

Monopoly


Pure Monopoly

- ◆ **A monopolized market has a single seller.**
- ◆ **The monopolist's demand curve is the (downward sloping) market demand curve.**
- ◆ **So the monopolist can alter the market price by adjusting its output level.**

Pure Monopoly

\$/output unit

$P(q)$



Higher output q causes a lower market price, $p(q)$.

Output Level, q

Why Monopolies?

- ◆ **What causes monopolies?**
 - a legal fiat; e.g. US Postal Service
 - a patent; e.g. a new drug
 - sole ownership of a resource; e.g. a toll highway
 - formation of a cartel; e.g. OPEC
 - large economies of scale; e.g. local utility companies.

Pure Monopoly

- ◆ Suppose that the monopolist seeks to maximize its economic profit,

$$\Pi(q) = p(q)q - c(q).$$

- ◆ What output level q^* maximizes profit?

Profit-Maximization

$$\Pi(q) = p(q)q - c(q).$$


At the profit-maximizing output level q^*

$$\frac{d\Pi(q)}{dq} = \frac{d}{dq} (p(q)q) - \frac{dc(q)}{dq} = 0$$

so, for $q = q^*$,

$$\frac{d}{dq} (p(q)q) = \frac{dc(q)}{dq}.$$

Profit-Maximization



Marginal Revenue

Marginal revenue is the rate-of-change of revenue as the output level q increases;

$$MR(q) = \frac{d}{dq} (p(q)q) = p(q) + q \frac{dp(q)}{dq}.$$

$dp(q)/dq$ is the slope of the market inverse demand function so $dp(q)/dq < 0$. Therefore

$$MR(q) = p(q) + q \frac{dp(q)}{dq} < p(q)$$

for $q > 0$.


Marginal Revenue

E.g. if $p(q) = a - bq$ then

$$R(q) = p(q)q = aq - bq^2$$

and so

$$MR(q) = a - 2bq < a - bq = p(q) \text{ for } q > 0.$$



Marginal Cost


Marginal cost is the rate-of-change of total cost as the output level q increases;

$$MC(q) = \frac{dc(q)}{dq}.$$

E.g. if $c(q) = F + \alpha q + \beta q^2$ then

$$MC(q) = \alpha + 2\beta q.$$

Total/Marginal Cost



Profit-Maximization; An Example

At the profit-maximizing output level q^* , $MR(q^*) = MC(q^*)$. So if $p(q) = a - bq$ and if $c(q) = F + \alpha q + \beta q^2$ then

$$MR(q^*) = a - 2bq^* = \alpha + 2\beta q^* = MC(q^*)$$


and the profit-maximizing output level is

$$q^* = \frac{a - \alpha}{2(b + \beta)}$$

causing the market price to be

$$p(q^*) = a - bq^* = a - b \frac{a - \alpha}{2(b + \beta)}.$$

Profit-Maximization; An Example



Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

- ◆ **Suppose that market demand becomes less sensitive to changes in price (*i.e.* the own-price elasticity of demand becomes less negative). Does the monopolist exploit this by causing the market price to rise?**

Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

$$\begin{aligned}MR(q) &= \frac{d}{dq} (p(q)q) = p(q) + q \frac{dp(q)}{dq} \\ &= p(q) \left[1 + \frac{q}{p(q)} \frac{dp(q)}{dq} \right].\end{aligned}$$

Own-price elasticity of demand is

$$\varepsilon = \frac{p(q)}{q} \frac{dq}{dp(q)} \quad \text{so} \quad MR(q) = p(q) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right].$$

Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

$$MR(q) = p(q) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right].$$

Suppose the monopolist's marginal cost of production is constant, at \$k/ unit.

For a profit-maximum

$$MR(q^*) = p(q^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] = k \quad \text{or} \quad p(q^*) = \frac{k}{1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}}$$
$$\frac{p(q^*) - k}{p(q^*)} = -\frac{1}{\varepsilon}$$

Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

$$p(q^*) = \frac{k}{1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}}.$$

E.g. if $\varepsilon = -3$ then $p(q^*) = 3k/2$,
and if $\varepsilon = -2$ then $p(q^*) = 2k$.

So as ε rises towards -1 the monopolist alters its output level to make the market price of its product to rise.

Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

Notice that, since $MR(q^*) = p(q^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] = k$,

$$p(q^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] > 0 \implies 1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} > 0$$

That is, $\frac{1}{\varepsilon} > -1 \implies \varepsilon < -1$.

So a profit-maximizing monopolist always selects an output level for which market demand is own-price elastic.

A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly


- ◆ A profits tax levied at rate t reduces profit from $\Pi(q^*)$ to $(1-t)\Pi(q^*)$.
- ◆ Q: How is after-tax profit, $(1-t)\Pi(q^*)$, maximized?
- ◆ A: By maximizing before-tax profit, $\Pi(q^*)$.
- ◆ So a profits tax has no effect on the monopolist's choices of output level, output price, or demands for inputs.
- ◆ I.e. the profits tax is a **neutral tax**.

Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

- ◆ A quantity tax of $\$t$ / unit raises the marginal cost of production by $\$t$.
- ◆ So the tax reduces the profit-maximizing output level, causes the market price to rise, and input demands to fall.
- ◆ The quantity tax is **distortionary**.

Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

The quantity tax causes a drop in the output level, a rise in the output's price and a decline in demand for inputs.



Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

- ◆ Can a monopolist “pass” all of a \$t quantity tax to the consumers?
- ◆ Suppose the marginal cost of production is constant at \$k/ unit.
- ◆ With no tax, the monopolist’s price is

$$p(q^*) = \frac{k\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon}.$$

Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

- ◆ The tax increases marginal cost to $\$(k+t)/$ unit, changing the profit-maximizing price to

$$p(q^t) = \frac{(k+t)\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon}.$$

- ◆ The amount of the tax paid by buyers is

$$p(q^t) - p(q^*).$$

Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

$$p(q^t) - p(q^*) = \frac{(k+t)\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon} - \frac{k\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon} = \frac{t\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon}$$


is the amount of the tax passed on to buyers. E.g. if $\varepsilon = -2$, the amount of the tax passed on is $2t$.

Because $\varepsilon < -1$, $\varepsilon / (1+\varepsilon) > 1$ and so the monopolist passes on to consumers **more** than the tax!

The Inefficiency of Monopoly


- ◆ A market is Pareto **efficient** if it achieves the maximum possible total gains-to-trade.
- ◆ Otherwise a market is Pareto **inefficient**.

The Inefficiency of Monopoly




The efficient output level q^e satisfies $p(q) = MC(q)$. Total gains-to-trade is maximized.

The Inefficiency of Monopoly



$MC(q^*+1) < p(q^*+1)$ so both seller and buyer could gain if the (q^*+1) th unit of output was produced. Hence the $MC(q)$ market is Pareto inefficient.

The Inefficiency of Monopoly




The monopolist produces less than the efficient quantity, making the market price exceed the efficient market price.


Natural Monopoly

- ◆ **A natural monopoly arises when the firm's technology has economies-of-scale large enough for it to supply the whole market at a lower average total production cost than is possible with more than one firm in the market.**

Natural Monopoly



Inefficiency of a Natural Monopoly




Regulating a Natural Monopoly

- ◆ **Why not command that a natural monopoly produce the efficient amount of output?**
- ◆ **Then the deadweight loss will be zero, won't it?**

Regulating a Natural Monopoly

\$/ unit

At the efficient output level q^e , $ATC(q^e) > p(q^e)$ so the firm makes an economic loss.



Regulating a Natural Monopoly

- ◆ **So a natural monopoly cannot be forced to use marginal cost pricing. Doing so makes the firm exit, destroying both the market and any gains-to-trade.**
- ◆ **Regulatory schemes can induce the natural monopolist to produce the efficient output level without exiting.**