Annals of the Association of American Geographers

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t788352614

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Online Publication Date: 01 September 2003

To cite this Article Hayter, Roger(2003)"‘The War in the Woods’: Post-Fordist Restructuring, Globalization, and the Contested Remapping of British Columbia's Forest Economy’.Annals of the Association of American Geographers,93:3,706 — 729

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1111/1467-8306.9303010

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8306.9303010

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“The War in the Woods”: Post-Fordist Restructuring, Globalization, and the Contested Remapping of British Columbia’s Forest Economy

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Resource peripheries that are geographically remote from “core economies” are also peripheral to contemporary theorizing in economic geography, and requires higher profile within economic geography’s research agenda. The restructuring qua remapping of resource peripheries is collectively shaped by institutional forces unleashed by post-Fordism and globalization that are fundamentally different from the restructuring of cores. As industrial regions, resource peripheries must negotiate the imperatives of flexibility and neoliberalism from vulnerable, dependent positions on geographic margins. For many resource peripheries, neoliberalism has been perversely associated with trade protectionism. As resource regions, the restructuring of resource peripheries has been further complicated by resource-cycle dynamics and radically new social attitudes toward the exploitation of resources that have helped spawn the politics of environmentalism and aboriginalism. Trade, environmental, and aboriginal politics have clashed around the world to contest vested industrial interests and remap resource peripheries in terms of their value systems. British Columbia’s forest economy illustrates this contested remapping. For two decades, the powerful forces of neoliberalism, environmentalism, and aboriginalism have institutionalized a “war in the woods” of British Columbia that is sustained by shared criticism of provincial policy and disagreement over how remapping should proceed. The authority of the provincial government, which controls British Columbia’s forests, has been undermined, but it remains vital to socially acceptable remapping. Meanwhile, the enduring war in the woods testifies that geography matters on the periphery. Key Words: British Columbia contested space, forest economy, globalization, remapping, resource peripheries.

For almost twenty years, British Columbia’s (BC’s) forest economy has been widely characterized in terms of “the war in the woods.” The metaphor refers to three distinct disputes involving trade, the environment, and aboriginal peoples. The trade war began in 1981, when the Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (CFCLI), a powerful U.S.-based lumber lobby, claimed that BC’s forest-management system subsidizes industry and effectively sought restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber imports (Hayter 1992). The latest salvo in this war came in May 2002, when the United States imposed a punitive duty of 27 percent on Canadian exporters, threatening the basis of BC’s lumber industry, long reliant on American markets. As of May 2003, this duty remained in effect. The environmental battles began similarly in the early 1980s, featuring disruptive opposition by environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) (Wilson 1998). ENGOs also became allies of the CFCLI. Finally, long-standing aboriginal discontent, partly in association with the ENGOs, became invigorated in civil disobedience and legal action, disputing the forest industry’s access to timber (Tennant 1990). These wars have occurred when the forest industry has been threatened by technological changes that deepen global competition and demand more flexible production and employment. BC’s forests define a deeply troubled economy, and the provincial government—the custodian of most forests in BC—has found peace in the woods an elusive idea (Barnes and Hayter 1997; Hayter 2000b).

BC is not a singular case of a contested resource periphery. Globally, among many developing and developed countries, export-based resource exploitation faces conflict with environmental, cultural, and political imperatives (e.g. Anderson and Huber 1988; Soyez 1995, 2002; Dauvergne 1997; Stevens 1997; Zerner 2000). Yet resource peripheries are peripheral as places, and peripheral to contemporary theorizing in economic geography (Barnes, Hayter, and Hay 2001; Walker 2001; Hayter, Barnes and Bradshaw 2003). The formulation of ideas about such themes as industrial restructuring, flexible specialization, and globalization is rooted in the experience of industrial cores, old and new. To use, with license, Ann Markusen’s (1996) terms, cores are “sticky places” that are interesting and diverse and that require explanation. The implied contrast is that resource peripheries are “slippery spaces,” here today and gone tomorrow, scarcely worthy of economic geography’s attention.¹

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This article challenges such blinkered thinking to argue that analyses of resource peripheries deserve a higher profile within economic geography’s research agenda. After all, industrialization depends on resources as much as on markets, and resource peripheries are vital to the geography of the global economy. For inhabitants, peripheries are home as well as workplaces, and their industrialization reveals great diversity (Baldwin 1956; Auty 1995; Gibson 2000). In economic geography, recent studies have explained the distinctiveness of resource-based production systems as alternatives to dominant models of core-based industrialization. In a North American context, Walker’s (2001) analysis of California’s evolution prior to 1940 is a noteworthy exemplar. In Canada, the Innisian approach to economic development, especially as formalized by Watkins (1963, 1977), has stimulated assessments of the contemporary restructuring of BC’s forest-based economy in terms of principles formulated from particular (organizational, technological, and geographical) Canadian experience (Hayter and Barnes 1990; Barnes and Hayter 1992; Barnes, Hayter, and Hay 2001). Innis (1956) claimed that economic orthodoxy originated in “metropolitan powers” and that the Canadian resource periphery required its own “local models” (Barnes 1993, 357). This article’s general goal is to elaborate on the distinctiveness of resource peripheries by highlighting their contested nature during the contemporary phase of global restructuring, often expressed as a transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism and as “globalization” (Castells 1996). The article’s specific goal is to understand BC’s war in the woods and the (potential) remapping it entails.

The conceptual springboard for this discussion is recognition that the restructuring qua remapping of resource peripheries is collectively shaped by forces unleashed by post-Fordism and globalization that are fundamentally different from the restructuring of cores. Resource peripheries, as industrial regions, have been deeply affected by the paradigmatic industrial (technological and regulatory) dynamics of post-Fordism that are spearheaded by the imperatives of flexibility and neoliberalism. Resource peripheries must confront and negotiate these imperatives, however, from vulnerable spaces on geographic margins, spaces rooted in remoteness, high levels of export-dependence, specialization, and external control. Simultaneously, resource peripheries are resource regions, deeply affected by the peculiar characteristics of resource-cycle dynamics (Freudenburg 1992; Clapp 1998b; Prudham 2002). Resources are also culturally defined, valued both as factor inputs for industrialization and for wide-ranging ecological and cultural—including aesthetic and spiritual ("nonindustrial")—benefits (Zimmerman 1956; Hanink 2000). Moreover, as the resource-cycle hypothesis argues, in the context of renewable as well as nonrenewable resources, exploitation means that as resources deplete, they become more costly to industry, while their nonindustrial values are threatened or destroyed (Clapp 1998b). During post-Fordism, however, public attitudes have fundamentally changed in favor of the nonindustrial values of resources, even as industrial operations have faced increasing resource-cost disadvantages (O’Riordan 1976; Paehlke 1992). Indeed, “environmentalism”—broadly conceived as professionally organized social movements that seek to reduce human impacts on the natural environment—is a defining feature of post-Fordism and has especially profound consequences for resource peripheries (Buttel 1992). Resource peripheries are also the sites of mounting aboriginal resistance to industrial exploitation, broadly motivated by a sense of “aboriginalism” founded on self-identity within traditional cultures, aboriginal rights, and self-control over development (Stevens 1997).

In resource peripheries, the post-Fordist transformation has featured complex interactions between industrial and resource dynamics in which powerful imperatives of flexibility, neoliberalism, environmentalism, and aboriginalism have clashed to contest industrial development and restructuring. This clash is not coincidental, but is driven by the scale and intensity of Fordism’s resource cycles. Moreover, the radical innovations in information and communication technologies that have enabled a deepened global integration of capital have also empowered ENGOs and aboriginal groups to influence public opinion (and policy) and resist this deepening. ENGOs, in particular, are quintessential examples of post-Fordism’s information-based “network societies” the politics of which have a powerful global reach (Soyez 2002). The imperatives of flexibility, neoliberalism, environmentalism, and aboriginalism have created highly politicized, differentiated forms of globalization among resource peripheries.

The contested restructuring among resource peripheries is not much appreciated within economic geography’s debate over globalization, especially within the space-society tradition (Hanson 1999). This debate has been preoccupied with the implications of mobile (industrial and financial) capital for cores, their deindustrialization, and their continued significance across the economic spectrum (e.g. Florida and Smith 1993; Cox 1997; Cooke 1999; Martin 1999). These studies rightly emphasize the importance of local institutions in providing the glue to keep cores “sticky.” The sticky-place
metaphor, however, comes dangerously close to conflating economic geography’s rationale with the viability of cores. Industrial dispersal—and its contested nature—confirms that geography matters on the periphery. For resource peripheries, global qua exogenous forces have always been powerful, and globalization as a parallel trend with post-Fordism has heralded new, powerful global influences. But global-local dynamics are not zero-sum games between abstract, independent entities. Rather, local-global processes are implemented by various institutions that, in thought and action, interdependently engage local and global perspectives. On the periphery, where resources are immobile and geographically extensive, even exploitation of Baldwin’s (1956) hypothetical “empty lands” that have no prior local actors requires that resource rights are defined and allocated (mapped) as a basis for “local” settlement and the accumulation of “institutionalized” (vested) interests. Subsequent restructuring implies re-mapping among old and new institutions; the contested nature of this remapping further underlines local influence.

This article proceeds in two main parts. First, it discusses the implications of post-Fordism and its associated contested global-local dynamics for resource peripheries. Second, it explains BC’s “war in the woods” as a contest between vested interests and rival (“wannebé”) remappers. A peculiarity of this contest is that its local referee, the provincial government, has lost influence, and the future map of BC’s forests is uncertain. Methodologically, the discussion is synthetic and integrates themes that are normally analyzed in separate categories, connecting economic geography’s “space-society” and “environment-society” traditions, as Hanson (1999) advocates. I seek to achieve this synthesis by privileging the role of institutions, generally conceived as “systems of rules, procedures, and conventions, both of a formal and informal nature” (Martin 2000, 79). Institutions imply many different, overlapping forms, including (business and nonbusiness) organizations and coalitions, local cultures, and general belief systems, such as industrialism, environmentalism and aboriginalism, that are themselves highly differentiated. Crucially, global-local processes are socially instituted and interdependent and comprise different value systems and behaviors that, whether complementary or in conflict, are organized by regions (Holmén 1995). I do not wish to reify the crude core-periphery dichotomy as a summary of regional differentiation created by global-local processes. Rather, given the theoretical peripheralization of peripheries, this article seeks a better understanding of this differentiation than is possible from a preoccupation with (selected) cores.

The “Globalization” of Resource Peripheries during Post-Fordism

The global-local (exogenous-endogenous) dichotomy defines a way of thinking about local variability that relates to traditional distinctions between “site” and “situation” (or relative location) and between endogenous and exogenous factors as a basis for theories of regional and urban differentiation and development (Armstrong and Taylor 1978). Global-local distinctions also correspond to space-place distinctions that recognize that people work within competitive (global) divisions of labor while developing multifaceted attachments in particular territories (places) (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 20). Simply stated, the global-local dichotomy represents a crude classification of factors that interact and modify each other in various ways to define places that are unique but not singular (Johnston 1984; Holmén 1995). In Holmén’s (1995) metaphorical terms, regions are “meeting places” for these interactions, and the “global” simply means “beyond the local,” however the latter is defined (Figure 1).

As instituted processes, however, global-local dynamics reflect particular geographical and historical conditions. Indeed, the idea of globalization is a contemporary debate about these dynamics—specifically, how they have changed during the post-Fordist transformation. As integral parts of this transformation, the globalization of resource peripheries reflects distinctive geographical circumstances and the peculiar characteristics of resource exploitation. Brief reference to the global-local dynamics of resource peripheries during Fordism—especially during its boom decades, from the late 1940s to the 1970s—provides the base from which to understand their globalization during post-Fordism (Freeman 1987).

After 1945, Fordism among capitalist countries is generally characterized as comprising stable and structured national and international systems of governance and production. In leading nations, (Big) Government, Business, and Labor collaborated over some form of Keynesian macroeconomic planning, internationally anchored by Pax Americana within the Cold War context, fixed exchange rates, and growing commitments to free trade and investment as organized by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Economically, Fordism featured a mass-production model that powerfully affected resource exploitation. Between 1918 and 1948, the United States alone consumed more minerals than had the rest of the world in recorded history, and resource consumption expanded even faster during Fordism’s boom decades (Warren 1973, xv). The GATT and the security concerns of the Cold War facilitated the dispersal of resource expansion around the globe to
feed the rapidly growing demands of the industrial cores. While organizational options were frequently available, in practice, expansions across the resource spectrum increasingly corresponded to the Fordist template of domination by horizontally and vertically integrated multinational corporations (MNCs), mass production and standardization, specialized union labor, specialized "rigid" capital equipment, and the celebration of economies of scale and size, and of (relative) stability (Baldwin 1956; Hayter 2000c). Resource production typically featured continuous-flow processes, rather than the assembly-type operations of classic Fordism. Fordism’s distinctiveness in resource peripheries, however, primarily derives from their remoteness and inherently strong "global" influences. In many remote regions, "local" organization, labor, and equipment had to be imported and new towns and economic infrastructure created as preconditions for exploitation. Indeed, Jensen’s (1989) characterization of the Canadian case as “permeable Fordism” because of its dependence on exports, foreign ownership, and foreign technology has wider relevance. The possibility of resource exhaustion also added "local" vulnerability to resource peripheries.

In the 1970s, recessions, energy crises, and stagflation signaled long-term problems with the structured stability of Fordism, notably falling productivity growth at a time of rising international competition and changing market dynamics. In response, stimulated by radical technological changes, led by microelectronics, that have had pervasive effects across the industrial spectrum, post-Fordism has emphasized “flexibility” with respect to international regulations and production systems (Piore and Sabel 1984; Freeman 1987). Flexibility imperatives have encouraged neoliberalism and deregulation, beginning with the demise of the fixed currency exchange system in 1973, while virtually enveloping the entire globe as a result of the end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, leading-edge production systems have featured flexible firms and networks deploying various kinds of flexible labor. The Fordist boom also created an environmental crisis. The intensity and scope of resource cycles had rapidly depleted resources, and it threatened the nonindustrial values of resources everywhere. In late Fordism, warnings of global environmental catastrophe, metaphorically expressed as “silent spring” (Carson 1962) and “Spaceship Earth” (Boulding 1966), evoked widespread public alarm over the extent of environmental destruction, the loss of ecological (and cultural) diversity, and resource scarcity (Meadows et al. 1972). This alarm was further provoked by the energy crises of the 1970s. During post-Fordism, the emerging global nature of environmental problems stimulated fundamental changes in public attitudes toward the environment and resource exploitation (O’Riordan 1976; Paehlke 1992; Garner 1996; Jamison 1996; Soyez 2002). These changes are rooted in support for the “nonindustrial” benefits or values of resources and triggered the rise of environmentalism and proliferation of ENGOs. In tandem, environmental policies mushroomed, and the “greening” of business became a powerful trend that now engages increasingly proactive corporate behavior (Eden 1996; Florida 1996; Richards and Forsch 1997). Yet, as the leitmotiv of post-Fordism, the implications of flexibility for environmentalism are ambiguous (Freeman 1992; Hayter and Le Heron 2002). Indeed, according to Freeman (1992), post-Fordism needs to be replaced by a green paradigm in which innovation driven by...
ecological imperatives will supersede innovation based on flexibility.

Post-Fordism has heralded new forms of global-local dynamics, generally summarized as globalization, that take on different forms in different places. In industrial cores, debates over deindustrialization and reindustrialization have focused on the meaning of flexibility imperatives for capital and labor, occasionally linked to the greening of corporate behavior, largely as a complementary trend (Florida 1996). On many resource peripheries, flexibility and environmental imperatives have combined to create different forms of contested restructuring. Thus, as industrial regions, resource peripheries have to cope with the challenge of flexible production systems and neoliberal trade regimes from already vulnerable positions on the periphery. Additionally, environmental imperatives have defined special problems for peripheries as resource sectors due to the distinctive characteristics of resource exploitation. Resource depletion means that costs rise as the most accessible, highest-quality resources are used first (Freudenburg 1992; Clapp 1998b). Moreover, resource-based industrialization not only generates pollution problems, which often can be reduced, but also directly depletes the nonindustrial values of resources. Old-growth forests are a principal case in point, as their exploitation destroys ecological values along with related extant aboriginal cultures. From this perspective, the idea of sustainability is problematic and large-scale industrialization an inherently objectionable idea. Although not a new phenomenon, environmental and aboriginal resistance to resource exploitation has become widespread—possibly systemic—during post-Fordism, intimately connected to the challenges of flexibility and neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism, Environmentalism, and Aboriginalism

Contested searches for employment and organizational flexibility have occurred in resource peripheries, sometimes strongly so, as in BC’s forest economy (Hayter and Barnes 1992; Hayter 1997; Rees and Hayter 1996). In highly capital-intensive, “rigid” mining industries, such as Arizona’s copper mines, opportunities for labor and product-market flexibilities are less evident (O’hUallachain and Mathews 1994). Yet mining-based MNCs have “played off” regions in conflicts with labor as part of their restructuring efforts (Bradbury 1985). Further, the development of “flying in” labor forces to remote mining sites is a quintessential post-Fordist expression of flexibility, designed to minimize fixed costs in infrastructure, facilitate adjustment of labor costs to operating levels, and reduce future problems associated with embedded labor and social-exit costs (Storey 2001).

Labor costs rarely dominate resource industries, and labor conflicts over flexibility are not the primary motive for the globalization of resource peripheries. Trade conflicts, however, are a different matter. Neoliberalism, and its commitment to market forces and the “freeing” of trade and investment from political barriers, implies a further extension of the free-trade principles gradually extended by the GATT during Fordism. Moreover, resource peripheries, always critically concerned about market access, have generally supported the free-trade agenda. The expectations raised by neoliberalism in this regard, however, have been frequently and deeply confounded, as is attested by both long-simmering and new trade conflicts between industrial powers and resource peripheries. The reasons are broadly twofold. First, bluntly stated, more free trade has not meant laissez-faire (Hayter 1992). Rather, governments have introduced a myriad of policies to shape global trading roles, and trade liberalization has required the establishment of rules, regulatory agencies, and an array of adjudication agencies and processes. The United States, Japan, and the European Community (EC) dominate this “rule-setting.” Second, these countries have powerful resource lobbies that have insisted on protectionism in return for domestic political support. Increasingly, such protectionism is rationalized by linking free trade with the notion of “fair” trade based on “equivalent” conditions of employment, taxation, or environmental regulations. Such linking of trade with “nontrade” issues has become an important feature of neoliberalism, with extraordinary implications for resource peripheries.

During post-Fordism, competition among resource peripheries has intensified, especially as low-priced resources of former centrally planned economies have been incorporated into the world system. Yet neoliberalism has not automatically opened up the markets of core countries for resource products; sometimes it has been perverse. The continued high level of subsidies allocated to the agriculture sectors of the United States, Japan, and the EC that, combined with tariff barriers, seriously impede the agricultural exports from poor countries are particularly depressing in this context. Such protectionism is justified by claims that poor countries have unfair cost advantages. As BC’s softwood lumber war with the U.S. illustrates, charges of “unfairness” are also directed at resource peripheries with high wages, taxes, and strong environmental regulations. Moreover, powerful countries have reinforced these charges with measures that protect their own resource sectors, including subsidies, tariffs, and quota systems that have threatened or distorted
production in many resource peripheries elsewhere. Typically, these conflicts have featured heated political and legal debates involving local, national, and international government agencies, courts, and adjudication committees, a significant irony of which is the sustained support by resource peripheries for free-trade principles and the globalization agenda of dominant countries. Peripheries such as BC’s forest economy that are export-dependent on these dominant countries, however, have less leverage in deciding what is fair trade (Hayter 1992).

Resource-cycle dynamics and social reinterpretations of resources have further profoundly complicated the globalization of resource peripheries. Just when many resource industries have faced the cost disadvantages of mature resource cycles, burgeoning environmental legislation has demanded reductions in environmental pollution and the preservation of environmental values, while environmental-impact studies and environmental monitoring have added further costs. Moreover, environmental and aboriginal resistance toward industry differs fundamentally from labor and trade conflicts that are predominantly economic in nature and do not question resources as factors of production. Rather, environmental and aboriginal politics are rooted in alternate ways of thinking about resources that give priority to nonindustrial values.

During post-Fordism, the global politics of environmentalism have been spearheaded by ENGOs that pursue distinctive strategies and select specific place-based environmental conflicts as targets. Resource peripheries have particular priority as sites of resource depletion and the destruction of biodiversity, which have global significance in both real and symbolic terms. Indeed, high-profile, belligerent ENGO campaigns have featured antining, antifishing (including antiwhaling and anti-sealing), and antilogging activities in resource peripheries. These campaigns of resistance to resource exploitation have been frequently linked to aboriginal activities that are embedded in resource peripheries and claimed by ENGOs to represent appropriate environmental behavior. Even if this assumption is accepted, aboriginal peoples have fundamentally different motives from environmentalism, variously based on maintaining or regaining established and new aboriginal rights, empowerment, and facilitating self-realization, including highly diverse forms of economic development. Aboriginal resistance also occurs in vastly different socioeconomic contexts. There are aboriginal peoples within poor countries who are desperately defending their traditions on surviving remnants of territory (Nietschmann 1997). In contrast, across North America, Australia, and New Zealand, aboriginal peoples are trying to maintain aboriginal rights and power within capitalist landscapes that have already fundamentally changed their societies (Barker and Soyez 1994; Willems-Braun 1997).

ENGOs are self-appointed, “independent” activist groups that promote environmentalism among governments, business, and the public (O’Riordan 1976; Paehlke 1992). ENGOs vary considerably in size and scope—the largest have become professionalized, structured, and multinational organizations that deal with many environmental issues—and in beliefs and tactics. Radical environmentalism, for example, promotes “deep ecology” and biocentrism, while conventional anthropocentric views emphasize human needs and ideas related to sustainable development. Tactics vary from sundry kinds of civil disobedience (sometimes even criminal activities), the use of the court system to prosecute violators, and various kinds of lobbying and advertising, to participation in decision-making bodies concerned with environmental matters. Although connected to green parties in various countries, ENGOs are not usually democratically elected, and their activities depend on volunteers and professional staffing funded by individuals and, increasingly, by foundations.

The tactical strengths of ENGOs are based on their abilities to communicate and use information in shaping public opinion, lobbying governments, pressuring corporations, agenda-setting, and organizing campaigns against industrialization in the world’s most remote places. The technics of the information age, so compromising to territorial governance, have proven ideally suited to the proliferation of boundary-spanning ENGOs and to their development of “cascading networks” (Rosenau 1990, 301) and “space-producing lobbies” (Soyez 2002, 204) that criss-cross political boundaries in bewildering fashion at high speed (Ekins 1992; Princen 1994). They are exemplars of the network society (Castells 1996). The biggest ENGOs scarcely think of national laws as constraints and are more mobile than their principal opponents, industrial MNCs.5

In resource peripheries, ENGOs are global and local institutions (Hayter and Soyze 1996). As local institutions, ENGOs are democratic voices, urging greater local control over resources, greater transparency in resource allocation, and wider (stakeholder) participation in resource use. Indeed, ENGOs began as local opposition to the global force of industrial destruction. For Paehlke (1996), enlightened environmentalism is fundamentally democratic in that it depends on societies that celebrate individual initiative and because it deliberately seeks to engage the public in the environmental agenda. As global institutions, Princen (1994) argues, ENGOs provide “countervailing power” to MNCs (and irresponsible governments) to ensure transparency in informing
the public of all the implications of industrialization and that action is taken at appropriate "biogeographical scales." He also emphasizes that ENGOs gain social legitimacy by their sole focus on environmental issues.

As global institutions, however, ENGOs seek to impose values on resource peripheries, regardless of local priorities or preferences. Three criticisms can be briefly identified. First, as Taylor (1996) argues, ENGOs are prone to authoritarian thought, empowered by their single-issue focus and global scope. He further notes that the scientific basis for resource-scarcity issues is rarely straightforward (even among scientists) and that ENGOs can communicate misleading and ambiguous messages to further their goals. Moreover, to justify operations (and funding), ENGOs may target resource regions where success is more likely, rather than necessarily most appropriate. Second, ENGO targeting of specific regions, firms, and projects may fail to take into account wider implications, generating unintended negative impacts on the environment. For example, Moore (2000), a founder of Greenpeace, argues that unremitting ENGO attacks on forestry are misformed and increase environmental problems, as the ecological benefits of young, growing forests are lost and switchades are made to more environmentally damaging substitute products. Third, ENGOs express urban elitism. According to Arnold (1999), ENGO agendas are increasingly controlled by urban-based endowment funds that are motivated by the values of rich urbanites. Indeed, in a Pacific Northwest context, Lee (1994, 228) argues that ENGOs "using guilt, shame and ridicule to control people," often supported by federal bureaucracies and trust funds, are creating a "cultural upheaval" in the region as they seek to monopolize policy in federal forest lands. The recent tactic employed by ENGOs of renaming and "claiming" resource regions as conservation areas graphically reflects the dissonance between urban and rural values.

ENGOs have often sought alliances with aboriginal peoples in opposing resource exploitation. Indeed, post-Fordism has involved a reawakening of aboriginal consciousness and identity that has fueled increasing resistance to large-scale industrialization in resource areas across developing countries (Anderson and Huber 1988; Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Clapp 1999a, c) and the rich countries of the "new world" (Barker and Soyez 1994). This reawakening is perhaps surprising. During Fordism, resource exploitation pushed industrialization to all corners of the globe, constantly threatening indigenous populations that then were commonly regarded as vestiges of dying ways of life, soon to be pushed off the map altogether. As Moore’s (1963, 89) empathetic lament indicates, the "rapid incorporation of virtually every part of the world into the international and political 'community' marks the end, or the beginning of the end, for isolated and exotic tribal communities and also for complex and archaic civilizations. In this sense . . . the unification of the world is complete."

Instead, Barker and Soyez (1994, 32) explain, aboriginal peoples in northern Canada—stimulated by changed public opinion, links with ENGOs, and the new information technologies—"think locally but act globally" as they seek "support in the international arena" for their (local) rights and culture. To use Soyez’s (2002, 195) phrase, aboriginal peoples have joined ENGOs as "previously marginal actors" in shaping the restructuring of resource peripheries. Moreover, aboriginal networks that cross-cut political boundaries are developing rapidly—sometimes in tandem with ENGO networks, sometimes in conflict with them. In the context of the Kayapo tribe in Para, in the Brazilian Amazon, Posey (1996, 1999) revealed the unique aboriginal knowledge of ecological relationships. Indeed, he suggested that Amazon tribes had helped create the region’s great plant variety, and he argued against the industrialization of the rainforest on ecological and cultural grounds. In 1987, Posey helped Kayapo chiefs protest at the World Bank in Washington the flooding of their land for dams. In 1989, with the foundation of the International Society for Ethnobiology, he urged the protection of the ecological knowledge of tribal peoples as intellectual property rights agreements. These rights were subsequently incorporated in the Biodiversity Convention at the 1992 Rio Summit, at which Posey organized an Earth Parliament as an aboriginal forum to express concern for attacks on their culture. In parallel empirically based advocacy work, Nietschmann (1997) recorded the connections of the Miskito to their (sea) environment in the North Atlantic autonomous region of Nicaragua. He helped the Miskito gain international support for their way of life as they defended their "contested coral" against an array of external threats that have included not only foreign fishing fleets, drug traffickers, Nicaraguan governments, and antigovernment insurgency movements, but also ENGOs funded by the U.S. government. Indeed, for Nietschmann (1997, 197), ENGOs were "predatory conservationists," part of a "colonial" attempt to divide ("remap") Miskito territory into a biosphere reserve and commercial areas for Nicaraguan fisherman.

On resource peripheries, global forces have long been powerful and have become extraordinarily complex in post-Fordism, even in remote, sparsely populated places. As the Miskitos’ defense of their contested coral confirms, however, local institutions cannot be ignored. Despite
vulnerability to external forces, resource peripheries are still “meeting places” where locally based institutions are connected globally and globally based institutions are connected locally (Figure 1). There is a significant intellectual challenge in tracing the geopolitics underlying these interactions, which show little respect for spatial boundaries as they span, jump, and criss-cross scales (Soyez 1995; see also Swyngedouw 1997). Yet these spatially unbounded politics are also engaged in attempts to restructure and remap instituted rights within resource peripheries. The intellectual and policy challenge raised by the remapping of resource peripheries lies in drawing the contours between the remapping of scalar politics and remapping in place. These connections are problematic: they must be synthesized locally, and this synthesis is inherently normative, requiring adjudication of alternative values, social legitimacies, and responsibilities. Indeed, to an increasing degree, resource peripheries have become meeting places where this remapping and new synthesis have become contested, even prone to violence. Such conflicts underline the importance of geography on the periphery and the imperative of cooperative relations in truly socially progressive remapping.

**British Columbia's Forest Wars**

BC's forest economy provides a remarkable example of a contested resource periphery. The province comprises a vast area of 95 million hectares, and exploitation of resource wealth—especially forest resources—has keyed its incorporation into the global economy over the past 120 years. Traditionally, the provincial government has equated forest policy with industrial policy. In the decades after 1945, it undertook a “Fordist” strategy involving the “liquidation” (and commodification) of BC’s old-growth forests, which were leased to large corporations in return for large-scale investments in export-oriented industrialization (Hayter 2000b). Since the 1970s, however, the organizational, technological, environmental, and cultural assumptions underlying this strategy have been undermined. Since 1980, sustained protectionist attacks directed against BC’s lumber industry by the CFCLI have developed into demands for the privatization of BC’s forests. ENGOs have emerged as powerful agents demanding greater commitment to conservation, and aboriginal peoples have vigorously resurrection their largely unresolved treaty claims. BC has become a contested space in which rival groups are seeking to remap forest resources according to their values. The intensity and duration of this war in the woods reflects the engrained nature of vested interests and because the remappers, while they condemn the status quo, differ on the contours of a new map.

Historically, BC’s war in the woods is a legacy of a regulated (permeable) Fordist strategy formulated by the Forest Act of 1947 and the more or less simultaneous establishment of powerful unions. In Wilson’s (1987, 7) terms, the provincial government, big business, and unions became the principal vested interests that formed a (wood) “exploitation alliance” that dominated BC’s forest policy. From BC’s entry into Confederation in 1872 until 1947, forest tenures and some private lands were allocated with few rules, as if the forests were an “empty land,” scarcely inhibited by a sparse aboriginal population numbering around 26,000 in the 1880s (Fisher 1977, 210). Highly speculative booms soon established a vibrant forest industry focused on Vancouver, but forests were ravaged, especially on the accessible coast. The government stopped granting leases in 1913. The instabilities of world wars and the depression of the 1930s, when smaller companies were perceived as especially vulnerable, provided further backdrops to rethinking the Forest Act of 1947.

Under the terms of this act, for reasons that remain unclear, the provincial government retained public ownership of BC’s forests. The government also anticipated that large corporations, especially MNCs, would provide rapid growth with stability by combining production expertise with access to export markets and sources of finance. Indeed, the government’s forest-tenure policy was predicated on commitments by individual firms to investing in large-scale facilities in return for extensive, long-term timber leases—such as tree-farm licenses (TFLs), granted for twenty-five years and renewable—and a regime of low “stumpage,” essentially a tax on timber harvested from public, provincially controlled lands. The act also equated stable economic growth with sustained yield forestry. The key to this link lay in the annual allowable cut (AAC) established for each lease by the government to ensure that renewal would occur in time for a second cut, while requiring that firms must either use their AAC or forfeit it. In practice, estimating AACS was judgmental, and forest renewal relied almost completely on natural regeneration. Moreover, the prevailing logging philosophy advised that BC’s vast natural, mature (old-growth) forests should be cut before they became “decadent,” thereby losing further (economic) value through fire, disease, and pests, while new, faster-growing forests would be ecologically beneficial (Percy 1986). The government also endorsed log-harvesting by clear-cutting—in which all trees are logged within cut-blocks—on the basis of economics, worker safety, and environment. Despite claims to sustained yield principles, forest policy
explicitly meant the “liquidation”—by clear-cutting—of old growth (Wilson 1998). By the 1970s, however, the wood-exploitation axis itself recognized “fall-down effects” in harvested volumes and species, as old-growth depletion in quantity or quality could not be synchronized with new growth.

In its own terms of reference, permeable Fordism worked well for BC’s forest economy. Economic growth between 1950 and 1970, as indicated by production, profits, and employment, was impressive and dispersed throughout the province, further enabled by the vigorous policies of the provincial government in providing energy, transportation, and social infrastructure, including “new town” legislation (Hayter 1976; Bradbury 1978). Although aboriginal peoples remained marginalized, BC’s forest towns were prosperous, relatively stable, and culturally diverse communities. Moreover, collective bargaining by tough-minded industrial unions, with “locals” dispersed throughout the province, had placed them among the highest-income communities in Canada. In addition, within the constraints imposed by the pre-eminence of industrial values, Crown control over BC’s forests was deemed inherently virtuous because of its implications for public accessibility and multiple use, notably recreational uses.

Fordism’s inheritance, however, has proven deeply problematical. Since 1970, BC’s forest economy has become a highly volatile space (Figure 2). Two sharp recessions in the 1970s preceded record high levels of production and profit in 1979 that, in turn, were followed by a devastating recession in the early 1980s. A subsequent sharp boom in the late 1980s was followed by deep recessions in the early and late 1990s, the latter occurring while the rest of Canada’s forest industries were expanding. Permeable Fordism emphasized commodity standardization and did not provide industry with the innovative culture required to cope with the dynamics and uncertainties of post-Fordism. Indeed, harvest levels relentlessly increased, specifically in the interior, where, by 1996, logging production was over twice that of the coast (Figure 3). In the cool temperate rainforests of the coast, balsam, hemlock, western red cedar, and Douglas fir dominate the harvest, while the predominant interior species include lodgepole pine, spruce, and true firs. In 1996, BC’s log harvest of over 75,000 cubic meters—42 percent of the Canadian total—mostly supplied large-scale production in support of a forest sector, comprising 100,000 direct jobs and manufactured shipments worth Can$16.5 billion. The sector continues to define BC’s global role. Remarkably, the export orientation of BC’s forest economy increased in the 1990s (Table 1).

Figure 2. Earnings after tax on shareholders’ equity for British Columbia forest companies. Source: Hayter 2000b: 78.

Since 1980, the transition to a contested space has been dramatic. In 1980, the map of BC’s forest landscape was clearly demarcated, dominated by a well-defined set of corporate tenures that were underwritten by unquestioned provincial authority over resource use—a supposed bedrock of the Canadian Federation. By 2001, however, provincial government autonomy was in dispute within and beyond the province: the CFCLI, ENGOs, and aboriginal peoples undermined BC’s vested interests as each group sought to remap the forest landscape according to their priorities. These “wannabe remappers” have profoundly politicized forest policy in BC, and the debates have criss-crossed the globe. Moreover, since trade and aboriginal matters are federal responsibilities, the Canadian government and the Supreme Court of Canada have become significant global (external) forces in BC’s forest economy in ways they never were traditionally. The 1980s recession provided the catalyst to the transition to contested space.

The 1980s Recession: The Trigger for Contesting BC’s Forest Space

If the profound troubles of BC’s forest economy were driven by the onset of neoliberalism, aboriginalism, and environmentalism (Barnes and Hayter 1997; Hayter 2000b), it was during the recessionary crisis of 1981–1985 that these industrial and resource dynamics collided and exploded. The severity of this recession is well documented. BC’s forest economy lost 20,000 jobs among both professionals and hourly workers; profits of $500 million in 1979 became losses of $500 million in 1982; debt-equity ratios increased; and 1980 output levels were not recovered until 1986 (Grass and Hayter 1989; Hayter and Barnes 1992). The recession’s role as a turning point in the forest economy’s evolution remains unappreciated. Yet, for industry, the recession stimulated calls to diversify from reliance on standardized commodities that were in the secular price-cost squeeze created by constantly rising...
costs and declining real prices (Woodbridge, Reed, and Associates 1984). Since then, a flexible work culture has been a battleground between management and unions (Barnes and Hayter 1992), and flexible mass production and flexible specialization have been discernible trends (Rees and Hayter 1996; Edgington and Hayter 1997).

The 1980s recession also excited the wannabe remappers, and, unlike labor relations, their battles could not be resolved through established institutional mechanisms, such as collective bargaining. The CFCLI began to lobby the U.S. federal government to restrict Canadian lumber imports, principally by arguing that BC’s lumber industry, which accounts for 66 percent of Canada’s exports to the U.S., was unfairly subsidized by low stumpage. Initially, Canadian arguments, led by a BC-based forestry association, convinced U.S. trade and related courts, in a decision

Figure 3. Log production in British Columbia by specie and region, 1996.
Table 1. Total and Export Values of British Columbia Forest Products, 1952, 1966, 1987, and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value (Can$)</th>
<th>Export Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>483.9</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,037.0</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>11,602</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>16,466</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hayter (2000a, 73)

made in 1983, to reject the CFCLI’s countervail and recognize that stumpage payments did not incorporate subsidies, but reflected the local species mix, higher costs of production, and greater distances to markets. This Canadian victory, however, was not to last. In 1985, the CFCLI implicated the lumber dispute in the free-trade talks beginning between Canada and the United States. Indeed, as a precondition for a general free-trade agreement (FTA), the CFCLI insisted on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Canada and the United States that would penalize Canadian lumber exports to the United States. This dispute also stimulated the incorporation of a “trade-dispute mechanism” within the FTA and subsequently NAFTA, an initiative that was widely touted in Canada as a way of preempting trade disputes in the future but that has provided little consolation for BC.

Simultaneously, the 1980s recession stimulated ENGO and aboriginal opposition to BC’s forestry practices. This opposition was part of a series of broad (left-wing) “solidarity protests” against the “restraint policies” introduced by the provincial government (Allen and Rosenbluth 1986). ENGOs were empowered by the seeming demise of the forest industries, which they portrayed as a declining sunset sector, a view supported by the Ministry of Forestry’s first public recognition in 1980 of fall-down effects in harvesting levels. ENGOs were further inflamed on discovering that in 1981, the provincial government had introduced the concept of “sympathetic administration” by relaxing rules governing forestry in an attempt to aid the crisis-torn industry. In 1983, the Green Party was officially created in BC. Aboriginal peoples, many of whom had been trying to negotiate treaties for one hundred years, also became alarmed about loss of the resource base. From 1979 to 1985, ENGO and aboriginal protests of logging jointly emerged in the coastal region, especially around Meares Island, Clayoquot Sound, and South Moresby in the Queen Charlottes (Wilson 1998; Stansbury 2000). In 1985–1986, aboriginal frustrations exploded in a campaign of blockades around BC (Blomley 1996), while ENGOs pursued “valley-by-valley” protests against logging, especially in the coastal region.

The wannabe remappers are complex, internally diverse institutions. Though the CFCLI is secretive about its members, it is known to comprise both small and giant forest companies, based especially in the Pacific Northwest and the South but from other regions as well, and its highly public campaigns have been led by politicians, notably Senators Max Baccus (Montana) and Bob Packwood (Oregon). By the mid-1980s, in BC as elsewhere, the ENGO system involved professional organizations such as Greenpeace that were international in scope, as well as many small organizations that represented a range of beliefs and tactics. With about 200 separate bands, ranging in size from a few people to a few thousand, reserves located in all regions of BC in rural and urban areas, and half of their populations living off-reserve, aboriginal peoples are highly varied. Although all of these wannabe remappers have united to oppose the wood-exploitation alliance, differences among and within them render agreement over an overall remapping process extremely difficult. The contest between the wannabe remappers and vested interests needs, first and foremost, to be resolved at the provincial scale.

The remainder of this discussion explores the contested remapping of BC’s forest economy, revealing how the demands of the wannabe remappers on BC’s forest policy have escalated. The main hypothesis guiding this discussion is that the wannabe remappers have formed a tacit alliance that has effectively disempowered the provincial government, a hypothesis depicted in cartoon form in Figure 4. With respect to the cartoon’s implied political economy, I focus particularly on the nature and evolution of the motives of the wannabe remappers, and why substantial policy initiatives to appease them on the part of the provincial government have failed. A related hypothesis is that the wannabe remappers have agreed to oppose provincial policies, their different motives imply that the future map of BC is highly uncertain. The discussion notes the possibility that this uncertainty may undermine socially desirable forms of restructuring. It also notes the fragmentation of the old wood-exploitation alliance, as multinational desirable forms of restructuring. It also notes the fragmentation of the old wood-exploitation alliance, as multinational forest corporations (MFC in Figure 4) became critics of government policy.

The Escalating Demands of the Wannabe Remappers

By the mid-1980s, the provincial government of BC was under enormous pressure to make fundamental changes in forest policy to help the restructuring of the forest industry while also meeting the diverse concerns of the CFCLI, ENGOs, and aboriginal peoples. Indeed, the latter two groups disputed the traditional equation of forest policy with industrial policy. Some tentative steps
toward resolving the forestry crisis were taken in the dying days of the (right-wing) Social Credit (Socred) government. It was, however, the (left-wing) New Democratic party (NDP)—well connected to the solidarity movement mentioned above—that won a convincing provincial mandate in 1991, in large measure to bring peace to the woods. Indeed, the NDP introduced a remarkable battery of policies designed to appease the remappers and promote industrial restructuring toward higher-value activities (Table 2; Cashore et al. 2001). Significant, escalating increases in stumpage—the tax on timber cut on provincially owned lands—were at the core of this “reregulation” (Hayter 2000b), making BC’s timber costs among the highest in North America. Increased stumpage, which promised higher revenues for the provincial government, was meant to appease the CFCLI and was consistent with ENGO assertions that BC’s timber was undervalued.

To further appease the ENGOs, the new (1995) Forest Practices Code drastically changed logging regulations to meet environmental concerns—for example, by reducing the permitted size of clear-cuts, disallowing logging near streams and the practice of “discontinuous clear-cutting,” and making logging proposals an entirely transparent process requiring public input. The park system was also expanded to 12 percent of the provincial land-base; a special decision-making process for Clayoquot Sound was introduced; timber-supply reviews were conducted; new pollution laws were passed; and new regional planning procedures were developed along the lines urged by environmentalists (M’Gonigle and Parfitt 1994). To appease aboriginal demands, the NDP recognized the “inherent rights” of aboriginal peoples and urged the federal government to cooperate in a new treaty process. The government further believed—albeit on the basis of questionable assumptions—that the higher direct and indirect costs imposed by its reregulation would stimulate industry to “add value” (Hayter 2000b, 89–97). Unfortunately, attempts by provincial governments to bring peace to the woods have only met with increased futility.

**Uncle Sam’s Giant and Lengthening Shadow**

With the onset of free-trade talks between Canada and the United States, the CFCLI gained leverage to demand protection for their industry to be a precondition for the FTA. In 1985, a leading suggestion by the CFCLI was for a 10-percent tariff on Canadian lumber imports for three years (Hayter 1992). In 1986, the MOU established a 15-percent export tax that could be reduced by “equivalent” increases in Canadian stumpage, and this agreement was incorporated in the FTA of 1989. Given substantial increases in BC’s stumpage, the imminent signing of NAFTA, and a trade-dispute mechanism already in place, in 1991 the Canadian Federal government withdrew from the MOU, claiming the intent of the MOU had been fulfilled and was no longer necessary. The Canadian government also claimed a legal right to withdraw from the MOU. The CFCLI disagreed with Canada’s withdrawal from the MOU and mounted another intense campaign against BC’s lumber industry, now arguing that logs from Crown land were subsidized because they were not sold on “open markets” but were allocated to long-term licensees and were subject to export restrictions. This pressure resulted in the Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) of 1996, which imposed a quota system, more disruptive of free trade than tariffs or export taxes, on four Canadian provinces—Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and BC (Hayter 2000a, 232). The SLA expired in April 2001.

In May 2002, following unusually acrimonious political debate on both sides of the border, the United States confirmed countervailing and antidumping duties that averaged to a 27-percent duty on Canadian lumber imports. The CFCLI-inspired U.S. position is that Canada—specifically BC—must conduct market auctions for logs, fully permitting their export, if market access to the

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**Figure 4.** “The wannabe remappers disempower British Columbia’s provincial government: Forest ownership is not control!” This cartoon, commissioned (without my knowledge) for an opinion piece I wrote (Hayter 2000a), is published with the permission of Bill Schuss.
The United States is to be forthcoming. A related demand is that forests be privatized.

To caricature this long, convoluted trade dispute, Uncle Sam has cast a giant, threatening, and lengthening shadow over BC’s forest economy (Figure 5). The shadow is deeply ironic, not least because BC’s forest economy has fundamentally developed according to the strictures of free trade, and the central conclusion of Shearer and colleagues (1973) was that a continental free-trade agreement would have little impact on BC! In the present dispute, in various U.S. and international courts and trade hearings, the argument that BC’s forest policies constitute a subsidy has been consistently rejected. In contrast, many other forest regions across North America have received direct grants and tax breaks, while in the United States, despite much rhetoric to the contrary, only a small amount of the timber harvest (14 percent) is subject to market auction (Reed 2002). Canada, however, has little leverage to place U.S. policies on the table.

These ironies notwithstanding, BC’s predicament in the softwood lumber dispute is not simply due to the political power or bullying by the CFCLI. Canadian handling of the trade dispute has been inept and fragmented (Hayter 2000a, 232–40). The basic error

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### Table 2. Forest Policy Reregulation in British Columbia: Key Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revised stumpage formula, 1988</td>
<td>Shift from market-based system to waterbed system (introduced 1988, retained by new provincial government).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks, 1990–</td>
<td>2.5 million hectares added to the provincial protected-area system between 1990 and 1995, with goal to have 12 percent of provincial land base in parks to conserve environmental values. 108 new parks in 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE), 1992</td>
<td>CORE established to develop regional land-user plans for entire province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp-mill effluent standards, 1992</td>
<td>New targets for all pollutants; AOX levels to be reduced to zero by 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber supply reviews, 1992–</td>
<td>Reassessment of allowable annual cut (AAC) for industry, to assess fall-down effect and effects of provincial policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayoquot Sound Compromise, 1993</td>
<td>Committees representing numerous interest groups proposed (first) Land Use Plan, in 1993; scientific advisory panel established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty process, 1993–</td>
<td>Canada-BC Memorandum of Understanding creates a five-stage treaty process to resolve aboriginal land claims that cover entire province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Renewal BC, 1994</td>
<td>New agency, funded from “super stumpage,” with broad mandate to invest in silviculture, help forest communities, workers, firms, and other interest groups, and fund research projects and organizations. NewFo established in 1997 to redirect laid-off union workers to silviculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Practices Code, 1995</td>
<td>Reform forestry to meet environmental values: size of clear-cuts reduced; continuous clear-cutting eliminated; wildlife, biotic, and aesthetic values incorporated in forest plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs Accord, 1997</td>
<td>Agreement in principle with industry to promote jobs, especially by small firms and in “value-added.” Subsidies for new jobs provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small firms, 1998–</td>
<td>In 1998, 5 percent of wood fiber of tree-farm licenses diverted to small firms; more wood fiber diverted in 1990s. Industry association activity funded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community forests</td>
<td>Proposals requested in 1997, with three to be awarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure reform?</td>
<td>Devolution? Market-driven timber pricing?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hayter (2000a, 90).
made by the Canadian federal government, which has haunted them since, was to link an export tax with stumpage in the 1986 MOU. Canadian negotiators proclaimed the MOU a triumph since an export tax retained revenues within Canada that would have been otherwise lost to the United States if a tariff had been imposed. Increased stumpage to reduce the export tax had similar implications. The Canadian government, however, failed to appreciate the MOU’s implications for Canadian sovereignty. As Percy and Yoder (1987, xxvi) note, the MOU “is historic with enormous implications for Canadian resource industries in general” because it marked the first time American governments had directly challenged the resource-management policy of another country and had done so based on legal-political arguments rather than economic grounds. This view proved prescient, as the MOU provided a loophole for the CFCLI to influence “domestic” forest policies and it has fully exploited the opportunity. Moreover, since 1983, the Canadian side has not effectively used sympathetic support within the United States—specifically, interest groups linked to U.S. consumers—nor has it presented a united front. The views of the BC government have often differed from those of other provinces and the federal government, and the allocation of quotas has led to unprecedented public bickering among corporate leaders. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Socreds and NDP sometimes publicly supported the CFCLI’s subsidy arguments, in the naive belief that by simply increasing stumpage, the trade dispute could be resolved (and that the forest industry could adjust to higher-value production). Such support for the CFCLI’s views has undermined the coherence of Canada’s bargaining position and the implications of rulings by international and U.S. trade adjudication bodies that have concluded that Canadian stumpage policies are not subsidies. Further, the BC government continued to welcome foreign ownership, most controversially the 1999 acquisition of BC’s corporate champion, MacMillan Bloedel (MB), by Tacoma, Washington-based giant Weyerhaeuser. Weyerhaeuser is now BC’s biggest firm; it controls substantial timberlands on either side of the border, and its flexibility in integrating its cross-border operations would clearly benefit from privatization and log auctions in BC.

**ENGOS: Claiming the “Great Bear Rainforest” for the “Globe”**

Like the CFCLI, ENGOs have increased their demands on BC’s forest space, unappeased by forest reregulation. As illustrated by the formation of the Friends of Clayoquot Sound in 1979 to protest logging on Meares Island, ENGO opposition to the forest industry began as localized logging blockades, transparently organized by local people, who often sought legal support to preserve locally prized forests. By the mid-1980s, the scale of valley-by-valley conflicts had expanded, court injunctions were ignored if unfavorable, nonlocal ENGOs had become involved, and criminal behavior such as tree-spiking was occurring. By the time of the Clayoquot Sound protests of 1990–1993, when over 1,000 people were arrested, ENGO opposition to the forest industry was being orchestrated internationally, organized principally by Greenpeace International and its affiliates, along with the U.S.-based Rainforest Action Network (RAN) and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Localized logging blockades were complemented by globally based market boycott campaigns, sources of financing had shifted toward trust funds based in the world’s leading cities, and protests were publicized by skilled, even manipulative use of the media across North America and Europe. Indeed, Greenpeace International had decided to target BC forest policy as a strategic priority, shifting its forestry organization from Amsterdam to Vancouver in 1996, while Greenpeace Canada moved its forest head office from Toronto to Vancouver in 1993. Greenpeace, RAN, and NRDC justified their campaigns on the basis of the globally unique and significant ecological values of BC’s old-growth forests, especially the coastal temperate rainforests, symbolized by the white kermode bear of the central coast. In 1993, these organizations began an ambitious global campaign to preserve old growth in BC’s coastal region, including much of Vancouver Island, which they would like to rename the Great Bear Rainforest (Figure 6). ENGOs have also proposed preservation of a vast swath of interior BC known as the Y2Y (Yellowstone to Yukon corridor). Publicity campaigns, requests for donations, research reports, blockades, support from the “rich and famous,” and consumer boycotts, however, have featured the Great Bear Rainforest (McAllister and McAllister 1997; Wilson 1998; Stansbury 2000). ENGOs have clearly become more than wannabe remappers. The extensive impacts of ENGO activity on corporate and government policy is symbolized by victories for remapping BC, most notably in 1999, when the Clayoquot Sound became a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural (UNESCO) biosphere region in which logging has been almost eliminated.

Further, in 2001, ENGOs engineered an agreement involving sixty-five separate parties that has been proclaimed as a “landmark deal to protect a vast swath of the central coast dubbed the Great Bear Rainforest and to repair the province’s tarnished international image”
(Hamilton and Kines 2001, A6). Indeed, a spokesperson for Greenpeace Europe claims that BC has moved from “global pariah to ecohero in one day” (Hamilton and Kines 2001, A6) and that Greenpeace will immediately stop its market boycotts, as well as logging blockades planned for the summer. The core of this “Great Bear Pact” protects 600,000 hectares of old growth (seen as a “legacy for the world”), anticipates creation of community forests, and compensates firms that have lost logging rights (Kines 2001, A5). In this region and elsewhere, ENGOs are also demanding that any logging of old growth must be “ecocertified” according to the Forest Steward Council, a “third-party” ENGO based in Mexico, rather than by other organizations deemed to have links to industry. Such a development would considerably deepen ENGO control over BC’s forest economy.

Even though differences between ENGOs in strategies and tactics are evident, they have collectively resisted the wood-exploitation alliance without much public criticism of one another. Few provincial government initiatives have satisfied the ENGOs, an attitude justified by their perceived global mandates. ENGOs rejected the Forest Code—the environmental centerpiece of the deregulation—for some groups, such as the Sierra Legal Defense Fund, it is not enforced properly, while for others, such as Greenpeace, it is inappropriate because it still permits the clear-cutting of old growth. Similarly, the government’s achievement in doubling the size of protected parkland to 12 percent of BC’s land base—a United Nations (UN) target for the globe—is dismissed by ENGOs as a minimum level. ENGOs were also incensed by the government’s initial Clayoquot Sound Compromise: those protests only ended with the UNESCO biosphere decision. ENGO disdain for the provincial government was underlined in 1999, when an announcement of a (secret) agreement between Greenpeace and Weyerhaeuser regarding the Great Bear proved premature because they had not gained support from local communities such as aboriginal peoples or, indeed, even bothered to mention their plan to the government, the owner of the public forest.

The Clayoquot protests of 1993 also marked a significant split between ENGOs and unionized labor, as jobs were threatened and subsequently lost in the UNESCO biosphere decision. In fact, the ENGO protests were smaller than the labor-organized counterdemonstration, but the former has become “legendary” and the latter forgotten, symbolic of shifting power between the institutions. Indeed, the Great Bear Pact of 2001 was basically negotiated between ENGOs and corporations, little influenced by unions (and local communities), who lost 500 jobs in the deal. Whether this pact will mark the end to the war in the woods, as some claim, remains to be seen (Hamilton and Kines 2001, A1). While ENGOs see it as a “first step” (Kines 2001, A5), compensation levels have not been agreed upon and unions and communities are unhappy, ENGOs and the CFCLI are cooperating to fight BC’s forest policies, and differences between urban and rural values remain evident. Land claims also have to be resolved.

Aboriginal (“First Nations”) Land Claims

Long-simmering aboriginal discontent over failures to sign treaties in BC flared up in the early 1980s and was given significant impetus by two major political initiatives, one national and one provincial. Nationally, the federal government repatriated the constitution from the United Kingdom in 1982 and created a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that enshrine aboriginal rights while enhancing the powers of the court system. Provincially, BC’s governments had traditionally denied responsibility for treaty-making, pointing to federal responsibility in this regard (Tennant 1990). This attitude changed in 1991, when the new NDP government committed itself to redressing aboriginal grievances and helping to bring peace in the woods. In 1993, the provincial and federal
governments, in cooperation with native groups, agreed to a new treaty process that, as a general principle, sought to empower aboriginal peoples by recognizing their "inherent rights" to self-government and control over resources. Their growing characterization as "First Nations" connotes respect for tradition and empowerment beyond the powers of municipal governments, to include "exclusive" "nation-state" discretion. The treaty process assumed that aboriginal self-government would redress political grievances, initiate sustaining forms of local development, and reduce the uncertainty facing investments in BC's forest economy arising from land claims and associated protests. The new process, however, has not evolved as intended. While it immediately led to overlapping treaty claims covering the entire province (map n.d.), including four claims on the central coast overlapping the Great Bear Rainforest proposal and existing TFLs (Figure 7), none had been concluded by the end of 2002. The only recently completed treaty, agreed upon with the Nisga'a in 1999, was conducted outside of the new process.\footnote{Several factors have frustrated the process. First, the process only identified steps in the planning process, without specifying principles that defined inherent rights, limits to claims, or forms of compensation. Second, aboriginal appeals to the court system have taken time and legal decisions have not been political solutions. In particular, in the split decision in \textit{Delgamuukw} in 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned a Supreme Court of BC decision to confirm aboriginal rights and use of oral traditions in support of these rights (Bell 1998). Yet the implications are ambiguous, and even supporters of the aboriginal movement argue that \textit{Delgamuukw} subjects aboriginal rights to "broad and vague restrictions" (Flanagan 1998, 279). Fourth, while \textit{Delgamuukw} advised that land claims should be resolved politically, aboriginal...}

Figure 7. British Columbia's contested space: Aboriginal land claims on the central coast.
leaders differ on whether the courts or political negotiations provide the most appropriate route to advance land claims. Possibly, Canadian politicians had also hoped for unequivocal legal solutions to land claims’ dilemmas.

Finally, the treaty process has been divisive in both aboriginal and nonaboriginal communities. Several native bands have refused to join the treaty process or have withdrawn, while the Nisga’a Treaty was (temporarily) challenged by rival bands and a few Nisga’a women. Recently, a judge in the Supreme Court of BC permitted a legal challenge from a dissident Nisga’a community (Mulgrew 2002). While the judge dismissed the dissenters’ concern that the Nisga’a Tribal Council had too much power over them, he accepted that the Nisga’a Treaty may have undermined federal and provincial powers and associated individual Canadian rights. From a nonaboriginal perspective, provincial and federal governments inevitably debate over forms of resource transfers to aboriginal peoples in terms of the mix of land and money, since land must come from the province. More fundamentally, there is no social consensus that aboriginal peoples should have exclusive entitlements and inherent rights, even if this is the legal and governmental view. The critics underline the vast potential costs of treaties and express beliefs that place-based treaties—including the allocation of forest resources specifically to aboriginal peoples—confound relationships between economic development, specialization, and integration and, at worst, are a form of apartheid that will prolong marginality (Estey 1999).

Since 1980, aboriginal land claims in BC have escalated in a way that has fueled rather than assuaged uncertainty facing forest-sector restructuring. Treaties have not been completed, but aboriginal peoples are no longer “marginal actors” in the forest economy. Brief reference to the Haida people, who number about 2,500 in their traditional territory of the Queen Charlotte Islands (Haida Gwaii), is instructive in this regard. After their designation as TFL 39 in 1961, the Queen Charlottes became a major log supply area for MB’s timber-processing facilities to the south (Hayter 1976). The Haida were not consulted. In the 1980s, the Haida joined with ENGOs to blockade logging, and in 1987, South Moresby became a national park, excluding logging. When Weyerhaeuser acquired MB in 1999, the Haida began legal action opposing the transfer of TFL 39, because they had not been consulted (Lee 2002). While, as of May 2003, this case had yet to be heard, in 2002 the Haida filed a land claim to the entire archipelago, noting that all Crown land is subject to aboriginal title, and they have circulated a “draft protocol” establishing Haida interests. Incidentally, these interests extend to resources beneath the sea, a new development in treaty claims. In the meantime, as Weyerhaeuser has scaled back logging plans and engaged an Indian-owned logging contractor, the Haida “have become adept at wielding influence on issues ranging from where a new hospital should go to how the Gwaii Haanas national park on South Moresby is operated. They’ve mastered the art of using ‘observer status’ to subtly influence . . . community meetings, where people defer to them out of not wanting to exclude or offend” (Lee 2002, D3). For aboriginal peoples, if the courts have not prescribed solutions to the meaning of aboriginal title, they have clearly indicated that native interests must be heard and accommodated (Palmer 2002). The implications of this accommodation, along with aboriginal threats to “shut BC,” are casting an uncertain shadow over the restructuring of the forest economy (Hunter 2002).

Evolving Alliances

In BC, since the Friends of Clayoquot Sound cooperated with the Nuu-cha-nulth Tribal Council to obtain injunctions to stop the logging of Meares Island in the early 1980s, ENGOs and aboriginal peoples have formed “natural” alliances against the wood-exploitation alliance. Admittedly, aboriginal peoples have clashed with ENGOs. For example, on arrival in Tofino Harbour in 1993 on his “converted warship,” Sea Shepherd, Paul Watson of Greenpeace faced vociferous opposition from local native leaders to his proposed tree-spiking strategy as a way of demonstrating land claims (Bohn 1993). In another publicized clash, Chief Watts of the Nuu-cha-nulth was a featured participant in an NDP-organized tour of Europe that defended BC’s forest policies against spiraling ENGO criticisms. Nevertheless, ENGOs have diligently maintained contact and redressed concerns with aboriginal peoples, whom they portray as models of local control in harmony with nature (M’Gonigle and Parfit 1994). In turn, ENGO protests and networks have invigorated aboriginalism. As Larry Baird of the Ucluelet band warned the next premier of BC, should he think about derailing the treaty process, “We will go to the markets of the world and tell them what you are doing. We are well connected . . . and we will use these relationships to harm this province if you are going to harm us . . . I have some influential friends who would dearly love to tackle you head on” (Bula 2001, A6). One of the “friends” mentioned is Robert Kennedy, Jr., leader of the NRDC and promoter of the Great Bear Rain Forest.

As the war in the woods has deepened, “unusual” alliances between rival groups have evolved. Most
notably, ENGOs have openly supported the CFCLI in opposing BC’s forest policies. Even though it is a strident opponent of logging interests in the United States, the NRDC has become a highly vocal supporter of the CFCLI. Thus, at a Washington news conference, the NRDC and other “leading environmental groups announced that they were joining forces with the U.S. timber industry to restrict Canadian imports” (Hamilton and O’Neil 2001, D7). In turn, at this conference, Max Baccus, on behalf of the CFCLI, widened the scope of its accusation that BC’s forest policy subsidized the forest industry to include “lax environmental protection,” citing the absence of an endangered species act in Canada (Hamilton and O’Neil 2001, D7). In BC, ENGOs, led by the Sierra Legal Defence Fund, have timed publication of reports highly critical of BC’s forest practices to occur prior to crucial trade negotiations. Indeed, in a tirade against BC’s forest policies that linked subsidies not only to low stumpage but also to high wages, the coordinator of the BC Environmental Network supported the idea of timber auctions and the export of raw logs and urged British Columbians to “collaborate with American critics” (Cooperman 2002, A11).

There are also growing connections between corporations—and even labor—and aboriginal peoples and ENGOs. Forest corporations, in particular, have increasingly hired aboriginal people, established contracting relations, and entered into joint business ventures (JBVs) with aboriginal peoples (Hayter 2000b, 339). Existing reserve areas contain timber, usually not well managed, and corporations clearly sense that treaty-making will shift further resources to aboriginal control. JBV s and contracting out to aboriginal companies also deflect conflicts with ENGOs. Recently, some (union) loggers and mill workers, both laid-off and working, have opined a need to work with ENGOs and especially aboriginal peoples. On the Queen Charlotte s, for example, Weyerhaeuser’s loggers took a day off work to consult with the Haida. Indeed, one worker claimed that “he would rather work for the Haida and get rid of the company altogether,” while suggesting that “ex-loggers and the environmentalists” will unite in “another war in the woods” against the provincial government if it cannot resolve land claims and problems of overcutting (Peters 2002, 102). This view is certainly not the union position—ENGOs and unions remain strongly antagonistic—and JBV s and contracting out to aboriginal companies have been slow to prove themselves operationally. Nevertheless, these developments underlie the uncertain winds of change blowing through BC’s forest economy while exposing the decline of ability of the provincial government—whether right-wing or left-wing—to lead its remapping.

Ironically, as the remappers have collectively disempowered the provincial government, the latter has become less capable of resolving the issues they raise. The government has limited room to maneuver. Indeed, in 1998, its modifications of the Forest Practices Code (Hayter 2000a, 151–52) and modest stumpage reductions to help the forest industry regain profitability in BC while it was booming in the rest of Canada further alienated ENGOs and the CFCLI. The privatization debate further underscores provincial disempowerment. The CFCLI, the BC forest industry, and other observers favor privatization of Crown forests, in part because private ownership is expected to provide incentives to invest in sustainable resource management (Drushka 1993). In 1999, the exasperated Minister of Forests, himself a former union leader, agreed with this view, perhaps also wishing to simply devolve responsibility away from the government. Whatever his motives, ENGOs stridently oppose privatization, as do aboriginal peoples until their land claims are settled, and the Minister’s suggestion was immediately (effectively) criticized by ENGOs (Burda 1999).

Remapping British Columbia

Since Confederation, the forest economy has played a defining role in the economy and culture of BC. Following large-scale industrialization in the 1880s, the first capitalist mapping of BC’s forest economy reflected the spirit of an entrepreneurial model. In the 1940s, BC’s forest economy was remapped according to Fordist principles, and the wood-exploitation alliance of government, big business, and union labor overwhelmed this first, entrepreneurial map without entirely replacing it. The Fordist map, now subject to so much criticism, nevertheless exhibited growth, stability, significant income and social equality, and multiple uses, albeit at the expense of aboriginal and environmental values. With gathering force after the 1970s, but especially since the deep recession of the early 1980s, a third remapping of BC is evolving. This map is proving much harder to draw. The difficulties arise because of the institutionalized strengths of vested interests, because the institutions representing the wannabe remappers can only agree on their opposition to the vested interests but not on solutions, and because the provincial government is less autonomous than it was in the 1880s or 1940s. How will BC’s future map be drawn? BC is on the knife-edge of unruliness in which maps with widely differing social implications are possible. Two polar types—one democratic, the other authoritarian—illustrate some possibilities.

The North Cowichan community forest is small (5,000 hectares), privately owned by the municipality, and an elected council, which cannot alienate forest land without
a referendum, is responsible for forest policy. Its unique origins lie in the 1930s, when forest owners who could not pay their debts lost their land to the municipality (Figure 8). The forest is managed by two foresters appointed by the council and advised by a seventeen-member (voluntary) Forest Advisory Board. The council’s policy is governed by several important principles, notably: that local buyers receive a three-percent discount; that forest activities must pay for themselves; that the export of logs is forbidden; that forestry follows multiple-use principles; and by the new Forest Practices Code. In practice, the forest generates surpluses for the municipality in supplying a range of products to various buyers. This community forest is a model of local democratic control and planning: it caters to multiple stakeholders, providing a range of economic, environmental, aesthetic, and recreational functions, and is based on all kinds of formal and informal interactions and participation. In general, support for some form of community forests is growing in BC, while the plethora of JBVs, ecocertification, various partnership arrangements between old and new institutional actors, and (occasional) expressions of mutual understanding between vested interests and the wannabe remappers all suggest possibilities for stronger regional cooperation. Admittedly, there are serious questions about its practicality.

In an alternate and more threatening scenario, the principal remappers have made a deal to divide BC into

![Figure 8. The North Cowichan Community Forest.](image-url)
“kingdoms” over which they maintain control; industry over privatized forests, ENGOs over parks, and aboriginal peoples over treaty areas (Figure 9). This map reveals the face of authoritarianism—even imperialism—based on “strategic cooperation” among the principal remappers. Fundamentally, this map is about control and exclusive rather than inclusive use. Given its hypothetical nature, the map reveals real tendencies away from a multiple-use model toward broad zones shaped by the demands of the most powerful remappers. These tendencies are illustrated by demands for privatization and industry working circles, ENGO attempts to create and control the Great Bear Rainforest, and the insistence that the treaty process create race-based enclaves controlled by leaders who may or may not represent their members. Any interaction among such zones would be formal and “political,” enforced by (corporate, aboriginal, and ENGO) gatekeepers. Such a map is authoritarian, possibly socially regressive, and less egalitarian than the landscape dominated by the old wood-exploitation alliance. This is no idle threat. Major bastions of democratic practice underlying the Fordist landscape—especially elected provincial governments, labor unions, and community governments—have lost power during post-Fordism. Meanwhile, ENGOs and aboriginal peoples, who are less committed to democratic traditions, have more power, while large business organizations, which are inherently hierarchical in nature, remain influential.13

For economic geography, BC’s contested forest economy is a reminder that “rethinking regions” (Allen, Massey, and Cochrane 1998) needs to incorporate all kinds of places, including resource peripheries, not just cores. In BC, for example, the restructuring of the forest economy demands a synthesis of cultural, economic, environmental, and political institutionalisms that are driven by fundamentally different motives and have clashed in ways not evident in cores. During post-Fordism, as places have become increasingly globally integrated, they have remained unique and the local vitally important. In BC’s case, global forces have been intense and complex; globalization must be seen as a multidimensional (environmental, cultural, economic, and political) phenomenon. Yet globalization in BC cannot be understood without reference to the local. BC is a contested space precisely because remapping its territory is important. The failure of government to resolve BC’s war in the woods further testifies to this importance. Contested places have distinct forms of stickiness. In BC, peace in the woods proposes a preferred geography—but not the only one.

Acknowledgments

I am especially grateful for the advice offered by Trevor Barnes, Alex Clapp, Jerry Patchell, and Dietrich Soyez, vitally important constructive comments from four referees, and the direction of John Paul Jones III and Audrey Kobayashi. The financial support of SSHRC #410 2001 0071 is also gratefully acknowledged. A version of this article was presented at the World Conference on Economic Geography, Singapore, December 2000, and at the Meetings of the IGU Commission on the Dynamics of Industrial Spaces, Johannesburg, August 2002.

Notes

1. I hasten to add that Markusen’s impressive studies of American regional development explicitly incorporate resource sectors and peripheries (e.g., Markusen 1987). I would also emphasize that I am not disputing the importance of cores, their highly varied geography, or the contributions of industrial geography toward understanding their anatomy.
2. Economic historians of the “Far West” in the United States have made related arguments that industrial history is preoccupied with the core regions of the east (Igler 2000), thus following the “Innisian” tradition of Canadian economic history (Barnes 1999).
3. Within the context of economic geography's contemporary debate over the meanings of its "institutional turn," this article's institutionalism accords with the interpretations provided by Martin (2000) and Barnes (1999).

4. I use "Fordism" and "post-Fordism" as labels for long-term Kondratiev cycles, waves, or phases that are interpreted by Freeman (1987) as techno-economic paradigms and by regulation theorists such as Lipietz (1992) as regimes of accumulation. Other labels are also used. Freeman normally refers to post-Fordism as "the information and communication techno-economic paradigm," but since post-Fordism is the more widely used term within economic geography, I adopt it here. Debating the pros and cons of alternative theories of long-run industrialization and their labels is not a concern of this article.

5. Greenpeace symbolizes the emergence of ENGOs as global actors. Founded in 1971 in a church basement in Vancouver by a few "peace" activists and some "greens," "Green-Peace" held its first protest against U.S. nuclear testing in the Aleutian Islands. In 1979, several of the founders created Greenpeace International, and its head office was relocated from Vancouver to Amsterdam. By 1986, Greenpeace was the world's largest ENGO, with an annual budget of over U.S.$100 million. In 1995, Greenpeace had offices in 32 countries, a budget of $150 million, and 2.9 million members in 158 countries. Its head offices and decision-making hierarchy match those of the corporate world and are ideal for mounting publicity campaigns, interacting with the leaders of MNCs, banks, international agencies, and foundations, and organizing protest campaigns. Greenpeace has ships, such as the Rainbow Warrior, and its campaigns are fought widely on the high seas as well as over land. Constantly seeking publicity through connections with the "rich and famous" (such as actor Pierce Brosnan, rock group U2, and Robert Kennedy, Jr.), Greenpeace is the subject of a Hollywood movie, that ultimate of global accolades.


7. BC's forest policy of 1947 also has to be seen in context of a substantial debate on forest and community "stability and sustainability" in the United States in the 1930s (Lee, Field, and Burch 1990).

8. At present, there are two main forest industry unions, based in the sawmill and pulp and paper sectors, called the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) and the Communication, Paper, and Energy Workers Union. Toward the end of Fordism, they broke away from U.S. control to become Canadian-controlled institutions.

9. In BC, the most influential larger ENGOs are the various affiliates of Greenpeace (Canada, Germany, U.K., U.S., and International), the San Francisco-based Rainforest Action Network (RAN), and the Natural Resources Defense Council and Pacific Resource Defense Council, both based in the United States. The best known BC-based groups are the Sierra Legal Defence Fund, the Western Canada Wilderness Committee, and Friends of Clayoquot Sound (Stainsbury 2000, 34). See footnote 5.

10. "Discontinuous clear-cutting" refers to the practice of clear-cutting adjacent areas in successive years, creating huge logged-over areas. The Forest Code prevents clear-cuts bigger than 40 hectares on the coast (60 hectares in the interior), and an area adjacent to a clear-cut cannot be cut until "greening" has occurred in the clear-cut, usually after seven to eight years.

11. ENGOs have mounted massive publicity campaigns to gain public support and money for the Great Bear Rainforest. They have frequently allied themselves to support from the "rich and famous." Most recently, U2 agreed to join the Greenpeace campaign (Joyce 2001). ENGO media campaigns in BC have also made skillful use of "local ecoheroes": they have featured a grandmother, a teenager, and a former ecology professor who is a TV personality and the director of an environmental foundation.

12. In the Nisga'a Treaty of 1999, the Nisga'a, with an on-reserve population of 5,000 in a remote area of northwestern BC, were granted self-government and exclusive voting rights in a communal territory of 1,930 square kilometers (and 15 square kilometers of fee-simple lands), various monetary and nonmonetary benefits, and control over resources. The Nisga'a will be able to use (or not use) the forest resources as they choose, and stumpage will go to them, not BC. If they do log, provincial regulations apply. One controversial feature of the treaty is that non-Nisga'a—a definition that includes Nisga'a women who have married non-Nisga'a men—are not allowed to vote in elections. In time, the Nisga'a will be required to forfeit their tax-free status and aboriginal rights outside the treaty area.

13. The need to resolve the remapping of BC's forest economy is hard to underestimate. Many rural communities, especially those linked with the forest economy, have begun to depopulate, fragmentation between metropolitan and rural BC is widening, and in 2001 BC became a "have-not" province for the first time (Ward 2002). The war in the woods underlies these trends.

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