Guest Lecture on Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is practical in a way other moral theories are not. While rule-guided and duty-guided theories concentrate on reasoning about the theoretical principles of moral decision-making, the reasoning of virtue ethics is extrapolated from moral practice.
Virtue ethics is structured in a way which allows it to define the behaviour
of the virtuous person. The situation is perceived within the framework
of a character. It is particularly clear in Aristotle’s account of virtue
ethics. The moral agent “sees and judges with the eyes of experience.”
Contemporary followers of Aristotle (Aristotelians or neo-Aristotelians)
mention the descriptive aspect of the moral worth of virtues as well. Philippa
Foot suggests that when one evaluates a morally pertinent action, the evaluation
includes a descriptive element of a particular behavior. In this manner
the words ‘rude’ or cruel’ can be seen as descriptions. We describe action
as cruel in addition to judging it as cruel.
Virtue ethics recognizes the fact that we are engaged in morally relevant
activities long before we are able to reason about morality.
Virtue ethics includes the early childhood experience in its theoretical
considerations.
Virtue ethicists dedicate a large part of their theoretical framework
to the shaping of pre-reflective experience, that is, the cultivation of
virtues.
Some contemporary virtue theorists emphasize the habitual nature of virtue; others, the moral character that consists of certain interconnection between virtues; and still others, the moral value that makes dispositions virtuous.
Nancy Sherman argues for the gradual development of the capacity for virtue, since the reasoning ability develops with the process of maturation:
“Child is viewed not statically, but as in progress toward full humanity…. To lack deliberative skills at a certain stage does not imply the absence of other cognitive capacities specific to ethical response. Therefore, virtues, while acquired through habituation, are not entirely divorced from reason, even at the earliest stages of their cultivation.” (Sherman)Virtue may be perceived as good in two distinct senses:
a) Virtue can make the person good: it is admirable in its possessorNeo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: the concept of virtue is Aristotelian, but the neo-Aristotelians disagree with Aristotle on women, or slaves, etc.The list of virtues neo-Aristotelians accept differs from Aristotle’s. For instance, Aristotle did not include, benevolence or charity on his list, yet the neo-Aristotelians assume that these virtues are on the list now.
b) Virtue is good for the person: it is desirable for its possessor.
Non-Aristotelian virtue ethics: For instance,
agent-based virtue ethics advocated by Michael Slote. He argued that the
principle of impartiality demands an equal consideration for the well being
of all the participants in the moral community, including the agent herself.
Thus, the agent's self-interests become a legitimate component in her decision-making.
Another example: Christine Swanton: Her version of virtue ethics is
a pluralist virtue ethics: there are different sets of virtues that fit
different kinds of people. A virtuous action may have the need to satisfy
more than one conception of right in order to be considered virtuous. Her
version of virtue ethics allows for a degree of situational consideration
as a threshold concept.