Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700

By Wilbur Samuel Howell



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CHAPTER 4

The English Ramists

I. Ramus's Reform of Dialectic and Rhetoric

PIERRE DE LA RAMÉE, also known as Peter Ramus, was born in the Catholic faith in the year 1515 at the little village of Cuth in Vermandois in the north of France; and he died at Paris on August 26, 1572, as a Protestant victim of what came to be called the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day.[1] His life was as stormy as the times in which he lived. At the age of 21, after a struggle for an education at Paris against the discouragements of poverty and lack of family assistance, he was awarded his degree of master of arts as a result of his defense of the bold thesis that all things affirmed on the authority of Aristotle are overelaborate, contrived, artificial.[2] Although this was more of an attack upon works

[1] For the best biography of Ramus, see Charles Waddington, *Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée) sa vie, ses écrits et ses opinions* (Paris, 1855). This work grew out of Waddington's earlier Latin biography, *De Petri Rami Vita, Scriptis, Philosophia* (Paris, 1848), published under the name of Waddington-Kastus. For a somewhat shorter French account, see Charles Desmaze, *P. Ramus Professeur au Collége de France sa vie, ses écrits, sa mort 1515-1572* (Paris, 1864). See also the brief life by Gustave Rigollot in *Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, s.v. Ramus, Pierre.

The best English life is by Frank Pierrepont Graves, *Peter Ramus and the Educational Reformation of the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1912). For recent discussions of Ramus's influence, see Hardin Craig, *The Enchanted Glass* (New York, 1936), pp. 142-159; Crane, *Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance*, pp. 51, 55-57; Perry Miller, *The New England Mind* (New York, 1939), pp. 111-180, 312-330, 493-501; Baldwin, *William Shakspere's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke*, II, 4-68; Harold S. Wilson and Clarence A. Forbes, *Gabriel Harvey's "Ciceronianus,"* University of Nebraska Studies: Studies in the Humanities No. 4 (Lincoln, 1945), pp. 1-34, 107-139; Rosemond Tuve, *Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery* (Chicago, 1947), pp. 331-353; Sister Miriam Joseph, *Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language*, pp. 3-40; Donald Lemen Clark, *John Milton at St. Paul's School* (New York, 1948), pp. 76-77, 160-161, 179.

For special studies of Ramus, see the following: Leon Howard, "'The Invention' of Milton's 'Great Argument': A Study of the Logic of 'God's Ways to Men,'" *The Huntington Library Quarterly*, IX (February 1946), 149-173; Norman E. Nelson, *Peter Ramus and the Confusion of Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetry*, The University of Michigan Contributions in Modern Philology, No. 2 (Ann Arbor, 1947); P. A. Duhamel, "The Logic and Rhetoric of Peter Ramus," *Modern Philology*, XLVI (February 1949), 163-171; J. Milton French, "Milton, Ramus, and Edward Phillips," *Modern Philology*, XLVII (November 1949), 82-87; Wilbur S. Howell, "Ramus and English Rhetoric: 1574-1681," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXXVII (1951), 299-310; Walter J. Ong, S.J., "Hobbes and Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English," *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society*, I (1949-1953), 260-269.

[2] Waddington, *Ramus*, pp. 28-29. For a good discussion of the proper English translation of Ramus's thesis, see P. Albert Duhamel, "Milton's Alleged Ramism," *PMLA*, LXVII (1952), 1036.

professing to be Aristotelian than upon those actually written by Aristotle, and although it tended to discredit Aristotle's late medieval disciples more than the master himself, it was nevertheless a radical doctrine, and it made Ramus seem impudent if not almost sacrilegious. The rest of his life was a struggle against the educational procedures of his time and against the hostility that the unorthodox always bring upon themselves. He sought reform throughout the field of the liberal arts, and he laid out a new program for grammar and rhetoric as well as for logic; but his own efforts were mainly bent upon the reform of the latter subject, and thus his work is perhaps best understood as a great protest against the scholasticism that I explained above in Chapter 2. His two earliest writings on logic were angrily criticized and even suppressed by royal edict, a part of the verdict against him being that he was to teach philosophy no more. Somewhat later, the whole of the verdict against him was reversed, thanks to his powerful friend, the cardinal of Lorraine, but this success made him more contentious than ever. Then came his conversion to Protestantism, his exile from Paris, his return, a second exile, a second return, and a series of troubles and misadventures that finally ended when he was killed by the mob as the St. Bartholomew massacre was in its third day.

As Ramus looked at the scholastic logic, the traditional rhetoric, and the conventional grammar of his day, he was troubled by what seemed to him to be redundancy and indecisiveness in the theories of these basic liberal arts. It seemed to him to be necessary for instruction in communication that students be trained to discover subject matter through a study of all the general wisdom behind a given specific issue or case. But was it strictly required that both logic and rhetoric offer this training, as they did when each of them sought to teach the doctrine of invention? Again, it seemed to him necessary that students be taught the principles of arrangement of subject matter through some sort of study of the degrees of generality of various statements and perhaps even through some study of the psychological habits of people who receive communications. But was it strictly required that both logic and rhetoric offer this training, as they did when each made the doctrine of arrangement into a major topic? And was it strictly required that rhetoric, having contracted to teach organization of material, should place the theory of the six parts of an oration under the heading of invention, with the result that the very crux of the problem of arrangement was disposed of before the

topic of arrangement came up for discussion? Still again, it seemed to him to be necessary that students master the schemes and the tropes, since these departures from everyday speech were needed to give discourse the persuasive aura of aristocracy in an aristocratic society. But was it strictly required that the schemes and the tropes be handled both as a part of grammar and as a part of rhetoric in the existing curriculum?

Ramus's reform of the liberal arts was in fact a system of direct answers to these questions. He ordained that logic should offer training in invention and arrangement, with no help whatever from rhetoric. He ordained that the topic of arrangement should take care of all speculations regarding the method of discourse, with no help whatever from invention. He ordained that rhetoric should offer training in style and delivery, and that style should be limited to the tropes and the schemes, with no help whatever from grammar, which was to be assigned only subject matter derived from considerations of etymology and syntax. The subject of memory, which we have seen to be a recognized part of traditional rhetoric since the youth of Cicero, was detached by Ramus from rhetoric, and was not made a special topic elsewhere in his scheme for the liberal arts, except so far as logic helped memory indirectly by providing the theoretical basis for strict organization of discourse.

The closest associate of Ramus in his program of reform was Omer Talon, also known as Audomarus Talaeus, whose special task it was to write the reformed rhetoric, as Ramus was to write the logic. In the preface to his first work on rhetoric, the *Institutiones Oratoriae*, published at Paris in 1544, Talaeus says that Ramus's purpose in reforming the arts had already been proclaimed by his *Dialecticae Institutiones* and his *Aristotelicae Animadversiones*, his two earliest works on logic. And Talaeus adds that his own purpose is now proclaimed in this present work of his.[3] An even better and more specific declaration of the way in which Ramus and Talaeus had agreed to collaborate in revising logic and rhetoric is found in Talaeus's preface to his revised and more polished rhetoric, where he speaks as follows:

> Peter Ramus cleaned up the theory of invention, arrangement, and memory, and returned these subjects to logic, where they properly belong. Then, assisted indeed by his lectures and opinions, I recalled rhetoric to style and delivery (since these are the only parts proper to it); and I explained it by genus and species, (which method was previously allowed to me); and I illustrated it with examples drawn both from oratory and poetry. Thus these present precepts are almost wholly in words drawn from those authors; but as this first and rude outline has unfolded, the precepts have been tested by the judgment of both of us, and disposed in order, and ornamented and treated by kind.[4]

[3] *Petri Rami Professoris Regii, & Audomari Talaei Collectaneae Praefationes, Epistolae, Orationes* (Marburg, 1599), pp. 14-15. This preface is dated at Paris in the year 1544.

The notion that dialectic should consist of the procedures of invention and arrangement goes back to Aristotle's *Topics*, as I mentioned earlier, and was a recurrent feature of scholastic logic.[5] The great fifteenth-century advocate of this notion, Rudolph Agricola, was the one who led Ramus to base his own logic upon it. Agricola died many years before Ramus was born, but Johannes Sturm, the disciple of Agricola, lectured at the University of Paris when Ramus was a student there, and those lectures, as Ramus himself testifies, excited an incredible fervor for the study of logic, and gave Ramus his first real awareness of its applications.[6]

Ramus's reform of the liberal arts, however, involved more than Agricola's theory that logic should consist of the topics of invention and arrangement. After all, Thomas Wilson adhered to Agricola's bipartite division of logic without feeling it therefore necessary to exclude invention and arrangement from rhetoric and to limit rhetoric only to style and delivery. What Ramus did was to proceed beyond Agricola by fortifying himself with three general laws out of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, and these laws explain his reforms better than anything else. Incidentally, the nature of these laws as Aristotle and Vincent of Beauvais conceived of them has already been indicated in my earlier chapter on scholastic logic.[7] Ramus was particularly impressed by these laws as the basic criteria for determining the subject matter and the organization of all science.[8] The importance he attached to them indicates that he was the sort of re-

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16. Translation mine. For Ramus's own statement of the way in which he returned the topic of memory to logic, see *P. Rami Scholarum Dialecticarum, seu Animadversionum in Organum Aristotelis, libri xx*, Recens emendati per Joan Piscatorem Argentinensem (Frankfort, 1581), p. 593.

[5] See above, pp. 15-16.

[6] *Collectaneae Praefationes, Epistolae, Orationes*, p. 67. See also Waddington, *Ramus*, pp. 384-385.

[7] See above, pp. 41-44.

[8] For a list of references by Ramus to these laws at various places in his writings, see Wilbur S. Howell, *Fénelon's Dialogues on Eloquence* (Princeton, 1951), p. 8, note 5.

former who used one part of the old order to revise that order as a whole, rather than the sort who abandoned the old order and adopted a new.

Although his laws came ultimately to be known among English Ramists as the law of truth, of justice, and of wisdom, and among Latin Ramists as *lex veritatis*, *lex justitiae*, and *lex sapientiae*, they were called "du tout," "par soy," and "vniuersel premierement" by Ramus himself in the famous first French edition of his *Dialectiqve*, after their original Latin forms "de omni," "per se," and "universaliter primum."[9] "Et bref," says Ramus, "toute enonciation marquée de ces trois marques, *Du tout*, *Par soy*, *Vniuersel premierement*, est vray principe d'art & science, & premiere cause de sa verité, comme nous dirons plus amplement au neufiesme des Animaduersions." "And in brief every statement marked by these three marks, 'of all,' 'in itself,' 'universal in the first instance,' is a true principle of art and science, and is the first cause of its truth, as we shall show more fully in the ninth book of the *Animadversions*."[10]

One of the most suggestive of the explanations of the meaning assigned by the Ramists to these laws is found in the French version of the *Dialectiqve* published in 1576, four years after Ramus's death. This version is not to be confused with that just quoted, which Ramus prepared and published by himself at Paris in 1555 and at Avignon in 1556 as part of his program to make the learned arts available in his own native language.[11] The French version published after his death contains the following explanation of the three laws, the terminology being more fully developed than that of the version of 1555:

> Next, an axiom is true or false: true, when it pronounces as the thing itself is; false, when it pronounces to the contrary. The true axiom is necessary or contingent: necessary, when it is always true and cannot possibly be false. And this axiom is named and marked by Aristotle in the first book of his *Demonstration* [that is, the *Posterior Analytics*], the mark being "of all"; the impossible, on the contrary, can never be true. Axioms of the arts ought to be affirmed and true generally and necessarily in this fashion, but beyond this they ought also to be homogeneous and reciprocal. A homogeneous axiom is one in which the parts are essential among themselves; as the form is essential to that which is formed; and as the subject is essential to its proper adjunct, and as the proper adjunct is essential to its subject in itself, and not through any other cause; and as the genus has its species to which it is essential. And this axiom is marked and termed "in itself." A reciprocal axiom is when the predicate is affirmed and true of its subject, not only "of all," and not only "in itself," but also reciprocally: as *Grammar is the art of speaking well; Rhetoric, the art of communicating well; Dialectic, the art of disputing well; Arithmetic, the art of computing well; Geometry, the art of measuring well*; also, *man is a reasonable creature; grammar is composed of two parts, etymology and syntax; number is even or odd; the wolf is born to howl*. And this axiom is called "universal in the first instance."[12]

The first of these axioms, the *lex veritatis*, permitted Ramus to sift out of the liberal arts any propositions that were true only at times. Such propositions were in the field of opinion rather than of science, and while they have to be reckoned with in our daily lives, where contingent truths, probabilities, and uncertainties surround us, they cannot claim to be demonstrable, and thus they cannot achieve the validity of necessary truth. Ramus wanted the learned arts to consist of universal and necessary affirmations—of affirmations in which the predicate was true of every case of the subject. For example, in the proposition that dialectic is the art of disputing well, every case of disputing according to artistic principle is a case of dialectic, and thus, according to him, the proposition is truly general, truly necessary, and to that extent is a candidate for admission into the dialectical science.

The second of these axioms, the *lex justitiae*, permitted Ramus to sift out of one liberal art any propositions that belonged to another. Suppose, for example, that you examined traditional grammar and traditional rhetoric, and found in the first the statement that schemes were grammatical and rhetorical, whereas in the second you found the statement that grammatical schemes were orthographical or syntactical, while rhetorical schemes were of words, of sentences, and of amplification. Here would be a case where the same statements appeared in about the same form in two different arts, and the subject

[9] *Dialectiqve de Pierre de la Ramee* (Paris: André Wechel, 1555), pp. 84-85. For these terms in Latin, see *P. Rami Regii Professoris Dialecticae Libri Duo* (Lvtetiae: Apud Andream Wechelum, 1574), pp. 52-53.

[10] *Dialectiqve* (1555), pp. 84-85. Translation mine here and below.

[11] For a warning against the confusing of the translation of 1576 with the earlier translation, see Waddington-Kastus, *De Petri Rami Vita, Scriptis, Philosophia*, p. 177. See also Waddington, *Ramus*, pp. 451-452.

[12] *La Dialectiqve de M. Pierre de La Ramee Professevr du Roy, comprise en deux liures selon la derniere edition* (Paris: Guillaume Auuray, 1576), foll. 38v-49r. Translation mine here and below.

matter of the two arts seemed intermingled and confused. The law of justice, invoked at this point, required a decision to be made as to which of the two arts properly possessed the topic of schemes and tropes, and what was therefore left to the art which lost the decision. Ramus decided that schemes and tropes belonged to communicating well, rather than to speaking well, and that grammar was left with absolute dominion over etymology and syntax as the two essential properties of the art of serving oneself by means of articulate speech. The same fundamental decisions had to be made in relation to the ultimate ownership of statements having to do with invention and disposition. These statements were claimed by traditional rhetoric and scholastic logic, as we have seen; but Ramus, accepting Agricola (and Aristotle's *Topics*) as authority for the claim of logic to these procedures, decided that rhetoric had proper subject matter when it was left with style and delivery.

The third of these axioms, the *lex sapientiae*, permitted Ramus to clarify the organization of the subject matter of the liberal arts. In its original meaning, this law meant that the predicate of a scientific proposition must represent the nearest rather than the more remote class of things to which the subject could belong. Thus if we say that grammar is an art, our statement is scientific, since it places our subject in its proximate rather than its remote class. But if we say that grammar is a form, our statement places our subject in a class too remote from its scientific character, and thus the statement, although true, is not admissible into the grammatical science. Now Ramus saw the possibility of extending this law so that, instead of using it to place a given subject into its nearest class, we would use it to determine whether a given proposition belonged in the class of most general statements, or in the class of merely general statements, or in the class of concrete statements. And he also saw the possibility of proceeding to present a science in accordance with this classifying of propositions, the most general statements being placed first, the less general ones next, and the least general ones last. Thus the *lex sapientiae* appears to be the logical basis of Ramus's famous definition of method:

> Method is arrangement, by which among many things the first in respect to conspicuousness is put in the first place, the second in the second, the third in the third, and so on. This term refers to every discipline and every dispute. Yet it commonly is taken in the sense of a direction sign and of a shortening of the highway. And by this metaphor it was practised in school by the Greeks and the Latins, who, speaking also of rhetoric, called method arrangement, from the term for its genus. And under this term there is no doctrine, whether of proposition, or of syllogism, that is taught in rhetoric, except only so far as rhetoric makes mention of method.[13]

The best short statement of Ramus's theory of logic, and thus of his major contribution to learning, is found in the French version of the *Dialectiqve* as published in 1555, although the Latin analogue of that work, the *Dialecticae Libri Duo*, first published one year later, is also a good summary of his logical teachings. Waddington calls the latter treatise Ramus's final word on logic, whereas he calls the former the first and most important philosophical work in French up to Descartes's *Discours de la Méthode*.[14] This verdict would have pleased Ramus in a very special way. For in the last preface which he wrote for his *Dialecticae Libri Duo*, he mentions Archimedes as having wished that his discourse on the sphere and cylinder might be engraved on his tomb; "and as for me," adds Ramus, "if you wish to inform yourself about my vigils and my studies, I shall want the column of my sepulchre to be taken up with the establishing of the art of logic or dialectic."[15] To Ramus, logic was the center of the program of liberal studies, and the chief instrument of man in the quest for salvation. In fact, the strength of Ramus's passion for this subject can be inferred from his own statement that God is the only perfect logician, that man surpasses the beasts by virtue of his capacity to reason syllogistically, and that one man surpasses another only so far as his address to the problem of method is superior.[16]

The *Dialectiqve* of 1555 is inscribed to Cardinal Charles of Lorraine, whom Ramus designates on the title page and in the dedicatory epistle as his Maecenas. The epistle thanks the cardinal for his protection of Ramus against the Aristotelians who sought to suppress his teachings, and offers the present book as a return for that favor. Dialectic, observes Ramus, deserves the great attention it has received from philosophers; "for if the special arts have been reduced to rule by the great labor of many men, grammar and rhetoric for speaking well and for ornamenting speech, arithmetic and geometry for computing and measuring well, what quantity of vigils and what

[13] *Dialectiqve* (1555), p. 119.
[14] *Ramus*, pp. 9, 106.
[15] *Dialecticae Libri Duo* (Lvtetiae, 1574), p. 2; *La Dialectiqve de M. Pierre de La Ramee* (Paris, 1576), sig. A2r. Translation mine.
[16] *Dialectiqve* (1555), pp. 118-119, 135-136, 139.

great number of men worked together to fashion dialectic, the general art of inventing and judging all things?"[17] The epistle proceeds to give a brief history of speculations upon dialectic or logic, Aristotle being credited with one hundred and thirty books on the subject, of which thirty-five deal with the true dialectic inasmuch as they speak of arguments and of the disposition and judgment of arguments.[18] The last great name in this brief history is Galen, after whom, says Ramus, the true love of wisdom ceased, and the servile love of Aristotle began. As for himself, Ramus believes it his mission to cull from the works of the past, and particularly from the dialectical works of Aristotle, such precepts and rules as are strictly germane to dialectic, and then to arrange them in the fashion required by his own regulations for method. Upon this mission, he says, I have spent almost twenty years, and not merely the nine which Horace had recommended as the proper interval between composition and publication.

Book I of the *Dialectiqve* opens with the definition that dialectic is the art of disputing well, and that logic is to be used in the same sense. Its rules are derived from the workings of the human reason. Man ought to study dialectic in order to dispute well, "because it proclaims to us the truth of all argument and as a consequence the falsehood, whether the truth be necessary, as in science, or, as in opinion, contingent, that is to say, capable both of being and not being."[19] Ramus observes later:

> But because of these two species, Aristotle wished to make two logics, one for science, and the other for opinion; in which (saving the honor of so great a master) he has very greatly erred. For although articles of knowledge are on the one hand necessary and scientific, and on the other contingent and matters of opinion, so it is nevertheless that as sight is common in viewing all colors, whether permanent or changeable, so the art of knowing, that is to say, dialectic or logic, is one and the same doctrine in respect to perceiving all things, as will be seen

[17] *Ibid.*, fol. 2v. This preface is also printed in Waddington, *Ramus*, pp. 401-407.

[18] By thirty-five books of Aristotle on "la vraye dialectique," Ramus means, as he himself indicates, not thirty-five separate works, but some nine works divided into thirty-five main sections. Thus he counts the six separate titles in the *Organon* as containing seventeen main sections or books; he counts the *Metaphysics* as containing fourteen main sections or books; and he counts the *Rhetoric* as containing four sections or books, three of which he would reckon as belonging to the work now accepted as Aristotle's, and the other, as belonging to *De Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, now usually regarded as the work of someone else.

[19] *Dialectiqve* (1555), p. 2.

> by its very parts, and as the *Aristotelian Animadversions* explain more fully.[20]

Thus does Ramus indicate his belief in one system of logic for both science and opinion, and in one theory of invention and arrangement for both logician and rhetorician, whereas the scholastics, following Aristotle and Cicero, preferred two systems of logic, one for science and the other for opinion, and two systems of invention and disposition, one in the field of scientific and the other in the field of popular discourse. Nowhere is the issue between scholastic and Ramist indicated more sharply than it is in the words just quoted. Nowhere is the essential point in Ramus's reform of scholastic logic and traditional rhetoric stated more firmly than it is right here.

Ramus's next main point is that dialectic has two parts, invention and judgment or arrangement. These are not severely insulated from each other, he goes on, but rather are involved in each other, the first being devoted to the separate parts of reasoning, and the other, to the arranging of those parts into discourse. The separate parts of reasoning offer a problem in terminology, and Ramus proceeds carefully to review the various terms for those parts in traditional Aristotelian logic. One traditional term, he says, is categorem; another is category; still another is topics, that is, places and notes. The doctrine of topics or places or localities, he goes on, indicates that the parts of reasoning dwell in seats or habitats. But these parts should more properly be called principles, elements, terms, means, reasons, proofs, or arguments. These two last terms seem to Ramus to be the most appropriate for his purposes. "We shall use the terms of reasoning, that is, proof and argument, as being the most widely received and the most customary in this art."[21]

The basic distinction in Ramus's treatment of invention is that between artistic and non-artistic arguments—a distinction which he expressly credits to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and which has been discussed earlier in these pages.[22] Having established argument as the term for the thing produced by invention, Ramus proceeds to define the two great types of argument thus:

> Argument then is artistic or non-artistic, as Aristotle partitions it in the second of the *Rhetoric*: artistic, which creates belief by itself and by its nature, is divided into the primary and the derivative primary.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. See above, p. 16.

[21] *Dialectiqve*, p. 5.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 5. See above, pp. 68-69.

> Non-artistic argument is that which by itself and through its own force does not create belief, as for example the five types which Aristotle describes in the first of his *Rhetoric*, laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths. Thus it is always that these arguments are interchangeably called authorities and witnesses.[23]

To artistic arguments, Ramus devotes fifty-five pages, and to the non-artistic, five. Since one of the great differences between the ancient and the modern theory of proof is that the ancients stressed the discovery of artistic proofs, and correspondingly neglected the non-artistic, whereas the moderns have done almost exactly the reverse, it can be seen that on this point Ramus is hardly a modern in his emphasis.

Artistic arguments, as distributed between the category of primary and the category of derivative primary, involve nine basic terms. The six of these which are primary comprise causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, opposites, and comparatives; the three which are derivative comprise reasoning from name, reasoning from division, and reasoning by definition. Since the class of non-artistic arguments is composed, not of generals, but of particulars, it can be argued that Ramus intended it as a class to rank with the nine basic terms just enumerated to form a theory of invention of ten topics. In other words, it can be argued that he wanted to preserve ten basic entities out of respect for Aristotle's ten categories and thus give his reformed logic a traditional flavor. By splitting some of these ten topics into subdivisions (for example, by speaking of cause as the final, the formal, the efficient, and the material), he succeeded in preserving other traditional terms while effecting a neat reorganization of the accepted subject matter.

The ten basic entities in Ramus's theory of logical invention are in reality the ten basic relations between predicate and subject in the logical proposition, or the ten basic relations among the objects of knowledge in the human environment.[24] This means in a way that if you set yourself to making truthful declarations about an object, those declarations will inevitably concern the object's causes, or its effects, or its subjects, or its adjuncts, or its opposites, or its analogues, or its name, or its divisions, or its definition, or its witnesses. Thus a discourse on man might be made up of declarations on man as

[23] *Dialectiqve*, pp. 5-6, 61. For Aristotle's discussion of this distinction, and of the five types of non-artistic arguments, see *Rhetoric*, 1.2,15.

[24] *Dialectiqve*, pp. 71-72.

the product of causes, man as the producer of effects, man as the subject of many circumstances, man as the circumstance of certain subjects (the earth, for example); of declarations on things opposite to man, and things analogous to man; and of declarations about words that signify man, about wholes that include him, or parts that make him up, or definitions that exactly characterize him, or witnesses who testify to something he has or does not have.[25] When Thomas Wilson, Ramus's contemporary, wanted to show how the topics of logic worked, he indicated that some nineteen different basic topics were to be applied to a given concept, and he listed those topics as a miscellany not only of some of the predicaments and all of the predicables, but also of additions created by splitting certain other old terms asunder.[26] It was the indeterminate number of these topics in the scholastic theory that Ramus objected to, as he also objected to the fact that the scholastics mentioned the predicaments and predicables under invention as well as under arrangement, as if redundancy could not or should not be avoided. He wanted to make logic rigidly scientific by reducing the theory of logical invention to its universal kinds, not to a mixture of universals and particulars; and by treating these kinds in one of the two divisions of logic, not in both. As he brings his account of invention to a close, he observes:

> Consequently, then, although man may be ignorant of all things, this is not in any sense to declare that he should not seek or that he cannot invent, in view of the fact that he has naturally in himself the power to understand all things; and when he shall have before his eyes the art of invention by its universal kinds, as a sort of mirror reflecting for him the universal images and the generals of all things, it will be much easier for him by means of these images to recognize each single species, and therefore to invent that which he is seeking; but it is necessary by very many examples, by great practice, by long use, to burnish and polish this mirror before it can shine and render up these images.[27]

John Seton, Thomas Wilson, and Ralph Lever treated arrangement or judgment by making it the first rather than the second grand division of logic, as if the problem of arranging thought were of primary importance in the theory of learned discourse.[28] Ramus re-

[25] In his "Peroration de L'Invention," *Dialectiqve*, pp. 65-70, Ramus sketches a discourse upon man derived from the basic terms of his theory of topics.

[26] See above, pp. 25-28.

[27] *Dialectiqve*, p. 69.

[28] See above, pp. 16, 51, 60.

verses this emphasis, although little significance should be attached to his decision. What is really significant is that his treatment of arrangement does not include any mention of the categories or predicaments, any mention of the predicables, but is devoted instead to three other aspects of scholastic logic, expounded in the ascending order of complexity. After defining judgment as "the second part of logic, which shows the ways and means of judging well by means of certain rules of arrangement," and after indicating Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* and *Posterior Analytics* as the great source of these rules, Ramus adds, "The arrangement of logic has three species, the proposition, the syllogism, method."[29] This sentence gives an exhaustive inventory of his second book, and that second book is the most influential of all his contributions to logic.

The proposition, or in Ramus's French the "Enonciation," "is arrangement by means of which something is stated of something else."[30] This is the simplest unit of arrangement, the most elementary way of ordering what has been invented; and its parts are the subject (or antecedent) and the predicate (or consequent). It is at this point, by the way, that Ramus designates his theory of invention as a theory of the generic relations between antecedent and consequent, those relations being that of cause to effect, of effect to cause, of subject to adjunct, of adjunct to subject, and so on. But Ramus's main interest now is to show what the proposition is as a unit of discourse. Thus he discusses the simple proposition (which consists of one subject and one predicate) and the compound proposition, where the predicate is composite, or relative, or conditional, or disjunctive. The distinguishing feature of this part of his work is that, in concluding his analysis of the proposition, he mentions the three laws by which one can judge whether or not a given proposition is scientific. Since these three laws have already been explained as Vincent of Beauvais and Ramus conceived of them,[31] I shall say nothing further about them here, except to suggest that they stand in the structure of Ramistic logic as the five predicables stood in scholasticism. That is, a statement became properly scientific in the eyes of scholastic logic when it could be classed as having a predicate of genus, of species, of difference, of property, or of accident.[32] In the eyes of Ramus, who ignored the five predicables as a topic in logic, a statement became

[29] *Dialectiqve*, p. 71.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[31] See above, pp. 41-44, 149-153.
[32] See above, pp. 17-18.

properly scientific only when it satisfied simultaneously each one of the three laws.

"Syllogism," says Ramus in beginning his discussion of the second aspect of judgment, "is arrangement by means of which a question under examination is ordered along with the proof and brought to a necessary conclusion."[33] Ramus's attendant discussion is conventional. He speaks of the three parts of the syllogism; the three figures of the simple syllogism, with their various moods; the composite syllogisms, conditional and disjunctive. He does not bother to speak of induction as a possible alternative to the syllogism; and thus he departs from scholastic logic, which usually recognized induction as a species of argument.[34] If his procedure in this respect seems far from progressive, it should be remembered, not only that the time was not yet ripe for sciences based upon experiment, observation, and the minute description of particulars, but also that a logic of induction in advance of that time would have had no influence. Moreover, Ramus's conception of science was that it began, not with the particulars that might one day yield universals, but with the universals that could be tested by his three laws. For such a science, the syllogism was the master instrument, while the judgment of particulars was a preliminary matter. Thus he says in his concluding remarks on the syllogistic judgment:

> When the judgment of the major premise and of the minor premise will then be well guaranteed, and the syllogistic collocation of these elements well set out, the question under examination will also be well judged to be true or false; for at the second judgment the first is presupposed, and from the first is borrowed that double light to clarify the conclusion. And in brief the art of the syllogism does not inform us of any other thing than that of resolving a stated question by the manifest truth of two well-arranged parts.[35]

Ramus later allows the process of induction, which arrives at a preliminary judgment by a survey of particulars, to be a common possession among all forms of life, whereas the syllogism is the property only of the highest form of life and the expression only of the highest intelligence. He phrases this thought in the following words:

> Finally let us remember that the syllogism is a law of reason, truer and more just than all the laws which Lycurgus and Solon once

[33] *Dialectiqve*, p. 87.
[34] See above, pp. 22-23, 54, 60.
[35] *Dialectiqve*, pp. 113-114.

> fashioned, through which the judgment of the doubtful proposition is established by a necessary and immutable verdict—I say, a law of reason, proper to man, not being in any sense shared with the other animals, as the preliminary judgment can be in some sense shared, but solely in things pertaining to sense and belonging to the body and the physical life.[36]

Then he goes on to say that lower forms of life like spiders and ants, despite their sensory adjustment to their environment, can conceive of nothing by using a middle term, and can draw no conclusion by properly comparing and disposing such a term in the figure of a syllogism. Certainly, he adds, "—certainly this part in man is the image of some sort of divinity."[37]

The final section of Ramus's *Dialectiqve* is given over to the discussion of method, his definition of which has already been quoted as an application of the *lex sapientiae*. What Ramus has to say on method is the most important part of his contribution to the theory of communication, and it exercised such influence that a century-long debate on that subject ensued, one masterpiece of which was Descartes's *Discours de la Méthode*. The enthusiasm of Ramus's disciples and the malice of his opponents conspired, however, to distort this aspect of his own teaching, and to narrow his recommendations to the one that struck everybody as most unusual. Thus it is necessary to approach these recommendations through his own words rather than through the words of his later critics and admirers.

"Method," says Ramus, "is natural or prudential."[38] This view of method as twofold follows upon his definition of method as that in which ideas in any learned treatise or dispute are to be arranged in the order of their conspicuousness, the most conspicuous things being given first place, and less conspicuous things being given subordinate places. While both the natural and the prudential methods, as explained by Ramus, fall under his definition, and are governed by it, the natural method attempts to arrange ideas according to their degree of conspicuousness in an absolute sense, whereas the prudential method attempts to arrange them according to their degree of conspicuousness in the consciousness of the inexpert listener or reader.

The natural method, or as Ramus later implies, the method of arranging a scientific discourse, proceeds upon the assumption that some statements are naturally more evident or more conspicuous

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 118. [37] *Ibid.*, p. 119. [38] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

than others, as for example, a statement of the cause of a thing is more evident than a statement of its effect, or a general and universal is more evident than a particular or singular.[39] However true it is, argues Ramus, that any authentic discipline must consist of general and universal rules, those rules nevertheless possess different degrees of generality, and to the extent that they are more general, they should outrank the less general in the order of presentation. Thus propositions of utmost generality will be placed first; propositions of lesser generality will be placed next; subalterns will be placed next; "and finally the examples, which are most particular, will be placed last."[40] After tracing the origins of this method to the works of Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Ramus observes:

> And in a word this artistic method to me appears as a sort of long chain of gold, such as Homer imagined, in which the links are these degrees thus depending one from another, and all joined so justly together, that nothing could be removed from it, without breaking the order and continuity of the whole.[41]

Although Ramus's own *Dialectiqve* exemplifies the natural method as well as any work could, he is not content to rest the case there. Instead, in his discussion of this phase of method, he fabricates an illustration to show what it means; and the illustration is valuable as a precise description of the procedures he himself followed in reforming the liberal arts. His illustration consists in asking us to assume that all the definitions, divisions, and rules of grammar have been discovered and tested; and that each one is then inscribed upon its own paper and is mixed with the others in a jug, like tickets in a lottery. Now, Ramus demands, what part of logic will be able to teach one to arrange these papers in their rightful order as I draw them forth? Not the first part, surely, for here is a case where all materials have already been found, and where no need exists for the use of the places of invention. Not the doctrine of proposition or of syllogism, for here is a case where all the materials have been stated in proper form and tested by the first and by the second operation of judgment. No, of all the parts of logic, only method can help in this case. Accordingly, the logician, by invoking the natural method, will draw the papers from the jug, and when he comes upon the paper saying, "Grammar is the doctrine of speaking well," he will

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 128. See below, pp. 164, 168-169.
[40] *Dialectiqve*, pp. 120-121. [41] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

recognize this as the most general statement he can possibly encounter about grammar, and he will put this paper first. When later he comes upon another paper saying, "The parts of grammar are two, etymology and syntax," he will recognize it as the next most general statement he can possibly encounter, and he will rank it second. He will rank third the statement that defines etymology. He will then rank under etymology all statements belonging to it, keeping the proper order from general to particular. Then he will repeat the same operation for the second part of grammar, putting first the definition of syntax, then less general statements about it, and finally the examples. Between each topic in the entire treatise, as at last assembled, he will then insert transitional elements to indicate what the preceding topic has been, and what the following will be. "For," says Ramus, "by means of these notes of transition the spirit is refreshed and stimulated."[42]

Ramus's habit of dividing a subject into two main parts, as illustrated by this discourse on grammar, and by his treatment of logic and rhetoric, led to the assumption that for him the natural method is essentially the method of dichotomies—of proceeding always to separate a logical class into two subclasses opposed to each other by contradiction, and to separate the subclasses and the sub-subclasses in the same way, until the entire structure of any science resembled a severely geometrical pattern of bifurcations. Actually, however, the natural method as used by Ramus himself is better defined as the concept of arranging ideas in the descending order of generality than as the concept of dividing invariably by twos. Not only does Ramus's own definition of the natural method stress the former concept, without reference to the latter; but his procedure tends also in the same direction. For example, although he divides logic into invention and arrangement, and invention into artistic and non-artistic proofs, he proceeds to discuss the latter under five headings, not two; and of course his treatment of arrangement falls, not into two parts, but three. Again, he divides artistic proofs into primary and derivative primary, but he proceeds to discuss the former class under six headings, and the latter, under three. Even his original distribution of logic into invention and arrangement is not based upon the assumption that the principle of contradiction is involved, for he expressly notes the presence of invention in an act of arrangement, and the

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

presence of arrangement in an act of invention.[43] His followers tended to construe the natural method and the law of justice to mean the severest kind of dichotomizing, as if any given idea had only two members, one completely insulated from the other. But it is worth noticing that Ramus himself did not take the habit of dichotomies as seriously as that.

Nor did he limit the use of the natural method to learned writing or to the kind of discourse in which the expert talks to the expert. He expressly says that it is used also in poetry and oratory, and his discussion of this point is worth quoting as an indication of the relation of logic and criticism in Ramistic philosophy:

> Now this method is not solely applicable to the material of the arts and doctrines, but to all things which we intend to teach easily and clearly. And consequently it is common to orators, poets, and all writers. The orators in their introductions and narrations, their proofs and perorations, like to follow this order, and they call it then the order of art and of nature. And sometimes they practice it most assiduously, as Cicero did in the accusation, first stating, then distributing.
>
> [This reference to Cicero's speech against Verres, II.1.12.34, is then explained by Ramus as an example of the natural method.]
>
> Thus do the poets, if sometimes they treat matter of learning and doctrine. As Virgil in the *Georgics* first divides his matter into four parts, as I have said. And in the first book he treats the things common to all parts, as astrology and meteorology; and the threshing of the wheat and its husbandry, which was the first part proper. He writes in the second book of trees in general and then of vines in particular. In the third book he writes of cows, horses, sheep, goats, dogs. And in the fourth, of bees.[44]

As a result of Ramus's belief in the applicability of the natural method to all types of discourse, popular as well as learned, it came to be assumed in the course of time that his theory of communication advocated nothing except the natural method. But this is hardly the case. He devotes eight pages of the *Dialectiqve* to the prudential method, which he defines as that "in which things are given precedence, not altogether and absolutely in terms of their being the most conspicuous, but in terms of their being still the most convenient for him whom we must instruct, and of their being most amenable for inducing and leading him whither we purpose."[45] He adds:

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. See also above, p. 155.
[44] *Dialectiqve*, pp. 123-125.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

> It is termed prudential disposition by the orators, because it lies largely in man's prudence rather than in art and in the precepts of doctrine, very much as if the natural method were arrangement for science, and the prudential method were arrangement for opinion.[46]

In his discussion of the prudential method, Ramus indicates that it is taught and practiced by philosophers, poets, and orators. Aristotle, he says, had implied it in his references to the procedures of hidden and deceitful insinuation, where the speaker or writer begins in the middle, without declaring what he intends to do, or what the parts of his subject are, as when he indulges in analogy or parable. As for the use of this method by philosophers, Ramus mentions Plato as the supreme example. Poets, who propose to teach the people, have to accept their auditors as a beast of many heads, says Ramus, and thus have to begin their stories in the middle, and explain later how things got to be as they are. The wisdom of this method, Ramus goes on, has particularly appealed to orators in their attempts to gain initial attention of their hearers. He then sums up this phase of his discussion:

> And in brief all the tropes and figures of style, all the graces of action, which make up the whole of rhetoric, true and distinct from logic, serve no other purpose than to lead this vexatious and mulish auditor, who is postulated to us by this [i.e., the prudential] method; and have been studied on no other account than that of the failings and perversities of this very one, as Aristotle truly teaches in the third of the *Rhetoric*.[47]

These words, written as the *Dialectiqve* is close to its final page, may be taken as Ramus's best statement of the reasons behind the rhetorician's special interest in the prudential method. The troublesome and stubborn auditor, who is present in body but not in mind as the orator speaks, will not follow ideas arranged exclusively in a descending order of generality, and thus will not be captivated by the natural method, as would the scientist and philosopher. What the popular audience needs is the casualness and variety of the prudential method, the flattery of the tropes and figures, the graces of delivery. One might wonder at this point why Ramus, believing these things, would not allow rhetoric to have something to say of

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 128. I have corrected the misprint in the last clause, which reads: "comme si la methode de nature estoit iugement de science, la methode de science [that is, de prudence] estoit iugement d'opinion."

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

arrangement as well as of style and delivery—why he would not concede rhetoric three parts or possibly even four, instead of two, on the assumption that invention, like arrangement, style, and delivery, is one process in scientific discourse and quite another in discourse addressed to the people. Had he gone that far, he would have been closer to the Aristotelian and Ciceronian opinion than he turned out to be. In fact, his real break with Aristotle and Cicero was in ordaining that rhetoric must cease to speculate upon invention and arrangement as well as style and delivery, as if the two former processes had little relevance except in scientific discourse. To Aristotle and Cicero, dialectic was the theory of learned communication, rhetoric of popular communication, and thus both arts needed the two former processes, while rhetoric needed the two latter in particular. To Ramus, dialectic was the theory of subject matter and form in communication, rhetoric the theory of stylistic and oral presentation. By his standards, invention and arrangement were the true property of logic, and must be treated only in logic, even if arrangement had to have two aspects, one for the learned auditor and the other for the people. By his standards, style and delivery were the true property of rhetoric, and must therefore be treated only in rhetoric, even if the popular audience which demanded them had to have also a special theory of method that rhetoric was not allowed to mention.

The dictate that style and delivery are the whole of rhetoric was given concrete formulation by Ramus's good friend and colleague Audomarus Talaeus, as mentioned before.[48] Talaeus is said to have been born around 1510 in Vermandois, the region of Ramus's birth five years later; and he died at Paris in 1562, ten years before the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day.[49] There seems to be no evidence that Talaeus shared Ramus's views towards ecclesiastical reform, but the whole body of his work is witness that in the field of educational reform he and Ramus were the closest and most friendly of collaborators. His *Institutiones Oratoriae*, published at Paris in 1544, is declared in its preface to do for the field of rhetoric what Ramus's *Dialecticae Institutiones* of the preceding year had done for the field of logic. An even fuller explanation of the nature of his collaboration with Ramus has already been quoted above,[50] and that explanation accompanied his *Rhetorica*, which had reached its fifth edition by

[48] See above, pp. 148-149.

[49] See *Biographie Universelle*, s.v. Talon, Omer; also *Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, s.v. Talon, Omer.

[50] pp. 148-149.

1552, and which was intended to reduce Ramistic rhetoric to its briefest Latin expression, as Ramistic logic was reduced to its briefest Latin expression by Ramus's *Dialecticae Libri Duo* of 1556.

A very good indication of Talaeus's adherence to the reforms of Ramus is found in a now-forgotten work, *La Rhetoriqve Francoise*, published at Paris in 1555. This work is a French translation of Talaeus's *Rhetorica*, done in the very year of Ramus's own French translation of his *Dialecticae Libri Duo*, and plainly intended to represent Ramistic rhetoric in vernacular learning, as the *Dialectiqve* represents Ramistic logic. The translator of Talaeus's *Rhetorica* into French was Antoine Foclin, who also called himself Foquelin or Fouquelin. Like Ramus and Talaeus, Foclin was a native of Vermandois. His edition of the satires of Persius, published at Paris in 1555, is dedicated to Ramus, under whom he had studied for the preceding nine years.[51] Thus he had ties of discipleship and place to bind him to Ramism and to dispose him to forward Ramus's reforms according to his own special talents.

La Rhetoriqve Francoise d'Antoine Foclin de Chauny en Vermandois is dedicated to Mary Queen of Scots, then twelve years of age and the darling of the French court, wherein she was being educated as the future bride of the dauphin and the future queen of France.[52] Foclin's dedicatory letter runs to six pages. It is full of enthusiasm for his generation's crusade to translate all the liberal arts into French and thus to save youth from having to master alien languages as a first step in education. It is also full of compliments for the young Scottish queen who would one day have the opportunity not only to assist native French writers to work in their own tongue, but also to support all learning and science. One passage indicates the nature of the education the young queen is receiving at the French court. Foclin mentions that Mary had recently pronounced a Latin oration in the presence of the king and queen and most of the princesses and nobles of the royal circle, and had then translated it into French. The oration had defended the unorthodox thesis, remarks Foclin, that it was becoming to women to know letters and the liberal arts; and it aroused admiration on all sides, and would

[51] See *Biographie Universelle*, s.v. Foquelin, Antoine.

[52] The title page of Foclin's work reads: "La Rhetoriqve Francoise d'Antoine Foclin de Chauny en Vermandois, A Tresillvstre Princesse Madame Marie Royne d'Ecosse. A Paris, De l'imprimerie d'André Wechel. 1555. Avec Privilege."

The Huntington Library holds this work in microfilm, and upon that copy my present discussion is based, all translations from it being mine.

have served him in the present work on rhetoric as a storehouse of examples of all the tropes and figures, had the French translation fallen sooner into his hands. Incidentally, the education of the young queen, as seen in this passage, is more conventional than that which Foclin is aiming for in his effort to make the learning of Latin unnecessary. In still another passage, Foclin apologizes to the queen because the French tongue is still too young and too poor to have a vocabulary of its own for the terms of the liberal arts, and must therefore borrow from the Greek or Latin, not only a basic term like rhetoric, but also the terms for all the tropes and figures.

So far as Ramism is concerned, the most important part of Foclin's dedicatory letter is that in which he identifies his work as a translation of the Latin rhetoric of Talaeus, and credits Talaeus with authorizing and even assisting in that translation. With reference to the enterprise of rendering the learned arts into French, Foclin says:

> In order to advance and patronize which in my own way, I have translated the precepts of rhetoric, as faithfully assembled from the books of the ancient Greek and Latin rhetoricians and arranged in unique order of disposition by Omer Talon, a man no less excellent in this art than perfect in all other disciplines. With the authorization and advice of whom, I have adapted the precepts of this art to our tongue, omitting at all times that to which her natural usage seemed repugnant; adding also that which she has of the proper and particular in herself, beyond Greek and Latin; and setting forth each precept by examples and evidences from the most approved authors of our language—which, I saw, had been done most methodically and ingeniously by that same author in Latin. In which (Madame) all that I can claim as mine (if I can claim anything mine in a work assembled by the labors of so many good men), all that, say I, which I can claim as mine, you have been the first to whom I have esteemed that it must needs be avowed and dedicated.[53]

Immediately after the dedicatory letter, which is dated at Paris, May 12, 1555, the text of Foclin's French version of Talaeus begins. It runs to 139 numbered pages, whereas Ramus's French *Dialectiqve* of that same year had run to 140 pages.[54] Such parallelism as this, by the way, is not hostile to the spirit of Ramism, which gave equal emphasis to the two arts, and made the arrangement of one cor-

[53] *Le Rhetoriqve Francoise*, sig. A3r-A3v.

[54] Foclin's *Rhetoriqve* appears to contain 138 pages, but actually it contains one page more than that, because of the mistake of having two pages numbered 112.

respond almost mathematically to that of the other. But in one sense the mathematical proportions of Ramus's *Dialectiqve* and of Foclin's *Rhetoriqve* do not coincide. The former allocates seventy pages to invention and seventy to arrangement, thus maintaining an absolute equality of emphasis between the two parts of logic. The latter allocates one hundred and thirteen pages to style and only twenty-six to delivery, as if the second part of rhetoric, however important it is in practice, did not have the theoretical interest that the first part has.

The opening words of Foclin's *Rhetoriqve* are a perfect illustration of the natural method described by Ramus. Says Foclin:

> Definition of rhetoric.
> Rhetoric is an art of speaking well and elegantly.
>
> The parts of rhetoric.
> Rhetoric has two parts, style and delivery.
>
> Style and its species.
> Style is not anything but the ornamenting and the enriching of speech and discourse; the which has two species, the one being called trope, the other, figure.
>
> Trope.
> Trope is a style by means of which the proper and natural meaning of the word is changed to another, as is indicated by the word trope, which in French means interchange.
>
> The species of trope.
> There are four sorts of trope: metonymy, irony, metaphor, and synecdoche.[55]

Having descended through these progressively less general statements to a cluster of four basic terms, as Ramus commanded, Foclin proceeds to discuss each term in the order of his enumeration. This part of his discussion turns out also to have a Ramistic bearing. One of the dictates of Ramus's natural method was that causes should be placed before effects.[56] Ramus himself observed this dictate by arranging his discussion of the first part of logic so that the topic of cause not only preceded the topic of effect but also came first among the ten basic topics of logical invention. Foclin's arrangement of tropes follows this very pattern, cause being first, effect second, subject third, adjunct fourth, and so on down Ramus's basic list. Thus metonymy, the first trope in Foclin's cluster, has four distinct kinds.

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

[56] See above, p. 161.

The first kind consists in stating a cause as a means of implying an effect. The second kind consists in stating an effect in order to imply a cause. The third kind consists in stating a subject in order to imply an accident or adjunct. The fourth kind consists in stating an accident in order to imply a subject. Irony, the second trope in Foclin's list, is defined as implying a contrary by its contrary, and this reminds us that Ramus's fifth concept in invention is that of opposites. Foclin's third trope, metaphor, is defined as implying a like by a like—again a reminder that Ramus's sixth concept is that of comparatives or similitudes. Synecdoche, the fourth trope in Foclin's cluster, is defined as implying the whole by naming the member, or as implying the genus by naming the species, or as doing the reverse of either of these two operations. Here again it is easy to see that Foclin has Ramus's eighth and ninth topic of invention in mind, that of division, which concerns wholes and parts, and that of definition, which concerns genus and species.

Foclin devotes thirty-four pages to these four tropes, managing under metaphor to discuss catachresis, allegory, enigma, and hyperbole. Much of his space is given over to illustrations of these stylistic devices from the works of French authors of the time. Thus he quotes from Tahureau, Baïf, and Clément Marot, the latter being cited from his translation of Virgil's first *Eclogue*. But his chief illustrations are drawn from Ronsard, Joachim du Bellay, and Jacques Amyot. In 1547 Amyot had published a French translation of the *Aethiopica* of Heliodorus under the title, *L'Histoire aethiopique de Heliodorus, contenant dix livres*; and it was this Greek romance from the early centuries of the Christian era which provided Foclin with almost as many illustrations as did Ronsard and Bellay, although in his dedicatory letter he expresses the belief that there is much of the contrived and the artificial about the tropes and figures of Heliodorus, whereas those in the Scottish queen's French version of her own Latin oration are by contrast true and natural.[57]

Figure, the second part of style in Ramistic rhetoric, is given seventy-nine pages of analysis and illustration by Foclin. His definition and division of this topic make no reference to grammatical figures, as did the older stylistic rhetoricians:

> Figure is then a species of style, by means of which the language is changed from the simple and popular manner of speaking. For just

[57] *La Rhetoriqve Francoise*, sig. A4r.

as in reference to words, some are literal, and others metaphorical, so in reference to language and manner of speaking, one kind is simple and popular, the other, figured—that it to say, a little changed from the popular and customary manner of speaking, as happens primarily when we wish to plan and discourse upon anything. Not that the vulgar do not sometimes use these ornaments of rhetoric, but that these lights do not shine as often in the language and speech of the unlearned.

Division of figure.

There are two sorts of figure: the one is in the word, the other in the sentence.[58]

Under these two headings, Foclin arranges his entire discussion of the uncustomary forms of speech. His analysis of figures of the word involves the topic of number, which leads him to speak of the measure and quantity of syllables in French poetry, and of resonance and rhythm in poetry and prose. Figures of the sentence involve such devices as prosopopoeia, apostrophe, and exclamation, each device being illustrated from the authors already named. Like a good Ramist, Foclin remembers that transitional elements in literary structure refresh and stimulate the spirit,[59] and thus he concludes his discussion of style with a model transition:

> The precepts of style, the first part of rhetoric, have been set forth in the tropes and figures. Let us go on to delivery, the second part of the doctrine and art proposed.[60]

Delivery, as Foclin defines it from Talaeus's Latin, becomes the external manifestation of style, the projection of style to the hearer. His text reads at this point:

Delivery.

> Delivery is a part of rhetoric which teaches how to express conveniently and how to put forth the style and the speech as conceived in the mind. So that it differs from style in nothing except that in the latter one thinks and conceives of what figure and elegant manner of speaking one will use, whereas in the former one takes pains that the utterance may be such as the conception and the thought of the mind have been.

Parts of delivery.

> Delivery has two parts, the voice, which is called the pronouncing, and the gesture, which is called the action. Of which parts, the first relates to the hearing, the second to the sight. For by these two senses, all knowledge comes into the mind.[61]

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

[59] See above, p. 162.

[60] *La Rhetorique Francoise*, p. 113, i.e., 113.

Foclin recommends that correct speech be learned in infancy and childhood as a part of grammar, but that rhetoric, as a later study, will show what voice and inflection should be used in all sentences, figures, and moods of speaking. He observes:

> For each thing that is said has some proper sound, some sound different from other things, and the voice sounds like the string of a lute, according as it has been touched as by the movement of things which must need be pronounced.[62]

Having made these general observations, Foclin quotes a long passage from *L'Histoire aethiopique*, and intersperses directions as to its pronunciation. After other quotations to the same effect, he turns to gesture, which he discusses in relation to the head, the face, the arms, and the hands. He mentions that gesture has great efficacy as a language that can be understood where spoken words are unintelligible. He recalls that Demosthenes strengthened his own delivery by diligent practice, even speaking against the roar of the sea to develop his voice. And, like most writers on this aspect of rhetoric, he cannot refrain from retelling the familiar story of how Demosthenes, when asked what he deemed the first requisite of eloquence, replied, "Delivery," only to repeat that same answer when he was then asked what was the second and what the third requisite.[63]

Thus did Foclin's *Rhetoriqve Francoise* bring into native French speech the Latin rhetoric of Talaeus in the very year of the first French version of Ramus's *Dialectiqve*. It would be idle to pretend that Foclin's translation is absolutely faithful to Talaeus's original, especially as Foclin himself acknowledges omissions, additions, and changes.[64] It would also be idle to pretend that Talaeus's *Rhetorica* was absolutely faithful to itself from one of its many versions to another in and out of France during the last half of the sixteenth century. Still again, it would be idle to pretend that Ramus's own *Dialectiqve* corresponds exactly to its later Latin and French versions, before and after Ramus's death. The truth is, Ramism as a system of logic and rhetoric in Latin, French, and English, is not a single

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113, i.e., 113-114.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 114, i.e., 115.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 137, i.e., 138.

[64] See above, p. 167. For a discussion of differences between Foclin's translation and Talaeus's original, see Walter J. Ong, S.J., "Fouquelin's French Rhetoric and the Ramist Vernacular Tradition," *Studies in Philology*, LI (1954), 127-142.

unvarying doctrine but a pattern of uniformities as to general framework and a pattern of variations as to many of its details. Perhaps the best statement of the pattern of uniformities in Ramism is to be found by the comparative study of Ramus's *Dialectiqve* of 1555 and Foclin's *Rhetoriqve Francoise* of the same year. At any rate these are authentic versions done by Ramus himself and by his leading collaborators for their own nation at the same moment of time and in the same stage of the development of their doctrine as a whole. With these versions in mind, we are now prepared to see what happened when Ramism crossed the English Channel and invaded the domain of John Seton, Richard Sherry, Thomas Wilson, and Ralph Lever.

II. Ramus's Dialectic in England

On April 4, 1550, Roger Ascham, public orator of the University of Cambridge, wrote a letter to his friend Johannes Sturm, master of the grammar school at Strasbourg. The letter was in Latin, as befitted correspondence of that era between learned men of different countries of the European community. One notable thing about that particular letter is that it contains an enthusiastic account of the literary accomplishments of a young lady named Elizabeth, whom Ascham had been tutoring for the preceding two years, and who was one day to be the most famous queen in English history. "The praise which Aristotle gives," remarks Ascham to Sturm, "wholly centres in her—beauty, stature, prudence, and industry." He adds: "She has just passed her sixteenth birthday, and shows such dignity and gentleness as are wonderful at her age and rank."[1] Her conversational ability in French, Italian, English, Latin, and Greek, her delight and skill in music, her restrained elegance of dress, and her gift for perceiving what makes literary style good or bad, are all described in glowing phrases by Ascham.

Another notable thing about that letter is that it refers to Joachim Périon, a learned French Benedictine, and to one Cephas Chlononius. What Ascham says of the former indicates his awareness that Périon has recently been translating Aristotle into Latin and recently speaking in defense of Aristotle and Cicero, while industriously collecting meanwhile a vast number of theological topics for use in controversy. Périon's defense of Aristotle and Cicero, by the way, had been directed against Peter Ramus, and had been published at Paris in the form of three orations, two of which bear the date of 1543, and the third, 1547. Ascham does not designate these particular publications nor does his letter anywhere refer to Ramus by name. But the Cephas Chlononius whom he mentions in his reference to Périon, and whom he allusively describes as an overbold critic of the leading philosopher of Greece and the leading teacher of Rome, is unquestionably to be identified as Ramus.[2]

Ascham's veiled censure of Ramus in this letter of 1550 has been tentatively established as the earliest reference by an Englishman

[1] These quotations are from the translation of part of this letter in *The Whole Works of Roger Ascham*, ed. John Allen Giles (London, 1864-65), vol. I, pt. I, pp. lxii-lxiv. For the complete Latin text of the letter, see the same place, pp. 181-193.

[2] See M. Guggenheim, "Beiträge zur Biographie des Petrus Ramus," *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik*, CXXI (1903), 141-142, where there is a convincing demonstration that Cephas Chlononius means Ramus in Ascham's letter.

to Ramus's philosophy.[3] Another very early reference, much more detailed, much more sympathetic, and not at all difficult to identify, is also the work of Ascham, and can be found in the letter which he wrote to Sturm on January 29, 1552, from Halle, when he was in the midst of a period of travel on the continent.[4] On this occasion, Ascham asks with some urgency that Sturm write him at once on a piece of news he has just heard. Some English friends of mine, says Ascham, inform me that Peter Ramus has written something critical against you and me as a result of your publication at Strasbourg of our correspondence.[5] You know what I think of Ramus from my previous letters to you, Ascham goes on; how much I approve of the spirit of his teaching, and of his general plan, which I take to be that of tearing to pieces some inept and insipid Aristotelians rather than that of refuting Aristotle himself. Unless you have forgotten my words or have torn up my letter, he continues, you will remember how much I prefer Ramus to Périon, the Ciceronianisms of whom I laughed at with Martin Bucer, as Philipp Melanchthon and I have laughed at his inept planning and bad arranging. Ramus appears to me, he says in an illuminating passage, to feel rightly concerning the doctrine of Christ, and to conceal his true opinions as the times may dictate, showing his zeal meanwhile by writing against those whom he perceives as deliberate adversaries of the true religion. And this judgment of mine concerning Ramus, he adds, has been confirmed by our Jerome Wolf, who has been in Paris and afterwards in Augsburg.

Ascham turns next to a more detailed exposition of his view of Ramism. I hope, he writes, that my former letters, and this present one, contain nothing in the way of license of expression; and yet my praise of the talent and the teaching of Ramus has been expressed both openly and silently, and my approval of his general position has been set forth in the following words:

> The excellent doctrine of Aristotle seems too devoid of adornment, too obscure, for delight in reading it to be able to arouse the zeal of the many, or for the usefulness of it to be able to compensate for the labors involved, because almost everywhere it is taught without the accurate use of examples.

[3] On this point see Wilson and Forbes, *Gabriel Harvey's "Ciceronianus,"* p. 19.

[4] For the complete Latin text of this letter, see Giles, *Works of Ascham*, vol. I, pt. II, pp. 318-322; for a translation of two brief excerpts, see vol. I, pt. I, pp. lxxvi-lxxvii.

[5] The reference is to *Rogeri Aschami et Joannis Sturmii Epistolae Duae de Nobilitate Anglicana* (Argentorati: Richelius excudebat, 1551). There is a copy of this work in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

This declaration, by the way, is the copy of a sentence which Ascham had already used in his letter to Sturm of April 4, 1550, in connection with his reference to Cephas Chlononius.[6] The fact that it is linked to Chlononius in the earlier letter, and to Ramus in the present one, permits us to be sure that Chlononius and Ramus are one and the same. Moreover, it permits us to see that Ascham and Ramus are together in insisting upon example or practice as the final confirmation of theory. Lest we miss his dedication to this tenet of Ramism, Ascham not only underlines now what he had said earlier, but he adds that he himself had always required theory to be accompanied by practice, lest studies appear uselessly involved in obscurity or rashly guided into error.

At this point in the letter of 1552, Ascham feels justified in reasserting his friendly disposition towards Ramus and in mentioning his regret at the latter's recent attack upon the Sturm-Ascham correspondence. I suspect, says Ascham, that certain Englishmen from Cambridge, who disagree somewhat with us in religion, have turned Ramus against us out of religious hostility, although they themselves have left England and now live in Paris for religious reasons.

Ascham goes on to remark that Ramus's intelligence is shown nowhere to better advantage than in his having selected as his adversaries the three greatest of men, Aristotle, Cicero, and Sturm. As for his present attack upon me, says Ascham, "I am not astonished nor greatly distressed, if I displease Ramus, whom the Aristotles, the Ciceros, and the Sturms are not able to please."[7] Then he makes a remark which is not only calculated to drive a wedge between Sturm and Ramus, but also is destined to be the earliest reaction by an Englishman to Ramus's reform of dialectic and rhetoric. Says he to Sturm:

> Ramus, I believe, will press you and rush at you with the greater violence, since he knows that you refer invention in the first instance to the art of speaking, whereas he removes it from his own course in rhetoric; and since he also knows that delivery, which these very Ramists make much of, is rightly regarded by you, by Aristotle, and by the learned generally, as belonging more in the realm of practice than of theory.

[6] This declaration and my subsequent quotations from the letter of 1552 are in my translation. For the two versions of the declaration as given by Ascham, see Giles, *Works of Ascham*, vol. I, pt. I, p. 186, and vol. I, pt. II, p. 319.

[7] Giles, vol. I, pt. II, p. 320.