Institutions

This category is large and heterogeneous. Here are a few major themes.

1. Transaction cost economics. My work on this topic began with JEBO 1987 and then continued with a chapter in Pitelis 1993. These two papers have been reprinted in a pair of anthologies on the new institutional economics edited by Claude Menard (2004, 2005). The main point is that TCE authors seldom attempt to justify their belief that observed forms of organization minimize aggregate transaction costs (or maximize total surplus). Providing an adequate justification is harder than one might think.

2. Evolutionary dynamics (MSS 1986; EAWM 1988; JEBO 1990; SCED 1994). These articles used ideas about learning and evolution to model the dynamics of technologies, organizational structures, and social conventions. The methods are primitive compared to recent work involving evolutionary game theory, genetic algorithms, and so on, but I still like the JEBO and SCED papers.

3. Collective farms (JPE 1993 and JCE 1993). These two articles were co-authored with Xiao-yuan Dong and explored the behavior and performance of Chinese collective farms. The JPE article was based on Xiao-yuan's 1990 PhD thesis at the University of Alberta. The JCE article was inspired by her reading of Justin Lin's work on the absence of exit rights for the members of such farms.

Here is a complete chronological list of my publications on institutions.

Signalling risk tolerance: Nuclear arsenals and alliance formation in the Cold War (with Cliff T. Bekar, Clyde G. Reed, and Joshua Stine), ch. 11 in Gregory K. Dow, Andrew Eckert, and Douglas S. West, eds., Industrial Organization, Trade, and Social Interaction: Essays in Honour of B. Curtis Eaton, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2010, 223-242.

The function of authority in transaction cost economics, ch. 13 in Claude Menard, ed., Institutional Dimensions of the Modern Corporation, vol. 5 of The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K., 2005 (originally in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8(1), March 1987, 13-38).

The appropriability critique of transaction cost economics, ch. 15 in Claude Menard, ed., Controversies and Challenges in the New Institutional Economics, vol. 7 of The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2004, 239-270 (originally in Christos Pitelis, ed., Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies, ch. 6, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, 101-132).

Review of M. Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52(4), December 2003, 598-601.

The function of authority in transaction cost economics, ch. 57 in Nicolai J. Foss, ed., The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, vol. 4, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, 2000, 399-424 (originally in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8(1), March 1987, 13-38).

Does free exit reduce shirking in production teams? (with Xiao-yuan Dong), reprinted in Justin Lin, Institutions, Technology, and China's Agricultural Development (in Chinese), Beijing University Press, Beijing, China, 2000, 327-344 (originally in Journal of Comparative Economics 17(2), June 1993, 472-484).

The new institutional economics and employment regulation, ch. 2 in Bruce E. Kaufman, ed., Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship, Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison, WI, 1997, 57-90.

Authority relations in the firm: Review and agenda for research, ch. 9 in John Groenewegen, ed., Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond, Boston, Kluwer, 1996, 171-188.

Review of M. Rutherford, Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New Institutionalism, Canadian Journal of Economics 29(1), February 1996, 248-251.

Stable social conventions in fluctuating payoff environments, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 5(2), December 1994, 243-272.

Review of U. Maki, B. Gustafsson, and C. Knudsen, eds., Rationality, Institutions, and Economic Methodology, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23(2), March 1994, 240-244.

The appropriability critique of transaction cost economics, ch. 6 in Christos Pitelis, ed., Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, 101-132.

Monitoring costs in Chinese agricultural teams (with Xiao-yuan Dong), Journal of Political Economy 101(3), June 1993, 539-553.

Does free exit reduce shirking in production teams? (with Xiao-yuan Dong), Journal of Comparative Economics 17(2), June 1993, 472-484.

Review of P. Rubin, Managing Business Transactions, Managerial and Decision Economics 14(1), January-February 1993, 91-93.

Review of A. Stinchcombe, Information and Organizations, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148(2), June 1992, 355-356.

Review of O. Williamson and S. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development, Business History Review 65(4), Winter 1991, 990-992.

Review of G. Hodgson, Economics and Institutions, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 15(1), January 1991, 160-164.

The organization as an adaptive network, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 14(2), October 1990, 159-185.

The evolution of organizational form: Selection, efficiency, and the new institutional economics, Economic Analysis and Workers’ Management 22(3), 1988, 139-167.

Non-cooperative bargaining in the theory of the firm: Some recent developments, Review of Radical Political Economics 20(2/3), Summer-Fall 1988, 171-176.

Configurational and coactivational views of organizational structure, Academy of Management Review 13(1), January 1988, 53-64.

The function of authority in transaction cost economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8(1), March 1987, 13-38.

Stability analysis for profit-responsive selection mechanisms, Mathematical Social Sciences 12(2), October 1986, 169-183.

Review of G. Donaldson and J.W. Lorsch, Decision Making at the Top: The Shaping of Strategic Direction, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 7(2), June 1986, 217-219.

A conceptual framework for the analysis of time allocation data (with F. Thomas Juster and Paul N. Courant), ch. 6 in F. Thomas Juster and Frank P. Stafford, eds., Time, Goods and Well-Being, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1985, 113-131.

Goods, time, and well-being: The joint dependence problem (with F. Thomas Juster), ch. 16 in F. Thomas Juster and Frank P. Stafford, eds., Time, Goods and Well-Being, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1985, 397-413.

The theory and measurement of well-being: A suggested framework for accounting and analysis (with F. Thomas Juster and Paul N. Courant), ch. 2 in F. Thomas Juster and Kenneth C. Land, eds., Social Accounting Systems, New York, Academic Press, 1981, 23-94.

A theoretical framework for the measurement of well-being (with F. Thomas Juster and Paul N. Courant), Review of Income and Wealth 27(1), March 1981, 1-31.