PROBLEM SET 2 - Search and Matching
(Due October 18)

1. An unemployed worker samples wage offers on the following terms: Each period, with probability \( \phi, \ 0 < \phi < 1, \) she receives no offer (you can regard this as a wage offer of zero forever). With probability \( 1 - \phi \) she receives an offer to work for \( w \) forever, where \( w \) is drawn from the cdf \( F(w) \). Successive draws are independently and identically distributed over time. The worker chooses a strategy to maximize

\[
E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t y_t
\]

where \( y_t = w \) if the worker is employed, and \( y_t = c \) if the worker is unemployed. Assume that if a job offer is accepted, the worker stays on the job forever.

Let \( v(w) \) be the expected value of \( \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t y_t \), for an unemployed worker who has offer \( w \) in hand and who behaves optimally from now on. Write down the Bellman equation for the worker’s problem.

2. Each period an unemployed worker receives an offer to work forever at wage \( w_t \), where \( w_t = w \) in the first period and \( w_t = \phi^t w \) after \( t \) periods on the job. Assume wages increase with tenure, ie, \( \phi > 1 \). Also assume the initial wage offer is drawn from a distribution \( F(w) \) that is constant over time (ie, entry-level wages are stationary).

The worker’s objective is to maximize \( E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t y_t \) where \( y_t = w_t \) if the worker is employed and \( y_t = c \) if the worker is unemployed, where \( c \) can be interpreted as unemployment compensation. Let \( v(w) \) be the optimal value of the objective function for an unemployed worker who has offer \( w \) in hand. Write down the Bellman equation for this problem. Show that, if two economies differ only in the growth rate of wages, eg, \( \phi_1 > \phi_2 \), then the economy with the higher wage growth has a lower reservation wage. Interpret the result. (Note: assume \( \beta \phi_i < 1, \ i = 1, 2 \)).

3. Each period an unemployed worker receives an offer to work forever at wage \( w \), where \( w \) is drawn from the distribution \( F(w) \). Offers are i.i.d. Each worker also has another source of income, denoted by \( \epsilon_t \), which can be interpreted as financial/nonhuman wealth. Each period workers get a realization of \( \epsilon_t \), which is i.i.d., and is drawn from the distribution \( G(\epsilon) \). Also assume that \( w_t \) and \( \epsilon_t \) are independently distributed. A worker’s objective is to maximize

\[
E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t y_t
\]
where \( y_t = w + \phi \epsilon_t \) if the worker has accepted a job with wage \( w \), and \( y_t = c + \epsilon_t \) if the worker remains unemployed. To reflect the fact that an employed worker has less time to collect information on nonhuman wealth, assume that \( \phi < 1 \). Also assume \( 0 < \text{prob}[w \geq c + (1 - \phi)\epsilon] < 1 \).

Write down the worker’s Bellman equation, and prove that the reservation wage increases with the level of nonhuman wealth. Interpret the result.

4. Consider the benchmark Mortensen-Pissarides model discussed in class. Steady state equilibrium in this model takes the form of 3 equations (e.g., eqs. 26.3.1, 26.3.5, and 26.3.12 in Ljungqvist & Sargent) in the 3 endogenous variables \( u \), \( w \), and \( \theta \). These equations are sometimes referred to as the Beveridge Curve, the Job Creation Curve, and the Nash Bargaining Curve, respectively. Using this system, compute the comparative static effects of (permanent) changes in productivity, \( y \), and the job separation rate, \( s \). Interpret these results economically. [Hints: (1) Notice that you can first consider separately the 2-dimensional system (26.3.5 and 26.3.12) for \( w \) and \( \theta \), (2) Check your qualitative results graphically using 2 graphs, one in \((\theta, w)\)-space and one in \((v, u)\)-space.

5. Consider a discrete-time matching model with infinitely lived, risk-neutral workers who are endowed with different skill levels. A worker of skill level \( i \) produces \( h_i \) goods each period that she is matched with a firm, where \( i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\} \) and \( h_{i+1} > h_i \). Each skill type has its own (but identical) matching function \( M(u_i, v_i) = Au_i^\alpha v_i^{1-\alpha} \), where \( u_i \) and \( v_i \) are the measures of unemployed workers and vacancies in skill market \( i \). Firms incur a vacancy cost \( c \cdot h_i \) each period a vacancy is posted (i.e., vacancy costs are proportional to the skill level). All matches are exogenously destroyed with probability \( s \in (0, 1) \) at the beginning of a period. Unemployed workers receive unemployment compensation \( b \). Finally, assume wages are determined by Nash bargaining between workers and firms, and let \( \phi \in [0, 1) \) be the worker’s weight in the Nash product, and assume \( \phi = \alpha \).

(a) Show analytically how the unemployment rate varies with skill level.

(b) Assume a uniform distribution of workers across skill levels. For different benefit levels, show numerically how the aggregate steady state unemployment rate is affected by a mean-preserving spread in the skill distribution.

(c) How do the results change if unemployment benefits are proportional to a worker’s productivity?