Poesis
Aristotle regards praxis and poesis to be generically different concepts. In the following passage from the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explicitly sets out the difference between them:
...action and making are different kinds of thing, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing, the end cannot be other than the
act itself. (1140 b 1-5)
Aristotle's treatment of the subject seems straightforward enough. Nevertheless, the passage
contains a much greater complexity of thought than meets the eye. On the one hand Aristotle
refers to an activity whose end (telos) is different from the activity itself; on the other hand he speaks of an activity whose telos is the activity itself. The first is poesis, and the second praxis.hcc.haifa.ac.il/~balaban/Doc/PAPERS/ Balaban-Prax&PoesisAristot.pdf

Hannah Arendt

takes up these questions from antiquity

in

The Human Condition

1958

The modern age, in its early concern with tangible products and demonstrable profits or its later obsession with smooth functioning and sociability, was not the first to denounce the idle uselessness of action and speech in particular and of politics in general...
...The calamities of action all arise from the human condition of plurality, which is the condition sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the public realm. Hence the attempt to do away with this plurality is always tantamount to the abolition of the public realm itself...
...Only the modern age's conviction that man can know only what he makes, that his allegedly higher capacities depend upon making and that he therefore is primarily homo faber and not an animal rationale, brought forth the much older implications of violence inherent in all interpretations of the realm of human affairs as a sphere of making...Marx's dictum that "violence is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one," that is, of all change in history and politics, only sums up the conviction of the whole modern age and draws the consequences of its innermost belief that history is "made" by men as nature is "made" by God.
...The substitution of making for acting and the concomitant degradation of politics into a means to obtain an allegedly "higher" end...in the modern age the productivity and progress of society--is as old as the tradition of political philosophy. It is true that only the modern age defined man primarily as homo faber, a toolmaker and producer of things, and therefore could overcome the deep-seated contempt and suspicion in which the tradition had held the whole sphere of fabrication. Yet, this same tradition, in so far as it also had turned against action--less openly, to be sure, but no less effectively...had introduced into political philosophy certain trends and patterns of though upon which the modern age could fall back. [i.e. the ends justify the means, or "you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs" which Arendt speaks of as violent, and which Ziezek expands upon in his discussions of political reasoning.]...The point is that Plato and, to a lesser degree,
Aristotle, who thought craftsmen not even worthy of full-fledged citizenship, were the first to propose handling political maters and ruling political bodies in the mode of fabrication...

The Human Condition, p. 197 to 206

Composition's connection to Praxis, Poesis, Making and
Action...

Foucault from “Remarks on Marx” (Semiotext 1991) 1978 interviews with Duccio TrombadoriThese quotes extract some of Foucault’s views about a particular conception of “the subject” as point of division between his theory and other (earlier) ideas.

In our context they open a question about "composing" and making as models and metaphors for making "man"

Trombadori:”…I wish to know how and for what reasons you distinguish yourself from them.[the Frankfurt School]
Foucault: Certainly distinctions exist. Schematically one can affirm that the conception of the “subject” that was adopted by the Frankfurt School was quite traditional, was of a philosophical character. Then, it was noticeably impregnated with the humanism of a Marxist type. That also explains the particular articulation of the latter with certain Freudian concepts, in the relationship between alienation and repression, between “liberation,” disalienation, and the end of exploitation.

I’m convinced that given these premises, the Frankfurt School cannot by any means admit that the problem is not to recover our “lost” identity, to free our imprisoned nature, our deepest truth; but instead the problem is to move towards something radically Other. The center, then, seems still to be found in Marx’s phrase: man produces man. It’s all in how you look at it. For me, what must be produced is not man identical to himself, exactly as nature would have designed him or according to his essence; on the contrary, we must produce something that doesn’t yet exist and about which we cannot know how and what it will be.

Secondly, let’s think about the verb “to produce.” I don’t agree that this production of man by man occurs in the same way, let’s say as that of the value of riches, or of an object of use, of the economic type. It’s a question rather of the destruction of what we are, of the creation of something entirely different, of a total innovation. Now it seems to me that the idea they had of this ”production of man by man” basically consisted in the need to free everything that, in the repressive system connected with rationality or the repression of exploitation linked with class society, had been experienced at a distance from man and his fundamental essence.