Jonah Schupbach, Utah :: Trimming IBE’s Hedges: In Defense of ‘Naïve’ Explanatory Inference
Friday February 9, 2024

Abstract: Traditional (some would say naïve) Inference to the Best Explanation  (IBE) infers a potential explanation of some explanandum from the comparative claim that this inferred  explanation is the best of the available potential explanations. In  response to philosophical objections to this inference form, IBE’s  defenders have put forward a host of hedges, alternately strengthening IBE’s premises and weakening its conclusion to make it more defensible.  Contemporary (some would say sophisticated) forms of IBE typically  integrate a combination of such hedges, effectively rendering them far  less applicable, powerful, and simple than the traditional version. This talk argues that a proper formal defense of  IBE has no need for such hedges. This is because classic objections to  “naïve” IBE—along with the hedges put forward in response to these—are  founded on two deep misunderstandings. We offer a more plausible and charitable understanding of “best explanation”  along with a discussion of the nature and formal evaluation of  inference. Once these ideas are properly understood, “naïve” IBE in its  simplest, traditional form turns out to be surprisingly defensible.