Microeconomic Theory
My papers in microeconomic theory mainly address two topics.
1. Bargaining within the firm (JEBO 1985; IER 1988; EJPE 1989). The underlying idea is that capital suppliers can make strategic commitments that increase their share of firm quasi-rent, but may reduce the total surplus of the firm. This research program eventually led to my 1993 AER article "Why Capital Hires Labor" (go to the 'labor-managed firms' research area for a full cite and web link).
2. Repeated games within the firm (JCE 2000 and IGTR 2004). Despite its later date, the 2004 paper comes first logically. It shows that when all input contributions and side payments must be self-enforced, the firm maximizes profit subject to a single aggregate incentive-compatibility constraint. The 2000 paper embeds this idea in an economy-wide framework and shows that it makes no difference whether the physical assets of a firm are owned by outsiders or by the workforce of the firm itself. I like this equivalence theorem, although it is rarely cited.
Here is a complete chronological list of my publications in microeconomic theory (papers on labor-managed firms are listed separately in the LMF section, although many of those also involve a considerable amount of theory).
The firm as a nexus of strategies, International Game Theory Review 6(4), December 2004, 525-554.
Review of S. Brams, Negotiation Games, Journal of Economic Literature 30(2), June 1992, 894-895.