This note was published in *Dialogue*, (1974),

**ON REDUCING THE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WORLDS**

NORMAN SWARTZ

*Simon Fraser University*

In his paper, "The
Two Main Problems of Philosophy"[Note 1],
Professor N.L. Wilson offers an
inductive argument for the thesis "that there is only one possible
world … possibility, actuality and necessity collapse into each
other."[p. 200].

He proceeds by posing several questions of the form,"What would the world be like if everything of such-and-such a sort were instead of so-and-so a sort?" In each case he shows that "the world would be exactly as it is."[p. 203]. For each question posed, there is an infinity-fold reduction in the number of possible worlds. Thereupon, Wilson concludes the section of his paper devoted to modalities by stating: "There must be more reductions. … At any rate these reductions seem to me to be sufficiently striking to justify us in at least conjecturing that there is only one possible world."[p. 212].

In spite of the fact
that Wilson (successfully I think) effects several infinity-fold
reductions of the number of possible worlds, he far from succeeds in
reducing the number to one. Quite the contrary: an infinity remains. For
it does little good to support Wilson's radical reduction thesis by
finding whole families of reductions, if at the same time there exist
means by which to generate vast hosts of different possible worlds. The
trouble with Wilson's reduction-formula is that in each instantiation of
it in his hands at least one universal quantifier occurs, e.g.
"What would the world be like if
every event occurred ten years before
it actually occurred?"[p. 202, italics added]. But one need only
substitute the strictly-particular quantifier, "some but not all
(or every)", for the universal one to get very different results.
For example we would get instead, "What would the world be like if
some but not every event occurred ten years before it actually
occurred?" Rather than the world being 'exactly as it is' we would find the
world somewhat or even greatly different. Indeed for a world consisting
of *n* original events, there are *n*!
*n* x [*n*-1] x [*n*-2] x … x 2 x 1)

Wilson tries to bolster
his argument by also deriving his conclusion from considerations of
'Carnap-like' state-descriptions. In effect, he argues that all
state-descriptions which can be obtained from one another by the
permutation of individual constants describe one and the same world.
(This is hardly news. Carnap himself called such state-descriptions
"isomorphic" and assigned equi-probabilities to their
disjunctions (the so-called structure-descriptions) treating
them, as it were, as
'super'-state-descriptions). What is crucial for our purposes, however,
is that the list of all the state-descriptions for any specified
language will always contain some state-descriptions which are
*not* isomorphic to
some others. The proof is trivial. All state-descriptions in a language
contain the same number of conjuncts. If there are *n* terms
in a state-description,
then there must be one state-description with no negated terms, some
with one, some with two, and so on, all the way through to the one
state-description which consists wholly of (*n*) negated terms. But since
it is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the isomorphism of
state-descriptions that they have the same number of negated terms, it
follows that not all state-descriptions in a language can be isomorphic.
Again, far from supporting Wilson's thesis, we can see that playing the
state-description game undermines it. For even though some (but not all)
state-descriptions in a given language will have isomorphs, we have
proved that every state-description has at least one non-isomorph. In
non-technical language this means that for any possible world described
by a Carnapian state-description, it can be demonstrated that there
exists at least one possible world which is not identical to it.

In sum, if the
modalities, possibility, actuality and necessity, are to be collapsed
into one another, then some far stronger arguments than Wilson's will be
required.

**Note**

1. *Dialogue, * XII (1973) No. 2,
pp. 199-216.[ Resume ]

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