- 1. a) Find minimum AC: either set MC = AC or take derivative of AC and set = 0. AC = $.01q^2 1.2q + 111$ dAC/dq = 0.2q 1.2 = 0 q = 60 at q = 60, AC = 75 = Price in Long run equilibrium Q = 4500
 - b) 4500/60 = 75 firms
 - c) Licence fee does not change MC. Firm sets MC = P $MC = 0.3q^2 2.4q + 111 = P (= 300 0.5Q)$ Let Q = 60q and sub into above $0.3q^2 2.4q + 111 = 300 0.5(60q)$ $q^2 20q + 6300 = 0$ => (q + 90)(q 70) = 0 => q = 70 and p = 90

Gross profit (70x90) - 5320 = 980Profit gets bid away on licence.

- 2. a) At min AC, q = 25 and AC = 125. Therefore P = \$125
 - b) From the demand curve Q = 1500. 1500/25 = 60 firms
 - c) The minimum AC will shift up by 20% therefore the new long run price is P = (1.2)(\$125) = \$150, and Q = 1400. therefore the number of firms = 56
 - d) the new longrun price is 125 + 50 = 175. Q = 1300 and firms = 52
 - e) For firms to increase from 60 to 63, market Q will increase to 1575 (63x25). From the demand curve, P = 106.25. Subsidy = 125 106.25 = \$18.75

Chapter 10:

- #3 a) MC = 10, y = 50, p = 60 and profit = 2500 F
 - b) Entrant's demand $p = (110 y_1) y_E = 60 y_E$
 - c) entrant's MR = $60 2y_E = MC = 10 y_E = 25$, p = 35 entrant's profit = 625 F
 - d) natural monoploy occurs for F > 625.
- #9 a) the profit maximizing prices are \$45 and \$60. Profit =\$382.50
 - b) any fixed fee that extracts CS above some price will work.
 - c) if $y \le 3$ then P = 90 10y and MR = 90 20y if y > 3 then P = 70 - 10y/3 and MR = 70 - 20y/3 $p^* = 35$ and profit = 367.59

chapter 11, #1

- a) p = 280, q = 360 profit = 64800
- b) n = number of firms:

$$p = (460+100n)/(n+1)$$
 $q = 720/(n+1)$ profit = 259200/(n+1)

- c) each firm produces 180 and profit = 32400. violator would produce 270. Violators profit will increase by \$4,050
- d) The limit output is 560, limit price is \$180 and profit is \$44,800 \$3,200
- e) There would be two firms, each earning \$8,800
- f) There would be 3 firms. profits of each = \$1,600
- g) One firm. Profit = \$44,800