XII. THEODORUS

1. Diog. Laert. II 8, 103/4: Θεόδωροι δὲ γεγόνασιν εἰκοσι… ἔνατος Βυζάντιος ἀπὸ λόγων πολιτικῶν, δέκατος, ὁμοίως οὗ Ἀριστοτέλης μνημονεύει διὰ τῆς ἐπιτομῆς τῶν ῥητόρων.

Post πολιτικῶν deesse videtur velut εὐδοκιμῶν. Nonum nostrum sophistam esse puto, decimum vero hominem minus nobilem, ab Aristotele solummodo memoratum, fort. noni filium, cf. Theodectarum exemplum. Edunt sane δέκατος ὁμοίως, οὗ.

 

 

2. Sud. s. v.: Θεόδωρος Βυζἀντιος σοφιστής, ὃς ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος λογοδαίδαλος ἐκλήθη. ἔγραψε κατὰ Θρασυβούλου, κατὰ Ἀνδοκίδου καὶ ἄλλα τινά.

Cf. Cic. orat. 12, 39 Theodorum inter eos enumerans, qui non ad iudiciorum certamen sed voluptatem aurium scripserant ‘quos logodaedalos appellat in Phaedro Socratesʼ. Quint. inst. 3, 1, 11: Theodorus Byzantius ex iis et ipse quos Plato appellat λογοδαιδάλους (ex Cicerone?). Sophistae stilum Cic. orat. 40 rectius describere videtur (praefractior nec satis… rotundus).

 

 

3. Cic. Brut. 12, 48 (ex Aristotele): Lysiam primo profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi, deinde, quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus autem ieiunior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse.

Artibus suis eum rhetoricen auxisse post Thrasymachum Aristoteles ait Soph. el. 34, 183 b 32 (v. supra A V 6), de temporum ratione etiam cf. Cic. orat. 12, 39.

 

4. Diοnysius Hal. de Isaeo p. 121, 25 Us. Rad.: Θεόδωρον δὲ τὸν Βυζάντιον ἀρχαῖόν τινα καὶ οὔτε ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἀκριβῆ (sic) οὕτε ἐξέτασιν ἱκανὴν (?) ἐν τοῖς ἐναγωνίοις δεδωκότα λόγοις.

σπουδῆς ἄξιον οὐθὲν eum invenisse idem dicit ad Ammaeum p. 259, 2 sq., οὐθὲν οὔτε καινὸν οὔτε περιττόν de Demosth. p. 143, 8. Artem testari videtur Plato Phaedr. 261 C, testatur Quint. 3, 1, 11 (supra A V 10).

 

5. Plato Phaedr. 266 D: {καὶ} καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας. Προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ. ταῦτα λέγεις (ἦ γάρ;) τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης; – ναί. – δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τʼ ἐπʼ αὐτῇ, τρίτον τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα. καὶ

5 πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Bυζἀντιον ἄνδρα. – τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον; – τί μήν; καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὔηνον κτλ.

2 ἐπʼ ἀρχῇ B

Hermias ad locum: ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγει τὸ ἐπὶ ἀποδείξει ἐτέραν ἀπόδειξιν ἐπαγαγεῖν. Schol. Aristot. rhet. p. 227, 25 ἐπεξέλεγχός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγῃ καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα συμβαλλόμενα. V. Hamberger 73 sq.

 

6. Anaximenes p. 88, 19 H.: τάττειν δὲ δεῖ τῶν μὲν πίστεων πρώτας τὰς μαρτυρίας.

Ordinem esse Byzantii ex Platone coniecit Spengel ad Anaxim. p. 257 sq.

 

 

7. Aristot. rhet. 1414 b 7: ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστεις. ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστεις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν πίστεών ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὔξησις τῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων· 5 ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο. ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ προοίμιον οὐδʼ ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλʼ ἀναμιμνήσκει. ἔσται οὖν, ἄν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος.

2 et 3 πίστις ll. 7. 8 an ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις <καὶ παραδιήγησις> καὶ προδιήγησις? Cf. sequentia.

οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον significare videtur Theodorum habuisse sectatores, qui etiam nova invenirent. παραδιήγησιν Aristoteles etiam 1417 a 3 sq.commendat. Ceterum adeundus est Quint. 4, 2, 128: est quaedam etiam repetita narratio, quae ἐπιδιήγησις dicitur, sane res declamatoria magis quam forensis, ideo autem reperta, ut, quia narratio brevis esse debet, fusius et ornatius res posset exponi, quod fit vel invidiae gratia vel miserationis. [Cassiodorii] de rhet. p. 502, 28 Halm: ἐπιδιήγησις fit ad augmentum vel invidiae vel miserationis. Hermogenes περὶ εὑρ. 2, 1 p. 189, 7 Sp. τὴν δὲ προκατάστασιν τῆς διηγήσεως, τὴν καὶ προδιήγησιν καλουμένην (repetita apud Maximum Planudem W V 220, 27 = Prol. Syll. p. 212, 17 R., Maximum Planudem W V 385, 20). Cf. W. Schmid, Gesch. d. gr. Lit. III 1 p. 193, 2.

 

8. Anοn. (Cornuti) rhet. 57 p. 364, 11 H.: εἴδη δὲ τῶν παραδιηγήσεων τρία· προδιήγησις, παραδιήγησις, ἐπιδιήγησις. (58) καὶ προδιήγησις μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἔξωθεν ἕτερόν τι διηγησώμεθα, ὥσπερ κτλ. (59) παραδιήγησις δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα ἕτερα διηγησώμεθα, ὡς κτλ., (60) ἐπιδιήγησις δέ, ὅταν μετὰ τὰς πίστεις ἢ τὸν ἐπίλογον διηγησώμεθα.

Novit idem p. 364, 6 etiam ἀντιδιηγήσεις (i. e. τῶν ἀντιδίκων εἰσαγόντων ἐτέρως ἐπαγομένας αὐτοὶ ἀντιδιηγούμεθα). Ipsa autem terminorum explicatio sumpta est ex auctore, qui post Demetrium Phalereum fuit, cf. eiusdem Anonymi p. 374, 6.

 

 

9. Rufus rhet. (περὶ διηγήσεως) W III p. 453, 6 = Rhet.gr. I p. 402, 23 H.: τρόποι δὲ τέσσαρες· διήγησις, παραδιήγησις, προδιήγησις καὶ ὑποδιήγησις.

(8) διήγησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἔφημεν, ἀπλῆ τῶν γεγενημένων φράσις· οἷον κτλ.

(17) παραδιήγησις δέ ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λόγου ἔξωθεν προστιθεμένη καὶ παραλαμβανομένη διήγησις ἐν τρόπῳ ἀφηγήσεως· οἷον κτλ.

(454, 8 W. ) προδιήγησίς ἐστιν ἡ πρὸ τῆς εἰς τὸ πρᾶγματελούσης διηγήσεως αἰτία παραλαμβανομένη· οἷον κτλ.

(14) ὑποδιήγησις δέ, ὅταν μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰς γνώμας τῶν πραξάντων ἑκάστου καὶ τὰς αἰτίας λέγωμεν· οἷον κτλ.

διήγησις, προδιήγησις iam Theodori fuere, sed ὑποδιήγησιν non esse in ἐπιδιήγησιν mutandam docet etiam Schol. B Hom. I 527.

 

10. Mart. Cap. rhet. 46 p. 486, 30 Halm: nοnnulli quinque species narrationis esse dixerunt, ut Theodorus Byzantius Graece discernit προδιήγησιν, ὑποδιήγησιν (sic), παραδιήγησιν, ἀντιδιήγησιν, καταδιήγησιν (sic).

 

Fortunatianus artis II 19 p. 112, 5 sq. Halm octo narrationis species discernit, quae sunt: διήγησις, ἀντιδιήγησις, μερικὴ διήγησις, παραδιήγησις, ὑποδιήγησις, καταδιήγησις, ἐπιδιήγησις, διασκευά (sic). Theodori sectatorum vestigia agnoscuntur. Non ad genera, sed rationem narrandi pertinet, quod anonymus (Cornutus) I p. 443, 19 Sp. (= p. 375, 9 H.) docet: Θεόδωρος μὲν πολλάς φησι γίνεσθαι (sc. διηγήσεις) καὶ ἐν ταῖς παραγραφαῖς δύο φησὶν εἶναι, τήν τε τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τὴν τῆς παραγραφῆς αὐτῆς, quae verba ad nostrum Theodorum rettullit W. Schmid (Gesch. d. gr. Lit. III 1 p. 193, 4).

 

11. Aristot. rhet. 1400 b 9: ἄλλος τόπος έκ τῶν ἀμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου Μηδείᾳ οἳ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς. ἥμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Mήδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων. 5 ἣ δʼ ἀπολογεῖται, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ιάσονα ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἥμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα, εἴπερ καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δʼ ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη.

8 ἡ προτέρα ΘΕ

Dubitant sitne prior Theodori ars intellegenda an ars ante Theοdorum, ut Spengel recte meo quoque iudicio iudicavit; ad rem F. Solmsen, RE. V A 2, 1843, 32 sq. Certe autem τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἀμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν cohaeret cum usu mores adversariorum exagitandi, quod genus antiquissimae proprium rhetoricae. Scholiasta quidem ad locum (p. 146, 5 R.) docet: ἡ γοῦν ῥητορικὴ τοῦ Θεοδώρου τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον παρεδίδου ἤτοι τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτηθέντων τινὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν, quod sane tam inane est, ut ex ipsis Aristotelis verbis neglecto eo quod est πρότερον videatur esse ductum. Locum ab Antiphonte egregie esse tractatum Hamberger monuit allatis exemplis 99 sq.

 

 

12. Aristot. rhet. p. 1412a 23: καὶ τὰ εὖ ᾐνιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα· μάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορῷ καὶ ὃ λέγει Θεόδωρος τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δέ, ὅταν παράδοξον ᾖ, καὶ μή, ὡς ἐκεῖνος, λέγει. πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλʼ ὡσπερεὶ ἐν

5 τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα, ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα. ἐξαπατᾷ γάρ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν: ‘ἔστειχε δʼ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλαʼ, ὃ δʼ ᾤετο πέδιλα ἐρεῖν. τούτου δʼ ἅμα λεγομένου δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὃ λέγει λέγειν ἀλλʼ <ἄλλο>, ὃ μεταστρέφει, 10 ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου εἰς Νίκωνα τὸν κιθαρῳδόν ‘Θρᾷττʼ ᾖσεʼ. προσποιεῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ‘θράττει σεʼ, καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ· ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει. διὸ μαθόντι ἡδύ, ἐπεί, εἰ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνει Θρᾷκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον εἶναι.

2 μεταφορά      3 comma ante τὸ καινὰ falso additur          4-5 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν   11 θράττει σε: Θρᾷττʼ ᾖσε, ut Meinekius coniecit, recepi collate narratiuncula, quae de Thraessa musicam corrumpente mutila sane exstat apud Mexlerum in Academicorum philosophorum indice Hercul. Col. V. 1 p. 14.

Multi artem nova dicendi tractaverant, Theodorus τὸ καινὰ λέγειν dixerat esse πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, i.e. si quis vocabulo daret sensum a consuetudine abhorrentem, quod Aristoteles improbat. Nicon autem citharoedus progenie Thrax erat idque scire debebant, ut dictum urbanum esse intellegerent auditores, neque enim iucundum erat nescientibus, nam Theodorus non quidem θράττει σε enuntiaverat, sed παρὰ γράμμα (unalittera mutata) Θρᾷττʼ ᾗσε, scilicet propter corruptam Niconis canendi rationem (cf. scholia p. 212, 10 R. παραπεποιημένα λέγει τὰ σκώμματα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα παρὰ γράμμα ἔν, οἷον πρός τινα τραυλόν· ὁλᾷς, κόλακος κεφαλὴν ἔχεις). Sic verba accipienda videntur, commentaria Aristotelis conferas.

 

13. Schol. ad Aristot. rhet. p. 1412a 25, p. 212, 2 R.: ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Θεόδωρος (ῥήτωρ δὲ ἦν) λέγει τὸ τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας εἰκόνας λέγειν {καὶ} σημαίνειν καινὰ ἤτοι παράξενα, ἂν καὶ ἄλλο τι φαίνηται λέγειν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ‘οἱ τέττιγες 5 αὐτοῖς χαμόθεν ᾄσονταιʼ. γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἥτοι τῷ ἄλλο σημαίνειν παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, ὅταν τὸ νοούμενον παράδοξον, ἢ παρὰ τὴν προτέραν δόξαν καὶ μὴ ὡς λέγει κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον.

5 ἤτοι τὸ           6 ᾖ

 

14. Aristot. rhet. p. 1399a 29: ἄλλος (sc. τόπος), ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταὐτὰ φανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μέν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαινοῦσι μάλιστα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βούλονται, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι συνάγειν θάτερον· τῶν γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώτατός ἐστιν.

Cf. Athenaeus 122 b Κηφισόδωρος... λέγει ὅτι εὕροι τις ἂν ὐπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν ἢ καὶ σοφιστῶν ἕν ἢ δύο γοῦν πονηρῶς εἰρημένα... Θεοδώρῳ δὲ τὸ κελεύειν μὲν πλέον ἔχειν, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ τὸ ἴσον. Theodorus inter Archilochum et Euripidem laudatur eumque poetam fuisse suspicatur Kaibel in indice Ath. p. 667 referens ad Bergkium P. l. g.4 II 376, Keilium Anal. Isocr. p. 99. Mira tamen cum Aristotele congruentia. Cf. Spengel ad Ar. rhet. p. 318 sq. [Isocr.] ad Demonic. 38. Theodorum vero poetam alium atque Kaibelius putat Bergkius l. l. a Kaibelio laudatus.

 

 

15. Philod. rhet. II 114 fr. IV 6 S.: οὐ μᾶλλον ἀπατῶσιν ἐν ἀγ[ῶσι]ν καὶ οἱ [δυνατ]οὶ ἢ ἀπατῶνται. θα[υμά]ζω δ’, εἰ μὴ μυριάκις αὐτῇ ἡπάτα πολλοῦς Θ[εό]δ[ωρ]ος· οὗτ[ος γὰρ δύνα]μιν ἔχων τῆς ἀπάτη[ς ὅμως] καὶ ἐαυτὸν [ὁ]μολ[ογεῖ πλ]ανᾶσθαι.

αὐτῇ i. e. τῇ ῥητορικῇ. Θεόδωρος incerto supplemento. οὐχὶ pro ὅμως Sudhaus. De ἀπάτης notione cf. Gorgias apud Plutarchum de glor. Athen. 348 C, de aud. poet. 15 Β, Helenae 8.

 

 

 

16. Rufini rhetoris de Theodoro numeros oratorios tractante ineptias v. apud Gorgiam fr. 38. Item quod Cicero (or. 39 = Gοrgiae fr. 34) de Theodorei stili argutiis narrat, ea verba Theοdorum περὶ λέξεως praecepta dedisse minime docent.

 

17. Quint. inst. 2, 15, 16: omnia subiecisse oratori videtur Aristoteles, cum dixit ‘vim esse videndi, quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibileʼ, et Iatrocles, qui non quidem adicit ‘in quaque reʼ, sed nihil excipiendo idem ostendit. vim enim vocat 5 inveniendi, quod sit in oratione persuasibile. qui fines et ipsi solam complectuntur inventionem. quod vitium fugiens Theodorus vim putat inveniendi et eloquendi cum ornatu credibilia in omni oratione.

3 Patrocles AP latrocles B       6. 7 Theodorus AN Eudorus Bn Bg P.

Vel si Theodori nomen recte traditum esset, ne tum quidem Byzantium intellegi certum esset. Nec vero recte W. Schmid (Gesch. d. gr. Lit. III 1 p. 193, 4) Theodori Byzantii διηγήσεως definitionem ab anοnymο Seg. (Cornutο) p. 434, 25 Sp. servatam esse putavit, quia is Theodorus, qui illic tertius post Neoclem et Zenonem et prior ante Apollodorum Theodori Gadareni adversarium appellatur, sine dubio iste Gadarenus est.

 

18. Auctor de sublimitate III 5: τούτῳ παράκειται τρίτον τι κακίας εἶδος ἐν τοῖς παθητικοῖς, ὅπερ ὁ Θεόδωρος παρένθυρσον ἐκάλει.

Nempe Theodorus Gadarenus, Tiberii magister. Byzantium laudari Spengel ipse valde incertum iudicavit. Pleraque enim, quae posteriores Theodoro tribuunt, Gadareni videntur esse.

 

 

XII. THEODORUS

1. Diogenes Laertius 2.8, 103-4: Some twenty persons have borne the name of Theodorus: […] (9) A Byzantine, famous for his political speeches. (10) Another, equally famous, mentioned by Aristotle in his Epitome of Orators.

The word for ‘famous’ appears to be missing in the Greek. The ninth man is, I think, our sophist, the tenth a less well-known one whom only Aristotle names, perhaps a son of the ninth, cf. the example of the Theodecteses. Others interpret the sentence as ‘one equally famous’ (while Radermacher thinks it means ‘one Aristotle equally mentions…’).

2. Suda: Theodorus was a sophist from Byzantium, whom Plato called logodaidalos (“skilled with words”). He wrote Against Thrasybulus, Against Andokides. and some more speeches.

 

Cf. Cic. orat. 12, 39: ‘… listing Theodorus among those who wrote not for court proceedings but to please the ears, “whom Socrates in Phaedrus calls ‘wordsmiths’.”’ Quint. 3.1.11: ‘Theodorus of Byzantium – another one of those Plato calls “wordsmiths”,’ perhaps taking this from Cicero. Cicero orat. 40 seems to describe this sophist’s style more correctly: ‘choppy and not well-rounded enough.’

 

3. Cicero, Brutus 12.48 (from Aristotle): Lysias would at first lay claim to being a professional speaker; later, however, as Theodorus was more subtle in the art and at the same time more sober in his speeches, Lysias began writing speeches for others.

Aristotle Soph. el. 34, 183 b 32 claims that he improved the art of rhetoric after Thrasymachus (see above, A V 6). On the chronology cf. Cic. orat. 12.39.

 

4. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Isaeus: Theodorus of Byzantion was one of the ancient rhetoricians. He was sloppy in his treatises and did not put enough research into his adversarial speeches.

The same author claims in To Ammaeus p. 259.2 f. that he discovered ‘nothing worth studying’; in On Demosthenes p. 143.8 ‘nothing new or original’. Plato Phaedr. 261C seems to testify to an Art, as certainly does Quint. 3.1.11 (above A V 10).

5. Plato, Phaedrus 266 D – 267 A: Thank you for reminding me. You mean that there must be an introduction first, at the beginning of the discourse; these are the things you mean, are they not?—the niceties of the art. – Yes. – And the narrative must come second with the testimony after it, and third the proofs, and fourth the probabilities; and confirmation and further confirmation are mentioned, I believe, by the man from Byzantium, that most excellent artist in words. – You mean the worthy Theodorus? – Of course. And he tells how refutation and further refutation must be accomplished, both in accusation and in defence. Shall we not bring the illustrious Parian, Evenus, into our discussion?

Hermias on this passage: ‘He calls “further confirmation” the adding to a demonstration of another demonstration.’ Schol. Aristot. rhet. p. 227, 25: ‘A “further refutation” is when someone speaks outside of the issue and says things that do not fit with the refutation and the dispute.’ See Hamberger 73 f.

 

6. Anaximenes, On Rhetoric: We must place witness testimony as the first of the means of proof.

Spengel on Anaximenes p. 257 f. infers from Plato that this order stems from our Byzantine.

 

7. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1414b7: So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech, and at the most the parts are four in number: exordium, statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory. Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following Theodorus and his school, who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional refutation.

‘Theodorus and his school’ seems to show that Theodorus had followers who came up with new ideas themselves. In 1417a3 ff. Aristotle also names a ‘side narrative’. One must also take account of Quint. 4.2.128: ‘There is a certain repeated narrative, called epidiegesis – more declamatory, to be honest, than forensic – which was invented in order that, as a narrative has to be short, the events might be expounded at greater length and more ornately; this is done either for the sake of fomenting enmity or of stirring pity.’ Hermogenes On Invention 2.1 p. 189, 7 Sp.: ‘…the preparation of the exposition, which is also called “pre-exposition”…’ – words repeated in Maximus Planudes W V 220.27 = Prol. Syll. P. 212, 17 R., Maximus Planudes W V 385.20. Cf. W. Schmid, Gesch. d. gr. Lit. III 1 p. 193, 2.

 

8. Anonymus (Cornutus), On Rhetoric: There are three kinds of exposition: pre-exposition, side exposition and after-exposition. A pre-exposition happens when, before dealing with the matter at hand itself, we expound another one independent of it [there follow some examples]. Side exposition is given when we expound different things about the same matter […]. An after-exposition happens when we expound something after the proofs or the epilogue.

The same author on p. 364.6 also knows a ‘counter-exposition’ (antidiegesis) (that is, when ‘the opponents introduce expositions given differently and we expound against them’). The explanation of the terms as such is taken from an author who lived after Demetrius of Phaleron, cf. the same Anonymous p. 374.6.

 

9. Rufus, On Rhetoric (On Exposition): There are four kinds: exposition, side exposition, pre-exposition and sub-exposition.

(8) An exposition, as we have said above, is the mere description of what happened […].

(17) A side exposition is an exposition in the manner of a report that is added and borrowed from the outside to what is useful for the discussion at hand […].

(454, 8W.) A pre-exposition is a causal description inserted before the exposition that leads toward the matter itself […].

(14) A sub-exposition happens when, alongside the facts of the matter, we describe both the intentions of the actors and their motivations.

‘Exposition’ and ‘pre-exposition’ were already in Theodorus, but  ‘sub-exposition’ is not to be changed into ‘additional exposition’ is shown also by the Scholium B on Iliad 1.527.

 

10. Martianus Capella, On Rhetoric: Some have claimed that there are five kinds of exposition; for instance, Theodorus of Byzantion distinguishes in Greek between pre-exposition, sub-exposition, side exposition, counter-exposition and pure exposition.

Fortunatianus, Ars 2.19 p. 112.5 f. Halm distinguishes eight forms of narratives, namely exposition, counter-exposition, partial exposition, side exposition, sub-exposition, pure exposition, additional exposition, disposition. One can sense a follower of Theodorus. The following teachings of the anonymous (Cornutus) 1 p. 443, 19 Sp. (= p. 375, 9 H.) refer not to genres but to the manner of narrating: ‘Theodorus claims that there are many kinds of exposition and in procedures of paragraphe specifically two, that of the charge and that of the paragraphe itself.’ W. Schmid (Gesch. d. gr. Lit. III 1 p. 193, 4) argues that these words refer to the Theodorus we are dealing with here.

 

11. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1400 b9: Another topic consists in making use of errors committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some accuse Medea of having killed her children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself pleads that she would have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first “Art” of Theodorus.

There is doubt as to whether one should take this passage to refer to an earlier treatise by Theodorus or one before Theodorus; the latter is the view of Spengel, which I deem correct. On this issue see F. Solmsen, RE. V A 2, 1843, 32 f. Certainly ‘making use of errors committed for purposes of accusation’ is consistent with the custom of exposing the opponent’s character, something that pertains to the most ancient rhetoric. The scholiast ad loc. (p. 146, 5 R.) writes: ‘The rhetorical teachings of Theodorus handed down the precept of attacking someone based on his errors,’ which however is so unsubstantial that it seems to have been taken from this Aristotelian passage with no mind paid to what ‘before’ means. Hamberger (99 f.) points out that Antiphon deals with this topos excellently.

 

12. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1412 a23 – 1412 b2: And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls “novel expressions” arise when what follows is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectation; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter; for they are deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance, the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected: “And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains,” whereas the hearer thought he was going to say “sandals.” This kind of joke must be clear from the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara, “you are troubled” (θράττει); for while pretending to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us; for he means something else. Therefore the joke is only agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it.

Many dealt with the new art of speaking; Theodorus claimed that ‘novel expressions’ were ‘opposed to the opinion prevailing so far’, that is, if someone gave a word a meaning very different from the customary one, which Aristotle criticizes. The lyre-player Nicon was of Thracian origin and this must have been well-known for the listeners to understand that it was an urban saying, as it would not have been funny to someone who did not know it. For Theodorus did not say ‘it troubles you’ but, changing one letter, ‘he sang Thracian songs’, alluding to Nicon’s impure manner of singing (cf. Schol. P. 212, 10 R.: ‘He calls “modified” the jokes created by the change of one letter, for instance, by saying to somebody who lisps : […]”’).

 

13. Scholia on Aristotle’s Rhetoric: But Theodorus, too, who was a rhetorician, says that using the popular images conveys new or half-foreign meanings even if it seems to be saying something else according to the appearance, as in “The cicadae will sing for them from the ground”.  This happens when something is signified either against the appearance, whenever the mental image is paradoxical, or against the initial impression and not the way one speaks according to the appearance.

 

14. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1399 a29: Again, since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavoring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements. This topic is the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.

Cf. Athenaeus 122 b: ‘Cephisodorus […] says that one would certainly find one or maybe two bad claims by any other poet or sophist […]. As for Theodorus, (the bad claims are) that he encourages to have more, but then praises having equal shares.’ Theodorus is mentioned between Archilochus and Euripides, and Kaibel suspects he was a poet, see his index on Athenaeus, p. 667, referring to Bergk P. l. g.4 II 376, Keil Anal. Isocr. p. 99. It is strange, though, how much similarity there is with Aristotle. Cf. Spengel ad Ar. rhet. p. 318 f.; [Isocr.] ad Demonic. 38. Bergk, however, in the passage cited by Kaibel opines that this Theodorus is a poet different from the one Kaibel thinks of.

 

15. Philodemos, On Rhetoric: Even the powerful do not deceive others as much as they are deceived. On this note, I wonder whether Theodorus did not deceive many people plenty of times: though having the ability to deceive, he admits that he himself is often in error.

‘Deceive with it’, that is, with rhetoric. ‘Thedorus’ is not a certain reconstruction of the fragmentary text. Sudhaus inserts ‘not’ instead of ‘himself’. On the concept of ‘deception’ cf. Gorgias in Plutarch, De gloria Atheniensium 348 C, De audiendis poetis 15 B, Helen 8.

 

16. On the rhetor Rufinus’ on Theodorus see Gorgias Frag. 38.

 

 

17. Quintilian, 2.15.16: Aristotle seems to have subjected everything to the orator by saying: “There is a power of seeing what is persuasive about each and every thing.” So does Iatrocles, who while he does not add “about each and every thing”, conveys the same concept by not naming any exceptions; for he refers to a power of finding what is persuasive in a speech. Such definitions too cover nothing but invention. Theodorus, on the other hand, avoids that flaw by positing a power of finding and ornately expressing what is credible in any speech.

Even if Theodorus’ name was handed down correctly, it would not be clear whether the one of Byzantium is meant. W. Schmid (Gesch. d. gr. Lit. III 1 p. 193.4) is wrong to think that Theodorus of Byzantium’s definition of ‘exposition’ is preserved in the anonymous Seg. (Cornutus) p. 434, 25 Sp., for the Theodorus who is named in that passage after Neocles and Zeno and before Apollodorus the opponent of Theodorus of Gadara must be that very Th. of Gadara.

 

18. Treatise On the Sublime: To this comes a third kind of flaw in impassioned speech, which Theodorus called affectation of style.

That is, Theodorus of Gadara, teacher of Tiberius. Spengel himself thought it very dubious that the one of Byzantium could be mentioned here. For most sayings that later authors attribute to a Theodorus appear to be by Theodorus of Gadara.