Alex Worsnip (UNC Chapel Hill): In Defense of Psychologizing
Abstract:Following Amy Flowerree, let's say that we "psychologize" when engaged in a disagreement with another person when we claim that the reasons they sincerely offer in favor of their beliefs do not really explain why they believe as they do, and instead offer an alternative causal explanation—perhaps appealing to their upbringing, interests, or desires—that is intended to cast doubt on their belief. There's a large literature on whether, epistemically speaking, such causal explanations do debunk or cast doubt on the beliefs in question. But in recent, separate papers, both Flowerree and Nick Smyth argue that regardless of how that epistemological debate is resolved, there are deep ethical problems with psychologizing. In doing so, they tap into broader societal ideas about norms of public discourse that claim that we should always engage with others' stated reasons for their claims and beliefs rather than trying to cast doubt on their motivations. My aim in this paper is to defend the ethical credentials of psychologizing. First, I argue against the claim that there's something necessarily incivil or disrespectful about psychologizing. Second, I build up a positive case for psychologizing by suggesting that it is often our only practical recourse for critique, given the inherent limits of the project of rebutting others' stated reasons.