

# THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ECONOMICS

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Suppose that bundles  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  induce the offspring levels 1 and 2, so  $\Psi(b_1) = 1$  and  $\Psi(b_2) = 2$ , where  $\Psi$  is the production function for expected offspring from commodities. Gamble 1 yields  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  each with probability  $1/2$ , where risk is independent. Gamble 2 also yields  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  each with probability  $1/2$ , but risk is aggregate. Individuals should prefer gamble 1 to gamble 2.

Given an environment  $s$ , type  $i$  faces an idiosyncratic gamble where  $q_k^{i,s} =$  probability of  $x_k^{i,s}$ .  $\Psi(x) =$  expected offspring from  $x$ . Hence  $\sum_k q_k^{i,s} \Psi(x_k^{i,s}) =$  expected offspring of  $i$  in  $s$ . If state  $s$  has probability  $\pi_s$ , then the long run limiting growth rate of  $i$  is

$$\sum_s \pi_s \ln \left( \sum_k q_k^{i,s} \Psi(x_k^{i,s}) \right).$$

In particular,

$\ln((1/2)\Psi(b_1) + (1/2)\Psi(b_2)) > (1/2)\ln\Psi(b_1) + (1/2)\ln\Psi(b_2)$ , by the strict concavity of  $\ln$ .

Seeds in the desert. Should they germinate after one rainfall? Optimal strategy is to randomize.

**Bergstrom, T.C “Storage for Good Times and Bad: Of Rats and Men,”** at <http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Evolution/store.pdf>

Suppose  $\Pr\{\text{long winter}\} = \alpha$ , and so  $\Pr\{\text{short winter}\} = 1 - \alpha$ . Type  $L$  squirrels save enough for a long winter and survive it with probability 1; type  $S$ 's save only enough for a short one, and can survive this with probability 1, but die for sure in a long winter. Suppose  $\Pr\{\text{survival of } L \text{ type in the fall}\} = 1/2$ ;  $\Pr\{\text{survival of } S \text{ type in the fall}\} = 3/4$ .

Consider a type that saves enough for a long winter with probability  $\pi$  but for a short winter with probability  $1 - \pi$ . Growth rate is

$$r = \alpha \ln(\pi/2) + (1 - \alpha) \ln(\pi/2 + (1 - \pi)(3/4)).$$

Maximized over  $\pi$  at  $\pi = 3\alpha$ , given  $\alpha \leq 1/3$

**Cooper W. S., R. H. Kaplan. 1982. “Adaptive ‘coin-flipping’: a decision-theoretic examination of natural selection for random individual variation.” *Journal of Theoretical Biology*. 94:135–151.**

The probability of a snowy winter is  $p \in (0, 1/2)$ ; that of a clear winter is  $1 - p \in (1/2, 1)$ . Animals with dark coats survive clear winters for sure but die in snowy winters; those that develop white coats survive snowy winters but die in clear ones. A type that randomizes choosing a white coat with probability  $\pi$  and a dark coat with probability  $1 - \pi$  has growth rate  $r = p \ln \pi + (1 - p) \ln(1 - \pi)$ . This is maximized by  $\pi = p$ .

C&K assert that individuals who choose white the flip are “altruistic” because the probability of such an individual dying is higher given  $1 - p > 1/2 > p$ .

**Grafen, A. “Formal Darwinism, the individual-as-maximizing-agent analogy and bet-hedging,”** *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 266, 799-803.

**Curry, P. “Decision Making under Uncertainty and the Evolution of Interdependent Preferences”,** *Journal of Economic Theory* 98, 2001, 357-369.

A continuum of animals of size 1.  $\pi$  choose white and  $1 - \pi$  choose dark. Consider a small mass of size  $\varepsilon$ . If they choose white, the expected fraction of the population they will be is  $\frac{p\varepsilon}{\pi} = \varepsilon$  if  $p = \pi$ . If they choose dark, the expected fraction of the population they will be is  $\frac{1-p}{1-\pi}\varepsilon = \varepsilon$ , if  $p = \pi$ . The type that randomizes  $(\pi, 1 - \pi)$  is maximizing the *expected fraction* of the population it will be.

## 5. INTERTEMPORAL PREFERENCES

**Robson, A.J. and Samuelson, L. "The Evolutionary Basis of Intertemporal Preferences," AER P&P 97 (2007) 496-500.**

Agents live  $\ell$  periods, producing  $x_i$  offspring in  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ . Given a large population, it evolves as

$$L = \begin{bmatrix} e^{-\delta} x_1 & e^{-\delta} & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ e^{-\delta} x_2 & 0 & e^{-\delta} & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots \\ e^{-\delta} x_{\ell-1} & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & e^{-\delta} \\ e^{-\delta} x_{\ell} & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} "$$

$$N(t+1)^T = N(t)^T L = \dots = N(0)^T L^{t+1}$$


Perron-Frobenius Theorem. Growth rate is the dominant eigenvalue  $\lambda$ —the unique positive root of the Euler-Lotka equation—

$$1 = \frac{x_1}{e^{\delta\lambda}} + \frac{x_2}{(e^{\delta\lambda})^2} + \dots + \frac{x_\ell}{(e^{\delta\lambda})^\ell}.$$

Note that

$$\frac{1}{t} \ln \|N(t)\| \rightarrow \ln \tilde{\lambda},$$

where  $\|N(t)\| = N_1(t) + \dots + N_\ell(t)$ . On an evolutionary indifference surface,  $e^{\delta\tilde{\lambda}}$  is constant. These surfaces are thus hyperplanes.



When  $\lambda$  is constant,

$$0 = \frac{dx_i}{(e^{\delta\lambda})^i} + \frac{dx_{i+1}}{(e^{\delta\lambda})^{i+1}} \text{ so that } -\frac{dx_{i+1}}{dx_i} = e^{\delta\lambda}.$$

### Preferences Over Consumption

Let  $f_\tau(c_\tau)$  give age- $\tau$  births as a function of period- $\tau$  consumption  $c_\tau$ . The  $f_\tau$  are strictly increasing and concave.

For any consumption vector  $c$ ,

$$1 = \frac{f_1(c_1)}{\theta} + \dots + \frac{f_\tau(c_\tau)}{\theta^\tau} + \dots + \frac{f_\ell(c_{\ell-1})}{\theta^{\ell-1}} + \frac{f_\ell(c_\ell)}{\theta^\ell},$$

where  $\theta > 0$  is constant on an indifference surface. No additively separable representation, but  $\theta(c_1, \dots, c_\ell)$  and hence  $\lambda(c_1, \dots, c_\ell)$  is strictly increasing and quasi-concave.

## Geometric Discounting

Let  $(f_1, \dots, f_\ell)$  be the optimal utility profile and  $\theta = e^{\delta} \lambda$ , where  $\lambda$  is the Frobenius root of the Leslie matrix. Then

$$1 = \frac{f_1}{\theta} + \frac{f_2}{\theta^2} + \dots + \frac{f_\ell}{\theta^\ell}.$$

If  $(f'_1, \dots, f'_\ell)$  is suboptimal then

$$\frac{f_1}{\theta} + \frac{f_2}{\theta^2} + \dots + \frac{f_\ell}{\theta^\ell} = 1 > \frac{f'_1}{\theta} + \frac{f'_2}{\theta^2} + \dots + \frac{f'_\ell}{\theta^\ell}.$$

Since  $\ln \theta = \delta + \ln \tilde{\lambda}$ , the rate of time discount is equal to the rate of population growth plus the mortality rate.

**Robson, A.J. and Samuelson, L. “The Evolution of Impatience with Aggregate Uncertainty,” AER 99 (2009) 1925-53.**

Aggregate risk in an age structured population means that Leslie matrix is random, i.i.d., say. Hence—

$$\tilde{N}(t+1)^T = N(0)^T \tilde{L}(1)\tilde{L}(2)\dots\tilde{L}(t)$$

“Sub-additive ergodic theorem” guarantees the existence of  $\lambda$  such that

$$\frac{1}{t} \ln \|\tilde{N}(t)\| \rightarrow \Lambda, \text{ wp } 1.$$

**Aggregate uncertainty slows growth.** If matrices are iid, then  $\Lambda < \ln \bar{\lambda}$ , where  $\bar{\lambda}$  is the dominant eigenvalue of  $E(\tilde{L})$ .

All survival probabilities are subject to an aggregate shock so—

$$L = \tilde{s}\bar{L}, \text{ where } \bar{L} = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 & 1 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ x_2 & 0 & 1 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_{\ell-1} & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 1 \\ x_{\ell} & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $\tilde{s}$  is i.i.d. It follows that

$$\tilde{N}(t)^T = \tilde{s}(1)\dots\tilde{s}(t)N(0)^T L^t.$$

so that

$$\frac{1}{t} \ln \|\tilde{N}(t)\| = \frac{\sum_{\tau=1}^t \ln \tilde{s}(\tau)}{t} + \frac{1}{t} \ln \|N(0)^T L^t\| \rightarrow E \ln \tilde{s} + \ln \bar{\lambda} = E \ln \tilde{s}\bar{\lambda}$$

where  $\bar{\lambda}$  is the dominant eigenvalue of the matrix  $\bar{L}$ .

The growth rate is then

$$\Lambda = E \ln \tilde{s} \bar{\lambda}(x) < \ln E \tilde{s} \bar{\lambda}(x) = \ln \bar{s} \bar{\lambda}(x),$$

where  $\bar{s} = E(\tilde{s})$ . Then

$$-\frac{dx_{i+1}}{dx_i} = \frac{\frac{d\Lambda}{dx_i}}{\frac{d\Lambda}{dx_{i+1}}} = \frac{\frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dx_i}}{\frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dx_{i+1}}} = \bar{\lambda} > \frac{e^\Lambda}{\bar{s}}.$$

Thus the discount rate is the growth rate with no mortality. This rate exceeds the growth rate plus the mortality rate from mean survival.

**Gurven and Kaplan (2007).**

Individuals start reproducing at age 15 and stop at age 45, that the probability of giving birth in a given year is 0.15. The dominant eigenvalue solves  $1 = \sum_{\tau=15}^{45} \frac{(.15)}{\bar{\lambda}^{\tau}}$ , so  $\bar{\lambda} = 1.05675$  and  $\ln \bar{\lambda} = 0.055$ .

If the growth rate is zero,

$$0 = \Lambda = \ln \bar{\lambda} + E \ln \tilde{S} = 0.055 + E \ln \tilde{S},$$

With probability  $1 - p$  the death rate is about two percent. With probability  $p$  a catastrophe with survival rate of  $S^{\dagger}$  appears. Then  $E \ln \tilde{S} = p \ln S^{\dagger} + (1 - p)(-0.02) = -0.055$ . Thus  $p = 0.05$  if  $S^{\dagger} = 0.50$ , for example. Then  $\ln E \tilde{S} = -0.045$ , so aggregate uncertainty generates an extra 1%.

**Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008)**