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The Meta-Theory of Philosophy: Marx's Formulation

DEONTOLOGICAL GROUNDS FOR REVOLUTION

The ambition of philosophy of praxis is to link the fulfillment of the "demands of reason" to revolutionary political goals. The establishment of this link implies that the practice of a rational life includes revolutionary political action, and that revolution itself can be rationally justified. These are in fact fundamental conclusions of Marx and Lukács in their early Marxist work. In his early works Marx develops a meta-theory of political philosophy and derives original grounds for revolution from it. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács constructs a meta-theory of classical German philosophy from which he too derives a rationale for revolution. This chapter will be primarily concerned with Marx's early justification of revolution, while a later one will take up Lukács' related argument.

By way of introduction to the concept of revolution in philosophy of praxis, it will be helpful to consider the tradi-

tional idea of the right of revolution. Of course throughout most of its history political philosophy has been more concerned with rational grounds for obedience to government than with the right of revolution. Usually obedience has been justified by reference to functions performed by the state to the benefit of the individuals. However, the expectation of a fair return for obedience may easily be disappointed. Then, when the state fails to fulfill its function, grounds for obedience may become grounds for revolution. Similarly, most justifications of revolution imply a theory of obligation to the post-revolutionary state. This dialectic of obedience and revolt is not a sign of inconsistency in political philosophy, but on the contrary results from its consistent commitment to rationality in a world of contingencies, and its ever enlarging claims for the individual. These observations are confirmed by the early revolutionary theories of Marx and Lukács. In both cases conservative political doctrines, taken as the basis of a meta-theoretical critique, are transformed into their revolutionary opposites precisely in the name of reason.

We can gauge their originality by comparison with earlier revolutionary political theory. The classic ground for revolution, formulated for example by Locke, is teleological or utilitarian in character. Locke believes that "the end of government is the good of mankind."¹ Although Marxists only rarely offer utilitarian arguments for revolution, a vaguely utilitarian concern for human happiness constitutes the moral aura of most Marxist discourse. Marxists implicitly add to Locke's critique of political relations a parallel critique of property relations, both of which, in their view, should be instrumental to human happiness. Locke's main point is conserved: society, as a common creation of human beings, should serve their interests and not the contrary.

Socialism undoubtedly originated in some such sense of revolution as a legitimate collective means to happiness. However, if the early Marx had presented a simply humanitarian justification of revolution, he would have fallen beneath

the level of the philosophy of the *Aufklärung* in which he was so deeply schooled. For Marx it is not enough to show that revolution is a means to happiness, since Kant and Hegel question the ethical status of happiness itself. Kant shows that as a rational being man has higher interests than those discovered through a utilitarian calculus, including duties of obedience to the state regardless of "material" consequences. By conceptualizing this "higher" sphere of duty in terms of a dialectical theory of individuation and mutual recognition, Hegel succeeds in basing similar conclusions on a far richer social theory. Thus in Kant and Hegel traditional speculative philosophy takes a conservative turn, denying the pertinence of the utilitarian grounds for revolution put forth in progressive theories such as Locke's.

Marx revives revolutionary theory not by a "regression" to utilitarianism, but rather by developing a new deontological ground of revolution, based on the intrinsic nature of rationality. Deontological grounds for revolution flow from the demand for rational political action, independent of the use to be made of the freedom won by revolution, whether it be the pursuit of happiness, morality, or any other end. The chief representative of this position is Rousseau, who assumes that the citizens of a rational society would use their freedom to achieve happiness, but for him freedom as the actual exercise of self-determining rationality is an end in itself.

The difference between teleological and deontological grounds for revolution is especially clear in Locke and Rousseau's discussions of slavery. Both are against it, of course, but for very different reasons. Locke argues that slavery is illegitimate because "this freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but by which forfeits his preservation and life together."² Rousseau, on the contrary, makes no appeal to the right to life, but claims an obligation to moral self-responsibility incompatible with slavery. He argues that "when a man renounces his liberty he

renounces his essential manhood, his rights, and even his duty as a human being. . . . It is incompatible with man's nature, and to deprive him of his free will is to deprive his actions of all moral sanction."³

Deontological grounds for revolution are usually explained as Rousseau does here, by reference to an absolute value placed on human dignity, the right of each individual to determine himself freely, to secure respectful treatment from others. It is argued that where political conditions prevent this they ought to be overthrown. Here we pass from the mere *right* of revolution, which flows from a concern with human happiness, to an *obligation* to revolution in the name of dignity and freedom. This is very much the sort of problem that preoccupies the young Marx. He writes in one early essay: "To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself. . . . The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being for man. It ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being. . . ."⁴ For the young Marx, a revolution "*à la hauteur des principes*" is a revolution for freedom and dignity.⁵

Basic to this theory of revolution is the idea that the rational subject is not fulfilled merely in thought, nor even in private morality, but also requires a sphere of public activity. But where rationality must be deployed, there freedom too is necessary, for "Freedom is the 'formal element' of rationality, the only form in which reason can be."⁶ Thus for Marx, as for Rousseau, revolution is a condition for the full exercise of reason. It is comparable with Cartesian doubt or the Enlightenment struggle against superstition as an attack on contingent obstacles to rationality, as a methodological preliminary to the flowering of humankind's highest faculty.

Marx's concern with the problem of revolutionary rationality is formulated explicitly in some of his earliest writings. He tries to show that revolution can satisfy what he calls "the

demands of reason," that through it reason, or philosophy, can be "realized" in social reality.⁷ This terminology is of course Hegelian. It was Hegel who first proposed to show that "reason" was "realized," that the contradiction between the rational concept of the state and its historical reality had finally been overcome. This philosophical *tour de force* was intended to lay the revolution to rest, to deprive it of the halo of rationality with which the eighteenth century had surrounded it. Starting from such premises, Marx's task is laid out for him: to demonstrate that reason is *not* in fact realized, that it continues to produce "demands" transcendent to the given state of affairs, that revolution is therefore still a rational act.

But after Kant and Hegel, it is not possible for Marx to renew revolutionary theory by returning to the speculative methods of a Rousseau. Kant's conservative political philosophy is based precisely on the implicit grounds for obedience to government contained in the Rousseauian revolutionary theory. This theory itself must therefore be submitted to a radical critique in order to discover how political philosophy had been reconciled—prematurely—with an unjust society, and to find in it elements that can be reformulated to again ground a revolutionary struggle against this society. The core of this effort consists in overcoming the antinomy of need and reason Marx identifies as constitutive of the entire tradition of political philosophy. Marx subjects the concepts of need and reason to a critique and a revision in the course of which he develops his metatheoretical approach. I will show later that the antinomy of need and reason in Marx is only a particular instance of the antinomy of fact and value with which Lukács is centrally concerned in his early work.

Marx's meta-theory of political philosophy is based on a specific construction of the relation between need and reason in political philosophy, one which derives largely from an interpretation of Rousseau as seen through the eyes of Kant. This of course limits the bearing of Marx's analysis, which

simply assumes that the essence of the whole tradition is revealed in what is presumably its highest stage. Nevertheless, the analysis is at least an interesting hypothesis about political philosophy in general; furthermore, Marx's approach is sociologically justified because it is the doctrine of Rousseau-Kant that underlies the democratic ideology of the French Revolution and later German liberalism.

Marx assumes with Rousseau and Kant that freedom is not whim but "obedience to self-given law."⁸ With them he also assumes that the rules of conduct cannot be *derived* from happiness as an end, but must be derived from the concept of reason: the rational individual owes it to himself to maintain his autonomy from both his own needs and the power of other men. Happiness is not, however, a matter of indifference for Rousseau, nor even for Kant. In Rousseau, for example, freedom is essentially the right and the power to do what is in one's own interests as a member of the community. Freedom is a value in itself, but it is also bound up with the pursuit of collective self-interest in the higher sphere of politics.

It has been argued that in Kant too right conduct establishes general forms of social interaction which maximize the freedom of each individual to follow his merely "natural" end, which is happiness. What Kant does is not so much to reject the pursuit of happiness as to reduce it to an "anthropological" or empirical consideration, thereby clearly delineating the boundaries between deontological and utilitarian grounds for political action.⁹ The basis of this philosophical distinction is the praxeological one between ethics and economics. In the ethical form of action, the behavior of all subjects is intrinsically compatible and harmonious, while in the economic form of action, behavior may be conflictual and competitive. Only ethical action, which achieves harmony through conformity to a universal rule, can be granted the dignity of reason. The pursuit of material welfare is mere "content" of experience, determined by nature and therefore contingent, compatible in principle, Kant would argue, with ethical behavior but subordinate to it by right.

For Marx this construction of the relation of reason and need results in a disturbing split between the ideal of freedom and the actual motives which, in real life, freedom serves. This split is particularly significant because it undercuts the protest against poverty in a formally "rational" society, reducing such protest to a marginal concern of merely empirical interest. Life becomes, in fact, a means to rationality in a topsy turvy vision likely to satisfy only those for whom the means of life are assured. What is required is a reformulation of political theory to establish the intrinsic rationality and universality of the pursuit of happiness and the satisfaction of the needs on which happiness depends.

Marx worked out this program in three stages, to which correspond three important early works. In the first part of the essay "On the Jewish Question" he attacks the problem of need, in order to show that the conflictual form of action associated with it is not natural and necessary, but historical and subject to revolutionary change. This essay culminates in a new formulation of the concept of freedom, in line with the revision of the concept of need. The second stage of the analysis is developed in the "Introduction" to the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right." There Marx arrives by a deduction from principles at the political and social conditions for a realization of his new concept of freedom. This argument leads to the proletariat, which he identifies as the agent of a revolution that will abolish philosophy in realizing it. The last stage is reached in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844. There Marx follows the thread to its beginning in the concept of reason itself, which he now sets out to revise.

THE ANTINOMY OF REASON AND NEED

Marx's essay "On the Jewish Question" is an attempt to overcome the antinomy of form and content opposing the ideal of the bourgeois-democratic state to the facts of capitalist social and economic life. Marx conceptualizes this antinomy

through the split between moral-political rationality (the basis of the state) and utilitarian-anthropological goals (the basis of the economy) as it appears in Rousseau and the French Revolution, filtered through Kant and Hegel. He argues that this split is reflected in the distinction between "man" and "citizen" in French revolutionary theory, and that this distinction in turn depends on that between civil society, the sphere of private activity, and the state, the sphere of cooperative activity.

Marx shows that the state accumulates all the functions of rationality: consciousness, reflexivity, morality, universality, and "species-life," this last being a term derived from Feuerbach which signifies the consciously social and cooperative nature of man. The merely empirical functions of natural human existence are then consigned to the sphere of civil society, where the individual lives his "real" life, as opposed to his ideal rational life as a citizen in the state. In civil society the egoism of private individuals creates a hell of competition in the pursuit of happiness through economic aggression. There human action does not achieve rational universality, but is rather mere nature. Marx writes:

The perfected political state is, by its nature, the species life of man as opposed to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the political sphere, as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained to its full development, man leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life, a double existence—celestial and terrestrial. He lives in the political community, where he acts simply as a private individual, treats other men as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means and becomes the plaything of alien powers.¹⁰

In presenting the problem in this manner, Marx is not simply criticizing the egoism of bourgeois society. There is that, but more important is the fact that "species life" is decisively linked to reason in the concept of the state. In the

political domain, rationality is exemplified by the cooperative, communal aspect of human nature, which takes refuge in the state once it has been driven from the intensely competitive civil society. As Marx put it in his letter to Ruge: "Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. . . . As far as actual life is concerned, the political state especially contains in all its modern forms the demands of reason, even where the political state is not yet conscious of socialistic demands."¹¹ The problem now is to criticize the "irrational" and contradictory form in which reason exists in the modern state in order to understand why reason has been confined to this limited domain, why actual life continues to persist as an empirical and natural residue antagonistic to reason in a civil society alongside the state.

Marx seeks a solution through a critique of the limits of the concept of political revolution, which at this point is equivalent for him with the French Revolution.¹² Political revolution aims to change the principles governing social interaction in order to maximize individual freedom in private life. In practice, the revolution accepts the given basis of private life as received from the *ancien régime*, namely private property, and attempts to lift the burden of feudal restrictions weighing on this basis. "This revolution," Marx says, "regards civil society, the sphere of human needs, labour, private interests and civil law, as the basis of its own existence, as a self-subsistent pre-condition, and thus as its natural basis."¹³

Civil society appears essentially as a sphere of "nature" because it lacks the two most important determinations of rationality, which are *reflexivity* and *universality*. On the one hand, the political revolution does not conceive of civil society as a historical result, as the outcome of a process of mediation, hence as a self-reflected and self-developed sphere of reason. Instead, it is seen as the product of the egoistic individuals whose natural inclinations govern it once all feudal restrictions have been eliminated. These egoistic individuals are simply received by the revolution as "the passive, given

result of the dissolution of society [of the *ancien régime*], an object of direct apprehension and consequently a natural object."¹⁴

On the other hand, as a "natural" man, the merely given product of instinct and need, the egoistic individual of bourgeois society is plunged into a *bellum omnium contra omnes*. The activity of this egoistic individual can consist only in degraded competitive strife. Its form is not rational or universal and no process of mediation can raise it to rational universality. The contradiction between reason and need, the one necessary and universal, the other contingent and particular, cannot, Marx claims, be resolved on the ground of capitalist society.

Marx goes on to show that the bourgeois split in the individual between need and reason, man and citizen is a dialectical one in which each polar opposite requires the other for its existence. The polarity of man and citizen reflects a split in human nature inevitable in capitalist society, a split between its empirical content and its rational essence. The empirical man of civil society is the really existing human being, an egoistic residue standing in perpetual contradiction with its own rational instantiation as citizen. But only through the citizen can the man exist, that is, can the individual freely pursue private interests in private life under the protection of the state. Meanwhile, the ideal citizen, member of the state, is the essence of what it is to be human, a rational political animal. Yet the citizen is there only to protect and defend the rights of man. Existence and essence require each other and also stand in contradiction. Marx says, "Man as he really is, is seen only in the form of egoistic man, and man in his true nature only in the form of abstract citizen."¹⁵

Political revolution founders on this antinomy. It confines itself to liberating a pregiven "nature" that bears within it the irrationality of private competition. In the face of this nature, reason has a bare "artificial" existence as an "allegorical, moral person" in the citizen.¹⁶ Most abstractly formulated, the

dilemma is an example of the fundamental antinomy of form and content with which philosophy of praxis is concerned: *rational form here presides over empirical content not by mediating it and raising it to rational universality, but by leaving it to be in its given condition.*

At this very abstract level, Marx's critique of formal democracy is structurally similar to Lukács' critique of Kantian ethics. In Lukács' terms, the antinomy of reason and need that Marx identifies would be an example of the more general antinomy of value and fact, of "ought" and "is," that arises from the formalistic concept of reason. This concept of reason is based on the acceptance of "immediacy," that is to say, on the failure to discover in the given facts those potentialities and tendencies embodying rationality and driving them toward a rational end. Instead, the given is *defined* as indifferent to reason and value, as the merely empirical, factual residue of the process of formal abstraction in which the concept of reason is constructed. As Lukács put it, "Precisely in the pure, classical expression it received in the philosophy of Kant it remains true that the 'ought' presupposes an existing reality to which the category of 'ought' remains *inapplicable* in principle."¹⁷ This is the dilemma of bourgeois democracy as Marx explains it: political rationality presupposes as its material substratum an irrational social existence which cannot be made to conform to rational principles.

Marx and Lukács, then, arrive at similar solutions to the problem they have identified. In the more abstract terms of

Lukács, this solution "consists in annulling [*aufzuheben*] that indifference of form towards content . . ." which is the basis of reified rationality.¹⁸ More concretely, for Marx, it is necessary to transform civil society into a sphere of rational interaction. Mere political revolution is not adequate to the task. Marx writes, "The political revolution dissolves civil society into its elements [egoistic individuals] without revolutionizing these elements themselves or subjecting them to criticism."¹⁹ What is required is precisely the "revolutionizing" of private

and individual existence so that it too conforms with the demands of reason. The content of free activity must no longer stand in contradiction with freedom itself.

At this point Marx derives what might be called a new "concept" or *Begriff* of free society from the *Aufhebung* of the contradictions he has identified between the concept and the object of traditional democratic political theory. He does not yet know concretely in what rational social activity would consist, but he knows the condition for such activity, namely, the transcendence of the opposition between private egoism and rational common action. For this it is necessary that collective action in the common interest, action based on the reciprocal recognition of the humanity and needs of all individuals, transcend the narrow boundaries of politics and extend to economic life as well. Then economic activity would have a rational form and human needs would partake of rational universality through their reciprocal recognition by all. Marx concludes:

Human emancipation will only be complete when the real individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-being; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (*forces propres*) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as political power.²⁰

This new condition for the fulfillment of the "demands of reason" is contained already in abstract form in the modern state. It is the new basis for deontological grounds for revolution and for what Marx calls the "realization of philosophy."

In sum, Marx has shown that political philosophy accepts the irrational form of the pursuit of happiness (civil society) as a natural fact, and so applies the demands of reason only to the state. These demands concern, among other things, the establishment of a true community through the reconciliation of antinomial opposites such as individual and society, private interest and common good, and all the similar displacements

of the antinomy of content and form in the political domain. But Marx is able to demonstrate that community cannot be realized in a partial domain, such as the state, alongside a civil society based on a conflictual form of action.

To fulfill the demands of reason, then, it will be necessary to extend them to civil society. To accomplish this, in turn, it is necessary to overcome what Lukács calls the "immediacy" of the sphere of need, its philosophically naturalized form, which admits of no possibility of change and progress. This Marx succeeds in doing when he arrives at the concept of a social revolution which would not just change the state, but also bring about the "revolutionizing of the elements themselves." Community can be realized at all levels of society, including the material level of the sphere of need, when the system of practice governing the pursuit of happiness in class society has been transformed.

THE AGENT OF REVOLUTION

The next step in Marx's analysis consists in finding a possible agent for the radical transformation of man and citizen he proposes. This proves to be a more delicate matter than would first appear. On the one hand, Marx must base his new concept of freedom on some actual social force to escape the merely abstract ethical relation of philosophy to reality he has already rejected in his letter to Ruge. On the other hand, in attempting to base his philosophy on a real social force, there is the danger that he will reduce historical action to a mere instrument of philosophy, which later would then be the real "subject" of the revolutionary process.

In Marx's "Introduction" to the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," when he first approaches this problem in a highly speculative form, he does indeed fail to resolve the dilemma posed above. There he arrives at an undialectical construction of the relation of theory to practice which does not so much overcome the

abstract character of ethical demands as impute this very abstractness to the demands of an entire social class. Lucien Goldmann suggests that this failure is not of merely biographical interest in the study of Marx's development, but that the undialectical conclusions of this text anticipate the later undialectical construction of the theory-practice relation in the socialist movement: "In fact, it suffices to replace the word philosophy in the 'Introduction' with the word Party (and at bottom in the two cases we are concerned with an ideology-elaborating group) in order to obtain a position very close to that expressed by Lenin in his work *What is To Be Done?*"²¹ The discussion of class consciousness in a later chapter of this book will explore Lukács' solution to precisely this problem.

Marx's failure in this essay is due in part to his method, which differs radically from that of his later sociological and economic work. He does not start from an analysis of society but from philosophy. He takes his new philosophical concept of freedom and tests it against the various classes of society to find one which can serve as its representative in practice. As he puts it, "Revolutions need a passive element, a material basis . . ." ²² Or again, "Theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses."²³ Marx's essay has the appearance of a class analysis and indeed some features of it anticipate his later theory of class. Marx tries to prove that previous, merely political revolutions have failed to achieve human emancipation because they have liberated not man but particular classes from oppression. The bourgeoisie, for example, was oppressed by the nobility in France *as a class*, in terms of its particular interests in the society. The wrongs done to the bourgeoisie *appeared* to all other classes to exemplify the general injustice of the society and so they supported the bourgeoisie in its revolution. But the liberation of the bourgeoisie from these wrongs was not human emancipation but only bourgeois emancipation. It did not free man but the bourgeoisie to pursue its interests, which in turn came into conflict with the interests of society as a whole.

Thus it is the very principle of class which is the source of the limits of political revolution. Marx concludes, and this distinguishes his method from that of the later works, that his philosophy cannot be realized by a social class in the usual sense but only by "a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution of all classes."²⁴ What he is seeking, in other words, is a class that is not a class, a "universal" class in something like Hegel's sense of the term, with no particular interest at all, hence none opposed to that of society as a whole. Having arrived at a rather Hegelian formulation of the problem in his earlier essay, it is not surprising that he here reaches a variant of the Hegelian solution.

Marx argues that the proletariat alone of all classes can go beyond a limited, merely political revolution to a general human revolution, a social revolution, for it has no status within the existing system at all. It is, Marx claims, and here he was right for his time if not for ours, the product of the "disintegration" of other social strata, with no traditional status of its own to defend. For this reason its protest can be truly universal in character, and can bring down the system of class which Marx now identifies as the source of egoistic individualism and the basis of civil society.

The proletariat, Marx concludes, can alone "revolutionize the elements themselves," that is, transform what it is to be an individual in society. For it has no interest in conserving a particular status opposed to the whole, hence no interest in perpetuating the split between civil society and the state to ensure itself a domain of free competitive aggression. The proletariat thus appears as the appropriate instrument of Marx's philosophy and the demand for revolution is now addressed to this class. Marx writes, "Philosophy is the head of this emancipation and the proletariat is its heart. Philosophy can only be realized by the abolition of the proletariat, and the proletariat can only be abolished by the realization of philosophy."²⁵

In spite of the elegance and symmetry of this solution, it falls far short of resolving the problems Marx has posed for himself. Here theory and practice are seen to arise independently, and if social revolution satisfies essential demands of theory, it is by no means clear that the proletariat intends this result in revolting. Lukács remarks:

The issue turns on the question of theory and practice. And this not merely in the sense given it by Marx when he says in his first critique of Hegel that "theory becomes a material force when it has seized the masses." Even more to the point is the need to discover those features and determinations both of the theory and the ways of seizing the masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle of revolution. We must extract the practical essence of the theory from the method and its relation to its object. If this is not done that "seizing the masses" could well turn out to be a will o' the wisp. It might turn out that the masses were seized by quite different forces, that they were in pursuit of quite different ends. In that event, there would be no necessary connection between the theory and their activity, it would be a form that enables the masses to become conscious of their socially necessary or fortuitous actions, without ensuring a genuine and necessary bond between consciousness and action.²⁶

Lukács goes on to point out that in this same text Marx briefly lays down the basic condition for achieving a real unity of theory and practice. Marx writes, "Will theoretical needs be directly practical needs? It is not enough that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive toward thought."²⁷ Both Marx and Lukács thus arrive at the conclusion that it is not only the "indifference of form towards content" that must be overcome, but also the indifference of content towards form.

Marx has so far seen the necessity of creating a form of rational interaction in the pursuit of happiness and to this end he has identified an agent capable of implementing the "demands of reason." But still the form-content distinction persists, because the pursuit of happiness itself has not been

raised to rational universality, only its form. The proletariat appears as a passive instrument of philosophy because in revolting to achieve happiness, it unconsciously serves the "cunning of reason" by realizing rational form in actual life. An ungenerous observer could still insist that Marx is tossing "the roasted pigeons of absolute science" into the mouth of the proletariat. Marx now seems to realize that there is no solution within the framework of a concept of reason as pure form, and so he proceeds to a radical critique and revision of the concept of reason itself.

REVISION OF THE CONCEPT OF REASON

In the third phase of his early work, in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, Marx sets out to unify theory and practice through revising the concept of reason as it is formulated both in the philosophical tradition and his own previous writings. To accomplish this, Marx must return to the study of need from a new angle. In the early essays, Marx found a *form* of rational interaction in the pursuit of happiness. But the *content* of the concept of need with which he worked remained unthematized and unanalyzed; it remained, in fact, immediate and hence irrational for Marx as it had for earlier political philosophy. This dimension of the problem now becomes the decisive one.

If there was a still dogmatic element in the earlier essays, it lay in Marx's failure to derive rational social interaction, the "revolutionizing of the elements themselves," from the needs it was to help satisfy. Instead, social revolution still appeared as a philosophical exigency from which the needy could incidentally benefit. The antinomy of need and reason is not abolished in the accidental convergence of philosophy and the proletariat, but rather reproduced in a new guise. The antinomies of philosophy and reality, theory and practice which appear in Marx's discussion of historical agency are simply displacements of the original antinomy of political philosophy.

To resolve these antinomies, Marx will now reverse the terms of the problem and attempt to found the demands of reason in the very nature of need. But this amounts to demonstrating that the content of the sphere of need is rational, is, in fact, *the* essential sphere of rationality for a meta-theoretically reconstructed concept of reason.

In developing this meta-theoretical approach to rationality, Marx is greatly aided by Feuerbach, who treads a similar path with more maturity and assurance in the same period. Feuerbach's central idea is that philosophy is secularized theology. He says, "What lies in the other world for religion, lies in this world for philosophy."²⁸ This is particularly true of the philosophical concepts of subject and object. When philosophy identifies the subject with reason, with thinking, it brings the theological idea of "spirit" down to earth. Similarly, the concept of the object as an object-of-thought, constituted by thought or obeying rational laws, is a homely transcendental equivalent for Biblical Genesis.

This is on the face of it a crass and reductionist interpretation of the essence of philosophy. What makes Feuerbach interesting and important is his attempt to go beyond this basic thesis toward a reconstruction of philosophy. There is a parallel here with Marx's method in the essays discussed above. Marx took certain general formal principles of political philosophy—the demands of reason—and detached them from their accustomed object, in this case the state, to apply them to another object, society. Feuerbach does something similar for philosophy in general, detaching its formal structure from its concept of the subject and object. The "philosophy of the future," as Feuerbach calls it, will conserve these formal traits but attach them to a new subject-object concept. This is a meta-theoretical approach to the critique and revision of fundamental philosophical concepts because in it these concepts are relativized through contact with the concrete existential domains from which they were first abstracted in their initial construction as philosophical. This is particularly clear in Feuerbach.

Feuerbach calls Hegel's thought, which he sees as the culmination of the philosophical tradition, a "philosophy of identity." The identity referred to is that of thought and being, reason and reality. This identity Feuerbach sees as a theological principle and to it he opposes what he calls "the true and absolute viewpoint": "the viewpoint of the distinction between I and thou, subject and object."²⁹ Yet although Feuerbach rejects the philosophy of identity, he tries to conserve its formal principles on another plane.

He first redefines the concepts of subject and object, arguing that they are both sensuous, natural things in the world which cannot be brought together merely conceptually. The identity achieved in and through thought is spurious and ideological, but there is another kind of subject-object identity which can be achieved in nature through sense perception and love. Feuerbach writes, "The identity of subject and object, which in self-consciousness [in other words, in Hegel] is only an abstract idea, is truth and reality only in man's sensuous perception of man."³⁰ Thus the formal principle, subject-object identity, is taken from Hegel and conserved, while its content in Hegel's own thought is rejected.

The upshot is an enlargement of the concept of the subject to include more than thinking, to include the whole man, so to speak. This enlarged subject retains what might be called an "ontological pathos" through its continued submission to the formal principles of idealistic philosophy. Feuerbach expressed his conclusion in ringing phrases which certainly influenced Marx.

The unity of thought and being has meaning and truth only when man is comprehended as the ground and subject of this unity. Only a real being recognizes real objects; only where thought is not the subject of itself but a predicate of a real being is the idea not separated from being. . . .

From this result the following categorical imperatives: Desire not to be a philosopher as distinct from a man; be nothing else than a thinking man. Do not think as a thinker, that is, with a faculty torn from the totality of the real human being and isolated for itself; think

as a living and real being, as one exposed to the vivifying and refreshing waves of the world's oceans. Think in existence, in the world as a member of it, not in the vacuum of abstraction as a solitary monad, as an absolute monarch, as an indifferent, super-worldly God; then you can be sure that your ideas are unities of being and thought.³¹

That is precisely Marx's starting point in the *1844 Manuscripts*. There he attempts to obey Feuerbach's injunction by a heroic effort to overcome the gap between thought and life. As Marx puts it, "One basis for life and another for science is *a priori* a falsehood."³² Elsewhere in the text, Marx expresses himself in the first person in a manner which indicates his personal stake in the matter.

My universal consciousness is only the theoretical form of that whose living form is the real community, the social entity, although at the present day this universal consciousness is an abstraction from real life and is opposed to it as an enemy. That is why the activity of my universal consciousness as such is my theoretical existence as a social being.³³

However, Marx is a better dialectician and a more rigorous thinker than Feuerbach. He is not content to retain simply the most general form of the philosophy of identity, while giving an anthropological twist to the concepts of subject and object. He takes far more than this from Hegel in order to accomplish far more ambitious goals than Feuerbach's. Marx follows Hegel in requiring that subject-object unity be grasped as the actual constitution or production of the object by the subject. He also agrees with the Hegel of the *Phenomenology of Mind* that this production takes place in the historical process. He accepts, in other words, what

Lukács describes as "Hegel's programme: to see the absolute, the goal of his philosophy, as a *result* remains valid for Marxism with its very different objects of knowledge, and is even of greater concern to it, as the dialectical process is seen

to be identical with the course of history."³⁴ The formal principles Marx retains are thus richer and more complex than those that survive Feuerbach's critical blast.

As Marx works out his program in the *Manuscripts*, it becomes clear that he is attempting not just a "reform of philosophy"—Feuerbach's phrase—but a rigorous *Aufhebung*, or transcendence, of Hegelian idealism, and with it of philosophy generally. To accomplish this Marx develops a meta-theoretical critique of Hegel, designed to show that the latter's attempt to found reason as absolute knowledge is a still theological attempt to overcome social alienation in thought. The "*ordre des raisons*" must be reversed: when alienation is overcome in real life, then and only then will it be possible to overcome the alienation of reason. In line with this approach, which subordinates the truth of reason to a philosophical anthropology, Marx praises Feuerbach, who "founded genuine materialism and positive science by making the social relationship of 'man to man' the basic principle of his theory."³⁵ Simultaneously, in contra-distinction to Feuerbach, Marx believes that it is capitalism which is responsible for the degradation of the relation of "man to man." Thus the *Manuscripts* do not achieve their end in a mere philosophical reformulation of the concept of reason. Revolution becomes the basis for a new identity, overcoming the opposition of thought and life, thinker and society, by founding reason in life and community in practice. The retention of the formal structure of Hegel's thought infused with this new content yields a philosophy of praxis.

How does Marx go about it? I will first sketch the three dialectical "moments" of Marx's meta-theoretical approach and then elaborate each in some detail. Marx begins by showing that philosophical categories are "in reality" displacements of social ones. This demonstration involves the elaboration of new theoretical categories in terms of which to explain the failure of the traditional theory to understand its own relation to reality. For example, Marx is convinced that

the problem of alienated labor is the real foundation of Hegel's philosophy, but that Hegel fails for not posing it clearly. Marx argues that "Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy. He conceives labour as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man. . . . [But] labour as Hegel understands and recognizes it is abstract mental labour. Thus, that which above all constitutes the essence of philosophy, the alienation of man knowing himself, or alienated science *thinking* itself, Hegel grasps as its essence."³⁶ The whole artificial, speculative and ultimately theological structure of Hegel's system results from just this inability to thematize real labor as the ontological core of history.

Having relativized the philosophical categories with respect to social ones, Marx proceeds to the second "moment" of the meta-theory. This consists in casting the social categories in the form of the philosophical ones, as does Feuerbach in the passages discussed above. Finally, in a third phase, the meta-theory demonstrates the philosophical pertinence of social action in resolving the contradictions of the philosophically recast social categories. In this phase Marx is able to show that the problem of the alienation of labor is a fundamental problem *within* philosophy, and not just a contingent problem of practice. This is impossible within Hegel's own thought, which encounters the alienation of labor in history as no more than a passing concern.

In sum, Marx redefines the *terms* of Hegel's philosophy, while retaining in part the *relations* Hegel establishes between these terms. Marx can then set the entire system in motion in history itself because of the social redefinition to which he has submitted it. It is clear that these new definitions do not correspond with Hegel's. It is also clear that Marx shifts back and forth in the *Manuscripts* between his own concepts and Hegel's, using the same terms in different senses. But this is not just an ambiguous use of terms. Marx's substantive thesis is that Hegel's concepts are a misconstruction of a reality better described by Marx's own, that Hegel

attempts in a mystified way to solve the very problems that concern Marx.

The first phase of Marx's meta-theory is developed in the conclusion of the *Manuscripts*, in his "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic." There Marx argues that Hegel's term "alienation" stands for the uncomprehended object of thought. To found reason, that is, to demonstrate the unity of subject and object, "It is necessary, therefore, to surmount the object of consciousness. Objectivity as such is regarded as an alienated human relationship which does not correspond with the essence of man, self-consciousness."³⁷ The return of the alienated, the demonstration of its unity with the conscious subject, consists for Hegel only in surpassing the cognitive immediacy of the object. The appropriation of alienated reality is in fact its comprehension by which this immediacy is overcome. But, Marx argues, in its social application this method leaves the world exactly as it was before, tacking a certificate of rationality onto every form of oppression. Since alienation is, at least for Hegel, really overcome in philosophy, the need to change the world has vanished. Thought can congratulate itself on having *produced* the reality and thereby justified it.

This is once again what Lukács means by philosophy remaining in the standpoint of immediacy. In *The Holy Family*, Marx describes it as "the mystery of speculative construction." He says, "Speculation on the one hand apparently freely creates its object *a priori* out of itself and, on the other hand, precisely because it wishes to get rid by sophistry of the rational and natural dependence on the *object*, falls into the most irrational and unnatural *bondage* to the object, whose most accidental and most individual attributes it is obliged to construe as absolutely necessary and general."³⁸

Hegel's conservatism, Marx believes, results from describing real alienation as the phenomenal appearance of the alienation of reason. For Hegel the alienation of the individual in the *ancien régime* did not consist in the fact that he was reduced to an "abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible

being," but in the fact that the state did not correspond with its concept, that, in practice, it could not command the rational obedience of its subjects. Once the state has been reformed, then it *can* command rational obedience even from an "abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being." There is thus a merely contingent relation between philosophy and Marx's "real" alienation, which consists in human misery and dependence. The philosopher becomes the "enemy" of the human community in demonstrating to it that it should accept its fate without protest. He withdraws the moral credit of the oppressed by rationalizing the established order.

Marx argues that Hegel falls into "uncritical positivism and uncritical idealism" because he begins by narrowing the subject to a mere function of thought. Marx writes,

For Hegel, human life, man is equivalent to self-consciousness. All alienation of human life is, therefore, nothing but alienation of self-consciousness. The alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded as the expression, reflected in knowledge and thought, of the real alienation of human life. Instead, actual alienation, that which appears real, is in its innermost hidden nature (which philosophy first discloses) only the phenomenal being of the alienation of real human life, self-consciousness.³⁹

Hence for Hegel, "It is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself inhumanly, in opposition to himself, but that he objectifies himself by distinction from and in opposition to abstract thought, which constitutes alienation as it exists and as it has to be transcended."⁴⁰

In opposition to the formula he ascribes to Hegel, "man= self-consciousness," Marx argues that man is sensuous natural existence, that, therefore, the subject is a natural being.⁴¹ Its essential mode of activity is also natural: labor, not thinking. Similarly, Marx proposes to redefine the concept of the object as an essential correlate of this subject, as a sense object, existing proximally for the human senses as an object of need.

Note that Marx does not return to Locke. He does not found knowledge on the senses in the empiricist manner, but applies the general formal principle of subject-object identity to a redefined subject and object. Thus Marx's "sense object" is not a Lockean "idea" but the actual object itself, as it exists for the senses and especially as it exists as an object of need. With the establishment of these new definitions of the philosophical subject and object, the first phase of Marx's meta-theory is completed.

The second phase of the meta-theory then proceeds to reconstitute the formal structure of philosophy of identity with the help of these redefined terms. It is in this phase that Marx revises the concepts of need and reason to overcome their antinomial formulations in political philosophy. This revision consists, essentially, in transferring the formal attributes of reason to need. In Hegel, reason is self-reflexive, it mediates itself in the course of its own self-development in history; again, for Hegel reason is also universal, both in the narrow sense that its ethical postulates apply equally to all, but also in the broader sense that its unconditioned categories apply to the whole of reality. The formal principles of the philosophy of identity, such as the exigency of a unity of subject and object, are the foundation of this concept of rationality, their fulfillment the essential demand of reason which establishes reason's *imperium*. For Marx all these determinations of rationality are simply transferred wholesale onto "man." And since "man" in Marx's sense is a being of need, this remarkable substitution results in the attribution of the characteristic traits of rationality to the sphere of need. Need therefore no longer appears as the irrational content of a formalistic rationality, but is itself charged with the functions of rationality.

For Marx the philosophical subject is now a natural being, man. As such, this subject encounters its object, nature, in a natural way. The proximate relation of subject to object will be need, which motivates labor for the satisfaction of need.

"As a natural, embodied, sentient, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited being, like animals and plants. The objects of his drives exist outside himself as objects independent of him, yet they are objects of his needs, essential objects which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his faculties."⁴² Were this simply a statement about human physiology it would of course be completely banal. It is no news that hunger requires food. However, Marx is attempting to make a statement about being in general, about ontology, and not just about the empirical being of the animal man. He writes, "Man's feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological characteristics in the narrower sense, but are true *ontological* affirmations of being (nature) . . ." ⁴³

Bertell Ollman has suggested that we use the concept of "internal relations" to describe Marx's theory of need. Indeed, Marx rejects empiricism's nonteleological, external and accidental concept of relatedness. The ontologically primordial sphere is not that of mechanistic natural science, in which such external relations prevail, but the sphere of need, in which "the need of a thing is the evident irrefutable proof that the thing belongs to my being, that the existence of this thing for me and its property are the property . . . of my being."⁴⁴ Hence Marx says that "Nature is the inorganic body of man," to express the idea that man and nature, subject and object, are joined in essential interdependence.⁴⁵

Now too the labor through which need is satisfied will also appear as an ontological category in the forms of philosophy of identity. Labor is in fact the actual process of unifying subject and object, man and nature in the self-development of a humanized rationality. Here Marx passes from the abstract and immediate positing of the unity of subject and object in need, to a reflexive, mediated unity through the production of the object by the subject in labor.

Such philosophically reconceptualized labor Marx calls "objectification," the natural activity of the naturalized sub-

ject, man. When human beings transform their environment through labor, they "objectify their needs and faculties. This they must do, for as a natural being man must "express and authenticate himself in being as well as in thought."⁴⁶ The result is a "humanized" nature within which human beings can fulfill themselves and unfold their potentialities in a continuous process of self-creation. There too they can recognize their own existence confirmed and universalized in the transformed objects of labor and, by extension, in all of being. Marx writes, "It is only when objective reality everywhere becomes for man in society the reality of human faculties, human reality, and the reality of his own faculties, that all objects become for him the objectification of himself. The objects then confirm and realize his individuality. They are his own objects, which is to say that man himself becomes the object."⁴⁷

Finally, the third phase of the meta-theory derives philosophical and political consequences from these formulations, consequences that appear once the terms of philosophy have been reconstituted within the domain of history where they can be set into motion through social practice. At stake here is the meaning of the concept of alienation which, Marx argues, stands in contradiction to the "human essence." Hegel's concept of alienation is now revised to mean a specific, degraded type of objectification in which the transformed world turns around and dominates its creators instead of serving them. Here the individuals cannot recognize or develop themselves through their objects, but are crushed and oppressed by them. Because alienation, as "loss of the object, is not just a social category but also a determination of being generally, this condition can be reformulated as the antinomy of subject and object. In alienation, subject and object stand in conflict, as opposed principles requiring mediation.

The fundamental exigency of philosophy of identity is that the object appear as a product of the subject, but for Marx the

process of this production is now a real one, occurring in history and not in the head of a philosopher. Alienation is a problem for philosophy, splitting subject from object, but not a problem that could be solved in pure thought through a speculative construction. Marx notes that "the medium through which alienation occurs is itself a practical one."⁴⁸ Its transcendence will also have to be practical, requiring a reversal in the relations between human beings and the products of their labor. This then is the "real" alienation which must be overcome and which Hegel confounds with objectivity itself.

Philosophy now appears for Marx not as a means through which a subject-object unity is achieved, but rather as the reflection in thought of their unity in history through labor. And where this unity is obstructed by alienation, the consequences will be felt by philosophy too as failure of its project. Thus where Hegel saw actual alienation, alienation in Marx's sense of the term, as the phenomenal form of the alienation of self-consciousness, Marx reverses the terms and defines the alienation of self-consciousness as the phenomenal form of actual alienation.

This alienation of self-consciousness consists for Marx in religion and idealistic philosophy. The human species creates a world through labor which dominates and dispossesses it; in thought too the products of the mind become powers over it. The species' spiritual and intellectual struggle to understand and reconcile itself with its own alienation gives rise to myths and speculative constructions. In them the individuals rationalize their powerlessness and learn to accept its inevitability as a positive good, as "the rose in the cross of the present."⁴⁹ In Hegel this form of artificial reconciliation with alienation nevertheless points toward the solution by mythologizing the unity of subject and object in labor.

Such alienated thought, Marx believes, cannot resolve its own antinomies. The concept of reason cannot be founded so long as alienation is accepted immediately in reality. It is the

fact that philosophy remains in immediacy, that its transcendence of alienation takes place merely in thought and not in real life, that is responsible for idealism's theological turn toward a supra-sensible reality. But if the overcoming of alienation in practice is essential to the liberation of reason from theological myths, then revolution itself is a *methodological* necessity for philosophy.

A characteristic theory-practice relation now emerges, quite similar to that which Lukács establishes in his early work. If theory attempts to overcome alienation in pure thought, it will fall into various secularized forms of religion. Yet alienation is the obstacle which must be overcome in order to found reason, for to accept it as it is means to fail to unite subject and object, to demonstrate the production of the latter by the former, and this Marx continues to believe is necessary. Thus theory can found itself only by passing into practice to destroy alienation in reality. This can be done through socialist revolution. Marx writes:

It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there a purely philosophical problem.⁵⁰

The purpose of theory on these terms is to provide the proletariat with the "intellectual arms" it needs to solve not only its own problems but those of philosophy as well. No longer does theory appear as the real subject of this process, representing rational form to the proletariat, which latter, as mere need or factual content, can only be a "passive," "material" base for reason. Rather, the domain of need and labor in which the proletariat moves is also the element of reason itself. The contradictions the proletariat experiences in

its existence are not accidentally related to the contradictions of philosophy, but are one and the same. Theory and practice have been united.

In reaching this conclusion Marx finally derives a wholly new type of ground for revolution: the ultimate demand of reason is rationality; revolution alone can satisfy this demand by resolving the antinomies of philosophy. If this is true then reason itself requires revolution, and every rational individual is committed by the very nature of reason to lend a hand.

FROM MARX TO LUKÁCS

The preceding discussion has shown that Marx's early meta-theory of philosophy is in fact a critique of formalism, both in politics and more generally in the theory of rationality. In the next chapter, I will show how this critique of formalism is further elaborated in Lukács' early Marxist philosophy.

Lukács' theory is deeply dependent on Marx's, even though the most important early philosophical writings of Marx were still unpublished at the time. Insofar as the theory presented in the *Manuscripts* is concerned, this dependency is therefore indirect, mediated by Marx's *Capital*. It is precisely because

Lukács studied *Capital* to find in it the basis of a meta-theory of formal rationality that he was able to reconstruct and extend its philosophical dimension in a manner paralleling Marx's own early philosophical work.

Marx arrived at the study of the economy not merely through a change in interests, but through a rigorous philosophical argumentation in the course of which he demonstrates that economics is the science of alienation, the discipline in which is charted the original and basic alienation from which the more complex philosophical forms of it are derived. Although Marx later abandoned the philosophy of praxis of his early works, the trace of this original discovery of the economy is preserved in his later ones. This trace appears

most clearly in the continuing use of a meta-theoretical approach.

Marx's *Capital* continues to criticize formalistic abstractions by bringing them into relation to the social substratum from which they were originally abstracted. It is true that these are no longer philosophical abstractions but economic ones; however, Marx treats these latter in much the same way he had treated the former in the *Manuscripts*. The social contradictions he discovers are, in effect, philosophical antinomies reconstructed in a domain where they can be resolved through social action. The "secret" of *Capital*, its frequent obscurities, the "coquetting" with Hegel, the significance Marx attached to it as the basis of a theory of socialist revolution, all this is to be explained in terms of his fidelity to the original meta-theoretical project. Thus *Capital* is more than a scientific work on economics; it is also a chapter in the history of philosophy.

However, given its exclusively economic focus, *Capital* cannot adequately formulate and resolve the philosophical problems to which it is implicitly addressed. This is damaging to the coherence of Marxism; most importantly, it leaves a gap between the critique of capitalism and the socialist solution, a gap often filled by making pseudo-scientific and determinist claims for the theory of the economy. Whatever Marx himself may have said along these lines on occasion, Marxist economics establishes no causal connection between capitalism and socialism. As I will explain in more detail below, socialist revolution and the transition to a socialist society involve a type of cultural change that cannot be theorized on the model of those processes of "natural history" to which the mature Marx once compared them. On the contrary, the meta-theory of philosophy comes much closer to anticipating in philosophical terms the kind of cultural approach that can alone connect the critique of capitalism with socialism.

This was Lukács' great insight: the understanding that the critique of formal rationality implicit in Marx's economic works is the key to developing an adequate Marxist theory of revolution. Lukács thus began with a work, *Capital*, that responded only implicitly, methodologically to his own preoccupations. He made this implicit dimension of Marxist economic theory explicit by reconstructing its meta-theoretical premises. Then, generalizing Marx's concepts,

Lukács reformulated the philosophical implications of the economic theory as the basis of a theory of revolution. To accomplish this, Lukács had to supply the missing moment in the meta-theory at the basis of Marxist economics, the moment in which philosophy itself operates with the historicized philosophical concepts to resolve simultaneously both historical and philosophical problems. In taking this step beyond Marx, Lukács developed an original philosophy of praxis.

22. Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International, 1968), pp. 596-597.

23. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *op. cit.*, p. 50.

24. For a summary of the theory, see the appendix to Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests*.

25. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science in the Modern World* (New York: Mentor, 1948), p. 88.

26. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origins of the Negative Dialectic* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 26-27.

27. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International, 1968), p. 121.

28. Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," *Negations*, trans. by J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 142.

29. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," L. Easton and K. Guddat, trans. and eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 402.

30. I owe many of the ideas in this section to Gerald Doppelt, who suggested that I include it.

31. Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: International, 1979), p. 29.

CHAPTER 2

1. John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government," in Ernest Barker, ed., *Social Contract* (New York: Oxford University, 1962), p. 133.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract," trans. by G. Hopkins, in Ernest Barker, ed., *Social Contract* (New York: Oxford University, 1962), p. 175.

4. Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," in T. B. Bottomore, trans. and ed., *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (London: C. A. Watts, 1963), p. 52.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

6. Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," in *Negations* trans. by J. Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 137.

7. Karl Marx, "Letter to Ruge," in Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, trans. and eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), p. 213.

8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat Social* (Paris: Gonthier, 1962), p. 247. Barker's edition has the tendentiously incorrect "to obey the laws laid

down by society is to be free." Cf. Ernest Barker, ed., *Social Contract* (New York: Oxford University, 1962), p. 186. For more on the relation of Rousseau and Kant, see Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

9. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, *Kant: The Philosophy of Right* (London: Macmillan, 1970), chapter III.

10. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in T. B. Bottomore, trans. and ed., *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (London: C. A. Watts, 1963), p. 13.

11. Karl Marx, "Letter to Ruge," *op. cit.*, p. 213.

12. This critique is basic to understanding the Marxian conception of socialism and socialist politics. Marx was aware of the Hegelian critique of Jacobin voluntarism and quite self-consciously worked toward a non-voluntaristic formulation of revolutionary theory. Marx believed political revolution to be through and through tied to class society because in it moral exigencies contrary to the "private" interests of the individuals are imposed by the state on a separate civil society of private owners. A revolution to abolish class society and private property would only reproduce these evils were it to attempt to impose a moral legislation in opposition to the perceived interests of the individuals. Rather, a socialist revolution against the very principle of class would necessarily have to be rooted in these interests; only on this condition would it overcome the antinomy of state and civil society, reason and need. Whatever the course of events in the existing communist countries, Marx at least was aware of the type of problems raised by conservative critics such as Leo Strauss or J. L. Talmon, who see in Marxism simply another version of Jacobin voluntarism. For more on Marx's approach, see especially his early essay, "Critical Notes on The King of Prussia and Social Reform' ", in L. Easton and K. Guddat, trans. and eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Doubleday, 1967). Cf. on Marx and Jacobinism, François Furet, *Penser la Revolution Française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978).

13. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *op. cit.*, p. 30.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

17. *HCC*, p. 160.

18. *HCC*, p. 126.

19. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *op. cit.*, p. 30.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

21. Lucien Goldmann, "Philosophie et sociologie dans l'oeuvre du jeune Marx: Contribution a l'étude du problème," in *Marxisme et Sciences Humaines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p. 148. For a recent reformulation of the problem, see Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979).

22. Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," in T. B. Bottomore, trans. and ed., *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (London: C. A. Watts, 1963), p. 53.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 58. For a fuller discussion of the relation of this early concept of the proletariat to Marx's later theory of class, see William Leiss, "Critical Theory and Its Future," *Political Theory* 2 (1974), part II.

25. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," *op. cit.*, p. 59.

26. *HCC*, p. 2.

27. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," *op. cit.*, p. 54.

28. Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, trans. by M. Vogel, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 5.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 67. For a useful discussion of the relation of Marx to Feuerbach, see Shlomo Avineri, "The Hegelian Origins of Marx's Political Thought," in S. Avineri, ed., *Marx' Socialism* (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1972), pp. 3-4; *passim*.

32. Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," in T. B. Bottomore, trans. and ed., *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (London: C. A. Watts, 1963), p. 163.

33. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," *op. cit.*, p. 158.

34. *HCC*, p. 170. Cf. also Georg Lukács, "Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics," in Georg Lukács, *Tactics and Ethics*, trans. by M. McCollgan, ed. by R. Livingstone (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 214-215.

35. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," *op. cit.*, p. 197.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 203. Jean Hyppolite has written a famous defense of Hegel in response to such criticisms. See "Alienation et objectivation," in Jean Hyppolite, *Etudes sur Marx et Hegel* (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1965). For a response to Hyppolite, see Istvan Meszaros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 242-245.

38. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism*, trans. by R. Dixon and C. Dutte (Moscow: Progress, 1975), p. 70.

39. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," *op. cit.*, p. 204.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

44. Quoted in Bertell Ollman, *Alienation* (New York: Cambridge University, 1971), p. 275.

45. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

49. The phrase is, of course, Hegel's. See, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. by T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University, 1952), p. 12.

50. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," *op. cit.*, p. 162. That the concept of reason is truly at issue in Marx seems to me to be a necessary implication of his discussion of the reform of the sciences. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164. This aspect of his theory will be discussed at greater length in the conclusion of this book.

CHAPTER 3

1. George Lukács, "The Old Culture and the New Culture," trans. by P. Breines and S. Weber, *Telos*, no. 5 (1970), p. 21.

2. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern Univ., 1970), p. 299.

3. The other major work of this tendency is Karl Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1966), originally published in 1923, at the same time as Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness*. Korsch's book is available in a partial English translation under the title *Marxism and Philosophy*, trans. by F. Halliday (New York: Monthly Review, 1970).

4. Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, p. 105.

5. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 83.

6. *HCC*, p. 102.

7. For a discussion of the gap between Marx's critique of political economy and the revolutionary theory of socialism, cf., Stanley Moore, "Utopian Themes in Marx and Mao: A Critique for Modern Revisionists," *Monthly Review* 21, no. 2 (1969). Moore's argument is developed further in "Marx and Lenin as Historical Materialists," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 4, no. 2 (1975).

8. *HCC*, p. 152.

9. *HCC*, pp. 184-185.

10. *HCC*, p. 231.

11. *HCC*, p. 102.

12. *HCC*, p. 179.

*Lukács, Marx
and the
Sources of
Critical Theory*

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