Countering Radicalization of Diaspora Communities in Canada

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Working Paper Series

COUNTERING RADICALIZATION OF DIASPORA COMMUNITIES IN CANADA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada has long served as a fundraising and logistics hub for dozens of global terrorist organizations as well as an occasional target for attacks. In recent years, both Canada and the United States have also seen an increase in the number of cases of homegrown extremism and radicalization amongst various diaspora communities, involving recent immigrants as well as second and third generation residents and citizens. Diaspora communities have a long history of producing violence in Canada and can rapidly import conflict to Canada’s shores. The most notorious example is the simultaneous set of bombings aimed at Air India that killed 331 people – the most lethal terrorist incident prior to 9/11.

This study provides an initial assessment of the state of radicalization amongst immigrant groups active within Canada’s largest metropolitan areas. The authors conducted an extensive literature review and examined over sixty cases of radicalization amongst diaspora communities in North America. The radicalization problem in Canada is multi-faceted, and there are several Canadian diaspora communities that continue to suffer from small, unabashed radical elements within them, including the Tamil, Sikh, Arab, and Muslim diaspora communities.

Many North American radicals have lived, worked, or studied in their host country for extended periods of time and rarely fit the mold of a classic “sleeper operative.” These individuals appear to have failed to integrate into a pluralistic, tolerant democracy, or they have turned away and integrated into a radicalized subculture that has taken root through a perversion of the freedoms afforded by multiculturalism. There is no single path to radicalization, and
there is no guaranteed method for deradicalization. There are, however, several viable models and best practices in dealing with radicalization in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East that could be modified for use in North America.

Given the variety of violent groups tied to North American diaspora communities, policies and programs dealing with this challenge must address both secular and religious organizations. It appears counterproductive to focus radicalization prevention efforts on particular nationalities, since a review of just sixty North American terrorist plots since 9/11 included individuals with first or second generation roots in more than 30 different countries.

Canada should develop a national counterradicalization strategy that is complemented with targeted policies and programs that deter and prevent future radicalization as well as a formal deradicalization program. These efforts should be supported by culturally-sensitive community policing and voluntary self-policing within diaspora communities.
1.0 INTRODUCTION

According to unclassified government reports, Canada has long served as a fundraising and logistics hub for dozens of global terrorist organizations as well as an occasional target for attacks. Despite this history, there has been limited exploration into this area of political violence. As the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 noted, Canadian research into terrorism-related issues has been relatively sparse, which matches the country’s “weak national capacity for academic research into vital issues of national security interest” (Vol. One 2010, 52; Rudner 2010, 142).

Radicalization is a prerequisite to terrorism. Studying radicalization should be a high priority, because the costs of fighting terrorism overseas and employing an army of law enforcement and security personnel to deal with hundreds of fanatics is unsustainable (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009, 9). Exploring the radicalization process may offer a more realistic strategy than capturing or killing every terrorist, and discouraging radicalization and terrorist recruitment can stop a drag on the economy and a threat to democracy (Jacobson 2010, 1; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009, 9).

In recent years, both Canada and the United States have also seen an increase in the number of cases of homegrown extremism and radicalization amongst various diaspora communities, involving recent immigrants as well as second and third generation residents and citizens. This trend suggests the possibility of additional future attacks that may approach the levels of violence seen in Europe over the last decade. Neither Canada nor the United States has a national policy geared towards preventing radicalization. This type of
policy development requires a broad-based assessment of radicalization in order to promote evidence-based decision-making.

Further study of the phenomenon of radicalization can uncover why Canada remains an attractive host for those promoting intolerance and violence. Canada offers a unique vantage point to view recent debates about immigration and integration policy and the role these play in radicalization (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 10). Most radicalization research to date has focused too narrowly on Islamic extremists, which are not the only group producing violent radicals. Clearly, small violent minorities within diaspora communities do not have a monopoly on terrorism within Canada. Diaspora communities, however, have a long history of producing violence in the country and provide an extended social support network that can rapidly import conflict to Canada’s shores. Given the variety of violent groups tied to Canadian immigrant diaspora communities, policies and programs dealing with this challenge must address both secular and religious organizations.

This study provides an initial assessment of the state of radicalization amongst immigrant groups active within Canada’s largest metropolitan areas. By comparing Canadian diaspora populations presently linked to radicalism and terrorism, policymakers and public officials can gauge the relative security threats posed by these groups and individuals and manage the unique challenges they create. The original research questions guiding the study were: 1) What factors may promote radicalization and terrorism from diaspora communities in Canada? and 2) What strategies can security, policing, and justice organizations employ to detect or reduce radicalization and prevent terrorism within these communities? To answer these questions, the authors conducted an extensive literature review and an examination of several dozen cases of radicalization amongst diaspora communities in North America and Europe. To
understand factors and future trajectories that may affect Canadian diaspora communities, policies and debates over assimilation and multiculturalism were also reviewed. The authors surveyed counterradicalization policies and activities and formal disengagement and deradicalization programs in Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Finally, best practices in community policing techniques and self-policing of diaspora communities have also been identified to help detect incipient radicalization. This initial study should help lay the groundwork for future research into this growing North American national security problem.

2.0 The Radicalization Process

Radicalization is not a new phenomenon, but common usage of the term and its frequent connection to terrorism only began around 2004 (HSI 2006, 2). As with terrorism, there are many different definitions for radicalization. The RCMP defines radicalization as the process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views (CACP 2008, 2). The Dutch intelligence agency, AIVD, defines it as a readiness to pursue or support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order (HSI 2006, 2). Much of the current literature suggests that radicalization involves more than simply adopting a system of extreme beliefs, but it also implies imposing those beliefs on the rest of society (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009, 7). Consequently, an individual who has been radicalized will often display a willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change (Rabasa et al. 2010, 1). Though radicalization may make an individual prone to violence, it does
not always produce this result. Radicalization, however, can be seen as a prerequisite to terrorism (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009, 8).

There are two distinct processes opposing radicalization – disengagement and deradicalization. These processes may be applied at the individual level or collective group level. Disengagement involves a behavioral change and a rejection of violent means, though not necessarily a reduction in ideological support for a cause (Neumann 2010, 12). A disengaged individual may withdraw from a radical organization or an organization may cease its violence, but each may retain the original, radical worldview (Rabasa et al. 2010, 13). In other words, disengagement focuses on outward actions. Deradicalization is the process of moderating beliefs and rejecting extremist ideology, making it more about internal views. Disengagement can occur without deradicalization, but deradicalization cannot occur without disengagement (Rabasa et al. 2010, 181).

Today, radicalization is often discussed in relation to terrorism, for which there is no universally agreed definition. Paraphrasing the Canadian Criminal Code, “terrorist activity” involves an act committed for a political, religious, or ideological purpose with the intention of intimidating a segment of the public by the use of violence against individuals and property or disruption of an essential service or facility [(C-46), Part II. 1 Terrorism, Section 83.01(1)(b)]. Historically, terrorism was divided into domestic (involving citizens of only one country) and international varieties, though this distinction became blurred over time with the advent of so-called “homegrown terrorism.” In the US, the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 defined homegrown terrorism as “the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a large group or individual born, raised, or operating primarily within the United States... in furtherance of political or social objectives”
Homegrown terrorism covers both classic domestic terrorists and a more nebulous set of individuals that are newly arrived or come from the first, second, or even third generation of immigrants within a diaspora community that may not have fully integrated within a host country. Homegrown terrorism may be a misnomer, since many of these individuals may never have considered their host country to be their “home.”

Various root causes have been offered for why radicalization occurs, especially amongst members of diaspora communities. The European Commission suggested individual exclusion, threatened identity, discrimination, globalization, and immigration as possible root causes, noting a lack of connection to the linguistic, religious, or political beliefs of the parents’ generation or that of the host country (EC 2005). Canadian senior officials have also identified poverty and intense feelings of marginalization and alienation as root causes (Riddell-Dixon 2008, 37). Victimhood is a common theme running through many of these causation models. Radicalization and the employment of violence are thought to offer empowerment, overcome “failing” non-violent approaches, and forge a new identity in opposition to an exclusionary enemy (Change Institute February 2008, 36). Radicalization does not occur in a vacuum nor through alienation alone, and terrorist indoctrination may not always occur at the margins of society (CACP 2008, 6). Indeed, radicalizing figures often serve as community leaders, though outside the mainstream.

Most recent radicalization research related to diaspora communities in the West focuses narrowly on religious groups, particularly Muslims. The rationale behind this focus is that since 9/11 most planned or actual terrorist attacks in Western Europe and North America have been carried out by young Muslims of various national and cultural origins who were either native-born citizens or long-term residents and who had undergone an identifiable process of radical-
ization (CACP 2008, 6). It is important to note that the Muslim diaspora is not the only community producing violent extremists. Radicalization is not limited to any one religion, ethnicity, culture, or ideology, and understanding the threat of diaspora radicalization in Canada requires examination of a broader cross-section of immigrant populations. Our review of several dozen North American terrorist plots and attacks since 9/11 included individuals with first or second generation roots to the following nationalities: Afghani; Albanian; Algerian; Bangladeshi; Dominican; Egyptian; Eritrean; Guyanese; Haitian; Indian; Iranian; Iraqi; Jamaican; Jordanian; Kosovar; Kuwaiti; Lebanese; Libyan; Moroccan; Nicaraguan; Palestinian; Pakistani; Peruvian; Saudi; Somali; Sri Lankan; Sudanese; Syrian; Trinidadian; Tunisian; Turkish; and Yemeni. Given the wide variety of groups and individuals operating in North America, it would create a security blind spot to concentrate solely on a handful of select countries or to overlook secular and ethno-nationalist groups. Even in addressing religiously-oriented radicalization, it is important to note that radical political views are often more salient and serve as a prerequisite for terrorism, as opposed to religious faith alone (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009, 8). Still, understanding the radicalization process of Muslim “jihadists” is instructive in illustrating pathways into terrorism amongst diaspora communities.

The US Federal Bureau of Investigation conceives of Muslim radicalization as a four-stage cycle: pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action (FBI 2006, 3). It is illustrated below:
Various motivating factors, which are thought to be unique to every individual, may spur conversion and initiation of the radicalization process to becoming a violent jihadist. The four types of potential violent jihadists are described as jilted believers, protest converts, acceptance seekers, and faith re-interpreters. Once in the identification stage, the individual becomes alienated from his former life and affiliates with like-minded individuals while strengthening his dedication to Islam (FBI 2006, 3). During the identification stage, the individual may engage in training and group bonding experiences to solidify his extremist identity, but he does not pursue training in preparation for an attack (FBI 2006, 7). An indoctrination period follows. At this point, the individual becomes convinced that action is required to further the cause, and,
if recruited, he undergoes extensive vetting and operational tests to gauge his willingness to participate in an attack and test his resolve (FBI 2006, 3). The action stage represents various activities, including participation in jihad, terrorist attacks, facilitation, recruitment, or financing. The actions can be violent or non-violent, but they are done with the intention of inflicting damage to the enemy (FBI 2006, 8). Evidence suggests that radicalization does not always lead to action, and it is a fluid process that does not have a time table (FBI 2006, 4).

There are multiple models of Muslim extremist recruitment. The FBI noted that recruitment is often accomplished by personal friends who have established bonds with the extremist group or member, and it may not involve a charismatic leader (FBI 2006, 6). Sometimes intermediary organizations, such as Hizb al-Tahrir, act as “conveyor belts” and “match-makers” transforming newcomers into sympathizers, supporters, and members of terrorist networks (Jacobson 2010, 5). In other cases, traveling clerics and agitators pass through local communities to galvanize support and radicalize the faithful, indoctrinating adherents and propelling them to training camps to acquire terrorist skills for operations (Rudner 2010, 122). This was the case with radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki shortly after the September 11th attacks. He spoke to groups across the United Kingdom from London to Aberdeen and developed his lecture series, Constants in the Path of Jihad, while fleeing an FBI inquiry in the United States (Gardham 2010). A generic recruitment process may include these steps:

1) Attract/promote exposure to seminal ideas;

2) Invite prospects to smaller, select gathering;

3) Develop social bond to small group;
4) Gradually introduce political/radical ideas;

5) Cultivate extremism, focusing on political/radical ideas; and

6) Allow social forces to mobilize volunteers for action (Borum 2006, 7).

The nature of the recruitment message often varies depending on the audience and context of the conflict. For example, initial recruitment of Somali-Americans from Minneapolis into al-Shabab focused on the religious duty to defend Somalia from Christian Ethiopian invaders, and after the Ethiopian withdrawal recruiters stressed that becoming jihadis would be “fun,” “cool,” and an opportunity to “get to shoot guns” (Temple-Raston 2010).

Radicalization occurs in many venues. These venues include: places of employment; prisons; universities; study groups; community centers; conferences; mosques and other houses of worship; religious bookshops; local gyms; and private domiciles (Change Institute February 2008, 40; HSI 2006, 5). Vigorous law enforcement surveillance and expulsions from mainstream houses of worship have pushed radical activities to more informal and mundane locations. In Europe, informal “garage mosques” have emerged to avoid interlopers and accommodate the rapid growth of the Muslim population (HSI 2006, 5). Prisons are a unique radicalization venue. The prison environment often produces a need for protection, a search for meaning and identity, and a desire to defy a system perceived as unjust (Neumann 2010, 29). For incarcerated radicals, the prison offers a captive audience and occasionally the opportunity to continue the struggle by other means. Prisoners can display psychological traits conducive to terrorist recruitment, including disillusionment with society, violent impulses, high levels of distress, a dysfunctional family system, and dependent personalities (Saathoff 2006, 7). Prisoners may be radicalized through internal drivers such as terrorist inmates and radical prison
chaplains or imams, or they may receive extremist messages from external drivers such as outside visitors, letters, or extremist literature, videos, and websites (Neumann 2010, 28).

The majority of the offenders in the Saudi Rehabilitation Program for imprisoned terrorists were radicalized through extremist books, tapes, and videos (Rabasa et al. 2010, 59). There is a long history of recorded messages and sermons being used for propaganda and to radicalize diaspora communities, including the smuggled audio tapes made by the Ayatollah Khomeini prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Today, radical speeches, gruesome videos, and inflammatory music are passed through a variety of media, including print, recordings, radio, satellite, television, and web-based forums such as chat rooms, bulletin boards, and websites (Change Institute February 2008, 40; FBI 2006). A declassified National Intelligence Estimate noted that the radicalization process is occurring “more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks (NIE 2006). The Internet is a “critical accelerator” for radicalization, in part because it speeds up the recruitment process and helps connect individuals to organizations that launch attacks (CACP 2008, 6; Temple-Raston 2010). The web does not just provide a means for organizations to find recruits. It also facilitates self-enlistment amongst a diaspora, fostering subsequent radicalization and fomenting a culture of militancy (Rudner 2010, 116). This is a particular concern for law enforcement and counterterrorism organizations, since the Internet eliminates the need for a “public” radicalization venue and facilitates small group and “lone wolf” radicalization (CACP 2008, 6). Traditional terrorist groups often shun newcomers they suspect may be spies, under surveillance, unstable, or who may jeopardize the security of an existing cell. This has been observed in a number of the North American cases reviewed. Yet these
individuals continued to find inspiration and training from massive amounts of radical materials online to pursue their own plots in the name of their chosen cause or movement.

Radicals and terrorists use the Internet as a forum for discussion, virtual community building, operational planning, training, dissemination of information, spreading propaganda about successful attacks, and glorifying martyrs (HSI 2006, 5; Change Institute February 2008, 4). One of the most common means of spreading radical messages has been through videos posted on YouTube. These videos include hundreds of sermons calling for jihad by the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, and these alone have proven sufficient to produce attacks. A recent example is the May 2010 stabbing of a British MP by Roshonara Choudhury. A 21-year-old theology student and daughter of Bangladeshi immigrants to England, Ms. Choudhury had no known links to terrorist groups before watching hundreds of hours of al-Awlaki videos, which motivated her to punish the legislator for voting for the Iraq invasion (Burns and Helft 2010). In late 2010, YouTube claimed to have removed videos involving “dangerous or illegal activities such as bomb-making, hate speech, and incitement to commit violent acts,” or that came from accounts registered by members or promoters of designated foreign terrorist organizations. Yet as of March 2011, the site still includes dozens of al-Awlaki videos calling for jihad or explaining why American civilians are legitimate targets for killings (Shane 2011). The FBI has seen an increase in the use of social media sites, such as Facebook, by radical groups and individuals (Osman 2010). Examples of individuals using Facebook examined in this study include the Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, thwarted al-Shabab conspirator Carlos Eduardo Almante, Swedish suicide bomber Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, and attempted Maryland military recruitment center bomber Antonio Martinez.
In the Martinez case, it was the radical messages on his Facebook page that initially alerted law enforcement to the potential threat (Gay 2010). At least one jihadist web forum has explicitly urged its members to use Facebook to spread radical ideas based on the previous propaganda successes from using YouTube (Osman 2010).

The Dutch AIVD suggested young people going through “jihadization” may display increasing isolation; loss of independence; fixation on cult figures, heroes, or inspirational leaders; and possible intimidation (Ministry 2006, 38). Similarly, the FBI developed the following preliminary indicators to identify Muslims going through the radicalization process:

- Increased isolation from former life
- Association with new social identity:
  - Wearing traditional Muslim attire
  - Growing facial hair
  - Frequent attendance at a mosque or a prayer group
- Travel to a Muslim country
- Increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group or political cause
- Attendance at a training camp or participation in paramilitary training
- Conducting surveillance activities
- Proselytizing
- Travel without obvious source of funds
- Suspicious purchases of bombmaking paraphernalia or weapons
- Large transfer of funds
- Formation of operational cell (FBI 2006, 10).
The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism developed the following ten signs of potential radicalization:

1) Catalyzing life event (death, divorce, bullying, loss of employment, etc.);
2) Alienation and/or isolation from family, friends, or community;
3) Loss of interest in school, work, or hobbies;
4) Obsession with a social, political, religious, or economic issue;
5) Association with other like-minded individuals;
6) Change in outward appearance and demeanor;
7) Use of special words, gestures, or symbols;
8) Embracing conspiratorial beliefs and speaking out for one’s cause;
9) Redirection of time and money to support radical activism or related activities; and
10) Intolerance towards opposing views, beliefs, or groups.

These apply to a wide variety of radical groups, not just religious ones.

Terrorists clearly are not born; they are forged through a process of radicalization. Some seek adventure, some revenge, while others wish for status or to develop an identity as part of a larger movement or cause (Venhaus 2010, 1). It is not one’s political or religious views that make one a terrorist, but rather the corruption and use of these ideas as the basis for violence against civilians that does.

Early psychological research began from the assumption that terrorists are abnormal or mentally ill and can be treated or cured. Psychologists thought that frustration over their inability to attain goals led to aggression and violence.
Others looked for evidence of childhood abuse and psychological trauma that damaged the ego and prevented self-control. Some felt terrorists suffered from “narcissistic rage” – over-valuing themselves and devaluing others while seeking to externalize their rage over their inadequacies in their personal or professional lives. Still more thought all terrorists could be conveniently categorized as crusaders, criminals, and crazies. Mental illness, however, is not conducive to terrorist planning and coordinated action, and terrorists show no higher levels of clinical mental illness than the general population. Indeed, terrorist groups are usually highly selective and seek to screen out unstable individuals. Psychopaths do not display the persistence, loyalty, selflessness, and sacrifice these groups demand. The outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.

Surprisingly, many terrorists view themselves as reluctant warriors, believing that history will see them as peacemakers or valiant martyrs driven to violence to serve the greater good. They trust their acts will spur change, help return to some golden age, or avenge a grievous wrong. Defining themselves as righteous protectors and visionaries, they feel the ends always justify the means, no matter what carnage they leave behind.

The resort to terrorism is a rational choice. It offers a way to show that even powerful governments cannot guarantee safety and security. Leaders who use terrorism can also become legitimate politicians over time, as demonstrated by Menachem Began, Yasir Arafat, and Gerry Adams. To them, terrorism is cheaper than all-out war and will kill fewer people. It also provides an opportunity to gain media access and to magnify the importance of marginalized individuals and causes. In this view, terrorism is “win-win,” since they will gain media attention regardless of whether the tactical operation is successful or not. Describing terrorists as rational actors does not justify their
actions or downplay their occasional delusional views of reality, but it clarifies that terrorism is the result of a strategic calculation to achieve specific goals and not some pathology.

One of the most important aspects of radicalization is the process of moral disengagement and dehumanization of “the enemy.” Terrorists offer a skewed moral justification for their violence, which helps them displace responsibility for and minimize or ignore their victims’ suffering. First, they perceive some harm or wrong has been committed to them or a community with which they identify. Second, they find or invent an external source to blame for this harm. Third, they construct a negative image of the enemy to spawn a shared hatred. Fourth, they underscore that the harm will continue or grow worse if nothing is done. Finally, they call for action and violence to thwart the impending threat. It is difficult to suggest the wholesale slaughter of fellow human beings without diminishing their worth or status. Therefore, radical propaganda describes opponents as subhuman (mud people); inhuman (the System); animals (pigs or monkeys); parasites (leeches or vampires); disease (plague or cancer); or evil incarnate (demons or the Great Satan). This rhetoric erodes constraints on violence and bloodshed by portraying victims as unworthy of living (Hoffman 2010, 31).

By appealing to visceral emotions and breaking communication lines, terrorist groups hope to prevent negotiations and isolate themselves from their violence and its effects. It is important for terrorists to see their civilian targets as complicit with the broader regime, by paying taxes or benefiting from unjust policies and practices. This allows terrorists to claim non-combatants are not neutral or unacceptable targets. Terrorist groups constantly reinforce these views and provide a sense of belonging and a larger purpose for their
members. The group’s belief system defines its acts as morally acceptable and diminishes any individual responsibility for their crimes.

Religious terrorists go one step further by claiming divine status from sacred authorities, allowing them to easily divide the world into good and evil realms. This, in turn, closes the door for political compromise and promotes more indiscriminate attacks, since the victims are in God’s hands. They believe their violence is a sacramental act of purification that punishes unbelievers and violators of God’s law or speeds up the coming of a messiah or the apocalypse. Religious radicals claim that killing infidels shortens their lives and prevents them from committing more sins (Change Institute February 2008, 103). Religious suicide terrorism does not involve the same dynamics as clinical suicide, since these individuals rarely show the risk factors of mood disorders, schizophrenia, substance abuse, or previous suicide attempts. It is important to note many “religious” terrorists do not come from strong religious backgrounds, and they often had an incomplete religious education or were exposed to a very narrow interpretation of their faith (Venhaus 2010, 5).

Terrorism has been used in the name of many different ideologies, creeds, cultures, nationalities, and causes. Terrorists have come from all strata of society and age groups, and they have varied family histories and backgrounds. Discomforting as it seems, there is no terrorist personality that separates them from society at large. Knowing how they view the world is key to understanding when and where they will strike.

3.0 DIASPORA DYNAMICS, MULTICULTURALISM, AND INTEGRATION

The term “diaspora” covers ethnic migrants; first-, second-, or even third-generation immigrants; guest workers; refugees; expatriates; and students, who can be thought of as playing an active role in two or more communities
simultaneously (Carment and Bercuson 2008, 6-7). In other words, members of a diaspora maintain a foothold in two worlds, and they may develop their composite identity from both their host country as well as their traditional ethnic or cultural roots. Diaspora communities have grown in part due to global migration patterns, and now an estimated 200 million people worldwide live outside their country of birth (Frideres 2008, 77). Traditionally, states have concentrated on integrating the first generation of migrants, assuming that the following generations would take care of themselves. In many states, integration policy pays much less attention to second and third generation migrant communities (Change Institute July 2008, 41). Over time new challenges have emerged that have weakened the integration process. Today’s diasporas have access to ubiquitous telecommunications, inexpensive international travel, and liberalized financial remittance systems that create “hyper-connectivity” with their home communities (Carment and Bercuson 2008, 7). This hyper-connectivity can provide an extended social support network, but it may also relieve pressures to integrate into a host country and provide pathways to import foreign conflict. Immigrant integration activities are almost always national in scope, but the lives of today’s immigrants can’t be fully understood by looking solely within national boundaries (Frideres 2008, 84).

Aside from concerns regarding the first wave of new immigrants, new challenges have developed regarding second and third generations. These challenges have been discussed most recently with regards to the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants, though there is little reason to think these do not extend to other diaspora communities. Children of immigrants can go through a “deculturalization process” in which they become trapped between two cultures, alienated from the traditional culture of their parents but not integrated into the culture of the host country (Ministry 2006, 46). This failure
to integrate may produce an identity crisis and increase susceptibility to radicalization. Some theorize that constantly managing two sets of norms can lead to an inability to reconcile the heritage identity with the Western identity (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 19). Others fear that second and third generation immigrants are more vulnerable to extremist ideologies (Gallis et al. 2005, i). This problem may be even more pernicious with second-generation visible minorities, who are “much less socially and politically integrated than their non-visible minority counterparts” (Anderson and Black 2008, 46). In some situations, integration of diaspora communities is purposely avoided through self-segregation and attempts to avoid assimilation. In this case, the lack of progression toward integration is a result of voluntary efforts on the part of the ethnic or cultural group to remain outside the mainstream society (Frideres 2008, 83).

European nations now face major integration challenges. Most of the national debates regarding these challenges center on the Muslim diaspora, which represents the largest minority in Europe as well as the fastest growing religion (Gallis et al. 2005, 1). Estimates for the size of the European Muslim population range widely. The Pew Research Center Forum on Religion & Public Life, which relies on census data and demographic records, estimates the number of European Muslims (including Russia) in 2010 at 44.1 million, and this population is projected to grow to over 58 million by 2030, with the biggest increases in France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Agrell 2011). These demographic changes have spurred concerns over the integration of this growing community. Europeans see radicalization through the lens of integration difficulties concerning the Muslim community’s inadequate economic, social, and political participation; high unemployment rates; criminality; and urban fragmentation (Rabasa et al. 2010, 122). Muslim communi-
ties in Europe are disproportionately represented in low-skilled, low-paid jobs, and radical Islam presents a vehicle of protest against problems of access to employment, housing, and discrimination (Change Institute February 2008, 22; Taarnby 2005, 33).

The two most common models of integration, assimilation and multiculturalism, have both proven difficult to implement in Europe (Fried 2006, 5). The French aimed to forge a national identity that minimized cultural or religious differences, where full acceptance of the host country’s values is expected (Archik, Rollins, and Woehrel 2005, 2). The British and Dutch have pursued multiculturalism, which allows diaspora communities to maintain distinct identities. This European multiculturalism has failed to eliminate xenophobia, racism, isolation, and alienation of Muslims and other diasporas, and it has helped crystallize separate, parallel societies (Fried 2006, 6; Archik, Rollins, and Woehrel 2005, 2). Based on a laissez faire legal framework and a historical legacy of incorporating four national identities, the United Kingdom’s multicultural approach differs from the federal and regionalized approaches of Germany and Belgium (Change Institute July 2008, 30). The German approach resembles the shortsighted policies of many other European countries. Most countries in Europe did not develop formal integration policies, viewing Muslim immigrants as guest workers whom they expected to leave and seeing even third generation individuals as “foreign” (Gallis et al. 2005, 32-3; Fried 2006, 6). Consequently, this diaspora community maintained its own cultural identity, and segregation within German society has encouraged radicalization (HSI 2006, 37).

European leaders are now decrying their failures to integrate their diaspora communities.
In 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy promoted a series of hundreds of town-hall meetings across France about how to define the French identity and the problem of integration, implying that the national identity is endangered (Sachs 2009). In 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed Germany’s attempt to create a multicultural society has “utterly failed,” placing the onus on immigrants to do more to integrate (Weaver 2010). In 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron stated multiculturalism encouraged “segregated communities” and condemned the “hands-off tolerance” in Britain that allowed immigrant groups “to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream,” which in turn allowed Islamic militants leeway to radicalize young Muslims (Burns 2011). The United Kingdom has played a unique role in the radicalization of the Muslim diaspora. During the 1980s and 1990s, the United Kingdom became the refuge of choice for scores of Islamic radicals who were expelled from their home countries for their extremism, becoming a global hub for radical ideology and terrorist activity that sought to spur a revivalism of Muslim identity amongst diaspora populations (Sullivan and Partlow 2006; Change Institute July 2008, 14). This climate, coupled with high traffic between Britain and Pakistan (over 400,000 people annually), offered many opportunities for the radicalization and recruitment of British residents (Bergen and Hoffman 2010, 7). This permissive environment helped to spread virulent forms of radical political and religious rhetoric that has spread throughout the Muslim diaspora and beyond. This breakdown in European integration is spurring the United Kingdom and other nations to abandon state-sponsored multiculturalism and return toward assimilation policies (Frideres 2008, 87).

The British case is instructive, since its approach most closely approximates those taken in Canada and the United States. The British complacently believed their Muslim community was better integrated, better educated, and
wealthier than their counterparts on the Continent until the July 7, 2005 suicide attacks, just as the Americans believed their “melting pot” acted as a firewall against radicalization and recruitment of American citizens and immigrants (Bergen and Hoffman 2010, 16). Support for al-Qaeda amongst the American Muslim diaspora was also thought to be much smaller than in Europe, due in part to better living conditions and greater integration. A Pew Research Center poll in 2006 showed only 5 percent of American Muslims overall expressed a positive view of al-Qaeda, with 7 percent of Muslims under 30 holding a favorable view of the organization (Jenkins 2010, 5). Nevertheless, the rapid growth of incidents involving domestic radicals, lone wolves, and trained terrorist recruits over the last two years makes the US appear little different from Europe in terms of terrorism amongst its diaspora communities (Bergen and Hoffman 2010, 31). Similar concerns are slowly growing in Canada.

Canada has seen tremendous changes in its immigration patterns and population growth over the last forty years. From the 1970s, Canada saw its immigration from Asia grow from 33 percent of total immigrants to 58 percent in 1990 (Carment and Bercuson 2008, 7). In 2001, more than 18 percent of the Canadian population was foreign-born representing thousands of ethnic groups, and by the following year immigrants accounted for more than half of Canada’s total annual population growth (Riddell-Dixon 2008, 31-2; Frideres 2008, 77). Canadian immigration is almost solely into large metropolitan centers. Since the 1990s, 94 percent of immigrants settled in urban centers, and during the first decade of the twenty-first century 73 percent of immigrants settled in just three cities – Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal (Riddell-Dixon 2008, 40). Religious communities within immigrant populations are set to grow substantially over the next decade. By 2017, the Muslim population is expected to grow by 145 percent from nearly 2 percent of the total Canadian
population to over 4 percent, and the Canadian Sikh and Hindu populations are expected to grow by 72 percent and 92 percent respectively over the same period (Biles, Burstein, and Frideres 2008, 270). Another credible estimate suggested the Muslim population of Canada alone will grow to 2.7 million by 2030, making up 6.6 per cent of the total population (Agrell 2011).

Canadian integration efforts have continued to evolve in the face of this rapidly changing migrant mosaic. In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau instituted multicultural ideals to overcome barriers to full participation in Canadian society, to support cultural development of ethno-cultural groups, to promote creative interchange, and to assist all new immigrants in acquiring at least one official language (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 8). Canada was the first to adopt a national multiculturalism law – the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 – which was intended to forge a new Canadian identity that integrated newcomers while allowing them to preserve elements of their own culture (Rimok and Rouzier 2008, 200). Canada further strengthened this model of integration by enacting the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001. The “two-way street” model of integration implied that current citizens and immigrants adapt to each other, encouraging immigrants to weave themselves into Canada’s economic, social, political, and cultural spheres as soon as possible after arrival (Biles, Burstein, and Frideres 2008, 4 and 273).

Though Canadian multiculturalism has been the law of the land for decades, it has not been embraced and implemented in every corner of Canada. The most notable exception is the provincial government of Quebec, which has not adopted the approach advocated by multiculturalism (Rimok and Rouzier 2008, 203). This has been despite the fact that the policy was developed, in part, as a reaction to the wave of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s (Anderson and Black 2008, 45). This strong current of Quebec nation-
alism has positioned the province to follow an approach much closer to that of France. In recent years, Quebec has pushed for greater secularism and seen attempts to ban cultural expressions of religious faith in public settings, including the face-covering *niqab* veil common to some conservative Muslim and Arab cultures, as well as the *kirpan* – a Sikh religious blade.

Critics note that there is no strong empirical basis supporting the success of Canada’s two-way approach to integration, nor is there any evidence that Canada’s multiculturalism is better than the British or Dutch models (Biles, Burstein, and Frideres 2008, 271; Granatstein 2008, 86). Indeed, there is growing debate that high levels of immigration and increasing religious diversity are placing unsustainable pressure on this model, and mounting evidence suggests “a profound and lasting deterioration” of economic success amongst Canadian immigrants (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 8; Biles, Burstein, and Frideres 2008, 7). Part of the problem may be the way Canadian integration and immigrant services are structured. The federal government plays the largest role in establishing integration policies, especially through the agencies of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (focused on the first three years) and Canadian Heritage (covering long-term integration). The majority of newcomer services, however, occur through third-party agencies, such as immigrant service provider organizations, educational institutions, issue-based organizations, private sector partners, and ethno-specific organizations (Biles 2008, 141). Temporary foreign migrants, which now outnumber permanent residents, can’t benefit from many of these training, language, and settlement services. Funding for immigrant services varies by province making access to them uneven, and as of 2010 resources for them are being redistributed.

In 2006, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated he does not believe Canada’s open and culturally diverse society makes it “a more vulner-
able target for terrorist activity,” though he conceded “in some communities we do find promoters of terror, people who use cultural, religious symbols to perpetrate violent crime” (CBC News 2006). However, holes in Canada’s integration and social safety net have important implications for radicalization to violence. Just as European debates have intertwined economic concerns, immigration, and integration, Canadian data suggest some immigrant populations are worse off in socio-economic terms than their predecessors, despite Canada’s image as a multicultural beacon (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 8). Critics contend that Canadian multiculturalism funded and “exacerbated the problem of angry émigrés who weren’t even trying to fit into the society of their adopted country” (Granatstein 2008, 83). The concern extends beyond the inefficiency of multiculturalism as an integration model and the unevenness of socio-economic outcomes, to the potential for diaspora communities to import conflicts from abroad and/or to wall themselves off and forestall the development of a pluralistic, liberal national identity. A growing number of governments note the inherent dangers of the worldviews that some immigrants import with them, which may undermine one of the main goals of integration – low conflict interaction between native-born citizens and immigrants (Khan 2007; Frideres 2008, 79). Conflicts may also be imported along with their victims. In 2004, refugees comprised 14 percent of all migrants, and there are reports of undesirables entering Canada and abusing its commitment to assisting refugees (Riddell-Dixon 2008, 33; Littlewood 2010, 7). Radicalization takes root in the cracks of civil society. Canada would do well to stress integration across many levels. Ten indicators of successful social integration endorsed by one collection of intelligence and security professionals were: acceptance; welcome; integration level; entitlement; equal opportunity; social access; loyalty; citizenship/pride; acceptance of social values in society;
and language competency (Pressman 2006, 11-13). It is important to note that building highly functioning immigrant communities and with equality of economic opportunity is not “a guarantee against the kind of radicalization that can lead to terrorism” (CACP 2008, 7).

4.0 Radicalization of Diaspora Communities in Canada

Small groups of radicals within North American diaspora communities have long produced violence and terrorism. A nineteenth century example would include Irish Catholic Fenians, which represented a diaspora community supporting international and homegrown attacks on North American soil, including assassinations (Haglund 2008, 98). The middle of the twentieth century saw international and homegrown attacks from various nationalist and diaspora communities in Canada. Anti-Castro Cuban émigré factions murdered Cuban officials in Montreal and Ottawa, attacked the Cuba Pavilion at Expo ’67 in Montreal as well as the Cuban embassy in 1974 (Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 67; Littlewood 2010, 2 and 5). In the 1980s, Armenian terrorists carried out scores of attacks in over twenty countries, including the assassination of Turkish diplomats in Ottawa and the storming of the Turkish embassy in 1985 (Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 65; Littlewood 2010, 2). In addition to short terrorist campaigns, individual attacks have also come from radical elements of diaspora communities in Canada. Examples include: the October 1971 attack on Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin in Ottawa by a member of the Canadian Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation; the April 1989 hijacking of an American Greyhound bus to the Canadian Parliament by a Lebanese Christian from the Lebanese Liberation Front; the April 1992 storming of the Embassy of Iran in Ottawa by Iranian exiles; and the May 1993 murder of a Canadian researcher and a Ugandan colleague by suspected Ugandan Christian
Democratic Army members (Littlewood 2010, 2-5). Diaspora communities in Canada have also spread radicalization and conflict beyond the country’s borders, as demonstrated by members of the Croatian diaspora. Along with incidents in the United States, Croatian terrorists carried out attacks in Canada, including bombings at the Yugoslavian embassy in Ottawa in 1967 and 1968 (Littlewood 2010, 5). Millions of dollars were also raised amongst the quarter-million-strong Croatian diaspora that lived in Canada to help fuel conflict abroad, and some Canadian-Croats, such as Gojko Susak, returned to preside over ethnic cleansing operations back in Europe (Granatstein 2008, 83).

Radicalization, conflict, and terrorism have long been a danger from within a variety of diaspora communities in Canada. Today, the largest Canadian communities experiencing continued radicalization and extremism are the Tamil diaspora, the Arab and Muslim diaspora, and the Sikh diaspora.

Canada is home to the largest expatriate Tamil community outside of Asia, with some 200,000 Tamils living in the country. Radical elements within this diaspora community have long been connected to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), officially designated as a terrorist group in Canada since April 2006. The LTTE has reportedly maintained offices in some 38 different countries in order to fundraise amongst the Tamil diaspora, and security experts have warned that the LTTE plans to reorganize and regroup in Canada after suffering defeat in the 30-year Sri Lankan civil war (Hoffman 2010, 53; Armstrong January 2010). In order to curtail LTTE fundraising efforts, Canada added the World Tamil Movement to its banned List of Entities in June 2008, which was the first Canadian non-profit organization to be added as a listed entity under section 85.05 of the Criminal Code (Carter and Carter 2008, 1). This followed the arrest of Prapaharan Thambithurai, who ultimately pleaded guilty to raising funds for the LTTE in British Columbia and was sentenced to
six months in jail in May 2010, making him the first person in Canada to be charged solely with raising funds for a banned terrorist organization (Matas and Freeze 2010). In 2010, the Canada Revenue Agency also revoked the charitable status of the Tamil (Sri Lanka) Refugee-Aid Society of Ottawa, stating it “was operating as part of the support network for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam” by providing $713,000 to a LTTE front group (CBC News July 2010). Fundraising for the LTTE in Canada does not always go on in the shadows of the Tamil diaspora. Indeed, one fundraising dinner in Toronto included the then Finance Minister of Canada (Granatstein 2008, 83). Fundraising efforts for the LTTE are multi-faceted. The four main income streams are direct contributions from diaspora communities, funds siphoned from NGOs and charities, people smuggling, and investments in legitimate, Tamil-run businesses (Hoffman 2010, 53). Contributions are not always voluntary. There have been reports of coerced taxes paid by Tamil diaspora households in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom (Hoffman 2010, 53).

Radical activities extend beyond mere fundraising in Canada; they also include direct attempts to arm terrorists. The most notable recent case in 2006 involved at least half a dozen men from Ontario: Suresh Sriskandarajah; Ramanan Mylvaganam; Piratheepan Nadarajah; Sahilal Sabaratnam; Thiruthanikan Thanigasalam; and Sathajhan Sarachandran (Bell and Humphreys 2009; Bell December 2010). The men attempted to procure nearly a million dollars worth of weapons for the LTTE across the border in New York, including ten anti-aircraft missiles and 500 assault rifles. These individuals were not marginalized members within the Tamil diaspora. Sabaratnam was the communications director of the Canadian Tamil Congress in 2005, and Sarachandran was the national president of Canadian Tamil Students Association. The end of the Sri Lankan civil war has also led to an increase in human-smuggling activities. A
January 2010 report for the Canadian government noted that the release of more than 100,000 displaced Tamils from containment camps are creating a “significant challenge for Canada” on the immigration front (Chase and Freeze 2010). The recent arrival of Tamil migrant ships to Canada’s west coast has increased security concerns about the possibility of former LTTE members infiltrating Canada as refugees. These concerns were validated when one of the 492 migrants aboard the MV Sun Sea admitted he was a member of the LTTE to the Canada Border Services Agency, leading to a determination of his inadmissibility by the Immigration and Refugee Board in early March 2011 (Dhillon 2011). There have been reports of other men and women amongst these migrants that may also have connections to the Tigers. Attempts are now being made to preempt migrant ships with arrests in Thailand and elsewhere.

Radical activities amongst the Tamil diaspora extend beyond terrorist fundraising to include violence as well. There are reports of violent attacks against individuals who failed to conform to radical demands, as well as their property (Leman-Langlois and Brodeur 2005, 128). Likewise, there have been multiple arsons against Buddhist temples, such as the one in Scarborough in May 2009 where Sinhalese Sri Lankans are known to worship (Reinhart 2009). Radicalization of the Tamil diaspora continues largely unabated in Canada. Canadian Tamils still celebrate “Martyrs’ Day” in secret each November to beatify LTTE suicide bombers and other fighters. In 2009, Federal agents kicked firebrand Tamil speaker Sebastian Seeman out of the country ahead of one event (Freeze and Reinhart 2009). The festivities continued nevertheless in a sprawling banquet hall in Brampton, where a stream of visitors walked up a red-carpeted aisle lined with bouquets and flags bearing the LTTE emblem to place gloriosa lilies on a shrine to the fallen martyrs (Reinhart 2009). The covers of local Tamil-language newspapers still feature pictures of deceased
LTTE-leader Velupillai Prabhakaran with headlines reading “His Braveness is Never Defeated” and “the Defeated Homeland Will Rise Again” (Freeze and Reinhart 2009). Outgoing RCMP Commissioner Bill Elliott has stated “Canada is one of the few places in the world where [Tamil Tiger] terrorists and supporters might seek to hide in plain sight” (Freeze and Reinhart 2009). Since the end of the civil war, members of the Tamil diaspora in Canada have sought to reorganize a secessionist government based abroad with the goal of achieving an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka in the next couple generations. Critics fear this will only impede the nascent peace and may represent “a bid by diaspora Tamils to revive the Tigers by remote control, from behind a veneer of legitimate politics” (Reinhart 2010). It remains to be seen what continued radicalization of this community following the civil war will produce both within Canada’s border and beyond.

The Arab and Muslim diaspora communities in Canada have also witnessed radicalization of individuals and organizations in their midst. The Arab and Muslim communities, of course, do not overlap directly and they are ethnically and culturally diverse. One can see a radicalized internal split between Christian and Muslim Arabs in Canada in the recent incident where the al-Qaeda linked Shumukh-al-Islam website posted the names, photos, and phone numbers of 100 Canadians (mostly Egyptian Copts) and called for their beheadings (Lilley 2010). Arabs represent a minority within the Muslim diaspora, which also includes Pakistanis, Indians, Africans, Southeast Asians and others, and some of these diaspora elements have become protagonists in the regional conflicts of their countries of origin (Aoun 2008, 115). Likewise, the heterogeneous make-up of religious segments and political organizations sympathetic to radicalism – including Salafists, Deobandis, Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jamaat-e-Islami, and others – makes it difficult to parse precisely the ele-
ments most prone to produce danger in Canada (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 21).

One presumes that the subset of individuals willing to be recruited and radicalized is quite small, but the size of that group is hard to estimate. As the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police noted, the extent of radicalization in contemporary Canada is difficult to determine with regard to radicalization associated with Islamist extremism, since few domestic academic studies address its extent (2008, 7). Both the Arab and Muslim diaspora communities have experienced obstacles to integration. One observer has indicated that a significant portion of the Arab and Muslim diasporas in Canada remains economically unstable and retains linkages to their families in their countries of origin that are “so strong that they still perceive their host country, Canada, as foreign” (Aoun 2008, 114-5). Significant numbers of Muslim immigrants to Canada began in the early 1990s, and ghettoization remains less pronounced than in Western Europe, though the unemployment rate of Canadian Muslims is double the national average (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 17).

Since the mid-1990s, Canada has seen a rise in the number of terrorist networks and radical organizations tied to the Muslim and Arab diaspora communities. Many of the early terrorist networks in Canada had ties to North Africa. One example is the Fateh Kamel network. In September 1994, Fateh Kamel, an Algerian-Canadian, left Montreal along with two Moroccan-Canadians to join the El Muzahid unit of foreign fighters in Bosnia, and he later became the interface between al-Qaeda and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (Mili Part I 2005). Another prominent example is the Montreal cell connected to Ahmed Ressam, who fraudulently entered Canada as a refugee and lived in Canada for several years. Ressam admitted to planning a large bomb attack in the Outremont district, a Montreal Jewish neighborhood, and he was
later caught crossing into the United States from Vancouver to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport (Mili Part I 2005; Brodeur 2010, 199). Other radicalized North African individuals to emerge from the Muslim diaspora include Egyptian-Canadian Essam Marzouk and Tunisian-Canadians Abderraouf Jdey and Faker Boussora, both of whom remain wanted by the FBI (Mili Part II 2005).

There are numerous cases of radicalization, violence, and terrorism emerging from the Arab and Muslim diaspora communities in Canada since 9/11. Some of these cases include:

- In early 2002, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Kuwaiti-Canadian who immigrated in 1994, was arrested in Oman for conducting surveillance for plots to bomb embassies in Singapore and the Philippines and was sentenced to life in prison after pleading guilty to terrorism charges in January 2008 (Shephard 2008).

- In 2002, Mohamed Harkat, an Algerian refugee claimant to Canada, was arrested, held on a security certificate, and now faces deportation for his association with Abu Zubaydah and other members of al-Qaeda and charges that he was sent to Canada to plan or fund terrorism (Freeze December 2010).

- In May 2002, Mustapha Muhammad Krer, a Libyan-Canadian who lived in Montreal from 1989, was arrested on terrorism charges upon his return to Libya for his role as a former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in Canada (MacLeod 2008).

- In 2003, Hassan Farhat, an Iraqi Kurd and landed Canadian immigrant who founded the Salaheddin Islamic Centre in Scarborough, was captured in northern Iraq and accused by CSIS of commanding a guerilla unit that
included suicide bombers as a member of Ansar al Islam (MacLeod 2008; Mili Part II 2005).

- In July 2003, Abdul Rahman Jabarah, brother of Mohammed Jabarah and a former Carleton University student, was killed in a firefight with Saudi Arabian authorities as part of a group wanted for a series of truck bombings that killed 34 people in Riyadh (MacLeod 2008).

- In October 2003, Ahmed Said Khadr, an Egyptian-Canadian labeled the highest-ranking Canadian member of al-Qaeda, was killed in a shootout in Waziristan (Mili Part II 2005).

- In December 2003, Mohammed Abdullah Warsame, a Somali-Canadian, was arrested after crossing into the United States and ultimately pleaded guilty in 2009 to providing material support to al-Qaeda at two terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was deported back to Canada in 2010 (Mili Part II 2005; Morrow 2010, A11).

- In March 2004, Mohammad Momin Khawaja, a Canadian born to Pakistani immigrants, was arrested and became the first man charged under the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act for building remote-control detonators for the UK fertilizer bomb plot as well as financing and facilitating terrorism, for which he ultimately received a life sentence (CBC News 2009; Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 25; Matas and Freeze 2010).

- In April 2004, Sleiman Elmerhebi, a Lebanese-Canadian, claimed to be part of the Sheikh Ahmed Yassin Brigades and firebombed a Jewish school in Montreal, later pleading guilty to arson and receiving a sentence of 40 months in prison (CBC News 2005).

- In October 2004, Rudwan Khalil Abubaker, a Canadian refugee from Eritrea born in Sudan who worked as an actor and model in Vancouver, was killed
by Russian security forces after going to Chechnya for jihad (Mili Part II 2005; MacLeod 2008).

- In 2005, Kassem Daher, a Lebanese-Canadian, was indicted in the US for running a terrorist support network from Edmonton and using a Muslim charity to cover his alleged activities as a terrorist fundraiser, arms buyer and recruiter (MacLeod 2008).

- In 2006, the Toronto 18, composed of first and second generation Canadian immigrants from Pakistan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Jordan, Fiji, Somalia, Trinidad and Tobago, Iraq, and Jamaica, have faced a variety of terrorism charges connected to the primary plot to detonate truck bombs outside the Toronto Stock Exchange, the offices of CSIS, and Canadian Forces Base Trenton to shock Parliament into pulling Canada’s soldiers from Afghanistan (Freeze January 2010; Friscolanti 2010; Teotonio 2010).

- In early 2007, the three Lost Boys from the University of Manitoba – Ferid Imam, a Canadian immigrant from East Africa; Miawand Yar, a Canadian immigrant from Pakistan; and Muhammad al-Farekh, an American from Texas – disappeared, boarded a plane to Pakistan, and Imam has just been charged with conducting terrorist training there (McArthur et al. 2010; Freeze 2011).

- In September 2007, Moroccan-born Said Namouh, who came to Canada in 2003, was arrested for planning a car bomb attack in Vienna and editing propaganda videos for al-Qaeda, and he was later found guilty of four terrorism-related charges and sentenced to life in prison in 2010 (MacLeod 2008; Terry 2011).

- In 2008, Hassan Naim Diab, a Lebanese-Canadian university professor at the University of Ottawa and Carleton University, was arrested in Canada
by the RCMP at the request of French authorities who accused him of the 1980 bombing of a Paris synagogue that killed four people (Terry 2011).

- In 2009, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian immigration consultant primarily based in Chicago, was charged with facilitating David Headley’s trip to India, which laid the groundwork for the Mumbai attacks that killed over 160 people (Freeze and Curry 2010).

- In August 2010, Hiva Alizadeh, a Sunni Iranian who moved to Canada nine years prior, was charged with conspiring to detonate bombs in Canada and raise funds for IED attacks on Canadians in Afghanistan. The RCMP seized 50 circuit boards during the arrest of Alizadeh, Misbahuddin Ahmed, Khurram Syed Sher, and others in Ottawa (McArthur et al. 2010; CBC News September 2010; Seymour 2010).

- In 2010, Matin Abdul Stanikzy, an Afghani who arrived in Canada in November 2009, was charged with attempting to possess explosive substances to detonate an IED in order to kill 30 to 100 people at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa (Chase 2011).

- In 2011, Iraqi-Canadian Sayfilden Tahir Sharif (also Faruk Khalil Muhammad Isa) of Edmonton was accused by the FBI of organizing a pipeline of Tunisian suicide bombers to go to Iraq and carry out truck bomb attacks. He is alleged to have coached suicide terrorists and notified their relatives of successful attacks, as well as counseling his own sister to become a suicide bomber (Freeze and McArthur 2011).

Assessments of radicalization and terrorism in Canada have grown increasingly grim. In 2006, the US State Department concluded that terrorists have “capitalized on liberal Canadian immigration and asylum policies to enjoy safe haven, raise funds, arrange logistical support, and plan terrorist attacks” (Bell...
and Humphreys 2006). In November 2007, the Chairman of Lloyd’s of London stated that “Canada’s risk profile has changed in recent years and while no stranger to terrorism, intelligence suggests that its role is shifting from a hub for fundraising and planning attacks outside the nation – for example in the U.S. – to a credible target in its own right” (Archambault 2010, 101). In 2008, a report by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police stated that “numerous quantitative and qualitative measures indicate that radicalization in Canada is more entrenched than current investigations show” (CACP 2008, 2).

Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism remains the first security priority of intelligence agencies, and Canada has been identified repeatedly in al-Qaeda propaganda as a legitimate target because of its role in Afghanistan (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 20-1). In May 2010, Richard Fadden, head of CSIS, stated publicly that it is tracking more than 200 people linked to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, and he expressed concern over radicalized youths, whose families may have been in Canada for several generations but who have become disenchanted with Canadian society (Reuters 2010). The last decade has seen a changing of the guard in terms of radicalization and terrorism from the Arab and Muslim diasporas in Canada, from immigrants and refugees who brought their conflicts to Canada, to a new generation of Canadian-born radicals representing second or third generations thought to have been integrated (Bell and Humphreys 2006; Reuters 2010). Even the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 noted that homegrown terrorism “represents an increasing threat to Canada” (Vol. One 2010, 31). Some have suggested radicalization of second-generation Muslims is attributable to extremist imams who spread jihadist doctrine and serve as recruiters from mosques active in promoting radicalization, such as the Assuna Mosque in Montreal (Mili Part II 2005). Distinguished scholar Martin Rudner has noted
that terrorist recruitment actively occurs in Canadian communities, and that terrorist elements here have coerced and manipulated local homeland communities to conform and lend support to the militant jihadist agenda and foment domestic radicalization (2010, 116 and 123).

The Somali community represents one element within the Muslim diaspora that has begun to produce more radicals and individuals of concern, both in Canada and the United States. The organization charged with radicalizing members of this community is the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabab, which Canada designated a terrorist organization in March 2010. Minister for Public Safety Vic Toews stated “There is a great deal of concern in the community over the radical elements,” and he indicated authorities have assembled sufficient evidence that the group is active in Canada (Freeze March 2010). In October 2010, RCMP Commissioner Bill Elliott stated Islamic radicalization of Canada’s Somali community is becoming a national security concern (MacLeod 2010). In recent years, the United States has seen large waves of dozens of ethnic Somalis recruited in the United States by al-Shabab for terrorism, two of whom went on to become the first Americans to have carried out suicide attacks (Jenkins 2010, 16; Bergen and Hoffman 2010, 3 and 34-5). In late 2009, half a dozen young ethnic Somalis vanished from Toronto in a similar pattern (MacLeod 2010). One of these men, Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim, has already been eulogized by al-Shabab for dying in fighting in Somalia (Bell May 2010).

Sikh extremists provided the most notorious example of a diaspora community producing radicalization and terrorist violence in Canada. The twin bombs that originated in Vancouver aimed at Air India flights killed 331 people, of which 278 were either Canadian citizens or residents (Bolan 2005, 69). This attack was the most lethal terrorist incident prior to 9/11. The Air
India bombings in 1985 demonstrated how easily any country can become enmeshed in local conflicts fought in distant places, and they offer a cautionary tale about the importation of a homeland conflict to Canada, which proved difficult to prevent or to resolve in the courts after the fact (Hoffman 2010, 58; Granatstein 2008, 83).

The Sikh diaspora community in Canada has a long history. Sikhs first came to Canada in 1897, and many settled within farming and logging communities in British Columbia (Bolan 2005, 33). The Canadian Sikh population grew slowly until an October 1967 policy change was made that allowed visitors to apply for immigration status while in Canada, after which tens of thousands of Sikhs came to live in British Columbia by the 1980s (Bolan 2005, 36). Sikhs also emigrated to the United States, the UK, Germany, Holland, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia, but Canada boasted the largest Sikh diaspora in the world (Bolan 2005, 35; Commission Vol. One 2010, 103). Today, the Canadian Sikh diaspora is approximately 300,000 strong. The Sikh diaspora has long played an integral role in the politics of the Punjab and India more broadly, especially in terms of mobilizing funds (Razavy 2006, 80-1). Sikhs played a role in Ghadar movement that sought to end the British occupation of India, creating a powerful dynamic between the diaspora and the homeland. Mark Juergensmeyer describes a Ghadar syndrome – a militant nationalist movement [that] is created abroad by expatriates, for whom the movement is also an outlet for their economic and social frustrations and a vehicle for their ethnic identities (Razavy 2006, 81). Beginning in the 1970s, militant elements of the Sikh diaspora, especially those in British Columbia, channeled their collective identity into efforts to create an independent Khalistan homeland (“Land of the Pure”), imbued with the principles of the Sikh faith but not exclusively for Sikhs (Bolan 2005, 35; Change Institute February 2008, 31).
Over time, this political goal grew into religious nationalism, and ultimately a religious crusade (Hoffman 2010, 32).

The Sikh religion extols non-violence and condemns the taking of a human life (Hoffman 2010, 35). As with many faiths, however, there is a long history of militancy and violence behind the establishment of the Sikh religion. Sikhism is an offshoot of a Hindu reform movement founded in the Punjab over 400 years ago, which places a strong emphasis on prominent religious symbols and personal identification with the Golden Temple at Amritsar and sacred scriptures (Hoffman 2010, 33). Militancy is not a new phenomenon amongst Sikhs, who reciprocated violence against Mughal oppressors and developed a belief in the right to defend their faith through the use of arms following the martyrdom of the fifth guru, Arjan, in 1606 (Razavy 2006, 79). Martyrdom then became a central concept to the Sikh faith (Hoffman 2010, 36). The concept of religious purity was also added to the faith through the introduction of the order of the Khalsa. In 1699, the last guru Gobind Singh began the tradition of baptizing Sikhs and introduced the physical symbols of the Sikh soldier-saint – the kara (steel bracelet), kirpan (dagger), kaesh (long hair and beard), kangha (comb), and kachaira (undergarment) (Bolan 2005, 34; Razavy 2006, 79). Baptized Sikhs represent a minority within the Sikh faith. In the 1970s and 1980s, some Sikhs came to see themselves as martyrs fighting to preserve their religious community, and they embarked on a campaign to cleanse the Punjab of “foreign influences” by indiscriminately killing Hindus and escalating their violence thereafter (Hoffman 2010, 33 and 36). Much of this violence was driven by and spread amongst elements of the Sikh diaspora, which became further radicalized and called for dharam yudh (holy war) following the bloody end to the standoff at the Sikh Golden Temple of Amritsar in June 1984 (Razavy 2006, 80; Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 45).
Two groups stoked the majority of the violence in Canada that would later erupt into the Air India bombings and subsequent attacks – the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) and the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI). The ISYF, an international branch of the All India Sikh Students’ Federation, is a historically violent organization that had been proscribed in India because of its killings of Sikhs and Hindus (Commission Vol. One 2010, 130). Numerous sources link the ISYF with murders, bombings, and abductions, and a report by the Department of the Solicitor General of Canada stated, “The ISYF collaborates and/or associates with a number of Sikh terrorist organizations, notably Babbar Khalsa (BK), the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) and the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF)” (Razavy 2006, 84). The group grew to over four thousand members, and it has also been associated with Islamist terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET) (Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 59; Razavy 2006, 85). The ISYF has its largest followings in the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and the United States (Razavy 2006, 83).

The Babbar Khalsa (BK), Tigers of the True Faith, was founded in 1978, and its overseas component Babbar Khalsa International was co-founded by Talwinder Singh Parmar, a Sikh immigrant to Canada who became baptized in British Columbia (Bolan 2005, 31). Parmar was directly implicated in the Air India bombings, but he died in India before being brought to trial. The BK and BKI continue to operate as powerful, militant Sikh groups that vow to avenge the deaths of Sikhs and offer no compromise on their goal to establish a fundamentalist, independent Sikh state (Razavy 2006, 86). In addition to money raised through Sikh gurdwaras, the BK raised funds by attaining charitable status with the Canadian government, becoming a registered, not-for-profit organization in British Columbia after its charitable status was revoked in 1996 (Razavy 2006, 87-8). The BK split over Parmar’s controversial
tactics, with a minority faction run by Ajaib Singh Bagri that still venerates him (Razavy 2006, 87). Canada did not formally ban the ISYF, BK, and BKI as terrorist organizations until June 2003, eighteen years after the Air India bombings (Bolan 2005, 3).

The RCMP first became aware of Sikh extremism amongst the diaspora in late 1974 when Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, the founder of the Khalistan movement, created “Khalistan Consulates” in Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 258-9; Wark 2010, 158). The RCMP opened investigations into the threat of Sikh radicalism in 1981, with major investigations in British Columbia, Toronto, and Windsor (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 258). Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also expressed concerns about Canada becoming a base for Sikh terrorism to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau at a Commonwealth meeting in Nairobi in 1981 (Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 26).

From 1981 through 1984, Sikh radical activities and violence grew, including:

- March 18, 1982: Kuldip Singh Samra opened fire in an Osgoode Hall courtroom in Toronto killing two men after losing his bid to overturn an election at a local Sikh temple;
- May 8, 1982: The Government of India High Commissioner to Canada was pelted with eggs by Sikhs at the Vancouver Airport;
- October 16, 1982: 500 protesters marched on the Indian Consulate in Vancouver;
- November 14, 1982: Metro Toronto Police Constable Christopher Fernandes was shot at a Sikh demonstration outside the Indian Consulate in Toronto; and
- July 18, 1984: The acting Indian High Commissioner was assaulted by five Sikhs while visiting Winnipeg (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 259).

On June 27, 1984, the RCMP granted authority for the most intensive level of investigation, level 4, into Sikh extremism (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 262). Following the assault on Amritsar, Parmar was released from prison in Germany and returned to Canada on July 21st, where he was greeted at the airport by frenzied supporters who held up swords for him to walk under while they called for Indira Gandhi’s death (Bolan 2005, 45). Sikhs in Toronto “disclosed their intention to directly support terrorist action targeted against the Government of India,” and radical BK members called for Sikhs to “unite, fight and kill” and planned to “kill 50,000 Hindus” (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 124 and 262; Bolan 2005, 46). In Vancouver, 20,000 Sikhs protested outside the Indian Consulate, and two men stormed the Consulate in an attempt to hold the Consul-General of India hostage (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 277; Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 54). Other violent demonstrations were held regularly, and Indian missions and officials were attacked and physically assaulted, along with the police officers protecting them (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 126). Some Canadian Sikhs even began wearing t-shirts emblazoned with the word “Terrorist” (Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 60). Tensions were so high that on August 16, 1984 External Affairs Minister Jean Chretien issued an apology to the Indian government for threats being made to its diplomats in Canada (Bolan 2005, 46-7).

Between the summer of 1984 and the bombing on June 23, 1985, the RCMP, CSIS, Department of External Affairs, Transport Canada, and local police had amassed a great deal of additional information about Sikh extremism and threats to Air India, including:
• In November 1984, a plot to bomb Air India planes was hatched by Sikh extremists;

• In the fall of 1984, BK member Ajaib Singh Bagri was allegedly nominated to a committee to plan the hijacking of an Air India plane;

• In February 1985, moderate lawyer Ujjal Dosanjh was beaten with a pipe and nearly killed;

• In March 1985, an ISYF member was arrested at the Vancouver airport with part of an Uzi;

• On June 1, 1985, Air India warned of the likelihood of sabotage attempts against Air India planes by Sikh extremists using time-delayed devices, which could be placed in registered baggage and special vigilance was warranted on items like transistor radios;

• In early June 1985, Parmar and Reyat conducted explosive experiments near Duncan;

• On June 12, 1985, a prominent Sikh extremist stated that something would happen “in two weeks” to make up for the lack of attacks on Indian targets at an ISYF meeting; and

• In June 1985, the RCMP received “highly classified” intelligence that led to the conclusion that special security precautions for all Air India flights to and from Canada were necessary (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 96 and 121-2).

The bombings went ahead even though 70 threat assessments had been circulated about Sikh extremism, which had been reclassified as the number one threat within CSIS (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 123 and 272; Wark 2010, 159). More than a dozen of these threat assessments focused on Air India,
which was the subject of more threats than any other airline at that time (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 123). This seems especially remarkable given that there was only one Air India flight a week leaving Canada (Bolan 2005, 48). The success of the bombing despite all of the surveillance, intelligence, and overwhelming evidence of radicalization within the Sikh diaspora and the particularized threat to Air India remains a shock to this day. This is all the more galling since the government knew the identity of the extremists likely to be involved in such an attack (Commission Vol. One 2010, 103). Given all of this, the Major Commission stated “Indeed it is impossible to draw any conclusion other than that, almost without exception, the agencies and institutions did not take the threat seriously” (Commission Vol. One 2010, 83).

A failure to appreciate the continuing threat of Sikh extremism hampered attempts to bring the perpetrators to justice. The only person ever held to account for the Air India bombings was the bombmaker Inderjit Singh Reyat, who was convicted for the Narita airport bombing and pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the bombing of Flight 182. He was later convicted of perjury in a subsequent trial, for which he was recently sentenced to nine years (Bains 2010). Of the three individuals who were to be the key witnesses at the Air India trial, one was murdered before the trial began, one feigned memory loss, and one was forced to enter the Witness Protection Program two years earlier than planned (Commission Vol. One 2010, 125).

Sikh extremists carried out many other attacks, including some south of the Canadian border. From June 1984 to May 1986, Sikh radicals committed over a dozen attacks across six U.S. states, including several murders and bombings. On June 17, 1984, Sikh terrorists in Seattle, Washington bombed the Vedanta Society, an Indian cultural organization. Three days later, Sikhs were implicated in the bombing of the Vedanta Society in Kansas City, Missouri.
On August 1, 1984, Sikh extremists kidnapped and murdered a prominent Indian doctor in Missouri, and another Indian official and his wife were shot in Tacoma, Washington on the same day. A more sinister plot reportedly began in November 1984, in which four Sikh militants turned up for mercenary training in Dolomite, Alabama. According to testimony, they wanted to be trained in assassination, urban combat techniques, explosives, and chemical warfare, and the training director claimed they had expressed an interest in contaminating water supplies, creating mass panic in Indian movie houses, destroying nuclear power plants, and assassinating Indian government officials (Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 78-9). By May 1985, the US plotters had been discovered after shifting their main target from Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to an Indian Minister of State convalescing in New Orleans (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 127). Vancouver, Toronto, and Windsor Sikh radicals were involved in the plot. Other reported Canadian incidents of radical violence include the October 1984 beating of Punjabi poet Gurcharan Rampuri and an assault on Surrey community activist Charan Gill (Bolan 2005, 49).

Sikh radicalism continued well after the Air India bombings. In May 1986, the RCMP and FBI investigated a BK plot out of Montreal to blow up a loaded Air India Boeing 747 flying out of New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport, in order to force Air India out of North America (Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 182; Brodeur 2010, 190 and 206). Also in May 1986, Malkiat Singh Sidhu, an Indian cabinet minister, was shot and nearly assassinated on Vancouver Island (Commission Vol. Two 2010, 28). In August 1988, controversial journalist and founder of the *Indo-Canadian Times*, Tara Singh Hayer, was nearly killed and left bound to a wheelchair. It was the first time a Canadian journalist had been shot within the country (Bolan 2005, 99). He was later assassinated in his Surrey home in November 1998 (Leman-Langlois and Brodeur 2005, 128).
Much of the internationally-aimed violence from the Canadian Sikh diaspora diminished following the end of the Sikh insurgency in India in 1994. However, many of the groups and organizations that promote Sikh autonomy remain active, and they have retained their militancy (Razavy 2006, 89; Archambault 2010, 84). These violent groups and individuals turned their focus to fights over control of Canadian Sikh temples, or gurdwaras, which circulate and control large sums of money. The build up to the Air India bombings was preceded by leaders of the BKI and ISYF engaging in public campaigns of fiery rhetoric and communal intimidation to radicalize gurdwaras and take them over, including temples in Toronto, Mississauga, Markham, and Vancouver in 1984 (Commission Vol. One 2010, 85; Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 61). As fundamentalists lost control of some temples, they broke away to form their own gurdwaras. Battles for control sometimes turned bloody, as in the 1994 shooting of moderate Bikar Singh Dhillon during a takeover challenge to the ISYF for the largest and most lucrative gurdwara – the Ross Street temple in Vancouver (Bolan 2005, 103). Moderate parties wrested control of many of the highly influential temples in September 1996, though violence surged again in 1998 following a fundamentalist edict regarding the removal of temple furniture, a Western innovation to 400-year-old communal practices (Razavy 2006, 90; Jiwa and Hauka 2006, 247; Bolan 2005, 33). These types of proxy battles over money and control continue to this day. In April 2010, two Brampton temples saw radical violence, including the stabbing of a controversial speaker and attacks with a hatchet, tire iron, and machete on four worshippers (Armstrong April 21, 2010, A1).

Continued radicalization of small portions of the Sikh diaspora in Canada has also remained on public display. In October 2007, Air India mastermind and BKI founder Parmar was praised as a martyr at a Surrey memorial ser-
vice, and that year’s earlier Vaisakhi parade, which celebrates the birth of Sikh religion, included a float featuring photos portraying Parmar and other assassins as martyrs (Bolan 2007; Armstrong April 20, 2010, S1). The Surrey Vaisakhi parade has grown increasingly controversial. In 2010, it included another float celebrating Sikh terrorist group leaders as martyrs, and parade organizers made veiled threats against the safety of BC MLA Dave Hayer and Liberal MP Ujjal Dosanjh (Hume 2010).

Mr. Dosanjh has faced continued threats and become an outspoken critic of radicalization, extremism, and violence within the Sikh diaspora community. The former BC Premier and Liberal Cabinet Minister has repeatedly warned that Sikh extremism is on the rise in Canada, just as he did prior to the Air India bombings in 1985 (Armstrong April 21, 2010, A1). He is concerned that turning a blind eye to the “glorification of violence” will indoctrinate young Canadians with a message of hate and have a grave impact on the fabric of society (Hume 2010).

Mr. Dosanjh has stated that Canadian multiculturalism has been completely distorted and allowed extremism to take root in Sikh and other ethnic communities, and that Canada has failed to instill its own values on new immigrants (Armstrong April 21, 2010, A1). Radicalization within the Canadian Sikh community, including intimidation, persecution, and assaults, has been largely ignored, perceived as an internal problem within a minority community (Bolan 2005, 102).

There have been other recent echoes of the radicalization that preceded the Air India tragedy. A recent attempt has been made to revive the BK and BKI in India, as demonstrated by the May 22, 2005 bombing of a Delhi movie theater by BK operatives. Just as Indira Gandhi warned Trudeau in
1981, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed concern in 2009 over growing support by Canadian Sikhs for militants in the Punjab to Prime Minister Harper (Armstrong April 21, 2010, A1). Just as before the Air India bombings, Canadian Sikh separatist groups are reportedly “one of the two major areas” in which CSIS manpower is deployed (Razavy 2006, 80).

5.0 COUNTERRADICALIZATION POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

For years, security experts have decried the lack of a national counterradicalization strategy in Canada, as well as the absence of public engagement and education programs that highlight symptoms of radicalization (MacLeod 2008). The United States also does not have a domestic counterradicalization strategy, nor is there a federal government agency specifically charged with identifying radicalization and interdicting terrorist recruitment (Rabasa et al. 2010, 190; Bergen and Hoffman 2010, 29). This is remarkable given that there are reportedly 3,984 federal, state, and local organizations working on domestic counterterrorism in the United States (Priest and Arkin 2010). There have been episodic American outreach efforts to Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities to deter and prevent radicalization, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s “E-Team” activities in eight metropolitan areas (Nelson and Bodurian 2010, 8-9). These activities, however, do not constitute a national level program that is equal to the growing challenge of diaspora community radicalization. In contrast, Europe has developed counterradicalization strategies at the international, national, and municipal levels, as well as direct and indirect counterradicalization programs. The main emphasis of European programs has been to prevent at-risk individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who are not irreconcilable (Rabasa et al. 2010, 34 and 38).
Transatlantic dialogue about radicalization has identified several factors that may promote it, including large youth bulges during periods of high unemployment, poverty, and radicalized educational institutions and NGOs (CSIS 2004). The 2005 European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy suggested the following recruitment and radicalization prevention priorities: development of common approaches to spot and tackle problem behavior; addressing incitement and recruitment in key environments; development of a media strategy; promotion of good governance; development of intercultural dialogue; development of a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues; and continued research (Council 2005, 9). There is not a European consensus on the best approach to counterradicalization. Individual European governments have used four broad strategies to counteract radicalization: 1) reforming asylum law, police and intelligence cooperation, and judicial coordination; 2) improving social integration; 3) combating ghettoization; and 4) blocking entry to or expelling radical imams, conducting surveillance, criminalizing incitement, and encouraging the growth of grassroots Islamic groups (Niblett 2006; Archik, Rollins, and Woehrel 2005, 5). The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have both developed clear national counterradicalization strategies supported by cooperative, broad-based programs delivered through a range of agencies and partners (Change Institute July 2008, 35).

The overarching UK counterterrorism strategy is known as CONTEST, and counterradicalization is at the heart of its PREVENT pillar (CACP 2008, 3). In the March 2009 iteration, referred to as CONTEST-2, even greater emphasis has been placed on a more proactive approach in preventing radicalization (Rabasa et al. 2010, 122). PREVENT core objectives include undermining extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices; disrupting promoters of violent extremism; supporting vulnerable individuals; building community re-
silence; addressing genuine grievances; developing intelligence, analysis and research capabilities; and providing strategic communications (CACP 2008, 8). PREVENT represents a gold standard in terms of its comprehensiveness and sophistication (Rabasa et al. 2010, 137).

A series of community consultations led by the Department for Communities and Local Government following the 2005 London bombings developed the original ideas behind PREVENT (Change Institute July 2008, 36 and 106-9). Policing plays a special role in PREVENT, but it is not the dominant force behind the strategy. The emphasis on broad community involvement is premised on the belief that communities defeat terrorism, not the police (CACP 2008, 9). The PREVENT strand seeks to engage both young people and women, and it even includes activities geared towards improving the training of imams and addressing community security and Islamophobia. The principal weakness of the UK approach is that it focuses exclusively on Muslim extremism, and this has fed into Muslim perceptions of being targeted by counterterrorism measures (CACP 2008, 12; Rabasa et al. 2010, 136). Critics of PREVENT claim it will have limited impact without an equivalent and visible policy push on economic and social integration of diaspora communities (Change Institute July 2008, 115).

Still, PREVENT should be lauded in terms of its scope and unity of effort. PREVENT programs involve a range of agencies and service providers, from educational bodies and local government to community organizations, NGOs, and law enforcement (CACP 2008, 3). These efforts reach into local communities to promote grassroots projects. Police are a primary conduit for delivering local counterradicalization programs. The Police Reform Act of 2002 effectively legislated a neighborhood policing approach across the UK, and each of the UK’s forty three Chief Constables has a statutory obligation to dem-
onstrate engagement with communities and to develop and deliver PREVENT programming in his jurisdiction (CACP 2008, 3 and 9). Beyond PREVENT, the UK has made other innovative steps in dealing with radicalization, and it has even used student groups and political advocacy for counterradicalization. For example, the British government gave a platform to the Muslim Public Affairs Committee in 2006 to denounce the promotion of violence over the negative depictions of the Prophet Mohammed in European newspapers (Venhaus 2010, 14). Britain even has its own indigenous counterradicalization think tank. The UK’s Quilliam Foundation, founded by former Islamists, works with British law enforcement, parents, teachers, and community leaders to debunk radical propaganda (Nelson and Bodurian 2010, 7-8). The UK government has grown more concerned with the role of radical narratives and more selective in its choice of partners. British authorities have recently withdrawn their support from Islamist-dominated organizations, such as the Muslim Council of Britain, and they have begun to work with organizations combating Islamist ideology (Rabasa et al. 2010, 125). Likewise, British Prime Minister David Cameron has indicated his government would take additional measures to stop Muslim radicalization. These include barring “preachers of hate” from visiting to speak, cutting off government funds to adversarial organizations, and stopping hostile groups from reaching people in publicly-funded universities and prisons (Burns 2011).

Following the murder of Theo van Gough, the Netherlands developed a broad-based national counterradicalization program led by the Ministry of Justice, which sought to bind the individual to the state, promoted empowerment, and targeted radical elements in society for deradicalization. In 2006, AIVD widened the preventive national approach to include local government, civil society, and moderate religious figures (Change Institute July 2008, 38).
Some of the Dutch preventative measures have been aimed outward as well. For example, the Dutch immigration process has included a values testing system to weed out the small percentage of applicants who may not be able to adjust to Western society or could present future security risks (Khan 2007). Dutch national-level activities have coalesced into a formal national counterradicalization strategy.

In 2008, the Dutch adopted the *Action Plan on Polarization and Radicalization 2007-2011*, aimed at preventing radicalization by educating and employing at-risk individuals, pointing out radical elements in society, and excluding and limiting the influence of individuals who have violated community standards (Change Institute July 2008, 38-9). The national action plan focused on local counterradicalization efforts to enhance social cohesion and makes use of local youth workers, truancy officers, the police, and others to target Moroccan school dropouts, who are seen as the group most vulnerable to radicalization (Rabasa et al. 2010, 141-142). The Dutch developed a wide range of counterradicalization activities, such as: dialogue between religions and broader society; radicalization research programs; citizenship education; youth social work intervention and counseling; resilience training; and educational material on extremism (Change Institute July 2008, 39-40). The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sciences also created a Radicalization Office to train teachers, social workers, and students on the subject (Change Institute July 2008, 38).

Some of the Dutch counterradicalization programs have been quite targeted. One set of local preventive programs focused on the sub-municipality of Slotervaart in Amsterdam, considered a hotbed of potential radicalism amongst Moroccan and Turkish diaspora elements. These counterradicalization efforts covered awareness, resilience, and an alert and response network
Similarly, a youth intervention education program, Academia Islamica, attempted to empower key figures in the community, organize a series of debates, and personally coach radicalized youngsters (Change Institute July 2008, 83-4). Some of these programs are not without controversy. For example, a Department of Public Order, Safety, and Security program – Information House – which provided a case-level municipal warning system linking crime prevention networks, community organizations, local government offices, and telephone hotlines to monitor and rehabilitate radical Islamists, was ultimately closed in 2009 over privacy concerns (Rabasa et al. 2010, 147-8). Other warning programs were developed, including the City of Rotterdam’s Information Switch Point Radicalization mechanism to detect radicalization indicators (Rabasa et al. 2010, 149).

Denmark followed a similar path to that of the Netherlands. In 2003 the Danish Security and Intelligence Service developed formal, regular dialogues with imams and ethnic minority associations in Denmark to encourage mutual understanding, emphasize violent radicals are a small minority, and clarify that members of Muslim diaspora communities are not part of the problem but part of the solution (Change Institute July 2008, 62-3). Over several years, community outreach and voluntary counterradicalization prompted the development of a national strategy to meet the growing threat. The Danish government’s 2009 counterradicalization strategy – A Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalization Among Young People – seeks to combat all forms of extremism, specifically targeting individuals before they break the law (Rabasa et al. 2010, 151-2). The accompanying counterradicalization programs have been smaller than those of the British and the Dutch. Under its strategy, the Danish Ministry of Refugee Immigration and Integration Affairs has partnered with the Danish Security and Intelligence
Service and municipal authorities to create a voluntary pilot deradicalization program, which encourages radicalized individuals to exit groups, mentors at-risk youth, and indirectly challenges radical ideas by promoting democratic values (Rabasa et al. 2010, 153-5).

Other European nations have not developed comprehensive national counterradicalization strategies, though a few do offer some innovative approaches to improve integration and information sharing. The Islam Forum Berlin represents a best practice from Germany. Set up in 2002 and incorporating a mix of ethnic and faith umbrella organizations, the Forum focuses on providing imams with practical knowledge about the political system, social security, health insurance, education, and vocational training in order to better support their communities, and it involves security officials and departments in coordination with the Berlin Commissioner for Integration and Migration and the Muslim Academy of Germany (Change Institute July 2008, 56). There are a couple of examples of indirect counterradicalization best practices within France. One is the Muslim Scouts of France, a secular, intercultural association open to all faiths, which was set up to address Algerian youth exclusion and grew to include 4,000 boys and girls (Change Institute July 2008, 52 and 67-8). Another is the Institute of Islamic Culture, created in 2006 to promote recognition of Islam, keep public order in the Goutte d’Or area of Paris, and encourage social cohesion through long-term community development (Change Institute July 2008, 73-4). Spanish integration efforts have been aimed at citizenship education and intercultural mediation. Set up in 2005, the Spanish School of Intercultural Citizenship improves integration by including intercultural and citizenship modules in labor integration courses, creating courses that foster newcomer development, and providing guidance to professional associations on diversity best practices (Change Institute July
2008, 92-3). The apolitical Spanish Association of Intercultural Mediators in Andalusia developed new methods of intercultural communication and intervention between the Spanish host society and its immigrants to promote successful coexistence (Change Institute July 2008, 100-1). Outside of Europe, even Saudi Arabia has implemented counterradicalization programs that provide the general public with information about Islamic extremism and offer social and athletic programs to keep young Saudis away from extremists (Rabasa et al. 2010, 57-8).

Stepping back, one can see the varied nature of European counterradicalization strategies, policies, and programs. Some best practices identified from European examples include: developing containment plans for potential backlashes in the aftermath of a terrorist attack; developing initiatives to provide grievance redress; empowering voices that challenge terrorist rhetoric; developing educational initiatives; identifying trustworthy interlocutors; and improving the identification of early indicators (Change Institute July 2008, 28). Many of these efforts have evolved to confront radical ideologies head on. Governments can do much to highlight voices critical of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, disseminate counter narratives, and publicize cases of people who have successfully left these groups so those on the inside realize withdrawal is an option (Jacobson 2010, 2; Change Institute February 2008, 6). European governments, however, have found it difficult to promote particular interpretations of Islam as part of their counterradicalization program, and they discovered they must select their religious and ethnic community partners with care to ensure they are working with authentic voices with grassroots support and who promote liberal democracy (Rabasa et al. 2010, xxi and 122).
Canada should develop a comprehensive national counterradicalization strategy based on lessons learned from the experiences of these other countries, but which reflects Canada’s unique reality and has broader applicability across a wider array of target communities (CACP 2008, 4). A broad counterradicalization strategy should stress integration and inclusion, and counterradicalization programs would do well to work across the wide spectrum of potential radicals while strengthening their connection to society, avoiding marginalization, and refining their communal identities (Change Institute July 2008, 42; Rabasa et al. 2010, 143). Simply promoting democratic and national values is likely to prove insufficient in warding off radicalization (Rabasa et al. 2010, xxi). The challenge posed by radicalization of diaspora communities involves both secular and religious bodies. Among immigrant populations, the first encounter with al-Qaeda’s doctrine often occurred in a mosque or Islamic community center, but actively fostering moderate religious education and activities there can provide a powerful alternative to radical views (Venhaus 2010, 14). When dealing with religious communities, counterradicalization policies should never fail to distinguish between the legitimate expression of faith and extremist ideologies (Neumann 2010, 2). Other steps can be taken to bolster counterradicalization efforts. For example, Martin Rudner has encouraged a review of Canada’s anti-hate laws to prosecute terrorist propaganda and incitement (Bolan 2007). Irrespective of the course Canada charts, it should appreciate the difficulty in measuring the efficacy of counterradicalization activities (CACP 2008, 13). Still, a failure to develop coherent counterradicalization policies and programs may leave the nation vulnerable to future violence.
6.0 DISENGAGEMENT AND DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS

Prisons represent another area of concern when dealing with the challenge of radicalization. They are “places of vulnerability” that provide conditions in which radical ideologies can flourish amongst identity seekers, protection seekers, and rebels (Neumann 2010, 2). Prisons have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period, and imprisoned radicals often regard incarceration as an opportunity to continue the struggle and support the wider campaign (Neumann 2010, 1 and 15).

Europeans governments have moved into prisons to monitor radicalization there. The European Union, UK, France, and the Netherlands have all produced leaflets or manuals with instructions on indicators of prison radicalization, including acts of open defiance and attempts to replace and marginalize the prison imam (Neumann 2010, 31-2). The Germans have developed exit programs for neo-Nazi and right-wing groups, but they have not established similar programs for Islamist terrorist or extremist organizations (Jacobson 2010, 23). Compared to overall population, Muslims are significantly over-represented in some Western prison populations, in France by a factor of 10, in Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK by a factor of 4, and in the US by a factor of 3 (Neumann 2010, 33).

Exceeding two million inmates, the United States has the world’s largest prison population, and almost all of its convicted terrorists are held in just three prisons (Cilluffo and Saathoff 2006, i; Neumann 2010, 18). The US Federal Bureau of Prisons has attempted to address Muslim radicalization in prisons by: examining religious service providers’ beliefs on violence, ties to foreign governments, and willingness to provide services for all faiths; re-
requiring endorsement from national religious organizations; implementing guidelines for approval of religious materials; and mandating constant supervision of inmate-led groups (Cilluffo and Saathoff 2006, 13-4; Lappin 2003). Federal civil service chaplains must meet the same employment requirements as a federal law enforcement officer (Vanyur 2006). The FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have also organized the Correctional Intelligence Initiative to improve intelligence collection and to detect, deter, and disrupt prison radicalization and recruitment, using local Joint Terrorism Task Forces to train correctional administrators, coordinate intelligence sharing, translate extremist materials, and communicate best practices (Van Duyn 2006; Vanyur 2006; Neumann 2010, 32-3). Despite these advanced measures taken at the federal level, much of the potential candidates for radicalization may be outside of their reach. After all, 93 percent of American inmates are in state and local prisons and jails (Cilluffo and Saathoff 2006, 1).

Nearly all of the European and North American efforts have been aimed at monitoring and preventing radicalization, not reversing it. Focusing only on preventing prison radicalization without active deradicalization programs merely contains the threat within the prison walls, and most countries lack the resources to incarcerate growing numbers of radicals indefinitely (Neumann 2010, 8; Rabasa et al. 2010, 37). Neither Canada nor the United States has a formal deradicalization program (Rabasa et al. 2010, 190). This is surprising given the number of terrorists and violent radicals imprisoned in the United States, and the comparatively short prison sentences for Canadian radicals. Most of the formal disengagement and deradicalization programs have been developed in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Nearly a dozen countries have carried out such programs (Neumann 2010, 47; Jacobson 2010, 4).
The general individual disengagement process typically begins with a trigger, frequently a traumatic event, which calls into question a person’s commitment to violence or the radical organization (Rabasa et al. 2010, 13). Following the trigger, a combination of push factors (such as intragroup disputes over ideology or disappointment with the terrorist lifestyle) and pull factors (potential benefits to ceasing violence) lead to a turning point, when an individual must determine whether to leave covertly, overtly, or publicly and reintegrate into mainstream society (Rabasa et al. 2010, 15-20; Jacobson 2010, 1; Neumann 2010, 48). All individual disengagement and deradicalization programs make use of these push and pull factors. The probability that an individual will disengage or deradicalize appears to be inversely related to the degree of commitment and involvement in the group or movement (Rabasa et al. 2010, xv). Individuals who leave radical organizations must withdraw from much of their social support structure, and terrorist cell members who maintain contact with friends and family outside the organization are more likely to withdraw than those whose social network is more limited (Rabasa et al. 2010, 159; Jacobson 2010, 16).

The primary focus of most deradicalization programs is on imprisoned individuals, and the primary objective of these programs is rehabilitation, in hopes of obtaining intelligence, discrediting the extremist ideology, and preventing future recidivism (Rabasa et al. 2010, 182). There is no one method or path to deradicalization, so comprehensive programs offer multiple reasons for radicals to abandon violence and their ideology (Rabasa et al. 2010, 184). Many deradicalization programs have an ideological component and a material component – incorporating theological dialogue with scholars as well as tangible benefits in the form of jobs, training, and other services to encourage cooperation (Rabasa et al. 2010, 7). Inducements also include more comforts
during incarceration, early release, amnesty, or financial assistance during and after imprisonment (Neumann 2010, 53).

The ideological dimension is an important element of deradicalization programs, though it can be problematic to address in Muslim and other religious radicals. It is difficult for violent Islamists to renounce their ideology, which they consider to be drawn from religious obligations (Rabasa et al. 2010, 4). However, it is critical to deal with radical doctrine. Many Al-Qaeda affiliated prisoners see it as their religious duty to propagate their faith and political ideology, through the Islamic concept of dawa (Neumann 2010, 16). Religious counseling can offer some hope though. Studies of deradicalized extremists have confirmed that many had little to no formal religious training, and several reintegration programs have successfully rehabilitated them by directly refuting radical religious interpretations with knowledgeable clerics and scholars (Rabasa et al. 2010, 30; Venhaus 2010, 12). Deradicalization is difficult to measure, since it is an internal process. There are likely to be “irreconcilables” who are difficult to identify and who refuse to renounce their beliefs or refrain from the use of violence (Rabasa et al. 2010, 7).

Deradicalization and disengagement programs have been aimed at both individual and collective levels, with varying degrees of success. Deradicalization at the collective level is much less common, relying on militant leaders to renounce their commitment to violence and use peer pressure to produce attitudinal and behavioral moderation amongst their fellow members (Rabasa et al. 2010, 160 and 170). Only Algeria, Libya, and Egypt have seen successful collective deradicalization processes occur via negotiations with host governments (Neumann 2010, 41; Rabasa et al. 2010, 82 and 86). In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Army stood down in 2000 after the country had descended into civil war, and the group’s military leaders convinced the imprisoned po-
political leadership to give up the fight (Neumann 2010, 42). In Libya, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group publicly renounced their efforts in a 417-page tome released in August 2009, which was followed by 214 ex-militants and supporters being released from prison (Rabasa et al. 2010, 86). In Egypt, two organizations went through collective deradicalization - al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (the Egyptian Islamic Group) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Announcing an end to fighting in 1997, the Egyptian Islamic Group’s jailed leaders wrote a series of books denouncing previous actions and recanting their ideology, toured prisons to speak with middle commanders and foot soldiers, and convinced nearly 15,000 radicals to abandon terrorism (Rabasa et al. 2010, 82-3; Neumann 2010, 42). The Egyptian government used al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya leaders as interlocutors to persuade Egyptian Islamic Jihad members to follow their own leader, Dr. Fadl, who renounced his radical ideology in *Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World* (Rabasa et al. 2010, 83). Dr. Fadl’s previous violent treatises were often used in justifying al-Qaeda tactics, and his reversal helped encourage al-Qaeda leadership defections, citing the group’s inaccurate interpretation of Islam in their decision process (Jacobson 2010, 5-8). Former terrorists and non-violent radicals can also act as credible interlocutors in individual deradicalization programs, like the one run in Indonesia from 2005 to 2007 (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 15; Neumann 2010, 51).

The Indonesian program is unique in its design and implementation. The ad hoc Indonesian model was run by a handful of senior police officers from the special counterterrorism unit, and it was funded largely by private donors (Rabasa et al. 2010, 94). Using former extremists, the Indonesian program concentrated on obtaining intelligence on the terrorist network in order to disrupt it, with rehabilitation being a lesser goal (Rabasa et al. 2010, 107 and 110). The Indonesian authorities did not implement any post-release moni-
toring. A lack of after-care has proven problematic in other deradicalization programs, including the unsuccessful one in Yemen. Running from 2002 to 2005, the Yemeni program sought assurances from 364 prisoners (nearly all were from the Yemeni diaspora and radicalized abroad) that they would refrain from violence within Yemen in exchange for their freedom, undergoing a brief religious dialogue process (Rabasa et al. 2010, 45 and 51; Neumann 2010, 51). The Yemeni program failed, because the government did not provide adequate post-release care and did not honor pledges of financial assistance (Rabasa et al. 2010, 53; Neumann 2010, 53). After-care monitoring and assistance have been crucial parts of the more successful programs.

The two most developed and best resourced deradicalization programs belong to Saudi Arabia and Singapore (Neumann 2010, 50). Saudi Arabia’s broader counterterrorism strategy is known as the Prevention, Rehabilitation, and After-Care approach, and its deradicalization program is the middle portion within it (Rabasa et al. 2010, 57). The Saudi government claims its deradicalization program has succeeded in rehabilitating 80 percent of over 3,000 targeted individuals and only 5 percent of 231 freed detainees have been rearrested (Rabasa et al. 2010, 33 and 75). Terrorists and extremists with blood on their hands are not eligible to participate in the Saudi Counseling Program (Jacobson 2010, 25; Rabasa et al. 2010, 64).

The Saudi Counseling Program involves a complex process of religious dialogue and instruction, psychological counseling, and extensive social support meant to convince radicals of the legitimacy and religious rectitude of the Saudi state (Rabasa et al. 2010, 58 and 62). The rehabilitation program is based on a presumption that individuals were abused and misled by radicals into straying from true Islam (Rabasa et al. 2010, 66). One part of the re-
habilitation program involves six-week courses led by two clerics and a social scientist with an exam given at the end (Rabasa et al. 2010, 73).

Fostering social responsibility among prisoners has become more important in the Saudi model over time (Neumann 2010, 51). Families play a central role. Prisoners are held at facilities closer to their families to foster interaction and incorporate them into the rehabilitation process, and the government provides alternative salaries, children’s schooling, housing assistance, and family health care to prevent further radicalization (Rabasa et al. 2010, 63 and 66; Jacobson 2010, 17; Neumann 2010, 53). Saudi authorities believed so strongly that spouses aid in rehabilitation that they helped find wives and paid for weddings of unmarried prisoners (Neumann 2010, 54). The Saudi program creates so many obligations and personal commitments on behalf of the former prisoners that it is exceedingly difficult to return to violence (Neumann 2010, 55). After release, rehabilitated former prisoners receive government stipends, cars, housing, and assistance in locating jobs (Rabasa et al. 2010, 66). American authorities in Iraq have sought to emulate the Saudis by establishing their own prison-based deradicalization program, and they reported early success with only 33 of 10,000 prisoners released committing further offenses (Rabasa et al. 2010, 33 and 45).

The most comprehensive of all disengagement and deradicalization programs, Singapore’s model is much smaller than the Saudi or Iraqi program, and only one of 40 freed former radicals has been detained again (Rabasa et al. 2010, 33 and 95). Launched in 2003, the program consists of the following interlocking components: psychological rehabilitation, religious rehabilitation, social rehabilitation, and community involvement and family support (Neumann 2010, 51; Rabasa et al. 2010, 96). The subject of Singapore’s rehabilitation programs are detainees and their families, and both are offered additional edu-
cation and professional training opportunities (Rabasa et al. 2010, 22 and 94). Singapore includes prisoners’ families in religious re-education and psychological counseling sessions, believing their families are radical too and should be reformed (Neumann 2010, 54). Post-release care also plays a large role in this model. After-care caseworkers provide counseling, financial assistance, training, and tuition, and they mentor detainees’ children, facilitate employment, assist with government paperwork, and provide post-release support to speed reintegration into society (Rabasa et al. 2010, 101).

The secular state of Singapore confronts a similar challenge to that of Western countries, and it has managed to include a strong theological dialogue component within its deradicalization program (Rabasa et al. 2010, 104). The Singapore deradicalization program uses *Moderation in Islam in the Context of the Muslim Community in Singapore*, a publication by the Pergas association of Islamic scholars, to refute jihadist arguments (Rabasa et al. 2010, 100). Clerics within the program must be both competent scholars of Islam as well as trained counselors, and detainees are regularly assessed by psychologists (Neumann 2010, 52; Rabasa et al. 2010, 97). Singapore has leveraged its theological deradicalization element to extend beyond the prison walls. The Religious Rehabilitation Group holds public dialogues, publishes moderate texts, and offers a website about its deradicalization program to encourage community involvement and counterradicalization. The British have also begun forging relationships with community groups to play active roles in implementing after-care probationary regimes and shaping former radicals’ social environments (Neumann 2010, 21).

The Saudi and Singaporean successes show prisons can offer opportunities for radicals to rethink their support for extremist causes, and they can play a positive role in tackling radicalization and terrorism in society as a
whole (Jacobson 2010, 1; Neumann 2010, 1). The key drivers and principles of deradicalization programs are: a mix of ideological re-education and vocational training; credible interlocutors; material inducements; transition back into mainstream society; and commitments and obligations towards family, community, and the state (Neumann 2010, 3; Rabasa et al. 2010, 36).

Like counterradicalization policies, deradicalization programs cannot simply be transplanted from abroad to North America, and Canadian and US deradicalization programs should reflect the social and cultural characteristics of the countries in which they are implemented (Rabasa et al. 2010, xxii; Neumann 2010, 49). Canadians and Americans may want to take note of the Saudi and Singaporean programs and consider involving families in any deradicalization and rehabilitation programs. A pilot deradicalization effort in the UK has also found success in educating and counseling detainees’ spouses, who often feel the greatest burden during their imprisonment (Jacobson 2010, 17-8). Continued care is another important element. To avoid the failures of other programs and to ensure continued disengagement from violence, North American deradicalization programs should continue to monitor former detainees and offer extensive support and counseling after their release (Rabasa et al. 2010, xv and xviii).

Given the variety of violent radicals active in North America, it would be a mistake to focus deradicalization efforts solely on Islamic extremism. Exit and rehabilitation programs here should be developed that cover radicals of any persuasion wishing to move away from violence (Change Institute February 2008, 145). A prison-based deradicalization program alone would likely not address the entire scope of the current problem. One of the challenges of rehabilitating radical members of diaspora communities is that prisoners may be released back into communities that are overwhelmingly sup-
portive of the cause that led to their arrest or conviction (Neumann 2010, 20-1). Consequently, any deradicalization program should be part of a larger counterradicalization strategy with complementary programs and community-based initiatives.

7.0 COUNTERTERRORISM AND COMMUNITY POLICING IN DIASPORA COMMUNITIES

Canadian counterterrorism efforts involve many entities including the RCMP, CSIS, Communications Security Establishment, Canada Border Services Agency, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Commission Vol. One 2010, 147). These agencies pursue a wide variety of missions, and the terrorist threat within Canada is also quite diverse. The multicultural character of Canadian society places particular demands on its security culture, especially in the current threat environment (Rudner 2010, 140). A lack of diversity within these establishments has made the counterterrorism mission more challenging. The near absence of ethnic minorities in CSIS and RCMP national security units makes it very difficult to perform undercover work and infiltrate diaspora terrorist networks (Brodeur 2010, 215). Both agencies may benefit from developing closer relations with diaspora communities, which can provide valuable insights, language skills, and cultural understanding to aid in the analysis of data and intelligence from their countries of origin (Riddell-Dixon 2008, 37). Some have pointed to the structures of these organizations as barriers to effective intelligence gathering and unity of effort. CSIS is highly centralized, whereas the RCMP is decentralized and dispersed, with RCMP divisions operating with some independence from headquarters (Brodeur 2010, 204). The Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 suggested that the RCMP is not properly structured to deal with terrorism investigations, and the RCMP may need to quit its contract po-
licensing duties to concentrate on investigating and supporting the prosecution of national security offences (Vol. One 2010, 217).

Cultural sensitivity and understanding are important in monitoring diaspora communities with radical elements. During the run-up to the Air India bombings, Canadian law enforcement agencies did not monitor Punjabi newspapers that could have clarified sources of tension, radicalization, and violence in the Sikh diaspora community (Bolan 2005, 99). A narrow focus on criminal investigations and blindness to continuing threats and radicalization can diminish community cooperation and turn sources into adversaries, as the RCMP demonstrated following the Air India bombings (Commission Vol. One 2010, 122). Good relationships between law enforcement and sources in or close to radical movements in diaspora communities are vital to acquiring actionable information (Strom et al. 2010, 19). As the Major Commission noted, it should have been clear from the outset that authorities would have to rely on drawing out information and piecing together the conspiracy from sources in the Sikh community, which called for patient and sensitive approaches (Vol. One 2010, 121). Heavy-handed tactics can provoke anger and erode the cooperation of the community, which is the most effective barrier to further radicalization (Jenkins 2010, viii). The RCMP is not the only national law enforcement agency to face this problem. Since 9/11, the FBI and Muslim and Arab diaspora leaders have worked to develop information-sharing relationships to act as a critical early-warning system against homegrown terrorism, which have come under strain with the infiltration of mosques by informants (Vitello and Semple 2009). The FBI is trying to repair these relationships. It has begun meeting Muslim and Arab leaders to hear their grievances regarding policing efforts (Vitello and Semple 2009).
It is important to recognize the role of law enforcement and public vigilance in stopping terrorist attacks, since one American study of 68 foiled plots since 1999 found that more than 80% of them were discovered by law enforcement or the general public (Beutel 2010, 7; Strom et al. 2010, 1). In that study, nearly 1 in 5 terrorist plots were foiled during investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes (Strom et al. 2010, 1). This suggests that intelligence and national security agencies are not the only significant players in stopping terrorism and radicalization. A radicalization prevention strategy should be rooted in the basic principles of policing, with an emphasis on community policing (CACP 2008, 14; Beutel 2010, 6). Local authorities are best placed to detect radicalization and intervene early in the process (Rabasa et al. 2010, 38). Municipal and provincial police partners need to be engaged in radicalization prevention, since they have deep local knowledge of and insights into communities of interest (CACP 2008, 14). Law enforcement aimed at immigrant and newcomer communities has several dimensions. Community policing in diaspora communities must actively and consistently address community concerns, fears of crime, and suspicions of authorities (Jenkins 2010, ix).

One of the easiest ways to alleviate fears and develop support is through effective community liaison. There is a precedent for this within Canada. The Vancouver Police Department has previously operated an Indo-Canadian Liaison Team to gain the trust of the Sikh community through culturally sensitive community policing (Commission Vol. One 2010, 92). The British have also developed a similar, robust model. The Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) represents a best practice in radicalization prevention policing. In 2002, the London Metropolitan Police Special Branch created the MCU to establish partnerships with Muslim community leaders who were best positioned to counter
radical propaganda (Change Institute July 2008, 116). Staffed by experienced Muslim and non-Muslim police officers with substantive contacts and experience in community liaison, the MCU applied community policing principles to fight terrorism and uses a “targeted and focused community partnership model” to maintain credibility (Change Institute July 2008, 116-7). The British have taken action to make their law enforcement forces more representative of their communities. Following the London bombings, the Metropolitan Police recruited more minorities and now has approximately 300 Muslim officers (Change Institute July 2008, 120). British police also developed “Gold Groups,” which were networks of trusted faith and community leaders that could be assembled quickly to provide expert advice and to allay suspicions and anxieties following terrorism-related arrests or attacks (CACP 2008, 3). The British Association of Chief Police Officers offers a two-day counterterrorism tabletop exercise, Operation Nicole, that is designed to promote greater understanding of counterterrorism operations and community concerns related to arrests for terrorist offences (Change Institute July 2008, 111-2). The association also heads a National Community Tensions Team that monitors community tension issues across the UK (Change Institute July 2008, 116).

Community policing, of course, is not a panacea, and a perception of tacit support for radicalism amongst a broader diaspora community can provide the moral infrastructure for those promoting violence (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 36). After all, radicalization and terrorism do not need community support to flourish, only community silence (CACP 2008, 12). Diaspora community leaders have a special role to play in recognizing radicalization. They have their own intelligence systems and usually possess a great deal of knowledge about activities in their local areas (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 35). Radicalization can occur quickly and pre-radicalization indicators may
appear quite subtle to a cultural outsider like a police or intelligence officer (CACP 2008, 6). Early signs include aggressive conflict with religious authorities about the legitimacy of violence and an interest in extremist literature, and these signals should be shared with law enforcement to prevent further radicalization to violence (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 38). Other items of concern include pre-operational surveillance, paramilitary training, smuggling, and suspicious documents (Strom et al. 2010, 1). The local British Channel Project combines the efforts of local police and community partners to identify individual radicalization, referring authorities to persons who visit terrorist websites, promote violence, or display other types of alarming behavior (Rabasa et al. 2010, 126).

Friends and relatives are usually more likely to know when someone is radicalizing and heading toward violence or self-destruction than the authorities (Jenkins 2010, ix; Nelson and Bodurian 2010, 8). Radicals and terrorists sometimes share information about their activities and beliefs to gain status and credibility within their community (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 35). There is plenty of evidence illustrating the effectiveness of self-policing by diaspora communities. Worried families and fellow members of North American diaspora communities assisted in identifying or thwarting: the Portland Seven in 2001; the Lackawanna Six in 2002; the Toledo Three plot in 2006; the Winnipeg Three in 2007; the Pakistan Five and mass American Somali recruiters in 2009; and Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Mohamed Hamoud Alessa, Carlos Eduardo Almante, and Matin Abdul Stanikzy in 2010 (Jenkins 2010, 11; Beutel 2010, 6; McArthur et al. 2010 A14; Hoffman and Bergen 2010, 3; Leinwand and Dorell 2010; McKinley and Yardley 2010; Chiaramonte et al. 2010; Chase 2011). Citizen and community self-policing can avoid religious or political debates and ensure cultural sensitivity (Jenkins 2010, 11).
Another important role for diaspora communities is the development of credible counter narratives. The unclassified US National Intelligence Estimate from April 2006 stated, “The Muslim mainstream has emerged as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror and could help to facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology.” A liberal approach to radicalization depends on a strong and engaged civil society with independent voices setting out forceful counter-arguments against extremist ideas (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 13; Change Institute July 2008, 135). Counter narratives can strip radicals and terrorists of their glamour and mystique by citing their ideological and theological shortcomings and through satire (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 14). This counter-narrative function is being provided by several bodies in the UK. Launched after the 2005 London bombings, the Progressive British Muslims organization has sought to provide a voice for progressives unrepresented by existing Muslim groups (Rabasa et al. 2010, 129-30). The London-Based Quilliam Foundation also carries out research, training, and outreach to provide an alternative to Islamism and to develop a Muslim identity that is at home in the West (Rabasa et al. 2010, 131-2). Another source of counter narratives is from former radicals themselves. Radicals who have left their movement after negative experiences should be encouraged and aided by authorities to tell their stories and explain the realities of living on the run and in deplorable conditions (Venhaus 2010, 15; Rabasa et al. 2010, 187). The British Active Change Foundation in the North End Waltham Forest neighborhood relies on individuals with personal experience with violent radicalization to keep youth off this path (Rabasa et al. 2010, 133-4).

Canada lacks public engagement and education programs that describe radicalization indicators that communities should be looking for in their neigh-
Historia (MacLeod 2008). Following the example of some European countries, Canada should work with diaspora communities to develop alternative, non-law-enforcement mechanisms at the local level to deal with radicalization (Jacobson 2010, 2). Some Canadian diaspora communities have shown voluntary signs of recognizing radicalization in their midst. For example, the Canadian Islamic Congress posted tips on spotting radicalization under the heading “Better To Be Safe Than Sorry” after the London transit bombings in 2005 (The Globe and Mail 2010). Canadian senior officials are starting to encourage this type of self-policing explicitly. In 2010, Canadian Public Safety Minister Vic Toews asked immigrant communities to keep an eye out for terrorist threats, since these communities may be best placed to spot the dangers (The Globe and Mail 2010).

Of course, policymakers and law enforcement officials should also not lose sight that radicalization is not the only issue for these communities (Change Institute July 2008, 8). However, radicalization of diaspora communities represents a significant and growing national security threat to Canada. Hundreds of Canadians have died as a result of terrorism produced by this threat. Effective law enforcement support of diaspora communities can help them become more resilient to radicalization (CACP 2008, 7). The essential components for containing diaspora radicalization and terrorism are community cooperation, tips from friends and family members, alert citizens, and focused intelligence collection (Jenkins 2010, 13). Culturally-sensitive community policing combined with voluntary self-policing efforts offer powerful mechanisms to reduce and root out radicalization within Canada.
8.0 Conclusion

The radicalization problem in Canada is multi-faceted, and it can be attributed to a number of sources, many of which are part of religious and ethnic diaspora communities. There is a long history of episodic and continued violence developing from within these communities, and no one group has had a monopoly on this type of extremism and violence. It appears counterproductive to focus radicalization prevention efforts on individual nationalities, since a review of just sixty North American terrorist plots and attacks since 9/11 included individuals with first or second generation roots in more than 30 different countries.

There are several Canadian diaspora communities that continue to suffer from small, unabashed radical elements within them, including the Tamil, Sikh, Arab, and Muslim diaspora communities. In previous generations, other diaspora communities in Canada have been in a similar position. Political radicalization and membership in a diaspora community from a conflict region seem to be at least as salient in most homegrown plots as religious identification. Many North American radicals have lived, worked, or studied in their host country for extended periods of time and do not usually fit the mold of a classic “sleeper operative.” These individuals appear to have failed to integrate into a pluralistic, tolerant democracy, or they have turned away and integrated into a radicalized subculture that has taken root through a perversion of the freedoms afforded by multiculturalism. Xenophobia and collective sanctions against identified ethnicities, religions, or nationalities are likely to be counterproductive or exacerbate tensions.

There is no single path to radicalization, and there is no guaranteed method for disengagement and deradicalization. Still, there are many viable models
that have been developed in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East that could inspire effective countermeasures in North America.

There is no evidence to suggest that Canada’s radicalization problem will diminish of its own accord. Canada needs to catch up with Europe before it faces a more grievous threat. Canada needs to develop a national counterradicalization strategy that is complemented with targeted policies and programs that deter and prevent future radicalization as well as a formal deradicalization program. These efforts should be supported by culturally-sensitive community policing and voluntary self-policing within diaspora communities. Canada should harmonize its efforts with the United States, since many of these plots extend beyond the border. Radicalization to violence can be managed, but it cannot be “solved” (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010, 13). Canada has failed to manage this problem in the past, with deadly consequences. Reducing radicalization today can save lives tomorrow.
REFERENCES


## Appendix: Selected Recent North American Diaspora Radicalization Cases

### Canadian Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Descent</th>
<th>Host Country Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Mohammed Mansour Jabarah</td>
<td>Kuwaiti</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Mohamed Harkat</td>
<td>Algerian</td>
<td>Refugee claimant</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Mustapha Muhammad Krer</td>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Hassan Farhat</td>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>Landed immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Abdul Rahman Jabarah</td>
<td>Kuwaiti</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Ahmed Said Khadr</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Mohammed Abdullah Warsame</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
</tr>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Mohammad Momin Khawaja</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Sleiman Elmerhebi</td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Rudwan Khalil Abubaker</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>Refugee claimant</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Kassem Daher</td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Toronto 18</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Canadian citizens</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>LTTE Weapons Ring</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Canadian citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Winnipeg Three</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Said Namouh</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Canadian resident</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Prapaharan Thambithurai</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Tahawwur Hussain Rana</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Ottawa Plot</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Matin Abdul Stanikzy</td>
<td>Afghani</td>
<td>Immigrant</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Sayfildin Tahir Sharif</td>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>Canadian citizen</td>
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### US Cases

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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Host Country Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>The Lackawanna Six</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>US citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>The Portland Seven</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
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