Tocqueville's Virus

Utopia and Dystopia in Western Social and Political Thought

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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
New York London

Introduction
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I. WHAT IS THE VIRUS?

> There is besides something special in this malady of the French Revolution that I feel without being able to describe it well or analyse its causes. It is a *virus* of a new and unknown kind. There were violent revolutions in the world, but the immoderate, violent, radical, desperate, audacious, almost mad, and nonetheless powerful and effective character of these revolutionaries is without precedent, it seems to me, in the great social agitations of past centuries. (Tocqueville, 1985: 373)

In 1858 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote to his cousin, Louis de Kergorlay, of his struggles to reconstruct the events of the French Revolution. In the letter he notes that progress has been slow, because of the mountains of source material that require consideration, and that he despairs of the enormity of his task that he believes will eventually force him to confront the significance of the strange new illness that made otherwise reasonable men become blood thirsty tyrants. In his psychoanalytic study of French Revolutionary Terror, *Citizens and Cannibals* (1991), Eli Sagan refers to Tocqueville's idea of the virus to symbolise his theory of political psychosis. Sagan's claim is that the utopianism of revolutionary movements, such as the Jacobins or Bolsheviks, will always collapse into the dystopia of terror because of the psychotic dialectic of anxiety and paranoia that these movements never fail to produce in even the most rational of men. For Sagan utopian revolutions, such as 1789 and 1917, tend to create this terrible dialectic because they wipe out the social, political, and psychic reference points that order men's lives and provide them with a sense of significance or structure. The effect of these enormous destructive events is, therefore, to plunge men into a vacuum where traditional forms of knowledge become more or less meaningless. Lost in this black hole, without order, structure, or significance, men turn to either deep historical prejudice or philosophical reason to reconstitute their social, political, and psychic space. In both cases Sagan refers to the psychoanalytic idea of paranoia to explain these reconstructive efforts. Whereas historical prejudice, founded upon class, race, or gender

lines, tends towards paranoia because it relies on clear divisions between imaginary figures, which we might call *us* and *them*, philosophical reason produces the same effect through its absolute faith in abstract systems of thought unable to accommodate the wrinkles that characterise base reality, what Lacan (2005a) calls the real.

If the first strategy of reconstitution, historical prejudice, is the form of paranoid politics we normally associate with primitive mob violence, and its random attacks on others who become scapegoats for social, political, economic, or psychic chaos, the second tactic is truly modern in its elevation of the brutal logic of mob violence to the level of a philosophical or, to be precise, ideological system able to read history itself through the lens of paranoid us/them relations. Whereas the first mode of paranoia is essentially mythological, because of the legendary nature of the stories that separate us from them, the second mode, ideology, enlists the support of modern reason to clarify its notion of the history of us/them interactions. In the first example, myth, there is no clear sense of a telos, or resolution, to the problem of antagonism. The singular myth is essentially cyclical in form since it symbolises the moral distinction between us and them without reference to historical narrative. However, upon the emergence of the mythological system, which occurs through the relation of a number of myths, myth starts to take on the narrative form of a series of episodes that chart the progress through time of the moral politics of us/them relations. Herein it is possible to see how myth, which supports the primitive violence of what Rene Girard (1989) calls the scapegoat mechanism, evolves to the extent where the simple moral opposition of us/them becomes a mythological narrative that runs through time. At this point mythology no longer simply divides us from them through the imposition of moral texture upon a series of singular episodes; now these singular episodes find their place in a more or less complete story of the distant origins and eventual fate of human life.

Enter the final, rational, transformation of the mythological system into the reasonable, philosophical, edifice that extinguishes the legendary content of the mythological structure and replaces it with modern scientific, historical facts. The function of facts is to prove the moral separation of us from them and, as a consequence, exchange the mythological/theological category of morality for the modern category of politics able to locate the justification for the essential political decision in secular, rather than theological, behaviours observed over the passage of time. But what is it that makes the use of the term *paranoia* appropriate to this exploration of these modes of thought? If, as Carl Schmitt (1996a) claimed in his book on the idea of politics, the essence of the political resides in the fundamental decision that separates friends from enemies or us from them, then it may be the case that all politics are shot through with paranoia about self/other relations. Despite the presence of what we might call everyday paranoia in normal politics, what makes particular types of myth/politics deserve their relation to the psychological term *paranoia* is their extreme response to the presence of anxiety, or what Kierkegaard (1981) would call the possibility of possibility. When revolution plunges men into the abyss of insignificance paranoid politics leads them to imagine their salvation through the complete elimination of the other side. They come to believe that the annihilation of them would rid us of the vertigo brought about by the suspension of the normal social and political situation.

Although normal myth/politics may contain an unconscious wish to eliminate the other who is always in some respects an enemy, the purpose of both legendary stories and political dialogue is to sublimate the remainder of primitive violence into a less destructive mode of sociability/civilization. However, it is Sagan's (1991) contention that when the social and political system is subject to massive trauma and, as a consequence, the population's psychic structure starts to collapse, the pathology of paranoia infects myth/politics so that the reconstitution of social, political, and psychic order seems to necessarily entail the total elimination of the enemy other. In the paranoid mythological/political narrative that structures us/them relations the complete destruction of the other is entirely legitimate. The evil other is to blame for either the past situation, which the revolution sought to smash to pieces, or current conditions that require urgent overhaul. Once their elimination is complete social, political, and psychic harmony will reign. There will be no more antagonism. Thus we will enter into the future of the eternal present. In the language of the most complex mythological cosmology in Western history, Judaeo-Christianity, we will enter Heaven. In the terminology of secular modernity, we will come to inhabit utopia, the classless commune or the pure racial state. It is in this way that paranoid mythology/politics constructs its historical narrative. They are responsible for the horrors of the past. They are also the cause of the wrinkles of the present. In the future when they are no more we will inhabit a perfect, timeless, state. For Sagan the emergence of this condition, the virus of anxiety/paranoia that infects men who have lost all sense of their place in the world, represents the fate of all revolutionary movements.

Following the initial moment of revolutionary fracture, when the abyss of freedom allows us to glimpse the possibility of possibility, we cannot but recoil in horror. In the face of radical uncertainty, men will seek to reconstitute their world through the elimination of others who seem to threaten their existence. They imagine that such ultra violence is the price they must pay to save their souls. Genocidal violence will be their salvation. Despite the virulence of the infection history shows that there have been various attempts to cure us. In Ancient Greece Socrates chose to reject Lex Talionis or the Law of Retaliation in order to try to finish the eternal war between us and them (Vlastos, 1991). As Rene Girard's (1997) works illustrate, the evolution of the Judaeo-Christian tradition from the Old Testament to the New Testament similarly sought to conclude the eternal return of the scapegoat mechanism through the story of God's ultimate sacrifice to

end the practice of sacrifice itself. Whereas the monstrous God of the Old Testament could recommend the principle of retaliation in Exodus ('an eye for an eye'), Christ would later revise his Father's law in his sermon on the mount ('turn the other cheek'). While it is true that the God of the Old Testament told his followers to love their neighbours, it took Christ to take the term *neighbours* further than the Old Testament's basic definition, which led to the conclusion that we should simply love other Israelites, in order to suggest that we should love other men or more precisely those not like us.

In modern psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud (1989a) made the equation between the Christian principle of neighbourly love and the conclusion of us/them conflicts in his essay *Civilization and Its Discontents*. In his metapsychology the state of agitation that leads to us/them violence and the paranoid dream of the utopic/dystopic condition free of antagonism is simply an external representation, or projection, of the intra-psychic condition that leads the principle of thanatos, or the death drive, to push humans back towards the oceanic womb state that entails suicidal self-destruction (Freud, 1990). If Freud chose to emphasise the uncanny element of paranoid utopias, which encourages us to chase the spectres of the distant past through violent confrontations of the present, the post-modern Marxist Fredric Jameson (2005) claims that the essential problem of paranoid utopias/dystopias is that they deprive us our possible futures. In order to counter the paranoid temptation to sacrifice the principle of hope to the absolute closure of utopia, Jameson suggests that we must strain to retain our interest in the science fictions that continue to link the present to our potential futures. Following Robert Nozick (1977), whose theory of heaven explains that a true utopia would embrace a proliferation of little utopias, Jameson's post-modern position seeks to fracture the violent paranoia of utopia through an emphasis on the boundless expanse of the human imagination. In a post-modern universe it is impossible to imagine a utopia that would not insist on the totalitarian control of the imagination. But the modern was no different in this respect. In much the same way that the post-modern is shot through with the tensions that radiate from the twin infinitives of endless decentralisation and relentless globalisation, the modern obsession with newness, imagination, revolution, utopia, and futurity was always scarred by the pathologies of fear, anxiety, and paranoia. If the classic works of Zamyatin (1993), Orwell (2004), and Huxley (1998), with their imagination transplants, ministries of truth, and compulsory promiscuity, suggest that modernity was caught under the sign of this tragic bind, then the nightmare societies of Stalin and Hitler simply confirm that reality was even more terrible than the masters of fiction could envisage.

Although numerous writers have sought to warn us of the paranoid logic of the virus, the infection continues to mutate today. Even the master theorist of the virus, Tocqueville, has been unable to cure the infection. In response to the horrors of the French Revolution, which led from the slow decay of the feudal system in the 18th century, through the initial

historical rupture in 1789 to the radical terrorist phase of the revolution in 1792, and the final resolution of the revolutionary process through the utopic rise of Napoleon and the French nation in 1804, Tocqueville (2000) sought to disrupt the lifecycle of the virus through reference to the politics of the American township. Tocqueville thought that the lifecycle of the virus, which ran through the stages of revolution, anxiety, paranoia, violence, and utopia, was fatal in the French because they were unable to stare into the abyss of the possibility of possibility and embrace their newfound freedoms. Instead their history of feudal oppression meant that their only response to the emergence of the possibility of possibility was to take flight into the viral logic of violence, terror, paranoia, utopia, and finally authoritarian dictatorship. Unlike the French, who had no sense of freedom, Tocqueville thought that Americans had shown themselves capable of self-mastery through their colonisation of the wilderness, their ability to create a social system ex nihilo without state intervention, and their capacity for self-government through township democracy.

By the time he wrote the second volume of his masterwork *Democracy in America* (2000) Tocqueville was not so sure about the prospects of American Democracy. He feared that even in America, that even in the land of the free, the virus had taken hold and started to infect the political system with the evils of anxiety, paranoia, and utopia. According to Tocqueville the problem with America was that society and economy had started to take precedence over politics. Men were less interested in freedom through association than they were in their own personal position relative to those of other men. In order to better explain this process Tocqueville coined the term *individualism*, by which he meant that men were no longer interested in public issues, but instead obsessed about their own private concerns. This abdication of freedom was, in itself, bad enough, but worse was to come. Tocqueville saw that in proportion to the citizenry's en masse retreat from public space, state administration, or bureaucracy, would take control of common political issues. Unlike previous European revolutions, the exchange of power in America was not brought about by bloody revolution. Rather Tocqueville saw that the people had simply lost interest in freedom. They had given up their autonomy for a life of private pleasure and voluntary servitude. Herein we witness the emergence of the novel lifecycle of the American mutation of the virus. In this case it was not that the slow decay of feudal power or a spontaneous outbreak of revolutionary violence led to the cycle of anxiety, paranoia, and utopia, but rather that men simply gave up their freedoms.

It was this gesture that led to the infection. The abdication of public space and the rise of individualism led to the anxiety of identity and the paranoid need to reconstitute American identity through various attacks on enemy others. At the bottom of this will to America lay the wish to reconstitute the original Puritan utopia, the city of God, which has driven Americans into the future since John Winthrop's original city on the hill

sermon in 1630. Indeed, we might argue that American history has been marked by sporadic outbreaks of the virus of paranoia every since. As James Morone (2003) notes in his book *Hellfire Nation*, it is possible to understand the entirety of American history through the lens of moral politics. According to this interpretation, from Winthrop to Dubya American history has been about the attempt to separate us from them, friends from enemies, saints from sinners, in order to construct a coherent American identity. Although Tocqueville was able to diagnose the appearance of the virus in the mid-19th century, recent American unilateralism in Iraq suggests that the infection is still present. By the time Tocqueville was able to recognise the symptoms, Europe was too far gone. As Jacob Talmon (1991) explains, it is possible that the French Revolution condemned the old world to Hitlerism and the Holocaust. The 20th century's other famous author of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt (2005), traces the moment of infection back to an even earlier point, the relationship between Socrates and Plato in the Athenian Polis. Yet regardless of whether we find the moment of infection in the rationalism of the French Enlightenment or the politics of Ancient Athens, most commentators recognise that the infection was rampant in Europe by the middle of the 19th century. There was no way back for Europeans. But surely America was a different story? Even though Tocqueville thought that it was a carrier, was it not possible that the horrors of the Gulag Archipelago and Auschwitz would save America from its utopian infection? Despite the horrors of the Gulag Archipelago and Auschwitz, it appears that this has not been the case. Although appearances continue to suggest that America champions Tocqueville's liberal cure to the virus of paranoia, through the support of notions of freedom, democracy, and rights, the reality of the situation suggests a quite different interpretation of American politics.

The autopsy of totalitarianism led America to solidify its historical rejection of state intervention in its citizens' private lives in the name of political inoculation. But the fear of the totalitarian/fundamental other has itself led to further symptoms of viral infection. Successive attacks on FDR's New Deal left Americans confident in their freedom from state intervention, but the subsequent enlargement of the security state meant that this was not the case. Today, Americans must suffer for the treasure of the possibility of possibility on a variety of fronts. On the one hand they must tolerate the savage labour market which, as Corey Robin (2004) explains, continues to feed off the ideology of individual responsibility and the fear of personal failure, and on the other hand, they have to endure the increasingly invasive security state, which exercises a type of Foucauldian micro fascism over the entire population, but that only ever become visible to those who, for one reason or another, become potential others in the land of the other. In the first instance there is no state. Americans are simply left to fend for themselves. They are thrown to the lions of business. In the second case, the state exercises enormous control over everyday life through the diffuse powers

of governmentality. Yet Americans continue to believe in their nation and America continues to exert an enormously attractive power over people across the world: Why is this the case? Tocqueville (2000) thought that Americans continue to believe in the value of the ideology of individualism, even though the despotic logic of democracy aims at the destruction of all forms of true self-realisation, because the constant agitations of capitalist self-making distract their attention from the reality of the American state's soft fascism. They forget how to think. In this state of slumber it is still possible to believe in notions of freedom, democracy, and rights precisely because one never bothers to test them.

If Americans bury their heads in the sand of private enterprise, many others across the globe feel that the promise of America still holds true. This is because America is perhaps the last place where it is still possible to believe in the utopia of freedom, democracy, law, and self-realisation. In particular the American dream of upward mobility through hard work and the realisation of natural talents continues to exert an enormous gravitational pull on much of the world's population. But the problem is that this American dream of self-realisation, which we might trace back as far as the invention of Jacksonian liberalism, was always haunted by a less friendly other side. The same liberalism that spoke of the potential of the man from nowhere to make it big, which led us to believe in the value of the possibility of possibility, was always shot through with the type of paranoia that continues to mark the popular notion of the rugged individual (Lieven, 2004). The original Homo Americanus, Jackson's frontiersman, was never more or less liberal than Hoover's 20th century version of the same figure, the rugged individual, or Dubya's image of American man, the 21st century Puritan missionary. Akin to the Hoover/Bush versions of the American ego-ideal, Jackson's character was always a white male anti-intellectual. This is what supporters of Americanism worldwide often fail to see. American liberalism, with its notions of upward mobility, meritocracy, and self-realisation, has never really been open to others, simply because the idea that bound these principles together, the individual, was never an empty concept. Rather the notion of the individual was always a complex representation of Homo Americanus that could only pass for an empty category because the ideal of the rock hard frontiersman was mistaken for a self-evident truth.

Entry to the American *us* is, therefore, reliant on the acceptance of this self-evident truth. There is little room for them on the other side of American liberalism. But there is more to America than nationalistic paranoia. While rugged individuals are able to maintain their belief in the liberal tradition, simply because there is no conflict between the possibility of possibility and American nationalism from their point of view, others continue to live *as if* the official moderate tradition was entirely true and believe that events that appear to disprove this fact are momentary lapses of liberal conscience. Although post-modernism has taught us that perspective is everything, the truth is probably somewhere in-between these two extremes. Those who

suggest that American liberalism is American nationalism and compare America to Stalin's Soviet Union, over-state the extent of the coincidence between the liberal ideas of freedom, meritocracy, and self-realisation and the Waspish traits of the rugged individual that characterise the notion of the American mission. On the other hand, it would also be a mistake to ignore the way that the ideal identity of the Waspish rugged individual qualifies the liberal freedoms that constitute the official American ideology and supplements the libertarian fantasy of total freedom to live one's own way with a set of norms and values that tell us about livin' right. If this is, in fact, the case then we might conclude that America has historically been able to strike a balance between the anxiety of the possibility of possibility and the paranoid temptation to social, political, and psychic reconstructions that require a moral politics of us/them relations.

At various points in history either the liberal tradition or the nationalistic norm has found itself on top (Morone, 2003). In the 1930s FDR sought to found a liberal America on the basis of the New Deal, but paranoid nationalism came back on the scene with Eisenhower's Cold War politics of us versus them. In the 1960s, first Kennedy and then Johnson sought to roll back the traditionalism of the 1950s through the construction of the Great Society, but this idealism soon gave way to calls for a return to proper American values. As the 1960s became the 1970s conservatives found it easy to blame the debacle of Vietnam on the weakness of liberalism. By the early 1980s, the conservatives had found their man in Ronald Reagan, the old movie star who could remake America in his own cinematic image of the rugged western hero. After Clinton's brief return to the liberalism of the 1960s, Dubya has led America into the 21st century on the basis of his own muscular mythology of the frontiersman out to subdue the wilderness in the name of God's chosen people. On the basis of this ideology American politics is once more under the sway of Hofstadter's (1996) famous paranoid style. In terms of the market, Bush's America has no sense of others. The global economy is simply an engine to feed America's addiction to the consumption of everything from oil to sneakers. Yet the endless fluctuations of the global market have had a problematic effect on America's sense of existential security. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri explain in the *Empire* (2000), the chaos of the market has meant that America is no longer in control of its own fate. In this respect it is possible to suggest that the globalisation of capitalism, which is at once post-modern, in its reliance on signs and symbols, risky in its dependence on confidence and fear, and entirely reliant on the principle of contagion to maintain the integrity of information flow across the network, represents the ultimate expression of the possibility of possibility.

For this reason we might choose to conclude that the global market is simply a post-modern version of the Californian dream of the gold rush, a representation of the liberal freedoms that have made America so attractive to people across the world for the past two hundred years (Cullen, 2003).

But the problem with this theory of the west is that it neglects to remember the chauvinism of the imperialistic prospector who we now know held a very particular view of the world. Given this recognition it is clear that consideration of America's relation to global capitalism must take into account both sides of its ideological tradition. We may claim that the American-led globalisation of capitalism, and subsequent spread of liberal politics, has resulted in an enormous increase of freedoms throughout the world, but it is also impossible to ignore that the same nation has fallen back on the paranoid style of politics in order to secure its own place in the new network society. Thus Dubya's Dixie capitalism is less liberal than its Yankee equivalent. Whereas supporters of the latter felt some concern for the new slaves of the third world, because their liberal conscience told them the market was meant to be an institution for self-realisation, Dubya's southern heritage has meant that he has no sense of concern for the global poor (Pieterse, 2004). Yet it is precisely because Bush's America lacks a liberal sense of the universal value of the market that it also finds it impossible to tolerate the endless vicissitudes, relentless deconstructions, and ceaseless fragmentations of an economic system that liberals might celebrate for its redistributive potential.

Although the Dixiecrat remains a gambler, his sense of ethnic superiority means that he is unwilling to lose out to his inferiors. Instead contemporary Dixie capitalism treats the global market like an untamed wilderness that must be brought under the rule of civilization through the use of what C. Wright Mills (2000) called military metaphysics. Thus we can see that in the state of globality the psychopathologies of anxiety and paranoia coexist in what Arthur Kroker (2005) calls a quantum condition. Whereas the market continues to endlessly de-/re-territorialize itself, the paranoid temptation leads men to attempt to restructure their social, political, and psychic situations through violent us/them politics. For evidence of the existence of this quantum condition we might refer to Hardt and Negri's (2000) strange concept of empire that is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere or consider the popular neo-conservative theory of the clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1998). In the first instance we observe the theoretical articulation of a global empire which could never be called totalitarian, but rather might best be understood through the metaphor of the shattering totality that is forever trying to reconstitute its integral self-identity. Whereas this image offers an explanation of the condition of the American empire, the second example provides us with a description of the state of paranoid politics. In the theory of the clash of civilizations, the paranoia of globality is laid bare. We confront them. There is no space for mediation or negotiation of a shared vision for the future. It is either us or them. In Bush's current version of this thesis, which is simply a re-write of recent Eisenhower/Reagan productions, the free West confronts the enemy of civilization, Islamic fundamentalism, in a winner takes all fight to the finish.

We know that it is a mistake to understand American liberalism from the point of view of official ideology. As a result we know we cannot take this neo-conservative thesis at face value. However, it is also clear that we cannot ignore the paranoia of others. In much the same way it would be a mistake to over-state the openness of American society, it would also be an error to imagine that Stalin was not a paranoid totalitarian or that Islamic fundamentalism is not a warped theocratic fascism bent on the realisation of an impossible Islamic utopia. But what can this recognition mean? Perhaps the lesson of such realism is that simply because Eisenhower, Reagan, and Bush were/are paranoid does not meant that the other was/is not out to destroy America. If this is, in fact, the ultimate lesson of post-World War II politics, which, in spite of Frances Fukuyama's (1993) claim to the contrary, have become no less theocratic-ideological than those of the first half of the 20th century, then we must conclude that our anxieties about the possibility of possibility, and the fear of the other who may try to exploit these possibilities in order to plot our destruction, are no longer simply projections of our existential insecurity before the abyss of freedom, but rather very real reactions to the possibility of imminent attack. It is possible that this transformation, from a state where the other becomes a scapegoat for our sense of vertigo before the possibility of possibility to a situation where our paranoid fears about the other are in fact correct, takes place precisely because the other now inhabits the same condition of globality that conditions our anxiety/paranoia in the first place.

It may be that the politics of globality generate an uncanny structure, whereby the other becomes our evil double, who symbolises everything that we cannot accept about ourselves, and we serve the same purpose for the other who similarly understands us through the lens of paranoia. The relation of these two positions under the sign of globality creates a kind of perpetual motion machine that reproduces the virus through the endless oscillation of the anxiety/paranoia couple. Anxiety continually gives way to paranoia, which gives way to further anxiety, upon the failure of paranoia to impose utopian closure upon the relentless de-/re-territorializations of the global market, which leads to further paranoia ad nauseam. Although it is unclear what the conclusion to this process might look like, we know that the struggle between the new paranoias of Dubya (the war on terror) and Bin Laden (the Islamic Jihad) represents the confrontation of two totally inflexible ideological systems unable to imagine co-existence with each other. Under conditions of globality, where the network is everything, and the principle of communication, or contagion, is central to life, what we might call the contemporary clash of fundamentalisms has become the perfect culture for the endless reproduction of the virus. In the Cold War, where two similarly oppositional ideologies went toe to toe, the function of the balance of power was to stabilise the paranoia/anxiety relation. Utopian hubris that issues from rampant paranoia was held in check by controls on anxiety, made possible by strategic principles such as MAD

(Mutual Assured Destruction), which sought to minimise the possibility to attack through the deterrent of certain massive counter-attack.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s it was no longer possible to rely on the balance of power to control the anxiety/paranoia relation. Indeed, the viral nature of information technologies, which led to the eventual integration of the communist states into the global network and was, as a consequence, central to the ultimate victory of the American form of market capitalism over its ideological nemesis, the Soviet model of state communism, also resulted in an enormous increase in anxiety in America itself. Although the Soviet Empire was already in terminal decline by the 1980s, Reagan was able to re-start the Cold War through mythological constructions, such as the evil empire, which he knew would appeal to Americans brought up on a diet of Flash Gordon and Star Wars. By the 1990s it was impossible to perform a similar trick and maintain the image of the dynamic totalitarian movement bent on the conquest of the free world. Soviet communism simply fell apart before American eyes. Neo-conservative opinion was clear in its response to the new situation. Given that America could either fall back to become one nation in a world of nations, and cope with potential threats that may emerge from the new global state of nature when they appear, or maintain its super-power status and manage the global situation to prevent the emergence of possible threats before they have the chance to realise their potential, there was no real choice. The notion of American exceptionalism made it clear that America could never simply be one nation in a world of nations. The related, quasi-theological, idea of the American mission simply lent credence to this position (Bacevich, 2005).

As a result the neo-conservative view was that America's future lay with a domestic/foreign policy that would ensure the maintenance of the American way of life through support of traditional Protestant values. While domestic policy, founded on the ideal of a return to traditional values, would roll back liberalism and, as a result, prevent a re-run of the debacle of Vietnam, foreign policy, based on muscular interventions in far off lands, would address potential threats to the American way of life at source, and secure favourable conditions for the preservation of American super-power status. Thus the neo-cons sought to resolve the enormous anxiety brought about by the collapse of the Cold War balance of power through a paranoid policy of domestic traditionalism/foreign interventionism. If it was possible to counter liberal criticisms of the former through an emphasis on the social value of conservative morality, it was similarly feasible to circumvent condemnation of the latter through reference to ideas of humanitarian intervention and export democracy. Although it is often easier for liberals to swallow the latter theory, because notions of humanitarian intervention seem to represent the pure American mission, than it is for them to come to terms with the former, because moral traditionalism clearly relies on a particular version of us/them politics, the truth is that the neo-con theory

of foreign interventionism is less about the pure mission to improve the condition of humanity in far off places and more about the paranoid quest to protect American interests in every part of the world.

However, if America's mission was to improve the condition of humanity then its leaders would not only have to intervene in foreign tyrannies, but also consider America's own conduct in the global economy. In the past the standard neo-conservative response to criticisms of multi-national exploitation, which is that capitalism is simply the best mechanism for the improvement of the condition of the global poor, was less transparent than it is today when the Bush principle of unilateral interventionism seems to prove that Carl Schmitt was on the mark when he said that whoever invokes humanity is simply trying to use the idea of moral universalism to excuse the exercise of national realpolitik (Zolo, 2002). Following the invention of the Bush Doctrine in 2002 it has become increasingly difficult to believe that American support for laissez-faire capitalism is anything but a policy meant to enrich American corporations. Although this connection suggests that Dubya's Dixie capitalism represents a return to old style imperialism, whereby military intervention follows economic investment in order to secure national interest, the truth may be more complex. It is entirely possible that the realpolitik of the Bush Doctrine, which seeks to expand the American sphere of influence until it covers the entire world, is simply the paranoid counter-point to the enormous anxiety that is the necessary by-product of the neo-liberal belief in the value of the runaway market. It is, of course, possible to say that traditional imperialism was always shot through with the virus of anxiety/paranoia, but I would suggest that the lightning speeds of the contemporary network mean that the virus is even more contagious today than it was when Marx wrote about an earlier, uncanny (unhomely), epoch.

In contemporary network capitalism our anxiety appears to totalise, so that we begin to see the emergence of an epidemic of neuroses that renders many unfit for work, because we must take into account the lightning speeds of the de-/re-territorializations of the economy that mean that we should replace the American dreams of upward mobility, meritocracy, and hard work with the figure of the lottery modelled on the impossible logic of the stock market. If the current American will to globality represents an attempt to stabilise this situation, through the exercise of military power in important, but unstable, parts of the economic network, then it is a strategy that comes with risks that conjure the painful memory of Vietnam. From the neo-con perspective, the war in Vietnam was a catastrophe in both domestic and foreign policy terms. Apart from the fact that the war was ultimately lost to the forces of communism, which led to a decline in America's global influence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, defeat was also a blow to American national character, unable to reconcile the history of the West with its inability to overcome the wilderness in south-east Asia. Even though the liberal roots of the humiliation in Asia were obvious to neo-

conservatives, the traumatic character of the event meant that it was not until Reagan took office that the nation was able to recover its self-belief (Bacevich, 2005).

In light of this episode the risk of the Bush Doctrine becomes clear: America must seek to stabilise the global situation in order to try to manage the unmanageable network economy, but evade confrontation with intractable enemies in far off places that will only further contribute to national anxiety about the state of American globality. The major innovations of the post-Vietnam era meant to prevent a repeat performance of the trauma of south-east Asia were both strategic and technological in nature. Under the tutelage of the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation the American military evolved the notion of the surgical strike in order to try to take advantage of its enormous technological advantage over all others. The purpose of the surgical strike, which refers to the use of precision technology to destroy specific military targets without reliance on ground troops or contact with civilian populations, was to prevent American involvement in another impossible conflict. In recent post-Vietnam conflicts, such as the Gulf War, surgical strikes were set to destroy military command and control structures and civilian communication networks. The objective of this information war was to disrupt the organisation of enemy forces, destroy his morale, and cause confusion in the civilian population. Despite the initial successes of this strategy, which remains very similar to earlier forms of psychological warfare in its efforts to create massive anxiety in the enemy population, it is now clear that the other side of such net-war is the emergence of new forms of paranoia in the headless mass, who soon reconstitute to fight their own primitive net-war (guerrilla warfare) under the banner of paranoid ideologies, such as Islamic fundamentalism (Hardt and Negri, 2004).

The rise of mass terrorism, which simply repeats the strategy of precision strike warfare on a primitive level, is, therefore, perfectly compatible with the post-Vietnam turn to net-war. Whereas American netwar represents an effort to destroy enemy organisation through *precision* strikes on communication systems, mass terrorism threatens to disrupt the everyday life of high tech western societies through *indiscriminate* attacks on representations of the network itself (New York Stock Exchange, Madrid Rail, London Tube). The effect of this strategy is to create hysteria, as normal social order appears to collapse, anxiety, about the identity of the unknown enemy who appears to be one of us, and, as a consequence, paranoia, as we seek to identify the enemy others who threaten our nation from within. It is now, when the fearful symmetry of the condition of globality and net-war means that we are caught in an endless spiral of anxiety and paranoia, that Tocqueville's virus becomes more than simply a metaphor for a social, political, psychic process, but rather a thing itself, a real organism caught up in the spiral of its own viral logic. For evidence of the strange situation that has seen the psycho-political idea of Tocqueville's virus find its ulti-

mate expression in the figure of the real microscopic virus, one need only consider the recent history of panics about contagion, which reflects our paranoid response to anxieties about de-/re-territorializations of social, political, economic, and cultural networks (Salecl, 2004). In the cases of AIDS, E-Bola, Marburg, SARS, Avian Flu, Love Bug, and the current evil, Bio-terrorism, the psycho-political virus of anxiety/paranoia takes the form of hysteria over the possibility of a real virus able to spread infection through the endless connections in the new network.

While the state takes on the task of national inoculation, so that public health programmes teach us about safe sex in the new open society, hygiene in far off places made accessible by the new freedom of travel, and how to spot terrorists who may try to unleash viral infections onto our transport networks, we have to ensure that our PCs run anti-virus software in order to protect our virtual identities from malicious cyber-terrorists bent on either the theft of our code or the destruction of the entire network itself. In each case our approach to the paranoia of globality, which has seen the network become more or less total in scope, is anxiety about the possibility of infection by viral others. Although the next step in the effort to control the virus is to diagnose the nature of the threat, the chaos of the network itself means that it is impossible to predict when or where infection will occur. If it is impossible to predict the temporal or spatial co-ordinates of occurrence of infection then the only other option is to remain on permanent red alert. Thus the condition of globality plunges us into a state of permanent anxiety, about the possibility of threats that may spring from the network without warning, and relentless paranoia, which leads us to imagine that we are entirety powerless before a monolithic network shot through with viral infections that are impossible to properly diagnose or combat precisely because they are subject to the same endless mutations as those that drive the network itself. This thesis, which suggests the equivalence of the state of globality and the figure of the virus, is not made in ignorance of the terrible viruses of the past, but rather reflects an appreciation of the special relationship that seems to exist between contemporary network capitalism and the microbiology of the viral organism that embodies the principle of contagion.

Given this recognition we might risk the claim that the coincidence of Tocqueville's virus of anxiety/paranoia with the rise to prominence of the real virus is a sign that Frances Fukuyama (1993) was correct when he wrote that the end of the Cold War and the onset of the current stage of globality mark the end of history itself. However, contrary to the normal interpretation of Fukuyama's thesis, which is that the end of history is symptomatic of the conclusion of major ideological conflict in the post-Cold War condition and the appearance of a new type of liberal stability, the rise of the figure of the virus suggests that the end of the historical notion of progress through time may have given way to the irreducible antagonism of the anxiety/paranoia couple that haunts the new global market, rather than

some utopic liberal state. In this respect the irreducible tension of the viral condition that turns through the endless mutations of the anxiety/paranoia couple repeats itself in the impossible fissure that separates the ideal virus from its material other, the microscopic organism that threatens to destroy our bodies, rather than our minds. Slavoj Žižek (2006) calls this fissure, which highlights, or symbolises, the irreducible nature of antagonism, and ultimately reflects the impossibility of paranoid utopia itself, the parallax gap. According to Žižek, the parallax gap is irrepressible. Despite our attempts to resolve anxiety through the construction of paranoid utopias that soon become terrible dystopias, the black hole will always re-appear. But perhaps what separates today, when the ideal virus of irreducibility takes on material form in the microscopic organism, from the past is that prior to the post-modern resolution of the end of history the ideology of progress meant that we were able to defer the moment when the ideal took on the properties of a material object through the modern ideas of newness, criticism, and improvement. Under the post-historical condition of globality, when the cycle of anxiety and paranoia has run its course, and the two positions co-exist in a psycho-political state that throbs with menace, the virus mutates into an invisible creature that symbolises the world condition. When we place this impossible organism under the microscope what we see is the master representation of the state of globality itself. For this reason we should celebrate the bi-centenary of the publication of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 2007. After two hundred years the German master's strange statement 'the spirit is a bone' seems today more relevant than ever before (Dolar, 1994). Following the master of dialectical reversals perhaps we must conclude that today *globalisation is a virus*.

II. VIROLOGY OF MODERNITY

If Tocqueville was the first thinker to identify the existence of the virus, then it was not until the invention of psychoanalysis that we were able to properly diagnose the nature of the malady through the construction of a psychopathology of political reason. The works of Freud and Lacan contain the conceptual machinery to enable us to explain the lifecycle of the virus in terms of the psychopathological symptoms infection produces in humans. Even though Freud had a concept of anxiety before he wrote his famous case study of paranoia, its final form was still to come. Thus, we should turn to Freud's (2003a) study of Schreber in order to consider the first element of our virology. In 1911 Freud wrote his famous case study of Daniel Paul Schreber to explore the condition of paranoia. Freud's thesis was that Schreber's paranoia, which led to the simultaneous emergence of a persecution complex and megalomaniacal belief in omnipotence, was a defence mechanism meant to save him from his homosexual desire for his father. According to Freud's paper the origin of this condition lay in father

Schreber's early relationship to his son. Little Schreber's early years were scarred by the father's implementation of his own theory of therapeutic gymnastics (Niederland, 1984). In his study of Freud's Schreber, Eric Santner (1996) suggests that the theory and practice of therapeutic gymnastics was a response to the social, political, and cultural transformations of fin de siècle Europe. Moritz Schreber's objective was never to torture children through the use of his terrible machines, but rather to ensure the production of proper Germans who would not succumb to the decadence of the new century. Despite father Schreber's best intentions, the implementation of these disciplinary techniques led his son to relate to him through the lens of a sado-masochistic complex. This psychic structure, which saw little Schreber become entirely subordinate to his father, would later sexualise and then, under force of repression, transform itself into a paranoid fantasy of persecution and omnipotence.

The conditions of persecution and megalomania were bound together in Schreber's paranoid psyche. While the evolution of the persecution complex was the effect of endless torments before the figure of ultimate authority, the father, who would later become a series of symbolic monsters, such as the psychiatrist Flechsig and even God Himself, the state of megalomania was a defensive response to the centrality of these endless torments in the psychic life of the paranoid Schreber. On the other side of Schreber's fantasy world the only logical response to the torturous schemes of God was to imagine that he, Schreber, was a figure of absolute cosmic importance. If God Himself was set on his relentless torture then he could only imagine that he was somehow central to the Almighty's plan. Thus Schreber's megalomaniacal belief in his own omnipotence was the product of his persecution complex, which paradoxically led him to imagine his own total impotence before the Almighty. However, on its own Freud's study of paranoia may not be enough to fully diagnose the psychopathological symptoms of the virus. Although his study illuminates the effect of physical and psychological torment on men, who may turn to paranoid fantasy in order to simultaneously escape from the ruin of their worlds and re-imagine their situation through the lens of self/other relations that projects their current predicament onto a cosmic scale of universal import, it fails to offer a theory of the everydayness of psychic instability to support its exploration of pathological effects. In order to address this lack we may supplement Freud's diagnosis of the cause of paranoia, homosexuality, and the reverse Oedipus complex, with a consideration of the concept of anxiety that includes a recognition of the normal human conditions of castration, loss, and threat. In Freud's (1992) theory of the Oedipus complex the normal role of the father is to ensure the proper separation of son from mom through the imposition of paternal law that makes incest taboo and, as a result, forces the youngster to search for symbols of mom outside of the family. If the Oedipus complex fails the boy never escapes his attachment to mother, but instead retains his fixation on her to the detriment of others who no longer inspire his desire.

In the case of Schreber the problem was never son's separation from mom, who is more or less invisible in his famous memoir, but rather his inability to overcome his brutal connection to dad that was now shot through with normal oedipal ambivalence about mom. Thus Schreber's God was not simply a tyrannical figure, who would take care of men but punish them when they broke the law, but instead a monstrous pervert bent on sexual sadism, which took the form of relentless efforts to transform Schreber into a woman so that he could impregnate him/her with rays. This fantasy represents a perversion of normal Oedipal ambivalence towards both mom, who usually becomes the ultimate love object who retains her attraction even when, seen through the lens of the law of individuation, she becomes a monstrous abyss that threatens to consume son, and dad, who represents the terrible law that simultaneously punishes our normal transgressions but remains the ultimate ego-ideal. We may consider this perversion evidence of first Schreber's categorial conflation, which essentially leads to Freud's theory of homosexuality, and second, his problematic relation to authority, which is seen to punish normal individuation through its efforts to destroy Schreber's masculine self-identity. In both cases the causal factor may be a crisis of authority that causes gender confusions when it over-compensates for its lack through the exercise of excessive force (Santner, 1996). In this respect we might conclude that Freud's Schreber was never able to develop his proper, masculine self because of the disciplinary techniques of his father, who was concerned to ensure the development of precisely the kind of masculine self-identity that Schreber was never able to achieve, precisely because of his excessive use of force, which was meant for defence of the proper social and political order in rapid decline in late 19th century Europe.

In this way the trace of Freud's study of paranoia leads through the homosexual relation straight back to psychological problems founded on changes to the wider social, political, economic, and cultural conditions of modernity. This is exactly where Santner takes Schreber in his book that opens up the possibility of an interpretation able to trace the convulsions of modern Germany from the catastrophe of World War I through the chaos of Weimar right up to the sublation of the era of instability in Hitler's Nazi movement. But what is it that makes men unable to live with instability? Why, for example, would fin de siècle culture cause Moritz Schreber to try to re-produce, or galvanise, his son through brutal disciplinary techniques? Why would Weimar Germany produce the Nazi movement? Perhaps the concept that best explains the psycho-pathological response to normal psychic instability is the notion of anxiety found in a number of Freud's papers from the 1895 study of anxiety neurosis to the 1926 paper, 'Inhibitions, Symptoms, Anxiety'. In the latter essay Freud claims that anxiety is a response to the threat of loss of the object of love that, in later life, may take the form of the super-ego or other representative of authority. This explanation was a revision of his earlier position, which was that anxi-

ty was an expression of the repression of libidinal energies, because it no ɔnger bound anxiety to internal biological process, but rather found the ause of anxiety in social, political, economic, and cultural malfunctions ɔ external space.

In the early version of the theory of anxiety, the threat of castration/ ɔss is not the cause of anxiety (Freud, 1975b). Rather the normal trauma f Oedipal castration causes the repression of libidinal energy that then urns back on the subject to produce the excitations of anxiety and, in ertain pathological cases, symptoms such as vertigo. In the 1926 update f the theory of anxiety the fact of castration is no longer a consideration Freud, 1977). It is now self-evident that castration causes anxiety, which auses desire, which causes anxiety, and so on. As Lacan (2005b) would ıter show, this process is entirely normal. Men live under the name of ıe father. But before Lacan came on the scene Freud was able to supple- ıent the intra-psychic dimension of anxiety, which turns off the fact of)edipal castration/repression, through the inclusion of a novel reference ɔ the meta-psychological sphere, which enables him to reinterpret anxi- ty in terms of the inter-psychic relationship between the self and others ho may try to interrupt his pursuit of the elusive object cause of desire. nxiety is now no longer about the fact of primary, intra-psychic, frustra- on (castration/repression/anxiety), but rather an effect of the possibility ıat the subject may lose contact with the object of love that he continues to ıase through the streams of the symbolic order. In this way Freud extends ıe entire theory of castration/anxiety/desire to the inter-psychic universe f society, politics, economics, and culture. As a result the new theory of nxiety builds upon its forerunner. It begins where the first thesis ends. fter the intra-psychic drama takes place, and the self suffers castration, he lunges into the world of others. It is now, when Freud's focus turns to the ıter-psychic sphere, that the second theory of anxiety becomes relevant.

In this context the concept of anxiety refers to the excitation that occurs hen the subject senses the possibility of further castration through the loss f the object of love. Freud (1977) calls this response to the possibility of ss, signal anxiety, in order to differentiate the pre-emptive dimension of ıxiety from the re-active dimension of the same condition, which he refers ɔ through the term automatic anxiety. In both cases the second theory of ıxiety reverses the relationship between repression and anxiety set out by ıe initial theory found in the 1895 essay on anxiety neurosis. Whereas the st theory explains that repression causes anxiety, because the retention of cessive libidinal energy causes internal excitation that unsettles the ego, ıe second theory suggests that anxiety about the possibility of the loss of ıe object of love causes the ego to turn to repression in order to make use the subsequent excess of excitation in the erection of defensive fortifica- ɔns. In the second theory of anxiety repression is a defensive reaction to e possibility of the loss of love that seeks to bolster egoistic integrity. This w theory of egoism and anxiety advances both Freud's earlier theories of

anxiety neurosis, which suggests that excessive excitation is never bound to an object, but rather takes the form of pathological symptoms such as vertigo, and anxiety hysteria, which says that the ego binds excessive libidinal energy to phobic objects. In the final theory of anxiety it is no longer simply that the ego projects excessive excitation onto a fearful object, but also that the creation of the fearful object enables the reinvigoration of the ego's own exoskeleton. At this point we may offer a new, synthetic, theory of anxiety that repeats the evolution of the condition of paranoia across a number of Freud's papers. The paper on Schreber shows that paranoia runs off a structure of *torment*, which represents an assault on egoistic integrity, *persecution*, whereby the subject imagines the monstrous other responsible for his torment, and *megalomania*, which enables the subject to bolster his egoistic structure through the construction of a narcissistic explanation for his torments before the monstrous other. In much the same way, the synthetic theory of anxiety runs through the 1895 essay on anxiety neurosis (1975b), where the repression of libidinal excitation converts into anxiety which converts into symptoms that torment the ego, the 1909 study of Little Hans (1991b), which shows how the excessive excitation that accompanies castration anxiety binds to phobic objects, and finally, the 1926 paper on anxiety (1977), whereby the ego converts the energy of anxiety into psychic materials able to bolster its own creaking structures. In this way it is possible to reconstruct a master theory of anxiety, which turns through the stages of symptom formation, phobia, and repression, to complement the idea of paranoia, which evolves through the phases of torment, persecution, and megalomania. Thus we may develop a general theory of anxiety-paranoia.

However, if it is possible to synthesise the Freudian ideas of anxiety and paranoia in a third form, anxiety-paranoia, why is it necessary to retain separate concepts of anxiety and paranoia? Although it is valuable to establish the compatibility of the concepts of anxiety and paranoia, so that we profit from their relationship, it is also necessary to insist on their separation, in order to maintain theoretical precision. Whereas the value of the idea of anxiety resides in its emphasis on the impact of external threats on the psychological condition of men, the import of paranoia is founded in its ability to explain the formation of pathological fantasies that seek to manage the effects of torment. In this respect it may be possible to think about the relationship between anxiety and paranoia through the Hegelian idea of the dialectic. While the theory of anxiety contains the potential of the theory of paranoia, because it shows how psychic instability may result in the construction of paranoid symptoms, the theory of paranoia contains the potential of the theory of anxiety, through its recognition of the possibility that pathological symptoms may emerge from unstable self/other relations. What maintains the separation of the two concepts is their difference in emphasis. Anxiety foregrounds the idea of the normality of psychic instability. Paranoia insists upon the pathological effects that

may occur when such psychic instability becomes impossible to manage. It is this identification in difference that enables the two concepts to maintain a profitable theoretical relation. However, though it may be possible to understand the relation between the concepts of anxiety and paranoia through the idea of the dialectic, because they maintain a sort of intra-/inter-conceptual connection, it is far harder to see how the couple would result in some Hegelian resolution, unless, of course, we insist that the fusion of anxiety and paranoia would result in some higher form of liberal totality able to reconcile the existence of radical freedom and the presence of an omnipotent other.

Although the ideal concepts may allow for this dialectical sublation, the truth is that the real condition of anxiety/paranoia, which we have chosen to symbolise/realise through the notion of the virus, has not found its conclusion in the liberal state that tempers both conditions, but has, rather, led to the strange invention of globality where both psychopathologies totalise to create a situation where everything/nothing seems possible. In the state of globality the subject experiences the terror of radical anxiety, before the edifice of the network that it is impossible to recognise because it seems to make quasi-instantaneous connections to cover the entire Earth, and the horror of paranoia for exactly the same reason, which is that the network appears to simultaneously realise Kierkegaard's (1981) notion of the possibility of possibility and the radical closure of every ideal city from Plato's (1991) *Republic* to Stalin's Soviet Union. Given the existence of this *frozen dialectic*, the intervention of psychoanalysis may be necessary to show us how to convert the endless cycle of anxiety/paranoia into a dialectic that might enable us to live with uncertainty. This is more or less what Renata Salecl (2004) attempts in her book on the concept of anxiety. Salecl's key thesis is that anxiety is a normal condition bound to the existence of desire, the survival of freedom, and ultimately the possibility of the future. She warns that the alternative to the state of anxiety is the totalitarian subject/world where there is no need for desire, because the world already provides everything the subject needs/wants, no need for freedom, because freedom suggests that change is necessary, and no need for the future, because the eternal present is the realisation of the promise of futurity.

It is unlikely that men would choose to exchange the condition of the liberal state, which pertains to the Freudian/Lacanian castration/anxiety/desire complex, for a totalitarian state, which seeks to resolve the endless nature of desire through the refusal of castration, because they know that they live under the rule of law, which secures itself through their castration and makes sure they have access to objects of desire to ease their anxiety. However, it is entirely uncertain whether they would refuse totalitarianism, or choose to take a short-cut straight back to mom, when face to face with what we might call radical anxiety, either the threat of loss, or loss, of the name of the father that secures legal order. The horror of this condition, which Lacan (1997) spoke about in his seminar on the psychoses,

is an effect of the emergence of the completely lawless situation, which effectively cancels castration, derails desire, and confronts men with the possibility of possibility, that is the fundamental Kantian freedom to write their own law. It is this situation, what Hobbes (1982) would call the state of nature, which really tests the ability of men to embrace their freedom to choose their own way of life. This is why it is easy for us to follow Salecl when she asks us to embrace our anxiety. It is far easier for us to sit back and abide by the law, which structures our psyches (castration, anxiety, desire), than it would be for us to refuse the law of desire in order to re-invent some pre-/post-historic totalitarianism. It would be far harder for us to embrace our anxiety, and live in the kingdom of freedom, if we were suddenly thrown back into the state of nature, where we could no longer rely on the law to structure our lives, control our anxieties through the regulation of desire, and organise our relationships with other men.

Perhaps we can now begin to understand why Moritz Schreber sought to transform his son into a steel hard man or recognise why many Germans felt that the Nazis were a solution to the chaos of Weimar. The truth is that when we must confront radical freedom, which is the freedom to make the law, rather than some basic freedom of choice inside the current law, it is easy for men who have lost all sense of their place in world to combat their radical anxiety through the invention of paranoid schemes that seek to cancel excessive freedom through the imposition of total control. In late 19th century Germany men were no longer subject to the problem of everyday anxiety, but rather came face to face with the radical form of uncertainty that appears when the law of the father itself starts to falter (Santner, 1996). The figure of Moritz Schreber is a perfect example of this situation. We have seen how his efforts to bolster the law of the father through the exercise of therapeutic gymnastics led to the eventual failure of little Schreber's ego and his own consequent flight into paranoia. As Lacan (1997) explains in his seminar on the psychoses, under conditions of foreclosure, when the phallic signifier which binds the symbolic order together starts to fail, the subject is unable to structure his own identity. At this point he falls into psychosis. In the state of psychosis the catastrophic subject confronts the other that no longer makes sense. Apart from the essential anchorage of the master signifier he can no longer understand the other. It appears simultaneously chaotic, because it is also in a state of collapse, and impenetrable, because the psychotic subject cannot help but imagine that its endless babble might represent some new, foreign, code.

Whereas in the state of radical anxiety the other lacks, because it is in a state of dissolution, under the conditions of phobia/paranoia it lacks lack, because it seems to possess some new, impossible logic that we can no longer identify. Enter paranoid politics. Given that the other makes no sense, we must conclude that it is either simply in a state of terminal decline, which means that we must learn to live in radical uncertainty, or that there is some other of the other who is out to destroy us through the other. The

value of the latter, paranoid, position is that it resolves the problem of radical anxiety, which threatens to plunge us into a state of schizophrenia, because it transforms the other's lack, 'it no longer makes sense', into the other's lack of lack, 'it makes perfect sense because we now know that the other is responsible for our otherwise senseless condition'. The role of the other of the other is, therefore, to make sense of a senseless situation. He also enables us to restructure our self-identity, 'we know who we are simply because we know we are not them', and provides us with a sense of purpose that enables to re-think our future, 'when we overcome them we will inhabit utopia, communism, global liberalism, etc.', where we will no longer have to rely on them to know ourselves. We have seen how paranoid politics function in the contemporary era of globalisation. As Corey Robin (2004) notes in his book on the concept of fear, 9/11 was valuable for America because the emergence of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda into the limelight made it possible to re-focus American identity through the identification of a terrible new enemy. Although it is clear that 9/11 shot a bolt of *moral electricity* through American politics, it is also more or less certain that Dubya's war on terror was able to serve a similar purpose for Islamic fundamentalists. The American response to 9/11 simply confirmed what the fundamentalists already knew. In the horrors of Camp X-Ray, Fallujah, and Abu Ghraib, they found evidence that America was the enemy of Islam and proof that the followers of the Quran must unite to oppose its evil plan to topple their theocratic law.

Although the emergence of the condition of globality symbolises the moment when Tocqueville's virus of anxiety/paranoia coincides with the rise to prominence of the impossible creature that confirms that the network is simultaneously totally open and impossible to escape, it is possible to suggest that it has taken the entire history of Western modernity to reach this final point when the ideal and the material coincide in what Hegel would call an infinite judgement (Dolar, 1994). From this perspective the long run of modern thought, from Socrates through Hobbes to Freud, may be seen through the lens of the microscope able to magnify the lifecycle of the virus and identify the psychotic process, which runs through the emergence of the possibility of possibility, the rise of radical anxiety, the turn to paranoia, and the final effort to realise some terrible utopic vision. The precise value of the virology of modernity is, therefore, to illuminate the existence of Lacan's (1998) other, dark, God that lurks in the shadow of the divinity of democracy, only to emerge whenever it seems that the God of liberty and freedom is about to complete his work. In this respect the virus represents the contagion that connects the principle of freedom to the law of bondage. It is the invisible force that stimulates men to resolve the possibility of freedom, the possibility of possibility we might call radical anxiety, through the invention of utopian visions that rely on the sacrificial logic of us/them politics to realise their paranoid schemes. Tocqueville (2000) spoke about the hubris of the politics of the impossible, but many have

sought to realise the end of uncertainty under the influence of paranoia. Consider the famous politicians and thinkers who have sought to realise their utopian fantasies: Critas, Plato, Robespierre, Winthrop, Hitler, and Stalin. Each of these figures requires independent consideration, but their contamination by the virus is a common theme that relates them to our master theory of modernity. In his *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1989a) Freud wrote that in the future psychoanalysis must develop a psychopathology of society. He was unaware that Tocqueville's works were already pregnant with such a theory or that his own invention, psychoanalysis, was already in a position to complete the French thinker's theory of the strange, unknown virus.

In Tocqueville's view the only solution to the virus of history, which, in Erich Fromm's (1994) words, saw men escape from their freedom into inhuman political systems, was the creation of a new type of hero able to live with radical anxiety, or, what Sheldon Wolin (2001) calls, radical doubt. But would this strategy not simply compound the problem of paranoia? What is the theory of the Nietzschean hero, who has the strength of character to stare straight back into the nothingness of the abyss, if not a paranoid interpretation of the uncanny condition of modernity? That Tocqueville opposes his paranoia of the Quixotic hero to the paranoia of state centralisation is not necessarily evidence of the failure of his virology, but might instead prove indicative of his turn to a novel type of critical theory we might call paranoia critique. Long before Salvador Dali was able to name paranoia critique in 1935, Tocqueville's works, but in particular *Democracy in America*, show signs of a mode of political thought that is simultaneously paranoid, in its invention of a monstrous Other, and critical, in its efforts to imagine an escape route from the prison state. Perhaps the effect of this surrealistic technique is, then, to render the present strange in order to realise the horror of the everyday that passes for normal and, as a consequence, open onto a new space of political debate that may help us to remedy the malady of the contemporary epoch.

Farrell (2005) recognises the prevalence of this truth effect in modernity. Given the infancy of the network society and the atomisation of the individual, he suggests that paranoia might even be more or less normal under conditions of modernity. But even though Farrell shows why paranoia might have become the interpretative psychology of modernity, there is a fundamental sense in which he seems unable to come to terms with the critical potential of paranoia. Although paranoia may contain its own critique, it is, of course, true that on its own, paranoia critique is in no way certain to solve the problem of the virus. Paranoia critique might open onto a new space for political debate, but the problem remains that this new space may itself simply sink back towards the closure of paranoia under pressure of radical uncertainty. We know that Tocqueville initially thought that the Puritan township might be immune to contagion, because Americans were too political to allow the state to ever seize control of their lives,

but *Democracy in America* is in many respects the story of the failure of that enterprise before the edifice of public opinion. Given the existence of the vortex of public opinion, which must cancel intra-social critique in order to unite the community of believers, opposition, which should prevent the evolution of paranoia inside the community, is no longer possible. The community of believers is thus necessarily paranoid, simply because too much internal criticism would inevitably entail the dissolution of the social system and the return to the primal state of radical anxiety. Under these conditions Tocqueville thought that the dis-ease of politics, which America could not tolerate, was shot through the economy (Wolin, 2001).

Whereas sameness of opinion was characteristic of the political order, inequality, difference, competition, and contrast were definitive of the economic system. Precisely because the former was the site of stagnation, inaction, and inertia, the latter became the scene of endless trauma, which, similar to the virus of anxiety/paranoia, ran through the cycle of production/consumption without obvious human motivation. Although this connection between the lifecycle of the virus and the process of production/consumption may appear an idle comparison on the basis of formal circularity, there is a much deeper historical equation between the American mutation of the virus, which today both enables and disables the state of globality, and the psychology of capitalism, which is, even in its contemporary form, still similar to the mindset Max Weber wrote about in his seminal work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2003). We remember that in Weber's study the early American was wracked by salvation anxiety. Unable to know the mind of God, whose plan was, since Luther and Calvin, inaccessible to men, he thought that he might prove his chosen status through economic tests. Thus the successful man might convince himself that God was on his side, even though he knew that this situation was entirely provisional on the events of tomorrow. Similarly the pauper could be equally sure that he would burn in Hell. His only hope was to turn the tide through prayer, sobriety, and hard work.

That this quest for proof of God's love set up endless competition in the economic sphere, paranoia about all others who must be rivals for His favour, and a moral politics totally unforgiving of those hopeless cases who fall foul of the chaos of the market, is evidence enough of the relationship between the virus of anxiety/paranoia and savage capitalism. In light of this view it may be that the precise value of Weber's study is to show that the virus of anxiety/paranoia was always already part of the Protestantism that led the early Americans to evolve their peculiar spirit of capitalism. The traditional interpretation of the Weberian theory of capitalism suggests that even though modernity killed God, Americans continue to believe in the Protestant ethic. Moral politics remains in operation in the shape of the political theories of individual responsibility and freedom from state intervention. As Robert Merton (1968) would suggest in the 1930s, the success theme is still essential to American life in the secular era. Thus it is

likely that the old Puritan struggle for salvation through success remains completely contemporary. As a result, even today, under the condition of what Tocqueville (2000) calls democratic envy, I still know that the other is always a rival, because if he is a success then I will invariably fail. Similarly, my Protestant unconscious tells me that society has no time for losers. The loser is a lost cause. If God has no time for the other, who is on course to spend eternity in Hell, then why should I care how he lives out his time on Earth? Under the liberalism of the 1960s and 1970s the paranoid cure to salvation anxiety took the form of an immoral addiction to consumption.

In this Babylonian complex production enables consumption enables the chemical high that tells me that I've made it. Aside from the conspicuous consumption of resources, which tells everybody else that I have money to burn, I can also bask in the primitive satisfaction that God is on my side because the other is nowhere. It should not, of course, escape our attention that the post-modern Babylonians were somehow able to reconcile their addiction to consumption with subterranean Puritanism. This was possible because in the second half of the 20th century the Puritan ideology was a shadow of its former self that left the success theme out on its own with no real support for its capital morality. However, Tocqueville knew that religion was never far from the surface of American society. This was true in the 19th century. It is true today. Thus Puritanism was never completely absent from the politics of American capitalism. The struggle to make it was always shot through with salvation anxiety and the concern to prove oneself on the right side of the us/them divide. Given this recognition it is possible to offer a complex interpretation of Weber's idea of status, which was meant to show how difference in capitalism is mediated by perceptions of position, through a thesis that explains how competition under capitalism is in reality the symptom of some deeper, unconscious, Puritan, addiction to power that is itself simply an effect of the condition of salvation anxiety. Perhaps it is this condition that is responsible for the massive inequalities of wealth under the current state of American globality?

If salvation anxiety requires that I must overpower all others to ensure my place in Heaven, then Protestant paranoia obliges me to continue the fight until I am the sole survivor, and there is no chance that the other can make a comeback. I cannot rest until I possess absolute wealth and the other languishes in total poverty. In the state of globality, when the market is a lightning fast lottery, it is even more important that I remain suspicious of all others, who may usurp my place in the ranks of the chosen people. At least under the liberalism of the 1960s and 1970s, when runaway consumerism took place in a more or less godless universe, Americans felt able to temper the worst excesses of the market with rational welfare programmes, meant to protect those who fall foul of capitalism from Hell on Earth. Although Puritan ideology was still a subterranean influence on liberals, Morone (2003) has shown that their take on hellfire politics took the form of the notion of the community of sinners. In this thesis individual sin

was an effect of the moral ruin of community, rather than an individual pathology. But in the wake of FDR, JFK, and LBJ the politics of public health have fallen out of favour. In the contemporary conservatism, when God is once more central to the idea of the American mission, the Puritan politics of individual sin are back in style. There is now no need to worry about others because savage capitalism is God's instrument on Earth. He will divide saints from sinners. We have no reason to question His plan. However, the problem of savage capitalism remains that it undermines our sense of community. Despite the minimal sense in which it is possible to claim that Americans agree on the moral value of the success theme, the market is highly unlikely to support social unity. On the contrary it creates a schizophrenic nation of saints and sinners.

The normal American response to the anomic effects of the market has been to unite the nation through political, or more precisely, ideological consensus. Regardless of their status Americans agree on the moral value of Americanism. Although capitalism spreads infection, because salvation anxiety leads to paranoia and so on, ideological consensus means that the American nation is a robust unity able to absorb market chaos. However, this is not an unconditional unity, but rather a contract totally reliant on the projection of us/them politics onto the international scene. Thus foreign policy becomes an essential screen for the projection of the internal unrest of the market. Following the logic of classical European imperialism, the paranoia of capitalism resolves itself through the invention of the paranoia of international politics that insists on the endless separation of us from them. Although Tocqueville (2000) was never explicit about the danger of American nationalism, he was clear that America was a nation of flat line mediocrity. In many respects this thesis, which we may interpret as an ironic commentary on the theory of American exceptionalism, was already a study in the peculiarity of the American nation. We are all familiar with the 20th century variants on this theme. In the works of Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), George A. Romero (1968), and Brett Easton Ellis (1991), the essential image of America is one of a monstrous unity of disparate individuals who are totally incapable of communication with each other and all outsiders. Thus the idea of the American nation that emerges is one founded on the negativity of the other. It is not that Americans have some deep sense of their commonality, but rather that they know that they are more similar in their resemblance to each other than they are in their likeness to the strange outsiders who they encounter from time to time.

In the post-totalitarian world, when utopian thought is taboo, this type of criticism may be more essential than ever before, simply because the liberal hegemony has no real sense of the necessity of radical change. It is by now commonplace to assert that the normal, liberal, response to the horrors of the totalitarianism was to make utopian schemes taboo in order to prevent the automatic slide into the dystopic conditions that have, historically, always been the result of efforts to realise Heaven on Earth. Although

there is some truth in this view, because paranoia critiques of the present always retain the possibility of the slide through radical anxiety back to paranoid utopia, the problem of the current liberal orthodoxy is that it has largely fell into the state of paranoia without the excuse of the pursuit of a common vision of human improvement to turn to for ideological support. In exchange for the vision of the common good liberals can, of course, call on the commitment to the idea of individual self-realisation through the market mechanism to legitimate their project, but this rather thin notion of virtue has historically only ever been able to survive because it has always looked like the best of a number of bad options. By comparison to a life under political tyranny, the dream of self-realisation seems utopic, but the problem is that in reality the market mechanism exercises its own, post-human type of economic tyranny that is similarly totally oblivious to the tears of humanity. As our consideration of contemporary Dixie capitalism has shown, capitalism has never really been open to self-realisation.

If Tocqueville (2000) was able to show that the individual was always a particular type, which could present itself as an empty category only because its contents were taken to be self-evident truths, Adorno and Horkheimer's (1997) notion of the pseudo-individual simply confirms for their 20th century audience what the master theorist of America taught us in the 19th century. The truth of this situation has become more or less clear in the steady rise to prominence of conservatism in Anglo-American politics. The self-evidence of the truth of the liberal individual has now become so certain that today even liberals are conservatives who believe that the market is more or less fair, while conservatives have become moral fundamentalists who not only believe in their right to enforce their views on those in their own cultural group, but also try to impose their view of livin' right on all others. In opposition to this novel form of liberal conservative paranoia, or what we normally call neo-conservatism, it may be that we require a new paranoia critique to stimulate a type of gloomy republicanism that will stand up for the rights of humans to live a decent life in the face of the post-human market that has no time for losers. In the past, republican defence movements have largely taken the form of ethnic, or national, forms of resistance, which easily slide into chauvinism and paranoia about the nature of others, but today this type of nationalism is not really a viable option, simply because the market is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. For this reason it is essential that today we meet the viral nature of the state of globality with a new global version of paranoia critique.

The task of the new, political, surrealism would be to reveal the obscene truth of today's capitalism. We must ask it to illuminate the monstrosity of network capitalism that leads a small minority to live in obscene luxury and the vast majority to live in terrible poverty, and diagnose the psychotic condition that causes those who bask in luxury to seek to reinforce their situation in order to ease their own fear that they may soon occupy the other side of the us/them divide. Given that the purpose of this critical

project would be to stimulate political consciousness in the apathetic mass, we might talk about the rise of a new type of global politics only upon the realisation of the horror of the contemporary. After the enormous efforts of numerous masters of the practice of ideology critique, such as Marx (1993), Tocqueville (2000), and Arendt (1973), we have no reason to suppose that our new global paranoia critique will easily wake the masses from their narcotic slumber. However, the point remains that criticism is not possible without constant practice. As Tocqueville understood practice makes perfect. He knew that the pursuit of democracy does not turn on the question of success or failure, but rather rests on the principle of participation. The failure to understand this fact was, perhaps, the greatest mistake of the Founders who thought that once set in motion the democratic machine would continue to function without the exertion of continual force. It is possible to suggest that this original misinterpretation of the physics of democracy has always been the essential stumbling block in the Anglo-American effort to realise the best possible society, but what is more likely is that Madison's error was simply a kind of Freudian slip that unintentionally spoke the truth of the mass happy to sink back into the swamp of everyday life.

But the mass is not a natural phenomenon. Regardless of what contemporary politicians would like us to believe, the individual, obsessing over his own private life and with no concern for others, is the recent invention of modern capitalism. For the ancients man was by nature a political animal. In the ancient city it was counter-natural for men to vanish into their own worlds and forget about the public sphere. Even though we must be sensitive to the enormous historical differences that separate ancient direct democracy from our modern representative variant of the same mode of government, recognition of Aristotle's original concept of the political animal may be useful today to remind us that the obsession with privacy is not an ahistorical norm or natural condition. This may seem like a simplistic enough point, but the value of such a strategy might be to deliver the masses from their comfortable womb state to a recognition of the catastrophe of global capitalism. If they come to recognise the truth of the paranoia critique of globality they will see the true horrors of the global poor, and the potential tragedy of climate change, and identify the monstrosity of the market that turns through endless deconstructions in the name of economic efficiency. They will also perceive the strange post-humanism of neo-liberal politics, which simultaneously support the furious logic of the market to bolster profit margins, and seek to counter the same madness through the constructions of paranoid nationalisms, meant to ensure that we come out on top in the new evolutionary struggle of global society.

As we have seen, the problem of these paranoias, which aim to secure our way of life to the detriment of others who lose out in the great game of economic natural selection, is that they simply contribute to the state of famine, disease, warfare, and environmental chaos that remains the lot of

millions of people across the world. Despite their purpose, such psychopolitical structures are also, paradoxically, more or less useless in the face of the radical anxiety we suffer before the lightning speeds of the network. Instead, they only serve to intensify this condition, because they continue to throw our very existence into doubt. Even though suspicion is, by definition, the central characteristic of paranoia, the psychotic combination of the schizophrenic network and paranoid politics, often leads to the type of radical anxiety Freud (1977) chose to call real anxiety. But if the infernal combination of global salvation anxiety and paranoid politics results in the emergence of real anxiety, which simply refers to the realistic origin of the perception of threat, then what are we to make of our paranoia? The answer is that we must invent a new category. Although Freud never spoke about real paranoia, we may now coin the term to explain the condition of contemporary global politics. Our response to the insanity of the market, which led us into the condition of paranoia that has eventually been able to realise itself, must therefore lead us to recall the old maxim that states that simply because we are paranoid does not mean that they are not out to get us. The precise effect of this reference to real paranoia might enable us to better understand the cyclical process that leads the anxiety/paranoia couple to realise itself.

We now know that the classic metaphor of this process under conditions of globality is the virus. If the ideal virus represents the cycle of anxiety/paranoia able to mutate, multiply, and grow in proportion to the violence of the convulsion of modernity, then the real virus is the effect of the realisation of this cycle in the state of globality when the terrible truth is that the other is no other, but rather my monstrous, evil twin. But if it is true that paranoid politics will never save us from the virus, but instead run us straight back into the impasse of radical anxiety, then how should we combat viral infection? The answer is that we must impose quarantine controls on the network itself in order to try to manage our radical anxiety, cope with the temptation to paranoia, and improve the condition of the millions of others who currently suffer before the greedy god of the profit margin. This recommendation will be particularly unpopular in the West, where the Anglo-American ideology of possessive individualism, has more or less taken complete control of the political sphere. From Thomas Hobbes to Adam Smith, F. A. Hayek to Milton Friedman, Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush, the history of liberalism, and its post-modern mutation neo-liberalism, has been set on the refusal of state intervention in the private lives of men. But this principle, under the rule of the Aristotelian equation of privacy and economy, has had terrible consequences, which the condition of globality is sure to make crystal clear. Following our paranoia critique of the contemporary situation, which suggests that Tocqueville's virus has now become a microscopic creature that no longer simply infects the minds of men but also wants to colonise their bodies, we must conclude that the only response to the state of globality is to roll back the apolitical condition

of privacy, return to the politics of civic virtue, and start to prioritise the welfare of the world's people.

Despite what Adam Smith (1998) taught about the market, the truth is that Marx (1988) was right when he wrote that capitalism was an enormous fetish that made men into miserable creatures who could no longer relate to themselves or their fellow men. We know that the infectious conditions that made contagion virulent were the product of men who must now take responsibility to change their own fate. Following Tocqueville (2000), who knew that politics was the only solution to the problem of centralisation, we must rouse ourselves to stop the virus before the pandemic of anxiety/paranoia wipes us off the face of the Earth. The surrealism of paranoia critique must support this project. In the first instance its task would be to reveal the truth of contemporary globality. Under critical reflection the terrible effects of runaway capitalism will surely emerge. Following this exercise, the next stage of the project would reverse the current predominance of economy over politics to put men back in control of their own fate. Whereas the contemporary paranoia of neo-liberal politics maintains that politics cannot interfere with economy, so that the network becomes a monstrous fetish that towers over men who no longer control their own lives, paranoia critique would seek to overturn this complex in order to make politics master of economy and put men back in charge of the things that they make.

III. THE HISTORY OF THE VIRUS

In this book I trace the long history of the virus from ancient Greece to post-modern America. Although Tocqueville was the first to identify the existence of the virus in the 19th century, I project his idea back through history by way of an investigation of the relationship between the conditions of anxiety and paranoia in the works of key figures in social and political thought. Given that Freud's psychoanalytic terminology was unknown to thinkers before the late 19th century, I explore the idea of the virus through the conceptual framework suitable to the writers under consideration. As such, the language of psychoanalysis makes its first proper appearance in chapter 3, which focuses on Hobbes's (1982) theory of the state and the emergence of psychoanalysis in response to the birth of modern subjectivity. In order to open my study I start in ancient Greece. Thus chapter 1 is an exploration of the ideas of freedom and tyranny in the social and political thought of Socrates and Plato. Whereas the idea of freedom would later take on psychological form in Freud's (1977) notion of radical anxiety, the theory of tyranny represents a pre-modern version of the concept of paranoia. In the first instance the basic political theory of freedom might be seen to relate to the Lacanian (1997) idea of the decline of parental law and the emergence of the possibility of possibility to remake

the law anew. In the second case the idea of tyranny may refer to the paranoid tendency to embrace some new father figure who no longer simply upholds law, but rather exploits his people to satisfy his own perverse lusts. In Freud's (2003a) study of Schreber the appearance of the perverse father was an effect of the decline of parental law. Little Schreber was unable to cope with radical anxiety because his own ego was totally reliant on his ambivalent relationship to his heinous master. In many ways it is possible to recognise the ideas of freedom and tyranny in the Schreber case. In Plato's (1991) typology of political forms, tyranny is the resolution of democracy. The tyrant appears because the mob is leaderless. His rule, which finds its basis in the satisfaction of his own lust, is a condensation of the democratic situation, which, in Plato's view, is the political form where the mob rules on the basis of its own passions. It is this unstable situation that simultaneously opens the space of tyranny and closes the possibility of politics between reasonable men able to control their passions and rule in the name of men in common.

However, recognition of the relationship between the anxiety/paranoia couple and the freedom/tyranny relation is not the precise object of my consideration of the politics of Socrates and Plato. Instead my objective is to focus on how first Socrates, and second Plato, sought to approach the problem of the possibility of possibility in the context of Athenian democracy. In short, I suggest that whereas Socrates felt able to embrace freedom, through a cosmopolitan theory of democracy founded on the space of the Agora, Plato's efforts to standardise his master's position led to his invention of the paranoid utopia of the *Republic* (1991). In her essay on the origin of politics, Hannah Arendt (2005) explains that in order to properly understand Plato's cancellation of what we might call the Socratic utopia of escape we must imagine his response to his master's execution before the law. For Arendt, this event led Plato to recognise that Socratic cosmopolitanism was impossible in a city of idiots (from the Greek noun, *idiotai*, which means normal people) and that the only way to secure a virtuous city was for virtuous men, philosophers, to rule over the rank and file. Thus Arendt claims that Plato's *Republic* (1991) brought the notion of rulership to social and political thought and set the pattern for 2,000 years of paranoid utopianism to come. In response to the form of kingship, which responds to the turbulence of human community with paranoia, Arendt proposes that we re-discover the Socratic, political unconscious of Plato's original republicanism. Even though this form is hidden, or repressed, beneath the history of efforts to discover the perfect form of leadership, she suggests that every failure to improve upon the essential Platonic scheme is pregnant with the original Socratic idea of politics. Despite the fact that Socratic politics might represent the ideal response to the failures of the Platonic leadership principle, the long evolution of social relations under conditions of modernity suggests that a quick return to political participation will not be an easy option.

In chapter 2 I compare two versions of social relations, those of Aristotle and Machiavelli, in order to show how the slow emergence of modernity led to the gradual decay of the ancient concept of sociability and the rise of the new modern form of political inter-action. Whereas Aristotle (1998) could still speak about Socratic interactions through his notion of pure friendship, the decline of the ancient model of politics was already written into his philosophy in the shape of the negative type of friendship, contract friendship. My suggestion is that by the time Machiavelli came on the scene the mode of friendship that does not deserve the name was the norm and that this led the great Florentine to base his politics on the principles of fear, suspicion, and prudence. In this respect it is possible to see how Machiavelli, who Leo Strauss (1995) would famously call the teacher of evil, could exchange the principle of civic virtue, which was, in the Ancients, the unquestionable object of politics, for the rule of necessity, interest, and power. However, it is my thesis that it was not until the time of Machiavelli's modern counterpart, Thomas Hobbes, that the virus really took hold in political theory. In chapter 3 I examine Hobbes's famous *Leviathan* (1982) in order to show how his vision of the state of nature plunges men into a Machiavellian condition, where the principles of necessity, interest, and power no longer simply emerge from anthropological observation, but rather evolve from hard scientific study. Hobbes's response to this theory of the primal state of humanity, which would later become Freud's condition of radical anxiety, was to posit the necessity of the Leviathan, or God Machine, that could make law and, as a consequence, enable social interaction to take place.

Despite the mystery about how Hobbes's bestial men would resolve to create the God machine in the first place, the fact that he later imagines that politics might only take place within the confines of the legal framework illustrates the extent of the drift from the Aristotelian notion of pure friendship to the properly modern idea of legal sociability. However, even though Hobbes turns the figure of the state into a phobic object, which enables men to resolve their radical anxiety before the abyssal terror of the state of nature, he maintains this effect only through the invention of the liberal split, which was unknown to the ancients, between public tyranny and private freedom. While politics becomes the preserve of the Leviathan, the economy remains the space of freedom. In the works of Aristotle, the creation of the split self was indicative of the rule of tyranny. By the time Hobbes came on the scene the same form would pass for the invention of liberalism. In the second half of chapter 3 I explore the psychological effects of this split, which turns off the reflection of the gap between self and other in modern inter-subjective relations back into the self that becomes other to itself, through a consideration of the way that Freudian psychoanalysis maps its theory of psychic composition onto the political construction of Hobbesian liberalism. In many ways it is possible to suggest that the Freudian realisation of Hobbes's original inauguration of modern subjectivity, which itself simply updates the ancients' idea of the duality of reason/passion and the Christian theory that opposes the higher form of the soul to the bestial dimension of the flesh, has always been the primal lesion that all modern utopians have sought to heal.

Whereas the early Christians would conclude that the escape from sin was impossible for men, the modern utopians came to the conclusion that proper leadership could render sinful men perfect. Following Hobbes' liberal break, Hegel would try to resolve the inter-subjective/intra-psychic condition in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1979). After Hegel, Marx would take up the same challenge in his theory of estrangement (1988), but this time through a consideration of material circumstance. In the 20th century the teacher of the French Hegelians, Alexandre Kojève (1981), would return to Hegel in order to declare that the liberal state was, in the final analysis, the realisation of the end of history. Finally, under conditions of globality, the neo-conservative champion Fukuyama (1993) would rehearse Kojève's return to Hegel in order to declare that the American political form was the ultimate ideological type. Given what we now know about the failure of Fukuyama's model, it may be possible to trace a line from Hobbes's (1982) original theory of the state of nature, through Tocqueville's (2000) virology of the American wilderness and democratic despotism, into Freud's (1989a) psychological interpretation of the tragic nature of humanity, and out through a realisation of the current state of globality with its own, final, mutation of the virus into a microscopic creature that is perhaps the true embodiment of the end of history. But this liberal theory of the tragic nature of freedom would, of course, represent only one route out of Hobbes' solution to the state of nature.

If it is true that the English philosopher was the first modern to try to resolve the problem of the possibility of possibility through the science of power, then the efforts of Tocqueville, Freud, and Fukuyama were similar in their liberalism. That is to say that each of them sought to work within the framework of Hobbes's original contract theory. While Tocqueville was keen to encourage political participation within the bounds of the law, Freud knew that the entire psychoanalytic project was meant to reconcile men to the human condition of lack before the law of the father, and Fukuyama bought into the idea that American liberalism was the sole survivor of the Cold War struggle between the forces of liberal reformism and social revolutionism. The central objective of each of these variants on the liberal theme was, therefore, to try to convince men to live together under conditions of lack. It was this condition that the other long run out of Hobbes's theory of modernity would reject. Thus the tradition of Rousseau, Robespierre, Hegel, and Marx sought to cure the split subject through the restoration of the original utopic condition of human nature where men are self-identical creatures who relate to each other like waves in a sea of waves. After my consideration of the relationship between Hobbes's political science and Freud's theory of psychoanalysis in the second half of chapter 3, I explore the essential problem of modernity and the various attempts

to resolve the condition of the critical self in chapter 4, 'Modernity and Schizophrenia', and chapter 5, 'Autism, Paranoia, Critique'.

In this part, the second section of the work, my thesis is that the essential turbulence of modernity, which results in the emergence of a new law of transgression, normalises the virus of anxiety/paranoia, or, to be more precise, translates the principle of mutation into the law of historical change. Thus the turn through radical anxiety, revolutionary law, utopic new order, critical paranoia, and revolution becomes the new law of the homeless, or uncanny, epoch where men either reconcile themselves to live in lack, come to believe in the cosmic value of war, or retain faith in some future resolution of the cycle. If the first of these alternatives represents the liberal route out of the schizophrenia of modernity, the second response refers to the Fascist/Nazi conclusion to the history of eternal flux, and the third position relates to the communistic solution to the state of homelessness. Following my exploration of the state of schizo modernity and consideration of the psychopathologies of autism and paranoia, the third section of the book focuses on totalitarianism. In chapter 6, 'Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism', and chapter 7, 'Arendt's Paranoia Critique of Modernity', I examine the Nazi and communistic positions in the thought of Hannah Arendt. The purpose of these chapters is to show how the resolution of modern European history, which, as Christian Meier (2005) has shown, ran from Athens to Auschwitz, saw the emergence of terrible twins, Hitlerism and Stalinism, bent on the realisation of post-human utopias of either the master race, which would include nobody caught under the sign of the real of human particularity, or the proletarian class, which could not tolerate men who could think, feel, or imagine in their own way.

In response to the terrors of the Gulag Archipelago and Auschwitz, Arendt (2005) suggests a return to Socratic politics that might enable men to resolve the state of radical anxiety through political association, rather than in the terrible paranoid fictions that have scarred the 20th century. But in many respects her solution to the European mutation of the virus marks a return to Tocqueville's original turn to American republicanism to solve to problem of the viral infection that struck post-revolutionary France. However, once we recognise that the recall of Socratic politics, which informs her support of American politics, is unlikely to work under contemporary conditions, it is hard to see how Arendt solves Tocqueville's (2000) essential problem of America, which is that the utopia of political participation has itself fallen into the kind of comfortable soft fascism characteristic of contemporary America. In the final chapter of the book I return to the first response to the condition of homelessness, liberal politics, and in particular, the problem of America. Here I ask if it is still possible to think about American politics in terms of a solution to the problem of the virus or whether under conditions of contemporary globality we must abandon the American way in favour of some new social and political ideology.

Part I

Ancients and Moderns