ECON 483

Selected Topics:

Economics of imperfect 
information and
Property Rights		 Summer 2004 Kevin Wainwright
604-291-5499
wainwrig@sfu.ca

Description:

Market structures that can be described as imperfectly competitive are often the result of costly measurement or costly enforcement of rights.  These costs lead economic agents to find a variety of structures for carrying out production and exchange.  When the activity is between firms this leads to such things as vertical restraints and franchise agreements.  When it is between firms and government (i.e. the public), this leads to various forms of regulation.  Within the firm there arises principal agent issues.  This course will look at a variety of settings where problems of costly information or costly enforcement arise, exposing the student to the property rights approach in economics as well as some of the literature in this area.

Required Text:


Barzel, Yoram, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University Press (1989),

ISBN 0-521-59713-7
 

Grading:

Participation 20%
Paper: 30%
Final:  50%

Reading List:

(Note: when possible, titles are linked to PDF downloadable articles; If not, you have to use the Library)
  1. NEW: Gallini, Nancy "Intellectual Property: When is it the best incentive system?" Working Paper, U of Tor.
  2. Akerlof, G. “The market for lemons: qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism” QJE, 1970
  3.  Barzel, Y “An alternative approach to the analysis of taxation” JPE, 84, 1976
  4.  Cheung, S..S. “The structure of a contract and the theory of a non-exclusive resource” JLE 1970 pp 49-70
  5. Dahlby, B.G. "Adverse slelection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance" Public Choice (37) 1981
  6. Eaton, B.C., Eaton, D., and Allen, D.W. Microeconomics 5th Ed. Prentice-Hall: "Chapter 17 - Choice Making under Uncertainty"
  7. Johnson, R. and Libcap G. “Contracting problems and regulation: the case of the fishery” AER, Dec. 1982
  8. Klein, B. "Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements" AER (1980)
  9.  Mathewson, F. and Winter, R. "The Economics of Franchise Contracts," The Journal of Law and Economics, Oct. (1985) 503-526
  10. Miyazaki, H. "The Rat Race and internal labor markets" Bell Journal of Economics (vol 8) 1977
  11.  Prather Brown, J “Toward an economic theory of liability” JLS, 1973, p 323-349
  12.  Rothchild, M and Stiglitz, J. “Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information” QJE, 90, 1976
  13.  Wainwright, K. “Dual organizational structures of franchise contracts” discussion paper
  14.  Wainwright, K. “Environmental Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Moral Hazard” discussion paper