></b> <b>Alex Rueger (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Robert Epperson (WWU)
	Chair: Kirstie Laird (SFU)
	Kant's distinction of free and adherent beauty has been considered problematic on several accounts. Is Kant really committed to claiming that we can, at least in principle, regard all cases of adherent beauty as instances of free beauty if we 'abstract' from whatever concepts we have of what the objects are supposed to be? Are there really no plausible constraints on our power of abstraction? I argue that the operation of 'abstracting from concepts of the objects' in Kant's theory is not as arbitrary as it might seem and that the strategy, properly understood, has its roots in aesthetic theories that preceded Kant's.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Non-Disjunctivism and Visual Awareness</i></b> <b>Rob Hudson (UofS)</b>
	Commentator: Ruth Michaels (GPRC)
	Chair: Dan Weiskopf (USF)
	In this paper I examine the issue whether veridical perceptual experience and a phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucination share a common subjective episode. The thesis that there is such an episode is known in the literature as non-disjunctivism. My position is that non-disjunctivism is correct, and I defend it from criticisms advanced by John Hyman, William Child, M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker utilizing in part the resources of recent experimental research in cognitive neuroscience.

<b>Saturday afternoon, first set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Autism, Hume, and Moral Agency</i> Katharina Paxman (UWO)</b>
	Commentator: David Zimmerman (SFU)
	Chair: Joseph Millum (UofT)
	Hume's principle of sympathy is an empathy mechanism required for Humean moral agency. Autism, frequently identified as an empathy disorder, is a condition that severely limits the sufferer's capacity to attribute mental states to others, particularly emotion. This paper compares Humean 'empathy' with the limited empathic experience of autists, who appear to be moral agents. It concludes that autists are not a case against Hume's position that sympathy is required for moral agency.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>An Epistemic Theory of Objective Chance</i> Richard Johns (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: Oliver Schulte (SFU)
	Chair: Jeff Pelletier (SFU)
	A theory of objective, single-case chances is presented and defended. The theory states that the chance of an event E is its epistemic probability, given maximal knowledge of the possible causes of E. This theory is uniquely successful in entailing all the known properties of chance, but involves heavy metaphysical commitment. It requires an objective rationality that determines proper degrees of belief in some contexts.

<b>Saturday, 14 October, afternoon cont'd (second set of sessions)</b>	
<b>14.30-15.20</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Freedom, Hedonism, and World-Value</i></b> <b>Ish Haji (UofC)</b>
	Commentator: Scott Woodcock (UVic)
	Chair: Darren Domskey (UofC)
	According to attitudinal hedonism, the overall balance of attitudinal pleasure over displeasure in a world fixes its intrinsic value. I first summarize Ross' objection to this theory. I then critically discuss Feldman's attempt to deflect this objection by revising the theory so that the values of pleasures and displeasures reflect the degree to which subjects deserve these things. Finally, I propose that a world-ranking hedonism must take into account the freedom of (dis)pleasures.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>A Dialectic of Acknowledgement</i></b> <b>Trudy Govier (Lethbridge)</b>
	Commentator: Bob Ware (UofC)
	Chair: Susan Turner (UVic)
	The concept of acknowledgement is central in the theory and practice of political reconciliation. I seek to explain its importance, distinguishing between existential, aversive, and affirmative acknowledgement. While victims cry out for acknowledgement, perpetrators tend to resist, a phenomenon explicable in terms of contested narratives and identities. Divisions that structured the conflict will not disappear in its immediate aftermath. Approaches that may overcome perpetrator resistance are briefly discussed.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Getting Real About Fiction: Why We Respond Emotionally to Art</i></b> <b>Joseph Palencik (Buffalo)</b>
	Commentator: Michael Kubara (Lethbridge)
	Chair: Vince Bergeron (UBC)
	This paper seeks to address lingering questions about the emotional response to fiction from the perspective of the philosophy of emotion. One characteristic of the emotional experience towards fiction is that we usually know beforehand and all along that the people and events we respond to are not real. Often the difficulty in addressing this problem is the result of research focusing on an input-output model of the emotions (otherwise called a structural or black-box theory). Here it is my intention to point to research intended to fill in the structural model's explanatory gap (otherwise called a process theory).
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Empiricism and the Vehicles of Thought</i></b> <b>Dan Weiskopf (USF)</b>
	Commentator: Martin Hahn (SFU)
	Chair: Rob Hudson (UofS)
	Concept empiricists claim that concepts are nothing more than perceptual representations that can be reactivated off-line. Evidence for empiricism comes from neuroscientific studies showing that perceptual regions of the brain are activated during cognitive tasks. But the neuroscientific evidence falls short of establishing empiricism. The causal structure of the brain involves widespread activity in perceptual and non-perceptual systems; no subset of this activity can be singled out as the unique neural vehicle of conceptual thought.

<b>Saturday afternoon, second set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>What Is the Puzzle of Change?</i> Pablo Rychter (Barcelona)</b>
	Commentator: Wayne Myrvold (UWO)
	Chair: Ben Caplan (OSU)
	I survey different recent attempts to lay down the traditional problem of change as puzzle and argue that these attempts are unsuccessful. I argue that even if there is no puzzle of change, there is still plenty of room for philosophers of persistence to develop their preferred accounts of change. Moreover, the pretension that there is a puzzle of change actually obscures the nature of the endurance-perdurance debate.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>The Transitivity of Constitution</i> Rob Wilson (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Roberta Ballarín (UBC)
	Chair: Patrick McGivern (UofA)
	Constitution and realization are relations that have been used in articulating views in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, both usually being contrasted with identity. Formally, identity is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. Constitution and realization, by contrast, are irreflexive and asymmetrical. But are they transitive relations? Answering this question proves to require more work than one might initially suspect. I focus here exclusively on constitution, but what I say about it carries over to realization.

<b>Saturday, 14 October, afternoon cont'd (third set of sessions)</b>	
<b>15.30-16.20</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism</i></b> <b>Kadri Vihvelin (USC)</b>
	Commentator: Bryson Brown (Lethbridge)
	Chair: Paul Russell (UBC)
	I shed light on the free will/determinism problem by drawing a distinction that has not been noted in the literature: The incompatibilist (someone who believes that free will is possible, but only at indeterministic worlds) is not an impossibilist (someone who believes that free will is metaphysically impossible). I defend compatibilism by showing that incompatibilist arguments either fail or turn out to be arguments for impossibilism.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Content and Contagion in Yawning</i></b> <b>John Sarnecki (Toledo)</b>
	Commentator: Karl Pfeifer (UofS)
	Chair: Matt Barker (Maryland)
	I examine three distinct attempts to reconcile the cognitive properties of contagious yawning with its physiological basis, one philosophical, one neurological, and one functional. While I argue that no account is wholly unproblematic, these theories suggest a plausible avenue for further research. More centrally, examining the relation between higher cognitive states and involuntary behaviours affords a unique opportunity to examine how higher level representational states engage neurophysiological structures in behaviour.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Are Propositions the Objects of Thought?</i></b> <b>Sean Crawford (Lancaster)</b>
	Commentator: Erin Eaker (UWO)
	Chair: Martin Hahn (SFU)
	One of the central arguments for the thesis that propositions are the objects of thought is that that view gives the best account of the logical form of quantified intentional sentences as well as the best explanation for the apparent validity of inferences involving them. I criticize this argument and argue that the alternative, anti-propositional multiple-relation theory, once defended by Russell, supplemented with plural quantification, accounts for a wider range of data.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Anselm Born Again</i></b> <b>Howard Sobel (UofT)</b>
	Commentator: Martin Tweedale (UofA)
	Chair: Steve Savitt (UBC)
	The Ontological Argument revisited. Anselm versus Guanilo rematched in Hartshorne versus Rowe. Conclusion when all is said: "So it all began, might have ended, and could now end. Though we know that it did not, and will not."

<b>Saturday afternoon, third set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Holism, Concept Individuation, and Conceptual Change</i></b> <b>Ingo Brigandt (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: John Woods (UBC/ King's College, London)
	Chair: Wayne Myrvold (UWO)
	The paper argues that some scientific concepts can be individuated in different ways. A term can be viewed as corresponding to a single concept; but at the same time, this term may legitimately be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts. The reason is that the same term can be subject to different epistemic and semantic interests (underlying a particular philosophical study), which determine how a concept is to be individuated.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>Physicalism, Microphysicalism, or Constitutionality?</i></b> <b>Patrick McGivern (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: John Heintz (UofC)
	Chair: Roberta Ballarin (UBC)
	I examine the relationships between the concepts of physicalism, microphysicalism, and compositionality. Philosophers typically conflate these three concepts, and yet they represent three distinct metaphysical claims. I argue – against critics such as Andreas Huttemann and David Papineau – that physicalism can sensibly be understood in part-whole terms. I also argue that understanding physicalism as a claim about compositionality, rather than as a claim about microphysicalism, best represents the evidence we use to argue for physicalism.
<b>16.30-18.00</b>	
<b>Fletcher Challenge Theatre</b>	<b>Keynote Address</b> <b>Professor Susan Wolf (UNC)</b> <b><i>Moral Obligations and Social Commands</i></b>
	What are moral obligations? The paper will review the most plausible alternatives, pointing out serious problems with each one. The author will defend a “social command theory” of moral obligation, according to which a condition of an act’s being morally obligatory is that it be commanded by a society of which one is a member. More important, though, is the recognition that the needs which we want the category of the morally obligatory to serve cannot all be met by a single concept.



<b>Sunday, 15 October, morning (first set of sessions)</b>	
<b>09.00-09.50</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Disagreement with Peers and Rational Obligation</i></b> <b>Nathan Ballantyne (Arizona)</b>
	Commentator: Ann Levey (UofC)
	Chair: Mark Young (Ottawa)
	Imagine that two characters believe they share similar evidence, awareness of the arguments, and the epistemic virtues that are relevant to answering some question but disagree over its answer. Here is a puzzle: how can the characters continue to disagree while each believes the other is equally well-poised to answer the question? (See, e.g., Kelly 2005 and Feldman 2006.) In this paper, I assess two standard responses to the puzzle and develop what I take to be a more satisfying response.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Legal Rigorism and Kant on the Right to Resist</i></b> <b>Radu Neculau (Montréal)</b>
	Commentator: Brian Thomas (UBC)
	Chair: Omid Payrow Shabani (Guelph)
	Two important notions qualify Kant's rejection of rebellion. First, the content of the concept of right varies by design with the norms and institutions in which right is instantiated. Second, any change in the system of right depends on legal interpretations that aim to secure the institutional monopoly of force in the state. Based on these, I argue that Kant's rejection of active political resistance does not make him a legal rigorist.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Situationism Threatens Utilitarianism</i></b> <b>Ian Brooks (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: Paul Viminiz (Lethbridge)
	Chair: Mark Migotti (UofC)
	John Doris holds that tiny changes in circumstances drastically change behaviour; character is, at best, situation dependant. Virtue ethicists have been rightly alarmed, but his situationism also endangers utilitarianism. Without character, we cannot tell which action maximizes hedonistic utility, we cannot obtain goods that objective lists tell us we need, and we cannot tell which of a person's conflicting preferences should be honoured. A piecemeal account of character formation might protect indirect utilitarians.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Does What We Want Influence What We See?</i></b> <b>Bence Nanay (UBC)</b>
	Commentator: Derek Brown (UofA)
	Chair: Nicolas Bullot (UofT)
	Most philosophical theories of perception claim or at least assume that perception is all-purpose: what we want to do does not influence what we see. I aim to show that this assumption is false: the content of our perceptual states depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Finally, it is pointed out that this claim has important implications with regards to the modularism vs. interactionism debate.

<b>Sunday morning, first set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Seeing Past, and Through, the Narrative Approach to Interference</i> Darren Domsy (UofC)</b>
	Commentator: Karen Houle (Guelph)
	Chair: Jennifer Welchman (UofA)
	European environmental philosophers who subscribe to a duty of non-interference often take a narrative approach to this concept of interference. Despite three serious and unavoidable difficulties, this narrative approach has been, and remains, remarkably appealing. In this paper, I unveil just how problematic the narrative approach is; compare it to a superior, agency approach; and use this agency approach to reveal the secret of the narrative approach's resilient appeal, despite its problems.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>A Lacuna in Millikan's Teleosemantics</i> Brian Leahy (Conn)</b>
	Commentator: Brent Smart (Columbia College)
	Chair: Chris Lepock (UofA)
	This paper has two goals. First it lays out Millikan's theory of language in a digestible manner. Second it makes clear that the theory, which is designed to account for sentences in the indicative and imperative voice, has no obvious extension that will capture conditional sentences.

<b>Sunday, 15 October, morning cont'd (second set of sessions)</b>	
<b>10.00-10.50</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Medicine and Religion in Plato's Symposium</i></b> <b>Mark McPherran (SFU)</b>
	Commentator: Sylvia Berryman (UBC)
	Chair: Martin Tweeddale (UofA)
	Plato's Symposium comprises a series of speeches in praise of Erôs made by Socrates and others. Although there have been numerous interpretations of the dialogue, the speech made by the Hippocratic physician Eryximachus has not been properly understood. I will offer my own account of the role Eryximachus plays in the dialogue in light of our knowledge of fifth century BCE Greek medicine and Plato's own particular religious and philosophical agenda.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>Kant, Duties to non-Human Animals, and Vegetarianism</i></b> <b>Emer O'Hagan (UofS)</b>
	Commentator: Omid Payrow Shabani (Guelph)
	Chair: Evan Tiffany (SFU)
	Can an ethical vegetarian find reasoned support for her position in Kantian moral theory? In this paper I do not argue for vegetarianism, but consider whether a Kantian ethic can accommodate some of the moral considerations typically advanced by vegetarians. I advance an argument for duties to animals, countering Kant's claim that we cannot have obligations to them but consistent with his conclusions about their proper treatment, and briefly sketch the basis for a Kantian vegetarian ethic.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Reasons to be Moral Revisited</i></b> <b>Sam Black (SFU)</b>
	Commentator: Mark Migotti (UofC)
	Chair: Amy Schmitter (UofA)
	I claim that the "why should I be moral?" question is capable of being answered, and that the reconciliation of duty and interest can figure centrally in that reply. I argue that the concern for authenticity (or autonomy) is intrinsic, and not reducible to other practical interests. When the morality question is rooted in concerns for self-authentication it can be answered. My preferred conception of authenticity entails that if duty and interest can be reconciled then that finding supports the conclusion that a commitment to morality is an authentic commitment.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>Levels of Reliabilist Appraisal: How to Make the Generality Problem Work for You</i></b> <b>Chris Lepock (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Patrick Rysiew (UVic)
	Chair: Roger Clarke (UBC)
	Reliabilist theories of knowledge face the "generality problem"; any token of a belief-forming processes instantiates types of different levels of generality, which can vary in reliability. I argue that we exploit this situation in epistemic discourse; we appraise beliefs in different ways by adverting to reliability at different levels of generality. We can detect at least two distinct uses of reliability, which underlie different sorts of appraisals of beliefs and believers.

<b>Sunday morning, second set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Environmental Virtue Ethics: Snark or Boojum?</i></b> <b>Jennifer Welchman (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: John Rowell (Selkirk)
	Chair: Karen Houle (Guelph)
	<i>The Hunting of the Snark</i> offers an apt metaphor for Environmental Ethics generally and Environmental Virtue Ethics specifically. Fearing that traditional ethical theories could not be usefully applied to nature, environmental ethicists set out to establish new axiologies and virtue theories to replace them. But each such 'snark' has proved a 'boojum,' (self-defeating.) I argue that the application of traditional virtue ethics is a more promising alternative.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>Leibniz, Parallelism, and Epiphenomenalism</i></b> <b>Peter Loftson (Guelph)</b>
	Commentator: Alan McLuckie (UofA)
	Chair: Ruth Michaels (GPRC)
	In previously published work, I have argued against the standard interpretation of Leibniz's metaphysics as idealist. In this paper, I offer additional support for the thesis that Leibniz is a body realist, drawing upon his celebrated parallelism. I develop an interpretation of his system according to which it constitutes a version of an epiphenomenalist theory, with causally inefficacious mind-like entities (the monads) and a coincident bodily world of motion and efficient causation.

<b>Sunday, 15 October, morning cont'd (third set of sessions)</b>	
<b>11.00-11.50</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Aristotle and the Law Courts</i></b> <b>David Mirhady (Humanities, SFU)</b>
	Commentator: Paul Beach (UofA)
	Chair: Mark McPherran (SFU)
	In the <i>Politics</i> , Aristotle recognizes participation in law courts as an essential element in citizenship, yet there has been relatively little scholarship on how he sees this participation being realized. References to law courts are sprinkled widely through the <i>Politics</i> , <i>Rhetoric</i> , and <i>Ethics</i> , as well as the <i>Athenaiôn politeia</i> , where their importance is revealed most clearly.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>The Deduction Problem and Kant's Account of Intuition in the Early 1770s</i></b> <b>Corey Dyck (UBC, Okanagan)</b>
	Commentator: Kirstie Laird (SFU)
	Chair: Alex Rueger (UofA)
	I consider Kant's overlooked pre-critical accounts of sensibility and the understanding. Against the well-entrenched opinion that Kant introduces the kind-distinction between concepts and intuitions in his <i>Inaugural Dissertation</i> of 1770, I show that even in the early 1770s Kant continues to hold that the deliverances of sensibility are singular concepts rather than non-discursive representations. This conclusion has important repercussions for our understanding of Kant's discovery of the problem motivating the transcendental deduction of the categories.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Great Expectations: Risk-taking Virtues</i></b> <b>Adam Morton (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Paul Viminiz (Lethbridge)
	Chair: Oliver Schulte (SFU)
	I relate issues about risk and expected utility from standard decision theory to issues about intellectual virtues. What traits of mind should a person have who evaluates gambles by their expectations? Along the way I distinguish between different kinds of risk.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>The Neuroscience of Moral Motivation</i></b> <b>Tim Schroeder (OSU)</b>
	Commentator: Mohan Matthen (UofT)
	Chair: Emer O'Hagan (UofS)
	People often do what is right because it is right. In this talk, I argue that tracing the causal pathways through the brain to behavior shows that, unless one acts out of something like a deeply ingrained habit, or on the basis of something like a Tourette tic, then in order to be morally motivated one must be influenced by one's appreciation of rewards and punishments.

<b>Sunday morning, third set of sessions cont'd</b>	
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>Flowing Genes and Cohesive Species</i></b> <b>Matt Barker (Maryland) and Rob Wilson (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Lyle Crawford (SFU)
	Chair: Karl Pfeifer (UofS)
	An influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. We bring needed clarity to the conceptualization of this view. This involves underlining its metaphorical dimensions. We then raise conceptual problems that both illuminate known empirical problems facing the view, and call into question the validity of the view's arguments. Finally, we suggest our arguments vitiate related views, namely the biological species concept and the species-as-individuals thesis.
<b>Room 6: 2945</b>	<b><i>Hobbes and the Really Big Stick: The Construction of Social Power</i></b> <b>Amy Schmitter (UofA)</b>
	Commentator: Sam Black (SFU)
	Chair: Will Buschert (UofS)
	Hobbes's view of how a sovereign forms the people of a commonwealth into one "person" presents a bit of a puzzle. Although sovereign power is "artificial," amassed through the collective cooperation of the individuals over whom it is exercised, no such cooperation is possible in the absence of a common power of enforcement. I argue that we should understand Hobbes to be tackling issues in the ontology of social institutions and political power.

<b>Sunday, 15 October, afternoon (last set of sessions)</b>	
<b>12.00-12.50</b>	
<b>Room 1: 2245</b>	<b><i>Truth in Fiction: The Story Concluded</i></b> <b>Peter Alward (Lethbridge)</b>
	Commentator: Frances Howard-Snyder (WWU)
	Chair: Bill Barthelemy (Kwantlen)
	Fictional truth is commonly analyzed in terms of the speech acts or propositional attitudes of a teller. In this paper, I investigate Lewis's counterfactual analysis in terms of felicitous narrator assertion, Currie's analysis in terms of fictional author belief, and Byrne's analysis in terms of ideal author invitations to make-believe and find them all lacking. I propose instead an analysis in terms of the revelations of an infelicitous narrator.
<b>Room 2: 1510</b>	<b><i>A Case for Leveling Down</i></b> <b>Alex Sager (UofC)</b>
	Commentator: Will Buschert (UofS)
	Chair: Evan Tiffany (SFU)
	The leveling-down objection accuses egalitarians of the (seemingly) absurd claim: an equal distribution achieved by lowering situation of the better-off is superior in some respect (equality), despite no one being better off. I dispute this seeming absurdity by providing five examples (one provided by Larry Temkin) where leveling down is justified and argue that this is for deontological or intrinsic reasons.
<b>Room 3: 1505-1515</b>	<b><i>Sen's Capabilities and Liberal Neutrality</i></b> <b>Chris Lowry (Queen's)</b>
	Commentator: Mary Butterfield (UVic)
	Chair: Sam Black (SFU)
	This paper connects the metric debate and the neutrality debate in contemporary liberal philosophy by examining Amartya Sen's capabilities approach. Although Sen has shied away from the neutrality debate, I argue that the move to capabilities is a move away from Rawls's primary goods metric and his version of neutrality. Sen's approach measures substantive freedom in terms of the quality of option sets, whose members – 'functionings' – are the constituents of different ways of living.
<b>Room 4: 1520</b>	<b><i>The Scientific Explanation of Qualia</i></b> <b>Jeff Foss (UVic)</b>
	Commentator: Mohan Matthen (UofT)
	Chair: Martin Hahn (SFU)
	It is commonly maintained that qualia (in their essential nature) cannot be explained by science even in principle.  Against this thesis I will argue that in fact we already have perfectly normal scientific explanations of color qualia.
<b>Room 5: 1315</b>	<b><i>The Mates Cases and the Generality Constraint</i></b> <b>Mark McCullagh (Guelph)</b>
	Commentator: Bernie Linsky (UofA)
	Chair: Jeff Pelletier (SFU)
	Mates's examples of substitution failures in belief sentences have been diagnosed in a variety of ways. I propose a new diagnosis: that they show that the conditions for using a concept in a belief ascription are weaker than the conditions for using a concept more straightforwardly. This entails that there is no uniformity to concept-possession of the sort needed to underwrite the research program that looks to possession conditions to understand the nature of concepts.