In April 1985, conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer suggested that "Ronald Reagan is the master if the new idea. ... He has produced the Reagan Doctrine ... [which] proclaims overt and unabashed American support for anti-communist revolutions."[1] Other analysts described this initiative as a "distinctive"[2] or "signature"[3] policy of the Reagan administration. Even President Ronald Reagan and certain of his advisers called attention to it as one of the administration's most significant efforts? These characterizations illustrate two tendencies: attributing policy to the executive branch alone; and linking the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the president and a few key advisers to policy. In fact, it is quite common to speak of U.S. foreign policy as that of a particular administration, and analysts who address the link between policymakers' beliefs and U.S. policy almost invariably focus on the president or a handful of high-level executive branch officials.[5] Few analysts look beyond the executive branch, which is unfortunate because evidence suggests an increasing willingness by Congress to get involved in the post-Vietnam era, and a greater role for Congress in the aftermath of the Cold War.[6] Likewise, few analysts study the beliefs of members of Congress, perhaps because of the difficulty identifying them among so many individuals and determining how those beliefs are translated into congressional actions. Yet members affect policy and so their beliefs and values are significant. My analysis of one foreign policy strategy, the Reagan Doctrine, suggests that attention to the beliefs of only one group of American policymakers fails to provide an accurate or sufficient account of U.S. policy, and reveals that these tendencies are either false or misleading.

The origin of the Reagan Doctrine seems to support the noted tendencies. This strategy emerged from the ideology of President Reagan and key administration officials, who interpreted international developments and prescribed a course of action in response. In fact, the administration was exceptionally homogeneous in its ideology. Most high-level officials saw two camps in the world, good and evil, and blamed the Soviet Union for instigating all trouble. As Reagan stated in a June 1980 interview, "let's not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."[7] The president and most of his key advisers believed that this Soviet troublemaking stemmed from a "grand design" for world domination. For instance, President Reagan stated "I know of no leader of the Soviet Union ... that has not more than once repeated ... their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world socialist of Communist state."[8] Later he declared that the Soviet Union was "the focus of evil in the modern world" following the "aggressive impulses of an evil empire."[9] Reagan surrounded himself with advisers who shared this view, filling high-level positions with zealous anti-communists. Conformity with this ideology was also emphasized in the selection of mid-level officials.[10] As one study noted, "the striking feature of the Reagan team was its ideological purity. White House political honchos ... even reached down to ensure purity in positions normally free from politics."[11] Many career foreign policy specialists were fired, transferred, or forced into retirement for their failure to meet the president's ideological standards.[12]

This ideological perspective guided the administration's attempt to fashion a strategy to respond to its interpretation of international developments of the 1970s. According to these policymakers, the Soviet Union was no longer contained, but was expanding into all areas of the developing world.[13] Most senior officials agreed that this expansion threatened American interest and demanded an American response. For example, Reagan's CIA Director William Casey referred to Soviet expansion as "a noose tightening, a rope woven of Communist victories around the globe."[14] Moreover, a response was made possible by the rise of anti-communist insurgencies, which some characterized as a worldwide democratic revolution.[15] The White House placed the blame for these setbacks on American inaction during the detente era of Nixon, Ford, and especially Carter. This belief, accompanied by the long-standing conservative criticism of containment as a defeatist strategy, drove these policymakers to advocate more active efforts to "roll back" the Soviet Union.[16] As Casey put it, the United States needed to "checkmate" the USSR and "roll them back."[17]

Development of the Reagan Doctrine

In addition to defining the problem, the most conservative members of the administration authored the strategy to respond to the situation. Early in the first term, the strategy was shaped by the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), which included Reagan's first Secretary of State Alexander Haig, National Security Adviser Richard Allen, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and, most importantly, CIA Director Casey.[18] By late January 1981, Casey, Caspar Weinberger, Haig, Allen, and the president and vice president agreed on the need for a covert strategic offensive against the USSR.[19] In an NSPG meeting in March, Casey proposed a CIA-directed program to provide covert aid to resistance movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Cuba, Grenada, Iran, Laos, Libya, and Nicaragua.[20] According to one source, Casey argued that "We need to be backing these movements with money and political muscle. If we can get the Soviets to expend enough resources, it will create fissures in the system. We need half a dozen Afghanistans."[21] This may be the official "first draft" of the Reagan Doctrine, to which President Reagan reportedly responded by asking Casey to further develop the idea and identify rebels that could be supported.[22]

By early 1983, the NSPG furthered the initiative in two National Security Decision Directives (NSDD-32 and 75). The first of these was coordinated by Thomas C. Reed, a consultant to the National Security Council. The general contents of this NSDD were revealed by William Clark, a National Security adviser, and others. It set out a national strategy (dubbed "Prevailing with Pride" by administration officials) with political, economic, diplomatic, informational, and military components. Among its recommendations, the directive suggested the provision of funds to anti-communist movements as a "forward strategy" to put pressure on the periphery of the "Soviet empire." It was, however, targeted primarily at Eastern Europe.[23]

NSDD-75 was written primarily by NSC staffer Richard Pipes in 1982, and it was signed on January 17, 1983. It committed the administration to seeking out Soviet weaknesses on its periphery and "rolling back" the USSR where possible. This directive is especially notable because its language radically altered the fundamental objectives previous administrations had pursued since the days of Harry Truman and because it constitutes the "only formal presidential directive during the Reagan Administration on U.S. strategy, goals, and objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union."[24] According to NSDD-75, the United States should "contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas, particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States."[25] Singling out Afghanistan, the administration proposed to "keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal" and "ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high." For the Third World, in what was clearly the first official enunciation of the Reagan Doctrine, the directive stated that "U.S. policy will seek to ... weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between [Soviet Third World allies] and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries."[26] This document coincided with attempts to implement aid programs in Afghanistan (January 1981), Nicaragua (December 1981), Angola (1981),[27] and Cambodia (mid-1982), and described the strategy that, two years later, would receive the title "Reagan Doctrine."

These efforts at developing and applying a strategy were encouraged by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank influential in personnel and policy choices during the 1980s. In November 1984, the foundation published a report that, among other recommendations, urged the Reagan administration to train, arm, advise, and organize anticommunist insurgencies in Marxist countries,[28] calling for the same actions that Casey had suggested in 1981 and that the NSPG had advised in 1982. Allen, then a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, predicted the report would "have a significant impact on administration thinking."[29]

Finally, the administration undertook a public effort to explain on-going assistance programs and to justify new ones. Although this effort occurred primarily after 1984, some important earlier examples may be found. The first was President Reagan's speech to the British Parliament in 1982, which Edwin Meese characterized as setting the stage for a "crusade for freedom"[30] and Reagan described as the source of the Reagan Doctrine.[31] Second, President Reagan told the Heritage Foundation that:

In the Third World, in Afghanistan, in Central America, in Africa, in Southeast Asia, opposition to totalitarianism is on the rise. It may not grab the headlines, but there is a democratic revolution underway. ... The goal of the free world must no longer be stated in the negative, that is, resistance to Soviet expansionism. ... We must go on the offensive with a forward strategy for freedom.[32]

Third, Casey frequently used speeches to advocate aid for anti-communist rebels, including one to the Center for the Study of the Presidency in March 1982.[33]

In fact, a speech by Casey on January 9, 1985 to the Union League Club in New York launched the administration's most concerted effort at enunciating a strategy. Casey explained that "the 1980s have emerged as the decade of freedom fighters resisting communist regimes, "and he argued that the United States should aid those groups, which "need only modest support and strength of purpose from nations which want to see freedom prevail."[34] Just weeks later, in his State of the Union speech in February 1985, Reagan declared that the United States "must not break faith with those who are risking their lives--on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua--to defy Soviet-supported aggression."[35] These remarks were buttressed by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who defended what he characterized as America's "long and noble tradition of supporting the struggle of other peoples for freedom, democracy, and independence."[36] Shultz's defense was followed by a presidential address to the UN General Assembly in October 1985 in which Reagan asserted that "America's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease."[37] In his 1986 State of the Union address, Reagan stated:

to those imprisoned in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to fight for freedom and democracy, for the fight to worship, to speak, to live, and to prosper in the family of free nations. ... You are not alone, Freedom Fighters. America will support with moral and material assistance your fight not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom--to win freedom in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua.[38]

Finally, in a significant policy statement in early 1986, the president told Congress that:

the Soviets and their clients are finding it difficult to consolidate [their gains of the 1970s] ... mainly because of the courageous forces of indigenous resistance. Growing resistance movements now challenge Communist regimes installed or maintained by the military power of the Soviet Union and its colonial agents in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. We did not create this historical phenomenon, but we must not fail to respond to it.[39]

The label "Reagan Doctrine" was soon adopted by administration officials, members of Congress, and others.[a]

The Reagan Doctrine and American Policymakers

Thus far the Reagan Doctrine appears to have been formulated by the executive branch alone. However true this is for the development of the policy idea, it is not true of the development of the policy itself. Significant slippage occurred in the process by which the initial idea was applied to specific instances (i.e., made into policy) involved actors from both branches. The result was an uneven application of the idea; in some instances it barely resembled initial declarations. The implementation of the initiative shows two different features of American policymaking: disagreement among American policy-makers (both within and between the branches); and active involvement by Congress.

Three groups of policymakers with differing views of the Reagan Doctrine can be identified. The first faction consisted of advocates of the initiative, and had adherents in both the executive and legislative branches. These individuals considered the strategy to be a universal, stand-alone approach to the problem of Soviet expansionism and sought to implement the Reagan Doctrine wherever anti-communist rebels existed, or, for some, could be created.[40] This faction viewed any retreat from this purpose, or the use of diplomacy m conjunction with the Reagan Doctrine, as a "sell-out" to communism. According to Shultz, they were "zealous advocates ... [who] saw little reason to address a comprehensive solution ... and seemed unwilling to understand the subtle international relationships involved."[41] A second group viewed the Reagan Doctrine as a potentially useful instrument of regional policy initiatives. These pragmatists in the State Department, White House, and Congress endorsed the idea of assistance to anti-communist rebels in certain circumstances as a tool to further larger policy objectives.[42] Chester Crocker, a member of this group, stated that "aiding anti-communist rebels was not by itself a strategy . ... Covert action ... is not foreign policy."[43] From their perspective, Reagan Doctrine aid to worthy rebel groups could be utilized as a part of a broader policy framework that included diplomatic efforts to resolve regional conflicts. Finally, a third group in Congress simply opposed the Reagan Doctrine. This faction of opponents objected to the conception of the world, the purposes, and the methods on which the policy was based.[44] Only in Afghanistan, where the Soviet invasion and direct military operations apparently precluded dissent, did this group quietly acquiesce in the application of the Reagan Doctrine. Otherwise, it maintained a near-perfect record of opposition. Significantly, when the Soviet troops were withdrawn, members of this group began advocating an end to U.S. assistance.

The characteristics and voting records of these factions in the House of Representatives from 1983 to 1989 suggest that the divisions were based on individual beliefs. As suggested by Table One,[45] almost all the 124 conservatives in the 98th to 100th Congresses were advocates of the Reagan Doctrine (i.e., 115, or 92.7 percent); no conservative was an opponent. Similarly, virtually all of the 130 liberals opposed the Reagan Doctrine (127, or 97.7 percent); no liberal was an advocate. Finally, as expected, moderates were split between the categories, with more falling into the pragmatist category than any other.

These factions disagreed on a series of policy issues, which helps to explain why the policy was only fully implemented in one of the cases for which it was designed and considered. The first dispute occurred over objectives. Even supporters of the initiative (whether advocates or pragmatists) had any of three objectives. The most avid proponents believed that by chipping away at the periphery of the Soviet empire, the United States might succeed in reversing or rolling back the Soviet gains of the 1970s. Supporting insurgencies against small, unstable Soviet clients might result in their overthrow, at little cost to the United States. Some thought that a series of defeats on the periphery might cause harm to the Soviet Union itself, perhaps even causing moderation, reform, or failure of the system.[46]

Second, some policymakers viewed the Reagan Doctrine as a means to challenge the Soviet Union in the developing world. The policy would respond to Soviet gains in the 1970s and raise the costs of the Soviet effort to consolidate those gains. Moreover, the initiative could, by raising the cost of supporting clients in the developing world, discourage new Soviet acquisitions. By announcing and then pursuing a policy of support for anticommunist insurgencies, America could re-engage, cope with Vietnam's effect on the U.S. role in the world, and, as Fred Ikle (Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy) noted, "demonstrate the United States' capacity as a super power to apply the use of force" when required in the developing world.[47] William Casey, for example, emphasized the need for the United States to respond to what he argued was a Soviet strategy to pressure the various "strategic chokepoints" in the Caribbean, Cape of Good Hope, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea. Casey and others saw a "resource war" in the making, and believed that unless the Soviet Union was challenged, it would gain control over vital strategic resources and transit routes.[48]

Third, more cautious supporters of the Reagan Doctrine viewed the policy as a tool with which to achieve regional peace settlements, an objective, it must be noted, that the most fervent advocates of the strategy rejected as appeasement. For pragmatists, the objective was to force the Soviet Union and its clients to negotiate an end to the conflicts, remove Soviet and Cuban troops, and allow elections. According to State Department official Peter Rodman, Shultz was the architect of this "dual track" approach that attempted to wed the power of the Reagan Doctrine to diplomacy.[49] Michael Armacost, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs explained:

with respect to conflicts ... in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia, we are determined to support those resistance forces that are fighting for the independence and freedom. However, we also believe these conflicts can and should be resolved politically. We have outlined a framework for promoting such solutions. The key is a negotiating process between the warring parties to bring an end to violence, national reconciliation, and the withdrawal of foreign troops; we see scope for US-Soviet talks to support such negotiations.[50]

Those opposed to the Reagan Doctrine offered several objections. Some pointed out the consequences of aiding a guerrilla war, concerned that the violence and its victims raised moral problems.[51] Others questioned the credentials of the freedom fighters[52] and suggested "the movements that the United States supports are not nearly so democratic and the regimes it opposes so totalitarian, so clearly Marxist-Leninist, or so Soviet-dominated as the administration's perspective assumes."[53] Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY) suggested that a "doctrine" that blindly advocated support for anti-communist insurgencies without examining the nature and level of U.S. interests in the specific context was "manifest absurdity."[54] Echoing this, others argued the doctrine failed to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests.[55] A Congressional Research Service analyst identified a substantial group in Congress concerned that the U.S. might be creating open-ended commitments to weak insurgencies that would result in "creeping intervention," and another which worried that the Reagan Doctrine would only intensify conflict, exacerbate superpower competition, make settlement of regional conflicts impossible, and actually entrench Soviet influence as Marxist regimes facing guerrilla war turned to the Soviet bloc for aid.[56] Finally, once Mikhail Gorbachev initiated his opening to the West, some worried that his reforms would be scuttled by intensified conflict in the Third World. As time passed, more policy-makers questioned the Reagan Doctrine's assumption that the Soviet Union was bent on world conquest and expansionism, which seemed less accurate in the presence of Gorbachev's internal reform efforts and foreign policy initiatives.[57]

A second major disagreement emerged from the consequences of this complex policy-making setting: disagreement over the potential recipients of Reagan Doctrine aid. Hard-liners argued that any instance of "pro-Soviet leftists" in power warranted an effort to support or even develop an anti-communist insurgency. This is obvious in the list of countries contained in Casey's 1981 proposal and in the Heritage Foundation recommendation (i.e., some of these were not facing insurgencies). Opponents believed that the Reagan Doctrine could be applied only in instances in which the Soviet Union was an invading and occupying force (i.e., Afghanistan).[58] Others tried to be more discriminating. For example Jeane Kirk-patrick and Alan Gerson, both from the UN mission, identified three conditions for Reagan Doctrine assistance: an indigenous, independent insurgency ("Democratic Resistance"); a government relying on arms and personnel/advisers from the Soviet bloc to maintain it ("Soviet Client"); and a population denied participation in their government ("Illegitimate Government").[59] However, even if these conditions are accepted as guidelines, they are very general because they rely on interpretations and judgments (e.g., what constitutes a "democratic resistance, a "client," or an "illegitimate government?"). Even a loose reading suggests that only six countries could be considered potential Reagan Doctrine cases (i.e., these countries had an insurgency against a leftist regime that received Soviet bloc military aid and advice): Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Mozambique.

Hard-liners argued for the application of the Reagan Doctrine in each case, although Ethiopia was immediately abandoned. For the rest, some policy discussion ensued. However, in Mozambique no aid was provided. In Nicaragua and Angola, aid was uneven, inconsistent, or provided only after 1986. In Cambodia, the assistance was non-lethal and limited (less than $10 million annually). Only in Afghanistan was the doctrine implemented fully, consistently, and substantially, with roughly $1 billion provided during the Reagan administration. The administration authors of the strategy, intending a comprehensive approach to all the cases, watched actual American policy develop in a more limited manner.

This clearly indicates that, quite apart from a universal "doctrine," the initiative was considered on a case-by-case basis. Because of disagreements over objectives, even some members of the administration seemed cautious about its "doctrine."[60] In testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, William Schneider, Jr., Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, stated that any decision to invoke the Reagan Doctrine toward any specific country or insurgency was to be "addressed in [its] particular political and historical context."[61] Secretary Shultz maintained that the "nature and extent of U.S. support necessarily varies from case to case."[62] In fact, it was precisely on this point that differences among actors in the foreign policy bureaucracy and Congress shaped the policy, and where the effect of the maneuvering between the three factions can be detected. Though hard-liners desired a "doctrine" to be observed in all instances, in actuality they managed only to identify situations where it could be debated.

This debate also included a disagreement over the specific criteria that would govern the decision to apply the Reagan Doctrine. It may well have been the intention of the authors of the initiative to apply the approach to all cases, but because this did not occur the discussion of criteria became significant. Executive branch officials could not agree on any set of criteria to guide the application of the Reagan Doctrine, aside from general references to U.S. interests.[63] Along with the group that desired universal application, others tried to identify circumstances that would trigger the Reagan Doctrine.[64] No officials, however, could produce a clearly defined set of guiding criteria.

The administration's inability or unwillingness to offer such guidelines prompted some members of Congress to define their own criteria. Again, hard-liners in Congress advocated universal application to all anti-communist movements (e.g., Representatives Jack Kemp (R-NY) and Dan Burton (R-IN), and Senators Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), Steven Symms (R-ID), and Jesse Helms (R-NC). Others such as Representative Stephen Solarz cautioned:

Clearly it is one thing to lay out general guidelines ... it is quite another to apply them in individual circumstances. And I think what we need here is some very clear and systematic analysis... it is incumbent upon us as we consider these various situations to see if we can fashion and formulate a set of criteria which can provide meaningful guidelines for us to determine which insurgencies it is in our interest to support.

Solarz argued that aid should contribute to a negotiated settlement, be consistent with U.S. interests, and be supported by domestic public opinion,[65] and Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) added that U.S. assistance should be provided only if the resistance was "democratic," backed by "broad world support," and facing "a genuine foreign intervention [or] invasion, and not merely a domestic squabble."[66] Because of the disagreement, however, members of Congress did not succeed in establishing an accepted set of criteria either.

As the idea was translated into policy, Congress affected each individual case, sometimes determining the policy that emerged.[67] In three cases, Congress was instrumental in applying a version of the strategy. Beginning in 1982, Congress consistently pushed to expand the level and quality of aid to the rebels in Afghanistan, taking the lead in increasing assistance from $30 million to over $400 million. The administration reacted to this pressure and accelerated U.S. aid in 1985. After 1988, the liberal and moderate factions applied pressure to reduce and rethink the aid program when the Soviet forces were withdrawn. For the Cambodia case, the administration began a small, non-lethal covert program in 1982, but Congress, led by Solarz, expanded the U.S. role in 1985. After the Vietnamese troops were withdrawn, liberal members of Congress pushed to end the application of the Reagan Doctrine. Because the initiation of assistance to Angolan rebels was prohibited by legislation, Congress was involved in the decision from the outset. What was interesting about this divisive debate was the presence of alliances between factions in each branch: hard-liners wanted alignment with the rebels and South Africa, liberals wanted normalized relations with the Angolan regime, and moderates wanted a negotiated settlement that would force out the Cuban troops stationed in Angola. Ultimately moderates and hard-liners made an uneasy alliance to lift the ban on aid in 1985 and begin assistance under the Reagan Doctrine in 1986. Once a settlement was reached in December 1988, moderates abandoned aid in favor of the reconciliation of the rebels and the regime, while hard-liners in both branches continued to press for support to the rebels, causing a stalemate in which the status quo, aid, continued.

In the other two cases, much of Congress actively opposed the application of the Reagan Doctrine. The clash between the executive and legislative branches over the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua is well known. [b] After the administration began assisting the rebels in 1981, many in Congress reacted by first restricting (in 1982) and then banning such aid (in 1984). Congress then tried to tie renewed assistance to a diplomatic settlement in 1985 and 1986. When the administration refused to negotiate and secretly organized aid to the rebels in violation of the congressional prohibition, a majority of Congress reacted by ending the application of the Reagan Doctrine. A majority prevented further assistance after 1986, and maintained support for a diplomatic initiative by Costa Rica which produced a settlement. Although some food, clothing, and medicine was provided to rebel camps in Honduras in 1988 and 1989, this constituted a congressional, not an administration, solution. In the case of Mozambique, another instance of cross-branch alliance occurred, with hard-liners in both branches working together to assist the rebels. However, a coalition of liberals and moderates in both branches rejected the idea. After a nasty struggle from 1985 to 1987, the president and a majority of Congress agreed on the moderate-liberal position and ended the hard-liner challenge,.

Conclusions: Implementation of the Reagan Doctrine

Table Two presents an overview of the Reagan Doctrine that suggests three periods during which it was variously implemented. In the first phase, 1981-1982, the administration authored the strategy and took steps to provide some anti-communist rebels with American aid. In the second period, from 1983 to 1986, the administration and its supporters moved toward a public rationale and Congress asserted itself in each case; some members attempted to define criteria for the application of the doctrine and the remainder were involved in votes on individual assistance programs. In the third period, 1987 to 1991, the Reagan Doctrine was continued in three cases (Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola) and rejected in two others (Nicaragua and Mozambique). The consensus on Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia lasted until the Soviet or Soviet bloc troops were withdrawn from each of those countries.

Although key administration officials contemplated a broad strategic initiative, the translation of their vision into policy resulted in significant alterations. Four versions of the strategy emerged. First, the authors and primary advocates of the doctrine imagined a "universal" version that would be applied uniformly to those situations in which a "pro-Soviet" regime faced opposition. Second, other policymakers defined a "two-track" version that joined the force of the doctrine to diplomacy in order to resolve regional issues. Third, a "truncated" version included the rationale of the "two-track" approach, but limited the application of the strategy only to situations in which foreign troops were present. Finally, a "Soviet aggressor" version was supported by policymakers who believed that the doctrine was appropriate only if the Soviet Union had actually invaded, installed a puppet government, and conducted military operations in support of that regime. As suggested by Figure One, advocates in the administration, Congress, and the public held the "universal" view, while most "opponents" in Congress and the public held the "Soviet aggressor" view. "Pragmatists" in the administration, Congress, and the public adopted a more restrictive view than "advocates" and a more expansive view than "opponents." Even pragmatists, however, were divided between the "two-track" and "truncated" versions.

The logic of the "universal" approach led its adherents to advocate Reagan Doctrine aid to all five cases and to oppose diplomatic settlements in each. The logic of the "Soviet aggressor" version led its supporters to oppose assistance in all cases but Afghanistan, although some also equated the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pragmatists insisted on: careful consideration of the relationship between the regime and the Soviet bloc, especially as it related to foreign troops; careful evaluation of the nature of the rebel groups, particularly the extent to which they were indigenous; and active diplomacy, for which Reagan Doctrine aid was to be a complement. All pragmatists rejected the application of the Reagan Doctrine to Mozambique, and most, especially in Congress, rejected its application to Nicaragua, except for 1985-1986. Ultimately, it was the combination of "truncated" and "two-track" versions that was applied to Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola and rejected in Mozambique and Nicaragua. Thus, the original authors of the strategy were unsuccessful in attaining its implementation according to their conception. Instead, a wider group of policymakers altered the original strategy and embedded it into a more limited, case-by-case approach that also relied on other instruments of foreign policy, including diplomacy and inducements.

Several characteristics of the policy-making process stand out. First, Congress was a major player in the formulation and implementation of policy. In the Afghanistan case, Congress actually took the lead in 1983, dramatically expanding assistance to the rebels, and remained a major partner throughout the life of the policy. The Cambodia case exhibits similar features, with Congress assuming policy leadership in 1985. The oft-described clash between the administration and Congress over aid to the Nicaraguan Contras demonstrates an inter-branch conflict that gradually evolved (after the Iran-Contra revelations)[c] into congressional dominance. Even in the Angola and Mozambique cases, in which the foreign policy bureaucracies played a more dominant leadership role, a period occurred in which inter-branch policymaking occurred.

A second feature is the cacophony of voices that were heard from both the legislative and executive branches. Although frequently discussed for Congress, with its 535 members, this feature is also exhibited for the executive branch, perhaps most clearly in the Angola and Mozambique cases, where members of the State Department attempted to pursue one set of objectives, while others from the CIA and Defense Department actively worked against those objectives in accordance with their own policy preferences. Some administration officials even accused others of treachery and disloyalty to "official" policy. Constantine Menges (and Casey), for example, accused George Shultz and the State Department of sabotaging "the President's policy.[68] Shultz, on the other hand, noted that "Bill Casey's pursuit of different foreign policy goals, using the CIA as his platform and his source of influence, was ... a continuing problem ... as we pursued what had been approved as administration policy."[69]

Finally, in several instances inter-branch alliances of like-minded policymakers developed. For example, to force the repeal of the Clark Amendment and begin aid to the Angolan rebels, hard-liners in the White House, foreign policy bureaucracy, and Congress allied against arrangement among those who opposed such a move. This also occurred on the Mozambique question. In both, the hardline alliance consisted of CIA Director Casey and members of the White House and foreign policy bureaucracy, including members of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Constantine Menges (NSC staff), Pat Buchanan (White House staff), Chief of Staff Don Regan and National Security Adviser John Poindexter. This administration group was supported by hard-liners in Congress, including Senators Jesse Helms, Steven Symms, and Malcolm Wallop and Representatives Mark Siljander (R-MI), Robert Dornan (R-CA), and Dan Burton.[70]

At the beginning of this analysis two tendencies in studies of American foreign policy were identified: attributing policy to the executive branch alone; and linking the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the president and his key advisers to policy. My analysis suggests that each of these is indeed misleading. The president exists in an environment that is complex and influenced by many different policymakers. Ample opportunity exists for actors from multiple locations in the foreign policy bureaucracy and Congress to affect foreign policy. This analysis not only suggests that Congress has an important effect on foreign policy, it also reinforces those studies that attack the myth of a monolithic executive branch. In truth, there was nearly as much bargaining among members and factions within the executive branch as there was between the executive and legislative branches. There were, moreover, cross-branch alliances that worked together to achieve policy according to their preferences. The attempt to create and apply a strategy based on assistance to anti-communist rebels involved actors from the White House, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and Congress. This suggests that exclusive attention to the executive branch in studies of American foreign policy is limited and seems to indicate a need for systematic inclusion of Congress.

Moreover, the link between individual attitudes, beliefs and values and foreign policy is considerably more complex than many existing analyses suggest. Trying to impute a causal relationship between the world-views of a handful of high-level executive branch officials and U.S. foreign policies ignores at least two important factors. First, it ignores the effect of a fragmented foreign policy bureaucracy. That is, because the foreign policy bureaucracy is vast and complex, and because it has opportunity to shape foreign policy in both the formulation and implementation stages, it is unlikely that what emerges as policy can be traced to individual beliefs, presidential or otherwise. Second, trying to make this link ignores the frequent involvement of members of Congress, and the fact that what emerges as policy often results from compromise and bargaining among many members of both branches. In effect, while it is certainly true that attitudes and beliefs affect the policy preferences of individual policymakers, it is almost certainly true that the process of amalgamating these views destroys those individual links to actual policy in most instances.

In short, it is simply not appropriate to speak of an administration and its policies when examining U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan Doctrine was "Reagan's" in the sense that the president's strategic "vision" was its foundation and because he selected key upper-level officials who shared his outlook and more directly produced the initiative. Moreover, President Reagan clearly made some key decisions, (e.g., to start the Nicaragua policy in 1981, to expand the Afghanistan operation in 1985 and 1986, and to provide covert aid to the Angolan rebels in 1985). However, the foreign policy bureaucracy and Congress were equally critical in each case. For instance, Casey was more important in devising the original strategy and Shultz, the State Department, and Congress were the authors of the "dual-track" and "truncated" versions, in which it was applied. Even some of the president's "decisions" were taken only after other actors pushed, prodded, and even manipulated the process. For example, while Casey and Congress pushed for expanded aid to the rebels in Afghanistan, other parts of the bureaucracy opposed such action and Reagan would not intervene to settle the dispute. Only in 1985, when Congress, Shultz, Casey, and Weinberger forced a consensus proposal did the president "decide" to accelerate the program. The fundamental point is that American foreign policy analyses must account for the involvement and potential influence of a variety of policymakers from the White House, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and Congress. As a former NSC staffer for President George Bush has noted, policymaking begins before the president makes a decision and continues long after the decision memorandum reaches the outbox.[71] The president is one voice, and can be the lead voice, but his is not the only voice.

This article draws on material and research from Chapters 2 and 8 of my book, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy.

a Editor's Note: Other Cold War presidential doctrines are: the Truman Doctrine (1947) proclaimed initially in reference to Greece and Turkey, but later applied to other parts of the world, stated that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) gave unilateral notice that the United States would intervene in the Middle East if any government threatened by a Communist takeover requested aid. The Johnson Doctrine (1965) stated that the president could use military force whenever he thought communism threatened the western hemisphere and was first issued when LBJ sent troops into the Dominican Republic. The Nixon Doctrine (1969), originally aimed at "southern tier" Third World countries in East Asia, came to represent the formal institutionalization of the policy of Vietnamization; that is, it noted that while the United States continued to support regional security and national self-sufficiency for nations in the Far East, it would no longer commit American troops to this effort. The Carter Doctrine (1980) maintained that any attempt by the Soviet Union "to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States."

b Editor's Note: For more details see Kimbra Krueger's article in this issue.

c Editor's Note: For a review of interpretations of the Iran-Contra affair, see D. Bruce Hicks's article in this issue.

Notes

1. Charles Krauthammer, "The Reagan Doctrine," Time, April 1, 1985, p. 54.

2. Robert C. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1989): 14.

3. Mark P. Lagon, "The International System and the Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism Explain Aid to Freedom Fighters," British Journal of Political Science 22 (Spring 1992): 40.

4. Ronald Reagan, Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); and George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993).

5. Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971); Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990); and Jerel Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987).

6. See Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds., Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993); and James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

7. Karen Elliott House, "Reagan's World: Republican Policies Stress Arms Buildup, a Firm Line to Soviets," Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1980 p. 1.

8. Ronald Reagan, "Interview With the President," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 17, no. 10 (April 1981): 232.

9. Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 19, no. 10 (April 1983): 367. On the administration's world view, see Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Reagan Administration's World View," Orbis 26, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 223-44.

10. Kegley and Wittkopf, "The Reagan World Views," p. 237-8; Dado Moreno, US Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1990), p. 83.

11. I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 119-20.

12. Destler, Gelb, and Zake, Our Own Worst, pp. 99-102; Moreno, US Policy, pp. 18, 83.

13. From 1974 to 1980, Marxist regimes came to power in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Guineau-Bissau, Sao Tome, Cape Verde, Grenada, Suriname, and Nicaragua, although not all were hostile to the United States (e.g., Guineau-Bissau, Sao Tome, Cape Verde, Suriname, and probably Zimbabwe).

14. Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From OSS to ClA (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), p. 217.

15. Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the 10th Anniversary Dinner, Heritage Foundation," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 19, no. 40 (October 1983): 1380-4.

16. On this criticism, see James Burnham, The Coming Defeat of Communism (New York: J.Day Press, 1950) and idem, Containment or Liberation: An Inquiry into the Aims of US Foreign Policy (New York: J.Day Press, 1953). This critique influenced the Eisenhower administration. For example, the 1952 Republican platform condemned the "negative, futile, and immoral policy of containment which abandons countless human beings to despotism and godless terrorism." Nonetheless, Eisenhower never seriously considered anything more than a propaganda effort. NSC study 162/2 concluded "the detachment of any major European satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or war," and, moreover, the United States did not aid the 1956 Hungarian uprising. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 128, 154-5. However, covert operations to overthrow governments in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), and Cuba (1961) may be viewed as precedents, although these were ClA-organized coups rather than support for indigenous guerrilla forces that could claim some legitimacy as popular movements.

17. Persico, Casey, p. 225.

18. Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. xvi. Also see Persico, p. 306, who argues that Casey authored the Reagan Doctrine.

20. Schweizer, Victory, p. 6.

20. Persico, Casey, p. 264; Schweizer, Victory, p. 22-3.

21. Schweizer, Victory, p. 23.

22. Ibid., p. 23. Interestingly, the source of this first draft may have been Constantine Menges, who had positioned himself as a Burnham disciple with a 1968 paper calling for U.S. support of insurgencies to combat Soviet expansionism. See Constantine Menges, Democratic Revolutionary Insurgency as an Alternative Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1968). According to Menges in The Twilight Struggle: The Soviet Union v. The United States Today (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1990), pp. 6-7, he proposed a policy to the Reagan transition team that was similar to Casey's draft. See also Menges's Inside the National Security Council (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).

23. Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 142-5; Schweizer, Victory, p. 76-7.

24. Schweizer, Victory, p. 131.

25. National Security Decision Directive Number 75, "US Relations with the USSR," January 17, 1983 (declassified July 16, 1994), p. 1.

26. National Security Decision Directive Number 75, pp. 4-5.

27. Congressional refusal to lift the Clark amendment's ban on aid to Angolan rebels prevented such assistance.

28. Stuart M. Butler, Michael Sanera, and W. Bruce Weinrod, Mandate for Leadership II (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1984), esp. pp. 264-70.

29. Bill Keller, "Conservative Group Urges Aid to Anti-Communist Guerrillas," The New York Times, November 20, 1984, sec. I, p. 20.

30. Lagon, Crusade for Freedom, p. 321, 370.

31. Reagan, Speaking My Mind, pp. 107-8.

32. Reagan, "Remarks at the 10th Anniversary Dinner," pp. 1382-3.

33. Also see his speeches to the Society of the Four Arts (February 23, 1982), the Denver Chief Executive Officers (July 30, 1982), Westminster College, Missouri (October 29, 1983), the Mid-America Club (April 4, 1984), Fordham University (February 25, 1986), the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (April 6, 1986), the OSS/Donovan Symposium (September 19, 1986), and Ashland College (October 27, 1986), all collected in Herbert Meyer, Scouting the Future: The Public Speeches of William J. Casey (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1989).

34. Meyer, Scouting the Future, pp. 171-2.

35. Reagan, "State of the Union Address," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21, no. 6 (March 1985): 146.

36. George Shultz, "Shaping American Foreign Policy: New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," Foreign Affairs 64, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 713. Also see "America and the Struggle for Freedom: Address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, February 22, 1985," Current Policy, 659 (Washington, DC: Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs).

37. Ronald Reagan, "A Foundation for Enduring Peace," Department of State Bulletin, November 1985, p. 3.

38. Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union Address," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 22, no. 6 (March 1986): 139.

39. Ronald Reagan, "Freedom, Regional Security, and Global Peace: Message of the President to Congress." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 22, no. 6 (March 1986): 359.

40. Representatives of this group include Casey, Kirkpatrick, Clark, Patrick Buchanan, Fred Ikle, and others in the administration, Toby Roth (R-WI), Dan Burton, and Jack Kemp in the House, and Malcolm Wallop, Jesse Helms, Steven Symms, and Gordon Humphrey in the Senate.

41. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1114.

42. Representatives of this group include George Shultz, Chester Crocker, Thomas Enders, Paul Wolfowitz, Michael Armacost, James Baker, Michael Deaver, and others in the administration, Dave McCurdy (D-OK), Hamilton Fish (R-NY), Stephen Solarz in the House, and Dennis DeConcini, Bill Bradley (D-NJ), and David Durenburger (R-MN) in the Senate.

43. Chester Crocker, High Noon in South Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.V. Norton, 1992), pp. 292-7.

44. Representatives include Michael Barnes, Lee Hamilton, David Bonior in the House, and Edward Kennedy, Robert Byrd, Alan Cranston, Christopher Dodd, and Tom Harkin in the Senate.

45. The table is created from ADA/ACU ideology scores (0-15 = liberal; 16-85 = moderate; 86-100 = conservative) and House roll-call votes on Reagan Doctrine assistance (procedural and undivided votes were eliminated from the selection; the votes, as numbered by Congressional Quarterly Roll Call Votes, are: 1983: 264, 266, 270, 377; 1984: 162; 1985: 58, 60, 61, 140, 141, 142, 143, 193, 199; 1986: 58, 178, 179, 180, 356; 1987: 30, 168; 1988: 7, 24, 157). Reagan Doctrine support was computed by dividing a member's votes for aid by the total number of Reagan Doctrine aid votes for which the member was eligible. An advocate supported the Reagan Doctrine 85 percent of the time or more, a pragmatist supported the doctrine from 15 percent to 85 percent of the time, and an opponent voted for the Reagan Doctrine less than 15 percent of the time.

46. E.g., Schweizer, Victory, pp. 1-23; and Menges, Inside the National Security Council.

47. Lagon, "The International System," p. 47.

48. See US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, The Possibility of a Resource War in Southern Africa: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., July 8, 1981 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981).

49. Lagon, Crusader or Freedom, p. 359.

50. Michael Armacost, "US Policy Toward the Third World," Department of State Bulletin, January 1987, p. 58.

51. Robert H. Johnson, "Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Fall 1988): 509-29; and Robert C. Tucker, Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1985).

52. Ted G. Carpenter, "US Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The Reagan Doctrine and its Pitfalls," Cato Institute Policy Analysis #74 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1986).

53. Johnson, "Misguided Morality." p. 514.

54. Christopher Demuth, Owen Hames, Irving Kristol, Joshua Muravchik, Stephen Rosenfeld, and Stephen Sodarz, The Reagan Doctrine and Beyond (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1987), p. 7.

55. Tucker, Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine; Christopher Layne "Requiem for the Reagan Doctrine," SAIS Review 8 (Summer 1988): 1-18.

56. Raymond W. Copson, "Contra Aid and the Reagan Doctrine: An Overview," Congressional Research Service Review, March 1987, p. 4.

57. See Mark N. Katz, "Beyond the Reagan Doctrine: Reassessing US Policy Toward Regional Conflicts," The Washington Quarterly 14, no. 1 (winter 1991): 169-79.

58. This may be inferred from voting records on the individual aid packages.

59. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, and Alan Gerson, "The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law," in Louis Henkin et al., eds., Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), pp. 19-25.

60. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," p. 14.

61. United States Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, US Policy Toward Anti-Communist Insurgencies: Hearing before the Committee on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., May 8, 1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 56.

62. Shultz, "Shaping American Foreign Policy," p. 17.

63. Lagon, Crusade for Freedom, p. 245.

64. See, for example the statement of Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, pp. 40-4.

65. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, p. 13.

66. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986-1987 (Part 5): Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 20, 27, 28 February and 5, 6, 12, 20 March 1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 657.

67. This summary draws on chapters 4-8 of American Foreign Policy-making and the Reagan Doctrine, a 1993 Northern Illinois University dissertation by James M. Scott.

68. Menges, Inside the National Security Council.

69. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1113.

70. On this alliance, see Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 1112-6; Crocker, High Noon in South Africa, pp. 268, 271, 281-7; and Menges, Inside the National Security Council, esp. pp. 230-40.

71. Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again," International Security 18, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 143-71.

TABLE 1

Ideology and Support for the Reagan Doctrine in the House of Representatives, 98th to 100th Congresses

Legend for Chart:

A - Attitude toward the Reagan Doctrine
B - Ideology: Conservatives
C - Ideology: Moderates
D - Ideology: Liberals

A                                B           C            D

Advocates              92.7% (115)  32.5% (91)            0

Pragmatists               7.3% (9)  35.4% (99)     2.3% (3)

Opponents                        0  32.1% (90)  97.7% (127)

Totals                         124         280          130

TABLE 2

Chronology of Reagan Doctrine Assistance

The following chart reads as follows:

Row 1: Year

Row 2: Afghanistan; Angola

Row 3: Nicaragua; Cambodia

Row 5: Mozambique

1980

          Covert aid $20-30 million                  No aid

          No aid                                     No aid

          No aid

1981

          Covert aid                    Aid request rejected
          $30 million

          Covert aid approve program                  No aid

          No aid


1982

          Aid increased                              No aid
          $40 million

          Covert aid $19 million          Covert non-lethal
                                             aid $5 million

          No aid


1983

          Aid increased $80 million                  No aid


          Aid increased                   Covert non-lethal
          $25 million                        aid $5 million

          No aid

1984

          Aid increased $130 million                 No aid

          Aid halted                      Covert non-lethal
                                             aid $5 million

          No aid

1985

          Aid increased                 Covert aid program
          $450 million                             approved

          Non-lethal overt                 Covert and overt
          aid $27 million                    non-lethal aid
                                             $12-15 million

          No aid; conservative pressure

1986

          Aid increased                          Covert aid
          $500 million                          $15 million

          Overt aid                        Covert and overt
          $100 million                       non-lethal aid
                                             $12-15 million

          No aid; conservative pressure

1987

          Covert aid $500 million             Aid increased
                                                $18 million

          Overt aid                        Covert and overt
          (from 1986)                        non-lethal aid
          no new aid                         $12-15 million
          approved

          Aid considered and rejected

1988

          Aid decreased                       Aid increased
          $350 million                          $40 million

          Aid ended[a]                     Covert and overt
                                             non-lethal aid
                                             $12-15 million

          No aid

1989

          Covert aid $350 million             Aid increased
                                                $60 million

          No aid[a]                        Covert and overt
                                             non-lethal aid
                                             $15-20 million

          No aid

1990

          Aid decreased                       Aid decreased
          $300 million                          $30 million

          No aid                                  Aid ended

          No aid

1991

          Aid ended                               Aid ended

          No aid                                  Aid ended

          No aid

a Congress provided limited amounts of food, medicine, and clothing to Contra camps in Honduras from 1988 to 1989.

DIAGRAM: FIGURE I. Versions and Supporters of the Reagan Doctrine.

~~~~~~~~

By JAMES M. SCOTT, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska at Kearney