“Every translation is in itself an interpretation” (Heidegger, date unknown)

Two key figures: Husserl, then Heidegger

Sciences at the time were divided into natural sciences (physics) and psychological sciences. Husserl's proposed that all sciences are perceived phenomena that essentially do not exist outside of human interpretation. They exist in the minds of humans who intentionally think of them, and are thus cognitive phenomena and subordinate to the study of phenomena, phenomenology. Phenomenology was originally proposed not as a science, but above all sciences. To find out more, check the huge numbers of books on/by Husserl and Heidegger in the SFU library.

Husserl, E. (1931), Ideas – General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology , MacMillan, New York

      Pure Phenomenology, to which we are here seeking the way, whose unique position in regard to all other sciences we wish to make clear, and to set forth as the most fundamental region of philosophy, is an essentially new science, which in virtue of its own governing peculiarity lies far removed from our ordinary thinking, and has not until our own day therefore shown an impulse to develop. It calls itself a science of “phenomena”. [ed: note the original philosopher of phenomenology distances himself from the phenomenon of phenomenology and claims phenomenology exists independent his cognition of it] Other sciences, long known to us, also treat of phenomena. Thus one heaers psychology referred to as a science of psychical, and natural science as a science of physical “appearances” or phenomena. So in history we hear speak occasionally of historical, and in the cultural sciences of cultural phenomena, and similarly for all sciences that deal with realities. [ed: note plural of reality] Now differently as the word “phenomenon” may be used in such contexts, and diverse as may be the meanings which it bears, it is certain that phenomenology also deals with all these “phenomena” and in all their meanings, but from a quite different point of view, the effect of which is to modify in a determinate way all the meanings which in term bears in the old-established sciences. Only as thus modified do these meanings enter the phenomenological sphere.

--- skip this   section if you're pressed for time ---

Husserl, E. (1964), The Idea of Phenomenology , Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

Chapter: “The Train of Thoughts in the Lectures”

Natural thinking in science and everyday life is untroubled by the difficulties concerning the possibility fo cognition. Philosophical thinking is circumscribed by one's position toward the problems concerning the possibility of cognition. The perplexities in which reflection about the possibility of a cognition that “gets at” the things themselves becomes entangled: How can we be sure that cognition accords with things as they exist in themselves, that it “gets at them”? What do things in themselves care about our ways of thinking and the logical rules governing them? There are laws of how we think; they are psychological laws – Biologism, psychological laws as laws of adaptation.

      Absutdity: to begin with, when we think naturally about cognition and fit it and its achievements into the natural ways of thinking which pertains to the sciences we arrive a theories that are appealing at first. But they end in contradiction or absurdity – Inclination to open skepticism.

      Even in this attempt to look at these problems scientifically we can call “theory of knowledge.” At any rate what emerges is the idea of a theory of knowledge as a science which solves the above-mentioned difficulties, gives us an ultimate, clear, therefore inherenelty consistent insight into the essence of cognition and the possibility of its achievements. The critique of sognition in this sense is the condition of the possibility of a metaphysics.

      The method of the critique of cognition is the phenomenological method, phenomenology as the general doctrine of essences, within which the science of the essence of cognition finds its place.

In a nutshell (www.phenomenologycenter.org)

•  Phenomenologists tend to oppose the acceptance of unobservable matters and grand systems erected in speculative thinking;

•  Phenomenologists tend to oppose naturalism (also called objectivism and positivism), which is the worldview growing from modern natural science and technology that has been spreading from Northern Europe since the Renaissance;

•  Positively speaking, phenomenologists tend to justify cognition (and some also evaluation and action) with reference to what Edmund Husserl called Evidenz, which is awareness of a matter itself as disclosed in the most clear, distinct, and adequate way for something of its kind;

•  Phenomenologists tend to believe that not only objects in the natural and cultural worlds, but also ideal objects, such as numbers, and even conscious life itself can be made evident and thus known;

•  Phenomenologists tend to hold that inquiry ought to focus upon what might be called "encountering" as it is directed at objects and, correlatively, upon "objects as they are encountered" (this terminology is not widely shared, but the emphasis on a dual problematics and the reflective approach it requires is);

•  Phenomenologists tend to recognize the role of description in universal, a priori, or "eidetic" terms as prior to explanation by means of causes, purposes, or grounds; and

•  Phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not what Husserl calls the transcendental phenomenological epochê and reduction is useful or even possible.

Marty's summary:

Phenomenologist allow everyone to have their own personal reality, in which unobservable matters may be imagined by the creative mind, but to not exist. On the flip side, if you believe it exists, then no one can censor your thoughts and denounce its existence. To play devil's advocate, any observation creates a reaction through our nervous system into our brain, which gives us the impression of its existence at the same level as imaginary observations (hallucinations). So exactly which phenomena should a phenomenologist accept or reject from their personal reality? If you can't see it, does cease to exist; if you can see it, should you still question its existence?

Why should you care:

Phenomenology in qualitative research:

Subjects :

When recording observations reported by the subject, we are left to assume that the situation unfolded as described by the subject. Their memory may deceive them, as may their interpretation of what may have actually happened. For example, in social network analysis, it is not uncommon to interview one subject about the relationships (s)he has and then follow up with all those contacts to get the reciprocal view of each relationship in order to triangulate a less biased reality.

Researchers :

      Similarly, while conducting qualitative research, there may be more happening than a researcher can realistically perceive, comprehend and consciously pay attention to. Of the observations we manage to record, they are nonetheless filtered through our state of mind and thus immediately interpreted from objective observation to a subjective record of what we may falsely believe was an account of an objective reality. Time, man power and budget permitting, it may be possible to curb a misinterpretation of events by using audio-video equipment and/or multiple researchers. As Flick mentioned, it is rare that researchers go back to their original transcripts, audio   or video recordings.

Readers :

      In reporting on qualitative research, we can not control how a reader interprets the report, as one might be able to do in an active dialog. As demonstrated in the last class, given the same report (eg. video), no two reactions are the same. A phenomenologist would claim that 8 people watchin one video created 8 realities of the video, while denouncing the real existence of the physical DVD unless someone actually (believed they) perceived it.