VIII. PRODICUS (Vorsokratiker 77. S4) 1. Plato Phaedri p. 267 B: ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασε καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς εὑρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων. 3 δεῖν Paris. δεινὰ BT Cf. Isocrates 4, 11: καίτοι τινὲς ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἔχουσι ... ὥσπερ ... σφᾶς μὲν διορῶντας τὰς μετριότητας ... Idem 2, 33. Plato Leg. 719 E, 722 A. Τhucyd. II 35, 2. Anaximenes 6 p. 35, 21 H.
2. Prol. in Hermogenem W VII 9 = P. S. p. 192, 24 Rabe: τῶν δὲ εἰς κακίαν {καὶ ἀρετὴν} διαβαλλόντων οἳ μὲν λέγουσιν αὐτὴν (sc. ῥητορικὴν) σοφιστικὴν καὶ ὁρίζονται οὕτως· ‘λόγων ἰσχὺς περὶ τοῦ δοκοῦντος πιθανοῦ.ʼ τούτου δὲ τὴν πρόφασιν Πρόδικον καὶ Ἱππίαν φασὶ δεδωκέναι.
3. Quint. inst. 3, 1, 12: adfectus Prodicus (scil. tractasse dicitur).
4. Aristot. Rhet. 1415 b 9: ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικοὺς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν, ἐὰν δέῃ. πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιᾶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμενοι, διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσἐχοντες ἀκροῶνται. ὥστε, ὅπου ἂν ἦ καιρός, λεκτέον· καί μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἢ ὑμέτερον, καὶ· ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν, οἷον οὐδεπώποτε ἀκηκόατε δεινὸν ἢ οὕτω θαυμαστόν. τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρόδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς.
5. Quint. inst. 4, 1, 73: contraque est interim prooemii vis etiam non exordio; nam iudices et in narratione nonnumquam et in argumentis ut attendant et ut faveant rogamus, quo Prοdicus velut dormitantes eos excitari putabat. 2 in exordio AP
6. Plato Crat. 384 Β: καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ σμικρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν μάθημα· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἥν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέ σε 5 αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος. 4 ἐκώλυσεν B Προδίκου τοῦ Κείου τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβολογίαν vocat Marcell. Vit. Thuc. 36, ὀνομάτων ἀκρίβειαν Schol. Plat. Phaedr. 267 Β, ὁρθοέπειάν τε καὶ ὀρθορρημοσύνην Themistius XXIII p. 350 Di. Huc fort. pertinet Schol. Townl. Il. Π 594 sq. ἐτράπετ’, ἔκτεινεν δὲ Βαθυκλῆα μεγαθύμον, Χάλκωνος φίλον υἱόν: … Χάλκωνος … Πρόδικος ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ χαλκοῦ κτήσεως <ὡς> καὶ Βαθυκλῆα. εἴρηκεν δὲ ἂν Χρύσωνος ἀπὸ τῆς καλλίστης ὕλης (scil. ἀπὸ τοῦ χρυσοῦ).
7. Aristot. top. 112 b 21: ἔτι καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συμβεβηκὸς ἔθηκεν ὡς ἕτερον διὰ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ὄνομα, καθάπερ Πρόδικος διῃρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὀνόματά ἐστιν. Cf. Plato Protag. 337 C, 358 A. Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 24.
8. Alexander Aphr. ad l. p. 181, 2: Πρόδικος δὲ ἐπειρᾶτο ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἴδιόν τι σημαινόμενον ὑποτάσσειν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, χαρὰν μὲν λέγοντες εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν, ἡδονὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἔπαρσιν, τέρψιν δὲ τὴν δι’ ὤτων ἡδονήν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ διὰ λόγων.
9. Hermias in Platonis Phaedr. p. 238, 22 (p. 191 Ast): ὁ Πρόδικος τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀκρίβειαν, οἷον διαφορὰν τέρψεως, χαρᾶς, εὐφροσύνης, τέρψιν καλῶν τὴν δι’ ὤτων ἀκοήν, χαρὰν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, εὐφροσύνην τὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων. Ariolari interpretem patet.
10. Plato Euthyd. 277 E: πρῶτον γάρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθώτητος μαθεῖν δεῖ. Sequitur inter μανθάνειν et ξυνιέναι distinctio. Ad synonymicam hanc artem Plato Prodici nomine appellato praeterea adludit Protag. 337 sq., 340 A, 341 A sq., Menonis 75 E, Lach. 197 B sq., Charmid. 163 A sq. Aperta praeterea est adlusio Protag. 350 D. Eiusdem artis exempla habes in Xenophontis narratiuncula, quam ad Prodicum ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους refert Mem. 2, 1, 21 sq. (Diels Vorsokr. 77 B 2). Idem Xenophon de Cyro (Cyrop. 8, 1, 31) διῄρει δὲ αἰδῶ καὶ σωφροσύνην τῇδε, ὡς τοὺς μὲν αἰδουμένους τὰ ἐν φανερῷ αἰσχρὰ φεύγοντας, τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ.
11. Anaximenes rhet. 4 p. 33, 1 H.: ἀδικίαν δὲ καὶ ἁμάρτημα καὶ ἀτυχίαν ὧδε ὁρίζεις· τὸ μὲν ἐκ προνοίας κακόν τι ποιεῖν ἀδικίας τίθει καὶ φάθι δεῖν τιμωρίαν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν μεγίστην λαμβάνειν· τὸ δὲ δι’ ἄγνοιαν βλαβερόν τι πράττειν ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι φατέον. τὸ δὲ μὴ δι’ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἑτέρους τινὰς ἢ διὰ τύχην μηδὲν ἐπιτελεῖν τῶν βουλευθέντων καλῶς ἀτυχίαν τίθει καὶ φάθι τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν εἶναι τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων ἴδιον, τὸ δὲ ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀτυχεῖν οὐ μόνον εἶναι ἑαυτῷ ἴδιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τῶν δικαζόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. 3 ἀδικίας (genitivo) codd. CDMPV: ἀδικίαν rell. Ad Prodicum fortasse referenda. Cf. Marciani Διαιρέσεις (Aristot. Pseudep. 679 sq.) Nr. 45, Antiphon tetral. Γ γ 4 ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀτυχία τοῦ πατάξαντος, ἡ δὲ συμφορὰ τοῦ παθόντος. ὃ μὲν γάρ, ἐξ ὧν ἔδρασεν ἐκεῖνος, διαφθαρείς, οὐ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ πατάξαντος χρησάμενος ἀπέθανεν, ὃ δὲ μεῖζω, ὧν ἔθελε, πράξας τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀτυχίᾳ, ὃν οὐκ ἔθελεν, ἀπέκτεινεν. Antiphon 5, 91 καὶ μὴν εἰ δέοι ἁμαρτεῖν τι, τὸ ἀδίκως ἀπολῦσαι ὁσιώτερον ἂν εἴη τοῦ μὴ δικαίως ἀπολέσαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁμάρτημα μόνον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον καὶ ἀσέβημα. Cf. etiam Gorg. Hel. 15. 19, Aristot. rhet. 1372 b 16, 1374 b 4, 1405 a 26, 1416 a 14, Eth. Nic. 1135 b 11, Peters p. 12. Sunt apud oratores Atticos distinctiones, quae Prodicum sapiunt, v. e. g. Andocides 3, 11 (εἰρήνη, σπονδαί), Isocrates Paneg. (4) 130 (κατηγορεῖν, νουθετεῖν), Hel. (10) 14 (ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ἐπαινεῖν), κατὰ Λοχ. (20) 9 (ἀδικία, ὕβρις). Amat talia orationis πρὸς Δημόνικον auctor: [Isocr.] 1, 20 (φιλοπροσηγορία, εὐπροσηγορία), 1, 27 (φιλόκαλος, καλλωπιστής), 1, 28 (χρήματα, κτήματα), amat Thucydides (iam Spengel, A. S. 54 sq.). Prodici verba apud Platonem Prot. 337 B ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι’ εὔνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσι δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις et Thucyididis 1, 69, 6 αἰτία μὲν γὰρ φίλων ἀνδρῶν ἐστιν ἁμαρτανόντων, κατηγορία δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἀδικησάντων composuit H. Gomperz p. 96. De Aristophanis Ran. 1157 sq. v. Rh. M. 69, 91 sq. Ab ipsis quidem scriptoribus, ne quid de philosophorum studiis dicam, multa eius generis videntur inventa, sed Prodici eos auctoritas movit. De re scripsit H. Mayer, Prodikos v. Keos, Rhet. Studien, 1. Heft, 2. Tl. Paderborn 1914, W. Wössner, Die synonymische Unterscheidung bei Thucydides und den politischen Rednern der Griechen, Diss. Berlin 1937.
12. Stob. IV 20, 65 (IV p. 468 H.): Προδίκου· ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν διπλασιασθεῖσαν ἔρωτα εἶναι, ἔρωτα δὲ διπλασιασθέντα μανίαν γίγνεσθαι. Cf. Xen. mem. 1, 3, 13.
13. Plato symp. 177 B: εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι, (οὐ δεινὸν) τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστὰς Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην ξυγγράφειν, ὥσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος ...; Herculis laus a Xenophonte primo celebrata et saepe repetita Prodici Ὥραις inerat, quem librum Callimachus inter rhetorica numeraverat, idcirco ab aliis vituperatus (Schol. Aristoph. Av. 692).
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VIII. PRODICUS
1. Plato, Phaedrus 267 B: And once, when Prodicus heard from me about these matters, he laughed and said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech, that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of reasonable length. Cf. Isocrates 4.11: ‘Yet some criticize those speeches that surpass the ability of lay people […] as if […] they themselves could judge the right measure…’ Ibid. 2.33: Plato Leg. 719 E, 722 A; Thuc. 2.35.2; Anaximenes 6 p. 35.21 H.
2. Prologue on Hermogenes: Among those who want to taint rhetoric as something bad, some call it sophistic and define it as follows: “strength of words about what is seemingly convincing.” They claim that Prodicus and Hippias gave us a reason to see it that way.
3. Quintilian 3.1.12: Prodicus (is said to have dealt with) the affects.
4. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1415b9: Further, engaging the hearers' attention is common to all parts of the speech, if necessary; for attention slackens everywhere else rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is ridiculous to put this1 at the beginning, at a time when all listen with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one must say, “And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as myself”; and, “I will tell you such a thing as you have never yet” heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus used to do; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture. 5. Quintilian 4.1.73: On the other hand, sometimes the exordium does not have the value of a preface, since at times we ask the judges both during the narration and in the argumentative part to pay attention and to favor us, something by which Prodicus thought they would be aroused as if out of doze.
6. Plato, Cratylus 384 B: and surely knowledge of names is no small matter. Now if I had attended Prodicus's fifty-drachma course of lectures, after which, as he himself says, a man has a complete education on this subject, there would be nothing to hinder your learning the truth about the correctness of names at once. It is called ‘Prodicus of Ceos’s subtlety about words’ by Marcell. Life of Thucydides 36, ‘precision with words’ Schol. Plat. Phaedr. 267 B, ‘correct use of words and rhythm’ Themisthius 23 p. 350.18 Di. Schol. Townl. Il. 16.594 f. may belong here: ‘”Glaucus, the leader of the Lycian warriors, turned around, and slew high-minded Bathycles, the dear son of Chalcon” – The name “Chalcon”, according to Prodicus, stems from the possession of bronze, as does the name Bathykles. He could have said “Chryson” from the most beautiful material (gold).
7. Aristotle, Topics 112 b21: Also, one may define that which is identical with itself as being different on the grounds that there is another word for it, as did Prodicus, who divided pleasure into joy, merriness and feeling good: these are all names for one and the same thing, pleasure. Cf. Plato Protag. 337 C, 358 A; Xen. Mem. 2.1.24. 8. Alexander of Aphrodisia p. 181.2: Prodicus attempted to assign to each of these words its own peculiar meaning, just like the Stoics define joy as reasonable elation, pleasure as unreasonable elation, merriness as pleasure through the ears and feeling good as pleasure through speech.
9. Hermias, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedros p. 238.22 (p. 191 Ast): Prodicus discovered precision in the choice of words; for instance, there is a difference between merriness, joy and feeling good: merriness is hearing something beautiful through the ears, joy is pleasure of the soul, feeling good that though the eyes. It is clear that the commentator is just speculating.
10. Plato, Euthydemus 277 E: First, as Prodicus says, one needs to learn about the correct use of words. There follows the distinction between manthanein and synienai. Plato also alludes to this synonymical art while uttering Prodicus’ name in Protag. 337 f., 340 A, 341 A f., Meno 75 E, Lach. 197 B f., Charmid. 163 A f. There is also an open allusion in Protag. 350 D. Some examples of this art are found in Xenophon’s little story that Mem. 2.1.21 f. refers to Prodicus ‘in the work about Heracles’ (Diels Vorsokr. 77 B 2). Xenophon, again, on Cyrus (Cyrop. 8.1.31): ‘He distinguished respectfulness and self-control in this way: the respectful flee what is shameful in the open, the self-controlled also what is shameful in the hidden.’
11. Anaximenes, On Rhetoric: You are to distinguish injustice, mistake and mishap as follows: call evil done on purpose injustice and say that for such deeds one must impose the greatest punishment available. Doing something bad because of ignorance is to be defined as mistake. Call the failure to attain the good things one was aiming at not because of one’s own actions but because of those of others or through chance mishap and say that committing injustice is peculiar to bad people, but making mistakes and being unlucky about one’s endeavors is not peculiar to oneself but common to the judges and to all other human beings. These words may refer to Prodicus. Cf. Marcian Distinctions (Arist. Pseudep. 679 f.) no. 45; Antiphon Tetral. 3.3: ‘Again, while the victim suffered the ill-effect of the mischance, it is the striker who suffered the mischance itself; for the one met his death as the result of the other’s act, so that it was not through his own mistake, but through the mistake of the man who struck him, that he was killed; whereas the other did more than he meant to do, and he had only himself to blame for the mischance whereby he killed a man whom he did not mean to slay.’ Antiphon 5.91: ‘For if it is necessary to commit a wrong, it is more acceptable to lose unjustly than to destroy unjustly. The former, in fact, is just a misdemeanor, the latter is also a sacrilege.’ Cf. also Gorg. Hel. 15.19, Aristot. rhet. 1372 b 16, 1374 b 4, 1405 a 26, 1416 a 14, Eth. Nic. 1135 b 11, Peters p. 12. The Attic orators often make distinctions that smell of Prodicus, see e. g. Andocides 3.11 (‘peace’, ‘treaty’), Isocrates Paneg. (4) 130 (‘accuse’, ‘criticise’), Hel. (10) 14 (‘give a defense speech’, ‘praise’), Against Loch. (20) 9 (‘wrong’, ‘wantonness’). The author of Against Demonicus loves such things: [Isocr.] 1, 20 (‘addressing friendly’, ‘addressing well’), 1, 27 (‘beauty-seeking’, ‘adornment-seeking’), 1, 28 (‘riches’, ‘possessions’); as does Thucydides (already Spengel, A. S. 54 f.). Gomperz p. 96 compares Prodicus’ words in Plato Prot. 337 B: ‘Debates are had by friends with friends out of love, arguments by opponents and enemies with each other’ to Thuc. 1.69.6: ‘Criticism is done to men one likes when they are wrong, accusation to enemies when they commit crimes.’ On Aristophanes Frogs 1157 f. see Rh.M. 69, 91 f. Ancient authors – not to speak of philosophical studies – came up with many such things themselves, but they were prompted by Prodicus’ authority. On this subject see H. Mayer, Prodikos v. Keos, Rhet. Studien, 1. Heft, 2. Tl. Paderborn 1914; W. Wössner, Die synonymische Unterscheidung bei Thucydides und den politischen Rednern der Griechen, Diss. Berlin 1937.
12. Stobaeus 4.20.65: Prodicus said that redoubled desire is love, redoubled love is madness. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1.3.13.
13. Plato, Symposion 177 B: And again, pray consider our worthy professors and the eulogies they frame of Hercules and others in prose, for example, the excellent Prodicus… The praise of Heracles, made famous first by Xenophon, then repeated many times, was contained in Prodicus’ Horai, a book that Callimachus listed among the rhetorical works, thus attracting other people’s criticism (Schol. Aristophanes Birds 692). |